x86: Confine early 1:1 mapped startup code
v7 cover x86: Confine early 1:1 mapped startup code
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
This is resend #2 of v5 [0] with some touchups applied.
Changes since v6:
- Drop flawed patch to move some SME/SEV related calls out of the early boot path to avoid the potential need for backporting patches #6/#7 to kernels where SEV support may not be crucial. This problem will be dealt with if/when it arises while doing those backports.
Changes since v5:
- drop patches that have been merged
- rebase onto latest tip/x86/boot
- fix comment regarding CR4.PGE wrt flushing of global TLB entries
- avoid adding startup code to .noinstr.text as it triggers objtool warnings
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Ard Biesheuvel (9):
x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt= x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 15 ++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 4 - arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c | 12 --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 3 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 43 ++++----- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 10 +-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 61 ++----------- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 93 ++++++++------------ arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 23 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 14 +-- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 13 --- arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 3 - arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 83 +++++------------ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 8 ++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 3 + 20 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 255 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
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PATCH v7 1/9 x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
When paging is enabled, the CR4.PAE and CR4.LA57 control bits cannot be changed, and so they can simply be preserved rather than reason about whether or not they need to be set. CR4.MCE should be preserved unless the kernel was built without CONFIG_X86_MCE, in which case it must be cleared.
CR4.PSE should be set explicitly, regardless of whether or not it was set before.
CR4.PGE is set explicitly, and then cleared and set again after programming CR3 in order to flush TLB entries based on global translations. This makes the first assignment redundant, and can therefore be omitted. So clear PGE by omitting it from the preserve mask, and set it again explicitly after switching to the new page tables.
--- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 30 ++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +12 -18
@@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax 1: + /* + * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to clean + * global 1:1 translations from the TLBs. + */ + movl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %edx #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE /* * Preserve CR4.MCE if the kernel will enable #MC support.
@@ -193,20 +198,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * configured will crash the system regardless of the CR4.MCE value set * here. */ - movq %cr4, %rcx - andl $X86_CR4_MCE, %ecx -#else - movl $0, %ecx + orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %edx #endif + movq %cr4, %rcx + andl %edx, %ecx - /* Enable PAE mode, PSE, PGE and LA57 */ - orl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PGE), %ecx -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL - testb $1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip) - jz 1f - orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %ecx -1: -#endif + /* Even if ignored in long mode, set PSE uniformly on all logical CPUs. */ + btsl $X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 /* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
@@ -223,14 +221,10 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) movq %rax, %cr3 /* - * Do a global TLB flush after the CR3 switch to make sure the TLB - * entries from the identity mapping are flushed. + * Set CR4.PGE to re-enable global translations. */ - movq %cr4, %rcx - movq %rcx, %rax - xorq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rcx + btsl $X86_CR4_PGE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 - movq %rax, %cr4 /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ movq $1f, %rax
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 1/9] x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code
Review
Quoted 3 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(quoted diff) +3
-0+ /* + * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to clean + * global 1:1 translations from the TLBs.
Brian raised this question when exactly global entries get flushed and I was looking for the exact definition in the SDM, here's what I'll do ontop:
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +6 -1
@@ -186,8 +186,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) 1: /* - * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to clean + * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to flush * global 1:1 translations from the TLBs. + * + * From the SDM: + * "If CR4.PGE is changing from 0 to 1, there were no global TLB + * entries before the execution; if CR4.PGE is changing from 1 to 0, + * there will be no global TLB entries after the execution." */ movl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %edx #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
---
And how it is perfectly clear.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 1/9] x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code
Quoted 31 lines · Borislav Petkov
Review
Quoted 3 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(quoted diff) +3
-0+ /* + * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to clean + * global 1:1 translations from the TLBs.Brian raised this question when exactly global entries get flushed and I was looking for the exact definition in the SDM, here's what I'll do ontop:
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +6
-2@@ -186,8 +186,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) 1: /* - * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to clean + * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to flush * global 1:1 translations from the TLBs. + * + * From the SDM: + * "If CR4.PGE is changing from 0 to 1, there were no global TLB + * entries before the execution; if CR4.PGE is changing from 1 to 0, + * there will be no global TLB entries after the execution." */ movl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %edx #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE ---
Quoted 2 lines
And how it is perfectly clear.
Looks good to me - thanks.
[tip: x86/boot] x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: dada8587068c820ba5e5d09b9c32d8bc28c4dbe6 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/dada8587068c820ba5e5d09b9c32d8bc28c4dbe6 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:09 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:11:34 +01:00
x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code
When paging is enabled, the CR4.PAE and CR4.LA57 control bits cannot be changed, and so they can simply be preserved rather than reason about whether or not they need to be set. CR4.MCE should be preserved unless the kernel was built without CONFIG_X86_MCE, in which case it must be cleared.
CR4.PSE should be set explicitly, regardless of whether or not it was set before.
CR4.PGE is set explicitly, and then cleared and set again after programming CR3 in order to flush TLB entries based on global translations. This makes the first assignment redundant, and can therefore be omitted. So clear PGE by omitting it from the preserve mask, and set it again explicitly after switching to the new page tables.
[ bp: Document the exact operation of CR4.PGE ]
--- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 35 +++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +17 -18
@@ -185,6 +185,16 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax 1: + /* + * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to flush + * global 1:1 translations from the TLBs. + * + * From the SDM: + * "If CR4.PGE is changing from 0 to 1, there were no global TLB + * entries before the execution; if CR4.PGE is changing from 1 to 0, + * there will be no global TLB entries after the execution." + */ + movl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %edx #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE /* * Preserve CR4.MCE if the kernel will enable #MC support.
@@ -193,20 +203,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * configured will crash the system regardless of the CR4.MCE value set * here. */ - movq %cr4, %rcx - andl $X86_CR4_MCE, %ecx -#else - movl $0, %ecx + orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %edx #endif + movq %cr4, %rcx + andl %edx, %ecx - /* Enable PAE mode, PSE, PGE and LA57 */ - orl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PGE), %ecx -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL - testb $1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip) - jz 1f - orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %ecx -1: -#endif + /* Even if ignored in long mode, set PSE uniformly on all logical CPUs. */ + btsl $X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 /* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
@@ -223,14 +226,10 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) movq %rax, %cr3 /* - * Do a global TLB flush after the CR3 switch to make sure the TLB - * entries from the identity mapping are flushed. + * Set CR4.PGE to re-enable global translations. */ - movq %cr4, %rcx - movq %rcx, %rax - xorq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rcx + btsl $X86_CR4_PGE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 - movq %rax, %cr4 /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ movq $1f, %rax
PATCH v7 2/9 x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Assigning the 5-level paging related global variables from the earliest C code using explicit references that use the 1:1 translation of memory is unnecessary, as the startup code itself does not rely on them to create the initial page tables, and this is all it should be doing. So defer these assignments to the primary C entry code that executes via the ordinary kernel virtual mapping.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 44 +++++++------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +1 -1
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ typedef unsigned long pgprotval_t;typedef struct {pteval_t pte; }pte_t ;typedef struct {pmdval_t pmd; }pmd_t ; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL extern unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL #ifdef USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 /* * cpu_feature_enabled() is not available in early boot code.
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +14 -30
78 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
Re: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 9 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Assigning the 5-level paging related global variables from the earliest C code using explicit references that use the 1:1 translation of memory is unnecessary, as the startup code itself does not rely on them to create the initial page tables, and this is all it should be doing. So defer these assignments to the primary C entry code that executes via the ordinary kernel virtual mapping.
Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 44 +++++++------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
Those should probably be tested on a 5level machine, just in case.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 17 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Assigning the 5-level paging related global variables from the earliest C code using explicit references that use the 1:1 translation of memory is unnecessary, as the startup code itself does not rely on them to create the initial page tables, and this is all it should be doing. So defer these assignments to the primary C entry code that executes via the ordinary kernel virtual mapping.
Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 44 +++++++------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
Quoted 4 lines
Reviewed-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>Those should probably be tested on a 5level machine, just in case.
I have tested this myself on QEMU with -cpu qemu64,+la57 and -cpu host+kvm using
- EFI boot (OVMF)
- legacy BIOS boot (SeaBIOS)
- with and without no5lvl on the command line
- with and without CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
The scenario that I have not managed to test is entering from EFI with 5 levels of paging enabled, and switching back to 4 levels (which should work regardless of CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL). However, no firmware in existence actually supports that today, and I am pretty sure that this code has never been tested under those conditions to begin with. (OVMF patches are under review atm to allow 5-level paging to be enabled in the firmware)
I currently don't have access to real hardware with LA57 support so any additional coverage there is highly appreciated (same for the last patch in this series)
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 7 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
The scenario that I have not managed to test is entering from EFI with 5 levels of paging enabled, and switching back to 4 levels (which should work regardless of
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL). However, no firmware in existence actually supports that today, and I am pretty sure that this code has never been tested under those conditions to begin with. (OVMF patches are under review atm to allow 5-level paging to be enabled in the firmware)
Aha.
Quoted 3 lines
I currently don't have access to real hardware with LA57 support so any additional coverage there is highly appreciated (same for the last patch in this series)
Right, I'm sure dhansen could dig up such a machine. We'll ask him nicely to test when the set is ready.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 7 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
The scenario that I have not managed to test is entering from EFI with 5 levels of paging enabled, and switching back to 4 levels (which should work regardless of
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL). However, no firmware in existence actually supports that today, and I am pretty sure that this code has never been tested under those conditions to begin with. (OVMF patches are under review atm to allow 5-level paging to be enabled in the firmware)
Quoted 2 lines
Aha.
I've built a debug OVMF image using the latest version of the series, and put it at [0]
Run like this
qemu-system-x86_64 -M q35 \
-cpu qemu64,+la57 -smp 4 \
-bios OVMF-5level.fd \
-kernel arch/x86/boot/bzImage \
-append console=ttyS0\ earlyprintk=ttyS0 \
-vga none -nographic -m 1g \
-initrd <initrd.img>
and you will get loads of DEBUG output from the firmware first, and then boot into Linux. (initrd can be omitted)
Right before entering, it will print
CpuDxe: 5-Level Paging = 1
which confirms that the firmware is running with 5 levels of paging.
I've confirmed that this boots happily with this series applied, including when using 'no5lvl' on the command line, or when disabling CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL [confirmed by inspecting /sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/kernel].
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 36 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 7 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
The scenario that I have not managed to test is entering from EFI with 5 levels of paging enabled, and switching back to 4 levels (which should work regardless of
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL). However, no firmware in existence actually supports that today, and I am pretty sure that this code has never been tested under those conditions to begin with. (OVMF patches are under review atm to allow 5-level paging to be enabled in the firmware)Quoted 2 lines
Aha.
I've built a debug OVMF image using the latest version of the series, and put it at [0]
Run like this
qemu-system-x86_64 -M q35 \
-cpu qemu64,+la57 -smp 4 \
-bios OVMF-5level.fd \
-kernelarch/x86/boot/bzImage\
-append console=ttyS0\ earlyprintk=ttyS0 \
-vga none -nographic -m 1g \
-initrd <initrd.img>and you will get loads of DEBUG output from the firmware first, and then boot into Linux. (initrd can be omitted)
Right before entering, it will print
CpuDxe: 5-Level Paging = 1
which confirms that the firmware is running with 5 levels of paging.
Quoted 7 lines
I've confirmed that this boots happily with this series applied, including when using 'no5lvl' on the command line, or when disabling
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL[confirmed by inspecting/sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/kernel].
Nice, that might come in handy for other testing too.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 43 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 42 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 7 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
The scenario that I have not managed to test is entering from EFI with 5 levels of paging enabled, and switching back to 4 levels (which should work regardless of
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL). However, no firmware in existence actually supports that today, and I am pretty sure that this code has never been tested under those conditions to begin with. (OVMF patches are under review atm to allow 5-level paging to be enabled in the firmware)Quoted 2 lines
Aha.
I've built a debug OVMF image using the latest version of the series, and put it at [0]
Run like this
qemu-system-x86_64 -M q35 \ -cpu qemu64,+la57 -smp 4 \ -bios OVMF-5level.fd \ -kernel arch/x86/boot/bzImage \ -append console=ttyS0\ earlyprintk=ttyS0 \ -vga none -nographic -m 1g \ -initrd <initrd.img>and you will get loads of DEBUG output from the firmware first, and then boot into Linux. (initrd can be omitted)
Right before entering, it will print
CpuDxe: 5-Level Paging = 1
which confirms that the firmware is running with 5 levels of paging.
I've confirmed that this boots happily with this series applied, including when using 'no5lvl' on the command line, or when disabling
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL[confirmed by inspecting/sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/kernel].
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Nice, that might come in handy for other testing too.
Be aware that additional work will need to be done in OVMF to support 5-level paging for SEV VMs.
Initial SEV implementation happened when there wasn't a page table library and so SEV support had to roll it's own page table modifications. A page table library has since been created and 5-level support was added, but the SEV code hasn't been converted over to use the new library, yet.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 3 lines
Thx.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 28 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 28 lines
I've built a debug OVMF image using the latest version of the series, and put it at [0]
Run like this
qemu-system-x86_64 -M q35 \
-cpu qemu64,+la57 -smp 4 \
-bios OVMF-5level.fd \
-kernelarch/x86/boot/bzImage\
-append console=ttyS0\ earlyprintk=ttyS0 \
-vga none -nographic -m 1g \
-initrd <initrd.img>and you will get loads of DEBUG output from the firmware first, and then boot into Linux. (initrd can be omitted)
Right before entering, it will print
CpuDxe: 5-Level Paging = 1
which confirms that the firmware is running with 5 levels of paging.
I've confirmed that this boots happily with this series applied, including when using 'no5lvl' on the command line, or when disabling
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL[confirmed by inspecting/sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/kernel].
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Nice, that might come in handy for other testing too.
Btw, on a semi-related note, do you have an idea whether a normal guest kernel using OVMF istead of seabios would be even able to boot a kernel supplied with -kernel like above but without an -initrd?
I have everything builtin and the same kernel boots fine in a guest with a
[ 0.000000] SMBIOS 3.0.0 present. [ 0.000000] DMI: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
but if I try to boot the respective guest installed with the OVMF BIOS from the debian package:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.7 by Debian distribution of EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: SMBIOS=0x7f788000 SMBIOS 3.0=0x7f786000 ACPI=0x7f97e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f97e014 MEMATTR=0x7ddfe018
it fails looking up the /dev/root device major/minor deep in the bowels of the vfs:
[ 2.565651] do_new_mount: [ 2.566380] vfs_get_tree: fc->root: 0000000000000000 [ 2.567298] kern_path: filename: ffff88800d666000 of name: /dev/root [ 2.568418] kern_path: ret: 0 [ 2.569009] lookup_bdev: kern_path(/dev/root, , path: ffff88800e537380), error: 0 [ 2.571645] lookup_bdev: inode->i_rdev: 0x0 [ 2.572417] get_tree_bdev: lookup_bdev(/dev/root, dev: 0x0), error: 0 ^^^^^^^^^
That dev_t should be 0x800002 - the major and minor of /dev/sda2 but it looks like something else is missing in this case...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 1 line · Borislav Petkov
...
Quoted 5 lines
Btw, on a semi-related note, do you have an idea whether a normal guest kernel using OVMF istead of seabios would be even able to boot a kernel supplied with -kernel like above but without an -initrd?
How are you passing the root device to the kernel? Via root= on the command line?
Quoted 5 lines
I have everything builtin and the same kernel boots fine in a guest with a
[ 0.000000] SMBIOS 3.0.0 present. [ 0.000000] DMI: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
OK, so this is SeaBIOS
Quoted 6 lines
but if I try to boot the respective guest installed with the OVMF BIOS from the debian package:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.7 by Debian distribution of EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: SMBIOS=0x7f788000 SMBIOS 3.0=0x7f786000 ACPI=0x7f97e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f97e014 MEMATTR=0x7ddfe018
and this is OVMF.
I have tried both of these, with i440fx as well as q35, and they all work happily with my Debian guest image passed via -hda to QEMU, and with root=/dev/sda2 on the kernel command line.
Quoted 12 lines
it fails looking up the
/dev/rootdevice major/minor deep in the bowels of the vfs:[ 2.565651] do_new_mount: [ 2.566380] vfs_get_tree: fc->root: 0000000000000000 [ 2.567298] kern_path: filename: ffff88800d666000 of name: /dev/root [ 2.568418] kern_path: ret: 0 [ 2.569009] lookup_bdev: kern_path(/dev/root, , path: ffff88800e537380), error: 0 [ 2.571645] lookup_bdev: inode->i_rdev: 0x0 [ 2.572417] get_tree_bdev: lookup_bdev(/dev/root, dev: 0x0), error: 0 ^^^^^^^^^
Quoted 3 lines
That
dev_tshould be0x800002- the major and minor of/dev/sda2but it looks like something else is missing in this case...
How did you get this output? Are these debug printk()s you added yourself?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Quoted 2 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
How are you passing the root device to the kernel? Via root= on the command line?
Yeah:
qemu
...
-kernel arch/x86/boot/bzImage
-append "root=/dev/sda2 resume=/dev/sda3 ...
Quoted 1 line
and this is OVMF.
Yap.
Quoted 3 lines
I have tried both of these, with i440fx as well as q35, and they all work happily with my Debian guest image passed via -hda to QEMU, and with root=/dev/sda2 on the kernel command line.
Interesting. I'm not passing any machine type. Maybe I should even thought I've never done it before.
/me goes and tries machine type.
Well, I'll be damned!
-machine type=pc-i440fx-2.8 - no workie BUT
-machine type=pc-q35-2.8
booted.
Now on to figure out what's different with q35 and why it is magical and it finds the root device just fine:
[ 2.732908] mount_root_generic: i: 2, fs_name: ext4 [ 2.734275] do_mount_root: name: /dev/root [ 2.735093] kern_path: filename: ffff88800d4de000 of name: /root [ 2.736954] kern_path: ret: 0 [ 2.737727] init_mount: kern_path(/root), ret: 0 [ 2.738964] path_mount: will do_new_mount [ 2.739784] do_new_mount: 1, fc source: (null) [ 2.740961] do_new_mount: 2, err: 0 [ 2.741722] do_new_mount: 3, err: 0 [ 2.742448] do_new_mount: 4, err: 0 [ 2.743164] vfs_get_tree: fc->root: 0000000000000000 [ 2.744095] kern_path: filename: ffff88800d4de000 of name: /dev/root [ 2.745352] kern_path: ret: 0 [ 2.745994] lookup_bdev: kern_path(/dev/root, , path: ffff88800cf163c0), error: 0 [ 2.747288] lookup_bdev: inode->i_rdev: 0x800002 [ 2.748163] get_tree_bdev: lookup_bdev(/dev/root, dev: 0x800002), error: 0 ^^^^^^^^^
Quoted 1 line
How did you get this output? Are these debug printk()s you added yourself?
Yeah, the good old "sprinkle printks" debugging method. Figured I should look at the VFS code out of interest. :-)
Thanks a lot for the suggestions, especially about q35!
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/boot] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 63bed96604205fa0b23c91d268df5f1f1b26faf6 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/63bed96604205fa0b23c91d268df5f1f1b26faf6 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:10 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:12:06 +01:00
x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables
Assigning the 5-level paging related global variables from the earliest C code using explicit references that use the 1:1 translation of memory is unnecessary, as the startup code itself does not rely on them to create the initial page tables, and this is all it should be doing. So defer these assignments to the primary C entry code that executes via the ordinary kernel virtual mapping.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 44 +++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +1 -1
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ typedef unsigned long pgprotval_t;typedef struct {pteval_t pte; }pte_t ;typedef struct {pmdval_t pmd; }pmd_t ; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL extern unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL #ifdef USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 /* * cpu_feature_enabled() is not available in early boot code.
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +14 -30
78 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH v7 3/9 x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Determining the address of the initial page table to program into CR3 involves:
- taking the physical address
- adding the SME encryption mask
On the primary entry path, the code is mapped using a 1:1 virtual to physical translation, so the physical address can be taken directly using a RIP-relative LEA instruction.
On the secondary entry path, the address can be obtained by taking the offset from the virtual kernel base (__START_kernel_map) and adding the physical kernel base.
This is implemented in a slightly confusing way, so clean this up.
--- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 25 ++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +7 -18
@@ -111,13 +111,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) call __startup_64 /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ - addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + leaq early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx + addq %rcx, %rax #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT mov %rax, %rdi - mov %rax, %r14 - - addq phys_base(%rip), %rdi /* * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
@@ -126,12 +124,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) * the next RET instruction. */ call sev_verify_cbit - - /* - * Restore CR3 value without the phys_base which will be added - * below, before writing %cr3. - */ - mov %r14, %rax #endif jmp 1f
@@ -171,18 +163,18 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */ xorq %r15, %r15 + /* Derive the runtime physical address of init_top_pgt[] */ + movq phys_base(%rip), %rax + addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + /* * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3. */ #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - movq sme_me_mask, %rax -#else - xorq %rax, %rax + addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax #endif - /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ - addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax 1: /*
@@ -207,9 +199,6 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) btsl $X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 - /* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */ - addq phys_base(%rip), %rax - /* * Switch to new page-table *
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
Re: [PATCH v7 3/9] x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address
Quoted 15 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Determining the address of the initial page table to program into CR3 involves:
- taking the physical address
- adding the SME encryption maskOn the primary entry path, the code is mapped using a 1:1 virtual to physical translation, so the physical address can be taken directly using a RIP-relative LEA instruction.
On the secondary entry path, the address can be obtained by taking the offset from the virtual kernel base (
__START_kernel_map) and adding the physical kernel base.
Quoted 6 lines
This is implemented in a slightly confusing way, so clean this up.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 25 ++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/boot] x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: d6a41f184dcea0814260af2780e147022c11dca8 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/d6a41f184dcea0814260af2780e147022c11dca8 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:11 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:12:16 +01:00
x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address
Determining the address of the initial page table to program into CR3 involves:
- taking the physical address
- adding the SME encryption mask
On the primary entry path, the code is mapped using a 1:1 virtual to physical translation, so the physical address can be taken directly using a RIP-relative LEA instruction.
On the secondary entry path, the address can be obtained by taking the offset from the virtual kernel base (__START_kernel_map) and adding the physical kernel base.
This is implemented in a slightly confusing way, so clean this up.
--- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 25 +++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +7 -18
@@ -111,13 +111,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) call __startup_64 /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ - addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + leaq early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx + addq %rcx, %rax #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT mov %rax, %rdi - mov %rax, %r14 - - addq phys_base(%rip), %rdi /* * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
@@ -126,12 +124,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) * the next RET instruction. */ call sev_verify_cbit - - /* - * Restore CR3 value without the phys_base which will be added - * below, before writing %cr3. - */ - mov %r14, %rax #endif jmp 1f
@@ -171,18 +163,18 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */ xorl %r15d, %r15d + /* Derive the runtime physical address of init_top_pgt[] */ + movq phys_base(%rip), %rax + addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + /* * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3. */ #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - movq sme_me_mask, %rax -#else - xorl %eax, %eax + addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax #endif - /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ - addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax 1: /*
@@ -212,9 +204,6 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) btsl $X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 - /* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */ - addq phys_base(%rip), %rax - /* * Switch to new page-table *
PATCH v7 4/9 x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The secondary startup code is used on the primary boot path as well, but in this case, the initial part runs from a 1:1 mapping, until an explicit cross-jump is made to the kernel virtual mapping of the same code.
On the secondary boot path, this jump is pointless as the code already executes from the mapping targeted by the jump. So combine this cross-jump with the jump from startup_64() into the common boot path. This simplifies the execution flow, and clearly separates code that runs from a 1:1 mapping from code that runs from the kernel virtual mapping.
Note that this requires a page table switch, so hoist the CR3 assignment into startup_64() as well. And since absolute symbol references will no longer be permitted in .head.text once we enable the associated build time checks, a RIP-relative memory operand is used in the JMP instruction, referring to an absolute constant in the .init.rodata section.
Given that the secondary startup code does not require a special placement inside the executable, move it to the .text section.
--- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 42 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +21 -21
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ L4_START_KERNEL = l4_index(__START_KERNEL_map) L3_START_KERNEL = pud_index(__START_KERNEL_map) - .text __HEAD .code64 SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
@@ -126,9 +125,21 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) call sev_verify_cbit #endif - jmp 1f + /* + * Switch to early_top_pgt which still has the identity mappings + * present. + */ + movq %rax, %cr3 + + /* Branch to the common startup code at its kernel virtual address */ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + jmp *0f(%rip) SYM_CODE_END(startup_64) + __INITRODATA +0: .quad common_startup_64 + + .text SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64) UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
@@ -174,8 +185,15 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax #endif + /* + * Switch to the init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and + * unmap the identity mapped ranges. + */ + movq %rax, %cr3 -1: +SYM_INNER_LABEL(common_startup_64, SYM_L_LOCAL) + UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR /* * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to clean
@@ -199,30 +217,12 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) btsl $X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 - /* - * Switch to new page-table - * - * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the - * identity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the - * init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and unmap the - * identity mapped ranges. - */ - movq %rax, %cr3 - /* * Set CR4.PGE to re-enable global translations. */ btsl $X86_CR4_PGE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 - /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ - movq $1f, %rax - ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE - jmp *%rax -1: - UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK - ANNOTATE_NOENDBR // above - #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* * For parallel boot, the APIC ID is read from the APIC, and then
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
Re: [PATCH v7 4/9] x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot
First
for the patch.
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) · line 130
Quoted 3 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +3
-0+ /* + * Switch to early_top_pgt which still has the identity mappings + * present.
I was wondering why we've had this "discrepancy" forever - the boot CPU would have early_top_pgt *with* the ident mappings while the APs would do init_top_pgt.
But we end up loading init_top_pgt on the BSP too in init_mem_mapping() so there's a short time during boot where we have this difference. I haven't found a reason to have it yet except "why bother"...
And now some details just for future reference:
On the BSP:
=> 0x10000a0: mov %rax,%cr3
cr3 0x9922000
111850: ffffffff89922000 8192 OBJECT GLOBAL DEFAULT 22 early_top_pgt
(gdb) p/x early_top_pgt
$3 = {{pgd = 0x9924063}, {pgd = 0x9924063}, {pgd = 0x0} <repeats 509 times>, {pgd = 0x2418067}}
first two PGDs and the last one are populated.
On the AP:
cr3 0x2416000
104747: ffffffff82416000 8192 OBJECT GLOBAL DEFAULT 12 init_top_pgt
(gdb) p/x (long[512])*0xffffffff82416000
$8 = {0x0 <repeats 273 times>, 0xbe01067, 0x0 <repeats 128 times>, 0xc000067, 0xc001067, 0xc002067, 0xc003067, 0xc004067, 0xc005067,
0xc006067, 0xc007067, 0xc008067, 0xc009067, 0xc00a067, 0xc00b067, 0xc00c067, 0xc00d067, 0xc00e067, 0xc00f067, 0xc010067, 0xc011067, 0xc012067, 0xc013067, 0xc014067, 0xc015067, 0xc016067, 0xc017067, 0xc018067, 0xc019067, 0xc01a067, 0xc01b067, 0xc01c067, 0xc01d067, 0xc01e067, 0xc01f067, 0xc020067, 0xc021067, 0xc022067, 0xc023067, 0xc024067, 0xc025067, 0xc026067, 0xc027067, 0xc028067, 0xc029067, 0xc02a067, 0xc02b067, 0xc02c067, 0xc02d067, 0xc02e067, 0xc02f067, 0xc030067, 0xc031067, 0xc032067, 0xc033067, 0xc034067, 0xc035067, 0xc036067, 0xc037067, 0xc038067, 0xc039067, 0xc03a067, 0xc03b067, 0xc03c067, 0xc03d067, 0xc03e067, 0xc03f067, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7ffd3067, 0x0 <repeats 39 times>, 0x7ffd1067, 0x0, 0x9b11067, 0x2418067}
and that one becomes the swapper_pg_dir which is the kernel pagetable we use.
PTI then does two separate ones, which is a whole different topic.
:-)
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 4/9] x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
First
Reviewed-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>for the patch.
Thanks.
Quoted 5 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) · line 130
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +3
-0+ /* + * Switch to early_top_pgt which still has the identity mappings + * present.
Quoted 8 lines
I was wondering why we've had this "discrepancy" forever - the boot CPU would have
early_top_pgt*with* the ident mappings while the APs would doinit_top_pgt.But we end up loading
init_top_pgton the BSP too ininit_mem_mapping()so there's a short time during boot where we have this difference. I haven't found a reason to have it yet except "why bother"...
Because we enter with a 1:1 mapping, and so we can only switch to another set of page tables that also includes this 1:1 mapping. Once we are running from the kernel mapping, we can drop the 1:1 mapping but we still need it.
What we could do for robustness is reduce this 1:1 mapping to text + rodata, and make it read-only, but I'm not sure it's worth the churn.
Quoted 40 lines
And now some details just for future reference:
On the BSP:
=>
0x10000a0: mov %rax,%cr3cr3
0x9922000
111850:ffffffff899220008192 OBJECT GLOBAL DEFAULT 22early_top_pgt(gdb) p/x
early_top_pgt
$3 = {{pgd =0x9924063}, {pgd =0x9924063}, {pgd =0x0} <repeats 509 times>, {pgd =0x2418067}}first two PGDs and the last one are populated.
On the AP:
cr3
0x2416000
104747:ffffffff824160008192 OBJECT GLOBAL DEFAULT 12init_top_pgt(gdb) p/x (long[512])*0xffffffff82416000
$8 = {0x0<repeats 273 times>,0xbe01067,0x0<repeats 128 times>,0xc000067,0xc001067,0xc002067,0xc003067,0xc004067,0xc005067,
0xc006067,0xc007067,0xc008067,0xc009067,0xc00a067,0xc00b067,0xc00c067,0xc00d067,0xc00e067,0xc00f067,0xc010067,0xc011067,0xc012067,0xc013067,0xc014067,0xc015067,0xc016067,0xc017067,0xc018067,0xc019067,0xc01a067,0xc01b067,0xc01c067,0xc01d067,0xc01e067,0xc01f067,0xc020067,0xc021067,0xc022067,0xc023067,0xc024067,0xc025067,0xc026067,0xc027067,0xc028067,0xc029067,0xc02a067,0xc02b067,0xc02c067,0xc02d067,0xc02e067,0xc02f067,0xc030067,0xc031067,0xc032067,0xc033067,0xc034067,0xc035067,0xc036067,0xc037067,0xc038067,0xc039067,0xc03a067,0xc03b067,0xc03c067,0xc03d067,0xc03e067,0xc03f067,0x0,0x0,0x7ffd3067,0x0<repeats 39 times>,0x7ffd1067,0x0,0x9b11067,0x2418067}and that one becomes the
swapper_pg_dirwhich is the kernel pagetable we use.PTI then does two separate ones, which is a whole different topic.
:-)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 4/9] x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot
Quoted 7 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Because we enter with a 1:1 mapping, and so we can only switch to another set of page tables that also includes this 1:1 mapping. Once we are running from the kernel mapping, we can drop the 1:1 mapping but we still need it.
What we could do for robustness is reduce this 1:1 mapping to text + rodata, and make it read-only, but I'm not sure it's worth the churn.
Yeah, I was experimenting a bit with some shenanigans with those two pagetables yesterday and arrived to a similar conclusion - there's no point in trying to unify them.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/boot] x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 828263957611c210da00c1820db73fac217135b6 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/828263957611c210da00c1820db73fac217135b6 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:12 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:12:20 +01:00
x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot
The secondary startup code is used on the primary boot path as well, but in this case, the initial part runs from a 1:1 mapping, until an explicit cross-jump is made to the kernel virtual mapping of the same code.
On the secondary boot path, this jump is pointless as the code already executes from the mapping targeted by the jump. So combine this cross-jump with the jump from startup_64() into the common boot path. This simplifies the execution flow, and clearly separates code that runs from a 1:1 mapping from code that runs from the kernel virtual mapping.
Note that this requires a page table switch, so hoist the CR3 assignment into startup_64() as well. And since absolute symbol references will no longer be permitted in .head.text once we enable the associated build time checks, a RIP-relative memory operand is used in the JMP instruction, referring to an absolute constant in the .init.rodata section.
Given that the secondary startup code does not require a special placement inside the executable, move it to the .text section.
--- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 42 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +21 -21
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ L4_START_KERNEL = l4_index(__START_KERNEL_map) L3_START_KERNEL = pud_index(__START_KERNEL_map) - .text __HEAD .code64 SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
@@ -126,9 +125,21 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) call sev_verify_cbit #endif - jmp 1f + /* + * Switch to early_top_pgt which still has the identity mappings + * present. + */ + movq %rax, %cr3 + + /* Branch to the common startup code at its kernel virtual address */ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + jmp *0f(%rip) SYM_CODE_END(startup_64) + __INITRODATA +0: .quad common_startup_64 + + .text SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64) UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
@@ -174,8 +185,15 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax #endif + /* + * Switch to the init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and + * unmap the identity mapped ranges. + */ + movq %rax, %cr3 -1: +SYM_INNER_LABEL(common_startup_64, SYM_L_LOCAL) + UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR /* * Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to flush
@@ -205,29 +223,11 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) movq %rcx, %cr4 /* - * Switch to new page-table - * - * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the - * identity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the - * init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and unmap the - * identity mapped ranges. - */ - movq %rax, %cr3 - - /* * Set CR4.PGE to re-enable global translations. */ btsl $X86_CR4_PGE_BIT, %ecx movq %rcx, %cr4 - /* Ensure I am executing from virtual addresses */ - movq $1f, %rax - ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE - jmp *%rax -1: - UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK - ANNOTATE_NOENDBR // above - #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* * For parallel boot, the APIC ID is read from the APIC, and then
PATCH v7 5/9 efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt=
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Parse the mem_encrypt= command line parameter from the EFI stub if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT=y, so that it can be passed to the early boot code by the arch code in the stub.
This avoids the need for the core kernel to do any string parsing very early in the boot.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c +8 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ static bool efi_noinitrd;static bool efi_nosoftreserve;static bool efi_disable_pci_dma =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA ); +int efi_mem_encrypt; +bool __pure __efi_soft_reserve_enabled (void ) {return !efi_nosoftreserve;
@@ -75,6 +77,12 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char const *cmdline) efi_noinitrd = true; }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ) && !strcmp (param,"no5lvl" )) { efi_no5lvl = true; + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT ) && + !strcmp (param,"mem_encrypt" ) && val) { +if (parse_option_str (val,"on" )) + efi_mem_encrypt =1 ; +else if (parse_option_str (val,"off" )) + efi_mem_encrypt =-1 ; }else if (!strcmp (param,"efi" ) && val) { efi_nochunk =parse_option_str (val,"nochunk" ); efi_novamap |=parse_option_str (val,"novamap" );
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +1 -1
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ extern bool efi_no5lvl;extern bool efi_nochunk;extern bool efi_nokaslr;extern int efi_loglevel; +extern int efi_mem_encrypt;extern bool efi_novamap; -extern const efi_system_table_t *efi_system_table;typedef union efi_dxe_services_table efi_dxe_services_table_t ;
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
Re: [PATCH v7 5/9] efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt=
Quoted 6 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Parse the mem_encrypt= command line parameter from the EFI stub if
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT=y, so that it can be passed to the early boot code by the arch code in the stub.
Quoted 8 lines
This avoids the need for the core kernel to do any string parsing very early in the boot.
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/boot] efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt=
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 7205f06e847422b66c1506eee01b9998ffc75d76 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/7205f06e847422b66c1506eee01b9998ffc75d76 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:13 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:12:24 +01:00
efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt=
Parse the mem_encrypt= command line parameter from the EFI stub if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT=y, so that it can be passed to the early boot code by the arch code in the stub.
This avoids the need for the core kernel to do any string parsing very early in the boot.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c +8 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ static bool efi_noinitrd;static bool efi_nosoftreserve;static bool efi_disable_pci_dma =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA ); +int efi_mem_encrypt; +bool __pure __efi_soft_reserve_enabled (void ) {return !efi_nosoftreserve;
@@ -75,6 +77,12 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char const *cmdline) efi_noinitrd = true; }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ) && !strcmp (param,"no5lvl" )) { efi_no5lvl = true; + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT ) && + !strcmp (param,"mem_encrypt" ) && val) { +if (parse_option_str (val,"on" )) + efi_mem_encrypt =1 ; +else if (parse_option_str (val,"off" )) + efi_mem_encrypt =-1 ; }else if (!strcmp (param,"efi" ) && val) { efi_nochunk =parse_option_str (val,"nochunk" ); efi_novamap |=parse_option_str (val,"novamap" );
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +1 -1
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ extern bool efi_no5lvl;extern bool efi_nochunk;extern bool efi_nokaslr;extern int efi_loglevel; +extern int efi_mem_encrypt;extern bool efi_novamap; -extern const efi_system_table_t *efi_system_table;typedef union efi_dxe_services_table efi_dxe_services_table_t ;
PATCH v7 6/9 x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs to occur even before the initial page tables are created.
This is problematic for a number of reasons:
- this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way;
- parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in security minded code;
- the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor)
Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86 bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm blocks.
This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 15 +++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 13 -------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 32 ++------------------ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +15 -0
@@ -371,6 +371,19 @@ unsigned long decompress_kernel(unsigned char *outbuf, unsigned long virt_addr,return entry; } +/* +* Set the memory encryption xloadflag based on the mem_encrypt= command line +* parameter, if provided. +*/ +static void parse_mem_encrypt (struct setup_header *hdr) +{ +int on =cmdline_find_option_bool ("mem_encrypt=on" ); +int off =cmdline_find_option_bool ("mem_encrypt=off" ); + +if (on > off) + hdr->xloadflags |=XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION ; +} +/* * The compressed kernel image (ZO), has been moved so that its position * is against the end of the buffer used to hold the uncompressed kernel
@@ -401,6 +414,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output)/* Clear flags intended for solely in-kernel use. */ boot_params_ptr->hdr.loadflags &= ~KASLR_FLAG ; +parse_mem_encrypt (&boot_params_ptr->hdr); +sanitize_boot_params (boot_params_ptr);if (boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_mode ==7 ) {
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@#define XLF_EFI_KEXEC (1<<4)#define XLF_5LEVEL (1<<5)#define XLF_5LEVEL_ENABLED (1<<6) +#define XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION (1<<7)#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
arch/x86/lib/Makefile +0 -13
@@ -14,19 +14,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN CFLAGS_REMOVE_delay.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) endif -# Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it -ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT -KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n -KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n -KCSAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n - -ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER -CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg -endif - -CFLAGS_cmdline.o := -fno-stack-protector -fno-jump-tables -endif - inat_tables_script = $(srctree)/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk inat_tables_maps = $(srctree)/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt quiet_cmd_inat_tables = GEN $@
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +3 -29
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@#include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/sections.h> -#include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/sev.h>
@@ -95,9 +94,6 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data {*/ static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch"); -static char sme_cmdline_arg[]__initdata ="mem_encrypt" ; -static char sme_cmdline_on[]__initdata ="on" ; -static void __init sme_clear_pgd (struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) {unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
@@ -504,11 +500,9 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)void __init sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp) { -const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on;unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;unsigned long feature_mask;unsigned long me_mask; -char buffer[16 ];bool snp;u64 msr;
@@ -551,6 +545,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ if (feature_mask ==AMD_SME_BIT ) { +if (!(bp->hdr.xloadflags &XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION )) +return ; +/* * No SME if Hypervisor bit is set. This check is here to * prevent a guest from trying to enable SME. For running as a
@@ -570,31 +567,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) msr =__rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG );if (!(msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; - }else { -/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ - goto out; } -/* -* Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running -* identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command -* line argument data using rip-relative addressing. -*/ - asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0" - :"=r" (cmdline_arg) - :"p" (sme_cmdline_arg)); - asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0" - :"=r" (cmdline_on) - :"p" (sme_cmdline_on)); - - cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64 )bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | - ((u64 )bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr <<32 )); - -if (cmdline_find_option (cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer,sizeof (buffer)) <0 || -strncmp (buffer, cmdline_on,sizeof (buffer))) -return ; - -out:RIP_REL_REF (sme_me_mask) = me_mask; physical_mask &= ~me_mask; cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +3 -0
@@ -884,6 +884,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle, } } +if (efi_mem_encrypt >0 ) + hdr->xloadflags |=XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION ; + status =efi_decompress_kernel (&kernel_entry);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {efi_err ("Failed to decompress kernel\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 6/9] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h line 41
Quoted 9 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +1
-0@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@#define XLF_EFI_KEXEC (1<<4)#define XLF_5LEVEL (1<<5)#define XLF_5LEVEL_ENABLED (1<<6) +#define XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION (1<<7)
Needs documenting in Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst.
And yes, those 5LEVEL things are not documented either but I'm even questioning the justification for their existence. We'll see...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 6/9] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor
Quoted 14 lines · Borislav Petkov
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h line 41
Quoted 9 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +1
-0@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@#define XLF_EFI_KEXEC (1<<4)#define XLF_5LEVEL (1<<5)#define XLF_5LEVEL_ENABLED (1<<6) +#define XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION (1<<7)Needs documenting in
Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst.
Ack.
Quoted 3 lines
And yes, those 5LEVEL things are not documented either but I'm even questioning the justification for their existence. We'll see...
Yeah that seems unnecessary to me. They are only used by kexec, and only for cases where you want to kexec a [much] older kernel that cannot deal with 5-level paging at all. AFAICT 5-level support was added in v4.13.
So I think we might be able to drop these entirely, no?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 6/9] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor
Quoted 4 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Yeah that seems unnecessary to me. They are only used by kexec, and only for cases where you want to kexec a [much] older kernel that cannot deal with 5-level paging at all. AFAICT 5-level support was added in v4.13.
Yeah, I can't imagine a use case where you'd do two different kernels
- one for normal boot and one for kexec and they'd differ in the .config and one would support 5level pagetables and the other wouldn't...
Quoted 1 line
So I think we might be able to drop these entirely, no?
Yeah:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/boot] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: cd0d9d92c8bb46e77de62efd7df13069ddd61e7d Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/cd0d9d92c8bb46e77de62efd7df13069ddd61e7d Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:14 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:12:28 +01:00
x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor
The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs to occur even before the initial page tables are created.
This is problematic for a number of reasons:
- this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way;
- parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in security minded code;
- the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor)
Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86 bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm blocks.
This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 15 +++++++++++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 +- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 13 +---------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 32 ++---------------------- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +15 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,19 @@ unsigned long decompress_kernel(unsigned char *outbuf, unsigned long virt_addr, }/* +* Set the memory encryption xloadflag based on the mem_encrypt= command line +* parameter, if provided. +*/ +static void parse_mem_encrypt (struct setup_header *hdr) +{ +int on =cmdline_find_option_bool ("mem_encrypt=on" ); +int off =cmdline_find_option_bool ("mem_encrypt=off" ); + +if (on > off) + hdr->xloadflags |=XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION ; +} + +/* * The compressed kernel image (ZO), has been moved so that its position * is against the end of the buffer used to hold the uncompressed kernel * image (VO) and the execution environment (.bss, .brk), which makes sure
@@ -401,6 +414,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output)/* Clear flags intended for solely in-kernel use. */ boot_params_ptr->hdr.loadflags &= ~KASLR_FLAG ; +parse_mem_encrypt (&boot_params_ptr->hdr); +sanitize_boot_params (boot_params_ptr);if (boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_mode ==7 ) {
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@#define XLF_EFI_KEXEC (1<<4)#define XLF_5LEVEL (1<<5)#define XLF_5LEVEL_ENABLED (1<<6) +#define XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION (1<<7)#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
arch/x86/lib/Makefile +0 -13
@@ -14,19 +14,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN CFLAGS_REMOVE_delay.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) endif -# Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it -ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT -KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n -KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n -KCSAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n - -ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER -CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg -endif - -CFLAGS_cmdline.o := -fno-stack-protector -fno-jump-tables -endif - inat_tables_script = $(srctree)/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk inat_tables_maps = $(srctree)/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt quiet_cmd_inat_tables = GEN $@
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +3 -29
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@#include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/sections.h> -#include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/sev.h>
@@ -95,9 +94,6 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data {*/ static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch"); -static char sme_cmdline_arg[]__initdata ="mem_encrypt" ; -static char sme_cmdline_on[]__initdata ="on" ; -static void __init sme_clear_pgd (struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) {unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
@@ -504,11 +500,9 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)void __init sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp) { -const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on;unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;unsigned long feature_mask;unsigned long me_mask; -char buffer[16 ];bool snp;u64 msr;
@@ -551,6 +545,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ if (feature_mask ==AMD_SME_BIT ) { +if (!(bp->hdr.xloadflags &XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION )) +return ; +/* * No SME if Hypervisor bit is set. This check is here to * prevent a guest from trying to enable SME. For running as a
@@ -570,31 +567,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) msr =__rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG );if (!(msr &MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; - }else { -/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ - goto out; } -/* -* Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running -* identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command -* line argument data using rip-relative addressing. -*/ - asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0" - :"=r" (cmdline_arg) - :"p" (sme_cmdline_arg)); - asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0" - :"=r" (cmdline_on) - :"p" (sme_cmdline_on)); - - cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64 )bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | - ((u64 )bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr <<32 )); - -if (cmdline_find_option (cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer,sizeof (buffer)) <0 || -strncmp (buffer, cmdline_on,sizeof (buffer))) -return ; - -out:RIP_REL_REF (sme_me_mask) = me_mask; physical_mask &= ~me_mask; cc_vendor =CC_VENDOR_AMD ;
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +3 -0
@@ -884,6 +884,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle, } } +if (efi_mem_encrypt >0 ) + hdr->xloadflags |=XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION ; + status =efi_decompress_kernel (&kernel_entry);if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) {efi_err ("Failed to decompress kernel\n" );
PATCH v7 7/9 x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The .head.text section is the initial primary entrypoint of the core kernel, and is entered with the CPU executing from a 1:1 mapping of memory. Such code must never access global variables using absolute references, as these are based on the kernel virtual mapping which is not active yet at this point.
Given that the SME startup code is also called from this early execution context, move it into .head.text as well. This will allow more thorough build time checks in the future to ensure that early startup code only uses RIP-relative references to global variables.
Also replace some occurrences of __pa_symbol() [which relies on the compiler generating an absolute reference, which is not guaranteed] and an open coded RIP-relative access with RIP_REL_REF().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 ++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 42 ++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +4 -4
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);void __init sme_early_init (void ); -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp); -void __init sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp); +void sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp); +void sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp);int __init early_set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size);int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size);
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }static inline void __init sme_early_init (void ) { } -static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp) { } -static inline void __init sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp) { } +static inline void sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp) { } +static inline void sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp) { }static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling (void ) { }
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +17 -25
138 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
[tip: x86/boot] x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 48204aba801f1b512b3abed10b8e1a63e03f3dd1 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/48204aba801f1b512b3abed10b8e1a63e03f3dd1 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:15 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:12:33 +01:00
x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text
The .head.text section is the initial primary entrypoint of the core kernel, and is entered with the CPU executing from a 1:1 mapping of memory. Such code must never access global variables using absolute references, as these are based on the kernel virtual mapping which is not active yet at this point.
Given that the SME startup code is also called from this early execution context, move it into .head.text as well. This will allow more thorough build time checks in the future to ensure that early startup code only uses RIP-relative references to global variables.
Also replace some occurrences of __pa_symbol() [which relies on the compiler generating an absolute reference, which is not guaranteed] and an open coded RIP-relative access with RIP_REL_REF().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +++--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 42 +++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +4 -4
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);void __init sme_early_init (void ); -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp); -void __init sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp); +void sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp); +void sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp);int __init early_set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size);int __init early_set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size);
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }static inline void __init sme_early_init (void ) { } -static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp) { } -static inline void __init sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp) { } +static inline void sme_encrypt_kernel (struct boot_params *bp) { } +static inline void sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp) { }static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling (void ) { }
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +17 -25
138 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH v7 8/9 x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
In preparation for implementing rigorous build time checks to enforce that only code that can support it will be called from the early 1:1 mapping of memory, move SEV init code that is called in this manner to the .head.text section.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 10 ++++----- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 23 +++++++++----------- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 14 +++++++----- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +3 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static bool fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address)#undef __init#define __init +#undef __head +#define __head +#define __BOOT_COMPRESSED/* Basic instruction decoding support needed */
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +5 -5
@@ -213,16 +213,16 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate)struct snp_guest_request_ioctl ;void setup_ghcb (void ); -void __init early_snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, -unsigned long npages); -void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, -unsigned long npages); +void early_snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +unsigned long npages); +void early_snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +unsigned long npages);void __init snp_prep_memory (unsigned long paddr,unsigned int sz,enum psc_op op);void snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages);void snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages);void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void );bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp); -void __init __noreturn snp_abort (void ); +void __noreturn snp_abort (void );int snp_issue_guest_request (u64 exit_code,struct snp_req_data *input,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);void snp_accept_memory (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end);u64 snp_get_unsupported_features (u64 status);
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +10 -13
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)return true; } -static void __noreturn sev_es_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason) +static void __head __noreturn +sev_es_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason) {u64 val =GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ ;
@@ -330,13 +331,7 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid*/ static const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table (void ) { -void *ptr; - - asm ("lea cpuid_table_copy(%%rip), %0" - :"=r" (ptr) - :"p" (&cpuid_table_copy)); - -return ptr; +return &RIP_REL_REF (cpuid_table_copy); }/*
@@ -395,7 +390,7 @@ static u32 snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, bool compacted)return xsave_size; } -static bool +static bool __headsnp_cpuid_get_validated_func (struct cpuid_leaf *leaf) {const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table =snp_cpuid_get_table ();
@@ -532,7 +527,8 @@ static int snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,* Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other non-zero return value * should be treated as fatal by caller. */ -static int snp_cpuid (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,struct cpuid_leaf *leaf) +static int __head +snp_cpuid (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,struct cpuid_leaf *leaf) {const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table =snp_cpuid_get_table ();
@@ -574,7 +570,7 @@ static int snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_le* page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the * hypervisor and only the CPUID exit-code. */ -void __init do_vc_no_ghcb (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long exit_code) +void __head do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code) {unsigned int subfn =lower_bits (regs->cx,32 );unsigned int fn =lower_bits (regs->ax,32 );
@@ -1025,7 +1021,8 @@ struct cc_setup_data {* Search for a Confidential Computing blob passed in as a setup_data entry * via the Linux Boot Protocol. */ -static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data (struct boot_params *bp) +static __head +struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp) {struct cc_setup_data *sd =NULL ;struct setup_data *hdr;
@@ -1052,7 +1049,7 @@ static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp)* mapping needs to be updated in sync with all the changes to virtual memory * layout and related mapping facilities throughout the boot process. */ -static void __init setup_cpuid_table (const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) +static void __head setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) {const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table_fw, *cpuid_table;int i;
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +8 -6
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include <linux/psp-sev.h> #include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h> +#include <asm/init.h> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/sev.h>
@@ -682,8 +683,9 @@ static u64 __init get_jump_table_addr(void)return ret; } -static void early_set_pages_state (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, -unsigned long npages,enum psc_op op) +static void __head +early_set_pages_state (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +unsigned long npages,enum psc_op op) {unsigned long paddr_end;u64 val;
@@ -739,7 +741,7 @@ static void early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,sev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX ,GHCB_TERM_PSC ); } -void __init early_snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +void __head early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,unsigned long npages) {/*
@@ -2062,7 +2064,7 @@ bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)* * Scan for the blob in that order. */ -static __init struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob (struct boot_params *bp) +static __head struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp) {struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -2088,7 +2090,7 @@ static __init struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)return cc_info; } -bool __init snp_init (struct boot_params *bp) +bool __head snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) {struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -2110,7 +2112,7 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)return true; } -void __init __noreturn snp_abort (void ) +void __head __noreturn snp_abort(void) {sev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_GEN ,GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
[tip: x86/boot] x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 428080c9b19bfda37c478cd626dbd3851db1aff9 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/428080c9b19bfda37c478cd626dbd3851db1aff9 Author: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:16 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:12:37 +01:00
x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section
In preparation for implementing rigorous build time checks to enforce that only code that can support it will be called from the early 1:1 mapping of memory, move SEV init code that is called in this manner to the .head.text section.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 23 ++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 14 ++++++++------ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +3 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static bool fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address)#undef __init#define __init +#undef __head +#define __head +#define __BOOT_COMPRESSED/* Basic instruction decoding support needed */
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +5 -5
@@ -213,16 +213,16 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate)struct snp_guest_request_ioctl ;void setup_ghcb (void ); -void __init early_snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, -unsigned long npages); -void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, -unsigned long npages); +void early_snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +unsigned long npages); +void early_snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +unsigned long npages);void __init snp_prep_memory (unsigned long paddr,unsigned int sz,enum psc_op op);void snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages);void snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages);void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void );bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp); -void __init __noreturn snp_abort (void ); +void __noreturn snp_abort (void );int snp_issue_guest_request (u64 exit_code,struct snp_req_data *input,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);void snp_accept_memory (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end);u64 snp_get_unsupported_features (u64 status);
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +10 -13
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)return true; } -static void __noreturn sev_es_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason) +static void __head __noreturn +sev_es_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason) {u64 val =GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ ;
@@ -330,13 +331,7 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid*/ static const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table (void ) { -void *ptr; - - asm ("lea cpuid_table_copy(%%rip), %0" - :"=r" (ptr) - :"p" (&cpuid_table_copy)); - -return ptr; +return &RIP_REL_REF (cpuid_table_copy); }/*
@@ -395,7 +390,7 @@ static u32 snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, bool compacted)return xsave_size; } -static bool +static bool __headsnp_cpuid_get_validated_func (struct cpuid_leaf *leaf) {const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table =snp_cpuid_get_table ();
@@ -532,7 +527,8 @@ static int snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,* Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other non-zero return value * should be treated as fatal by caller. */ -static int snp_cpuid (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,struct cpuid_leaf *leaf) +static int __head +snp_cpuid (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,struct cpuid_leaf *leaf) {const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table =snp_cpuid_get_table ();
@@ -574,7 +570,7 @@ static int snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_le* page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the * hypervisor and only the CPUID exit-code. */ -void __init do_vc_no_ghcb (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long exit_code) +void __head do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code) {unsigned int subfn =lower_bits (regs->cx,32 );unsigned int fn =lower_bits (regs->ax,32 );
@@ -1025,7 +1021,8 @@ struct cc_setup_data {* Search for a Confidential Computing blob passed in as a setup_data entry * via the Linux Boot Protocol. */ -static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data (struct boot_params *bp) +static __head +struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp) {struct cc_setup_data *sd =NULL ;struct setup_data *hdr;
@@ -1052,7 +1049,7 @@ static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp)* mapping needs to be updated in sync with all the changes to virtual memory * layout and related mapping facilities throughout the boot process. */ -static void __init setup_cpuid_table (const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) +static void __head setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) {const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table_fw, *cpuid_table;int i;
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +8 -6
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include <linux/psp-sev.h> #include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h> +#include <asm/init.h> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/sev.h>
@@ -682,8 +683,9 @@ static u64 __init get_jump_table_addr(void)return ret; } -static void early_set_pages_state (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, -unsigned long npages,enum psc_op op) +static void __head +early_set_pages_state (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +unsigned long npages,enum psc_op op) {unsigned long paddr_end;u64 val;
@@ -739,7 +741,7 @@ e_term:sev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX ,GHCB_TERM_PSC ); } -void __init early_snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr, +void __head early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,unsigned long npages) {/*
@@ -2062,7 +2064,7 @@ fail:* * Scan for the blob in that order. */ -static __init struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob (struct boot_params *bp) +static __head struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp) {struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -2088,7 +2090,7 @@ found_cc_info:return cc_info; } -bool __init snp_init (struct boot_params *bp) +bool __head snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) {struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -2110,7 +2112,7 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)return true; } -void __init __noreturn snp_abort (void ) +void __head __noreturn snp_abort(void) {sev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_GEN ,GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED ); }
PATCH v7 9/9 x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
On x86_64, the core kernel is entered in long mode, which implies that paging is enabled. This means that the CR4.LA57 control bit is guaranteed to be in sync with the number of paging levels used by the kernel, and there is no need to store this in a variable.
There is also no need to use variables for storing the calculations of pgdir_shift and ptrs_per_p4d, as they are easily determined on the fly.
This removes the need for two different sources of truth for determining whether 5-level paging is in use: CR4.LA57 always reflects the actual state, and never changes from the point of view of the 64-bit core kernel. The only potential concern is the cost of CR4 accesses, which can be mitigated using alternatives patching based on feature detection.
Note that even the decompressor does not manipulate any page tables before updating CR4.LA57, so it can also avoid the associated global variables entirely. However, as it does not implement alternatives patching, the associated ELF sections need to be discarded.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 4 -- arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c | 12 ------ arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 43 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 33 +-------------- arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 3 -- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 9 ---- 8 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +0 -4
@@ -16,9 +16,6 @@#define __NO_FORTIFY -/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */ -#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 -/* * Boot stub deals with identity mappings, physical and virtual addresses are * the same, so override these defines.
@@ -181,7 +178,6 @@ static inline int count_immovable_mem_regions(void) { return 0; }#endif /* ident_map_64.c */ -extern unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled, pgdir_shift, ptrs_per_p4d;extern void kernel_add_identity_map (unsigned long start,unsigned long end);/* Used by PAGE_KERN* macros: */
arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c +0 -12
@@ -9,13 +9,6 @@#define BIOS_START_MIN 0x20000U/* 128K, less than this is insane */ #define BIOS_START_MAX 0x9f000U/* 640K, absolute maximum */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL -/* __pgtable_l5_enabled needs to be in .data to avoid being cleared along with .bss */ -unsigned int __section(".data") __pgtable_l5_enabled; -unsigned int __section(".data") pgdir_shift = 39; -unsigned int __section(".data") ptrs_per_p4d = 1; -#endif -/* Buffer to preserve trampoline memory */ static char trampoline_save[TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_SIZE ];
@@ -125,11 +118,6 @@ asmlinkage void configure_5level_paging(struct boot_params *bp, void *pgtable) native_cpuid_eax(0) >= 7 && (native_cpuid_ecx(7) & (1 << (X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31)))) { l5_required = true; - -/* Initialize variables for 5-level paging */ - __pgtable_l5_enabled =1 ; - pgdir_shift =48 ; - ptrs_per_p4d =512 ; }/*
arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S +1 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ SECTIONS *(.dynamic) *(.dynsym) *(.dynstr) *(.dynbss) *(.hash) *(.gnu.hash) *(.note.*) + *(.altinstructions .altinstr_replacement) } .got.plt (INFO) : {
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +22 -21
77 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +0 -2
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */ -#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/linkage.h>
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +2 -31
@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */ -#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 -#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <linux/types.h>
@@ -52,14 +49,6 @@ extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt;pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX); -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL -unsigned int __pgtable_l5_enabled__ro_after_init ; -unsigned int pgdir_shift__ro_after_init =39 ; -EXPORT_SYMBOL (pgdir_shift); -unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d__ro_after_init =1 ; -EXPORT_SYMBOL (ptrs_per_p4d); -#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_MEMORY_LAYOUT unsigned long page_offset_base__ro_after_init = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE_L4;EXPORT_SYMBOL (page_offset_base);
@@ -78,21 +67,6 @@ static struct desc_struct startup_gdt[GDT_ENTRIES] __initdata = { [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(DESC_DATA64, 0, 0xfffff), }; -static inline bool check_la57_support (void ) -{ -if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL )) -return false; - -/* -* 5-level paging is detected and enabled at kernel decompression -* stage. Only check if it has been enabled there. -*/ -if (!(native_read_cr4 () &X86_CR4_LA57 )) -return false; - -return true; -} -static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup (struct boot_params *bp,pmdval_t *pmd) {unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end;
@@ -155,7 +129,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,bool la57;int i; - la57 =check_la57_support (); + la57 =pgtable_l5_enabled ();/* Is the address too large? */ if (physaddr >>MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS )
@@ -440,10 +414,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __noreturn x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode (__START_KERNEL & PGDIR_MASK)));BUILD_BUG_ON (__fix_to_virt (__end_of_fixed_addresses) <=MODULES_END ); -if (check_la57_support ()) { - __pgtable_l5_enabled =1 ; - pgdir_shift =48 ; - ptrs_per_p4d =512 ; +if (pgtable_l5_enabled ()) { page_offset_base = __PAGE_OFFSET_BASE_L5; vmalloc_base = __VMALLOC_BASE_L5; vmemmap_base = __VMEMMAP_BASE_L5;
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c +0 -3
@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING #define pr_fmt (fmt) "kasan: " fmt -/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */ -#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 -#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kdebug.h>
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +0 -9
@@ -27,15 +27,6 @@#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS -/* -* This code runs before CPU feature bits are set. By default, the -* pgtable_l5_enabled() function uses bit X86_FEATURE_LA57 to determine if -* 5-level paging is active, so that won't work here. USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 -* is provided to handle this situation and, instead, use a variable that -* has been set by the early boot code. -*/ -#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 -#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 9/9] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h typedef unsigned long pgprotval_t; · line 43
Quoted 9 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +9
-0+ asm(ALTERNATIVE_TERNARY( + "movq %%cr4, %[reg] \n\t btl %[la57], %k[reg]" CC_SET(c), + %P[feat], "stc", "clc") + : [reg] "=&r" (r), CC_OUT(c) (ret) + : [feat] "i" (X86_FEATURE_LA57), + [la57] "i" (X86_CR4_LA57_BIT) + : "cc"); + +return ret;
Yeah, I said this is creative but an alternative here looks like an overkill.
Can we use a RIP_REL_REF(global var) instead pls?
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 9/9] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state
Quoted 12 lines · Borislav Petkov
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h typedef unsigned long pgprotval_t; · line 43
Quoted 9 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +9
-0+ asm(ALTERNATIVE_TERNARY( + "movq %%cr4, %[reg] \n\t btl %[la57], %k[reg]" CC_SET(c), + %P[feat], "stc", "clc") + : [reg] "=&r" (r), CC_OUT(c) (ret) + : [feat] "i" (X86_FEATURE_LA57), + [la57] "i" (X86_CR4_LA57_BIT) + : "cc"); + +return ret;
Quoted 5 lines
Yeah, I said this is creative but an alternative here looks like an overkill.
Can we use a
RIP_REL_REF(global var)instead pls?
I don't see the point of that, tbh. Patch #2 already ripped out all the fixup_pointer() occurrences. This patch gets rid of the need to #define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 in each translation unit that contains code that might execute before alternatives patching has occurred.
Today, pgtable_l5_enabled() is used in many places, most of which resolve to cpu_feature_enabled(), and I don't think you are suggesting to replace all of those with a variable load, right? So that means we'll have to stick with early and late variants of pgtable_l5_enabled() like we have today, and we should just drop this patch instead - I put it at the end of the series for a reason.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 9/9] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state
Quoted 3 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Today,
pgtable_l5_enabled()is used in many places, most of which resolve tocpu_feature_enabled(), and I don't think you are suggesting to replace all of those with a variable load, right?
pgtable_l5_enabled() is the odd one out, special thing which should have been cpu_feature_enabled() as latter is the default interface we use to query what features the CPU supports. But 5level got done long ago and we hadn't decided upon cpu_feature_enabled() back then.
So should we replace it with it?
Yap, eventually.
Quoted 2 lines
So that means we'll have to stick with early and late variants of
pgtable_l5_enabled()like we have today,
I don't mind at all if we had a
early_pgtable_l5_enabled()
which does the RIP_REL_REF() thing and it should be used only in 1:1 mapping code and the late stuff should start to get replaced with cpu_feature_enabled() until pgtable_l5_enabled() is completely gone.
And then we even see whether we can opencode the handful places.
Quoted 2 lines
and we should just drop this patch instead - I put it at the end of the series for a reason.
Yeah, we can leave that one aside for now but use it to start a cleanup series.
If you're bored and feel like doing it, be my guest but for the next cycle. Or I'll put it on my evergrowing TODO and get to it eventually.
For now, lemme test your set without this one and see whether we can queue them even now.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 9/9] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Today,
pgtable_l5_enabled()is used in many places, most of which resolve tocpu_feature_enabled(), and I don't think you are suggesting to replace all of those with a variable load, right?
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pgtable_l5_enabled()is the odd one out, special thing which should have beencpu_feature_enabled()as latter is the default interface we use to query what features the CPU supports. But 5level got done long ago and we hadn't decided uponcpu_feature_enabled()back then.So should we replace it with it?
Yap, eventually.
That is not the issue here. The issue is that cpu_feature_enabled() will produce the wrong value if you call it too early.
The 'late' version of pgtable_l5_enabled() already uses cpu_feature_enabled(), and I don't think that needs to change. Or are you saying that pgtable_l5_enabled() should not exist at all, and all ordinary users should use cpu_feature_enabled() directly? I suspect that would cause problems where pgtable_l5_enabled() is used in static inlines in header files, and it is left up to the .c file to set the #define to convert all #include'd occurrences of pgtable_l5_enabled() into the 'early' variant.
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So that means we'll have to stick with early and late variants of
pgtable_l5_enabled()like we have today,I don't mind at all if we had a
early_pgtable_l5_enabled()
That wouldn't work with the static inline users of pgtable_l5_enabled().
Quoted 4 lines
which does the
RIP_REL_REF()thing and it should be used only in 1:1 mapping code and the late stuff should start to get replaced withcpu_feature_enabled()untilpgtable_l5_enabled()is completely gone.
All the references to pgtable_l5_enabled() are already gone from the code that executes from a 1:1 mapping. That is why this patch is
optional: it is just cleanup that goes on top of the earlier patch that gets rid of potentially problematic uses of fixup_pointer().
The issue being solved here is that we duplicate the value of CR4.LA57 into a global variable, in a way that requires us to reason about whether routines in a certain compilation unit might be called before cpu_feature_enabled() may be used. LA57 is an example of a feature where we cannot just assume that it is missing until the point where we figure out whether it is there or not, like in most other cases with CPU features that are truly optional.
But I am not aware of any issues around this, although the early accessors are probably used more widely than necessary at this point.
So an alternative approach might be to not use cpu_feature_enabled() at all, and always rely on the global variables. But that might tickle a hot path in the wrong way and cause a noticeable slowdown on some benchmark.
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And then we even see whether we can opencode the handful places.
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and we should just drop this patch instead - I put it at the end of the series for a reason.
Yeah, we can leave that one aside for now but use it to start a cleanup series.
If you're bored and feel like doing it, be my guest but for the next cycle. Or I'll put it on my evergrowing TODO and get to it eventually.
I don't mind revisiting this next cycle.
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For now, lemme test your set without this one and see whether we can queue them even now.
Cheers.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 9/9] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state
Quoted 2 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
That is not the issue here. The issue is that
cpu_feature_enabled()will produce the wrong value if you call it too early.
Looks like I didn't express myself too clearly: the early version of early_pgtable_l5_enabled() should use a simple variable like now - not cpu_feature_enabled().
And regardless, cpu_feature_enabled() should work even before alternatives have run because we do dynamic testing in that case... and so on and so on.
BUT(!), let's put a pin in this and let me first have an indepth look after the merge window so that I can poke at the details and produce a concrete diff which we can talk about.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteQuoted 19 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
This is resend #2 of v5 [0] with some touchups applied.
Changes since v6:
- Drop flawed patch to move some SME/SEV related calls out of the early boot path to avoid the potential need for backporting patches #6/#7 to kernels where SEV support may not be crucial. This problem will be dealt with if/when it arises while doing those backports.Changes since v5:
- drop patches that have been merged
- rebase onto latest tip/x86/boot
- fix comment regarding CR4.PGE wrt flushing of global TLB entries
- avoid adding startup code to .noinstr.text as it triggers objtool warnings
Quoted 9 lines
Cc Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Dionna Glaze <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
For the series, tested bare metal boots with mem_encrypt=on / mem_encrypt=off and boots of SVM, SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests.
Quoted 34 lines
Ard Biesheuvel (9):
x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in startup code x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt= x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 statearch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 15 ++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 4 - arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c | 12 --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 3 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 43 ++++----- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 10 +-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 61 ++----------- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 93 ++++++++------------ arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 23 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 14 +-- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 13 --- arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 3 - arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 83 +++++------------ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 8 ++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 3 + 20 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 255 deletions(-)
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 31 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 19 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
This is resend #2 of v5 [0] with some touchups applied.
Changes since v6:
- Drop flawed patch to move some SME/SEV related calls out of the early boot path to avoid the potential need for backporting patches #6/#7 to kernels where SEV support may not be crucial. This problem will be dealt with if/when it arises while doing those backports.Changes since v5:
- drop patches that have been merged
- rebase onto latest tip/x86/boot
- fix comment regarding CR4.PGE wrt flushing of global TLB entries
- avoid adding startup code to .noinstr.text as it triggers objtool warningsQuoted 9 lines
Cc Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Dionna Glaze <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
For the series, tested bare metal boots with mem_encrypt=on / mem_encrypt=off and boots of SVM, SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests.
Tested-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Thanks a lot! I take it this was a kernel built with GCC?
Quoted 32 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 31 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 28 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
This is resend #2 of v5 [0] with some touchups applied.
Changes since v6:
- Drop flawed patch to move some SME/SEV related calls out of the early boot path to avoid the potential need for backporting patches #6/#7 to kernels where SEV support may not be crucial. This problem will be dealt with if/when it arises while doing those backports.Changes since v5:
- drop patches that have been merged
- rebase onto latest tip/x86/boot
- fix comment regarding CR4.PGE wrt flushing of global TLB entries
- avoid adding startup code to .noinstr.text as it triggers objtool warnings[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Cc Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Dionna Glaze <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For the series, tested bare metal boots with mem_encrypt=on / mem_encrypt=off and boots of SVM, SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests.
Tested-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Thanks a lot! I take it this was a kernel built with GCC?
Yes, it was a GCC build, so I went back and rebuilt with Clang-14 and everything was fine there, too.
Thanks,
Tom
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 35 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 34 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 19 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
This is resend #2 of v5 [0] with some touchups applied.
Changes since v6:
- Drop flawed patch to move some SME/SEV related calls out of the early boot path to avoid the potential need for backporting patches #6/#7 to kernels where SEV support may not be crucial. This problem will be dealt with if/when it arises while doing those backports.Changes since v5:
- drop patches that have been merged
- rebase onto latest tip/x86/boot
- fix comment regarding CR4.PGE wrt flushing of global TLB entries
- avoid adding startup code to .noinstr.text as it triggers objtool warningsQuoted 9 lines
Cc Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Dionna Glaze <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>For the series, tested bare metal boots with mem_encrypt=on / mem_encrypt=off and boots of SVM, SEV, SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests.
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Tested-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Thanks a lot! I take it this was a kernel built with GCC?
Yes, it was a GCC build, so I went back and rebuilt with Clang-14 and everything was fine there, too.
OK, thanks again.