arch/x86: Fix typos
Subsystems (17)
PATCH 1/1 arch/x86: Fix typos
From: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Fix typos, most reported by "codespell arch/x86". Only touches comments, no code changes.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/irqdomain.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/amd_nb.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/iosf_mbi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_hub.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface_64.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 +- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/intel-quark/imr_selftest.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/pvh/head.S | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_time.c | 2 +- arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +- 60 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wa$(comma)-mrelax-relocations=no) KBUILD_CFLAGS += -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h -# sev.c indirectly inludes inat-table.h which is generated during +# sev.c indirectly includes inat-table.h which is generated during # compilation and stored in $(objtree). Add the directory to the includes so # that the compiler finds it even with out-of-tree builds (make O=/some/path). CFLAGS_sev.o += -I$(objtree)/arch/x86/lib/
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c +1 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@/* * accept_memory() and process_unaccepted_memory() called from EFI stub which -* runs before decompresser and its early_tdx_detect(). +* runs before decompressor and its early_tdx_detect(). * * Enumerate TDX directly from the early users. */
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +1 -1
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)* there. * * Intel-TDX has a secure RDMSR hypercall, but that needs to be -* implemented seperately in the low level startup ASM code. +* implemented separately in the low level startup ASM code. * Until that is in place, disable parallel bringup for TDX. */ x86_cpuinit.parallel_bringup = false;
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +1 -1
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ ALL_F: .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff .ifc \operation, dec movdqa %xmm1, %xmm3 - pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Cyphertext XOR E(K, Yn) + pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Ciphertext XOR E(K, Yn) mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10 add %r13, %r10
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S +1 -1
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ VARIABLE_OFFSET = 16*8 .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa %xmm1, %xmm3 - pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Cyphertext XOR E(K, Yn) + pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Ciphertext XOR E(K, Yn) mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10 add %r13, %r10
arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S +1 -1
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crc_pcl) xor crc1,crc1 xor crc2,crc2 - # Fall thruogh into top of crc array (crc_128) + # Fall through into top of crc array (crc_128) ################################################################ ## 3) CRC Array:
arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S +1 -1
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ frame_size = frame_WK + WK_SIZE # Useful QWORD "arrays" for simpler memory references # MSG, DIGEST, K_t, W_t are arrays -# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depdending on t being odd/even +# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depending on t being odd/even # Input message (arg1) #define MSG(i) 8*i(msg)
arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S +1 -1
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ frame_size = frame_WK + WK_SIZE # Useful QWORD "arrays" for simpler memory references # MSG, DIGEST, K_t, W_t are arrays -# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depdending on t being odd/even +# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depending on t being odd/even # Input message (arg1) #define MSG(i) 8*i(msg)
arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c +1 -1
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int amd_brs_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)* Where X is the number of taken branches due to interrupt * skid. Skid is large. * -* Where Y is the occurences of the event while BRS is +* Where Y is the occurrences of the event while BRS is * capturing the lbr_nr entries. * * By using retired taken branches, we limit the impact on the
arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +1 -1
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ static void amd_put_event_constraints_f17h(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,* period of each one and given that the BRS saturates, it would not be possible * to guarantee correlated content for all events. Therefore, in situations * where multiple events want to use BRS, the kernel enforces mutual exclusion. -* Exclusion is enforced by chosing only one counter for events using BRS. +* Exclusion is enforced by choosing only one counter for events using BRS. * The event scheduling logic will then automatically multiplex the * events and ensure that at most one event is actively using BRS. *
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +1 -1
@@ -4027,7 +4027,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)/* * Currently, the only caller of this function is the atomic_switch_perf_msrs(). -* The host perf conext helps to prepare the values of the real hardware for +* The host perf context helps to prepare the values of the real hardware for * a set of msrs that need to be switched atomically in a vmx transaction. * * For example, the pseudocode needed to add a new msr should look like:
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c +1 -1
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static bool __send_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector,/* * This particular version of the IPI hypercall can -* only target upto 64 CPUs. +* only target up to 64 CPUs. */ if (vcpu >=64 ) goto do_ex_hypercall;
arch/x86/hyperv/irqdomain.c +1 -1
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void hv_irq_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg)* This interrupt is already mapped. Let's unmap first. * * We don't use retarget interrupt hypercalls here because -* Microsoft Hypervisor doens't allow root to change the vector +* Microsoft Hypervisor doesn't allow root to change the vector * or specify VPs outside of the set that is initially used * during mapping. */
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +1 -1
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void __noreturn hv_ghcb_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)/* Tell the hypervisor what went wrong. */ val |=GHCB_SEV_TERM_REASON (set, reason); -/* Request Guest Termination from Hypvervisor */ +/* Request Guest Termination from Hypervisor */ wr_ghcb_msr (val);VMGEXIT ();
arch/x86/include/asm/amd_nb.h +1 -1
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline bool amd_gart_present(void)if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD )return false; -/* GART present only on Fam15h, upto model 0fh */ +/* GART present only on Fam15h, up to model 0fh */ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 ==0xf || boot_cpu_data.x86 ==0x10 || (boot_cpu_data.x86 ==0x15 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model <0x10 ))return true;
arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@/* * Our IMM is signed, as such it must live at the top end of the word. Also, -* since C99 hex constants are of ambigious type, force cast the mask to 'int' +* since C99 hex constants are of ambiguous type, force cast the mask to 'int' * so that FIELD_GET() will DTRT and sign extend the value when it extracts it. */ #define EX_DATA_TYPE_MASK ((int)0x000000FF)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +1 -1
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ struct fpu_state_perm {* * This master permission field is only to be used when * task.fpu.fpstate based checks fail to validate whether the task -* is allowed to expand it's xfeatures set which requires to +* is allowed to expand its xfeatures set which requires to * allocate a larger sized fpstate buffer. * * Do not access this field directly. Use the provided helper
arch/x86/include/asm/iosf_mbi.h +1 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int iosf_mbi_modify(u8 port, u8 opcode, u32 offset, u32 mdr, u32 mask);* This function will block all kernel access to the PMIC I2C bus, so that the * P-Unit can safely access the PMIC over the shared I2C bus. * -* Note on these systems the i2c-bus driver will request a sempahore from the +* Note on these systems the i2c-bus driver will request a semaphore from the * P-Unit for exclusive access to the PMIC bus when i2c drivers are accessing * it, but this does not appear to be sufficient, we still need to avoid making * certain P-Unit requests during the access window to avoid problems.
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -1652,7 +1652,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {/* Whether or not a virtual NMI is pending in hardware. */ bool (*is_vnmi_pending)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);/* -* Attempt to pend a virtual NMI in harware. Returns %true on success +* Attempt to pend a virtual NMI in hardware. Returns %true on success * to allow using static_call_ret0 as the fallback. */ bool (*set_vnmi_pending)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +2 -2
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@* but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not * claim to be perfect and it can be speculated around by the CPU, but it * is considered that it obfuscates the problem enough to make exploitation -* extremly difficult. +* extremely difficult. */ #define RET_DEPTH_SHIFT 5#define RSB_RET_STUFF_LOOPS 16
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@/* * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should -* eventually turn into it's own annotation. +* eventually turn into its own annotation. */ .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h +1 -1
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static inline void native_pgd_clear(pgd_t *pgd)* F (2) in swp entry is used to record when a pagetable is * writeprotected by userfaultfd WP support. * -* E (3) in swp entry is used to rememeber PG_anon_exclusive. +* E (3) in swp entry is used to remember PG_anon_exclusive. * * Bit 7 in swp entry should be 0 because pmd_present checks not only P, * but also L and G.
arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_hub.h +1 -1
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static inline int uv_blade_to_node(int blade)return uv_socket_to_node (blade); } -/* Blade number of current cpu. Numnbered 0 .. <#blades -1> */ +/* Blade number of current cpu. Numbered 0 .. <#blades -1> */ static inline int uv_numa_blade_id (void ) {return uv_hub_info->numa_blade_id;
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h +1 -1
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static __always_inlineu64 vdso_calc_delta (u64 cycles,u64 last,u64 mask,u32 mult) {/* -* Due to the MSB/Sign-bit being used as invald marker (see +* Due to the MSB/Sign-bit being used as invalid marker (see * arch_vdso_cycles_valid() above), the effective mask is S64_MAX. */ u64 delta = (cycles - last) &S64_MAX ;
arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface_64.h +1 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@* RING1 -> RING3 kernel mode. * RING2 -> RING3 kernel mode. * RING3 -> RING3 user mode. -* However RING0 indicates that the guest kernel should return to iteself +* However RING0 indicates that the guest kernel should return to itself * directly with * orb $3,1*8(%rsp) * iretq
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h +1 -1
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static const struct hsmp_msg_desc hsmp_msg_desc_table[] = {/* * HSMP_GET_DIMM_THERMAL, num_args = 1, response_sz = 1 * input: args[0] = DIMM address[7:0] -* output: args[0] = temperature in degree celcius[31:21] + update rate in ms[16:8] + +* output: args[0] = temperature in degree celsius[31:21] + update rate in ms[16:8] + * DIMM address[7:0] */ {1, 1, HSMP_GET},
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +1 -1
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void *__text_poke(text_poke_f func, void *addr, const void *src, size_t l* Note that the caller must ensure that if the modified code is part of a * module, the module would not be removed during poking. This can be achieved * by registering a module notifier, and ordering module removal and patching -* trough a mutex. +* through a mutex. */ void *text_poke (void *addr,const void *opcode,size_t len) {
arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c +1 -1
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ int __init gart_iommu_init(void) iommu_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);/* * Tricky. The GART table remaps the physical memory range, -* so the CPU wont notice potential aliases and if the memory +* so the CPU won't notice potential aliases and if the memory * is remapped to UC later on, we might surprise the PCI devices * with a stray writeout of a cacheline. So play it sure and * do an explicit, full-scale wbinvd() _after_ having marked all
arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # # Leads to non-deterministic coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. -# In particualr, smp_apic_timer_interrupt() is called in random places. +# In particular, smp_apic_timer_interrupt() is called in random places. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += apic.o apic_common.o apic_noop.o ipi.o vector.o init.o
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +1 -1
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ bool __init apic_needs_pit(void)/* * If interrupt delivery mode is legacy PIC or virtual wire without -* configuration, the local APIC timer wont be set up. Make sure +* configuration, the local APIC timer won't be set up. Make sure * that the PIT is initialized. */ if (apic_intr_mode == APIC_PIC ||
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +1 -1
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void)void lapic_assign_legacy_vector (unsigned int irq,bool replace) {/* -* Use assign system here so it wont get accounted as allocated +* Use assign system here so it won't get accounted as allocated * and moveable in the cpu hotplug check and it prevents managed * irq reservation from touching it. */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,* * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match -* the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct. +* the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is calculated from the provided sigstruct. * * Return: * - 0: Success.
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +1 -1
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_update_guest_xfd);* Must be invoked from KVM after a VMEXIT before enabling interrupts when * XFD write emulation is disabled. This is required because the guest can * freely modify XFD and the state at VMEXIT is not guaranteed to be the -* same as the state on VMENTER. So software state has to be udpated before +* same as the state on VMENTER. So software state has to be updated before * any operation which depends on it can take place. * * Note: It can be invoked unconditionally even when write emulation is
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +2 -2
@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * Switch to new page-table * * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the - * indentity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the + * identity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the * init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and unmap the - * indentity mapped ranges. + * identity mapped ranges. */ movq %rax, %cr3
arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c +2 -2
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static void __init hpet_select_clockevents(void) hpet_base.nr_clockevents =0 ; -/* No point if MSI is disabled or CPU has an Always Runing APIC Timer */ +/* No point if MSI is disabled or CPU has an Always Running APIC Timer */ if (hpet_msi_disable ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ARAT ))return ;
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static bool __init mwait_pc10_supported(void)* and per CPU timer interrupts. * * The probability that this problem is going to be solved in the -* forseeable future is close to zero, so the kernel has to be cluttered +* foreseeable future is close to zero, so the kernel has to be cluttered * with heuristics to keep up with the ever growing amount of hardware and * firmware trainwrecks. Hopefully some day hardware people will understand * that the approach of "This can be fixed in software" is not sustainable.
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +1 -1
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)* Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel * specific page encryption status settings before we load a * new kernel by kexec. Reset the page encryption status -* during early boot intead of just before kexec to avoid SMP +* during early boot instead of just before kexec to avoid SMP * races during kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(). * NOTE: We cannot reset the complete shared pages list * here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c +1 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int __init parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall(char *arg) }early_param ("no-kvmclock-vsyscall" , parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall); -/* Aligned to page sizes to match whats mapped via vsyscalls to userspace */ +/* Aligned to page sizes to match what's mapped via vsyscalls to userspace */ #define HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE \ (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info))
arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c +3 -3
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@* This handles calls from both 32bit and 64bit mode. * * Lock order: -* contex.ldt_usr_sem +* context.ldt_usr_sem * mmap_lock * context.lock */
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)/* * Any change to mm->context.ldt is followed by an IPI to all * CPUs with the mm active. The LDT will not be freed until -* after the IPI is handled by all such CPUs. This means that, +* after the IPI is handled by all such CPUs. This means that * if the ldt_struct changes before we return, the values we see * will be safe, and the new values will be loaded before we run * any user code.
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(modify_ldt, int , func , void __user * , ptr , }/* * The SYSCALL_DEFINE() macros give us an 'unsigned long' -* return type, but tht ABI for sys_modify_ldt() expects +* return type, but the ABI for sys_modify_ldt() expects * 'int'. This cast gives us an int-sized value in %rax * for the return code. The 'unsigned' is necessary so * the compiler does not try to sign-extend the negative
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ void native_tss_update_io_bitmap(void)/* * Make sure that the TSS limit is covering the IO bitmap. It might have * been cut down by a VMEXIT to 0x67 which would cause a subsequent I/O -* access from user space to trigger a #GP because tbe bitmap is outside +* access from user space to trigger a #GP because the bitmap is outside * the TSS limit. */ refresh_tss_limit ();
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +1 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void __noreturn sev_es_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)/* Tell the hypervisor what went wrong. */ val |=GHCB_SEV_TERM_REASON (set, reason); -/* Request Guest Termination from Hypvervisor */ +/* Request Guest Termination from Hypervisor */ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr (val);VMGEXIT ();
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(/* * If the index isn't significant, use the first entry with a -* matching function. It's userspace's responsibilty to not +* matching function. It's userspace's responsibility to not * provide "duplicate" entries in all cases. */ if (!(e->flags &KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX ) || e->index == index)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2 -2
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ static void pte_list_desc_remove_entry(struct kvm *kvm,/* * The head descriptor is empty. If there are no tail descriptors, -* nullify the rmap head to mark the list as emtpy, else point the rmap +* nullify the rmap head to mark the list as empty, else point the rmap * head at the next descriptor, i.e. the new head. */ if (!head_desc->more)
@@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages (kvm, memslot, start, end, target_level, false);/* -* A TLB flush is unnecessary at this point for the same resons as in +* A TLB flush is unnecessary at this point for the same reasons as in * kvm_mmu_slot_try_split_huge_pages(). */ }
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static bool try_step_up(struct tdp_iter *iter)* Step to the next SPTE in a pre-order traversal of the paging structure. * To get to the next SPTE, the iterator either steps down towards the goal * GFN, if at a present, non-last-level SPTE, or over to a SPTE mapping a -* highter GFN. +* higher GFN. * * The basic algorithm is as follows: * 1. If the current SPTE is a non-last-level SPTE, step down into the page
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -4741,7 +4741,7 @@ static int svm_check_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,* Emulation is possible for SEV guests if and only if a prefilled * buffer containing the bytes of the intercepted instruction is * available. SEV guest memory is encrypted with a guest specific key -* and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read cyphertext and +* and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read ciphertext and * decode garbage. * * If KVM is NOT trying to simply skip an instruction, inject #UD if
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +1 -1
@@ -6561,7 +6561,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,* code was changed such that flag signals vmcs12 should * be copied into eVMCS in guest memory. * -* To preserve backwards compatability, allow user +* To preserve backwards compatibility, allow user * to set this flag even when there is no VMXON region. */ if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS )
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ static void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)* do generate error codes with bits 31:16 set, and so KVM's * ABI lets userspace shove in arbitrary 32-bit values. Drop * the upper bits to avoid VM-Fail, losing information that -* does't really exist is preferable to killing the VM. +* doesn't really exist is preferable to killing the VM. */ vmcs_write32 (VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE , (u16 )ex->error_code); intr_info |=INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK ;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -3
@@ -10165,7 +10165,7 @@ static void kvm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)* * But, if a VM-Exit occurs during instruction execution, and KVM does NOT skip * the instruction or inject an exception, then KVM can incorrecty inject a new -* asynchrounous event if the event became pending after the CPU fetched the +* asynchronous event if the event became pending after the CPU fetched the * instruction (in the guest). E.g. if a page fault (#PF, #NPF, EPT violation) * occurs and is resolved by KVM, a coincident NMI, SMI, IRQ, etc... can be * injected on the restarted instruction instead of being deferred until the
@@ -10186,7 +10186,7 @@ static int kvm_check_and_inject_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int r;/* -* Process nested events first, as nested VM-Exit supercedes event +* Process nested events first, as nested VM-Exit supersedes event * re-injection. If there's an event queued for re-injection, it will * be saved into the appropriate vmc{b,s}12 fields on nested VM-Exit. */
@@ -10884,7 +10884,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* * Assert that vCPU vs. VM APICv state is consistent. An APICv * update must kick and wait for all vCPUs before toggling the -* per-VM state, and responsing vCPUs must wait for the update +* per-VM state, and responding vCPUs must wait for the update * to complete before servicing KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE. */ WARN_ON_ONCE((kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(vcpu) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) &&
arch/x86/lib/delay.c +1 -1
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void delay_halt_mwaitx(u64 unused, u64 cycles) delay =min_t (u64,MWAITX_MAX_WAIT_CYCLES , cycles);/* -* Use cpu_tss_rw as a cacheline-aligned, seldomly accessed per-cpu +* Use cpu_tss_rw as a cacheline-aligned, seldom accessed per-cpu * variable as the monitor target. */ __monitorx (raw_cpu_ptr (&cpu_tss_rw),0 ,0 );
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +3 -3
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pte_table(pte_t *pte_start, pmd_t *pmd)return ; } -/* free a pte talbe */ +/* free a pte table */ free_pagetable (pmd_page (*pmd),0 );spin_lock (&init_mm.page_table_lock);pmd_clear (pmd);
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pmd_table(pmd_t *pmd_start, pud_t *pud)return ; } -/* free a pmd talbe */ +/* free a pmd table */ free_pagetable (pud_page (*pud),0 );spin_lock (&init_mm.page_table_lock);pud_clear (pud);
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pud_table(pud_t *pud_start, p4d_t *p4d)return ; } -/* free a pud talbe */ +/* free a pud table */ free_pagetable (p4d_page (*p4d),0 );spin_lock (&init_mm.page_table_lock);p4d_clear (p4d);
arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c +1 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@* memory ranges: uncached, write-combining, write-through, write-protected, * and the most commonly used and default attribute: write-back caching. * -* PAT support supercedes and augments MTRR support in a compatible fashion: MTRR is +* PAT support supersedes and augments MTRR support in a compatible fashion: MTRR is * a hardware interface to enumerate a limited number of physical memory ranges * and set their caching attributes explicitly, programmed into the CPU via MSRs. * Even modern CPUs have MTRRs enabled - but these are typically not touched
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +2 -2
@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ static int __change_page_attr(struct cpa_data *cpa, int primary)/* * We need to keep the pfn from the existing PTE, -* after all we're only going to change it's attributes +* after all we're only going to change its attributes * not the memory it points to */ new_pte =pfn_pte (pfn, new_prot);
@@ -2447,7 +2447,7 @@ int __init kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,/* * The typical sequence for unmapping is to find a pte through * lookup_address_in_pgd() (ideally, it should never return NULL because -* the address is already mapped) and change it's protections. As pfn is +* the address is already mapped) and change its protections. As pfn is * the *target* of a mapping, it's not useful while unmapping. */ struct cpa_data cpa = {
arch/x86/mm/pti.c +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@* * https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER * -* The original work was written by and and signed off by for the Linux +* The original work was written by and signed off by for the Linux * kernel by: * * Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <[email protected]>
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +1 -1
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static void l1d_flush_evaluate(unsigned long prev_mm, unsigned long next_mm,/* * Validate that it is not running on an SMT sibling as this would -* make the excercise pointless because the siblings share L1D. If +* make the exercise pointless because the siblings share L1D. If * it runs on a SMT sibling, notify it with SIGBUS on return to * user/guest */
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1 -1
@@ -2143,7 +2143,7 @@ static void save_args(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **prog, }else {/* Only copy the arguments on-stack to current * 'stack_size' and ignore the regs, used to -* prepare the arguments on-stack for orign call. +* prepare the arguments on-stack for origin call. */ if (for_call_origin) { nr_regs += arg_regs;
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c +1 -1
@@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@ struct jit_context {#define PROLOGUE_SIZE 35/* -* Emit prologue code for BPF program and check it's size. +* Emit prologue code for BPF program and check its size. * bpf_tail_call helper will skip it while jumping into another program. */ static void emit_prologue (u8 **pprog,u32 stack_depth)
arch/x86/platform/intel-quark/imr_selftest.c +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@* Copyright(c) 2015 Bryan O'Donoghue <[email protected]> * * IMR self test. The purpose of this module is to run a set of tests on the -* IMR API to validate it's sanity. We check for overlapping, reserved +* IMR API to validate its sanity. We check for overlapping, reserved * addresses and setup/teardown sanity. * */
arch/x86/platform/pvh/head.S +1 -1
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ * Bit 8 (TF) must be cleared. Other bits are all unspecified. * * All other processor registers and flag bits are unspecified. The OS is in - * charge of setting up it's own stack, GDT and IDT. + * charge of setting up its own stack, GDT and IDT. */ #define PVH_GDT_ENTRY_CS 1
arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c +1 -1
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static void uv_nmi_dump_state_cpu(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs)this_cpu_write (uv_cpu_nmi.state,UV_NMI_STATE_DUMP_DONE ); } -/* Trigger a slave CPU to dump it's state */ +/* Trigger a slave CPU to dump its state */ static void uv_nmi_trigger_dump (int cpu) {int retry = uv_nmi_trigger_delay;
arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_time.c +1 -1
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int uv_rtc_unset_timer(int cpu, int force)* Read the RTC. * * Starting with HUB rev 2.0, the UV RTC register is replicated across all -* cachelines of it's own page. This allows faster simultaneous reads +* cachelines of its own page. This allows faster simultaneous reads * from a given socket. */ static u64 uv_read_rtc (struct clocksource *cs)
arch/x86/realmode/init.c +1 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)set_real_mode_mem (mem);/* -* Unconditionally reserve the entire fisrt 1M, see comment in +* Unconditionally reserve the entire first 1M, see comment in * setup_arch(). */ memblock_reserve (0 ,SZ_1M );
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +1 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@* would need to validate the whole pagetable before going on. * Naturally, this is quite slow. The solution is to "pin" a * pagetable, which enforces all the constraints on the pagetable even -* when it is not actively in use. This menas that Xen can be assured +* when it is not actively in use. This means that Xen can be assured * that it is still valid when you do load it into %cr3, and doesn't * need to revalidate it. *
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 74 lines · Bjorn Helgaas
From: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Fix typos, most reported by "codespell
arch/x86". Only touches comments, no code changes.Signed-off-by Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/irqdomain.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/amd_nb.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/iosf_mbi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_hub.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface_64.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 +- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/intel-quark/imr_selftest.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/pvh/head.S | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_time.c | 2 +- arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +- 60 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void) · line 742
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +1
-1@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void)void lapic_assign_legacy_vector (unsigned int irq,bool replace) {/* -* Use assign system here so it wont get accounted as allocated +* Use assign system here so it won't get accounted as allocated * and moveable in the cpu hotplug check and it prevents managed
OK, but movable is preferred.
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void) · line 744
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +0
-0* irq reservation from touching it. */
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
#Randy
Ingo Molnar
AppliedQuoted 10 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 9 lines · Bjorn Helgaas
From: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Fix typos, most reported by "codespell
arch/x86". Only touches comments, no code changes.Signed-off-by Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>---
60 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void) · line 742
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +1
-1@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void)void lapic_assign_legacy_vector (unsigned int irq,bool replace) {/* -* Use assign system here so it wont get accounted as allocated +* Use assign system here so it won't get accounted as allocated * and moveable in the cpu hotplug check and it prevents managed OK, but movable is preferred.
Ok, I've added this to the patch too.
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void) · line 744
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +0
-0* irq reservation from touching it. */ Reviewed-by Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Applied this patch to tip:x86/cleanups, thanks guys!
Ingo
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cleanups branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cleanups branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 54aa699e8094efb7d7675fefbc03dfce24f98456 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/54aa699e8094efb7d7675fefbc03dfce24f98456 Author: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 02 Jan 2024 18:40:11 -06:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 03 Jan 2024 11:46:22 +01:00
arch/x86: Fix typos
Fix typos, most reported by "codespell arch/x86". Only touches comments, no code changes.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S | 2 +- arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/irqdomain.c | 2 +- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/amd_nb.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/iosf_mbi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_hub.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface_64.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 +- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/intel-quark/imr_selftest.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/pvh/head.S | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_time.c | 2 +- arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +- 60 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wa$(comma)-mrelax-relocations=no) KBUILD_CFLAGS += -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h -# sev.c indirectly inludes inat-table.h which is generated during +# sev.c indirectly includes inat-table.h which is generated during # compilation and stored in $(objtree). Add the directory to the includes so # that the compiler finds it even with out-of-tree builds (make O=/some/path). CFLAGS_sev.o += -I$(objtree)/arch/x86/lib/
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c +1 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@/* * accept_memory() and process_unaccepted_memory() called from EFI stub which -* runs before decompresser and its early_tdx_detect(). +* runs before decompressor and its early_tdx_detect(). * * Enumerate TDX directly from the early users. */
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +1 -1
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)* there. * * Intel-TDX has a secure RDMSR hypercall, but that needs to be -* implemented seperately in the low level startup ASM code. +* implemented separately in the low level startup ASM code. * Until that is in place, disable parallel bringup for TDX. */ x86_cpuinit.parallel_bringup = false;
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +1 -1
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ ALL_F: .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff .ifc \operation, dec movdqa %xmm1, %xmm3 - pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Cyphertext XOR E(K, Yn) + pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Ciphertext XOR E(K, Yn) mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10 add %r13, %r10
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S +1 -1
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ VARIABLE_OFFSET = 16*8 .if \ENC_DEC == DEC vmovdqa %xmm1, %xmm3 - pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Cyphertext XOR E(K, Yn) + pxor %xmm1, %xmm9 # Ciphertext XOR E(K, Yn) mov \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN, %r10 add %r13, %r10
arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S +1 -1
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crc_pcl) xor crc1,crc1 xor crc2,crc2 - # Fall thruogh into top of crc array (crc_128) + # Fall through into top of crc array (crc_128) ################################################################ ## 3) CRC Array:
arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx-asm.S +1 -1
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ frame_size = frame_WK + WK_SIZE # Useful QWORD "arrays" for simpler memory references # MSG, DIGEST, K_t, W_t are arrays -# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depdending on t being odd/even +# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depending on t being odd/even # Input message (arg1) #define MSG(i) 8*i(msg)
arch/x86/crypto/sha512-ssse3-asm.S +1 -1
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ frame_size = frame_WK + WK_SIZE # Useful QWORD "arrays" for simpler memory references # MSG, DIGEST, K_t, W_t are arrays -# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depdending on t being odd/even +# WK_2(t) points to 1 of 2 qwords at frame.WK depending on t being odd/even # Input message (arg1) #define MSG(i) 8*i(msg)
arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c +1 -1
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int amd_brs_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)* Where X is the number of taken branches due to interrupt * skid. Skid is large. * -* Where Y is the occurences of the event while BRS is +* Where Y is the occurrences of the event while BRS is * capturing the lbr_nr entries. * * By using retired taken branches, we limit the impact on the
arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +1 -1
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ static void amd_put_event_constraints_f17h(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,* period of each one and given that the BRS saturates, it would not be possible * to guarantee correlated content for all events. Therefore, in situations * where multiple events want to use BRS, the kernel enforces mutual exclusion. -* Exclusion is enforced by chosing only one counter for events using BRS. +* Exclusion is enforced by choosing only one counter for events using BRS. * The event scheduling logic will then automatically multiplex the * events and ensure that at most one event is actively using BRS. *
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +1 -1
@@ -4027,7 +4027,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)/* * Currently, the only caller of this function is the atomic_switch_perf_msrs(). -* The host perf conext helps to prepare the values of the real hardware for +* The host perf context helps to prepare the values of the real hardware for * a set of msrs that need to be switched atomically in a vmx transaction. * * For example, the pseudocode needed to add a new msr should look like:
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c +1 -1
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static bool __send_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector,/* * This particular version of the IPI hypercall can -* only target upto 64 CPUs. +* only target up to 64 CPUs. */ if (vcpu >=64 ) goto do_ex_hypercall;
arch/x86/hyperv/irqdomain.c +1 -1
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void hv_irq_compose_msi_msg(struct irq_data *data, struct msi_msg *msg)* This interrupt is already mapped. Let's unmap first. * * We don't use retarget interrupt hypercalls here because -* Microsoft Hypervisor doens't allow root to change the vector +* Microsoft Hypervisor doesn't allow root to change the vector * or specify VPs outside of the set that is initially used * during mapping. */
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +1 -1
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void __noreturn hv_ghcb_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)/* Tell the hypervisor what went wrong. */ val |=GHCB_SEV_TERM_REASON (set, reason); -/* Request Guest Termination from Hypvervisor */ +/* Request Guest Termination from Hypervisor */ wr_ghcb_msr (val);VMGEXIT ();
arch/x86/include/asm/amd_nb.h +1 -1
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline bool amd_gart_present(void)if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor !=X86_VENDOR_AMD )return false; -/* GART present only on Fam15h, upto model 0fh */ +/* GART present only on Fam15h, up to model 0fh */ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 ==0xf || boot_cpu_data.x86 ==0x10 || (boot_cpu_data.x86 ==0x15 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model <0x10 ))return true;
arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@/* * Our IMM is signed, as such it must live at the top end of the word. Also, -* since C99 hex constants are of ambigious type, force cast the mask to 'int' +* since C99 hex constants are of ambiguous type, force cast the mask to 'int' * so that FIELD_GET() will DTRT and sign extend the value when it extracts it. */ #define EX_DATA_TYPE_MASK ((int)0x000000FF)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +1 -1
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ struct fpu_state_perm {* * This master permission field is only to be used when * task.fpu.fpstate based checks fail to validate whether the task -* is allowed to expand it's xfeatures set which requires to +* is allowed to expand its xfeatures set which requires to * allocate a larger sized fpstate buffer. * * Do not access this field directly. Use the provided helper
arch/x86/include/asm/iosf_mbi.h +1 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int iosf_mbi_modify(u8 port, u8 opcode, u32 offset, u32 mdr, u32 mask);* This function will block all kernel access to the PMIC I2C bus, so that the * P-Unit can safely access the PMIC over the shared I2C bus. * -* Note on these systems the i2c-bus driver will request a sempahore from the +* Note on these systems the i2c-bus driver will request a semaphore from the * P-Unit for exclusive access to the PMIC bus when i2c drivers are accessing * it, but this does not appear to be sufficient, we still need to avoid making * certain P-Unit requests during the access window to avoid problems.
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -1652,7 +1652,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {/* Whether or not a virtual NMI is pending in hardware. */ bool (*is_vnmi_pending)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);/* -* Attempt to pend a virtual NMI in harware. Returns %true on success +* Attempt to pend a virtual NMI in hardware. Returns %true on success * to allow using static_call_ret0 as the fallback. */ bool (*set_vnmi_pending)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +2 -2
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@* but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not * claim to be perfect and it can be speculated around by the CPU, but it * is considered that it obfuscates the problem enough to make exploitation -* extremly difficult. +* extremely difficult. */ #define RET_DEPTH_SHIFT 5#define RSB_RET_STUFF_LOOPS 16
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@/* * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should -* eventually turn into it's own annotation. +* eventually turn into its own annotation. */ .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END #if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h +1 -1
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static inline void native_pgd_clear(pgd_t *pgd)* F (2) in swp entry is used to record when a pagetable is * writeprotected by userfaultfd WP support. * -* E (3) in swp entry is used to rememeber PG_anon_exclusive. +* E (3) in swp entry is used to remember PG_anon_exclusive. * * Bit 7 in swp entry should be 0 because pmd_present checks not only P, * but also L and G.
arch/x86/include/asm/uv/uv_hub.h +1 -1
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static inline int uv_blade_to_node(int blade)return uv_socket_to_node (blade); } -/* Blade number of current cpu. Numnbered 0 .. <#blades -1> */ +/* Blade number of current cpu. Numbered 0 .. <#blades -1> */ static inline int uv_numa_blade_id (void ) {return uv_hub_info->numa_blade_id;
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h +1 -1
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static __always_inlineu64 vdso_calc_delta (u64 cycles,u64 last,u64 mask,u32 mult) {/* -* Due to the MSB/Sign-bit being used as invald marker (see +* Due to the MSB/Sign-bit being used as invalid marker (see * arch_vdso_cycles_valid() above), the effective mask is S64_MAX. */ u64 delta = (cycles - last) &S64_MAX ;
arch/x86/include/asm/xen/interface_64.h +1 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@* RING1 -> RING3 kernel mode. * RING2 -> RING3 kernel mode. * RING3 -> RING3 user mode. -* However RING0 indicates that the guest kernel should return to iteself +* However RING0 indicates that the guest kernel should return to itself * directly with * orb $3,1*8(%rsp) * iretq
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h +1 -1
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static const struct hsmp_msg_desc hsmp_msg_desc_table[] = {/* * HSMP_GET_DIMM_THERMAL, num_args = 1, response_sz = 1 * input: args[0] = DIMM address[7:0] -* output: args[0] = temperature in degree celcius[31:21] + update rate in ms[16:8] + +* output: args[0] = temperature in degree celsius[31:21] + update rate in ms[16:8] + * DIMM address[7:0] */ {1, 1, HSMP_GET},
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +1 -1
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void *__text_poke(text_poke_f func, void *addr, const void *src, size_t l* Note that the caller must ensure that if the modified code is part of a * module, the module would not be removed during poking. This can be achieved * by registering a module notifier, and ordering module removal and patching -* trough a mutex. +* through a mutex. */ void *text_poke (void *addr,const void *opcode,size_t len) {
arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c +1 -1
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ int __init gart_iommu_init(void) iommu_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);/* * Tricky. The GART table remaps the physical memory range, -* so the CPU wont notice potential aliases and if the memory +* so the CPU won't notice potential aliases and if the memory * is remapped to UC later on, we might surprise the PCI devices * with a stray writeout of a cacheline. So play it sure and * do an explicit, full-scale wbinvd() _after_ having marked all
arch/x86/kernel/apic/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # # Leads to non-deterministic coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. -# In particualr, smp_apic_timer_interrupt() is called in random places. +# In particular, smp_apic_timer_interrupt() is called in random places. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += apic.o apic_common.o apic_noop.o ipi.o vector.o init.o
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +1 -1
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ bool __init apic_needs_pit(void)/* * If interrupt delivery mode is legacy PIC or virtual wire without -* configuration, the local APIC timer wont be set up. Make sure +* configuration, the local APIC timer won't be set up. Make sure * that the PIT is initialized. */ if (apic_intr_mode == APIC_PIC ||
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +2 -2
@@ -738,8 +738,8 @@ int __init arch_probe_nr_irqs(void)void lapic_assign_legacy_vector (unsigned int irq,bool replace) {/* -* Use assign system here so it wont get accounted as allocated -* and moveable in the cpu hotplug check and it prevents managed +* Use assign system here so it won't get accounted as allocated +* and movable in the cpu hotplug check and it prevents managed * irq reservation from touching it. */ irq_matrix_assign_system (vector_matrix,ISA_IRQ_VECTOR (irq), replace);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ err_out:* * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match -* the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct. +* the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is calculated from the provided sigstruct. * * Return: * - 0: Success.
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +1 -1
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_update_guest_xfd);* Must be invoked from KVM after a VMEXIT before enabling interrupts when * XFD write emulation is disabled. This is required because the guest can * freely modify XFD and the state at VMEXIT is not guaranteed to be the -* same as the state on VMENTER. So software state has to be udpated before +* same as the state on VMENTER. So software state has to be updated before * any operation which depends on it can take place. * * Note: It can be invoked unconditionally even when write emulation is
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +2 -2
@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * Switch to new page-table * * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the - * indentity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the + * identity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the * init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and unmap the - * indentity mapped ranges. + * identity mapped ranges. */ movq %rax, %cr3
arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c +2 -2
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static void __init hpet_select_clockevents(void) hpet_base.nr_clockevents =0 ; -/* No point if MSI is disabled or CPU has an Always Runing APIC Timer */ +/* No point if MSI is disabled or CPU has an Always Running APIC Timer */ if (hpet_msi_disable ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ARAT ))return ;
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static bool __init mwait_pc10_supported(void)* and per CPU timer interrupts. * * The probability that this problem is going to be solved in the -* forseeable future is close to zero, so the kernel has to be cluttered +* foreseeable future is close to zero, so the kernel has to be cluttered * with heuristics to keep up with the ever growing amount of hardware and * firmware trainwrecks. Hopefully some day hardware people will understand * that the approach of "This can be fixed in software" is not sustainable.
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +1 -1
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)* Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel * specific page encryption status settings before we load a * new kernel by kexec. Reset the page encryption status -* during early boot intead of just before kexec to avoid SMP +* during early boot instead of just before kexec to avoid SMP * races during kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(). * NOTE: We cannot reset the complete shared pages list * here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c +1 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int __init parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall(char *arg) }early_param ("no-kvmclock-vsyscall" , parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall); -/* Aligned to page sizes to match whats mapped via vsyscalls to userspace */ +/* Aligned to page sizes to match what's mapped via vsyscalls to userspace */ #define HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE \ (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info))
arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c +3 -3
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@* This handles calls from both 32bit and 64bit mode. * * Lock order: -* contex.ldt_usr_sem +* context.ldt_usr_sem * mmap_lock * context.lock */
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)/* * Any change to mm->context.ldt is followed by an IPI to all * CPUs with the mm active. The LDT will not be freed until -* after the IPI is handled by all such CPUs. This means that, +* after the IPI is handled by all such CPUs. This means that * if the ldt_struct changes before we return, the values we see * will be safe, and the new values will be loaded before we run * any user code.
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(modify_ldt, int , func , void __user * , ptr , }/* * The SYSCALL_DEFINE() macros give us an 'unsigned long' -* return type, but tht ABI for sys_modify_ldt() expects +* return type, but the ABI for sys_modify_ldt() expects * 'int'. This cast gives us an int-sized value in %rax * for the return code. The 'unsigned' is necessary so * the compiler does not try to sign-extend the negative
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ void native_tss_update_io_bitmap(void)/* * Make sure that the TSS limit is covering the IO bitmap. It might have * been cut down by a VMEXIT to 0x67 which would cause a subsequent I/O -* access from user space to trigger a #GP because tbe bitmap is outside +* access from user space to trigger a #GP because the bitmap is outside * the TSS limit. */ refresh_tss_limit ();
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +1 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void __noreturn sev_es_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)/* Tell the hypervisor what went wrong. */ val |=GHCB_SEV_TERM_REASON (set, reason); -/* Request Guest Termination from Hypvervisor */ +/* Request Guest Termination from Hypervisor */ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr (val);VMGEXIT ();
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(/* * If the index isn't significant, use the first entry with a -* matching function. It's userspace's responsibilty to not +* matching function. It's userspace's responsibility to not * provide "duplicate" entries in all cases. */ if (!(e->flags &KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX ) || e->index == index)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2 -2
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ static void pte_list_desc_remove_entry(struct kvm *kvm,/* * The head descriptor is empty. If there are no tail descriptors, -* nullify the rmap head to mark the list as emtpy, else point the rmap +* nullify the rmap head to mark the list as empty, else point the rmap * head at the next descriptor, i.e. the new head. */ if (!head_desc->more)
@@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages (kvm, memslot, start, end, target_level, false);/* -* A TLB flush is unnecessary at this point for the same resons as in +* A TLB flush is unnecessary at this point for the same reasons as in * kvm_mmu_slot_try_split_huge_pages(). */ }
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static bool try_step_up(struct tdp_iter *iter)* Step to the next SPTE in a pre-order traversal of the paging structure. * To get to the next SPTE, the iterator either steps down towards the goal * GFN, if at a present, non-last-level SPTE, or over to a SPTE mapping a -* highter GFN. +* higher GFN. * * The basic algorithm is as follows: * 1. If the current SPTE is a non-last-level SPTE, step down into the page
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -4741,7 +4741,7 @@ static int svm_check_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,* Emulation is possible for SEV guests if and only if a prefilled * buffer containing the bytes of the intercepted instruction is * available. SEV guest memory is encrypted with a guest specific key -* and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read cyphertext and +* and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read ciphertext and * decode garbage. * * If KVM is NOT trying to simply skip an instruction, inject #UD if
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +1 -1
@@ -6561,7 +6561,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,* code was changed such that flag signals vmcs12 should * be copied into eVMCS in guest memory. * -* To preserve backwards compatability, allow user +* To preserve backwards compatibility, allow user * to set this flag even when there is no VMXON region. */ if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS )
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ static void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)* do generate error codes with bits 31:16 set, and so KVM's * ABI lets userspace shove in arbitrary 32-bit values. Drop * the upper bits to avoid VM-Fail, losing information that -* does't really exist is preferable to killing the VM. +* doesn't really exist is preferable to killing the VM. */ vmcs_write32 (VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE , (u16 )ex->error_code); intr_info |=INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK ;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -3
@@ -10165,7 +10165,7 @@ static void kvm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)* * But, if a VM-Exit occurs during instruction execution, and KVM does NOT skip * the instruction or inject an exception, then KVM can incorrecty inject a new -* asynchrounous event if the event became pending after the CPU fetched the +* asynchronous event if the event became pending after the CPU fetched the * instruction (in the guest). E.g. if a page fault (#PF, #NPF, EPT violation) * occurs and is resolved by KVM, a coincident NMI, SMI, IRQ, etc... can be * injected on the restarted instruction instead of being deferred until the
@@ -10186,7 +10186,7 @@ static int kvm_check_and_inject_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int r;/* -* Process nested events first, as nested VM-Exit supercedes event +* Process nested events first, as nested VM-Exit supersedes event * re-injection. If there's an event queued for re-injection, it will * be saved into the appropriate vmc{b,s}12 fields on nested VM-Exit. */
@@ -10884,7 +10884,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* * Assert that vCPU vs. VM APICv state is consistent. An APICv * update must kick and wait for all vCPUs before toggling the -* per-VM state, and responsing vCPUs must wait for the update +* per-VM state, and responding vCPUs must wait for the update * to complete before servicing KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE. */ WARN_ON_ONCE((kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(vcpu) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) &&
arch/x86/lib/delay.c +1 -1
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void delay_halt_mwaitx(u64 unused, u64 cycles) delay =min_t (u64,MWAITX_MAX_WAIT_CYCLES , cycles);/* -* Use cpu_tss_rw as a cacheline-aligned, seldomly accessed per-cpu +* Use cpu_tss_rw as a cacheline-aligned, seldom accessed per-cpu * variable as the monitor target. */ __monitorx (raw_cpu_ptr (&cpu_tss_rw),0 ,0 );
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +3 -3
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pte_table(pte_t *pte_start, pmd_t *pmd)return ; } -/* free a pte talbe */ +/* free a pte table */ free_pagetable (pmd_page (*pmd),0 );spin_lock (&init_mm.page_table_lock);pmd_clear (pmd);
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pmd_table(pmd_t *pmd_start, pud_t *pud)return ; } -/* free a pmd talbe */ +/* free a pmd table */ free_pagetable (pud_page (*pud),0 );spin_lock (&init_mm.page_table_lock);pud_clear (pud);
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pud_table(pud_t *pud_start, p4d_t *p4d)return ; } -/* free a pud talbe */ +/* free a pud table */ free_pagetable (p4d_page (*p4d),0 );spin_lock (&init_mm.page_table_lock);p4d_clear (p4d);
arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c +1 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@* memory ranges: uncached, write-combining, write-through, write-protected, * and the most commonly used and default attribute: write-back caching. * -* PAT support supercedes and augments MTRR support in a compatible fashion: MTRR is +* PAT support supersedes and augments MTRR support in a compatible fashion: MTRR is * a hardware interface to enumerate a limited number of physical memory ranges * and set their caching attributes explicitly, programmed into the CPU via MSRs. * Even modern CPUs have MTRRs enabled - but these are typically not touched
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +2 -2
@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ repeat:/* * We need to keep the pfn from the existing PTE, -* after all we're only going to change it's attributes +* after all we're only going to change its attributes * not the memory it points to */ new_pte =pfn_pte (pfn, new_prot);
@@ -2447,7 +2447,7 @@ int __init kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,/* * The typical sequence for unmapping is to find a pte through * lookup_address_in_pgd() (ideally, it should never return NULL because -* the address is already mapped) and change it's protections. As pfn is +* the address is already mapped) and change its protections. As pfn is * the *target* of a mapping, it's not useful while unmapping. */ struct cpa_data cpa = {
arch/x86/mm/pti.c +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@* * https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER * -* The original work was written by and and signed off by for the Linux +* The original work was written by and signed off by for the Linux * kernel by: * * Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <[email protected]>
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +1 -1
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static void l1d_flush_evaluate(unsigned long prev_mm, unsigned long next_mm,/* * Validate that it is not running on an SMT sibling as this would -* make the excercise pointless because the siblings share L1D. If +* make the exercise pointless because the siblings share L1D. If * it runs on a SMT sibling, notify it with SIGBUS on return to * user/guest */
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1 -1
@@ -2143,7 +2143,7 @@ static void save_args(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **prog, }else {/* Only copy the arguments on-stack to current * 'stack_size' and ignore the regs, used to -* prepare the arguments on-stack for orign call. +* prepare the arguments on-stack for origin call. */ if (for_call_origin) { nr_regs += arg_regs;
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c +1 -1
@@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@ struct jit_context {#define PROLOGUE_SIZE 35/* -* Emit prologue code for BPF program and check it's size. +* Emit prologue code for BPF program and check its size. * bpf_tail_call helper will skip it while jumping into another program. */ static void emit_prologue (u8 **pprog,u32 stack_depth)
arch/x86/platform/intel-quark/imr_selftest.c +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@* Copyright(c) 2015 Bryan O'Donoghue <[email protected]> * * IMR self test. The purpose of this module is to run a set of tests on the -* IMR API to validate it's sanity. We check for overlapping, reserved +* IMR API to validate its sanity. We check for overlapping, reserved * addresses and setup/teardown sanity. * */
arch/x86/platform/pvh/head.S +1 -1
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ * Bit 8 (TF) must be cleared. Other bits are all unspecified. * * All other processor registers and flag bits are unspecified. The OS is in - * charge of setting up it's own stack, GDT and IDT. + * charge of setting up its own stack, GDT and IDT. */ #define PVH_GDT_ENTRY_CS 1
arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c +1 -1
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static void uv_nmi_dump_state_cpu(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs)this_cpu_write (uv_cpu_nmi.state,UV_NMI_STATE_DUMP_DONE ); } -/* Trigger a slave CPU to dump it's state */ +/* Trigger a slave CPU to dump its state */ static void uv_nmi_trigger_dump (int cpu) {int retry = uv_nmi_trigger_delay;
arch/x86/platform/uv/uv_time.c +1 -1
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int uv_rtc_unset_timer(int cpu, int force)* Read the RTC. * * Starting with HUB rev 2.0, the UV RTC register is replicated across all -* cachelines of it's own page. This allows faster simultaneous reads +* cachelines of its own page. This allows faster simultaneous reads * from a given socket. */ static u64 uv_read_rtc (struct clocksource *cs)
arch/x86/realmode/init.c +1 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)set_real_mode_mem (mem);/* -* Unconditionally reserve the entire fisrt 1M, see comment in +* Unconditionally reserve the entire first 1M, see comment in * setup_arch(). */ memblock_reserve (0 ,SZ_1M );
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +1 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@* would need to validate the whole pagetable before going on. * Naturally, this is quite slow. The solution is to "pin" a * pagetable, which enforces all the constraints on the pagetable even -* when it is not actively in use. This menas that Xen can be assured +* when it is not actively in use. This means that Xen can be assured * that it is still valid when you do load it into %cr3, and doesn't * need to revalidate it. *