Landlock: IOCTL support
Subsystems (8)
Günther Noack
reviewerv12 cover Landlock: IOCTL support
Hello!
These patches add simple ioctl(2) support to Landlock.
Objective
~~~~~~~~~
Make ioctl(2) requests restrictable with Landlock, in a way that is useful for real-world applications.
Proposed approach
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right, which restricts the use of ioctl(2) on block and character devices.
We attach the this access right to opened file descriptors, as we already do for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE.
If LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV is handled (restricted in the ruleset), the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right governs the use of all device-specific IOCTL commands. We make exceptions for common and known-harmless IOCTL commands such as FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC, as well as other IOCTL commands for regular files, which are implemented in fs/ioctl.c. A full list of these IOCTL commands is listed in the documentation.
I believe that this approach works for the majority of use cases, and offers a good trade-off between complexity of the Landlock API and implementation and flexibility when the feature is used.
Current limitations
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
With this patch set, ioctl(2) requests can *not* be filtered based on file type, device number (dev_t) or on the ioctl(2) request number.
On the initial RFC patch set [1], we have reached consensus to start with this simpler coarse-grained approach, and build additional IOCTL restriction capabilities on top in subsequent steps.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
Notable implications of this approach
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* A processes' existing open file descriptors stay unaffected when a process enables Landlock.
This means in particular that in common scenarios, the terminal's IOCTLs (ioctl_tty(2)) continue to work.
* ioctl(2) continues to be available for file descriptors for non-device files. Example: Network sockets, memfd_create(2).
Examples
~~~~~~~~
Starting a sandboxed shell from $HOME with samples/landlock/sandboxer:
LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=. ./sandboxer /bin/bash
The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right is part of the "read-write" rights here, so we expect that newly opened files outside of $HOME don't work with most IOCTL commands.
* "stty" works: It probes terminal properties
* "stty </dev/tty" fails: /dev/tty can be reopened, but the IOCTL is denied.
* "eject" fails: ioctls to use CD-ROM drive are denied.
* "ls /dev" works: It uses ioctl to get the terminal size for columnar layout
* The text editors "vim" and "mg" work. (GNU Emacs fails because it attempts to reopen /dev/tty.)
Unaffected IOCTL commands
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To decide which IOCTL commands should be blanket-permitted, we went through the list of IOCTL commands which are handled directly in fs/ioctl.c and looked at them individually to understand what they are about.
The following commands are permitted by Landlock unconditionally:
* FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX - these work on the file descriptor and manipulate the close-on-exec flag (also available through fcntl(2) with F_SETFD)
* FIONBIO, FIOASYNC - these work on the struct file and enable nonblocking-IO and async flags (also available through fcntl(2) with F_SETFL)
The following commands are also technically permitted by Landlock unconditionally, but are not supported by device files. By permitting them in Landlock on device files, we naturally return the normal error code.
* FIOQSIZE - get the size of the opened file or directory
* FIBMAP - get the file system block numbers underlying a file
* FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64,
FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE: Backwards compatibility with legacy XFS preallocation syscalls which predate fallocate(2).
The following commands are also technically permitted by Landlock, but they are really operating on the file system's superblock, rather than on the file itself:
* FIFREEZE, FITHAW - work on superblock(!) to freeze/thaw the file system. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
* FIGETBSZ - get file system blocksize
The following commands are technically permitted by Landlock:
* FS_IOC_FIEMAP - get information about file extent mapping
(c.f. https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/filesystems/fiemap.txt)
* FIDEDUPERANGE, FICLONE, FICLONERANGE - manipulating shared physical storage between multiple files. These only work on some COW file systems, by design.
* Accessing file attributes:
* FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS - manipulate inode flags (ioctl_iflags(2))
* FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR, FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR - more attributes
Notably, the command FIONREAD is *not* blanket-permitted, because it would be a device-specific implementation.
Related Work
~~~~~~~~~~~~
OpenBSD's pledge(2) [2] restricts ioctl(2) independent of the file descriptor which is used. The implementers maintain multiple allow-lists of predefined ioctl(2) operations required for different application domains such as "audio", "bpf", "tty" and "inet".
OpenBSD does not guarantee backwards compatibility to the same extent as Linux does, so it's easier for them to update these lists in later versions. It might not be a feasible approach for Linux though.
[2] https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-7.4/pledge.2
Open Questions
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Is this approach OK as a mechanism for identifying the IOCTL commands which are handled by do_vfs_ioctl()?
Changes
~~~~~~~
V12:
* Rebased on Arnd's proposal:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
This means that:
* the IOCTL security hooks can return a special value ENOFILEOPS,
which is treated specially in fs/ioctl.c to permit the IOCTL,
but only as long as it does not call f_ops->unlocked_ioctl or
f_ops->compat_ioctl.* The only change compared to V11 is commit 1, as well as a small adaptation in the commit 2 (The Landlock implementation needs to return the new special value). The tests and documentation commits are exactly the same as before.
V11:
* Rebased on Mickaël's proposal to refactor fs/ioctl.c:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
This means that:
* we do not add the file_vfs_ioctl() hook as in V10
* we add vfs_get_ioctl_handler() instead, so that Landlock can query which of the IOCTL commands in handled in do_vfs_ioctl()
That proposal is used here unmodified (except for minor typos in the commit description).
* Use the hook_ioctl_compat LSM hook as well.
V10:
* Major change: only restrict IOCTL invocations on device files
* Rename access right to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
* Remove the notion of synthetic access rights and IOCTL right groups
* Introduce a new LSM hook file_vfs_ioctl, which gets invoked just before the call to f_ops->unlocked_ioctl()
* Documentation
* Various complications were removed or simplified:
* Suggestion to mount file systems as nodev is not needed any more, as Landlock already lets users distinguish device files.
* Remarks about fscrypt were removed. The fscrypt-related IOCTLs only applied to regular files and directories, so this patch does not affect them any more.
* Various documentation of the IOCTL grouping approach was removed, as it's not needed any more.
V9:
* in “landlock: Add IOCTL access right”:
* Change IOCTL group names and grouping as discussed with Mickaël. This makes the grouping coarser, and we occasionally rely on the underlying implementation to perform the appropriate read/write checks.
* Group IOCTL_RW (one of READ_FILE, WRITE_FILE or READ_DIR):
FIONREAD, FIOQSIZE, FIGETBSZ
* Group IOCTL_RWF (one of READ_FILE or WRITE_FILE):
FS_IOC_FIEMAP, FIBMAP, FIDEDUPERANGE, FICLONE, FICLONERANGE, FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE
* Excempt pipe file descriptors from IOCTL restrictions, even for named pipes which are opened from the file system. This is to be consistent with anonymous pipes created with pipe(2). As discussed in https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
* Document rationale for the IOCTL grouping in the code
* Use __attribute_const__
* Rename required_ioctl_access() to get_required_ioctl_access()
* Selftests
* Simplify IOCTL test fixtures as a result of simpler grouping.
* Test that IOCTLs are permitted on named pipe FDs.
* Test that IOCTLs are permitted on named Unix Domain Socket FDs.
* Work around compilation issue with old GCC / glibc.
https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/Synchronizing_Headers
Thanks to Huyadi <[email protected]>, who pointed this out in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
and Mickaël, who fixed it through #include reordering.
* Documentation changes
* Reword "IOCTL commands" section a bit
* s/permit/allow/
* s/access right/right/, if preceded by LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_*
* s/IOCTL/FS_IOCTL/ in ASCII table
* Update IOCTL grouping documentation in header file
* Removed a few of the earlier commits in this patch set, which have already been merged.
V8:
* Documentation changes
* userspace-api/landlock.rst:
* Add an extra paragraph about how the IOCTL right combines when used with other access rights.
* Explain better the circumstances under which passing of file descriptors between different Landlock domains can happen
* limits.h: Add comment to explain public vs internal FS access rights
* Add a paragraph in the commit to explain better why the IOCTL right works as it does
V7:
* in “landlock: Add IOCTL access right”:
* Make IOCTL_GROUPS a #define so that static_assert works even on old compilers (bug reported by Intel about PowerPC GCC9 config)
* Adapt indentation of IOCTL_GROUPS definition
* Add missing dots in kernel-doc comments.
* in “landlock: Remove remaining "inline" modifiers in .c files”:
* explain reasoning in commit message
V6:
* Implementation:
* Check that only publicly visible access rights can be used when adding a rule (rather than the synthetic ones). Thanks Mickaël for spotting that!
* Move all functionality related to IOCTL groups and synthetic access rights into the same place at the top of fs.c
* Move kernel doc to the .c file in one instance
* Smaller code style issues (upcase IOCTL, vardecl at block start)
* Remove inline modifier from functions in .c files
* Tests:
* use SKIP
* Rename 'fd' to dir_fd and file_fd where appropriate
* Remove duplicate "ioctl" mentions from test names
* Rename "permitted" to "allowed", in ioctl and ftruncate tests
* Do not add rules if access is 0, in test helper
V5:
* Implementation:
* move IOCTL group expansion logic into fs.c (implementation suggested by mic)
* rename IOCTL_CMD_G* constants to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_GROUP*
* fs.c: create ioctl_groups constant
* add "const" to some variables
* Formatting and docstring fixes (including wrong kernel-doc format)
* samples/landlock: fix ABI version and fallback attribute (mic)
* Documentation
* move header documentation changes into the implementation commit
* spell out how FIFREEZE, FITHAW and attribute-manipulation ioctls from fs/ioctl.c are handled
* change ABI 4 to ABI 5 in some missing places
V4:
* use "synthetic" IOCTL access rights, as previously discussed
* testing changes
* use a large fixture-based test, for more exhaustive coverage, and replace some of the earlier tests with it
* rebased on mic-next
V3:
* always permit the IOCTL commands FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO, FIOASYNC and FIONREAD, independent of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL
* increment ABI version in the same commit where the feature is introduced
* testing changes
* use FIOQSIZE instead of TTY IOCTL commands
(FIOQSIZE works with regular files, directories and memfds)
* run the memfd test with both Landlock enabled and disabled
* add a test for the always-permitted IOCTL commands
V2:
* rebased on mic-next
* added documentation
* exercise ioctl(2) in the memfd test
* test: Use layout0 for the test
---
V1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V9: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V10: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
V11: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
Günther Noack (9):
security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH) selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain
sockets
samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
landlock: Document IOCTL support
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 76 +++- fs/ioctl.c | 25 +- include/linux/security.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 35 +- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 13 +- security/landlock/fs.c | 45 ++- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 8 +- security/security.c | 10 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++- 11 files changed, 576 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
base-commit: a17c60e533f5cd832e77e0d194e2e0bb663371b6
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 1/9 security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
If security_file_ioctl or security_file_ioctl_compat return ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic in fs/ioctl.c will permit the given IOCTL command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly in fs/ioctl.c and does not use the f_ops->unhandled_ioctl or f_ops->compat_ioctl operations, which are defined by the given file.
The possible return values for security_file_ioctl and security_file_ioctl_compat are now:
* 0 - to permit the IOCTL
* ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall back to the file implementation.
* any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that error
This is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2], and implements the proposal from [3].
--- fs/ioctl.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/ioctl.c +20 -5
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static int do_vfs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int fd,case FIONREAD :if (!S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) -return vfs_ioctl (filp, cmd, arg); +return -ENOIOCTLCMD ;return put_user (i_size_read (inode) - filp->f_pos, (int __user *)argp);
@@ -858,17 +858,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd, unsigned long, arg) {struct fd f =fdget (fd);int error; +bool use_file_ops = true;if (!f.file)return -EBADF ; error =security_file_ioctl (f.file, cmd, arg); -if (error) +if (error == -ENOFILEOPS ) + use_file_ops = false; +else if (error) goto out; error =do_vfs_ioctl (f.file, fd, cmd, arg); -if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD ) - error =vfs_ioctl (f.file, cmd, arg); +if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD ) { +if (use_file_ops) + error =vfs_ioctl (f.file, cmd, arg); +else + error = -EACCES ; + } out:fdput (f);
@@ -916,12 +923,15 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd, {struct fd f =fdget (fd);int error; +bool use_file_ops = true;if (!f.file)return -EBADF ; error =security_file_ioctl_compat (f.file, cmd, arg); -if (error) +if (error == -ENOFILEOPS ) + use_file_ops = false; +else if (error) goto out;switch (cmd) {
@@ -967,6 +977,11 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd,if (error != -ENOIOCTLCMD )break ; +if (!use_file_ops) { + error = -EACCES ; +break ; + } +if (f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl) error = f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl (f.file, cmd, arg);if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD )
include/linux/security.h +6 -0
@@ -248,6 +248,12 @@ static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = { __kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_stringify) }; +/* +* Returned by security_file_ioctl and security_file_ioctl_compat to indicate +* that the IOCTL request may not be dispatched to the file's f_ops IOCTL impl. +*/ +#define ENOFILEOPS 532 +static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str (enum kernel_load_data_id id) {if ((unsigned )id >=LOADING_MAX_ID )
security/security.c +8 -2
@@ -2719,7 +2719,10 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file)* value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used * by the security module. * -* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. +* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. Returns -ENOFILEOPS if +* permission is granted for IOCTL commands that do not get handled by +* f_ops->unlocked_ioctl(). Returns another negative error code is +* permission is denied. */ int security_file_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) {
@@ -2736,7 +2739,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);* Compat version of security_file_ioctl() that correctly handles 32-bit * processes running on 64-bit kernels. * -* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. +* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. Returns -ENOFILEOPS if permission +* is granted for IOCTL commands that do not get handled by +* f_ops->compat_ioctl(). Returns another negative error code is +* permission is denied. */ int security_file_ioctl_compat (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerRe: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
include/linux/security.h static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = { · line 255
Quoted 13 lines · Günther Noack
include/linux/security.h +5
-0@@ -248,6 +248,12 @@ static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = { __kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_stringify) }; +/* +* Returned by security_file_ioctl and security_file_ioctl_compat to indicate +* that the IOCTL request may not be dispatched to the file's f_ops IOCTL impl. +*/ +#define ENOFILEOPS 532
FYI, the thinking here was:
* I could not find an existing error code that seemed to have a similar meaning, which we could reuse.
* At the same time, the meaning of this error code is so special that the approach of adding it to kernel-private codes in include/linux/errno.h also seemed wrong.
* The number 532 is just one higher than the highest code in include/linux/errno.h
Suggestions welcome :)
—Günther
Re: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
In reply to Günther NoackQuoted 9 lines · Günther Noack
If
security_file_ioctlorsecurity_file_ioctl_compatreturn ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic infs/ioctl.cwill permit the given IOCTL command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly infs/ioctl.cand does not use thef_ops->unhandled_ioctlorf_ops->compat_ioctloperations, which are defined by the given file.The possible return values for
security_file_ioctlandsecurity_file_ioctl_compatare now:
Quoted 7 lines
* 0 - to permit the IOCTL
* ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall back to the file implementation.
* any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that errorThis is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2], and implements the proposal from [3].
Thanks for trying it out, I think this is a good solution and I like how the code turned out.
One small thing that I believe needs some extra changes:
Quoted 12 lines
(quoted diff) +5
-0@@ -967,6 +977,11 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd, if (error != -ENOIOCTLCMD) break; + if (!use_file_ops) { + error = -EACCES; + break; + } + if (f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl) error = f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
Quoted 1 line
if (error ==
-ENOIOCTLCMD)
The compat FIONREAD handler now ends up calling ->compat_ioctl() where it used to call ->ioctl(). I think this means we need to audit every driver that implements its own FIONREAD/SIOCINQ/TIOCINQ to make sure it has a working compat implementation.
I have done one pass through all such drivers and think the change below should be sufficient for all of them, but please have another look. Feel free to fold this change into your patch. The pipe.c change also fixes an existing bug with IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE/IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, so that may need to be a separate patch and get backported.
Arnd
drivers/tty/tty_io.c +1 -0
@@ -2891,6 +2891,7 @@ static long tty_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,int retval = -ENOIOCTLCMD ;switch (cmd) { +case TIOCINQ :case TIOCOUTQ :case TIOCSTI :case TIOCGWINSZ :
fs/pipe.c +9 -0
@@ -652,6 +652,14 @@ static long pipe_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) } } +static long pipe_compat_ioctl (struct file *filp,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) +{ +if (cmd ==IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE ) +return pipe_ioctl (filp, cmd, arg); + +return compat_ptr_ioctl (filp, cmd, arg); +} +/* No kernel lock held - fine */ static __poll_t pipe_poll (struct file *filp,poll_table *wait)
@@ -1234,6 +1242,7 @@ const struct file_operations pipefifo_fops = { .write_iter = pipe_write, .poll = pipe_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = pipe_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = pipe_compat_ioctl, .release = pipe_release, .fasync = pipe_fasync, .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
net/socket.c +1 -0
@@ -3496,6 +3496,7 @@ static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,case SIOCSARP :case SIOCGARP :case SIOCDARP : +case SIOCINQ :case SIOCOUTQ :case SIOCOUTQNSD :case SIOCATMARK :
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Quoted 15 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 14 lines · Günther Noack
If
security_file_ioctlorsecurity_file_ioctl_compatreturn ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic infs/ioctl.cwill permit the given IOCTL command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly infs/ioctl.cand does not use thef_ops->unhandled_ioctlorf_ops->compat_ioctloperations, which are defined by the given file.The possible return values for
security_file_ioctlandsecurity_file_ioctl_compatare now:* 0 - to permit the IOCTL
* ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall back to the file implementation.
* any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that error
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2], and implements the proposal from [3].
Thanks for trying it out, I think this is a good solution and I like how the code turned out.
This is indeed a simpler solution but unfortunately this doesn't fit well with the requirements for an access control, especially when we need to log denied accesses. Indeed, with this approach, the LSM (or any other security mechanism) that returns ENOFILEOPS cannot know for sure if the related request will allowed or not, and then it cannot create reliable logs (unlike with EACCES or EPERM).
Re: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Quoted 22 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 15 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 14 lines · Günther Noack
If
security_file_ioctlorsecurity_file_ioctl_compatreturn ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic infs/ioctl.cwill permit the given IOCTL command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly infs/ioctl.cand does not use thef_ops->unhandled_ioctlorf_ops->compat_ioctloperations, which are defined by the given file.The possible return values for
security_file_ioctlandsecurity_file_ioctl_compatare now:* 0 - to permit the IOCTL
* ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall back to the file implementation.
* any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that errorQuoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2], and implements the proposal from [3].
Thanks for trying it out, I think this is a good solution and I like how the code turned out.
Quoted 6 lines
This is indeed a simpler solution but unfortunately this doesn't fit well with the requirements for an access control, especially when we need to log denied accesses. Indeed, with this approach, the LSM (or any other security mechanism) that returns ENOFILEOPS cannot know for sure if the related request will allowed or not, and then it cannot create reliable logs (unlike with EACCES or EPERM).
Where does the requirement come from specifically, i.e. who is the consumer of that log?
Even if the log doesn't tell you directly whether the ioctl was ultimately denied, I would think logging the ENOFILEOPS along with the command number is enough to reconstruct what actually happened from reading the log later.
Arnd
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Quoted 30 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 22 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 15 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 14 lines · Günther Noack
If
security_file_ioctlorsecurity_file_ioctl_compatreturn ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic infs/ioctl.cwill permit the given IOCTL command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly infs/ioctl.cand does not use thef_ops->unhandled_ioctlorf_ops->compat_ioctloperations, which are defined by the given file.The possible return values for
security_file_ioctlandsecurity_file_ioctl_compatare now:* 0 - to permit the IOCTL
* ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall back to the file implementation.
* any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that errorQuoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2], and implements the proposal from [3].
Thanks for trying it out, I think this is a good solution and I like how the code turned out.
Quoted 6 lines
This is indeed a simpler solution but unfortunately this doesn't fit well with the requirements for an access control, especially when we need to log denied accesses. Indeed, with this approach, the LSM (or any other security mechanism) that returns ENOFILEOPS cannot know for sure if the related request will allowed or not, and then it cannot create reliable logs (unlike with EACCES or EPERM).
Quoted 2 lines
Where does the requirement come from specifically, i.e. who is the consumer of that log?
The audit framework may be used by LSMs to log denials.
Quoted 5 lines
Even if the log doesn't tell you directly whether the ioctl was ultimately denied, I would think logging the ENOFILEOPS along with the command number is enough to reconstruct what actually happened from reading the log later.
We could indeed log ENOFILEOPS but that could include a lot of allowed requests and we usually only want unlegitimate access requests to be logged. Recording all ENOFILEOPS would mean 1/ that logs would be flooded by legitimate requests and 2/ that user space log parsers would need to deduce if a request was allowed or not, which require to know the list of IOCTL commands implemented by fs/ioctl.c, which would defeat the goal of this specific patch.
Re: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Quoted 21 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 11 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 7 lines · Mickaël Salaün
This is indeed a simpler solution but unfortunately this doesn't fit well with the requirements for an access control, especially when we need to log denied accesses. Indeed, with this approach, the LSM (or any other security mechanism) that returns ENOFILEOPS cannot know for sure if the related request will allowed or not, and then it cannot create reliable logs (unlike with EACCES or EPERM).
Where does the requirement come from specifically, i.e. who is the consumer of that log?
The audit framework may be used by LSMs to log denials.
Quoted 5 lines
Even if the log doesn't tell you directly whether the ioctl was ultimately denied, I would think logging the ENOFILEOPS along with the command number is enough to reconstruct what actually happened from reading the log later.
Quoted 7 lines
We could indeed log ENOFILEOPS but that could include a lot of allowed requests and we usually only want unlegitimate access requests to be logged. Recording all ENOFILEOPS would mean 1/ that logs would be flooded by legitimate requests and 2/ that user space log parsers would need to deduce if a request was allowed or not, which require to know the list of IOCTL commands implemented by
fs/ioctl.c, which would defeat the goal of this specific patch.
Right, makes sense. Unfortunately that means I don't see any option that I think is actually better than what we have today, but that forces the use of a custom whitelist or extra logic in landlock.
I didn't really mind having an extra hook for the callbacks in addition to the top-level one, but that was already nacked.
Arnd
Günther Noack
reviewerRe: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Quoted 30 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 21 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 11 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 7 lines · Mickaël Salaün
This is indeed a simpler solution but unfortunately this doesn't fit well with the requirements for an access control, especially when we need to log denied accesses. Indeed, with this approach, the LSM (or any other security mechanism) that returns ENOFILEOPS cannot know for sure if the related request will allowed or not, and then it cannot create reliable logs (unlike with EACCES or EPERM).
Where does the requirement come from specifically, i.e. who is the consumer of that log?
The audit framework may be used by LSMs to log denials.
Quoted 5 lines
Even if the log doesn't tell you directly whether the ioctl was ultimately denied, I would think logging the ENOFILEOPS along with the command number is enough to reconstruct what actually happened from reading the log later.
Quoted 7 lines
We could indeed log ENOFILEOPS but that could include a lot of allowed requests and we usually only want unlegitimate access requests to be logged. Recording all ENOFILEOPS would mean 1/ that logs would be flooded by legitimate requests and 2/ that user space log parsers would need to deduce if a request was allowed or not, which require to know the list of IOCTL commands implemented by
fs/ioctl.c, which would defeat the goal of this specific patch.
Quoted 7 lines
Right, makes sense. Unfortunately that means I don't see any option that I think is actually better than what we have today, but that forces the use of a custom whitelist or extra logic in landlock.
I didn't really mind having an extra hook for the callbacks in addition to the top-level one, but that was already nacked.
Thank you both for the review!
I agree, this approach would break logging.
As you both also said, I also think this leads us back to the approach where we hardcode the allow-list of permitted IOCTL commands in the file_ioctl hook.
I think this approach has the following upsides:
1. Landlock's (future) audit logging will be able to log exactly which IOCTL commands were denied.
2. The allow-list of permitted IOCTL commands can be reasoned about locally and does not accidentally change as a side-effect of a change to the implementation of fs/ioctl.c.
A risk that we have is:
3. We might miss changes to fs/ioctl.c which we might want to reflect in Landlock.
To think about 2 and 3 in more concrete terms, I categorized the scenarios in which IOCTL cmd implementations can get added to or removed from the do_vfs_ioctl() layer:
Case A: New cmd added to do_vfs_ioctl layer
We want to double check whether this cmd should be included in Landlock's allow list. (Because the command is new, there are no existing users of the IOCTL command, so we can't break anyone and we it probably does not require to be made explicit in Landlock's ABI versioning scheme.)
==> We need to catch these changes early,
and should do Landlock-side changes in sync.
Case B: Existing cmd removed from do_vfs_ioctl layer
(This case is unlikely, as it would be a backwards-incompatible change in the ioctl interface.)
Case C: Existing cmd is moved from f_ops->..._ioctl() to do_vfs_ioctl()
(For regular files, I think this has happened for the XFS "reflink" ioctls before, which became features in other COW file systems as well.)
If such a change happens for device files (which are in scope for Landlock's IOCTL feature), we should catch these changes. We should consider whether the affected IOCTL command should be allow-listed. Strictly speaking, if we allow-list the cmd, which was previously not allow-listed, this would mean that Landlock's DEV_IOCTL feature would have different semantics than before (permitting an additional cmd), and it would potentially be a backwards-incompatible change that need to be made explicit in Landlock's ABI versioning.
Case D: Existing cmd is moved from do_vfs_ioctl() to f_ops->..._ioctl()
(This case seems also very unlikely to me because it decentralizes the reasoning about these IOCTL APIs which are currently centrally controlled and must stay backwards compatible.)
So -- a proposal:
* Keep the original implementation of fs/ioctl.c
* Implement Landlock's file_ioctl hook with a switch(cmd) where we list the permitted IOCTL commands from do_vfs_ioctl.
* Make sure Landlock maintainers learn about changes to do_vfs_ioctl():
* Put a warning on top of do_vfs_ioctl() to loop in Landlock maintainers
* Set up automation to catch such changes?
Open questions are:
* Mickaël, do you think we should use a more device-file-specific subset of IOCTL commands again, or would you prefer to stick to the full list of all IOCTL commands implemented in do_vfs_ioctl()?
* Regarding automation:
We could additionally set up some automation to watch changes to do_vfs_ioctl(). Given the low rate of change in that corner, we might get away with extracting the relevant portion of the C file (awk '/^static int do_vfs_ioctl/, /^\}/' fs/ioctl.c) and watching for any changes. It is brittle, but the rate of changes is low, and reasoning about source code is difficult and error prone as well.
In an ideal world this could maybe be part of the kernel test suites, but I still have not found the right place where this could be hooked in. Do you have any thoughts on this?
Thanks,
—Günther
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Quoted 97 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 30 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 21 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 11 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 7 lines · Mickaël Salaün
This is indeed a simpler solution but unfortunately this doesn't fit well with the requirements for an access control, especially when we need to log denied accesses. Indeed, with this approach, the LSM (or any other security mechanism) that returns ENOFILEOPS cannot know for sure if the related request will allowed or not, and then it cannot create reliable logs (unlike with EACCES or EPERM).
Where does the requirement come from specifically, i.e. who is the consumer of that log?
The audit framework may be used by LSMs to log denials.
Quoted 5 lines
Even if the log doesn't tell you directly whether the ioctl was ultimately denied, I would think logging the ENOFILEOPS along with the command number is enough to reconstruct what actually happened from reading the log later.
Quoted 7 lines
We could indeed log ENOFILEOPS but that could include a lot of allowed requests and we usually only want unlegitimate access requests to be logged. Recording all ENOFILEOPS would mean 1/ that logs would be flooded by legitimate requests and 2/ that user space log parsers would need to deduce if a request was allowed or not, which require to know the list of IOCTL commands implemented by
fs/ioctl.c, which would defeat the goal of this specific patch.Quoted 7 lines
Right, makes sense. Unfortunately that means I don't see any option that I think is actually better than what we have today, but that forces the use of a custom whitelist or extra logic in landlock.
I didn't really mind having an extra hook for the callbacks in addition to the top-level one, but that was already nacked.
Thank you both for the review!
I agree, this approach would break logging.
As you both also said, I also think this leads us back to the approach where we hardcode the allow-list of permitted IOCTL commands in the
file_ioctlhook.I think this approach has the following upsides:
1. Landlock's (future) audit logging will be able to log exactly which IOCTL commands were denied.
2. The allow-list of permitted IOCTL commands can be reasoned about locally and does not accidentally change as a side-effect of a change to the implementation offs/ioctl.c.A risk that we have is:
3. We might miss changes to
fs/ioctl.cwhich we might want to reflect in Landlock.To think about 2 and 3 in more concrete terms, I categorized the scenarios in which IOCTL cmd implementations can get added to or removed from the
do_vfs_ioctl()layer:Case A: New cmd added to
do_vfs_ioctllayerWe want to double check whether this cmd should be included in Landlock's allow list. (Because the command is new, there are no existing users of the IOCTL command, so we can't break anyone and we it probably does not require to be made explicit in Landlock's ABI versioning scheme.)
==> We need to catch these changes early,
and should do Landlock-side changes in sync.Case B: Existing cmd removed from
do_vfs_ioctllayer(This case is unlikely, as it would be a backwards-incompatible change in the ioctl interface.)
Case C: Existing cmd is moved from f_ops->..._ioctl() to
do_vfs_ioctl()(For regular files, I think this has happened for the XFS "reflink" ioctls before, which became features in other COW file systems as well.)
If such a change happens for device files (which are in scope for Landlock's IOCTL feature), we should catch these changes. We should consider whether the affected IOCTL command should be allow-listed. Strictly speaking, if we allow-list the cmd, which was previously not allow-listed, this would mean that Landlock's
DEV_IOCTLfeature would have different semantics than before (permitting an additional cmd), and it would potentially be a backwards-incompatible change that need to be made explicit in Landlock's ABI versioning.
Quoted 6 lines
Case D: Existing cmd is moved from
do_vfs_ioctl()to f_ops->..._ioctl()(This case seems also very unlikely to me because it decentralizes the reasoning about these IOCTL APIs which are currently centrally controlled and must stay backwards compatible.)
Excellent summary! You should put a link to this email in the commit message and quickly explain why we ended up here.
Quoted 10 lines
So -- a proposal:
* Keep the original implementation of
fs/ioctl.c
* Implement Landlock'sfile_ioctlhook with a switch(cmd) where we list the permitted IOCTL commands fromdo_vfs_ioctl.
* Make sure Landlock maintainers learn about changes todo_vfs_ioctl():
* Put a warning on top ofdo_vfs_ioctl()to loop in Landlock maintainers
Yes please.
Quoted 8 lines
* Set up automation to catch such changes?
Open questions are:
* Mickaël, do you think we should use a more device-file-specific subset of IOCTL commands again, or would you prefer to stick to the full list of all IOCTL commands implemented in
do_vfs_ioctl()?
We should stick to the device-file-specific IOCTL commands [1] but we should probably complete the switch-case with commented cases (in the same order as in do_vfs_ioctl) to know which one were reviewed (as in [1]). These helpers should now be static and in security/landlock/fs.c
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
BTW, there are now two new IOCTL commands (FS_IOC_GETUUID and FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH) masking device-specific IOCTL ones.
Quoted 10 lines
* Regarding automation:
We could additionally set up some automation to watch changes to
do_vfs_ioctl(). Given the low rate of change in that corner, we might get away with extracting the relevant portion of the C file (awk '/^static int do_vfs_ioctl/, /^\}/'fs/ioctl.c) and watching for any changes. It is brittle, but the rate of changes is low, and reasoning about source code is difficult and error prone as well.
Quoted 3 lines
In an ideal world this could maybe be part of the kernel test suites, but I still have not found the right place where this could be hooked in. Do you have any thoughts on this?
I think this change should be enough for now:
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -12222,6 +12222,7 @@ W: https://landlock.io T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git F: Documentation/security/landlock.rst F: Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +F: fs/ioctl.c F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h F: samples/landlock/ F: security/landlock/
It should be OK considered the number of patches matching this file: a subset of https://lore.kernel.org/all/?q=dfn%3Afs%2Fioctl.c
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
In reply to Günther NoackQuoted 7 lines · Günther Noack
If
security_file_ioctlorsecurity_file_ioctl_compatreturn ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic infs/ioctl.cwill permit the given IOCTL command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly infs/ioctl.cand does not use thef_ops->unhandled_ioctlorf_ops->compat_ioctloperations, which are defined by the given file.
Quoted 7 lines
The possible return values for
security_file_ioctlandsecurity_file_ioctl_compatare now:* 0 - to permit the IOCTL
* ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall back to the file implementation.
* any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that error
At this point I think this thread has resolved itself, but I wanted to add a quick comment for those who may stumble across this in the future ... I want to discourage magic return values in the LSM hooks as much as possible; they have caused issues in the past and I suspect they will continue to do so in the future (although now that we have proper function header comments the risk may be slightly lower). If there is absolutely no way around it, then that's okay, but if possible I would prefer we stick with the 0:allowed, !0:rejected model for the LSM hook return values.
Quoted 17 lines
This is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2], and implements the proposal from [3].
Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Paul Moore <[email protected]>Cc Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>Suggested-by Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- fs/ioctl.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 2/9 landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices
In reply to Günther NoackIntroduces the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right
and increments the Landlock ABI version to 5.
This access right applies to device-custom IOCTL commands when they are invoked on block or character device files.
Like the truncate right, this right is associated with a file descriptor at the time of open(2), and gets respected even when the file descriptor is used outside of the thread which it was originally opened in.
Therefore, a newly enabled Landlock policy does not apply to file descriptors which are already open.
If the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right is handled, only a small number of safe IOCTL commands will be permitted on newly opened device files. These include FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC, as well as other IOCTL commands for regular files which are implemented in fs/ioctl.c.
Noteworthy scenarios which require special attention:
TTY devices are often passed into a process from the parent process, and so a newly enabled Landlock policy does not retroactively apply to them automatically. In the past, TTY devices have often supported IOCTL commands like TIOCSTI and some TIOCLINUX subcommands, which were letting callers control the TTY input buffer (and simulate keypresses). This should be restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN programs on modern kernels though.
Known limitations:
The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV access right is a coarse-grained control over IOCTL commands.
Landlock users may use path-based restrictions in combination with their knowledge about the file system layout to control what IOCTLs can be done.
--- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 35 +++++++++++---- security/landlock/fs.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++-- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 8 +++- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 5 ++- 6 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +27 -8
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {* files and directories. Files or directories opened before the sandboxing * are not subject to these restrictions. * -* A file can only receive these access rights: +* The following access rights apply only to files: * * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that
@@ -138,12 +138,13 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`, * :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with -* ``O_TRUNC``. Whether an opened file can be truncated with -* :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the -* same way as read and write permissions are checked during -* :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and -* %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the -* third version of the Landlock ABI. +* ``O_TRUNC``. This access right is available since the third version of the +* Landlock ABI. +* +* Whether an opened file can be truncated with :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` or used +* with `ioctl(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the same way as +* read and write permissions are checked during :manpage:`open(2)` using +* %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. * * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
@@ -198,13 +199,30 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {* If multiple requirements are not met, the ``EACCES`` error code takes * precedence over ``EXDEV``. * +* The following access right applies both to files and directories: +* +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV: Invoke :manpage:`ioctl(2)` commands on an opened +* character or block device. +* +* This access right applies to all `ioctl(2)` commands implemented by device +* drivers. However, the following common IOCTL commands continue to be +* invokable independent of the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right: +* +* ``FIOCLEX``, ``FIONCLEX``, ``FIONBIO``, ``FIOASYNC``, ``FIOQSIZE``, +* ``FIFREEZE``, ``FITHAW``, ``FS_IOC_FIEMAP``, ``FIGETBSZ``, ``FICLONE``, +* ``FICLONERANGE``, ``FIDEDUPERANGE``, ``FS_IOC_GETFLAGS``, +* ``FS_IOC_SETFLAGS``, ``FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR``, ``FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR`` +* +* This access right is available since the fifth version of the Landlock +* ABI. +* * .. warning:: * * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, * :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`, * :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`, -* :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. +* :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. */ /* clang-format off */
@@ -223,6 +241,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV (1ULL << 15)/* clang-format on */ /**
security/landlock/fs.c +42 -3
75 lines not on this page · raw message
security/landlock/limits.h +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS 0
security/landlock/syscalls.c +6 -2
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { .write = fop_dummy_write, }; -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 4 +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 5/** * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
@@ -321,7 +321,11 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access)return -ENOMSG ; -/* Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints. */ +/* +* Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints and only +* consists of publicly visible access rights (as opposed to synthetic +* ones). +*/ mask =landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask (ruleset,0 );if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)return -EINVAL ;
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { .handled_access_fs =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , }; -ASSERT_EQ (4 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 , +ASSERT_EQ (5 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 ,LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION )); ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +3 -2
@@ -527,9 +527,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval) LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV) -#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE +#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV#define ACCESS_ALL ( \ ACCESS_FILE | \
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 3/9 selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support
In reply to Günther NoackExercises Landlock's IOCTL feature in different combinations of handling and permitting the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right, and in different combinations of using files and directories.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 233 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +233 -3
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@*/ #define _GNU_SOURCE +#include <asm/termbits.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <linux/landlock.h> #include <linux/magic.h>
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@#include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/capability.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <sys/sendfile.h>
@@ -23,6 +25,12 @@#include <sys/vfs.h> #include <unistd.h> +/* +* Intentionally included last to work around header conflict. +* See https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/Synchronizing_Headers. +*/ +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include "common.h" #ifndef renameat2
@@ -735,6 +743,9 @@ static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, }for (i =0 ; rules[i].path; i++) { +if (!rules[i].access) +continue ; +add_path_beneath (_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access, rules[i].path); }
@@ -3443,7 +3454,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled)LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ;int ruleset_fd; -/* Enable Landlock. */ +/* Enables Landlock. */ ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules);ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd);
@@ -3526,7 +3537,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate)LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ;int ruleset_fd; -/* Enable Landlock. */ +/* Enables Landlock. */ ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules);ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd);
@@ -3752,7 +3763,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate) };int fd, ruleset_fd; -/* Enable Landlock. */ +/* Enables Landlock. */ ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, variant->handled, rules);ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd);enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd);
@@ -3829,6 +3840,16 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate_in_different_processes)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (socket_fds[1 ])); } +/* Invokes the FS_IOC_GETFLAGS IOCTL and returns its errno or 0. */ +static int test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl (int fd) +{ +uint32_t flags; + +if (ioctl (fd,FS_IOC_GETFLAGS , &flags) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} +TEST (memfd_ftruncate) {int fd;
@@ -3845,6 +3866,215 @@ TEST(memfd_ftruncate)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); } +static int test_fionread_ioctl (int fd) +{ +size_t sz =0 ; + +if (ioctl (fd,FIONREAD , &sz) <0 && errno ==EACCES ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE (ioctl) {}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP (ioctl) {}; + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN (ioctl) {}; +/* clang-format on */ + +FIXTURE_VARIANT (ioctl) +{ +const __u64 handled; +const __u64 allowed; +const mode_t open_mode; +/* +* TCGETS is used as a characteristic device-specific IOCTL command. +* The logic is the same for other IOCTL commands as well. +*/ +const int expected_tcgets_result;/* terminal device IOCTL */ +/* +* FIONREAD is implemented in fs/ioctl.c for regular files, +* but we do not blanket-permit it for devices. +*/ +const int expected_fionread_result; +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ioctl, handled_i_allowed_none) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV, + .allowed = 0, + .open_mode = O_RDWR, + .expected_tcgets_result = EACCES, + .expected_fionread_result =EACCES , +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ioctl, handled_i_allowed_i) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV , + .allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV, + .open_mode = O_RDWR, + .expected_tcgets_result = 0, + .expected_fionread_result = 0, +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ioctl, unhandled) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, + .allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, + .open_mode = O_RDWR, + .expected_tcgets_result = 0, + .expected_fionread_result = 0, +}; + +static int test_fioqsize_ioctl (int fd) +{ +size_t sz; + +if (ioctl (fd,FIOQSIZE , &sz) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +static int test_tcgets_ioctl (int fd) +{ +struct termios info; + +if (ioctl (fd,TCGETS , &info) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_dir_access_file) +{ +const int flag =0 ; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path ="/dev" , + .access = variant->allowed, + }, + {}, + }; +int file_fd, ruleset_fd; + +/* Enables Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, variant->handled, rules); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + + file_fd =open ("/dev/tty" , variant->open_mode); +ASSERT_LE (0 , file_fd); + +/* Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors. */ +EXPECT_EQ (variant->expected_tcgets_result,test_tcgets_ioctl (file_fd)); +EXPECT_EQ (variant->expected_fionread_result, +test_fionread_ioctl (file_fd)); + +/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIOCLEX )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIONCLEX )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIONBIO , &flag)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIOASYNC , &flag)); +EXPECT_EQ (ENOTTY ,test_fioqsize_ioctl (file_fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (file_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_dir_access_dir) +{ +const int flag =0 ; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path ="/dev" , + .access = variant->allowed, + }, + {}, + }; +int dir_fd, ruleset_fd; + +/* Enables Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, variant->handled, rules); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* +* Ignore variant->open_mode for this test, as we intend to open a +* directory. If the directory can not be opened, the variant is +* infeasible to test with an opened directory. +*/ + dir_fd =open ("/dev" ,O_RDONLY ); +if (dir_fd <0 ) +return ; + +/* +* Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors. +* We do not use the expected values from the fixture here. +* +* When using IOCTL on a directory, no Landlock restrictions apply. +* TCGETS will fail anyway because it is not invoked on a TTY device. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (ENOTTY ,test_tcgets_ioctl (dir_fd)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_fionread_ioctl (dir_fd)); + +/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (dir_fd,FIOCLEX )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (dir_fd,FIONCLEX )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (dir_fd,FIONBIO , &flag)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (dir_fd,FIOASYNC , &flag)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_fioqsize_ioctl (dir_fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (dir_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_file_access_file) +{ +const int flag =0 ; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path ="/dev/tty0" , + .access = variant->allowed, + }, + {}, + }; +int file_fd, ruleset_fd; + +if (variant->allowed &LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR ) { +SKIP (return,"LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR " +"can not be granted on files" ); + } + +/* Enables Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, variant->handled, rules); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + + file_fd =open ("/dev/tty0" , variant->open_mode); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd) + { +TH_LOG ("Failed to open /dev/tty0: %s" ,strerror (errno)); + } + +/* Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors. */ +EXPECT_EQ (variant->expected_tcgets_result,test_tcgets_ioctl (file_fd)); +EXPECT_EQ (variant->expected_fionread_result, +test_fionread_ioctl (file_fd)); + +/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIOCLEX )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIONCLEX )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIONBIO , &flag)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,ioctl (file_fd,FIOASYNC , &flag)); +EXPECT_EQ (ENOTTY ,test_fioqsize_ioctl (file_fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (file_fd)); +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (layout1_bind) {};/* clang-format on */
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 4/9 selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds
In reply to Günther NoackBecause the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right is associated with the opened file during open(2), IOCTLs are supposed to work with files which are opened by means other than open(2).
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +27 -9
@@ -3850,20 +3850,38 @@ static int test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl(int fd)return 0 ; } -TEST (memfd_ftruncate) +TEST (memfd_ftruncate_and_ioctl) { -int fd; - - fd =memfd_create ("name" ,MFD_CLOEXEC ); -ASSERT_LE (0 , fd); +const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = { + .handled_access_fs =ACCESS_ALL , + }; +int ruleset_fd, fd, i;/* -* Checks that ftruncate is permitted on file descriptors that are -* created in ways other than open(2). +* We exercise the same test both with and without Landlock enabled, to +* ensure that it behaves the same in both cases. */ -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd)); +for (i =0 ; i <2 ; i++) { +/* Creates a new memfd. */ + fd =memfd_create ("name" ,MFD_CLOEXEC ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , fd); -ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); +/* +* Checks that operations associated with the opened file +* (ftruncate, ioctl) are permitted on file descriptors that are +* created in ways other than open(2). +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl (fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); + +/* Enables Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =landlock_create_ruleset (&attr,sizeof (attr),0 ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + } }static int test_fionread_ioctl (int fd)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 5/9 selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH)
In reply to Günther Noackioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) operations on files opened with O_PATH should always return EBADF, independent of the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV access rights in that file hierarchy.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +40 -0
@@ -3893,6 +3893,46 @@ static int test_fionread_ioctl(int fd)return 0 ; } +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, o_path_ftruncate_and_ioctl) +{ +const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = { + .handled_access_fs =ACCESS_ALL , + }; +int ruleset_fd, fd; + +/* +* Checks that for files opened with O_PATH, both ioctl(2) and +* ftruncate(2) yield EBADF, as it is documented in open(2) for the +* O_PATH flag. +*/ + fd =open (dir_s1d1,O_PATH |O_CLOEXEC ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , fd); + +EXPECT_EQ (EBADF ,test_ftruncate (fd)); +EXPECT_EQ (EBADF ,test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl (fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); + +/* Enables Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =landlock_create_ruleset (&attr,sizeof (attr),0 ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* +* Checks that after enabling Landlock, +* - the file can still be opened with O_PATH +* - both ioctl and truncate still yield EBADF (not EACCES). +*/ + fd =open (dir_s1d1,O_PATH |O_CLOEXEC ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , fd); + +EXPECT_EQ (EBADF ,test_ftruncate (fd)); +EXPECT_EQ (EBADF ,test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl (fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (ioctl) {};
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 6/9 selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes
In reply to Günther NoackNamed pipes should behave like pipes created with pipe(2), so we don't want to restrict IOCTLs on them.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +43 -0
@@ -3933,6 +3933,49 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, o_path_ftruncate_and_ioctl)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); } +/* +* Named pipes are not governed by the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right, +* because they are not character or block devices. +*/ +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_pipe_ioctl) +{ +pid_t child_pid; +int fd, ruleset_fd; +const char *const path = file1_s1d1; +const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = { + .handled_access_fs =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV , + }; + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (path)); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,mkfifo (path,0600 )); + +/* Enables Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =landlock_create_ruleset (&attr,sizeof (attr),0 ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* The child process opens the pipe for writing. */ + child_pid =fork (); +ASSERT_NE (-1 , child_pid); +if (child_pid ==0 ) { + fd =open (path,O_WRONLY ); +close (fd); +exit (0 ); + } + + fd =open (path,O_RDONLY ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , fd); + +/* FIONREAD is implemented by pipefifo_fops. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_fionread_ioctl (fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (path)); + +ASSERT_EQ (child_pid,waitpid (child_pid,NULL ,0 )); +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (ioctl) {};
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 7/9 selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain sockets
In reply to Günther Noack--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +51 -0
@@ -20,8 +20,10 @@#include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <sys/sendfile.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/sysmacros.h> +#include <sys/un.h> #include <sys/vfs.h> #include <unistd.h>
@@ -3976,6 +3978,55 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_pipe_ioctl)ASSERT_EQ (child_pid,waitpid (child_pid,NULL ,0 )); } +/* For named UNIX domain sockets, no IOCTL restrictions apply. */ +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_unix_domain_socket_ioctl) +{ +const char *const path = file1_s1d1; +int srv_fd, cli_fd, ruleset_fd; +socklen_t size; +struct sockaddr_un srv_un, cli_un; +const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = { + .handled_access_fs =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV , + }; + +/* Sets up a server */ + srv_un.sun_family =AF_UNIX ; +strncpy (srv_un.sun_path, path,sizeof (srv_un.sun_path)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (path)); +ASSERT_LE (0 , (srv_fd =socket (AF_UNIX ,SOCK_STREAM ,0 ))); + + size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +strlen (srv_un.sun_path); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,bind (srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srv_un, size)); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,listen (srv_fd,10 /* qlen */ )); + +/* Enables Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =landlock_create_ruleset (&attr,sizeof (attr),0 ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* Sets up a client connection to it */ + cli_un.sun_family =AF_UNIX ; + +ASSERT_LE (0 , (cli_fd =socket (AF_UNIX ,SOCK_STREAM ,0 ))); + + size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +strlen (cli_un.sun_path); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,bind (cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, size)); + +bzero (&cli_un,sizeof (cli_un)); + cli_un.sun_family =AF_UNIX ; +strncpy (cli_un.sun_path, path,sizeof (cli_un.sun_path)); + size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +strlen (cli_un.sun_path); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,connect (cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, size)); + +/* FIONREAD and other IOCTLs should not be forbidden. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_fionread_ioctl (cli_fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (cli_fd)); +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (ioctl) {};
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 8/9 samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
In reply to Günther NoackAdd IOCTL support to the Landlock sample tool.
The IOCTL right is grouped with the read-write rights in the sample tool, as some IOCTL requests provide features that mutate state.
--- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c +10 -3
@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)/* clang-format on */
@@ -201,11 +202,12 @@ static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)/* clang-format on */ -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 4 +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 5int main (const int argc,char *const argv[],char *const *const envp) {
@@ -319,6 +321,11 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &= ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP ); + __attribute__((fallthrough)); +case 4 : +/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV for ABI < 5 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV ; +fprintf (stderr,"Hint: You should update the running kernel " "to leverage Landlock features "
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
Günther Noack
reviewerPATCH v12 9/9 landlock: Document IOCTL support
In reply to Günther NoackIn the paragraph above the fallback logic, use the shorter phrasing from the landlock(7) man page.
--- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 76 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +61 -15
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV, .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
@@ -85,10 +86,10 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be executed, it is safer to follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, we should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are -using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or -none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version -of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should -remove access rights which are only supported in higher versions of the ABI. +using. + +To be compatible with older Linux versions, we detect the available Landlock ABI +version, and only use the available subset of access rights: .. code-block:: c
@@ -114,6 +115,10 @@ remove access rights which are only supported in higher versions of the ABI. ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &= ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); + __attribute__((fallthrough)); + case 4: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV for ABI < 5 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV; } This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -225,6 +230,7 @@ access rights per directory enables to change the location of such directory without relying on the destination directory access rights (except those that are required for this operation, see ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` documentation). + Having self-sufficient hierarchies also helps to tighten the required access rights to the minimal set of data. This also helps avoid sinkhole directories, i.e. directories where data can be linked to but not linked from. However,
@@ -318,18 +324,26 @@ It should also be noted that truncating files does not require the system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the flags ``O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC``. -When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` -right is associated with the newly created file descriptor and will be used for -subsequent truncation attempts using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`. The behavior is -similar to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked -during :manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and +The truncate right is associated with the opened file (see below). + +Rights associated with file descriptors +--------------------------------------- + +When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` and +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` rights is associated with the newly created +file descriptor and will be used for subsequent truncation and ioctl attempts +using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` and :manpage:`ioctl(2)`. The behavior is similar +to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked during +:manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and :manpage:`write(2)` calls. -As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors for the -same file, where one grants the right to truncate the file and the other does -not. It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between processes, -keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not have an -enforced Landlock ruleset. +As a consequence, it is possible that a process has multiple open file +descriptors referring to the same file, but Landlock enforces different things +when operating with these file descriptors. This can happen when a Landlock +ruleset gets enforced and the process keeps file descriptors which were opened +both before and after the enforcement. It is also possible to pass such file +descriptors between processes, keeping their Landlock properties, even when some +of the involved processes do not have an enforced Landlock ruleset. Compatibility =============
@@ -458,6 +472,28 @@ Memory usage Kernel memory allocated to create rulesets is accounted and can be restricted by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. +IOCTL support +------------- + +The ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right restricts the use of +:manpage:`ioctl(2)`, but it only applies to *newly opened* device files. This +means specifically that pre-existing file descriptors like stdin, stdout and +stderr are unaffected. + +Users should be aware that TTY devices have traditionally permitted to control +other processes on the same TTY through the ``TIOCSTI`` and ``TIOCLINUX`` IOCTL +commands. Both of these require ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` on modern Linux systems, but +the behavior is configurable for ``TIOCSTI``. + +On older systems, it is therefore recommended to close inherited TTY file +descriptors, or to reopen them from ``/proc/self/fd/*`` without the +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right, if possible. + +Landlock's IOCTL support is coarse-grained at the moment, but may become more +fine-grained in the future. Until then, users are advised to establish the +guarantees that they need through the file hierarchy, by only allowing the +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right on files where it is really required. + Previous limitations ====================
@@ -495,6 +531,16 @@ bind and connect actions to only a set of allowed ports thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` and ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP`` access rights. +IOCTL (ABI < 5) +--------------- + +IOCTL operations could not be denied before the fifth Landlock ABI, so +:manpage:`ioctl(2)` is always allowed when using a kernel that only supports an +earlier ABI. + +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of +:manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` access right. + .. _kernel_support: Kernel support
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog