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tools: iio: replace seekdir() in iio_generic_buffer

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 20 messages Apr 3, 2024

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/20 tools: iio: replace seekdir() in iio_generic_buffer

From: Petre Rodan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e6500bfa053dc133021f9c144261b77b0ba7dc8 ]

Replace seekdir() with rewinddir() in order to fix a localized glibc bug.

One of the glibc patches that stable Gentoo is using causes an improper directory stream positioning bug on 32bit arm. That in turn ends up as a floating point exception in iio_generic_buffer.

The attached patch provides a fix by using an equivalent function which should not cause trouble for other distros and is easier to reason about in general as it obviously always goes back to to the start.

https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=31212

---
 tools/iio/iio_utils.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/iio/iio_utils.c +1 -1
index 6a00a6eecaef0..c5c5082cb24e5 100644
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ int build_channel_array(const char *device_dir, int buffer_idx,
 		goto error_close_dir;
 	}
 
-	seekdir(dp, 0);
+	rewinddir(dp);
 	while (ent = readdir(dp), ent) {
 		if (strcmp(ent->d_name + strlen(ent->d_name) - strlen("_en"),
 			   "_en") == 0) {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/20 usb: storage: sddr55: fix sloppy typing in sddr55_{read|write}_data()

From: Karina Yankevich <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d6429a3555fb29f380c5841a12f5ac3f7444af03 ]

In sddr55_{read|write}_data(), the address variables are needlessly typed as *unsigned long* -- which is 32-bit type on the 32-bit arches and 64-bit type on the 64-bit arches; those variables' value should fit into just 3 command bytes and consists of 10-bit block # (or at least the max block # seems to be 1023) and 4-/5-bit page # within a block, so 32-bit *unsigned* *int* type should be more than enough...

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static analysis tool.

[Sergey: rewrote the patch subject/description]

---
 drivers/usb/storage/sddr55.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/storage/sddr55.c +2 -2
index 15dc25801cdcc..0aa079405d23c 100644
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static int sddr55_read_data(struct us_data *us,
 	unsigned char *buffer;
 
 	unsigned int pba;
-	unsigned long address;
+	unsigned int address;
 
 	unsigned short pages;
 	unsigned int len, offset;
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static int sddr55_write_data(struct us_data *us,
 
 	unsigned int pba;
 	unsigned int new_pba;
-	unsigned long address;
+	unsigned int address;
 
 	unsigned short pages;
 	int i;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/20 bus: mhi: host: Add MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL state

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jeffrey Hugo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bce3f770684cc1d91ff9edab431b71ac991faf29 ]

When processing a SYSERR, if the device does not respond to the MHI_RESET from the host, the host will be stuck in a difficult to recover state. The host will remain in MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_PROCESS and not clean up the host channels. Clients will not be notified of the SYSERR via the destruction of their channel devices, which means clients may think that the device is still up. Subsequent SYSERR events such as a device fatal error will not be processed as the state machine cannot transition from PROCESS back to DETECT. The only way to recover from this is to unload the mhi module (wipe the state machine state) or for the mhi controller to initiate SHUTDOWN.

This issue was discovered by stress testing soc_reset events on AIC100 via the sysfs node.

soc_reset is processed entirely in hardware. When the register write hits the endpoint hardware, it causes the soc to reset without firmware involvement. In stress testing, there is a rare race where soc_reset N will cause the soc to reset and PBL to signal SYSERR (fatal error). If soc_reset N+1 is triggered before PBL can process the MHI_RESET from the host, then the soc will reset again, and re-run PBL from the beginning. This will cause PBL to lose all state. PBL will be waiting for the host to respond to the new syserr, but host will be stuck expecting the previous MHI_RESET to be processed.

Additionally, the AMSS EE firmware (QSM) was hacked to synthetically reproduce the issue by simulating a FW hang after the QSM issued a SYSERR. In this case, soc_reset would not recover the device.

For this failure case, to recover the device, we need a state similar to PROCESS, but can transition to DETECT. There is not a viable existing state to use. POR has the needed transitions, but assumes the device is in a good state and could allow the host to attempt to use the device. Allowing PROCESS to transition to DETECT invites the possibility of parallel SYSERR processing which could get the host and device out of sync.

Thus, invent a new state - MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL

This essentially a holding state. It allows us to clean up the host elements that are based on the old state of the device (channels), but does not allow us to directly advance back to an operational state. It does allow the detection and processing of another SYSERR which may recover the device, or allows the controller to do a clean shutdown.

---
 drivers/bus/mhi/host/init.c     |  1 +
 drivers/bus/mhi/host/internal.h |  9 ++++++---
 drivers/bus/mhi/host/pm.c       | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/bus/mhi/host/init.c +1 -0
index f78aefd2d7a36..cfd17c02fe20e 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static const char * const mhi_pm_state_str[] = {
 	[MHI_PM_STATE_FW_DL_ERR] = "Firmware Download Error",
 	[MHI_PM_STATE_SYS_ERR_DETECT] = "SYS ERROR Detect",
 	[MHI_PM_STATE_SYS_ERR_PROCESS] = "SYS ERROR Process",
+	[MHI_PM_STATE_SYS_ERR_FAIL] = "SYS ERROR Failure",
 	[MHI_PM_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS] = "SHUTDOWN Process",
 	[MHI_PM_STATE_LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT] = "Linkdown or Error Fatal Detect",
 };
drivers/bus/mhi/host/internal.h +6 -3
index 2e139e76de4c0..d2858236af52b 100644
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ enum mhi_pm_state {
 	MHI_PM_STATE_FW_DL_ERR,
 	MHI_PM_STATE_SYS_ERR_DETECT,
 	MHI_PM_STATE_SYS_ERR_PROCESS,
+	MHI_PM_STATE_SYS_ERR_FAIL,
 	MHI_PM_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS,
 	MHI_PM_STATE_LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT,
 	MHI_PM_STATE_MAX
@@ -104,14 +105,16 @@ enum mhi_pm_state {
 #define MHI_PM_FW_DL_ERR				BIT(7)
 #define MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_DETECT				BIT(8)
 #define MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_PROCESS				BIT(9)
-#define MHI_PM_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS				BIT(10)
+#define MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL				BIT(10)
+#define MHI_PM_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS				BIT(11)
 /* link not accessible */
-#define MHI_PM_LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT			BIT(11)
+#define MHI_PM_LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT			BIT(12)
 
 #define MHI_REG_ACCESS_VALID(pm_state)			((pm_state & (MHI_PM_POR | MHI_PM_M0 | \
 						MHI_PM_M2 | MHI_PM_M3_ENTER | MHI_PM_M3_EXIT | \
 						MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_DETECT | MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_PROCESS | \
-						MHI_PM_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS | MHI_PM_FW_DL_ERR)))
+						MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL | MHI_PM_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS |  \
+						MHI_PM_FW_DL_ERR)))
 #define MHI_PM_IN_ERROR_STATE(pm_state)			(pm_state >= MHI_PM_FW_DL_ERR)
 #define MHI_PM_IN_FATAL_STATE(pm_state)			(pm_state == MHI_PM_LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT)
 #define MHI_DB_ACCESS_VALID(mhi_cntrl)			(mhi_cntrl->pm_state & mhi_cntrl->db_access)
drivers/bus/mhi/host/pm.c +17 -3
index 8a4362d75fc43..27f8a40f288cf 100644
@@ -36,7 +36,10 @@
  *     M0 <--> M0
  *     M0 -> FW_DL_ERR
  *     M0 -> M3_ENTER -> M3 -> M3_EXIT --> M0
- * L1: SYS_ERR_DETECT -> SYS_ERR_PROCESS --> POR
+ * L1: SYS_ERR_DETECT -> SYS_ERR_PROCESS
+ *     SYS_ERR_PROCESS -> SYS_ERR_FAIL
+ *     SYS_ERR_FAIL -> SYS_ERR_DETECT
+ *     SYS_ERR_PROCESS --> POR
  * L2: SHUTDOWN_PROCESS -> LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT
  *     SHUTDOWN_PROCESS -> DISABLE
  * L3: LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT <--> LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT
@@ -93,7 +96,12 @@ static const struct mhi_pm_transitions dev_state_transitions[] = {
 	},
 	{
 		MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_PROCESS,
-		MHI_PM_POR | MHI_PM_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS |
+		MHI_PM_POR | MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL | MHI_PM_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS |
+		MHI_PM_LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT
+	},
+	{
+		MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL,
+		MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_DETECT | MHI_PM_SHUTDOWN_PROCESS |
 		MHI_PM_LD_ERR_FATAL_DETECT
 	},
 	/* L2 States */
@@ -624,7 +632,13 @@ static void mhi_pm_sys_error_transition(struct mhi_controller *mhi_cntrl)
 					!in_reset, timeout);
 		if (!ret || in_reset) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Device failed to exit MHI Reset state\n");
-			goto exit_sys_error_transition;
+			write_lock_irq(&mhi_cntrl->pm_lock);
+			cur_state = mhi_tryset_pm_state(mhi_cntrl,
+							MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL);
+			write_unlock_irq(&mhi_cntrl->pm_lock);
+			/* Shutdown may have occurred, otherwise cleanup now */
+			if (cur_state != MHI_PM_SYS_ERR_FAIL)
+				goto exit_sys_error_transition;
 		}
 
 		/*
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/20 kernfs: RCU protect kernfs_nodes and avoid kernfs_idr_lock in kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4207b556e62f0a8915afc5da4c5d5ad915a253a5 ]

The BPF helper bpf_cgroup_from_id() calls kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id() which acquires kernfs_idr_lock, which is an non-raw non-IRQ-safe lock. This can lead to deadlocks as bpf_cgroup_from_id() can be called from any BPF programs including e.g. the ones that attach to functions which are holding the scheduler rq lock.

Consider the following BPF program:

SEC("fentry/__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked")
int BPF_PROG(__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked, struct task_struct *p,
struct affinity_context *affn_ctx, struct rq *rq, struct rq_flags *rf)

  {
	  struct cgroup *cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(p->cgroups->dfl_cgrp->kn->id);

	  if (cgrp) {
		  bpf_printk("%d[%s] in %s", p->pid, p->comm, cgrp->kn->name);
		  bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);
	  }
	  return 0;

}

__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked() is called with rq lock held and the above BPF program calls bpf_cgroup_from_id() within leading to the following lockdep warning:

=====================================================
WARNING: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 6.7.0-rc3-work-00053-g07124366a1d7-dirty #147 Not tainted
-----------------------------------------------------
repro/1620 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
ffffffff833b3688 (kernfs_idr_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id+0x1e/0x70

and this task is already holding:
ffff888237ced698 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: task_rq_lock+0x4e/0xf0 which would create a new lock dependency:
(&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2} -> (kernfs_idr_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}
...
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(kernfs_idr_lock);
				 local_irq_disable();
				 lock(&rq->__lock);
				 lock(kernfs_idr_lock);
    <Interrupt>
      lock(&rq->__lock);

		 *** DEADLOCK ***
  ...
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
   dump_stack+0x10/0x20
   __lock_acquire+0x781/0x2a40
   lock_acquire+0xbf/0x1f0
   _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
   kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id+0x1e/0x70
   cgroup_get_from_id+0x21/0x240
   bpf_cgroup_from_id+0xe/0x20
   bpf_prog_98652316e9337a5a___set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked+0x96/0x11a
   bpf_trampoline_6442545632+0x4f/0x1000
   __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked+0x5/0x5a0
   sched_setaffinity+0x1b3/0x290
   __x64_sys_sched_setaffinity+0x4f/0x60
   do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

Let's fix it by protecting kernfs_node and kernfs_root with RCU and making kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id() acquire rcu_read_lock() instead of kernfs_idr_lock.

This adds an rcu_head to kernfs_node making it larger by 16 bytes on 64bit. Combined with the preceding rearrange patch, the net increase is 8 bytes.

---
 fs/kernfs/dir.c             | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/kernfs.h      |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/dir.c +20 -11
index 62d39ecf0a466..2405aeb39b9a2 100644
@@ -529,6 +529,20 @@ void kernfs_get(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernfs_get);
 
+static void kernfs_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct kernfs_node *kn = container_of(rcu, struct kernfs_node, rcu);
+
+	kfree_const(kn->name);
+
+	if (kn->iattr) {
+		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs, NULL);
+		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
+	}
+
+	kmem_cache_free(kernfs_node_cache, kn);
+}
+
 /**
  * kernfs_put - put a reference count on a kernfs_node
  * @kn: the target kernfs_node
@@ -557,16 +571,11 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_LINK)
 		kernfs_put(kn->symlink.target_kn);
 
-	kfree_const(kn->name);
-
-	if (kn->iattr) {
-		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs, NULL);
-		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
-	}
 	spin_lock(&kernfs_idr_lock);
 	idr_remove(&root->ino_idr, (u32)kernfs_ino(kn));
 	spin_unlock(&kernfs_idr_lock);
-	kmem_cache_free(kernfs_node_cache, kn);
+
+	call_rcu(&kn->rcu, kernfs_free_rcu);
 
 	kn = parent;
 	if (kn) {
@@ -575,7 +584,7 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	} else {
 		/* just released the root kn, free @root too */
 		idr_destroy(&root->ino_idr);
-		kfree(root);
+		kfree_rcu(root, rcu);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernfs_put);
@@ -715,7 +724,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id(struct kernfs_root *root,
 	ino_t ino = kernfs_id_ino(id);
 	u32 gen = kernfs_id_gen(id);
 
-	spin_lock(&kernfs_idr_lock);
+	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	kn = idr_find(&root->ino_idr, (u32)ino);
 	if (!kn)
@@ -739,10 +748,10 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id(struct kernfs_root *root,
 	if (unlikely(!__kernfs_active(kn) || !atomic_inc_not_zero(&kn->count)))
 		goto err_unlock;
 
-	spin_unlock(&kernfs_idr_lock);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return kn;
 err_unlock:
-	spin_unlock(&kernfs_idr_lock);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return NULL;
 }
 
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +2 -0
index a9b854cdfdb5f..210dac7e9ee25 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ struct kernfs_root {
 	struct rw_semaphore	kernfs_rwsem;
 	struct rw_semaphore	kernfs_iattr_rwsem;
 	struct rw_semaphore	kernfs_supers_rwsem;
+
+	struct rcu_head		rcu;
 };
 
 /* +1 to avoid triggering overflow warning when negating it */
include/linux/kernfs.h +2 -0
index 2a36f3218b510..5a952d00ea159 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,8 @@ struct kernfs_node {
 	unsigned short		flags;
 	umode_t			mode;
 	struct kernfs_iattrs	*iattr;
+
+	struct rcu_head		rcu;
 };
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/20 usb: gadget: uvc: mark incomplete frames with UVC_STREAM_ERR

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michael Grzeschik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2a3b7af120477d0571b815ccb8600cafd5ebf02f ]

If an frame was transmitted incomplete to the host, we set the UVC_STREAM_ERR bit in the header for the last request that is going to be queued. This way the host will know that it should drop the frame instead of trying to display the corrupted content.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_video.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_video.c +3 -0
index 91af3b1ef0d41..281e75027b344 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ uvc_video_encode_header(struct uvc_video *video, struct uvc_buffer *buf,
 
 	data[1] = UVC_STREAM_EOH | video->fid;
 
+	if (video->queue.flags & UVC_QUEUE_DROP_INCOMPLETE)
+		data[1] |= UVC_STREAM_ERR;
+
 	if (video->queue.buf_used == 0 && ts.tv_sec) {
 		/* dwClockFrequency is 48 MHz */
 		u32 pts = ((u64)ts.tv_sec * USEC_PER_SEC + ts.tv_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC) * 48;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/20 usb: typec: ucsi: Limit read size on v1.2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b3db266fb031fba88c423d4bb8983a73a3db6527 ]

Between UCSI 1.2 and UCSI 2.0, the size of the MESSAGE_IN region was increased from 16 to 256. In order to avoid overflowing reads for older systems, add a mechanism to use the read UCSI version to truncate read sizes on UCSI v1.2.

---
 drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h | 11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +24 -2
index 8f9dff993b3da..75efac331dc5a 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,19 @@
  */
 #define UCSI_SWAP_TIMEOUT_MS	5000
 
+static int ucsi_read_message_in(struct ucsi *ucsi, void *buf,
+					  size_t buf_size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Below UCSI 2.0, MESSAGE_IN was limited to 16 bytes. Truncate the
+	 * reads here.
+	 */
+	if (ucsi->version <= UCSI_VERSION_1_2)
+		buf_size = clamp(buf_size, 0, 16);
+
+	return ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, buf, buf_size);
+}
+
 static int ucsi_acknowledge_command(struct ucsi *ucsi)
 {
 	u64 ctrl;
@@ -72,7 +85,7 @@ static int ucsi_read_error(struct ucsi *ucsi)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, &error, sizeof(error));
+	ret = ucsi_read_message_in(ucsi, &error, sizeof(error));
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -170,7 +183,7 @@ int ucsi_send_command(struct ucsi *ucsi, u64 command,
 	length = ret;
 
 	if (data) {
-		ret = ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, data, size);
+		ret = ucsi_read_message_in(ucsi, data, size);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -1555,6 +1568,15 @@ int ucsi_register(struct ucsi *ucsi)
 	if (!ucsi->version)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	/*
+	 * Version format is JJ.M.N (JJ = Major version, M = Minor version,
+	 * N = sub-minor version).
+	 */
+	dev_dbg(ucsi->dev, "Registered UCSI interface with version %x.%x.%x",
+		UCSI_BCD_GET_MAJOR(ucsi->version),
+		UCSI_BCD_GET_MINOR(ucsi->version),
+		UCSI_BCD_GET_SUBMINOR(ucsi->version));
+
 	queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &ucsi->work, 0);
 
 	ucsi_debugfs_register(ucsi);
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h +11 -0
index 474315a72c770..ed8a82df93e5b 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ struct dentry;
 #define UCSI_CONTROL			8
 #define UCSI_MESSAGE_IN			16
 #define UCSI_MESSAGE_OUT		32
+#define UCSIv2_MESSAGE_OUT		272
+
+/* UCSI versions */
+#define UCSI_VERSION_1_2	0x0120
+#define UCSI_VERSION_2_0	0x0200
+#define UCSI_VERSION_2_1	0x0210
+#define UCSI_VERSION_3_0	0x0300
+
+#define UCSI_BCD_GET_MAJOR(_v_)		(((_v_) >> 8) & 0xFF)
+#define UCSI_BCD_GET_MINOR(_v_)		(((_v_) >> 4) & 0x0F)
+#define UCSI_BCD_GET_SUBMINOR(_v_)	((_v_) & 0x0F)
 
 /* Command Status and Connector Change Indication (CCI) bits */
 #define UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(_c_)		(((_c_) & GENMASK(7, 1)) >> 1)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/20 thunderbolt: Keep the domain powered when USB4 port is in redrive mode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a75e0684efe567ae5f6a8e91a8360c4c1773cf3a ]

If a DiplayPort cable is directly connected to the host routers USB4 port, there is no tunnel involved but the port is in "redrive" mode meaning that it is re-driving the DisplayPort signals from its DisplayPort source. In this case we need to keep the domain powered on otherwise once the domain enters D3cold the connected monitor blanks too.

Since this happens only on Intel Barlow Ridge add a quirk that takes runtime PM reference if we detect that the USB4 port entered redrive mode (and release it once it exits the mode).

---
 drivers/thunderbolt/quirks.c | 14 +++++++++++
 drivers/thunderbolt/tb.c     | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/thunderbolt/tb.h     |  4 +++
 3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/quirks.c +14 -0
index e6bfa63b40aee..e81de9c30eac9 100644
@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ static void quirk_usb3_maximum_bandwidth(struct tb_switch *sw)
 	}
 }
 
+static void quirk_block_rpm_in_redrive(struct tb_switch *sw)
+{
+	sw->quirks |= QUIRK_KEEP_POWER_IN_DP_REDRIVE;
+	tb_sw_dbg(sw, "preventing runtime PM in DP redrive mode\n");
+}
+
 struct tb_quirk {
 	u16 hw_vendor_id;
 	u16 hw_device_id;
@@ -86,6 +92,14 @@ static const struct tb_quirk tb_quirks[] = {
 		  quirk_usb3_maximum_bandwidth },
 	{ 0x8087, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BARLOW_RIDGE_HUB_40G_BRIDGE, 0x0000, 0x0000,
 		  quirk_usb3_maximum_bandwidth },
+	/*
+	 * Block Runtime PM in DP redrive mode for Intel Barlow Ridge host
+	 * controllers.
+	 */
+	{ 0x8087, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BARLOW_RIDGE_HOST_80G_NHI, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+		  quirk_block_rpm_in_redrive },
+	{ 0x8087, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BARLOW_RIDGE_HOST_40G_NHI, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+		  quirk_block_rpm_in_redrive },
 	/*
 	 * CLx is not supported on AMD USB4 Yellow Carp and Pink Sardine platforms.
 	 */
drivers/thunderbolt/tb.c +48 -1

67 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/thunderbolt/tb.h +4 -0
index d2a55ad2fd3e6..4893d2c7ac968 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #define QUIRK_FORCE_POWER_LINK_CONTROLLER		BIT(0)
 /* Disable CLx if not supported */
 #define QUIRK_NO_CLX					BIT(1)
+/* Need to keep power on while USB4 port is in redrive mode */
+#define QUIRK_KEEP_POWER_IN_DP_REDRIVE			BIT(2)
 
 /**
  * struct tb_nvm - Structure holding NVM information
@@ -261,6 +263,7 @@ struct tb_bandwidth_group {
  * @group_list: The adapter is linked to the group's list of ports through this
  * @max_bw: Maximum possible bandwidth through this adapter if set to
  *	    non-zero.
+ * @redrive: For DP IN, if true the adapter is in redrive mode.
  *
  * In USB4 terminology this structure represents an adapter (protocol or
  * lane adapter).
@@ -289,6 +292,7 @@ struct tb_port {
 	struct tb_bandwidth_group *group;
 	struct list_head group_list;
 	unsigned int max_bw;
+	bool redrive;
 };
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/20 usb: typec: tcpci: add generic tcpci fallback compatible

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Marco Felsch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8774ea7a553e2aec323170d49365b59af0a2b7e0 ]

The driver already support the tcpci binding for the i2c_device_id so add the support for the of_device_id too.

---
 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci.c +1 -0
index 0ee3e6e29bb17..7118551827f6a 100644
@@ -889,6 +889,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, tcpci_id);
 #ifdef CONFIG_OF
 static const struct of_device_id tcpci_of_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "nxp,ptn5110", },
+	{ .compatible = "tcpci", },
 	{},
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, tcpci_of_match);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/20 usb: sl811-hcd: only defined function checkdone if QUIRK2 is defined

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 12f371e2b6cb4b79c788f1f073992e115f4ca918 ]

Function checkdone is only required if QUIRK2 is defined, so add appropriate #if / #endif around the function.

Cleans up clang scan build warning:
drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c:588:18: warning: unused function 'checkdone' [-Wunused-function]

---
 drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c +2 -0
index 0956495bba575..2b871540bb500 100644
@@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ done(struct sl811 *sl811, struct sl811h_ep *ep, u8 bank)
 		finish_request(sl811, ep, urb, urbstat);
 }
 
+#ifdef QUIRK2
 static inline u8 checkdone(struct sl811 *sl811)
 {
 	u8	ctl;
@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ static inline u8 checkdone(struct sl811 *sl811)
 #endif
 	return irqstat;
 }
+#endif
 
 static irqreturn_t sl811h_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/20 ASoC: amd: yc: Fix non-functional mic on ASUS M7600RE

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: M Cooley <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db185362fca554b201e2c62beb15a02bb39a064b ]

The ASUS M7600RE (Vivobook Pro 16X OLED) needs a quirks-table entry for the internal microphone to function properly.

---
 sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c +7 -0
index 80ad60d485ea0..c47362afc9432 100644
@@ -297,6 +297,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id yc_acp_quirk_table[] = {
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "E1504FA"),
 		}
 	},
+	{
+		.driver_data = &acp6x_card,
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "M7600RE"),
+		}
+	},
 	{
 		.driver_data = &acp6x_card,
 		.matches = {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/20 thermal/of: Assume polling-delay(-passive) 0 when absent

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Konrad Dybcio <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 488164006a281986d95abbc4b26e340c19c4c85b ]

Currently, thermal zones associated with providers that have interrupts for signaling hot/critical trips are required to set a polling-delay of 0 to indicate no polling. This feels a bit backwards.

Change the code such that "no polling delay" also means "no polling".

---
 drivers/thermal/thermal_of.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/thermal/thermal_of.c +8 -4
index 1e0655b63259f..d5174f11b91c2 100644
@@ -225,14 +225,18 @@ static int thermal_of_monitor_init(struct device_node *np, int *delay, int *pdel
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = of_property_read_u32(np, "polling-delay-passive", pdelay);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		pr_err("%pOFn: missing polling-delay-passive property\n", np);
+	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+		*pdelay = 0;
+	} else if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("%pOFn: Couldn't get polling-delay-passive: %d\n", np, ret);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
 	ret = of_property_read_u32(np, "polling-delay", delay);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		pr_err("%pOFn: missing polling-delay property\n", np);
+	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+		*delay = 0;
+	} else if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("%pOFn: Couldn't get polling-delay: %d\n", np, ret);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/20 ASoC: soc-core.c: Skip dummy codec when adding platforms

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chancel Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 23fb6bc2696119391ec3a92ccaffe50e567c515e ]

When pcm_runtime is adding platform components it will scan all registered components. In case of DPCM FE/BE some DAI links will configure dummy platform. However both dummy codec and dummy platform are using "snd-soc-dummy" as component->name. Dummy codec should be skipped when adding platforms otherwise there'll be overflow and UBSAN complains.

---
 sound/soc/soc-core.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/soc/soc-core.c +3 -0
index 9de98c01d8151..e65fe3a7c3e42 100644
@@ -1105,6 +1105,9 @@ static int snd_soc_add_pcm_runtime(struct snd_soc_card *card,
 			if (!snd_soc_is_matching_component(platform, component))
 				continue;
 
+			if (snd_soc_component_is_dummy(component) && component->num_dai)
+				continue;
+
 			snd_soc_rtd_add_component(rtd, component);
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/20 x86/xen: attempt to inflate the memory balloon on PVH

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38620fc4e8934f1801c7811ef39a041914ac4c1d ]

When running as PVH or HVM Linux will use holes in the memory map as scratch space to map grants, foreign domain pages and possibly miscellaneous other stuff. However the usage of such memory map holes for Xen purposes can be problematic. The request of holesby Xen happen quite early in the kernel boot process (grant table setup already uses scratch map space), and it's possible that by then not all devices have reclaimed their MMIO space. It's not unlikely for chunks of Xen scratch map space to end up using PCI bridge MMIO window memory, which (as expected) causes quite a lot of issues in the system.

At least for PVH dom0 we have the possibility of using regions marked as UNUSABLE in the e820 memory map. Either if the region is UNUSABLE in the native memory map, or it has been converted into UNUSABLE in order to hide RAM regions from dom0, the second stage translation page-tables can populate those areas without issues.

PV already has this kind of logic, where the balloon driver is inflated at boot. Re-use the current logic in order to also inflate it when running as PVH. onvert UNUSABLE regions up to the ratio specified in EXTRA_MEM_RATIO to RAM, while reserving them using xen_add_extra_mem() (which is also moved so it's no longer tied to CONFIG_PV).

[jgross: fixed build for CONFIG_PVH without CONFIG_XEN_PVH]

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h |  5 ++
 arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c     |  3 ++
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c              | 32 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c          | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/xen/setup.c                  | 44 -----------------
 arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h                | 14 ++++++
 drivers/xen/balloon.c                 |  2 -
 7 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h +5 -0
index a9088250770f2..64fbd2dbc5b76 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ void xen_arch_unregister_cpu(int num);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PVH
 void __init xen_pvh_init(struct boot_params *boot_params);
 void __init mem_map_via_hcall(struct boot_params *boot_params_p);
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PVH
+void __init xen_reserve_extra_memory(struct boot_params *bootp);
+#else
+static inline void xen_reserve_extra_memory(struct boot_params *bootp) { }
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /* Lazy mode for batching updates / context switch */
arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c +3 -0
index 00a92cb2c8147..a12117f3d4de7 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ static void __init init_pvh_bootparams(bool xen_guest)
 	} else
 		xen_raw_printk("Warning: Can fit ISA range into e820\n");
 
+	if (xen_guest)
+		xen_reserve_extra_memory(&pvh_bootparams);
+
 	pvh_bootparams.hdr.cmd_line_ptr =
 		pvh_start_info.cmdline_paddr;
 
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +32 -0
index 3c61bb98c10e2..a01ca255b0c64 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/console.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
 
@@ -350,3 +351,34 @@ void xen_arch_unregister_cpu(int num)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xen_arch_unregister_cpu);
 #endif
+
+/* Amount of extra memory space we add to the e820 ranges */
+struct xen_memory_region xen_extra_mem[XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS] __initdata;
+
+void __init xen_add_extra_mem(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long n_pfns)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to check for zero size, should happen rarely and will only
+	 * write a new entry regarded to be unused due to zero size.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++) {
+		/* Add new region. */
+		if (xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns == 0) {
+			xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn = start_pfn;
+			xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns = n_pfns;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Append to existing region. */
+		if (xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn + xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns ==
+		    start_pfn) {
+			xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns += n_pfns;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (i == XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS)
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "Warning: not enough extra memory regions\n");
+
+	memblock_reserve(PFN_PHYS(start_pfn), PFN_PHYS(n_pfns));
+}
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c +68 -0

77 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/xen/setup.c +0 -44

62 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h +14 -0
index a87ab36889e76..79cf93f2c92f1 100644
@@ -163,4 +163,18 @@ void xen_hvm_post_suspend(int suspend_cancelled);
 static inline void xen_hvm_post_suspend(int suspend_cancelled) {}
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * The maximum amount of extra memory compared to the base size.  The
+ * main scaling factor is the size of struct page.  At extreme ratios
+ * of base:extra, all the base memory can be filled with page
+ * structures for the extra memory, leaving no space for anything
+ * else.
+ *
+ * 10x seems like a reasonable balance between scaling flexibility and
+ * leaving a practically usable system.
+ */
+#define EXTRA_MEM_RATIO		(10)
+
+void xen_add_extra_mem(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long n_pfns);
+
 #endif /* XEN_OPS_H */
drivers/xen/balloon.c +0 -2
index 586a1673459eb..db61bcb3aab17 100644
@@ -673,7 +673,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xen_free_ballooned_pages);
 
 static void __init balloon_add_regions(void)
 {
-#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV)
 	unsigned long start_pfn, pages;
 	unsigned long pfn, extra_pfn_end;
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -697,7 +696,6 @@ static void __init balloon_add_regions(void)
 
 		balloon_stats.total_pages += extra_pfn_end - start_pfn;
 	}
-#endif
 }
 
 static int __init balloon_init(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/20 fbdev: viafb: fix typo in hw_bitblt_1 and hw_bitblt_2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Aleksandr Burakov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc87bb342f106a0402186bcb588fcbe945dced4b ]

There are some actions with value 'tmp' but 'dst_addr' is checked instead. It is obvious that a copy-paste error was made here and the value of variable 'tmp' should be checked here.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/via/accel.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/via/accel.c +2 -2
index 0a1bc7a4d7853..1e04026f08091 100644
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int hw_bitblt_1(void __iomem *engine, u8 op, u32 width, u32 height,
 
 	if (op != VIA_BITBLT_FILL) {
 		tmp = src_mem ? 0 : src_addr;
-		if (dst_addr & 0xE0000007) {
+		if (tmp & 0xE0000007) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "hw_bitblt_1: Unsupported source "
 				"address %X\n", tmp);
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int hw_bitblt_2(void __iomem *engine, u8 op, u32 width, u32 height,
 		writel(tmp, engine + 0x18);
 
 		tmp = src_mem ? 0 : src_addr;
-		if (dst_addr & 0xE0000007) {
+		if (tmp & 0xE0000007) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "hw_bitblt_2: Unsupported source "
 				"address %X\n", tmp);
 			return -EINVAL;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/20 io_uring: clear opcode specific data for an early failure

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e21e1c45e1fe2e31732f40256b49c04e76a17cee ]

If failure happens before the opcode prep handler is called, ensure that we clear the opcode specific area of the request, which holds data specific to that request type. This prevents errors where opcode handlers either don't get to clear per-request private data since prep isn't even called.

---
 io_uring/io_uring.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +16 -9
index ea772a02c1405..c1e411017d8af 100644
@@ -2147,6 +2147,13 @@ static void io_init_req_drain(struct io_kiocb *req)
 	}
 }
 
+static __cold int io_init_fail_req(struct io_kiocb *req, int err)
+{
+	/* ensure per-opcode data is cleared if we fail before prep */
+	memset(&req->cmd.data, 0, sizeof(req->cmd.data));
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req,
 		       const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
 	__must_hold(&ctx->uring_lock)
@@ -2167,29 +2174,29 @@ static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req,
 
 	if (unlikely(opcode >= IORING_OP_LAST)) {
 		req->opcode = 0;
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return io_init_fail_req(req, -EINVAL);
 	}
 	def = &io_issue_defs[opcode];
 	if (unlikely(sqe_flags & ~SQE_COMMON_FLAGS)) {
 		/* enforce forwards compatibility on users */
 		if (sqe_flags & ~SQE_VALID_FLAGS)
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return io_init_fail_req(req, -EINVAL);
 		if (sqe_flags & IOSQE_BUFFER_SELECT) {
 			if (!def->buffer_select)
-				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				return io_init_fail_req(req, -EOPNOTSUPP);
 			req->buf_index = READ_ONCE(sqe->buf_group);
 		}
 		if (sqe_flags & IOSQE_CQE_SKIP_SUCCESS)
 			ctx->drain_disabled = true;
 		if (sqe_flags & IOSQE_IO_DRAIN) {
 			if (ctx->drain_disabled)
-				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				return io_init_fail_req(req, -EOPNOTSUPP);
 			io_init_req_drain(req);
 		}
 	}
 	if (unlikely(ctx->restricted || ctx->drain_active || ctx->drain_next)) {
 		if (ctx->restricted && !io_check_restriction(ctx, req, sqe_flags))
-			return -EACCES;
+			return io_init_fail_req(req, -EACCES);
 		/* knock it to the slow queue path, will be drained there */
 		if (ctx->drain_active)
 			req->flags |= REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC;
@@ -2202,9 +2209,9 @@ static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req,
 	}
 
 	if (!def->ioprio && sqe->ioprio)
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return io_init_fail_req(req, -EINVAL);
 	if (!def->iopoll && (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL))
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return io_init_fail_req(req, -EINVAL);
 
 	if (def->needs_file) {
 		struct io_submit_state *state = &ctx->submit_state;
@@ -2228,12 +2235,12 @@ static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req,
 
 		req->creds = xa_load(&ctx->personalities, personality);
 		if (!req->creds)
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return io_init_fail_req(req, -EINVAL);
 		get_cred(req->creds);
 		ret = security_uring_override_creds(req->creds);
 		if (ret) {
 			put_cred(req->creds);
-			return ret;
+			return io_init_fail_req(req, ret);
 		}
 		req->flags |= REQ_F_CREDS;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/20 modpost: fix null pointer dereference

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Max Kellermann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 23dfd914d2bfc4c9938b0084dffd7105de231d98 ]

If the find_fromsym() call fails and returns NULL, the warn() call will dereference this NULL pointer and cause the program to crash.

This happened when I tried to build with "test_user_copy" module. With this fix, it prints lots of warnings like this:

WARNING: modpost: lib/test_user_copy: section mismatch in reference: (unknown)+0x4 (section: .text.fixup) -> (unknown) (section: .init.text)

[email protected]:
The issue is reproduced with ARCH=arm allnoconfig + CONFIG_MODULES=y + CONFIG_RUNTIME_TESTING_MENU=y + CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY=m

---
 scripts/mod/modpost.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/mod/modpost.c +3 -1
index 5191fdbd3fa23..076f3c9e43fa5 100644
@@ -1153,7 +1153,9 @@ static void default_mismatch_handler(const char *modname, struct elf_info *elf,
 	sec_mismatch_count++;
 
 	warn("%s: section mismatch in reference: %s+0x%x (section: %s) -> %s (section: %s)\n",
-	     modname, fromsym, (unsigned int)(faddr - from->st_value), fromsec, tosym, tosec);
+	     modname, fromsym,
+	     (unsigned int)(faddr - (from ? from->st_value : 0)),
+	     fromsec, tosym, tosec);
 
 	if (mismatch->mismatch == EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT) {
 		if (match(tosec, mismatch->bad_tosec))
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/20 drivers/nvme: Add quirks for device 126f:2262

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Jiawei Fu (iBug)" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e89086c43f0500bc7c4ce225495b73b8ce234c1f ]

This commit adds NVME_QUIRK_NO_DEEPEST_PS and NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID for device [126f:2262], which appears to be a generic VID:PID pair used for many SSDs based on the Silicon Motion SM2262/SM2262EN controller.

Two of my SSDs with this VID:PID pair exhibit the same behavior:

* They frequently have trouble exiting the deepest power state (5), resulting in the entire disk unresponsive.
Verified by setting nvme_core.default_ps_max_latency_us=10000 and observing them behaving normally.
* They produce all-zero nguid and eui64 with nvme id-ns command.

The offending products are:

* HP SSD EX950 1TB
* HIKVISION C2000Pro 2TB

---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +3 -0
index f8e92404a6591..b985142fb84b9 100644
@@ -3361,6 +3361,9 @@ static const struct pci_device_id nvme_id_table[] = {
 				NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, },
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(REDHAT, 0x0010),	/* Qemu emulated controller */
 		.driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(0x126f, 0x2262),	/* Silicon Motion generic */
+		.driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_NO_DEEPEST_PS |
+				NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(0x126f, 0x2263),	/* Silicon Motion unidentified */
 		.driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_NO_NS_DESC_LIST |
 				NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, },
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/20 fbmon: prevent division by zero in fb_videomode_from_videomode()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Roman Smirnov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c2d953276b8b27459baed1277a4fdd5dd9bd4126 ]

The expression htotal * vtotal can have a zero value on overflow. It is necessary to prevent division by zero like in fb_var_to_videomode().

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmon.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmon.c +4 -3
index 79e5bfbdd34c2..0a26399dbc899 100644
@@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ int fb_get_mode(int flags, u32 val, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, struct fb_inf
 int fb_videomode_from_videomode(const struct videomode *vm,
 				struct fb_videomode *fbmode)
 {
-	unsigned int htotal, vtotal;
+	unsigned int htotal, vtotal, total;
 
 	fbmode->xres = vm->hactive;
 	fbmode->left_margin = vm->hback_porch;
@@ -1344,8 +1344,9 @@ int fb_videomode_from_videomode(const struct videomode *vm,
 	vtotal = vm->vactive + vm->vfront_porch + vm->vback_porch +
 		 vm->vsync_len;
 	/* prevent division by zero */
-	if (htotal && vtotal) {
-		fbmode->refresh = vm->pixelclock / (htotal * vtotal);
+	total = htotal * vtotal;
+	if (total) {
+		fbmode->refresh = vm->pixelclock / total;
 	/* a mode must have htotal and vtotal != 0 or it is invalid */
 	} else {
 		fbmode->refresh = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/20 ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirks for some Clevo laptops

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tim Crawford <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 33affa7fb46c0c07f6c49d4ddac9dd436715064c ]

Add audio quirks to fix speaker output and headset detection on some new Clevo models:

- L240TU (ALC245)
- PE60SNE-G (ALC1220)
- V350SNEQ (ALC245)

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +3 -0
index 88d006ac9568c..85d8c6cd27abb 100644
@@ -2645,6 +2645,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc882_fixup_tbl[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x65f1, "Clevo PC50HS", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x65f5, "Clevo PD50PN[NRT]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x66a2, "Clevo PE60RNE", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x66a6, "Clevo PE60SN[CDE]-[GS]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x67d1, "Clevo PB71[ER][CDF]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x67e1, "Clevo PB71[DE][CDF]", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x67e5, "Clevo PC70D[PRS](?:-D|-G)?", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_PB51ED_PINS),
@@ -10023,12 +10024,14 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xb120, "MSI Cubi MS-B120", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xb171, "Cubi N 8GL (MS-B171)", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x152d, 0x1082, "Quanta NL3", ALC269_FIXUP_LIFEBOOK),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x0353, "Clevo V35[05]SN[CDE]Q", ALC256_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x1323, "Clevo N130ZU", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x1325, "Clevo N15[01][CW]U", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x1401, "Clevo L140[CZ]U", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x1403, "Clevo N140CU", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x1404, "Clevo N150CU", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x14a1, "Clevo L141MU", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x2624, "Clevo L240TU", ALC256_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x4018, "Clevo NV40M[BE]", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x4019, "Clevo NV40MZ", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x4020, "Clevo NV40MB", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/20 drm/amdgpu: fix use-after-free bug

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vitaly Prosyak <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 22207fd5c80177b860279653d017474b2812af5e ]

The bug can be triggered by sending a single amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl to the AMDGPU DRM driver on any ASICs with an invalid address and size. The bug was reported by Joonkyo Jung <[email protected]>. For example the following code:

static void Syzkaller1(int fd)

{
	struct drm_amdgpu_gem_userptr arg;
	int ret;

	arg.addr = 0xffffffffffff0000;
	arg.size = 0x80000000; /*2 Gb*/
	arg.flags = 0x7;
	ret = drmIoctl(fd, 0xc1186451/*amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl*/, &arg);
}

Due to the address and size are not valid there is a failure in amdgpu_hmm_register->mmu_interval_notifier_insert->__mmu_interval_notifier_insert-> check_shl_overflow, but we even the amdgpu_hmm_register failure we still call amdgpu_hmm_unregister into amdgpu_gem_object_free which causes access to a bad address. The following stack is below when the issue is reproduced when Kazan is enabled:

[  +0.000014] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/ROG STRIX B550-F GAMING (WI-FI), BIOS 1401 12/03/2020
[  +0.000009] RIP: 0010:mmu_interval_notifier_remove+0x327/0x340
[  +0.000017] Code: ff ff 49 89 44 24 08 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 4c 89 f7 49 89 47 40 48 83 c0 22 49 89 47 48 e8 ce d1 2d 01 e9 32 ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 16 ff ff ff 4c 89 ef e8 fa 14 b3 ff e9 36 ff ff ff e8 80
[  +0.000014] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002657988 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  +0.000013] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff920004caf35 RCX: ffffffff8160565b
[  +0.000011] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8881a9f78260
[  +0.000010] RBP: ffffc90002657a70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520004caf25
[  +0.000010] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff8161d1d6 R12: ffff88810e988c00
[  +0.000010] R13: ffff888126fb5a00 R14: ffff88810e988c0c R15: ffff8881a9f78260
[  +0.000011] FS:  00007ff9ec848540(0000) GS:ffff8883cc880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  +0.000012] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  +0.000010] CR2: 000055b3f7e14328 CR3: 00000001b5770000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[  +0.000010] Call Trace:
[  +0.000006]  <TASK>
[  +0.000007]  ? show_regs+0x6a/0x80
[  +0.000018]  ? __warn+0xa5/0x1b0
[  +0.000019]  ? mmu_interval_notifier_remove+0x327/0x340
[  +0.000018]  ? report_bug+0x24a/0x290
[  +0.000022]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[  +0.000015]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x50
[  +0.000016]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[  +0.000017]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[  +0.000017]  ? mmu_interval_notifier_remove+0x23b/0x340
[  +0.000019]  ? mmu_interval_notifier_remove+0x327/0x340
[  +0.000019]  ? mmu_interval_notifier_remove+0x23b/0x340
[  +0.000020]  ? __pfx_mmu_interval_notifier_remove+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000017]  ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1e/0x30
[  +0.000018]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000014]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0xb1/0xc0
[  +0.000018]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000013]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  +0.000020]  amdgpu_hmm_unregister+0x34/0x50 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004695]  amdgpu_gem_object_free+0x66/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004534]  ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_object_free+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004291]  ? do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xe0
[  +0.000023]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000017]  drm_gem_object_free+0x3b/0x50 [drm]
[  +0.000489]  amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl+0x306/0x500 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004295]  ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004270]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000014]  ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[  +0.000015]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000013]  ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[  +0.000020]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000014]  ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
[  +0.000022]  ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0x17b/0x1f0 [drm]
[  +0.000496]  ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004272]  ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0x190/0x1f0 [drm]
[  +0.000492]  drm_ioctl_kernel+0x140/0x1f0 [drm]
[  +0.000497]  ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004297]  ? __pfx_drm_ioctl_kernel+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[  +0.000489]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000011]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  +0.000016]  drm_ioctl+0x3da/0x730 [drm]
[  +0.000475]  ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_userptr_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004293]  ? __pfx_drm_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[  +0.000506]  ? __pfx_rpm_resume+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000016]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000011]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  +0.000010]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000011]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x99/0x100
[  +0.000015]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000014]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000013]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000011]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000011]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0
[  +0.000013]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  +0.000010]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27/0x50
[  +0.000019]  amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x7e/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[  +0.004272]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xcd/0x110
[  +0.000020]  do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xe0
[  +0.000021]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[  +0.000015] RIP: 0033:0x7ff9ed31a94f
[  +0.000012] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
[  +0.000013] RSP: 002b:00007fff25f66790 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[  +0.000016] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b3f7e133e0 RCX: 00007ff9ed31a94f
[  +0.000012] RDX: 000055b3f7e133e0 RSI: 00000000c1186451 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  +0.000010] RBP: 00000000c1186451 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  +0.000009] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff25f66ca8
[  +0.000009] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055b3f7021ba8 R15: 00007ff9ed7af040
[  +0.000024]  </TASK>
[  +0.000007] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

v2: Consolidate any error handling into amdgpu_hmm_register
which applied to kfd_bo also. (Christian)
v3: Improve syntax and comment (Christian)

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_hmm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_hmm.c +16 -4
index 081267161d401..57516a8c5db34 100644
@@ -129,13 +129,25 @@ static const struct mmu_interval_notifier_ops amdgpu_hmm_hsa_ops = {
  */
 int amdgpu_hmm_register(struct amdgpu_bo *bo, unsigned long addr)
 {
+	int r;
+
 	if (bo->kfd_bo)
-		return mmu_interval_notifier_insert(&bo->notifier, current->mm,
+		r = mmu_interval_notifier_insert(&bo->notifier, current->mm,
 						    addr, amdgpu_bo_size(bo),
 						    &amdgpu_hmm_hsa_ops);
-	return mmu_interval_notifier_insert(&bo->notifier, current->mm, addr,
-					    amdgpu_bo_size(bo),
-					    &amdgpu_hmm_gfx_ops);
+	else
+		r = mmu_interval_notifier_insert(&bo->notifier, current->mm, addr,
+							amdgpu_bo_size(bo),
+							&amdgpu_hmm_gfx_ops);
+	if (r)
+		/*
+		 * Make sure amdgpu_hmm_unregister() doesn't call
+		 * mmu_interval_notifier_remove() when the notifier isn't properly
+		 * initialized.
+		 */
+		bo->notifier.mm = NULL;
+
+	return r;
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0