random: Fix the issue of '_might_sleep' function running in an atomic contex
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 random: Fix the issue of '_might_sleep' function running in an atomic contex
'input_handle_event' runs in an atomic context
(spinlock). In rare instances, it may call
the '_might_sleep' function, which could trigger
a kernel exception.
Backtrace: [<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc [<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec [<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144 [<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148 [<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c [<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90 [<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c [<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8 [<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c [<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec [<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38 [<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28 [<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8 [<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc [<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270 [<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48 [<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490 [<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- include/linux/workqueue.h | 1 + kernel/workqueue.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)if (orig <POOL_READY_BITS && new >=POOL_READY_BITS ) {crng_reseed (NULL );/* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ if (static_key_initialized) -execute_in_process_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready); +execute_in_non_atomic_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready);atomic_notifier_call_chain (&random_ready_notifier,0 ,NULL );wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );
include/linux/workqueue.h +1 -0
@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ extern void drain_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq);extern int schedule_on_each_cpu (work_func_t func);int execute_in_process_context (work_func_t fn,struct execute_work *); +int execute_in_non_atomic_context (work_func_t fn,struct execute_work *ew);extern bool flush_work (struct work_struct *work);extern bool cancel_work (struct work_struct *work);
kernel/workqueue.c +26 -0
@@ -4449,6 +4449,32 @@ int execute_in_process_context(work_func_t fn, struct execute_work *ew) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (execute_in_process_context); +/** +* execute_in_non_atomic_context - reliably execute the routine with user context +* @fn: the function to execute +* @ew: guaranteed storage for the execute work structure (must +* be available when the work executes) +* +* Schedules the function for delayed execution if atomic context is available, +* otherwise executes the function immediately . +* +* Return: 0 - function was executed +* 1 - function was scheduled for execution +*/ +int execute_in_non_atomic_context (work_func_t fn,struct execute_work *ew) +{ +if (!in_atomic ()) { +fn (&ew->work); +return 0 ; + } + +INIT_WORK (&ew->work, fn); +schedule_work (&ew->work); + +return 1 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (execute_in_non_atomic_context); +/** * free_workqueue_attrs - free a workqueue_attrs * @attrs: workqueue_attrs to free
Signature · 1 line
2.18.0
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerHi Guoyong,
Quoted 16 lines · Guoyong Wang
'
input_handle_event' runs in an atomic context
(spinlock). In rare instances, it may call
the '_might_sleep' function, which could trigger
a kernel exception.Backtrace: [<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc [<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec [<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144 [<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148 [<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c [<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90 [<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c [<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8 [<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c [<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec
Quoted 8 lines
[<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38 [<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28 [<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8 [<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc [<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270 [<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48 [<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490 [<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
Thanks for reporting this.
I'm wondering, though, rather than introducing a second function, maybe execute_in_process_context() should just gain a && !in_atomic(). That'd make things a bit simpler.
However, I'm pretty sure in_atomic() isn't actually a reliable way of determining that, depending on config. So maybe this should just call the worker always (if system_wq isn't null).
Alternatively, any chance the call to add_input_randomness() could be moved outside the spinlock, or does this not look possible?
Jason
Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
I'm wondering, though, rather than introducing a second function, maybe
execute_in_process_context()should just gain a&& !in_atomic(). That'd make things a bit simpler.However, I'm pretty sure
in_atomic()isn't actually a reliable way of determining that, depending on config. So maybe this should just call the worker always (ifsystem_wqisn't null).Alternatively, any chance the call to
add_input_randomness()could be moved outside the spinlock, or does this not look possible?
Hi Jason,
Thanks for your suggestions.
I am inclined to accept your second suggestion. My reluctance to accept the first is due to the concern that "&& !in_atomic()" could potentially alter the original meaning of the 'execute_in_process_context' interface. Regarding the third suggestion, modifying the logic associated with 'input' is not recommended.
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Guoyong Wang
Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
I'm wondering, though, rather than introducing a second function, maybe
execute_in_process_context()should just gain a&& !in_atomic(). That'd make things a bit simpler.However, I'm pretty sure
in_atomic()isn't actually a reliable way of determining that, depending on config. So maybe this should just call the worker always (ifsystem_wqisn't null).Alternatively, any chance the call to
add_input_randomness()could be moved outside the spinlock, or does this not look possible?Hi Jason,
Quoted 7 lines
Thanks for your suggestions.
I am inclined to accept your second suggestion. My reluctance to accept the first is due to the concern that "&& !in_atomic()" could potentially alter the original meaning of the '
execute_in_process_context' interface. Regarding the third suggestion, modifying the logic associated with 'input' is not recommended.
Doesn't something like the below seem simplest? Just move the call out of the spinlock and we're done.
drivers/input/input-core-private.h +1 -1
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@struct input_dev ;void input_mt_release_slots (struct input_dev *dev); -void input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev, +bool input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev,unsigned int type,unsigned int code,int value);#endif /* _INPUT_CORE_PRIVATE_H */
drivers/input/input.c +8 -3
@@ -391,20 +391,22 @@ static void input_event_dispose(struct input_dev *dev, int disposition, } } -void input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev, +bool input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev,unsigned int type,unsigned int code,int value) {int disposition; +bool should_contribute_to_rng = false;lockdep_assert_held (&dev->event_lock); disposition =input_get_disposition (dev, type, code, &value);if (disposition !=INPUT_IGNORE_EVENT ) {if (type !=EV_SYN ) -add_input_randomness (type, code, value); + should_contribute_to_rng = true;input_event_dispose (dev, disposition, type, code, value); } +return should_contribute_to_rng; }/**
@@ -428,12 +430,15 @@ void input_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, int value) { unsigned long flags; +bool should_contribute_to_rng;if (is_event_supported (type, dev->evbit,EV_MAX )) {spin_lock_irqsave (&dev->event_lock, flags); -input_handle_event (dev, type, code, value); + should_contribute_to_rng =input_handle_event (dev, type, code, value);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dev->event_lock, flags); +if (should_contribute_to_rng) +add_input_randomness (type, code, value); } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (input_event);
Quoted 62 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 9 lines
Hi Jason,
Thanks for your suggestions.
I am inclined to accept your second suggestion. My reluctance to accept the first is due to the concern that "&& !in_atomic()" could potentially alter the original meaning of the '
execute_in_process_context' interface. Regarding the third suggestion, modifying the logic associated with 'input' is not recommended.Doesn't something like the below seem simplest? Just move the call out of the spinlock and we're done.
drivers/input/input-core-private.h +1
-1@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@struct input_dev ;void input_mt_release_slots (struct input_dev *dev); -void input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev, +bool input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev,unsigned int type,unsigned int code,int value);#endif /* _INPUT_CORE_PRIVATE_H */ drivers/input/input.c +5
-2@@ -391,20 +391,22 @@ static void input_event_dispose(struct input_dev *dev, int disposition, } } -void input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev, +bool input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev,unsigned int type,unsigned int code,int value) {int disposition; +bool should_contribute_to_rng = false;lockdep_assert_held (&dev->event_lock); disposition =input_get_disposition (dev, type, code, &value);if (disposition !=INPUT_IGNORE_EVENT ) {if (type !=EV_SYN ) -add_input_randomness (type, code, value); +should_contribute_to_rng = true;input_event_dispose (dev, disposition, type, code, value); } +return should_contribute_to_rng; }/** @@ -428,12 +430,15 @@ void input_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, int value) { unsigned long flags; +bool should_contribute_to_rng;if (is_event_supported (type, dev->evbit,EV_MAX )) {
drivers/input/input.c void input_event(struct input_dev *dev, · line 444
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/input/input.c +3
-1spin_lock_irqsave (&dev->event_lock, flags); -input_handle_event (dev, type, code, value); +should_contribute_to_rng =input_handle_event (dev, type, code, value);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dev->event_lock, flags); +if (should_contribute_to_rng) +add_input_randomness (type, code, value); } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (input_event);
Hi Jason,
Your proposal is not suitable for scenarios where input_event is called within an atomic context.
For example:spin_lock(&dev->spinlock);input_event(dev, EV_ABS, ABS_X, x);spin_unlock(&dev->spinlock);
Quoted 62 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 9 lines
Hi Jason,
Thanks for your suggestions.
I am inclined to accept your second suggestion. My reluctance to accept the first is due to the concern that "&& !in_atomic()" could potentially alter the original meaning of the '
execute_in_process_context' interface. Regarding the third suggestion, modifying the logic associated with 'input' is not recommended.Doesn't something like the below seem simplest? Just move the call out of the spinlock and we're done.
drivers/input/input-core-private.h +1
-1@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@struct input_dev ;void input_mt_release_slots (struct input_dev *dev); -void input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev, +bool input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev,unsigned int type,unsigned int code,int value);#endif /* _INPUT_CORE_PRIVATE_H */ drivers/input/input.c +5
-2@@ -391,20 +391,22 @@ static void input_event_dispose(struct input_dev *dev, int disposition, } } -void input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev, +bool input_handle_event (struct input_dev *dev,unsigned int type,unsigned int code,int value) {int disposition; +bool should_contribute_to_rng = false;lockdep_assert_held (&dev->event_lock); disposition =input_get_disposition (dev, type, code, &value);if (disposition !=INPUT_IGNORE_EVENT ) {if (type !=EV_SYN ) -add_input_randomness (type, code, value); +should_contribute_to_rng = true;input_event_dispose (dev, disposition, type, code, value); } +return should_contribute_to_rng; }/** @@ -428,12 +430,15 @@ void input_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, int value) { unsigned long flags; +bool should_contribute_to_rng;if (is_event_supported (type, dev->evbit,EV_MAX )) {
drivers/input/input.c void input_event(struct input_dev *dev, · line 444
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/input/input.c +3
-1spin_lock_irqsave (&dev->event_lock, flags); -input_handle_event (dev, type, code, value); +should_contribute_to_rng =input_handle_event (dev, type, code, value);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dev->event_lock, flags); +if (should_contribute_to_rng) +add_input_randomness (type, code, value); } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (input_event);
Hi Jason,
As I mentioned last time: Your solution may not be applicable when 'input_event' is executed in users spinlock. What are you thoughts on this? I'm looking forward to your suggestions so we can reach an agreement and expedite the upstream process, Thanks!
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH 1/1 random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes, however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the execute_in_process_context() helper function, which accounts for whether or not the caller is in_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.
This turned out to be the case with input_handle_event() in drivers/input/input.c contributing entropy:
[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc [<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec [<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144 [<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148 [<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c [<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90 [<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c [<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8 [<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c [<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec [<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38 [<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28 [<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8 [<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc [<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270 [<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48 [<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490 [<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And in_atomic() isn't reliable.
So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is fine.
---
Guoyong- can you test this and tell me whether it fixes the problem you were seeing? If so, I'll try to get this sent up for 6.9. -Jason
drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +5 -5
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)static void __cold _credit_init_bits (size_t bits) { -static struct execute_work set_ready; + static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);unsigned int new, orig, add;unsigned long flags;
@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)if (orig <POOL_READY_BITS && new >=POOL_READY_BITS ) {crng_reseed (NULL );/* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ -if (static_key_initialized) -execute_in_process_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready); +if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq) +queue_work (system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);atomic_notifier_call_chain (&random_ready_notifier,0 ,NULL );wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );
@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)/* * If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels -* are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where -* it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. +* or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static +* branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized. */ if (!static_branch_likely (&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >=CRNG_READY )crng_set_ready (NULL );
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Quoted 91 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes, however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the
execute_in_process_context()helper function, which accounts for whether or not the caller isin_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.This turned out to be the case with
input_handle_event()indrivers/input/input.ccontributing entropy:[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc [<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec [<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144 [<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148 [<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c [<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90 [<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c [<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8 [<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c [<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec [<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38 [<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28 [<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8 [<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc [<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270 [<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48 [<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490 [<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And
in_atomic()isn't reliable.So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is fine.
Reported-by Guoyong Wang <[email protected]>Fixes f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>---
Guoyong- can you test this and tell me whether it fixes the problem you were seeing? If so, I'll try to get this sent up for 6.9. -Jasondrivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +5
-5@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)static void __cold _credit_init_bits (size_t bits) { -static struct execute_work set_ready; + static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);unsigned int new, orig, add;unsigned long flags;@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)if (orig <POOL_READY_BITS && new >=POOL_READY_BITS ) {crng_reseed (NULL );/* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ -if (static_key_initialized) -execute_in_process_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready); +if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq) +queue_work (system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);atomic_notifier_call_chain (&random_ready_notifier,0 ,NULL );wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)/* * If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels -* are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where -* it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. +* or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static +* branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized. */ if (!static_branch_likely (&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >=CRNG_READY )crng_set_ready (NULL );Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Hi Jason,
Thanks for your feedback. We concur with the proposed change and have verified that it works well in our tests. Next, I will provide a patch v2 for the changes discussed.
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerQuoted 95 lines · Guoyong Wang
Quoted 91 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes, however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the
execute_in_process_context()helper function, which accounts for whether or not the caller isin_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.This turned out to be the case with
input_handle_event()indrivers/input/input.ccontributing entropy:[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc [<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec [<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144 [<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148 [<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c [<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90 [<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c [<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8 [<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c [<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec [<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38 [<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28 [<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8 [<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc [<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270 [<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48 [<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490 [<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And
in_atomic()isn't reliable.So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is fine.
Reported-by Guoyong Wang <[email protected]>Fixes f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>---
Guoyong- can you test this and tell me whether it fixes the problem you were seeing? If so, I'll try to get this sent up for 6.9. -Jasondrivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +5
-5@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)static void __cold _credit_init_bits (size_t bits) { -static struct execute_work set_ready; + static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);unsigned int new, orig, add;unsigned long flags;@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)if (orig <POOL_READY_BITS && new >=POOL_READY_BITS ) {crng_reseed (NULL );/* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ -if (static_key_initialized) -execute_in_process_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready); +if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq) +queue_work (system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);atomic_notifier_call_chain (&random_ready_notifier,0 ,NULL );wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)/* * If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels -* are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where -* it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. +* or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static +* branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized. */ if (!static_branch_likely (&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >=CRNG_READY )crng_set_ready (NULL );Signature · 1 line
2.44.0Hi Jason,
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks for your feedback. We concur with the proposed change and have verified that it works well in our tests. Next, I will provide a patch v2 for the changes discussed.
No need. This is already upstream and has your Reported-by. It'll get backported to stable too.