6.1.64-rc1 review

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 510e35fb931ffc3b100e5d5ae4595cd3beca9f1a ]

Enumerator 3 is 1548 bytes according to the datasheet. Not 1542.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c | 4 ++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index fdf10318758b4..15a0a39cc33c1 100644
@@ -432,8 +432,8 @@ static const struct gmac_max_framelen gmac_maxlens[] = {
 		.val = CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1536,
 	},
 	{
-		.max_l3_len = 1542,
-		.val = CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1542,
+		.max_l3_len = 1548,
+		.val = CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1548,
 	},
 	{
 		.max_l3_len = 9212,

index 9fdf77d5eb374..99efb11557436 100644
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ union gmac_config0 {
 #define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1536	0
 #define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1518	1
 #define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1522	2
-#define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1542	3
+#define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1548	3
 #define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_9k	4	/* 9212 */
 #define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_10k	5	/* 10236 */
 #define  CONFIG0_MAXLEN_1518__6	6

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d4d0c5b4d279bfe3585fbd806efefd3e51c82afa ]

The Gemini ethernet controller provides hardware checksumming for frames up to 1514 bytes including ethernet headers but not FCS.

If we start sending bigger frames (after first bumping up the MTU on both interfaces sending and receiving the frames), truncated packets start to appear on the target such as in this tcpdump resulting from ping -s 1474:

23:34:17.241983 14:d6:4d:a8:3c:4f (oui Unknown) > bc:ae:c5:6b:a8:3d (oui Unknown), ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 1514: truncated-ip - 2 bytes missing! (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 32653, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 1502) OpenWrt.lan > Fecusia: ICMP echo request, id 1672, seq 50, length 1482

If we bypass the hardware checksumming and provide a software fallback, everything starts working fine up to the max TX MTU of 2047 bytes, for example ping -s2000 192.168.1.2:

00:44:29.587598 bc:ae:c5:6b:a8:3d (oui Unknown) > 14:d6:4d:a8:3c:4f (oui Unknown), ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 2042:
(tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 51828, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 2028) Fecusia > OpenWrt.lan: ICMP echo reply, id 1683, seq 4, length 2008

The bit enabling to bypass hardware checksum (or any of the "TSS" bits) are undocumented in the hardware reference manual. The entire hardware checksum unit appears undocumented. The conclusion that we need to use the "bypass" bit was found by trial-and-error.

Since no hardware checksum will happen, we slot in a software checksum fallback.

Check for the condition where we need to compute checksum on the skb with either hardware or software using == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL instead of != CHECKSUM_NONE which is an incomplete check according to <linux/skbuff.h>.

On the D-Link DIR-685 router this fixes a bug on the conduit interface to the RTL8366RB DSA switch: as the switch needs to add space for its tag it increases the MTU on the conduit interface to 1504 and that means that when the router sends packages of 1500 bytes these get an extra 4 bytes of DSA tag and the transfer fails because of the erroneous hardware checksumming, affecting such basic functionality as the LuCI web interface.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 15a0a39cc33c1..7b27d75a34ce7 100644
@@ -1145,6 +1145,7 @@ static int gmac_map_tx_bufs(struct net_device *netdev, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	dma_addr_t mapping;
 	unsigned short mtu;
 	void *buffer;
+	int ret;
 
 	mtu  = ETH_HLEN;
 	mtu += netdev->mtu;

@@ -1159,9 +1160,30 @@ static int gmac_map_tx_bufs(struct net_device *netdev, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		word3 |= mtu;
 	}
 
-	if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_NONE) {
+	if (skb->len >= ETH_FRAME_LEN) {
+		/* Hardware offloaded checksumming isn't working on frames
+		 * bigger than 1514 bytes. A hypothesis about this is that the
+		 * checksum buffer is only 1518 bytes, so when the frames get
+		 * bigger they get truncated, or the last few bytes get
+		 * overwritten by the FCS.
+		 *
+		 * Just use software checksumming and bypass on bigger frames.
+		 */
+		if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
+			ret = skb_checksum_help(skb);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+		}
+		word1 |= TSS_BYPASS_BIT;
+	} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
 		int tcp = 0;
 
+		/* We do not switch off the checksumming on non TCP/UDP
+		 * frames: as is shown from tests, the checksumming engine
+		 * is smart enough to see that a frame is not actually TCP
+		 * or UDP and then just pass it through without any changes
+		 * to the frame.
+		 */
 		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
 			word1 |= TSS_IP_CHKSUM_BIT;
 			tcp = ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP;

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dc6c0bfbaa947dd7976e30e8c29b10c868b6fa42 ]

The RX max frame size is over 10000 for the Gemini ethernet, but the TX max frame size is actually just 2047 (0x7ff after checking the datasheet). Reflect this in what we offer to Linux, cap the MTU at the TX max frame minus ethernet headers.

We delete the code disabling the hardware checksum for large MTUs as netdev->mtu can no longer be larger than netdev->max_mtu meaning the if()-clause in gmac_fix_features() is never true.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c | 17 ++++-------------
 drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

index 7b27d75a34ce7..7c0b0bc033c9c 100644
@@ -2000,15 +2000,6 @@ static int gmac_change_mtu(struct net_device *netdev, int new_mtu)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static netdev_features_t gmac_fix_features(struct net_device *netdev,
-					   netdev_features_t features)
-{
-	if (netdev->mtu + ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN > MTU_SIZE_BIT_MASK)
-		features &= ~GMAC_OFFLOAD_FEATURES;
-
-	return features;
-}
-
 static int gmac_set_features(struct net_device *netdev,
 			     netdev_features_t features)
 {

@@ -2234,7 +2225,6 @@ static const struct net_device_ops gmac_351x_ops = {
 	.ndo_set_mac_address	= gmac_set_mac_address,
 	.ndo_get_stats64	= gmac_get_stats64,
 	.ndo_change_mtu		= gmac_change_mtu,
-	.ndo_fix_features	= gmac_fix_features,
 	.ndo_set_features	= gmac_set_features,
 };
 

@@ -2486,11 +2476,12 @@ static int gemini_ethernet_port_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	netdev->hw_features = GMAC_OFFLOAD_FEATURES;
 	netdev->features |= GMAC_OFFLOAD_FEATURES | NETIF_F_GRO;
-	/* We can handle jumbo frames up to 10236 bytes so, let's accept
-	 * payloads of 10236 bytes minus VLAN and ethernet header
+	/* We can receive jumbo frames up to 10236 bytes but only
+	 * transmit 2047 bytes so, let's accept payloads of 2047
+	 * bytes minus VLAN and ethernet header
 	 */
 	netdev->min_mtu = ETH_MIN_MTU;
-	netdev->max_mtu = 10236 - VLAN_ETH_HLEN;
+	netdev->max_mtu = MTU_SIZE_BIT_MASK - VLAN_ETH_HLEN;
 
 	port->freeq_refill = 0;
 	netif_napi_add(netdev, &port->napi, gmac_napi_poll);

index 99efb11557436..24bb989981f23 100644
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ union gmac_txdesc_3 {
 #define SOF_BIT			0x80000000
 #define EOF_BIT			0x40000000
 #define EOFIE_BIT		BIT(29)
-#define MTU_SIZE_BIT_MASK	0x1fff
+#define MTU_SIZE_BIT_MASK	0x7ff /* Max MTU 2047 bytes */
 
 /* GMAC Tx Descriptor */
 struct gmac_txdesc {

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4b7b492615cf3017190f55444f7016812b66611d ]

syzbot reported the following crash [1]

After releasing unix socket lock, u->oob_skb can be changed by another thread. We must temporarily increase skb refcount to make sure this other thread will not free the skb under us.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor+0xa7/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2866
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801f3b9cc4 by task syz-executor107/5297

CPU: 1 PID: 5297 Comm: syz-executor107 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-15910-gb8e3a87a627b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:588
unix_stream_read_actor+0xa7/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2866
unix_stream_recv_urg net/unix/af_unix.c:2587 [inline]
unix_stream_read_generic+0x19a5/0x2480 net/unix/af_unix.c:2666
unix_stream_recvmsg+0x189/0x1b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2903
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x170 net/socket.c:1066
____sys_recvmsg+0x21f/0x5c0 net/socket.c:2803
___sys_recvmsg+0x115/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2845
__sys_recvmsg+0x114/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2875
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7fc67492c559
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc6748ab228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000001c RCX: 00007fc67492c559
RDX: 0000000040010083 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007fc6749b6348 R08: 00007fc6748ab6c0 R09: 00007fc6748ab6c0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc6749b6340
R13: 00007fc6749b634c R14: 00007ffe9fac52a0 R15: 00007ffe9fac5388
</TASK>

Allocated by task 5295:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:763 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x180/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:3523
__alloc_skb+0x287/0x330 net/core/skbuff.c:641
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xe4/0x710 net/core/skbuff.c:6331
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x7e4/0x970 net/core/sock.c:2780
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1884 [inline]
queue_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2147 [inline]
unix_stream_sendmsg+0xb5f/0x10a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2301
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Freed by task 5295:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:522
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x15b/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1800 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x114/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:1826
slab_free mm/slub.c:3809 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xf8/0x340 mm/slub.c:3831
kfree_skbmem+0xef/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1015
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1073 [inline]
consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1288 [inline]
consume_skb+0xdf/0x170 net/core/skbuff.c:1282
queue_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2178 [inline]
unix_stream_sendmsg+0xd49/0x10a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2301
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801f3b9c80

which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 240 The buggy address is located 68 bytes inside of freed 240-byte region [ffff88801f3b9c80, ffff88801f3b9d70)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00007cee40 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1f3b9
flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888142a60640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5299, tgid 5283 (syz-executor107), ts 103803840339, free_ts 103600093431
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x2cf/0x340 mm/page_alloc.c:1537
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1544 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0xa25/0x36c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3312
__alloc_pages+0x1d0/0x4a0 mm/page_alloc.c:4568
alloc_pages_mpol+0x258/0x5f0 mm/mempolicy.c:2133
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1870 [inline]
allocate_slab+0x251/0x380 mm/slub.c:2017
new_slab mm/slub.c:2070 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0x8c7/0x1580 mm/slub.c:3223
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3322
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3375 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3468 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x132/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:3523
__alloc_skb+0x287/0x330 net/core/skbuff.c:641
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xe4/0x710 net/core/skbuff.c:6331
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x7e4/0x970 net/core/sock.c:2780
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1884 [inline]
queue_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2147 [inline]
unix_stream_sendmsg+0xb5f/0x10a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2301
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2667
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1137 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x4f8/0xa90 mm/page_alloc.c:2347
free_unref_page+0x33/0x3b0 mm/page_alloc.c:2487
__unfreeze_partials+0x21d/0x240 mm/slub.c:2655
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:168 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:187
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x18e/0x1d0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:294
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x65/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:305
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:763 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3486 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3493 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x15d/0x380 mm/slub.c:3502
vm_area_dup+0x21/0x2f0 kernel/fork.c:500
__split_vma+0x17d/0x1070 mm/mmap.c:2365
split_vma mm/mmap.c:2437 [inline]
vma_modify+0x25d/0x450 mm/mmap.c:2472
vma_modify_flags include/linux/mm.h:3271 [inline]
mprotect_fixup+0x228/0xc80 mm/mprotect.c:635
do_mprotect_pkey+0x852/0xd60 mm/mprotect.c:809
__do_sys_mprotect mm/mprotect.c:830 [inline]
__se_sys_mprotect mm/mprotect.c:827 [inline]
__x64_sys_mprotect+0x78/0xb0 mm/mprotect.c:827
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88801f3b9b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88801f3b9c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88801f3b9c80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

^
ffff88801f3b9d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc
ffff88801f3b9d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 310952f4c68f7..6dbeb80073338 100644
@@ -2641,15 +2641,16 @@ static int unix_stream_recv_urg(struct unix_stream_read_state *state)
 
 	if (!(state->flags & MSG_PEEK))
 		WRITE_ONCE(u->oob_skb, NULL);
-
+	else
+		skb_get(oob_skb);
 	unix_state_unlock(sk);
 
 	chunk = state->recv_actor(oob_skb, 0, chunk, state);
 
-	if (!(state->flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
+	if (!(state->flags & MSG_PEEK))
 		UNIXCB(oob_skb).consumed += 1;
-		kfree_skb(oob_skb);
-	}
+
+	consume_skb(oob_skb);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&u->iolock);
 

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linkui Xiao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a44af08e3d4d7566eeea98d7a29fe06e7b9de944 ]

K2CI reported a problem:

	consume_skb(skb);
	return err;

[nf_br_ip_fragment() error] uninitialized symbol 'err'.

err is not initialized, because returning 0 is expected, initialize err to 0.

---
 net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 73242962be5d7..06d94b2c6b5de 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int nf_br_ip_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
 	ktime_t tstamp = skb->tstamp;
 	struct ip_frag_state state;
 	struct iphdr *iph;
-	int err;
+	int err = 0;
 
 	/* for offloaded checksums cleanup checksum before fragmentation */
 	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c301f0981fdd3fd1ffac6836b423c4d7a8e0eb63 ]

The problem is in nft_byteorder_eval() where we are iterating through a loop and writing to dst[0], dst[1], dst[2] and so on... On each iteration we are writing 8 bytes. But dst[] is an array of u32 so each element only has space for 4 bytes. That means that every iteration overwrites part of the previous element.

I spotted this bug while reviewing commit caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter:
nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval") which is a related issue. I think that the reason we have not detected this bug in testing is that most of time we only write one element.

---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 4 ++--
 net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c     | 5 +++--
 net/netfilter/nft_meta.c          | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index d1f81a6d7773b..c726da3b7d68a 100644
@@ -177,9 +177,9 @@ static inline __be32 nft_reg_load_be32(const u32 *sreg)
 	return *(__force __be32 *)sreg;
 }
 
-static inline void nft_reg_store64(u32 *dreg, u64 val)
+static inline void nft_reg_store64(u64 *dreg, u64 val)
 {
-	put_unaligned(val, (u64 *)dreg);
+	put_unaligned(val, dreg);
 }
 
 static inline u64 nft_reg_load64(const u32 *sreg)

index 2e2eb2cb17bc7..605178133d9eb 100644
@@ -38,13 +38,14 @@ void nft_byteorder_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 
 	switch (priv->size) {
 	case 8: {
+		u64 *dst64 = (void *)dst;
 		u64 src64;
 
 		switch (priv->op) {
 		case NFT_BYTEORDER_NTOH:
 			for (i = 0; i < priv->len / 8; i++) {
 				src64 = nft_reg_load64(&src[i]);
-				nft_reg_store64(&dst[i],
+				nft_reg_store64(&dst64[i],
 						be64_to_cpu((__force __be64)src64));
 			}
 			break;

@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ void nft_byteorder_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 			for (i = 0; i < priv->len / 8; i++) {
 				src64 = (__force __u64)
 					cpu_to_be64(nft_reg_load64(&src[i]));
-				nft_reg_store64(&dst[i], src64);
+				nft_reg_store64(&dst64[i], src64);
 			}
 			break;
 		}

index 55d2d49c34259..6e83321926229 100644
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ nft_meta_get_eval_time(enum nft_meta_keys key,
 {
 	switch (key) {
 	case NFT_META_TIME_NS:
-		nft_reg_store64(dest, ktime_get_real_ns());
+		nft_reg_store64((u64 *)dest, ktime_get_real_ns());
 		break;
 	case NFT_META_TIME_DAY:
 		nft_reg_store8(dest, nft_meta_weekday());

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baruch Siach <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa02de9e75889915b554eda1964a631fd019973b ]

The while loop condition verifies 'count < limit'. Neither value change before the 'count >= limit' check. As is this check is dead code. But code inspection reveals a code path that modifies 'count' and then goto 'drain_data' and back to 'read_again'. So there is a need to verify count value sanity after 'read_again'.

Move 'read_again' up to fix the count limit check.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 1559a4dafd413..ab49cbf8801c7 100644
@@ -5233,10 +5233,10 @@ static int stmmac_rx(struct stmmac_priv *priv, int limit, u32 queue)
 			len = 0;
 		}
 
+read_again:
 		if (count >= limit)
 			break;
 
-read_again:
 		buf1_len = 0;
 		buf2_len = 0;
 		entry = next_entry;

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baruch Siach <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6cb4541853c7ee512111b0e7ddf3cb66c99c137 ]

dma_rx_size can be set as low as 64. Rx budget might be higher than that. Make sure to not overrun allocated rx buffers when budget is larger.

Leave one descriptor unused to avoid wrap around of 'dirty_rx' vs 'cur_rx'.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index ab49cbf8801c7..9f76c2f7d513b 100644
@@ -5198,6 +5198,7 @@ static int stmmac_rx(struct stmmac_priv *priv, int limit, u32 queue)
 
 	dma_dir = page_pool_get_dma_dir(rx_q->page_pool);
 	buf_sz = DIV_ROUND_UP(priv->dma_conf.dma_buf_sz, PAGE_SIZE) * PAGE_SIZE;
+	limit = min(priv->dma_conf.dma_rx_size - 1, (unsigned int)limit);
 
 	if (netif_msg_rx_status(priv)) {
 		void *rx_head;

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dust Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6f9b1a0731662648949a1c0587f6acb3b7f8acf1 ]

When mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc() fails, the encap_header allocated in mlx5e_tc_tun_create_header_ipv4{6} will be released within it. However, e->encap_header is already set to the previously freed encap_header before mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc(). As a result, the later mlx5e_encap_put() will free e->encap_header again, causing a double free issue.

mlx5e_encap_put()

    --> mlx5e_encap_dealloc()
        --> kfree(e->encap_header)

This happens when cmd: MLX5_CMD_OP_ALLOC_PACKET_REFORMAT_CONTEXT fail.

This patch fix it by not setting e->encap_header until mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc() success.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_tun.c | 10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

index 83bb0811e7741..ccfc626c37d48 100644
@@ -300,9 +300,6 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_create_header_ipv4(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 	if (err)
 		goto destroy_neigh_entry;
 
-	e->encap_size = ipv4_encap_size;
-	e->encap_header = encap_header;
-
 	if (!(nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
 		neigh_event_send(attr.n, NULL);
 		/* the encap entry will be made valid on neigh update event

@@ -322,6 +319,8 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_create_header_ipv4(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 		goto destroy_neigh_entry;
 	}
 
+	e->encap_size = ipv4_encap_size;
+	e->encap_header = encap_header;
 	e->flags |= MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID;
 	mlx5e_rep_queue_neigh_stats_work(netdev_priv(attr.out_dev));
 	mlx5e_route_lookup_ipv4_put(&attr);

@@ -568,9 +567,6 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_create_header_ipv6(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 	if (err)
 		goto destroy_neigh_entry;
 
-	e->encap_size = ipv6_encap_size;
-	e->encap_header = encap_header;
-
 	if (!(nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
 		neigh_event_send(attr.n, NULL);
 		/* the encap entry will be made valid on neigh update event

@@ -590,6 +586,8 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_create_header_ipv6(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 		goto destroy_neigh_entry;
 	}
 
+	e->encap_size = ipv6_encap_size;
+	e->encap_header = encap_header;
 	e->flags |= MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID;
 	mlx5e_rep_queue_neigh_stats_work(netdev_priv(attr.out_dev));
 	mlx5e_route_lookup_ipv6_put(&attr);

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gavin Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3a4aa3cb83563df942be49d145ee3b7ddf17d6bb ]

Follow up to the previous patch to fix the same issue for mlx5e_tc_tun_update_header_ipv4{6} when mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc() fails.

When mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc() fails, the encap_header allocated in mlx5e_tc_tun_update_header_ipv4{6} will be released within it. However, e->encap_header is already set to the previously freed encap_header before mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc(). As a result, the later mlx5e_encap_put() will free e->encap_header again, causing a double free issue.

mlx5e_encap_put()

     --> mlx5e_encap_dealloc()
         --> kfree(e->encap_header)

This patch fix it by not setting e->encap_header until mlx5_packet_reformat_alloc() success.

---
 .../ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_tun.c   | 20 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

index ccfc626c37d48..4db0483c066a8 100644
@@ -403,16 +403,12 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_update_header_ipv4(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 	if (err)
 		goto free_encap;
 
-	e->encap_size = ipv4_encap_size;
-	kfree(e->encap_header);
-	e->encap_header = encap_header;
-
 	if (!(nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
 		neigh_event_send(attr.n, NULL);
 		/* the encap entry will be made valid on neigh update event
 		 * and not used before that.
 		 */
-		goto release_neigh;
+		goto free_encap;
 	}
 
 	memset(&reformat_params, 0, sizeof(reformat_params));

@@ -426,6 +422,10 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_update_header_ipv4(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 		goto free_encap;
 	}
 
+	e->encap_size = ipv4_encap_size;
+	kfree(e->encap_header);
+	e->encap_header = encap_header;
+
 	e->flags |= MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID;
 	mlx5e_rep_queue_neigh_stats_work(netdev_priv(attr.out_dev));
 	mlx5e_route_lookup_ipv4_put(&attr);

@@ -669,16 +669,12 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_update_header_ipv6(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 	if (err)
 		goto free_encap;
 
-	e->encap_size = ipv6_encap_size;
-	kfree(e->encap_header);
-	e->encap_header = encap_header;
-
 	if (!(nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
 		neigh_event_send(attr.n, NULL);
 		/* the encap entry will be made valid on neigh update event
 		 * and not used before that.
 		 */
-		goto release_neigh;
+		goto free_encap;
 	}
 
 	memset(&reformat_params, 0, sizeof(reformat_params));

@@ -692,6 +688,10 @@ int mlx5e_tc_tun_update_header_ipv6(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 		goto free_encap;
 	}
 
+	e->encap_size = ipv6_encap_size;
+	kfree(e->encap_header);
+	e->encap_header = encap_header;
+
 	e->flags |= MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID;
 	mlx5e_rep_queue_neigh_stats_work(netdev_priv(attr.out_dev));
 	mlx5e_route_lookup_ipv6_put(&attr);

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0c101a23ca7eaf00eef1328eefb04b3a93401cc8 ]

Referenced commit addressed endianness issue in mlx5 pedit implementation in ad hoc manner instead of systematically treating integer values according to their types which left pedit fields of sizes not equal to 4 and where the bytes being modified are not least significant ones broken on big endian machines since wrong bits will be consumed during parsing which leads to following example error when applying pedit to source and destination MAC addresses:

[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mlx5_core 0001:00:00.1 p1v3_r: attempt to offload an unsupported field (cmd 0)
[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mask: 00000000330c5b68: 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00  ................
[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mask: 0000000017d22fd9: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mask: 000000008186d717: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mask: 0000000029eb6149: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mask: 000000007ed103e4: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mask: 00000000db8101a6: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
[Wed Oct 18 12:52:42 2023] mask: 00000000ec3c08a9: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00              ............

Treat masks and values of pedit and filter match as network byte order, refactor pointers to them to void pointers instead of confusing u32 pointers and only cast to pointer-to-integer when reading a value from them. Treat pedit mlx5_fields->field_mask as host byte order according to its type u32, change the constants in fields array accordingly.

---
 .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c   | 60 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

index 7ab489520a873..43239555f7850 100644
@@ -3102,7 +3102,7 @@ static struct mlx5_fields fields[] = {
 	OFFLOAD(DIPV6_31_0,   32, U32_MAX, ip6.daddr.s6_addr32[3], 0,
 		dst_ipv4_dst_ipv6.ipv6_layout.ipv6[12]),
 	OFFLOAD(IPV6_HOPLIMIT, 8,  U8_MAX, ip6.hop_limit, 0, ttl_hoplimit),
-	OFFLOAD(IP_DSCP, 16,  0xc00f, ip6, 0, ip_dscp),
+	OFFLOAD(IP_DSCP, 16,  0x0fc0, ip6, 0, ip_dscp),
 
 	OFFLOAD(TCP_SPORT, 16, U16_MAX, tcp.source,  0, tcp_sport),
 	OFFLOAD(TCP_DPORT, 16, U16_MAX, tcp.dest,    0, tcp_dport),

@@ -3113,21 +3113,31 @@ static struct mlx5_fields fields[] = {
 	OFFLOAD(UDP_DPORT, 16, U16_MAX, udp.dest,   0, udp_dport),
 };
 
-static unsigned long mask_to_le(unsigned long mask, int size)
+static u32 mask_field_get(void *mask, struct mlx5_fields *f)
 {
-	__be32 mask_be32;
-	__be16 mask_be16;
-
-	if (size == 32) {
-		mask_be32 = (__force __be32)(mask);
-		mask = (__force unsigned long)cpu_to_le32(be32_to_cpu(mask_be32));
-	} else if (size == 16) {
-		mask_be32 = (__force __be32)(mask);
-		mask_be16 = *(__be16 *)&mask_be32;
-		mask = (__force unsigned long)cpu_to_le16(be16_to_cpu(mask_be16));
+	switch (f->field_bsize) {
+	case 32:
+		return be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)mask) & f->field_mask;
+	case 16:
+		return be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *)mask) & (u16)f->field_mask;
+	default:
+		return *(u8 *)mask & (u8)f->field_mask;
 	}
+}
 
-	return mask;
+static void mask_field_clear(void *mask, struct mlx5_fields *f)
+{
+	switch (f->field_bsize) {
+	case 32:
+		*(__be32 *)mask &= ~cpu_to_be32(f->field_mask);
+		break;
+	case 16:
+		*(__be16 *)mask &= ~cpu_to_be16((u16)f->field_mask);
+		break;
+	default:
+		*(u8 *)mask &= ~(u8)f->field_mask;
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 static int offload_pedit_fields(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,

@@ -3139,11 +3149,12 @@ static int offload_pedit_fields(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 	struct pedit_headers *set_masks, *add_masks, *set_vals, *add_vals;
 	struct pedit_headers_action *hdrs = parse_attr->hdrs;
 	void *headers_c, *headers_v, *action, *vals_p;
-	u32 *s_masks_p, *a_masks_p, s_mask, a_mask;
 	struct mlx5e_tc_mod_hdr_acts *mod_acts;
-	unsigned long mask, field_mask;
+	void *s_masks_p, *a_masks_p;
 	int i, first, last, next_z;
 	struct mlx5_fields *f;
+	unsigned long mask;
+	u32 s_mask, a_mask;
 	u8 cmd;
 
 	mod_acts = &parse_attr->mod_hdr_acts;

@@ -3159,15 +3170,11 @@ static int offload_pedit_fields(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 		bool skip;
 
 		f = &fields[i];
-		/* avoid seeing bits set from previous iterations */
-		s_mask = 0;
-		a_mask = 0;
-
 		s_masks_p = (void *)set_masks + f->offset;
 		a_masks_p = (void *)add_masks + f->offset;
 
-		s_mask = *s_masks_p & f->field_mask;
-		a_mask = *a_masks_p & f->field_mask;
+		s_mask = mask_field_get(s_masks_p, f);
+		a_mask = mask_field_get(a_masks_p, f);
 
 		if (!s_mask && !a_mask) /* nothing to offload here */
 			continue;

@@ -3194,22 +3201,20 @@ static int offload_pedit_fields(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 					 match_mask, f->field_bsize))
 				skip = true;
 			/* clear to denote we consumed this field */
-			*s_masks_p &= ~f->field_mask;
+			mask_field_clear(s_masks_p, f);
 		} else {
 			cmd  = MLX5_ACTION_TYPE_ADD;
 			mask = a_mask;
 			vals_p = (void *)add_vals + f->offset;
 			/* add 0 is no change */
-			if ((*(u32 *)vals_p & f->field_mask) == 0)
+			if (!mask_field_get(vals_p, f))
 				skip = true;
 			/* clear to denote we consumed this field */
-			*a_masks_p &= ~f->field_mask;
+			mask_field_clear(a_masks_p, f);
 		}
 		if (skip)
 			continue;
 
-		mask = mask_to_le(mask, f->field_bsize);
-
 		first = find_first_bit(&mask, f->field_bsize);
 		next_z = find_next_zero_bit(&mask, f->field_bsize, first);
 		last  = find_last_bit(&mask, f->field_bsize);

@@ -3236,10 +3241,9 @@ static int offload_pedit_fields(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 		MLX5_SET(set_action_in, action, field, f->field);
 
 		if (cmd == MLX5_ACTION_TYPE_SET) {
+			unsigned long field_mask = f->field_mask;
 			int start;
 
-			field_mask = mask_to_le(f->field_mask, f->field_bsize);
-
 			/* if field is bit sized it can start not from first bit */
 			start = find_first_bit(&field_mask, f->field_bsize);
 

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dce94142842e119b982c27c1b62bd20890c7fd21 ]

icosq_str size is unnecessarily too long, and it causes a build warning -Wformat-truncation with W=1. Looking closely, It doesn't need to be 255B, hence this patch reduces the size to 32B which should be more than enough to host the string: "ICOSQ: 0x%x, ".

While here, add a missing space in the formatted string.

This fixes the following build warning:

$ KCFLAGS='-Wall -Werror'
$ make O=/tmp/kbuild/linux W=1 -s -j12 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/

drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_rx.c: In function 'mlx5e_reporter_rx_timeout':
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_rx.c:718:56:
error: ', CQ: 0x' directive output may be truncated writing 8 bytes into a region of size between 0 and 255 [-Werror=format-truncation=]
718 | "RX timeout on channel: %d, %sRQ: 0x%x, CQ: 0x%x",
| ^~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_rx.c:717:9: note: 'snprintf' output between 43 and 322 bytes into a destination of size 288

  717 |         snprintf(err_str, sizeof(err_str),
      |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  718 |                  "RX timeout on channel: %d, %sRQ: 0x%x, CQ: 0x%x",
      |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  719 |                  rq->ix, icosq_str, rq->rqn, rq->cq.mcq.cqn);
      |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_rx.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 1ae15b8536a85..9b1f1369ac4d8 100644
@@ -668,11 +668,11 @@ static int mlx5e_rx_reporter_dump(struct devlink_health_reporter *reporter,
 
 void mlx5e_reporter_rx_timeout(struct mlx5e_rq *rq)
 {
-	char icosq_str[MLX5E_REPORTER_PER_Q_MAX_LEN] = {};
 	char err_str[MLX5E_REPORTER_PER_Q_MAX_LEN];
 	struct mlx5e_icosq *icosq = rq->icosq;
 	struct mlx5e_priv *priv = rq->priv;
 	struct mlx5e_err_ctx err_ctx = {};
+	char icosq_str[32] = {};
 
 	err_ctx.ctx = rq;
 	err_ctx.recover = mlx5e_rx_reporter_timeout_recover;

@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ void mlx5e_reporter_rx_timeout(struct mlx5e_rq *rq)
 	if (icosq)
 		snprintf(icosq_str, sizeof(icosq_str), "ICOSQ: 0x%x, ", icosq->sqn);
 	snprintf(err_str, sizeof(err_str),
-		 "RX timeout on channel: %d, %sRQ: 0x%x, CQ: 0x%x",
+		 "RX timeout on channel: %d, %s RQ: 0x%x, CQ: 0x%x",
 		 rq->ix, icosq_str, rq->rqn, rq->cq.mcq.cqn);
 
 	mlx5e_health_report(priv, priv->rx_reporter, err_str, &err_ctx);

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 41e63c2baa11dc2aa71df5dd27a5bd87d11b6bbb ]

Treat the operation as an error case when the return value is equivalent to the size of the name buffer. Failed to write null terminator to the name buffer, making the string malformed and should not be used. Provide a string with only the firmware version when forming the string with the board id fails.

Without check, will trigger -Wformat-truncation with W=1.

    drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_ethtool.c: In function 'mlx5e_ethtool_get_drvinfo':
    drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_ethtool.c:49:31: warning: '%.16s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 16 bytes into a region of size between 13 and 22 [-Wformat-truncation=]
      49 |                  "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)",
         |                               ^~~~~
    drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_ethtool.c:48:9: note: 'snprintf' output between 12 and 37 bytes into a destination of size 32
      48 |         snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      49 |                  "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)",
         |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      50 |                  fw_rev_maj(mdev), fw_rev_min(mdev), fw_rev_sub(mdev),
         |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      51 |                  mdev->board_id);
         |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

---
 .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_ethtool.c    | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 1728e197558d0..eeba91d9c5211 100644
@@ -43,12 +43,17 @@ void mlx5e_ethtool_get_drvinfo(struct mlx5e_priv *priv,
 			       struct ethtool_drvinfo *drvinfo)
 {
 	struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev;
+	int count;
 
 	strscpy(drvinfo->driver, KBUILD_MODNAME, sizeof(drvinfo->driver));
-	snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
-		 "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)",
-		 fw_rev_maj(mdev), fw_rev_min(mdev), fw_rev_sub(mdev),
-		 mdev->board_id);
+	count = snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
+			 "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)", fw_rev_maj(mdev),
+			 fw_rev_min(mdev), fw_rev_sub(mdev), mdev->board_id);
+	if (count == sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version))
+		snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
+			 "%d.%d.%04d", fw_rev_maj(mdev),
+			 fw_rev_min(mdev), fw_rev_sub(mdev));
+
 	strscpy(drvinfo->bus_info, dev_name(mdev->device),
 		sizeof(drvinfo->bus_info));
 }

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rahul Rameshbabu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b2bd0c0264febcd8d47209079a6671c38e6558b ]

Treat the operation as an error case when the return value is equivalent to the size of the name buffer. Failed to write null terminator to the name buffer, making the string malformed and should not be used. Provide a string with only the firmware version when forming the string with the board id fails. This logic for representors is identical to normal flow with ethtool.

Without check, will trigger -Wformat-truncation with W=1.

    drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c: In function 'mlx5e_rep_get_drvinfo':
    drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c:78:31: warning: '%.16s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 16 bytes into a region of size between 13 and 22 [-Wformat-truncation=]
      78 |                  "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)",
         |                               ^~~~~
    drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c:77:9: note: 'snprintf' output between 12 and 37 bytes into a destination of size 32
      77 |         snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      78 |                  "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)",
         |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      79 |                  fw_rev_maj(mdev), fw_rev_min(mdev),
         |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      80 |                  fw_rev_sub(mdev), mdev->board_id);
         |                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index bd895ef341a0b..2653cb96c3105 100644
@@ -69,13 +69,17 @@ static void mlx5e_rep_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *dev,
 {
 	struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 	struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev;
+	int count;
 
 	strscpy(drvinfo->driver, mlx5e_rep_driver_name,
 		sizeof(drvinfo->driver));
-	snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
-		 "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)",
-		 fw_rev_maj(mdev), fw_rev_min(mdev),
-		 fw_rev_sub(mdev), mdev->board_id);
+	count = snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
+			 "%d.%d.%04d (%.16s)", fw_rev_maj(mdev),
+			 fw_rev_min(mdev), fw_rev_sub(mdev), mdev->board_id);
+	if (count == sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version))
+		snprintf(drvinfo->fw_version, sizeof(drvinfo->fw_version),
+			 "%d.%d.%04d", fw_rev_maj(mdev),
+			 fw_rev_min(mdev), fw_rev_sub(mdev));
 }
 
 static const struct counter_desc sw_rep_stats_desc[] = {

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7e1caeace0418381f36b3aa8403dfd82fc57fc53 ]

Macvlan device in passthru mode sets its lower device promiscuous mode according to its MACVLAN_FLAG_NOPROMISC flag instead of synchronizing it to its own promiscuity setting. However, macvlan_change_rx_flags() function doesn't check the mode before propagating such changes to the lower device which can cause net_device->promiscuity counter overflow as illustrated by reproduction example [0] and resulting dmesg log [1]. Fix the issue by first verifying the mode in macvlan_change_rx_flags() function before propagating promiscuous mode change to the lower device.

[0]:
ip link add macvlan1 link enp8s0f0 type macvlan mode passthru ip link set macvlan1 promisc on
ip l set dev macvlan1 up
ip link set macvlan1 promisc off
ip l set dev macvlan1 down
ip l set dev macvlan1 up

[1]:

[ 5156.281724] macvlan1: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5156.285467] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 enp8s0f0: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5156.287639] macvlan1: left promiscuous mode
[ 5156.288339] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 enp8s0f0: left promiscuous mode
[ 5156.290907] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 enp8s0f0: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5156.317197] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 enp8s0f0: promiscuity touches roof, set promiscuity failed. promiscuity feature of device might be broken.

---
 drivers/net/macvlan.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index b8cc55b2d721c..012830d12fde6 100644
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ static void macvlan_change_rx_flags(struct net_device *dev, int change)
 	if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
 		if (change & IFF_ALLMULTI)
 			dev_set_allmulti(lowerdev, dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI ? 1 : -1);
-		if (change & IFF_PROMISC)
+		if (!macvlan_passthru(vlan->port) && change & IFF_PROMISC)
 			dev_set_promiscuity(lowerdev,
 					    dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC ? 1 : -1);
 

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 137f01b3529d292a68d22e9681e2f903c768f790 ]

MSR_KNL_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY should be evaluated only if
1. this is KNL platform
AND
2. need to get C6 residency or need to calculate C1 residency

Fix the broken logic introduced by commit 1e9042b9c8d4 ("tools/power
turbostat: Fix CPU%C1 display value").

---
 tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index c61c6c704fbe6..4651ecbdc936c 100644
@@ -2180,7 +2180,7 @@ int get_counters(struct thread_data *t, struct core_data *c, struct pkg_data *p)
 	if ((DO_BIC(BIC_CPU_c6) || soft_c1_residency_display(BIC_CPU_c6)) && !do_knl_cstates) {
 		if (get_msr(cpu, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, &c->c6))
 			return -7;
-	} else if (do_knl_cstates || soft_c1_residency_display(BIC_CPU_c6)) {
+	} else if (do_knl_cstates && soft_c1_residency_display(BIC_CPU_c6)) {
 		if (get_msr(cpu, MSR_KNL_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, &c->c6))
 			return -7;
 	}

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b61b7d8c4c22c4298a50ae5d0ee88facb85ce665 ]

Currently the C-state Pre-wake will not be printed due to the probe has not been invoked. Invoke the probe function accordingly.

---
 tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index 4651ecbdc936c..b113900d94879 100644
@@ -5790,6 +5790,7 @@ void process_cpuid()
 	rapl_probe(family, model);
 	perf_limit_reasons_probe(family, model);
 	automatic_cstate_conversion_probe(family, model);
+	prewake_cstate_probe(family, model);
 
 	check_tcc_offset(model_orig);
 

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anastasia Belova <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ff31ba19d732efb9aca3633935d71085e68d5076 ]

"host=" should start with ';' (as in cifs_get_spnego_key) So its length should be 6.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 342717bf1dc28..1e6819daaaa7e 100644
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ struct key_type cifs_spnego_key_type = {
  * strlen(";sec=ntlmsspi") */
 #define MAX_MECH_STR_LEN	13
 
-/* strlen of "host=" */
-#define HOST_KEY_LEN		5
+/* strlen of ";host=" */
+#define HOST_KEY_LEN		6
 
 /* strlen of ";ip4=" or ";ip6=" */
 #define IP_KEY_LEN		5

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ekaterina Esina <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 181724fc72486dec2bec8803459be05b5162aaa8 ]

Remove extra check after condition, add check after generating key for encryption. The check is needed to return non zero rc before rewriting it with generating key for decryption.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 22954a9c7a6c7..69dbd08fd4419 100644
@@ -451,6 +451,8 @@ generate_smb3signingkey(struct cifs_ses *ses,
 				  ptriplet->encryption.context,
 				  ses->smb3encryptionkey,
 				  SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
 		rc = generate_key(ses, ptriplet->decryption.label,
 				  ptriplet->decryption.context,
 				  ses->smb3decryptionkey,

@@ -459,9 +461,6 @@ generate_smb3signingkey(struct cifs_ses *ses,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG_DUMP_KEYS
 	cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: dumping generated AES session keys\n", __func__);
 	/*

2.42.0

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harshit Mogalapalli <[email protected]>

commit 471aa951bf1206d3c10d0daa67005b8e4db4ff83 upstream.

When i915 perf interface is not available dereferencing it will lead to NULL dereferences.

As returning -ENOTSUPP is pretty clear return when perf interface is not available.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c |   15 +++------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -3809,11 +3809,8 @@ int i915_perf_open_ioctl(struct drm_devi
 	u32 known_open_flags;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!perf->i915) {
-		drm_dbg(&perf->i915->drm,
-			"i915 perf interface not available for this system\n");
+	if (!perf->i915)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
-	}
 
 	known_open_flags = I915_PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC |
 			   I915_PERF_FLAG_FD_NONBLOCK |

@@ -4140,11 +4137,8 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct dr
 	struct i915_oa_reg *regs;
 	int err, id;
 
-	if (!perf->i915) {
-		drm_dbg(&perf->i915->drm,
-			"i915 perf interface not available for this system\n");
+	if (!perf->i915)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
-	}
 
 	if (!perf->metrics_kobj) {
 		drm_dbg(&perf->i915->drm,

@@ -4306,11 +4300,8 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct
 	struct i915_oa_config *oa_config;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!perf->i915) {
-		drm_dbg(&perf->i915->drm,
-			"i915 perf interface not available for this system\n");
+	if (!perf->i915)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
-	}
 
 	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable()) {
 		drm_dbg(&perf->i915->drm,

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]>

commit c6e316ac05532febb0c966fa9b55f5258ed037be upstream.

We must check the return value of find_first_bit() before using the return value as an index array since it happens to overflow the array and then panic:

[  107.318430] Kernel BUG [#1]
[  107.319434] CPU: 3 PID: 1238 Comm: kill Tainted: G            E      6.6.0-rc6ubuntu-defconfig #2
[  107.319465] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[  107.319551] epc : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae
[  107.319840]  ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x52/0x3ae
[  107.319868] epc : ffffffff80a0a77c ra : ffffffff80a0a42a sp : ffffaf83fecda350
[  107.319884]  gp : ffffffff823961a8 tp : ffffaf8083db1dc0 t0 : ffffaf83fecda480
[  107.319899]  t1 : ffffffff80cafe62 t2 : 000000000000ff00 s0 : ffffaf83fecda520
[  107.319921]  s1 : ffffaf83fecda380 a0 : 00000018fca29df0 a1 : ffffffffffffffff
[  107.319936]  a2 : 0000000001073734 a3 : 0000000000000004 a4 : 0000000000000000
[  107.319951]  a5 : 0000000000000040 a6 : 000000001d1c8774 a7 : 0000000000504d55
[  107.319965]  s2 : ffffffff82451f10 s3 : ffffffff82724e70 s4 : 000000000000003f
[  107.319980]  s5 : 0000000000000011 s6 : ffffaf8083db27c0 s7 : 0000000000000000
[  107.319995]  s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 00007fffb45d6558 s10: 00007fffb45d81a0
[  107.320009]  s11: ffffaf7ffff60000 t3 : 0000000000000004 t4 : 0000000000000000
[  107.320023]  t5 : ffffaf7f80000000 t6 : ffffaf8000000000
[  107.320037] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[  107.320081] [<ffffffff80a0a77c>] pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae
[  107.320112] [<ffffffff800b42d0>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x9e/0x1a0
[  107.320131] [<ffffffff800ad92c>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36
[  107.320148] [<ffffffff8065f9f8>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e
[  107.320166] [<ffffffff80caf4a0>] handle_riscv_irq+0x54/0x86
[  107.320189] [<ffffffff80cb0036>] do_irq+0x64/0x96
[  107.320271] Code: 85a6 855e b097 ff7f 80e7 9220 b709 9002 4501 bbd9 (9002) 6097
[  107.320585] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  107.320704] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[  107.320775] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[  107.321219] Kernel Offset: 0x0 from 0xffffffff80000000
[  107.333051] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

---
 drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ static irqreturn_t pmu_sbi_ovf_handler(i
 
 	/* Firmware counter don't support overflow yet */
 	fidx = find_first_bit(cpu_hw_evt->used_hw_ctrs, RISCV_MAX_COUNTERS);
+	if (fidx == RISCV_MAX_COUNTERS) {
+		csr_clear(CSR_SIP, BIT(riscv_pmu_irq_num));
+		return IRQ_NONE;
+	}
+
 	event = cpu_hw_evt->events[fidx];
 	if (!event) {
 		csr_clear(CSR_SIP, SIP_LCOFIP);

This patch causes build failure with riscv64 defconfig, as reported in:
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/

Reverting this, and everything build and boot fine (qemu riscv64)

Best regards,
Nam

Thanks, now dropped.

greg k-h

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vikash Garodia <[email protected]>

commit 5e538fce33589da6d7cb2de1445b84d3a8a692f7 upstream.

Read and write pointers are used to track the packet index in the memory shared between video driver and firmware. There is a possibility of OOB access if the read or write pointer goes beyond the queue memory size. Add checks for the read and write pointer to avoid OOB access.

---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

@@ -205,6 +205,11 @@ static int venus_write_queue(struct venu
 
 	new_wr_idx = wr_idx + dwords;
 	wr_ptr = (u32 *)(queue->qmem.kva + (wr_idx << 2));
+
+	if (wr_ptr < (u32 *)queue->qmem.kva ||
+	    wr_ptr > (u32 *)(queue->qmem.kva + queue->qmem.size - sizeof(*wr_ptr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (new_wr_idx < qsize) {
 		memcpy(wr_ptr, packet, dwords << 2);
 	} else {

@@ -272,6 +277,11 @@ static int venus_read_queue(struct venus
 	}
 
 	rd_ptr = (u32 *)(queue->qmem.kva + (rd_idx << 2));
+
+	if (rd_ptr < (u32 *)queue->qmem.kva ||
+	    rd_ptr > (u32 *)(queue->qmem.kva + queue->qmem.size - sizeof(*rd_ptr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	dwords = *rd_ptr >> 2;
 	if (!dwords)
 		return -EINVAL;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>

commit f2d87895cbc4af80649850dcf5da36de6b2ed3dd upstream.

Ensure PERF_IP_FLAG_ASYNC is set always for asynchronous branches (i.e. interrupts etc).

---
 tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -1483,9 +1483,11 @@ static void intel_pt_sample_flags(struct
 	} else if (ptq->state->flags & INTEL_PT_ASYNC) {
 		if (!ptq->state->to_ip)
 			ptq->flags = PERF_IP_FLAG_BRANCH |
+				     PERF_IP_FLAG_ASYNC |
 				     PERF_IP_FLAG_TRACE_END;
 		else if (ptq->state->from_nr && !ptq->state->to_nr)
 			ptq->flags = PERF_IP_FLAG_BRANCH | PERF_IP_FLAG_CALL |
+				     PERF_IP_FLAG_ASYNC |
 				     PERF_IP_FLAG_VMEXIT;
 		else
 			ptq->flags = PERF_IP_FLAG_BRANCH | PERF_IP_FLAG_CALL |

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>

commit ea142e590aec55ba40c5affb4d49e68c713c63dc upstream.

When the PMU is disabled, MMCRA is not updated to disable BHRB and instruction sampling. This can lead to those features remaining enabled, which can slow down a real or emulated CPU.

---
 arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1371,8 +1371,7 @@ static void power_pmu_disable(struct pmu
 		/*
 		 * Disable instruction sampling if it was enabled
 		 */
-		if (cpuhw->mmcr.mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE)
-			val &= ~MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE;
+		val &= ~MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE;
 
 		/* Disable BHRB via mmcra (BHRBRD) for p10 */
 		if (ppmu->flags & PPMU_ARCH_31)

@@ -1383,7 +1382,7 @@ static void power_pmu_disable(struct pmu
 		 * instruction sampling or BHRB.
 		 */
 		if (val != mmcra) {
-			mtspr(SPRN_MMCRA, mmcra);
+			mtspr(SPRN_MMCRA, val);
 			mb();
 			isync();
 		}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 381fdb73d1e2a48244de7260550e453d1003bb8e upstream.

The performance mode of the gcc-plugin randstruct was shuffling struct members outside of the cache-line groups. Limit the range to the specified group indexes.

---
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -191,12 +191,14 @@ static void partition_struct(tree *field
 
 static void performance_shuffle(tree *newtree, unsigned long length, ranctx *prng_state)
 {
-	unsigned long i, x;
+	unsigned long i, x, index;
 	struct partition_group size_group[length];
 	unsigned long num_groups = 0;
 	unsigned long randnum;
 
 	partition_struct(newtree, length, (struct partition_group *)&size_group, &num_groups);
+
+	/* FIXME: this group shuffle is currently a no-op. */
 	for (i = num_groups - 1; i > 0; i--) {
 		struct partition_group tmp;
 		randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);

@@ -206,11 +208,14 @@ static void performance_shuffle(tree *ne
 	}
 
 	for (x = 0; x < num_groups; x++) {
-		for (i = size_group[x].start + size_group[x].length - 1; i > size_group[x].start; i--) {
+		for (index = size_group[x].length - 1; index > 0; index--) {
 			tree tmp;
+
+			i = size_group[x].start + index;
 			if (DECL_BIT_FIELD_TYPE(newtree[i]))
 				continue;
-			randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);
+			randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (index + 1);
+			randnum += size_group[x].start;
 			// we could handle this case differently if desired
 			if (DECL_BIT_FIELD_TYPE(newtree[randnum]))
 				continue;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hao Sun <[email protected]>

commit 811c363645b33e6e22658634329e95f383dfc705 upstream.

In check_stack_write_fixed_off(), imm value is cast to u32 before being spilled to the stack. Therefore, the sign information is lost, and the range information is incorrect when load from the stack again.

For the following prog:
0: r2 = r10
1: *(u64*)(r2 -40) = -44
2: r0 = *(u64*)(r2 - 40)
3: if r0 s<= 0xa goto +2
4: r0 = 1
5: exit
6: r0 = 0
7: exit

The verifier gives:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0

0: (bf) r2 = r10                      ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 -40) = -44        ; R2_w=fp0 fp-40_w=4294967252
2: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 -40)         ; R0_w=4294967252 R2_w=fp0

fp-40_w=4294967252
3: (c5) if r0 s< 0xa goto pc+2
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 3 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 2: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 -40) 3: R0_w=4294967252
4: (b7) r0 = 1 ; R0_w=1
5: (95) exit
verification time 7971 usec
stack depth 40
processed 6 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 0 peak_states 0 mark_read 0

So remove the incorrect cast, since imm field is declared as s32, and __mark_reg_known() takes u64, so imm would be correctly sign extended by compiler.

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3292,7 +3292,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(s
 		   insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) {
 		struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};
 
-		__mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (u32)insn->imm);
+		__mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, insn->imm);
 		fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
 		save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size);
 	} else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>

commit 291d044fd51f8484066300ee42afecf8c8db7b3a upstream.

BPF_END and BPF_NEG has a different specification for the source bit in the opcode compared to other ALU/ALU64 instructions, and is either reserved or use to specify the byte swap endianness. In both cases the source bit does not encode source operand location, and src_reg is a reserved field.

backtrack_insn() currently does not differentiate BPF_END and BPF_NEG from other ALU/ALU64 instructions, which leads to r0 being incorrectly marked as precise when processing BPF_ALU | BPF_TO_BE | BPF_END instructions. This commit teaches backtrack_insn() to correctly mark precision for such case.

While precise tracking of BPF_NEG and other BPF_END instructions are correct and does not need fixing, this commit opt to process all BPF_NEG and BPF_END instructions within the same if-clause to better align with current convention used in the verifier (e.g. check_alu_op).

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2596,7 +2596,12 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_ver
 	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
 		if (!(*reg_mask & dreg))
 			return 0;
-		if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
+		if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
+			/* sreg is reserved and unused
+			 * dreg still need precision before this insn
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
 			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
 				/* dreg = sreg
 				 * dreg needs precision after this insn

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ranjan Kumar <[email protected]>

commit 3c978492c333f0c08248a8d51cecbe5eb5f617c9 upstream.

The retry loop continues to iterate until the count reaches 30, even after receiving the correct value. Exit loop when a non-zero value is read.

---
 drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_base.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ _base_readl_ext_retry(const volatile voi
 
 	for (i = 0 ; i < 30 ; i++) {
 		ret_val = readl(addr);
-		if (ret_val == 0)
-			continue;
+		if (ret_val != 0)
+			break;
 	}
 
 	return ret_val;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chandrakanth patil <[email protected]>

commit 8e3ed9e786511ad800c33605ed904b9de49323cf upstream.

In BMC environments with concurrent access to multiple registers, certain registers occasionally yield a value of 0 even after 3 retries due to hardware errata. As a fix, we have extended the retry count from 3 to 30.

The same errata applies to the mpt3sas driver, and a similar patch has been accepted. Please find more details in the mpt3sas patch reference link.

---
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -263,13 +263,13 @@ u32 megasas_readl(struct megasas_instanc
 	 * Fusion registers could intermittently return all zeroes.
 	 * This behavior is transient in nature and subsequent reads will
 	 * return valid value. As a workaround in driver, retry readl for
-	 * upto three times until a non-zero value is read.
+	 * up to thirty times until a non-zero value is read.
 	 */
 	if (instance->adapter_type == AERO_SERIES) {
 		do {
 			ret_val = readl(addr);
 			i++;
-		} while (ret_val == 0 && i < 3);
+		} while (ret_val == 0 && i < 30);
 		return ret_val;
 	} else {
 		return readl(addr);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>

commit 19597cad64d608aa8ac2f8aef50a50187a565223 upstream.

User experiences system crash when running AER error injection. The perturbation causes the abort-all-I/O path to trigger. The driver assumes all I/O on this path is FCP only. If there is both NVMe & FCP traffic, a system crash happens. Add additional check to see if I/O is FCP or not before access.

PID: 999019 TASK: ff35d769f24722c0 CPU: 53 COMMAND: "kworker/53:1"
0 [ff3f78b964847b58] machine_kexec at ffffffffae86973d
1 [ff3f78b964847ba8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffae9be29d
2 [ff3f78b964847c70] crash_kexec at ffffffffae9bf528
3 [ff3f78b964847c78] oops_end at ffffffffae8282ab
4 [ff3f78b964847c98] exc_page_fault at ffffffffaf2da502
5 [ff3f78b964847cc0] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffaf400b62
[exception RIP: qla2x00_abort_srb+444]

   RIP: ffffffffc07b5f8c  RSP: ff3f78b964847d78  RFLAGS: 00010046
   RAX: 0000000000000282  RBX: ff35d74a0195a200  RCX: ff35d76886fd03a0
   RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffffffffc07c5ec8  RDI: ff35d74a0195a200
   RBP: ff35d76913d22080   R8: ff35d7694d103200   R9: ff35d7694d103200
   R10: 0000000100000000  R11: ffffffffb05d6630  R12: 0000000000010000
   R13: ff3f78b964847df8  R14: ff35d768d8754000  R15: ff35d768877248e0
   ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 6 [ff3f78b964847d70] qla2x00_abort_srb at ffffffffc07b5f84 [qla2xxx]
 7 [ff3f78b964847de0] __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds at ffffffffc07b6238 [qla2xxx]
 8 [ff3f78b964847e38] qla2x00_abort_all_cmds at ffffffffc07ba635 [qla2xxx]
 9 [ff3f78b964847e58] qla2x00_terminate_rport_io at ffffffffc08145eb [qla2xxx]

10 [ff3f78b964847e70] fc_terminate_rport_io at ffffffffc045987e [scsi_transport_fc] 11 [ff3f78b964847e88] process_one_work at ffffffffae914f15
12 [ff3f78b964847ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffae9154c0
13 [ff3f78b964847f10] kthread at ffffffffae91c456
14 [ff3f78b964847f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffae8036ef

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c |   12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1831,8 +1831,16 @@ static void qla2x00_abort_srb(struct qla
 		}
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(qp->qp_lock_ptr, *flags);
-		if (ret_cmd && blk_mq_request_started(scsi_cmd_to_rq(cmd)))
-			sp->done(sp, res);
+		switch (sp->type) {
+		case SRB_SCSI_CMD:
+			if (ret_cmd && blk_mq_request_started(scsi_cmd_to_rq(cmd)))
+				sp->done(sp, res);
+			break;
+		default:
+			if (ret_cmd)
+				sp->done(sp, res);
+			break;
+		}
 	} else {
 		sp->done(sp, res);
 	}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roxana Nicolescu <[email protected]>

commit 1c43c0f1f84aa59dfc98ce66f0a67b2922aa7f9d upstream.

x86 optimized crypto modules are built as modules rather than build-in and they are not loaded when the crypto API is initialized, resulting in the generic builtin module (sha1-generic) being used instead.

It was discovered when creating a sha1/sha256 checksum of a 2Gb file by using kcapi-tools because it would take significantly longer than creating a sha512 checksum of the same file. trace-cmd showed that for sha1/256 the generic module was used, whereas for sha512 the optimized module was used instead.

Add module aliases() for these x86 optimized crypto modules based on CPU feature bits so udev gets a chance to load them later in the boot process. This resulted in ~3x decrease in the real-time execution of kcapi-dsg.

Fix is inspired from commit
aa031b8f702e ("crypto: x86/sha512 - load based on CPU features") where a similar fix was done for sha512.

---
 arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c   |   12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

@@ -24,8 +24,17 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <crypto/sha1_base.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 
+static const struct x86_cpu_id module_cpu_ids[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_AVX2, NULL),
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_AVX, NULL),
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, module_cpu_ids);
+
 static int sha1_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
 			     unsigned int len, sha1_block_fn *sha1_xform)
 {

@@ -301,6 +310,9 @@ static inline void unregister_sha1_ni(vo
 
 static int __init sha1_ssse3_mod_init(void)
 {
+	if (!x86_match_cpu(module_cpu_ids))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	if (register_sha1_ssse3())
 		goto fail;
 

@@ -38,11 +38,20 @@
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <crypto/sha256_base.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 
 asmlinkage void sha256_transform_ssse3(struct sha256_state *state,
 				       const u8 *data, int blocks);
 
+static const struct x86_cpu_id module_cpu_ids[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_AVX2, NULL),
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_AVX, NULL),
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, module_cpu_ids);
+
 static int _sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
 			  unsigned int len, sha256_block_fn *sha256_xform)
 {

@@ -366,6 +375,9 @@ static inline void unregister_sha256_ni(
 
 static int __init sha256_ssse3_mod_init(void)
 {
+	if (!x86_match_cpu(module_cpu_ids))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	if (register_sha256_ssse3())
 		goto fail;
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pu Wen <[email protected]>

commit ee545b94d39a00c93dc98b1dbcbcf731d2eadeb4 upstream.

Hygon processors with a model ID > 3 have CPUID leaf 0xB correctly populated and don't need the fixed package ID shift workaround. The fixup is also incorrect when running in a guest.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -86,8 +86,12 @@ static void hygon_get_topology(struct cp
 		if (!err)
 			c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores);
 
-		/* Socket ID is ApicId[6] for these processors. */
-		c->phys_proc_id = c->apicid >> APICID_SOCKET_ID_BIT;
+		/*
+		 * Socket ID is ApicId[6] for the processors with model <= 0x3
+		 * when running on host.
+		 */
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && c->x86_model <= 0x3)
+			c->phys_proc_id = c->apicid >> APICID_SOCKET_ID_BIT;
 
 		cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu);
 	} else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <[email protected]>

commit d6800af51c76b6dae20e6023bbdc9b3da3ab5121 upstream.

Don't apply the stimer's counter side effects when modifying its value from user-space, as this may trigger spurious interrupts.

For example:
- The stimer is configured in auto-enable mode.
- The stimer's count is set and the timer enabled.
- The stimer expires, an interrupt is injected.
- The VM is live migrated.
- The stimer config and count are deserialized, auto-enable is ON, the stimer is re-enabled.
- The stimer expires right away, and injects an unwarranted interrupt.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -705,10 +705,12 @@ static int stimer_set_count(struct kvm_v
 
 	stimer_cleanup(stimer);
 	stimer->count = count;
-	if (stimer->count == 0)
-		stimer->config.enable = 0;
-	else if (stimer->config.auto_enable)
-		stimer->config.enable = 1;
+	if (!host) {
+		if (stimer->count == 0)
+			stimer->config.enable = 0;
+		else if (stimer->config.auto_enable)
+			stimer->config.enable = 1;
+	}
 
 	if (stimer->config.enable)
 		stimer_mark_pending(stimer, false);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej S. Szmigiero <[email protected]>

commit 2770d4722036d6bd24bcb78e9cd7f6e572077d03 upstream.

Hyper-V enabled Windows Server 2022 KVM VM cannot be started on Zen1 Ryzen since it crashes at boot with SYSTEM_THREAD_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED + STATUS_PRIVILEGED_INSTRUCTION (in other words, because of an unexpected #GP in the guest kernel).

This is because Windows tries to set bit 8 in MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG and can't handle receiving a #GP when doing so.

Give this MSR the same treatment that commit 2e32b7190641 ("x86, kvm: Add MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 to the list of ignored MSRs") gave MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 under justification that this MSR is baremetal-relevant only.
Although apparently it was then needed for Linux guests, not Windows as in this case.

With this change, the aforementioned guest setup is able to finish booting successfully.

This issue can be reproduced either on a Summit Ridge Ryzen (with just "-cpu host") or on a Naples EPYC (with "-cpu host,stepping=1" since EPYC is ordinarily stepping 2).

Alternatively, userspace could solve the problem by using MSR filters, but forcing every userspace to define a filter isn't very friendly and doesn't add much, if any, value. The only potential hiccup is if one of these "baremetal-only" MSRs ever requires actual emulation and/or has F/M/S specific behavior. But if that happens, then KVM can still punt *that* handling to userspace since userspace MSR filters "win" over KVM's default handling.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c               |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -551,6 +551,7 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_1		0xc0011004
 #define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG		0xc0011020
 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG		0xc0011022
+#define MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG		0xc0011023
 
 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029
 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT	 1

@@ -3582,6 +3582,7 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *
 	case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
 	case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
 	case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG:
+	case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG:
 	case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG:
 		break;
 

@@ -3982,6 +3983,7 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *
 	case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
 	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL:
 	case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG:
+	case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG:
 	case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG:
 	/*
 	 * Intel Sandy Bridge CPUs must support the RAPL (running average power

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tao Su <[email protected]>

commit 629d3698f6958ee6f8131ea324af794f973b12ac upstream.

When IPI virtualization is enabled, a WARN is triggered if bit12 of ICR MSR is set after APIC-write VM-exit. The reason is kvm_apic_send_ipi() thinks the APIC_ICR_BUSY bit should be cleared because KVM has no delay, but kvm_apic_write_nodecode() doesn't clear the APIC_ICR_BUSY bit.

Under the x2APIC section, regarding ICR, the SDM says:

It remains readable only to aid in debugging; however, software should not assume the value returned by reading the ICR is the last written value.

I.e. the guest is allowed to set bit 12. However, the SDM also gives KVM free reign to do whatever it wants with the bit, so long as KVM's behavior doesn't confuse userspace or break KVM's ABI.

Clear bit 12 so that it reads back as '0'. This approach is safer than "do nothing" and is consistent with the case where IPI virtualization is disabled or not supported, i.e.,

handle_fastpath_set_x2apic_icr_irqoff() -> kvm_x2apic_icr_write()

Opportunistically replace the TODO with a comment calling out that eating the write is likely faster than a conditional branch around the busy bit.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c |   26 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -2294,22 +2294,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_set_eoi);
 void kvm_apic_write_nodecode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 offset)
 {
 	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
-	u64 val;
 
 	/*
-	 * ICR is a single 64-bit register when x2APIC is enabled.  For legacy
-	 * xAPIC, ICR writes need to go down the common (slightly slower) path
-	 * to get the upper half from ICR2.
+	 * ICR is a single 64-bit register when x2APIC is enabled, all others
+	 * registers hold 32-bit values.  For legacy xAPIC, ICR writes need to
+	 * go down the common path to get the upper half from ICR2.
+	 *
+	 * Note, using the write helpers may incur an unnecessary write to the
+	 * virtual APIC state, but KVM needs to conditionally modify the value
+	 * in certain cases, e.g. to clear the ICR busy bit.  The cost of extra
+	 * conditional branches is likely a wash relative to the cost of the
+	 * maybe-unecessary write, and both are in the noise anyways.
 	 */
-	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && offset == APIC_ICR) {
-		val = kvm_lapic_get_reg64(apic, APIC_ICR);
-		kvm_apic_send_ipi(apic, (u32)val, (u32)(val >> 32));
-		trace_kvm_apic_write(APIC_ICR, val);
-	} else {
-		/* TODO: optimize to just emulate side effect w/o one more write */
-		val = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, offset);
-		kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, offset, (u32)val);
-	}
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && offset == APIC_ICR)
+		kvm_x2apic_icr_write(apic, kvm_lapic_get_reg64(apic, APIC_ICR));
+	else
+		kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, offset, kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, offset));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_write_nodecode);
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

commit 47846d51348dd62e5231a83be040981b17c955fa upstream.

The get_task_exe_file() function locks the given task with task_lock() which when used inside audit_exe_compare() can cause deadlocks on systems that generate audit records when the task_lock() is held. We resolve this problem with two changes: ignoring those cases where the task being audited is not the current task, and changing our approach to obtaining the executable file struct to not require task_lock().

With the intent of the audit exe filter being to filter on audit events generated by processes started by the specified executable, it makes sense that we would only want to use the exe filter on audit records associated with the currently executing process, e.g. @current. If we are asked to filter records using a non-@current task_struct we can safely ignore the exe filter without negatively impacting the admin's expectations for the exe filter.

Knowing that we only have to worry about filtering the currently executing task in audit_exe_compare() we can do away with the task_lock() and call get_mm_exe_file() with @current->mm directly.

---
 kernel/audit_watch.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -527,11 +527,18 @@ int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct
 	unsigned long ino;
 	dev_t dev;
 
-	exe_file = get_task_exe_file(tsk);
+	/* only do exe filtering if we are recording @current events/records */
+	if (tsk != current)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm))
+		return 0;
+	exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm);
 	if (!exe_file)
 		return 0;
 	ino = file_inode(exe_file)->i_ino;
 	dev = file_inode(exe_file)->i_sb->s_dev;
 	fput(exe_file);
+
 	return audit_mark_compare(mark, ino, dev);
 }

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

commit 969d90ec212bae4b45bf9d21d7daa30aa6cf055e upstream.

eBPF can end up calling into the audit code from some odd places, and some of these places don't have @current set properly so we end up tripping the WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm) near the top of audit_exe_compare(). While the basic !current->mm check is good, the WARN_ON_ONCE() results in some scary console messages so let's drop that and just do the regular !current->mm check to avoid problems.

---
 kernel/audit_watch.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct
 	if (tsk != current)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm))
+	if (!current->mm)
 		return 0;
 	exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm);
 	if (!exe_file)

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Krister Johansen <[email protected]>

commit 8001f49394e353f035306a45bcf504f06fca6355 upstream.

The code that checks for unknown boot options is unaware of the sysctl alias facility, which maps bootparams to sysctl values. If a user sets an old value that has a valid alias, a message about an invalid parameter will be printed during boot, and the parameter will get passed to init. Fix by checking for the existence of aliased parameters in the unknown boot parameter code. If an alias exists, don't return an error or pass the value to init.

---
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c  |    7 +++++++
 include/linux/sysctl.h |    6 ++++++
 init/main.c            |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)

@@ -1830,6 +1830,13 @@ static const char *sysctl_find_alias(cha
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+bool sysctl_is_alias(char *param)
+{
+	const char *alias = sysctl_find_alias(param);
+
+	return alias != NULL;
+}
+
 /* Set sysctl value passed on kernel command line. */
 static int process_sysctl_arg(char *param, char *val,
 			       const char *unused, void *arg)

@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ extern void __register_sysctl_init(const
 extern struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl_mount_point(const char *path);
 
 void do_sysctl_args(void);
+bool sysctl_is_alias(char *param);
 int do_proc_douintvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		      void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
 		      int (*conv)(unsigned long *lvalp,

@@ -301,6 +302,11 @@ static inline void setup_sysctl_set(stru
 static inline void do_sysctl_args(void)
 {
 }
+
+static inline bool sysctl_is_alias(char *param)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
 
 int sysctl_max_threads(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,

@@ -533,6 +533,10 @@ static int __init unknown_bootoption(cha
 {
 	size_t len = strlen(param);
 
+	/* Handle params aliased to sysctls */
+	if (sysctl_is_alias(param))
+		return 0;
+
 	repair_env_string(param, val);
 
 	/* Handle obsolete-style parameters */

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Muhammad Usama Anjum <[email protected]>

commit dd976a97d15b47656991e185a94ef42a0fa5cfd4 upstream.

The smp_processor_id() shouldn't be called from preemptible code. Instead use get_cpu() and put_cpu() which disables preemption in addition to getting the processor id. Enable preemption back after calling schedule_work() to make sure that the work gets scheduled on all cores other than the current core. We want to avoid a scenario where current core's stack trace is printed multiple times and one core's stack trace isn't printed because of scheduling of current task.

This fixes the following bug:

[  119.143590] sysrq: Show backtrace of all active CPUs
[  119.143902] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: bash/873
[  119.144586] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
[  119.144827] CPU: 6 PID: 873 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.10.124-dirty #3
[  119.144861] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 2023.05-1 07/22/2023
[  119.145053] Call trace:
[  119.145093]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a0
[  119.145122]  show_stack+0x18/0x70
[  119.145141]  dump_stack+0xc4/0x11c
[  119.145159]  check_preemption_disabled+0x100/0x110
[  119.145175]  debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
[  119.145195]  sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0x20/0xc0
[  119.145211]  __handle_sysrq+0x8c/0x1a0
[  119.145227]  write_sysrq_trigger+0x94/0x12c
[  119.145247]  proc_reg_write+0xa8/0xe4
[  119.145266]  vfs_write+0xec/0x280
[  119.145282]  ksys_write+0x6c/0x100
[  119.145298]  __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30
[  119.145315]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e4
[  119.145332]  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x8c
[  119.145348]  el0_svc+0x10/0x20
[  119.145364]  el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x140
[  119.145381]  el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0

---
 drivers/tty/sysrq.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -263,13 +263,14 @@ static void sysrq_handle_showallcpus(int
 		if (in_hardirq())
 			regs = get_irq_regs();
 
-		pr_info("CPU%d:\n", smp_processor_id());
+		pr_info("CPU%d:\n", get_cpu());
 		if (regs)
 			show_regs(regs);
 		else
 			show_stack(NULL, NULL, KERN_INFO);
 
 		schedule_work(&sysrq_showallcpus);
+		put_cpu();
 	}
 }
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavel Krasavin <[email protected]>

commit 2a1d728f20edeee7f26dc307ed9df4e0d23947ab upstream.

There might be hard lockup if we set crtscts mode on port without RTS/CTS configured:

# stty -F /dev/ttyAML6 crtscts; echo 1 > /dev/ttyAML6; echo 2 > /dev/ttyAML6
[   95.890386] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
[   95.890857] rcu:     3-...0: (201 ticks this GP) idle=e33c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=5844/5846 fqs=4984
[   95.900212] rcu:     (detected by 2, t=21016 jiffies, g=7753, q=296 ncpus=4)
[   95.906972] Task dump for CPU 3:
[   95.910178] task:bash            state:R  running task     stack:0     pid:205   ppid:1      flags:0x00000202
[   95.920059] Call trace:
[   95.922485]  __switch_to+0xe4/0x168
[   95.925951]  0xffffff8003477508
[   95.974379] watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 3
[   95.974424] Modules linked in: 88x2cs(O) rtc_meson_vrtc

Possible solution would be to not allow to setup crtscts on such port.

Tested on S905X3 based board.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -380,10 +380,14 @@ static void meson_uart_set_termios(struc
 	else
 		val |= AML_UART_STOP_BIT_1SB;
 
-	if (cflags & CRTSCTS)
-		val &= ~AML_UART_TWO_WIRE_EN;
-	else
+	if (cflags & CRTSCTS) {
+		if (port->flags & UPF_HARD_FLOW)
+			val &= ~AML_UART_TWO_WIRE_EN;
+		else
+			termios->c_cflag &= ~CRTSCTS;
+	} else {
 		val |= AML_UART_TWO_WIRE_EN;
+	}
 
 	writel(val, port->membase + AML_UART_CONTROL);
 

@@ -698,6 +702,7 @@ static int meson_uart_probe(struct platf
 	u32 fifosize = 64; /* Default is 64, 128 for EE UART_0 */
 	int ret = 0;
 	int irq;
+	bool has_rtscts;
 
 	if (pdev->dev.of_node)
 		pdev->id = of_alias_get_id(pdev->dev.of_node, "serial");

@@ -725,6 +730,7 @@ static int meson_uart_probe(struct platf
 		return irq;
 
 	of_property_read_u32(pdev->dev.of_node, "fifo-size", &fifosize);
+	has_rtscts = of_property_read_bool(pdev->dev.of_node, "uart-has-rtscts");
 
 	if (meson_ports[pdev->id]) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "port %d already allocated\n", pdev->id);

@@ -744,6 +750,8 @@ static int meson_uart_probe(struct platf
 	port->mapsize = resource_size(res_mem);
 	port->irq = irq;
 	port->flags = UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF | UPF_LOW_LATENCY;
+	if (has_rtscts)
+		port->flags |= UPF_HARD_FLOW;
 	port->has_sysrq = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SERIAL_MESON_CONSOLE);
 	port->dev = &pdev->dev;
 	port->line = pdev->id;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

commit a30badfd7c13fc8763a9e10c5a12ba7f81515a55 upstream.

On unplug of a Xen console, xencons_disconnect_backend() unconditionally calls free_irq() via unbind_from_irqhandler(), causing a warning of freeing an already-free IRQ:

(qemu) device_del con1

[   32.050919] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   32.050942] Trying to free already-free IRQ 33
[   32.050990] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 51 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1895 __free_irq+0x1d4/0x330

It should be using evtchn_put() to tear down the event channel binding, and let the Linux IRQ side of it be handled by notifier_del_irq() through the HVC code.

On which topic... xencons_disconnect_backend() should call hvc_remove() *first*, rather than tearing down the event channel and grant mapping while they are in use. And then the IRQ is guaranteed to be freed by the time it's torn down by evtchn_put().

Since evtchn_put() also closes the actual event channel, avoid calling xenbus_free_evtchn() except in the failure path where the IRQ was not successfully set up.

However, calling hvc_remove() at the start of xencons_disconnect_backend() still isn't early enough. An unplug request is indicated by the backend setting its state to XenbusStateClosing, which triggers a notification to xencons_backend_changed(), which... does nothing except set its own frontend state directly to XenbusStateClosed without *actually* tearing down the HVC device or, you know, making sure it isn't actively in use.

So the backend sees the guest frontend set its state to XenbusStateClosed and stops servicing the interrupt... and the guest spins for ever in the domU_write_console() function waiting for the ring to drain.

Fix that one by calling hvc_remove() from xencons_backend_changed() before signalling to the backend that it's OK to proceed with the removal.

Tested with 'dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/hvc1' while telling Qemu to remove the console device.

---
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -377,18 +377,21 @@ void xen_console_resume(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HVC_XEN_FRONTEND
 static void xencons_disconnect_backend(struct xencons_info *info)
 {
-	if (info->irq > 0)
-		unbind_from_irqhandler(info->irq, NULL);
-	info->irq = 0;
+	if (info->hvc != NULL)
+		hvc_remove(info->hvc);
+	info->hvc = NULL;
+	if (info->irq > 0) {
+		evtchn_put(info->evtchn);
+		info->irq = 0;
+		info->evtchn = 0;
+	}
+	/* evtchn_put() will also close it so this is only an error path */
 	if (info->evtchn > 0)
 		xenbus_free_evtchn(info->xbdev, info->evtchn);
 	info->evtchn = 0;
 	if (info->gntref > 0)
 		gnttab_free_grant_references(info->gntref);
 	info->gntref = 0;
-	if (info->hvc != NULL)
-		hvc_remove(info->hvc);
-	info->hvc = NULL;
 }
 
 static void xencons_free(struct xencons_info *info)

@@ -553,10 +556,23 @@ static void xencons_backend_changed(stru
 		if (dev->state == XenbusStateClosed)
 			break;
 		fallthrough;	/* Missed the backend's CLOSING state */
-	case XenbusStateClosing:
+	case XenbusStateClosing: {
+		struct xencons_info *info = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);;
+
+		/*
+		 * Don't tear down the evtchn and grant ref before the other
+		 * end has disconnected, but do stop userspace from trying
+		 * to use the device before we allow the backend to close.
+		 */
+		if (info->hvc) {
+			hvc_remove(info->hvc);
+			info->hvc = NULL;
+		}
+
 		xenbus_frontend_closed(dev);
 		break;
 	}
+	}
 }
 
 static const struct xenbus_device_id xencons_ids[] = {

@@ -616,7 +632,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
 		list_del(&info->list);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xencons_lock, flags);
 		if (info->irq)
-			unbind_from_irqhandler(info->irq, NULL);
+			evtchn_put(info->evtchn);
 		kfree(info);
 		return r;
 	}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

commit 2704c9a5593f4a47620c12dad78838ca62b52f48 upstream.

The xen_hvc_init() function should always register the frontend driver, even when there's no primary console — as there may be secondary consoles. (Qemu can always add secondary consoles, but only the toolstack can add the primary because it's special.)

---
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
 		ops = &dom0_hvc_ops;
 		r = xen_initial_domain_console_init();
 		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
+			goto register_fe;
 		info = vtermno_to_xencons(HVC_COOKIE);
 	} else {
 		ops = &domU_hvc_ops;

@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
 		else
 			r = xen_pv_console_init();
 		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
+			goto register_fe;
 
 		info = vtermno_to_xencons(HVC_COOKIE);
 		info->irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(info->evtchn);

@@ -638,6 +638,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
 	}
 
 	r = 0;
+ register_fe:
 #ifdef CONFIG_HVC_XEN_FRONTEND
 	r = xenbus_register_frontend(&xencons_driver);
 #endif

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

commit ef5dd8ec88ac11e8e353164407d55b73c988b369 upstream.

The xencons_connect_backend() function allocates a local interdomain event channel with xenbus_alloc_evtchn(), then calls bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi() to bind to that port# on the *remote* domain.

That doesn't work very well:

(qemu) device_add xen-console,id=con1,chardev=pty0

[   44.323872] xenconsole console-1: 2 xenbus_dev_probe on device/console/1
[   44.323995] xenconsole: probe of console-1 failed with error -2

Fix it to use bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(), which does the right thing by just binding that *local* event channel to an irq. The backend will do the interdomain binding.

This didn't affect the primary console because the setup for that is special — the toolstack allocates the guest event channel and the guest discovers it with HVMOP_get_param.

---
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static int xencons_connect_backend(struc
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	info->evtchn = evtchn;
-	irq = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(dev, evtchn);
+	irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(evtchn);
 	if (irq < 0)
 		return irq;
 	info->irq = irq;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>

commit 70b70a4307cccebe91388337b1c85735ce4de6ff upstream.

struct pci_dev contains two flags which govern whether the device may suspend to D3cold:

* no_d3cold provides an opt-out for drivers (e.g. if a device is known to not wake from D3cold)

* d3cold_allowed provides an opt-out for user space (default is true, user space may set to false)

Since commit 9d26d3a8f1b0 ("PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend"), the user space setting overwrites the driver setting. Essentially user space is trusted to know better than the driver whether D3cold is working.

That feels unsafe and wrong. Assume that the change was introduced inadvertently and do not overwrite no_d3cold when d3cold_allowed is modified. Instead, consider d3cold_allowed in addition to no_d3cold when choosing a suspend state for the device.

That way, user space may opt out of D3cold if the driver hasn't, but it may no longer force an opt in if the driver has opted out.

---
 drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c  |    2 +-
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c |    5 +----
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ pci_power_t acpi_pci_choose_state(struct
 {
 	int acpi_state, d_max;
 
-	if (pdev->no_d3cold)
+	if (pdev->no_d3cold || !pdev->d3cold_allowed)
 		d_max = ACPI_STATE_D3_HOT;
 	else
 		d_max = ACPI_STATE_D3_COLD;

@@ -529,10 +529,7 @@ static ssize_t d3cold_allowed_store(stru
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	pdev->d3cold_allowed = !!val;
-	if (pdev->d3cold_allowed)
-		pci_d3cold_enable(pdev);
-	else
-		pci_d3cold_disable(pdev);
+	pci_bridge_d3_update(pdev);
 
 	pm_runtime_resume(dev);
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit 19467a950b49432a84bf6dbadbbb17bdf89418b7 upstream.

damon_sysfs_set_targets(), which updates the targets of the context for online commitment, do not remove targets that removed from the corresponding sysfs files. As a result, more than intended targets of the context can exist and hence consume memory and monitoring CPU resource more than expected.

Fix it by removing all targets of the context and fill up again using the user input. This could cause unnecessary memory dealloc and realloc operations, but this is not a hot code path. Also, note that damon_target is stateless, and hence no data is lost.

---
 mm/damon/sysfs.c |   68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

@@ -2188,58 +2188,60 @@ destroy_targets_out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-/*
- * Search a target in a context that corresponds to the sysfs target input.
- *
- * Return: pointer to the target if found, NULL if not found, or negative
- * error code if the search failed.
- */
-static struct damon_target *damon_sysfs_existing_target(
-		struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target, struct damon_ctx *ctx)
+static int damon_sysfs_update_target(struct damon_target *target,
+		struct damon_ctx *ctx,
+		struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target)
 {
 	struct pid *pid;
-	struct damon_target *t;
+	struct damon_region *r, *next;
 
-	if (!damon_target_has_pid(ctx)) {
-		/* Up to only one target for paddr could exist */
-		damon_for_each_target(t, ctx)
-			return t;
-		return NULL;
-	}
+	if (!damon_target_has_pid(ctx))
+		return 0;
 
-	/* ops.id should be DAMON_OPS_VADDR or DAMON_OPS_FVADDR */
 	pid = find_get_pid(sys_target->pid);
 	if (!pid)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	damon_for_each_target(t, ctx) {
-		if (t->pid == pid) {
-			put_pid(pid);
-			return t;
-		}
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* no change to the target */
+	if (pid == target->pid) {
+		put_pid(pid);
+		return 0;
 	}
-	put_pid(pid);
-	return NULL;
+
+	/* remove old monitoring results and update the target's pid */
+	damon_for_each_region_safe(r, next, target)
+		damon_destroy_region(r, target);
+	put_pid(target->pid);
+	target->pid = pid;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int damon_sysfs_set_targets(struct damon_ctx *ctx,
 		struct damon_sysfs_targets *sysfs_targets)
 {
-	int i, err;
+	struct damon_target *t, *next;
+	int i = 0, err;
 
 	/* Multiple physical address space monitoring targets makes no sense */
 	if (ctx->ops.id == DAMON_OPS_PADDR && sysfs_targets->nr > 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sysfs_targets->nr; i++) {
+	damon_for_each_target_safe(t, next, ctx) {
+		if (i < sysfs_targets->nr) {
+			damon_sysfs_update_target(t, ctx,
+					sysfs_targets->targets_arr[i]);
+		} else {
+			if (damon_target_has_pid(ctx))
+				put_pid(t->pid);
+			damon_destroy_target(t);
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	for (; i < sysfs_targets->nr; i++) {
 		struct damon_sysfs_target *st = sysfs_targets->targets_arr[i];
-		struct damon_target *t = damon_sysfs_existing_target(st, ctx);
 
-		if (IS_ERR(t))
-			return PTR_ERR(t);
-		if (!t)
-			err = damon_sysfs_add_target(st, ctx);
-		else
-			err = damon_sysfs_set_regions(t, st->regions);
+		err = damon_sysfs_add_target(st, ctx);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit 9732336006764e2ee61225387e3c70eae9139035 upstream.

When user input is committed online, DAMON sysfs interface is ignoring the user input for the monitoring target regions. Such request is valid and useful for fixed monitoring target regions-based monitoring ops like 'paddr' or 'fvaddr'.

Update the region boundaries as user specified, too. Note that the monitoring results of the regions that overlap between the latest monitoring target regions and the new target regions are preserved.

Treat empty monitoring target regions user request as a request to just make no change to the monitoring target regions. Otherwise, users should set the monitoring target regions same to current one for every online input commit, and it could be challenging for dynamic monitoring target regions update DAMON ops like 'vaddr'. If the user really need to remove all monitoring target regions, they can simply remove the target and then create the target again with empty target regions.

---
 mm/damon/sysfs.c |   47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

@@ -2188,34 +2188,47 @@ destroy_targets_out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int damon_sysfs_update_target(struct damon_target *target,
-		struct damon_ctx *ctx,
-		struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target)
+static int damon_sysfs_update_target_pid(struct damon_target *target, int pid)
 {
-	struct pid *pid;
-	struct damon_region *r, *next;
-
-	if (!damon_target_has_pid(ctx))
-		return 0;
+	struct pid *pid_new;
 
-	pid = find_get_pid(sys_target->pid);
-	if (!pid)
+	pid_new = find_get_pid(pid);
+	if (!pid_new)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* no change to the target */
-	if (pid == target->pid) {
-		put_pid(pid);
+	if (pid_new == target->pid) {
+		put_pid(pid_new);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* remove old monitoring results and update the target's pid */
-	damon_for_each_region_safe(r, next, target)
-		damon_destroy_region(r, target);
 	put_pid(target->pid);
-	target->pid = pid;
+	target->pid = pid_new;
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int damon_sysfs_update_target(struct damon_target *target,
+		struct damon_ctx *ctx,
+		struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (damon_target_has_pid(ctx)) {
+		err = damon_sysfs_update_target_pid(target, sys_target->pid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do monitoring target region boundary update only if one or more
+	 * regions are set by the user.  This is for keeping current monitoring
+	 * target results and range easier, especially for dynamic monitoring
+	 * target regions update ops like 'vaddr'.
+	 */
+	if (sys_target->regions->nr)
+		err = damon_sysfs_set_regions(target, sys_target->regions);
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int damon_sysfs_set_targets(struct damon_ctx *ctx,
 		struct damon_sysfs_targets *sysfs_targets)
 {

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Krister Johansen <[email protected]>

commit 8b793bcda61f6c3ed4f5b2ded7530ef6749580cb upstream.

Setting softlockup_panic from do_sysctl_args() causes it to take effect later in boot. The lockup detector is enabled before SMP is brought online, but do_sysctl_args runs afterwards. If a user wants to set softlockup_panic on boot and have it trigger should a softlockup occur during onlining of the non-boot processors, they could do this prior to commit f117955a2255 ("kernel/watchdog.c: convert {soft/hard}lockup boot parameters to sysctl aliases"). However, after this commit the value of softlockup_panic is set too late to be of help for this type of problem. Restore the prior behavior.

---
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c |    1 -
 kernel/watchdog.c     |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1814,7 +1814,6 @@ static const struct sysctl_alias sysctl_
 	{"hung_task_panic",			"kernel.hung_task_panic" },
 	{"numa_zonelist_order",			"vm.numa_zonelist_order" },
 	{"softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace",	"kernel.softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace" },
-	{"softlockup_panic",			"kernel.softlockup_panic" },
 	{ }
 };
 

@@ -183,6 +183,13 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, hrt
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, hrtimer_interrupts_saved);
 static unsigned long soft_lockup_nmi_warn;
 
+static int __init softlockup_panic_setup(char *str)
+{
+	softlockup_panic = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("softlockup_panic=", softlockup_panic_setup);
+
 static int __init nowatchdog_setup(char *str)
 {
 	watchdog_user_enabled = 0;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit 44063f125af4bb4efd1d500d8091fa33a98af325 upstream.

When calculating the hotness threshold for lru_prio scheme of DAMON_LRU_SORT, the module divides some values by the maximum nr_accesses. However, due to the type of the related variables, simple division-based calculation of the divisor can return zero. As a result, divide-by-zero is possible. Fix it by using damon_max_nr_accesses(), which handles the case.

---
 mm/damon/lru_sort.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -195,9 +195,7 @@ static int damon_lru_sort_apply_paramete
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	/* aggr_interval / sample_interval is the maximum nr_accesses */
-	hot_thres = damon_lru_sort_mon_attrs.aggr_interval /
-		damon_lru_sort_mon_attrs.sample_interval *
+	hot_thres = damon_max_nr_accesses(&damon_lru_sort_mon_attrs) *
 		hot_thres_access_freq / 1000;
 	scheme = damon_lru_sort_new_hot_scheme(hot_thres);
 	if (!scheme)

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit 3bafc47d3c4a2fc4d3b382aeb3c087f8fc84d9fd upstream.

When calculating the hotness of each region for the under-quota regions prioritization, DAMON divides some values by the maximum nr_accesses. However, due to the type of the related variables, simple division-based calculation of the divisor can return zero. As a result, divide-by-zero is possible. Fix it by using damon_max_nr_accesses(), which handles the case.

---
 mm/damon/ops-common.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ void damon_pmdp_mkold(pmd_t *pmd, struct
 int damon_hot_score(struct damon_ctx *c, struct damon_region *r,
 			struct damos *s)
 {
-	unsigned int max_nr_accesses;
 	int freq_subscore;
 	unsigned int age_in_sec;
 	int age_in_log, age_subscore;

@@ -95,8 +94,8 @@ int damon_hot_score(struct damon_ctx *c,
 	unsigned int age_weight = s->quota.weight_age;
 	int hotness;
 
-	max_nr_accesses = c->attrs.aggr_interval / c->attrs.sample_interval;
-	freq_subscore = r->nr_accesses * DAMON_MAX_SUBSCORE / max_nr_accesses;
+	freq_subscore = r->nr_accesses * DAMON_MAX_SUBSCORE /
+		damon_max_nr_accesses(&c->attrs);
 
 	age_in_sec = (unsigned long)r->age * c->attrs.aggr_interval / 1000000;
 	for (age_in_log = 0; age_in_log < DAMON_MAX_AGE_IN_LOG && age_in_sec;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit 35f5d94187a6a3a8df2cba54beccca1c2379edb8 upstream.

Patch series "avoid divide-by-zero due to max_nr_accesses overflow".

The maximum nr_accesses of given DAMON context can be calculated by dividing the aggregation interval by the sampling interval. Some logics in DAMON uses the maximum nr_accesses as a divisor. Hence, the value shouldn't be zero. Such case is avoided since DAMON avoids setting the agregation interval as samller than the sampling interval. However, since nr_accesses is unsigned int while the intervals are unsigned long, the maximum nr_accesses could be zero while casting.

Avoid the divide-by-zero by implementing a function that handles the corner case (first patch), and replaces the vulnerable direct max nr_accesses calculations (remaining patches).

Note that the patches for the replacements are divided for broken commits, to make backporting on required tres easier. Especially, the last patch is for a patch that not yet merged into the mainline but in mm tree.

This patch (of 4):

The maximum nr_accesses of given DAMON context can be calculated by dividing the aggregation interval by the sampling interval. Some logics in DAMON uses the maximum nr_accesses as a divisor. Hence, the value shouldn't be zero. Such case is avoided since DAMON avoids setting the agregation interval as samller than the sampling interval. However, since nr_accesses is unsigned int while the intervals are unsigned long, the maximum nr_accesses could be zero while casting. Implement a function that handles the corner case.

Note that this commit is not fixing the real issue since this is only introducing the safe function that will replaces the problematic divisions. The replacements will be made by followup commits, to make backporting on stable series easier.

---
 include/linux/damon.h |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -559,6 +559,13 @@ static inline bool damon_target_has_pid(
 	return ctx->ops.id == DAMON_OPS_VADDR || ctx->ops.id == DAMON_OPS_FVADDR;
 }
 
+static inline unsigned int damon_max_nr_accesses(const struct damon_attrs *attrs)
+{
+	/* {aggr,sample}_interval are unsigned long, hence could overflow */
+	return min(attrs->aggr_interval / attrs->sample_interval,
+			(unsigned long)UINT_MAX);
+}
+
 
 int damon_start(struct damon_ctx **ctxs, int nr_ctxs, bool exclusive);
 int damon_stop(struct damon_ctx **ctxs, int nr_ctxs);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit b4936b544b08ed44949055b92bd25f77759ebafc upstream.

Patch series "mm/damon/sysfs: fix unhandled return values".

Some of DAMON sysfs interface code is not handling return values from some functions. As a result, confusing user input handling or NULL-dereference is possible. Check those properly.

This patch (of 3):

damon_sysfs_update_target() returns error code for failures, but its caller, damon_sysfs_set_targets() is ignoring that. The update function seems making no critical change in case of such failures, but the behavior will look like DAMON sysfs is silently ignoring or only partially accepting the user input. Fix it.

---
 mm/damon/sysfs.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2241,8 +2241,10 @@ static int damon_sysfs_set_targets(struc
 
 	damon_for_each_target_safe(t, next, ctx) {
 		if (i < sysfs_targets->nr) {
-			damon_sysfs_update_target(t, ctx,
+			err = damon_sysfs_update_target(t, ctx,
 					sysfs_targets->targets_arr[i]);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
 		} else {
 			if (damon_target_has_pid(ctx))
 				put_pid(t->pid);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Werner Sembach <[email protected]>

commit 0da9eccde3270b832c059ad618bf66e510c75d33 upstream.

The TongFang GMxXGxx/TUXEDO Stellaris/Pollaris Gen5 needs IRQ overriding for the keyboard to work.

Adding an entry for this laptop to the override_table makes the internal keyboard functional.

---
 drivers/acpi/resource.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -500,6 +500,18 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id mainge
 		}
 	},
 	{
+		/* TongFang GMxXGxx/TUXEDO Polaris 15 Gen5 AMD */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GMxXGxx"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		/* TongFang GM6XGxX/TUXEDO Stellaris 16 Gen5 AMD */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GM6XGxX"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
 		.ident = "MAINGEAR Vector Pro 2 17",
 		.matches = {
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Micro Electronics Inc"),

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Brown <[email protected]>

commit 0ec7731655de196bc1e4af99e495b38778109d22 upstream.

When we sync the register cache we do so with the cache bypassed in order to avoid overhead from writing the synced values back into the cache. If the regmap has ranges and the selector register for those ranges is in a register which is cached this has the unfortunate side effect of meaning that the physical and cached copies of the selector register can be out of sync after a cache sync. The cache will have whatever the selector was when the sync started and the hardware will have the selector for the register that was synced last.

Fix this by rewriting all cached selector registers after every sync, ensuring that the hardware and cache have the same content. This will result in extra writes that wouldn't otherwise be needed but is simple so hopefully robust. We don't read from the hardware since not all devices have physical read support.

Given that nobody noticed this until now it is likely that we are rarely if ever hitting this case.

---
 drivers/base/regmap/regcache.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)

@@ -331,6 +331,11 @@ static int regcache_default_sync(struct
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int rbtree_all(const void *key, const struct rb_node *node)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * regcache_sync - Sync the register cache with the hardware.
  *

@@ -348,6 +353,7 @@ int regcache_sync(struct regmap *map)
 	unsigned int i;
 	const char *name;
 	bool bypass;
+	struct rb_node *node;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(map->cache_type == REGCACHE_NONE))
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -392,6 +398,30 @@ out:
 	map->async = false;
 	map->cache_bypass = bypass;
 	map->no_sync_defaults = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we did any paging with cache bypassed and a cached
+	 * paging register then the register and cache state might
+	 * have gone out of sync, force writes of all the paging
+	 * registers.
+	 */
+	rb_for_each(node, 0, &map->range_tree, rbtree_all) {
+		struct regmap_range_node *this =
+			rb_entry(node, struct regmap_range_node, node);
+
+		/* If there's nothing in the cache there's nothing to sync */
+		ret = regcache_read(map, this->selector_reg, &i);
+		if (ret != 0)
+			continue;
+
+		ret = _regmap_write(map, this->selector_reg, i);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			dev_err(map->dev, "Failed to write %x = %x: %d\n",
+				this->selector_reg, i, ret);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	map->unlock(map->lock_arg);
 
 	regmap_async_complete(map);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 1a5352a81b4720ba43d9c899974e3bddf7ce0ce8 upstream.

The ath11k active pdevs are protected by RCU but the temperature event handling code calling ath11k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id() was not marked as a read-side critical section as reported by RCU lockdep:

	=============================
	WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
	6.6.0-rc6 #7 Not tainted
	-----------------------------
	drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/mac.c:638 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

	other info that might help us debug this:

	rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
	no locks held by swapper/0/0.
	...
	Call trace:
	...
	 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x16c/0x22c
	 ath11k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id+0x194/0x1b0 [ath11k]
	 ath11k_wmi_tlv_op_rx+0xa84/0x2c1c [ath11k]
	 ath11k_htc_rx_completion_handler+0x388/0x510 [ath11k]

Mark the code in question as an RCU read-side critical section to avoid any potential use-after-free issues.

Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.1 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.23

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -7775,15 +7775,19 @@ ath11k_wmi_pdev_temperature_event(struct
 	ath11k_dbg(ab, ATH11K_DBG_WMI,
 		   "pdev temperature ev temp %d pdev_id %d\n", ev->temp, ev->pdev_id);
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
 	ar = ath11k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id(ab, ev->pdev_id);
 	if (!ar) {
 		ath11k_warn(ab, "invalid pdev id in pdev temperature ev %d", ev->pdev_id);
-		kfree(tb);
-		return;
+		goto exit;
 	}
 
 	ath11k_thermal_event_temperature(ar, ev->temp);
 
+exit:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	kfree(tb);
 }
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 3b6c14833165f689cc5928574ebafe52bbce5f1e upstream.

The ath11k active pdevs are protected by RCU but the DFS radar event handling code calling ath11k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id() was not marked as a read-side critical section.

Mark the code in question as an RCU read-side critical section to avoid any potential use-after-free issues.

Compile tested only.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -7729,6 +7729,8 @@ ath11k_wmi_pdev_dfs_radar_detected_event
 		   ev->detector_id, ev->segment_id, ev->timestamp, ev->is_chirp,
 		   ev->freq_offset, ev->sidx);
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
 	ar = ath11k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id(ab, ev->pdev_id);
 
 	if (!ar) {

@@ -7746,6 +7748,8 @@ ath11k_wmi_pdev_dfs_radar_detected_event
 		ieee80211_radar_detected(ar->hw);
 
 exit:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	kfree(tb);
 }
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 3f77c7d605b29df277d77e9ee75d96e7ad145d2d upstream.

The ath11k active pdevs are protected by RCU but the htt pktlog handling code calling ath11k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id() was not marked as a read-side critical section.

Mark the code in question as an RCU read-side critical section to avoid any potential use-after-free issues.

Compile tested only.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp_rx.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1621,14 +1621,20 @@ static void ath11k_htt_pktlog(struct ath
 	u8 pdev_id;
 
 	pdev_id = FIELD_GET(HTT_T2H_PPDU_STATS_INFO_PDEV_ID, data->hdr);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
 	ar = ath11k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id(ab, pdev_id);
 	if (!ar) {
 		ath11k_warn(ab, "invalid pdev id %d on htt pktlog\n", pdev_id);
-		return;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	trace_ath11k_htt_pktlog(ar, data->payload, hdr->size,
 				ar->ab->pktlog_defs_checksum);
+
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 static void ath11k_htt_backpressure_event_handler(struct ath11k_base *ab,

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 1dea3c0720a146bd7193969f2847ccfed5be2221 upstream.

The ath11k active pdevs are protected by RCU but the gtk offload status event handling code calling ath11k_mac_get_arvif_by_vdev_id() was not marked as a read-side critical section.

Mark the code in question as an RCU read-side critical section to avoid any potential use-after-free issues.

Compile tested only.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/wmi.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -8001,12 +8001,13 @@ static void ath11k_wmi_gtk_offload_statu
 		return;
 	}
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
 	arvif = ath11k_mac_get_arvif_by_vdev_id(ab, ev->vdev_id);
 	if (!arvif) {
 		ath11k_warn(ab, "failed to get arvif for vdev_id:%d\n",
 			    ev->vdev_id);
-		kfree(tb);
-		return;
+		goto exit;
 	}
 
 	ath11k_dbg(ab, ATH11K_DBG_WMI, "wmi gtk offload event refresh_cnt %d\n",

@@ -8023,6 +8024,8 @@ static void ath11k_wmi_gtk_offload_statu
 
 	ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(arvif->vif, arvif->bssid,
 				   (void *)&replay_ctr_be, GFP_ATOMIC);
+exit:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	kfree(tb);
 }

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rong Chen <[email protected]>

commit 57925e16c9f7d18012bcf45bfa658f92c087981a upstream.

For the t7 and older SoC families, the CMD_CFG_ERROR has no effect. Starting from SoC family C3, setting this bit without SG LINK data address will cause the controller to generate an IRQ and stop working.

To fix it, don't set the bit CMD_CFG_ERROR anymore.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -817,7 +817,6 @@ static void meson_mmc_start_cmd(struct m
 
 	cmd_cfg |= FIELD_PREP(CMD_CFG_CMD_INDEX_MASK, cmd->opcode);
 	cmd_cfg |= CMD_CFG_OWNER;  /* owned by CPU */
-	cmd_cfg |= CMD_CFG_ERROR; /* stop in case of error */
 
 	meson_mmc_set_response_bits(cmd, &cmd_cfg);
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herve Codina <[email protected]>

commit 5e7afb2eb7b2a7c81e9f608cbdf74a07606fd1b5 upstream.

irq_remove_generic_chip() calculates the Linux interrupt number for removing the handler and interrupt chip based on gc::irq_base as a linear function of the bit positions of set bits in the @msk argument.

When the generic chip is present in an irq domain, i.e. created with a call to irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips(), gc::irq_base contains not the base Linux interrupt number. It contains the base hardware interrupt for this chip. It is set to 0 for the first chip in the domain, 0 + N for the next chip, where $N is the number of hardware interrupts per chip.

That means the Linux interrupt number cannot be calculated based on gc::irq_base for irqdomain based chips without a domain map lookup, which is currently missing.

Rework the code to take the irqdomain case into account and calculate the Linux interrupt number by a irqdomain lookup of the domain specific hardware interrupt number.

[ tglx: Massage changelog. Reshuffle the logic and add a proper comment. ]

---
 kernel/irq/generic-chip.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -544,21 +544,34 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_setup_alt_chip);
 void irq_remove_generic_chip(struct irq_chip_generic *gc, u32 msk,
 			     unsigned int clr, unsigned int set)
 {
-	unsigned int i = gc->irq_base;
+	unsigned int i, virq;
 
 	raw_spin_lock(&gc_lock);
 	list_del(&gc->list);
 	raw_spin_unlock(&gc_lock);
 
-	for (; msk; msk >>= 1, i++) {
+	for (i = 0; msk; msk >>= 1, i++) {
 		if (!(msk & 0x01))
 			continue;
 
+		/*
+		 * Interrupt domain based chips store the base hardware
+		 * interrupt number in gc::irq_base. Otherwise gc::irq_base
+		 * contains the base Linux interrupt number.
+		 */
+		if (gc->domain) {
+			virq = irq_find_mapping(gc->domain, gc->irq_base + i);
+			if (!virq)
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			virq = gc->irq_base + i;
+		}
+
 		/* Remove handler first. That will mask the irq line */
-		irq_set_handler(i, NULL);
-		irq_set_chip(i, &no_irq_chip);
-		irq_set_chip_data(i, NULL);
-		irq_modify_status(i, clr, set);
+		irq_set_handler(virq, NULL);
+		irq_set_chip(virq, &no_irq_chip);
+		irq_set_chip_data(virq, NULL);
+		irq_modify_status(virq, clr, set);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_remove_generic_chip);