libwebp: Fix CVE-2023-4863
PATCH 1/1 libwebp: Fix CVE-2023-4863
From: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
Heap buffer overflow in WebP in Google Chrome prior to 116.0.5845.187 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-4863
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2238431#c12
--- .../webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch | 109 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/libwebp_1.2.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +109 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From 95ea5226c870449522240ccff26f0b006037c520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Vincent Rabaud <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:06:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid incremental decoding check. + +The first condition is only necessary if we have not read enough +(enough being defined by src_last, not src_end which is the end +of the image). +The second condition now fits the comment below: "if not +incremental, and we are past the end of buffer". + +BUG=oss-fuzz:62136 + +Change-Id: I0700f67c62db8e1c02c2e429a069a71e606a5e4f + +CVE: CVE-2023-4863 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/webmproject/libwebp/commit/95ea5226c870449522240ccff26f0b006037c520] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + ...x-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ + src/dec/vp8l_dec.c | 15 +++++- + 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch + +diff --git a/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch b/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..21f67f4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ ++From 95ea5226c870449522240ccff26f0b006037c520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 ++From: Vincent Rabaud <[email protected]> ++Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:06:08 +0200 ++Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid incremental decoding check. ++ ++The first condition is only necessary if we have not read enough ++(enough being defined by src_last, not src_end which is the end ++of the image). ++The second condition now fits the comment below: "if not ++incremental, and we are past the end of buffer". ++ ++BUG=oss-fuzz:62136 ++ ++Change-Id: I0700f67c62db8e1c02c2e429a069a71e606a5e4f ++--- ++ src/dec/vp8l_dec.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- ++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) ++ ++diff --git a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c ++index 5ab34f56..809b1aa9 100644 ++--- a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c +++++ b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c ++@@ -1233,9 +1233,20 @@ static int DecodeImageData(VP8LDecoder* const dec, uint32_t* const data, ++ } ++ ++ br->eos_ = VP8LIsEndOfStream(br); ++- if (dec->incremental_ && br->eos_ && src < src_end) { +++ // In incremental decoding: +++ // br->eos_ && src < src_last: if 'br' reached the end of the buffer and +++ // 'src_last' has not been reached yet, there is not enough data. 'dec' has to +++ // be reset until there is more data. +++ // !br->eos_ && src < src_last: this cannot happen as either the buffer is +++ // fully read, either enough has been read to reach 'src_last'. +++ // src >= src_last: 'src_last' is reached, all is fine. 'src' can actually go +++ // beyond 'src_last' in case the image is cropped and an LZ77 goes further. +++ // The buffer might have been enough or there is some left. 'br->eos_' does +++ // not matter. +++ assert(!dec->incremental_ || (br->eos_ && src < src_last) || src >= src_last); +++ if (dec->incremental_ && br->eos_ && src < src_last) { ++ RestoreState(dec); ++- } else if (!br->eos_) { +++ } else if ((dec->incremental_ && src >= src_last) || !br->eos_) { ++ // Process the remaining rows corresponding to last row-block. ++ if (process_func != NULL) { ++ process_func(dec, row > last_row ? last_row : row); ++-- ++2.40.0 ++ +diff --git a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c +index 186b0b2..59a9e64 100644 +--- a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c ++++ b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c +@@ -1241,9 +1241,20 @@ static int DecodeImageData(VP8LDecoder* const dec, uint32_t* const data, + } + + br->eos_ = VP8LIsEndOfStream(br); +- if (dec->incremental_ && br->eos_ && src < src_end) { ++ // In incremental decoding: ++ // br->eos_ && src < src_last: if 'br' reached the end of the buffer and ++ // 'src_last' has not been reached yet, there is not enough data. 'dec' has to ++ // be reset until there is more data. ++ // !br->eos_ && src < src_last: this cannot happen as either the buffer is ++ // fully read, either enough has been read to reach 'src_last'. ++ // src >= src_last: 'src_last' is reached, all is fine. 'src' can actually go ++ // beyond 'src_last' in case the image is cropped and an LZ77 goes further. ++ // The buffer might have been enough or there is some left. 'br->eos_' does ++ // not matter. ++ assert(!dec->incremental_ || (br->eos_ && src < src_last) || src >= src_last); ++ if (dec->incremental_ && br->eos_ && src < src_last) { + RestoreState(dec); +- } else if (!br->eos_) { ++ } else if ((dec->incremental_ && src >= src_last) || !br->eos_) { + // Process the remaining rows corresponding to last row-block. + if (process_func != NULL) { + process_func(dec, row > last_row ? last_row : row); +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/libwebp_1.2.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6e8dee932c26f2dab503abf70c96d8bb \ SRC_URI = "http://downloads.webmproject.org/releases/webp/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2023-1999.patch \ file://CVE-2023-5129.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-4863.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7bf5a8a28cc69bcfa8cb214f2c3095703c6b73ac5fba4d5480c205331d9494df"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
Quoted 48 lines · Soumya via lists.openembedded.org
From: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
Heap buffer overflow in WebP in Google Chrome prior to 116.0.5845.187 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-4863
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2238431#c12Signed-off-by Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>---
.../webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch | 109
++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/libwebp_1.2.4.bb | 1 +2 files changed, 110 insertions(+)create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023- 4863.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From 95ea5226c870449522240ccff26f0b006037c520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +17
-0+From: Vincent Rabaud <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:06:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid incremental decoding check. + +The first condition is only necessary if we have not read enough +(enough being defined by src_last, not src_end which is the end +of the image). +The second condition now fits the comment below: "if not +incremental, and we are past the end of buffer". + +BUG=oss-fuzz:62136 + +Change-Id: I0700f67c62db8e1c02c2e429a069a71e606a5e4f + +CVE: CVE-2023-4863 + +Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/webmproject/libwebp/commit/95ea5226c870449522240c
cff26f0b006037c520]
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch
Quoted 5 lines
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +5
-0+ +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + ...x-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
Patch file included by mistake?
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 135 lines
+ src/dec/vp8l_dec.c | 15 +++++-
+ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding- check.patchmeta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +2
-0+ +diff --git a/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch
b/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patchmeta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +6
-0+new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..21f67f4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ ++From 95ea5226c870449522240ccff26f0b006037c520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
++From: Vincent Rabaud <[email protected]>
++Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:06:08 +0200
++Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid incremental decoding check. ++
++The first condition is only necessary if we have not read enough ++(enough being defined bysrc_last, notsrc_endwhich is the end ++of the image).
++The second condition now fits the comment below: "if not ++incremental, and we are past the end of buffer".
++
++BUG=oss-fuzz:62136
++
++Change-Id: I0700f67c62db8e1c02c2e429a069a71e606a5e4f
++---
++src/dec/vp8l_dec.c| 15 +++++++++++++--
++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
++
++diff --gita/src/dec/vp8l_dec.cb/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c++index5ab34f56..809b1aa9100644
++---a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c
+++++b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c
++@@ -1233,9 +1233,20 @@ static int DecodeImageData(VP8LDecoder* const dec, uint32_t* const data,
++ }
++
++br->eos_= VP8LIsEndOfStream(br);
++- if (dec->incremental_&&br->eos_&& src <src_end) { +++ // In incremental decoding:
+++ //br->eos_&& src <src_last: if 'br' reached the end of the buffer and
+++ // 'src_last' has not been reached yet, there is not enough data. 'dec' has to
+++ // be reset until there is more data.
+++ // !br->eos_ && src <src_last: this cannot happen as either the buffer is
+++ // fully read, either enough has been read to reach 'src_last'. +++ // src >=src_last: 'src_last' is reached, all is fine. 'src' can actually go
+++ // beyond 'src_last' in case the image is cropped and an LZ77 goes further.
+++ // The buffer might have been enough or there is some left. 'br-Quoted 1 line
eos_' does+++ // not matter.
+++ assert(!dec->incremental_ || (br->eos_&& src <src_last) || srcQuoted 1 line
=
src_last);+++ if (
dec->incremental_&&br->eos_&& src <src_last) { ++ RestoreState(dec);
++- } else if (!br->eos_) {
+++ } else if ((dec->incremental_&& src >=src_last) || !br->eos_) {
++ // Process the remaining rows corresponding to last row-block. ++ if (process_func!= NULL) {
++process_func(dec, row > last_row ? last_row : row);
++--
++2.40.0
++meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +5
-0+diff --git a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c +index 186b0b2..59a9e64 100644 +--- a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c ++++ b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c +@@ -1241,9 +1241,20 @@ static int DecodeImageData(VP8LDecoder* constdec, uint32_t* const data,
+ }
+
+br->eos_= VP8LIsEndOfStream(br);
+- if (dec->incremental_&&br->eos_&& src <src_end) { ++ // In incremental decoding:
++ //br->eos_&& src <src_last: if 'br' reached the end of the buffer and
++ // 'src_last' has not been reached yet, there is not enough data. 'dec' has to
++ // be reset until there is more data.
++ // !br->eos_ && src <src_last: this cannot happen as either the buffer is
++ // fully read, either enough has been read to reach 'src_last'. ++ // src >=src_last: 'src_last' is reached, all is fine. 'src' can actually go
++ // beyond 'src_last' in case the image is cropped and an LZ77 goes further.
++ // The buffer might have been enough or there is some left. 'br-Quoted 1 line
eos_' does++ // not matter.
++ assert(!dec->incremental_ || (br->eos_&& src <src_last) || srcQuoted 1 line
=
src_last);++ if (
dec->incremental_&&br->eos_&& src <src_last) { + RestoreState(dec);+- } else if (!br->eos_) { ++ } else if ((dec->incremental_ && src >= src_last) || !br->eos_) {+ // Process the remaining rows corresponding to last row-block. + if (
process_func!= NULL) {
+process_func(dec, row > last_row ? last_row : row);
+--
+2.40.0meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/libwebp_1.2.4.bb +0
-0@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6e8dee932c26f2dab503abf70c96d8bb \SRC_URI = "http://downloads.webmproject.org/releases/webp/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://CVE-2023-1999.patch \
file://CVE-2023-5129.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-4863.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7bf5a8a28cc69bcfa8cb214f2c3095703c6b73ac5fba4d5480c205331d9494df"-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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Yes Anuj, I will correct it and will send v2.
Regards,
Soumya
________________________________
From: Mittal, Anuj <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2023 10:25 AM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Sambu, Soumya <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] libwebp: Fix CVE-2023-4863
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Quoted 48 lines · Soumya via lists.openembedded.org
From: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
Heap buffer overflow in WebP in Google Chrome prior to 116.0.5845.187 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-4863
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2238431#c12Signed-off-by Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>--- .../webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch | 109 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/libwebp_1.2.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From 95ea5226c870449522240ccff26f0b006037c520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +17
-0+From: Vincent Rabaud <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:06:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid incremental decoding check. + +The first condition is only necessary if we have not read enough +(enough being defined by src_last, not src_end which is the end +of the image). +The second condition now fits the comment below: "if not +incremental, and we are past the end of buffer". + +BUG=oss-fuzz:62136 + +Change-Id: I0700f67c62db8e1c02c2e429a069a71e606a5e4f + +CVE: CVE-2023-4863 + +Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/webmproject/libwebp/commit/95ea5226c870449522240c
cff26f0b006037c520]
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch
Quoted 5 lines
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +5
-0+ +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + ...x-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
Patch file included by mistake?
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 135 lines
+
src/dec/vp8l_dec.c| 15 +++++-
+ 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding- check.patchmeta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +2
-0+ +diff --git a/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch
b/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patchmeta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +6
-0+new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..21f67f4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/0001-Fix-invalid-incremental-decoding-check.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ ++From 95ea5226c870449522240ccff26f0b006037c520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
++From: Vincent Rabaud <[email protected]>
++Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:06:08 +0200
++Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid incremental decoding check. ++
++The first condition is only necessary if we have not read enough ++(enough being defined bysrc_last, notsrc_endwhich is the end ++of the image).
++The second condition now fits the comment below: "if not ++incremental, and we are past the end of buffer".
++
++BUG=oss-fuzz:62136
++
++Change-Id: I0700f67c62db8e1c02c2e429a069a71e606a5e4f
++---
++src/dec/vp8l_dec.c| 15 +++++++++++++--
++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
++
++diff --gita/src/dec/vp8l_dec.cb/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c++index5ab34f56..809b1aa9100644
++---a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c
+++++b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c
++@@ -1233,9 +1233,20 @@ static int DecodeImageData(VP8LDecoder* const dec, uint32_t* const data,
++ }
++++ br->eos_ = VP8LIsEndOfStream(br); ++- if (dec->incremental_ && br->eos_ && src < src_end) { +++ // In incremental decoding: +++ // br->eos_ && src < src_last: if 'br' reached the end of thebuffer and
+++ // 'src_last' has not been reached yet, there is not enough data. 'dec' has to
+++ // be reset until there is more data.
+++ // !br->eos_ && src <src_last: this cannot happen as either the buffer is
+++ // fully read, either enough has been read to reach 'src_last'. +++ // src >=src_last: 'src_last' is reached, all is fine. 'src' can actually go
+++ // beyond 'src_last' in case the image is cropped and an LZ77 goes further.
+++ // The buffer might have been enough or there is some left. 'br-Quoted 1 line
eos_' does+++ // not matter.
+++ assert(!dec->incremental_ || (br->eos_&& src <src_last) || srcQuoted 1 line
=
src_last);+++ if (
dec->incremental_&&br->eos_&& src <src_last) {
++ RestoreState(dec);
++- } else if (!br->eos_) {
+++ } else if ((dec->incremental_&& src >=src_last) || !br->eos_) {
++ // Process the remaining rows corresponding to last row-block.
++ if (process_func!= NULL) {
++process_func(dec, row > last_row ? last_row : row);
++--
++2.40.0
++meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +5
-0+diff --git a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c +index 186b0b2..59a9e64 100644 +--- a/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c ++++ b/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c +@@ -1241,9 +1241,20 @@ static int DecodeImageData(VP8LDecoder* constdec, uint32_t* const data,
meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +6
-0+ } + + br->eos_ = VP8LIsEndOfStream(br); +- if (dec->incremental_ && br->eos_ && src < src_end) { ++ // In incremental decoding: ++ // br->eos_ && src < src_last: if 'br' reached the end of thebuffer and
++ // 'src_last' has not been reached yet, there is not enough data. 'dec' has to
++ // be reset until there is more data.
++ // !br->eos_ && src <src_last: this cannot happen as either the buffer is
++ // fully read, either enough has been read to reach 'src_last'. ++ // src >=src_last: 'src_last' is reached, all is fine. 'src' can actually go
++ // beyond 'src_last' in case the image is cropped and an LZ77 goes further.
++ // The buffer might have been enough or there is some left. 'br-Quoted 1 line
eos_' does++ // not matter.
++ assert(!dec->incremental_ || (br->eos_&& src <src_last) || srcQuoted 1 line
=
src_last);++ if (
dec->incremental_&&br->eos_&& src <src_last) {meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/files/CVE-2023-4863.patch new file +8
-0+ RestoreState(dec); +- } else if (!br->eos_) { ++ } else if ((dec->incremental_ && src >= src_last) || !br->eos_) { + // Process the remaining rows corresponding to last row-block. + if (process_func != NULL) { + process_func(dec, row > last_row ? last_row : row); +-- +2.40.0meta/recipes-multimedia/webp/libwebp_1.2.4.bb +1
-0@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6e8dee932c26f2dab503abf70c96d8bb \ SRC_URI = "http://downloads.webmproject.org/releases/webp/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2023-1999.patch \ file://CVE-2023-5129.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-4863.patch \ "SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
"7bf5a8a28cc69bcfa8cb214f2c3095703c6b73ac5fba4d5480c205331d9494df"-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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