x86/loader: only patch linux kernels
PATCH 1/1 x86/loader: only patch linux kernels
If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot verification.
Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
--- hw/i386/x86.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/i386/x86.c +1 -1
@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,* kernel on the other side of the fw_cfg interface matches the hash of the * file the user passed in. */ -if (!sev_enabled ()) { +if (!sev_enabled () && protocol >0 ) {memcpy (setup, header,MIN (sizeof (header), setup_size)); }
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Quoted 7 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot verification.
Quoted 5 lines
Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
Um we kind of care about Linux ;)
What's the plan? I suspect we should just add a command line flag to skip patching? And once we do that, it seems safer to just always rely on the flag?
Quoted 20 lines
Signed-off-by Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>--- hw/i386/x86.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)hw/i386/x86.c +1
-1@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,* kernel on the other side of the fw_cfg interface matches the hash of the * file the user passed in. */ -if (!sev_enabled ()) { +if (!sev_enabled () && protocol >0 ) {memcpy (setup, header,MIN (sizeof (header), setup_size)); }Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)
Quoted 11 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 10 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot verification.
Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
Um we kind of care about Linux ;)
What's the plan? I suspect we should just add a command line flag to skip patching? And once we do that, it seems safer to just always rely on the flag?
Well, there are more problems to solve here than just the patching. So lets have a look at the bigger picture before discussion the details ...
[ Cc'ing Daniel + Cole ]
Current state of affairs is that OVMF supports two ways to boot a linux kernel:
(1) Just load it as EFI binary and boot via linux kernel EFI stub, which is the modern way to load a linux kernel (which is why you can boot not only linux kernels but any efi binary).
(2) Use the old EFI handover protocol. Which is the RHEL-6 era way to boot a linux kernel on EFI.
For method (1) secure boot verification must pass. For (2) not. So if you try to use direct kernel boot with secure boot enabled OVMF will first try (1), which will fail, then go fallback to (2).
The reason for the failure is not only the patching, but also the fact that the linux kernel is typically verified by shim.efi (and the distro keys compiled into the binary) instead of the firmware.
Going though (2) is not ideal for multiple reasons, so we need some strategy how we'll go handle direct kernel load with uefi and secure boot in a way that (1) works.
Options I see:
(a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
(b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
(c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi in some new fw_cfg file.
(b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue. The options I see here are:
(A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom. Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway. It doesn't look that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all information needed ...
(B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the guest can choose what it needs.
(C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim switch and skip patching in case it is present.
(D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
Comments? Other/better ideas?
take care,
Gerd
Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)
Quoted 74 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
Quoted 11 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 10 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot verification.
Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
Um we kind of care about Linux ;)
What's the plan? I suspect we should just add a command line flag to skip patching? And once we do that, it seems safer to just always rely on the flag?
Well, there are more problems to solve here than just the patching. So lets have a look at the bigger picture before discussion the details ...
[ Cc'ing Daniel + Cole ]
Current state of affairs is that OVMF supports two ways to boot a linux kernel:
(1) Just load it as EFI binary and boot via linux kernel EFI stub, which is the modern way to load a linux kernel (which is why you can boot not only linux kernels but any efi binary).
(2) Use the old EFI handover protocol. Which is the RHEL-6 era way to boot a linux kernel on EFI.
For method (1) secure boot verification must pass. For (2) not. So if you try to use direct kernel boot with secure boot enabled OVMF will first try (1), which will fail, then go fallback to (2).
The reason for the failure is not only the patching, but also the fact that the linux kernel is typically verified by shim.efi (and the distro keys compiled into the binary) instead of the firmware.
Going though (2) is not ideal for multiple reasons, so we need some strategy how we'll go handle direct kernel load with uefi and secure boot in a way that (1) works.
Options I see:
(a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
(b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
(c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi in some new
fw_cfgfile.(b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue. The options I see here are:
(A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom. Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway. It doesn't look that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all information needed ...
(B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the guest can choose what it needs.
(C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim switch and skip patching in case it is present.
Quoted 6 lines
(D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
Comments? Other/better ideas?
take care,
Gerd
So if you didn't decide whether to do b or c then I guess D is easiest and covers both cases?
Signature · 1 line
MST
Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)
Quoted 77 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 76 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
Quoted 11 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 10 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot verification.
Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
Um we kind of care about Linux ;)
What's the plan? I suspect we should just add a command line flag to skip patching? And once we do that, it seems safer to just always rely on the flag?
Well, there are more problems to solve here than just the patching. So lets have a look at the bigger picture before discussion the details ...
[ Cc'ing Daniel + Cole ]
Current state of affairs is that OVMF supports two ways to boot a linux kernel:
(1) Just load it as EFI binary and boot via linux kernel EFI stub, which is the modern way to load a linux kernel (which is why you can boot not only linux kernels but any efi binary).
(2) Use the old EFI handover protocol. Which is the RHEL-6 era way to boot a linux kernel on EFI.
For method (1) secure boot verification must pass. For (2) not. So if you try to use direct kernel boot with secure boot enabled OVMF will first try (1), which will fail, then go fallback to (2).
The reason for the failure is not only the patching, but also the fact that the linux kernel is typically verified by shim.efi (and the distro keys compiled into the binary) instead of the firmware.
Going though (2) is not ideal for multiple reasons, so we need some strategy how we'll go handle direct kernel load with uefi and secure boot in a way that (1) works.
Options I see:
(a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
(b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
(c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi in some new
fw_cfgfile.(b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue. The options I see here are:
(A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom. Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway. It doesn't look that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all information needed ...
(B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the guest can choose what it needs.
(C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim switch and skip patching in case it is present.
(D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Comments? Other/better ideas?
take care,
GerdSo if you didn't decide whether to do b or c then I guess D is easiest and covers both cases?
Easiest if you look at qemu only. Adding a new config option adds burdens elsewhere though. Users and the management stack have to learn to use the new option.
Both (A) and (B) work automatically and can be combined with both (b) and (c). (B) is probably much easier to implement, drawback is it requires an firmware update too.
take care,
Gerd
Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 28 lines
Options I see:
(a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
(b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
(c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi in some new
fw_cfgfile.(b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue. The options I see here are:
(A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom. Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway. It doesn't look that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all information needed ...
(B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the guest can choose what it needs.
(C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim switch and skip patching in case it is present.
(D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Comments? Other/better ideas?
take care,
GerdSo if you didn't decide whether to do b or c then I guess D is easiest and covers both cases?
Quoted 7 lines
Easiest if you look at qemu only. Adding a new config option adds burdens elsewhere though. Users and the management stack have to learn to use the new option.
Both (A) and (B) work automatically and can be combined with both (b) and (c). (B) is probably much easier to implement, drawback is it requires an firmware update too.
Sneak preview for (c) + (B) is here:
https://git.kraxel.org/cgit/qemu/log/?h=sirius/direct-secure-boot
(well, almost, instead of unpatched setup header it exposes an unpatched kernel binary).
Currently looking at the ovmf side of things to make sure the idea actually works before posting patches to the list.
take care,
Gerd
Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)
In reply to Gerd HoffmannQuoted 53 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
Quoted 11 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 10 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
If the binary loaded via -kernel is *not* a linux kernel (in which case protocol == 0), do not patch the linux kernel header fields.
It's (a) pointless and (b) might break binaries by random patching and (c) changes the binary hash which in turn breaks secure boot verification.
Background: OVMF happily loads and runs not only linux kernels but any efi binary via direct kernel boot.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Note: Breaking the secure boot verification is a problem for linux kernels too, but fixed that is left for another day ...
Um we kind of care about Linux ;)
What's the plan? I suspect we should just add a command line flag to skip patching? And once we do that, it seems safer to just always rely on the flag?
Well, there are more problems to solve here than just the patching. So lets have a look at the bigger picture before discussion the details ...
[ Cc'ing Daniel + Cole ]
Current state of affairs is that OVMF supports two ways to boot a linux kernel:
(1) Just load it as EFI binary and boot via linux kernel EFI stub, which is the modern way to load a linux kernel (which is why you can boot not only linux kernels but any efi binary).
(2) Use the old EFI handover protocol. Which is the RHEL-6 era way to boot a linux kernel on EFI.
For method (1) secure boot verification must pass. For (2) not. So if you try to use direct kernel boot with secure boot enabled OVMF will first try (1), which will fail, then go fallback to (2).
The reason for the failure is not only the patching, but also the fact that the linux kernel is typically verified by shim.efi (and the distro keys compiled into the binary) instead of the firmware.
Going though (2) is not ideal for multiple reasons, so we need some strategy how we'll go handle direct kernel load with uefi and secure boot in a way that (1) works.
Options I see:
(a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
Quoted 6 lines
(b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
(c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi in some new
fw_cfgfile.
The problem with this is that now virt-install has to actually find the correct a shim.efi binary. It is already somewhat hard to find a suitable kerenl+initrd binary, and AFAIK, the places where we get these binaries don't have shim.efi alongside.
eg for RHEL/Fedora we grab kernel+initrd from the pxeboot dir:
This same problem with affect both options (a) and (c).
In various forums we have discussed adding the secureboot certs to the libosinfo database, so that we can have a customized EFI varstore with minimized certs, even for the ISO / HDD boot scenario. If we do that, then (b) is trivial for direct kernel boot too. (b) kills all birds with the same stone :-)
Quoted 12 lines
(b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue. The options I see here are:
(A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom. Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway. It doesn't look that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all information needed ...
(B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the guest can choose what it needs.
Quoted 6 lines
(C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim switch and skip patching in case it is present.
(D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
Comments? Other/better ideas?
I guess (b) + (D) is probably my preference.
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)
Hi,
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Options I see:
(a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
(b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
(c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi in some new
fw_cfgfile.
Quoted 8 lines
The problem with this is that now virt-install has to actually find the correct a shim.efi binary. It is already somewhat hard to find a suitable kerenl+initrd binary, and AFAIK, the places where we get these binaries don't have shim.efi alongside.
eg for RHEL/Fedora we grab kernel+initrd from the pxeboot dir:
Quoted 4 lines
In various forums we have discussed adding the secureboot certs to the libosinfo database, so that we can have a customized EFI varstore with minimized certs, even for the ISO / HDD boot scenario.
Well. It's not that easy unfortunately. At least the "minimized certs" part. shim often is signed with the microsoft keys only, so you can't drop that without rendering the install.iso unbootable.
Only adding the distro certs without removing the microsoft certs works of course.
Quoted 1 line
If we do that, then (b) is trivial for direct kernel boot too.
Yep.
Quoted 1 line
(b) kills all birds with the same stone :-)
See above. I'd love this being true but it is not.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
(b) + (c) both require a fix for the patching issue. The options I see here are:
(A) Move the patching from qemu to the linuxboot option rom. Strictly speaking it belongs there anyway. It doesn't look that easy though, for qemu it is easier to gather all information needed ...
(B) Provide both patched and unpatched setup header, so the guest can choose what it needs.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
(C) When implementing (c) above we can piggyback on the -shim switch and skip patching in case it is present.
(D) Add a flag to skip the patching.
Comments? Other/better ideas?
I guess (b) + (D) is probably my preference.
I prefer (B) over (D) because that doesn't require a new config option (which probably needs support in libvirt and possibly higher up in the management stack too ...).
Patch series implementing (B) and the -shim switch:
https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/
Using -shim is optional, so it's up to virt-install whenever it wants go for (b) or (c).
take care,
Gerd
Re: secure boot & direct kernel load (was: Re: [PATCH] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels)
Quoted 30 lines · Gerd Hoffmann
Hi,
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Options I see:
(a) Stop using direct kernel boot, let virt-install & other tools create vfat boot media with shim+kernel+initrd instead.
(b) Enroll the distro signing keys in the efi variable store, so booting the kernel without shim.efi works.
(c) Add support for loading shim to qemu (and ovmf), for example with a new '-shim' command line option which stores shim.efi in some new
fw_cfgfile.Quoted 8 lines
The problem with this is that now virt-install has to actually find the correct a shim.efi binary. It is already somewhat hard to find a suitable kerenl+initrd binary, and AFAIK, the places where we get these binaries don't have shim.efi alongside.
eg for RHEL/Fedora we grab kernel+initrd from the pxeboot dir:
Quoted 4 lines
In various forums we have discussed adding the secureboot certs to the libosinfo database, so that we can have a customized EFI varstore with minimized certs, even for the ISO / HDD boot scenario.
Quoted 6 lines
Well. It's not that easy unfortunately. At least the "minimized certs" part. shim often is signed with the microsoft keys only, so you can't drop that without rendering the install.iso unbootable.
Only adding the distro certs without removing the microsoft certs works of course.
In that scenario libosinfo would report that the given OS requires both the microsoft & $distro certs to be enrolled.
Only if shim were signed by the $distro certs, would libosifo omit reporting the microsoft certs.
Basically libosinfo would have to report whatever set of 'n' certs are required to make boot work.
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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