6.1.87-rc1 review
Subsystems (2)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 6.1.87-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 6.1.87-rc1
Fudongwang <[email protected]>
drm/amd/display: fix disable otg wa logic in DCN316
Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: always force full reset for SOC21
Lijo Lazar <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: Reset dGPU if suspend got aborted
Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
drm/i915: Disable port sync when bigjoiner is used
Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
drm/i915/cdclk: Fix CDCLK programming order when pipes are active
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA
Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr'
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation
Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Fix return type of spectre_bhi_state()
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
irqflags: Explicitly ignore lockdep_hrtimer_exit() argument
Adam Dunlap <[email protected]>
x86/apic: Force native_apic_mem_read() to use the MOV instruction
John Stultz <[email protected]>
selftests: timers: Fix abs() warning in posix_timers test
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n
Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
perf/x86: Fix out of range data
Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
vhost: Add smp_rmb() in vhost_enable_notify()
Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
vhost: Add smp_rmb() in vhost_vq_avail_empty()
Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
drm/client: Fully protect modes[] with dev->mode_config.mutex
Jammy Huang <[email protected]>
drm/ast: Fix soft lockup
Harish Kasiviswanathan <[email protected]>
drm/amdkfd: Reset GPU on queue preemption failure
Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
drm/i915/vrr: Disable VRR when using bigjoiner
Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>
kprobes: Fix possible use-after-free issue on kprobe registration
Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
io_uring/net: restore msg_control on sendzc retry
Boris Burkov <[email protected]>
btrfs: qgroup: convert PREALLOC to PERTRANS after record_root_in_trans
Boris Burkov <[email protected]>
btrfs: record delayed inode root in transaction
Boris Burkov <[email protected]>
btrfs: qgroup: correctly model root qgroup rsv in convert
Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Allocate local memory for page request queue
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
tracing: hide unused ftrace_event_id_fops
David Arinzon <[email protected]>
net: ena: Fix incorrect descriptor free behavior
David Arinzon <[email protected]>
net: ena: Wrong missing IO completions check order
David Arinzon <[email protected]>
net: ena: Fix potential sign extension issue
Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
af_unix: Do not use atomic ops for unix_sk(sk)->inflight.
Arınç ÜNAL <[email protected]>
net: dsa: mt7530: trap link-local frames regardless of ST Port State
Daniel Machon <[email protected]>
net: sparx5: fix wrong config being used when reconfiguring PCS
Carolina Jubran <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: HTB, Fix inconsistencies with QoS SQs number
Carolina Jubran <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: Fix mlx5e_priv_init() cleanup flow
Cosmin Ratiu <[email protected]>
net/mlx5: Properly link new fs rules into the tree
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
netfilter: complete validation of user input
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: SCO: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
ipv6: fix race condition between ipv6_get_ifaddr and ipv6_del_addr
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
ipv4/route: avoid unused-but-set-variable warning
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
ipv6: fib: hide unused 'pn' variable
Geetha sowjanya <[email protected]>
octeontx2-af: Fix NIX SQ mode and BP config
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
af_unix: Clear stale u->oob_skb.
Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
net: ks8851: Handle softirqs at the end of IRQ thread to fix hang
Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
net: ks8851: Inline ks8851_rx_skb()
Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]>
bnxt_en: Reset PTP tx_avail after possible firmware reset
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
geneve: fix header validation in geneve[6]_xmit_skb
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING
Petr Tesarik <[email protected]>
u64_stats: fix u64_stats_init() for lockdep when used repeatedly in one file
Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
net: openvswitch: fix unwanted error log on timeout policy probing
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix off by one in qla_edif_app_getstats()
Xiang Chen <[email protected]>
scsi: hisi_sas: Modify the deadline for ata_wait_after_reset()
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
nouveau: fix function cast warning
Alex Constantino <[email protected]>
Revert "drm/qxl: simplify qxl_fence_wait"
Frank Li <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: imx8-ss-conn: fix usdhc wrong lpcg clock order
Nini Song <[email protected]>
media: cec: core: remove length check of Timer Status
Anna-Maria Behnsen <[email protected]>
PM: s2idle: Make sure CPUs will wakeup directly on resume
Tim Huang <[email protected]>
drm/amd/pm: fixes a random hang in S4 for SMU v13.0.4/11
Dmitry Antipov <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Fix memory leak in hci_req_sync_complete()
Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
ring-buffer: Only update pages_touched when a new page is touched
Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid infinite loop trying to resize local TT
Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_scsi_dev_rescan() error path
Steve French <[email protected]>
smb3: fix Open files on server counter going negative
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 22 +- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +- Makefile | 4 +- arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8-ss-conn.dtsi | 12 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 21 +- arch/x86/events/core.c | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 82 ++++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 48 ++--- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 9 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c | 27 ++- .../gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c | 1 + .../amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dcn316/dcn316_clk_mgr.c | 19 +- .../gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_4_ppt.c | 12 +- drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_dp.c | 3 + drivers/gpu/drm/drm_client_modeset.c | 3 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.c | 7 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.h | 3 + drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_ddi.c | 5 + drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vrr.c | 7 + .../gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowof.c | 7 +- drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_release.c | 50 ++++- drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 2 +- drivers/media/cec/core/cec-adap.c | 14 -- drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h | 5 + drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_com.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c | 35 ++-- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 2 + .../net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_nix.c | 22 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/qos.c | 33 +-- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/selq.c | 2 + drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 2 - drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c | 3 +- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h | 3 - drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c | 16 +- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c | 11 - drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c | 11 - .../net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_port.c | 4 +- drivers/net/geneve.c | 4 +- drivers/scsi/hisi_sas/hisi_sas_main.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_edif.c | 2 +- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 28 ++- fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c | 3 + fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 2 + fs/btrfs/transaction.c | 17 +- fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c | 4 +- include/linux/dma-fence.h | 7 + include/linux/irqflags.h | 2 +- include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h | 9 +- include/net/addrconf.h | 4 + include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 9 + include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 33 +++ io_uring/net.c | 1 + kernel/cpu.c | 3 +- kernel/kprobes.c | 18 +- kernel/power/suspend.c | 6 + kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 6 +- kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 4 + net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 2 +- net/bluetooth/hci_request.c | 4 +- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 52 ++--- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 23 +-- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 + net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 4 + net/ipv4/route.c | 4 +- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 7 +- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 7 +- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 + net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 5 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 8 +- net/unix/garbage.c | 35 +++- net/unix/scm.c | 8 +- net/xdp/xsk.c | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c | 2 +- 77 files changed, 715 insertions(+), 382 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/69 smb3: fix Open files on server counter going negative
6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steve French <[email protected]>
commit 28e0947651ce6a2200b9a7eceb93282e97d7e51a upstream.
We were decrementing the count of open files on server twice for the case where we were closing cached directories.
--- fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c +2 -2
@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ smb2_close_cached_fid(struct kref *ref)if (cfid->is_open) { rc =SMB2_close (0 , cfid->tcon, cfid->fid.persistent_fid, cfid->fid.volatile_fid); -if (rc != -EBUSY && rc != -EAGAIN ) -atomic_dec (&cfid->tcon->num_remote_opens); +if (rc)/* should we retry on -EBUSY or -EAGAIN? */ +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"close cached dir rc %d\n" , rc); }free_cached_dir (cfid);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/69 ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_scsi_dev_rescan() error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
commit 79336504781e7fee5ddaf046dcc186c8dfdf60b1 upstream.
Commit 0c76106cb975 ("scsi: sd: Fix TCG OPAL unlock on system resume") incorrectly handles failures of scsi_resume_device() in ata_scsi_dev_rescan(), leading to a double call to spin_unlock_irqrestore() to unlock a device port. Fix this by redefining the goto labels used in case of errors and only unlock the port scsi_scan_mutex when scsi_resume_device() fails.
Bug found with the Smatch static checker warning:
drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c:4774 ata_scsi_dev_rescan() error: double unlocked 'ap->lock' (orig line 4757)
--- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +5 -4
@@ -4667,7 +4667,7 @@ void ata_scsi_dev_rescan(struct work_str* bail out. */ if (ap->pflags &ATA_PFLAG_SUSPENDED ) - goto unlock; + goto unlock_ap;if (!sdev)continue ;
@@ -4680,7 +4680,7 @@ void ata_scsi_dev_rescan(struct work_strif (do_resume) { ret =scsi_resume_device (sdev);if (ret == -EWOULDBLOCK ) - goto unlock; + goto unlock_scan; dev->flags &= ~ATA_DFLAG_RESUMING ; } ret =scsi_rescan_device (sdev);
@@ -4688,12 +4688,13 @@ void ata_scsi_dev_rescan(struct work_strspin_lock_irqsave (ap->lock, flags);if (ret) - goto unlock; + goto unlock_ap; } } -unlock: +unlock_ap:spin_unlock_irqrestore (ap->lock, flags); +unlock_scan:mutex_unlock (&ap->scsi_scan_mutex);/* Reschedule with a delay if scsi_rescan_device() returned an error */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/69 batman-adv: Avoid infinite loop trying to resize local TT
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
commit b1f532a3b1e6d2e5559c7ace49322922637a28aa upstream.
If the MTU of one of an attached interface becomes too small to transmit the local translation table then it must be resized to fit inside all fragments (when enabled) or a single packet.
But if the MTU becomes too low to transmit even the header + the VLAN specific part then the resizing of the local TT will never succeed. This can for example happen when the usable space is 110 bytes and 11 VLANs are on top of batman-adv. In this case, at least 116 byte would be needed. There will just be an endless spam of
batman_adv: batadv0: Forced to purge local tt entries to fit new maximum fragment MTU (110)
in the log but the function will never finish. Problem here is that the timeout will be halved all the time and will then stagnate at 0 and therefore never be able to reduce the table even more.
There are other scenarios possible with a similar result. The number of BATADV_TT_CLIENT_NOPURGE entries in the local TT can for example be too high to fit inside a packet. Such a scenario can therefore happen also with only a single VLAN + 7 non-purgable addresses - requiring at least 120 bytes.
While this should be handled proactively when:
* interface with too low MTU is added
* VLAN is added
* non-purgeable local mac is added
* MTU of an attached interface is reduced
* fragmentation setting gets disabled (which most likely requires dropping attached interfaces)
not all of these scenarios can be prevented because batman-adv is only consuming events without the the possibility to prevent these actions (non-purgable MAC address added, MTU of an attached interface is reduced). It is therefore necessary to also make sure that the code is able to handle also the situations when there were already incompatible system configuration are present.
--- net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/batman-adv/translation-table.c +1 -1
@@ -3948,7 +3948,7 @@ void batadv_tt_local_resize_to_mtu(strucspin_lock_bh (&bat_priv->tt.commit_lock); -while (true) { +while (timeout) { table_size =batadv_tt_local_table_transmit_size (bat_priv);if (packet_size_max >= table_size)break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/69 ring-buffer: Only update pages_touched when a new page is touched
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
commit ffe3986fece696cf65e0ef99e74c75f848be8e30 upstream.
The "buffer_percent" logic that is used by the ring buffer splice code to only wake up the tasks when there's no data after the buffer is filled to the percentage of the "buffer_percent" file is dependent on three variables that determine the amount of data that is in the ring buffer:
1) pages_read - incremented whenever a new sub-buffer is consumed
2) pages_lost - incremented every time a writer overwrites a sub-buffer
3) pages_touched - incremented when a write goes to a new sub-buffer
The percentage is the calculation of:
(pages_touched - (pages_lost + pages_read)) / nr_pages
Basically, the amount of data is the total number of sub-bufs that have been touched, minus the number of sub-bufs lost and sub-bufs consumed. This is divided by the total count to give the buffer percentage. When the percentage is greater than the value in the "buffer_percent" file, it wakes up splice readers waiting for that amount.
It was observed that over time, the amount read from the splice was constantly decreasing the longer the trace was running. That is, if one asked for 60%, it would read over 60% when it first starts tracing, but then it would be woken up at under 60% and would slowly decrease the amount of data read after being woken up, where the amount becomes much less than the buffer percent.
This was due to an accounting of the pages_touched incrementation. This value is incremented whenever a writer transfers to a new sub-buffer. But the place where it was incremented was incorrect. If a writer overflowed the current sub-buffer it would go to the next one. If it gets preempted by an interrupt at that time, and the interrupt performs a trace, it too will end up going to the next sub-buffer. But only one should increment the counter. Unfortunately, that was not the case.
Change the cmpxchg() that does the real switch of the tail-page into a try_cmpxchg(), and on success, perform the increment of pages_touched. This will only increment the counter once for when the writer moves to a new sub-buffer, and not when there's a race and is incremented for when a writer and its preempting writer both move to the same new sub-buffer.
--- kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c +3 -3
@@ -1543,7 +1543,6 @@ static void rb_tail_page_update(struct r old_write =local_add_return (RB_WRITE_INTCNT , &next_page->write); old_entries =local_add_return (RB_WRITE_INTCNT , &next_page->entries); -local_inc (&cpu_buffer->pages_touched);/* * Just make sure we have seen our old_write and synchronize * with any interrupts that come in.
@@ -1580,8 +1579,9 @@ static void rb_tail_page_update(struct r*/ local_set (&next_page->page->commit,0 ); -/* Again, either we update tail_page or an interrupt does */ - (void )cmpxchg (&cpu_buffer->tail_page, tail_page, next_page); +/* Either we update tail_page or an interrupt does */ +if (try_cmpxchg (&cpu_buffer->tail_page, &tail_page, next_page)) +local_inc (&cpu_buffer->pages_touched); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/69 Bluetooth: Fix memory leak in hci_req_sync_complete()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Antipov <[email protected]>
commit 45d355a926ab40f3ae7bc0b0a00cb0e3e8a5a810 upstream.
In 'hci_req_sync_complete()', always free the previous sync request state before assigning reference to a new one.
--- net/bluetooth/hci_request.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_request.c +3 -1
@@ -105,8 +105,10 @@ void hci_req_sync_complete(struct hci_deif (hdev->req_status ==HCI_REQ_PEND ) { hdev->req_result = result; hdev->req_status =HCI_REQ_DONE ; -if (skb) +if (skb) { +kfree_skb (hdev->req_skb); hdev->req_skb =skb_get (skb); + }wake_up_interruptible (&hdev->req_wait_q); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/69 drm/amd/pm: fixes a random hang in S4 for SMU v13.0.4/11
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tim Huang <[email protected]>
commit 31729e8c21ecfd671458e02b6511eb68c2225113 upstream.
While doing multiple S4 stress tests, GC/RLC/PMFW get into an invalid state resulting into hard hangs.
Adding a GFX reset as workaround just before sending the MP1_UNLOAD message avoids this failure.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_4_ppt.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_4_ppt.c +11 -1
@@ -222,8 +222,18 @@ static int smu_v13_0_4_system_features_cstruct amdgpu_device *adev = smu->adev;int ret =0 ; -if (!en && !adev->in_s0ix) +if (!en && !adev->in_s0ix) { +/* Adds a GFX reset as workaround just before sending the +* MP1_UNLOAD message to prevent GC/RLC/PMFW from entering +* an invalid state. +*/ + ret =smu_cmn_send_smc_msg_with_param (smu, SMU_MSG_GfxDeviceDriverReset, +SMU_RESET_MODE_2 ,NULL ); +if (ret) +return ret; + ret =smu_cmn_send_smc_msg (smu, SMU_MSG_PrepareMp1ForUnload,NULL ); + }return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/69 PM: s2idle: Make sure CPUs will wakeup directly on resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anna-Maria Behnsen <[email protected]>
commit 3c89a068bfd0698a5478f4cf39493595ef757d5e upstream.
s2idle works like a regular suspend with freezing processes and freezing devices. All CPUs except the control CPU go into idle. Once this is completed the control CPU kicks all other CPUs out of idle, so that they reenter the idle loop and then enter s2idle state. The control CPU then issues an swait() on the suspend state and therefore enters the idle loop as well.
Due to being kicked out of idle, the other CPUs leave their NOHZ states, which means the tick is active and the corresponding hrtimer is programmed to the next jiffie.
On entering s2idle the CPUs shut down their local clockevent device to prevent wakeups. The last CPU which enters s2idle shuts down its local clockevent and freezes timekeeping.
On resume, one of the CPUs receives the wakeup interrupt, unfreezes timekeeping and its local clockevent and starts the resume process. At that point all other CPUs are still in s2idle with their clockevents switched off. They only resume when they are kicked by another CPU or after resuming devices and then receiving a device interrupt.
That means there is no guarantee that all CPUs will wakeup directly on resume. As a consequence there is no guarantee that timers which are queued on those CPUs and should expire directly after resume, are handled. Also timer list timers which are remotely queued to one of those CPUs after resume will not result in a reprogramming IPI as the tick is active. Queueing a hrtimer will also not result in a reprogramming IPI because the first hrtimer event is already in the past.
The recent introduction of the timer pull model (7ee988770326 ("timers:
Implement the hierarchical pull model")) amplifies this problem, if the current migrator is one of the non woken up CPUs. When a non pinned timer list timer is queued and the queuing CPU goes idle, it relies on the still suspended migrator CPU to expire the timer which will happen by chance.
The problem exists since commit 8d89835b0467 ("PM: suspend: Do not pause cpuidle in the suspend-to-idle path"). There the cpuidle_pause() call which in turn invoked a wakeup for all idle CPUs was moved to a later point in the resume process. This might not be reached or reached very late because it waits on a timer of a still suspended CPU.
Address this by kicking all CPUs out of idle after the control CPU returns from swait() so that they resume their timers and restore consistent system state.
--- kernel/power/suspend.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
kernel/power/suspend.c +6 -0
@@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ static void s2idle_enter(void)swait_event_exclusive (s2idle_wait_head, s2idle_state ==S2IDLE_STATE_WAKE ); +/* +* Kick all CPUs to ensure that they resume their timers and restore +* consistent system state. +*/ +wake_up_all_idle_cpus (); +cpus_read_unlock ();raw_spin_lock_irq (&s2idle_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/69 media: cec: core: remove length check of Timer Status
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nini Song <[email protected]>
commit ce5d241c3ad4568c12842168288993234345c0eb upstream.
The valid_la is used to check the length requirements, including special cases of Timer Status. If the length is shorter than 5, that means no Duration Available is returned, the message will be forced to be invalid.
However, the description of Duration Available in the spec is that this parameter may be returned when these cases, or that it can be optionally return when these cases. The key words in the spec description are flexible choices.
Remove the special length check of Timer Status to fit the spec which is not compulsory about that.
--- drivers/media/cec/core/cec-adap.c | 14 -------------- 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-)
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-adap.c +0 -14
@@ -1121,20 +1121,6 @@ void cec_received_msg_ts(struct cec_adapif (valid_la && min_len) {/* These messages have special length requirements */ switch (cmd) { -case CEC_MSG_TIMER_STATUS : -if (msg->msg[2 ] &0x10 ) { -switch (msg->msg[2 ] &0xf ) { -case CEC_OP_PROG_INFO_NOT_ENOUGH_SPACE : -case CEC_OP_PROG_INFO_MIGHT_NOT_BE_ENOUGH_SPACE : -if (msg->len <5 ) - valid_la = false; -break ; - } - }else if ((msg->msg[2 ] &0xf ) ==CEC_OP_PROG_ERROR_DUPLICATE ) { -if (msg->len <5 ) - valid_la = false; - } -break ;case CEC_MSG_RECORD_ON :switch (msg->msg[2 ]) {case CEC_OP_RECORD_SRC_OWN :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/69 arm64: dts: imx8-ss-conn: fix usdhc wrong lpcg clock order
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Frank Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c6ddd6e7b166532a0816825442ff60f70aed9647 ]
The actual clock show wrong frequency:
echo on >/sys/devices/platform/bus\@5b000000/5b010000.mmc/power/control cat /sys/kernel/debug/mmc0/ios
clock: 200000000 Hz
actual clock: 166000000 Hz
^^^^^^^^^
.....
According to
sdhc0_lpcg: clock-controller@5b200000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8qxp-lpcg";
reg = <0x5b200000 0x10000>;
#clock-cells = <1>;
clocks = <&clk IMX_SC_R_SDHC_0 IMX_SC_PM_CLK_PER>,
<&conn_ipg_clk>, <&conn_axi_clk>;
clock-indices = <IMX_LPCG_CLK_0>, <IMX_LPCG_CLK_4>,
<IMX_LPCG_CLK_5>;
clock-output-names = "sdhc0_lpcg_per_clk",
"sdhc0_lpcg_ipg_clk",
"sdhc0_lpcg_ahb_clk";
power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_SDHC_0>;
}"per_clk" should be IMX_LPCG_CLK_0 instead of IMX_LPCG_CLK_5.
After correct clocks order:
echo on >/sys/devices/platform/bus\@5b000000/5b010000.mmc/power/control cat /sys/kernel/debug/mmc0/ios
clock: 200000000 Hz
actual clock: 198000000 Hz
^^^^^^^^
...
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8-ss-conn.dtsi | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8-ss-conn.dtsi +6 -6
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ usdhc1: mmc@5b010000 { interrupts = <GIC_SPI 232 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; reg = <0x5b010000 0x10000>; clocks = <&sdhc0_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_4>, - <&sdhc0_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_0>, - <&sdhc0_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_5>; + <&sdhc0_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_5>, + <&sdhc0_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_0>; clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per"; power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_SDHC_0>; status = "disabled";
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ usdhc2: mmc@5b020000 { interrupts = <GIC_SPI 233 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; reg = <0x5b020000 0x10000>; clocks = <&sdhc1_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_4>, - <&sdhc1_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_0>, - <&sdhc1_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_5>; + <&sdhc1_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_5>, + <&sdhc1_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_0>; clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per"; power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_SDHC_1>; fsl,tuning-start-tap = <20>;
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ usdhc3: mmc@5b030000 { interrupts = <GIC_SPI 234 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; reg = <0x5b030000 0x10000>; clocks = <&sdhc2_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_4>, - <&sdhc2_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_0>, - <&sdhc2_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_5>; + <&sdhc2_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_5>, + <&sdhc2_lpcg IMX_LPCG_CLK_0>; clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per"; power-domains = <&pd IMX_SC_R_SDHC_2>; status = "disabled";
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/69 Revert "drm/qxl: simplify qxl_fence_wait"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Constantino <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 07ed11afb68d94eadd4ffc082b97c2331307c5ea ]
This reverts commit 5a838e5d5825c85556011478abde708251cc0776.
Changes from commit 5a838e5d5825 ("drm/qxl: simplify qxl_fence_wait") would result in a '[TTM] Buffer eviction failed' exception whenever it reached a timeout.
Due to a dependency to DMA_FENCE_WARN this also restores some code deleted by commit d72277b6c37d ("dma-buf: nuke DMA_FENCE_TRACE macros v2").
--- drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_release.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/dma-fence.h | 7 +++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/qxl_release.c +45 -5
@@ -58,16 +58,56 @@ static long qxl_fence_wait(struct dma_fence *fence, bool intr, signed long timeout) {struct qxl_device *qdev; +struct qxl_release *release; +int count =0 , sc =0 ; +bool have_drawable_releases;unsigned long cur, end = jiffies + timeout; qdev = container_of(fence->lock, struct qxl_device, release_lock); + release = container_of(fence, struct qxl_release, base); + have_drawable_releases = release->type ==QXL_RELEASE_DRAWABLE ; -if (!wait_event_timeout (qdev->release_event, - (dma_fence_is_signaled (fence) || - (qxl_io_notify_oom (qdev),0 )), - timeout)) -return 0 ; +retry: + sc++; + +if (dma_fence_is_signaled (fence)) + goto signaled; + +qxl_io_notify_oom (qdev); + +for (count =0 ; count <11 ; count++) { +if (!qxl_queue_garbage_collect (qdev, true)) +break ; + +if (dma_fence_is_signaled (fence)) + goto signaled; + } + +if (dma_fence_is_signaled (fence)) + goto signaled; + +if (have_drawable_releases || sc <4 ) { +if (sc >2 ) +/* back off */ +usleep_range (500 ,1000 ); + +if (time_after (jiffies, end)) +return 0 ; + +if (have_drawable_releases && sc >300 ) { +DMA_FENCE_WARN (fence, +"failed to wait on release %llu after spincount %d\n" , + fence->context & ~0xf0000000 , sc); + goto signaled; + } + goto retry; + } +/* +* yeah, original sync_obj_wait gave up after 3 spins when +* have_drawable_releases is not set. +*/ +signaled: cur = jiffies;if (time_after (cur, end))return 0 ;
include/linux/dma-fence.h +7 -0
@@ -659,4 +659,11 @@ static inline bool dma_fence_is_container(struct dma_fence *fence)return dma_fence_is_array (fence) ||dma_fence_is_chain (fence); } +#define DMA_FENCE_WARN(f, fmt, args...) \ + do { \ + struct dma_fence *__ff = (f); \ + pr_warn("f %llu#%llu: " fmt, __ff->context, __ff->seqno,\ + ##args); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* __LINUX_DMA_FENCE_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/69 nouveau: fix function cast warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 185fdb4697cc9684a02f2fab0530ecdd0c2f15d4 ]
Calling a function through an incompatible pointer type causes breaks kcfi, so clang warns about the assignment:
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowof.c:73:10: error: cast from 'void (*)(const void *)' to 'void (*)(void *)' converts to incompatible function type [-Werror,-Wcast-function-type-strict]
73 | .fini = (void(*)(void *))kfree,
Avoid this with a trivial wrapper.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowof.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/bios/shadowof.c +6 -1
@@ -66,11 +66,16 @@ of_init(struct nvkm_bios *bios, const char *name)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } +static void of_fini (void *p) +{ +kfree (p); +} +const struct nvbios_source nvbios_of = { .name ="OpenFirmware" , .init = of_init, - .fini = (void (*)(void *))kfree, + .fini = of_fini, .read = of_read, .size = of_size, .rw = false,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/69 scsi: hisi_sas: Modify the deadline for ata_wait_after_reset()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiang Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0098c55e0881f0b32591f2110410d5c8b7f9bd5a ]
We found that the second parameter of function ata_wait_after_reset() is incorrectly used. We call smp_ata_check_ready_type() to poll the device type until the 30s timeout, so the correct deadline should be (jiffies + 30000).
--- drivers/scsi/hisi_sas/hisi_sas_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/hisi_sas/hisi_sas_main.c +1 -1
@@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ static int hisi_sas_debug_I_T_nexus_reset(struct domain_device *device)if (dev_is_sata (device)) {struct ata_link *link = &device->sata_dev.ap->link; - rc =ata_wait_after_reset (link,HISI_SAS_WAIT_PHYUP_TIMEOUT , + rc =ata_wait_after_reset (link, jiffies +HISI_SAS_WAIT_PHYUP_TIMEOUT , smp_ata_check_ready_type); }else {msleep (2000 );
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/69 scsi: qla2xxx: Fix off by one in qla_edif_app_getstats()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4406e4176f47177f5e51b4cc7e6a7a2ff3dbfbbd ]
The app_reply->elem[] array is allocated earlier in this function and it has app_req.num_ports elements. Thus this > comparison needs to be >= to prevent memory corruption.
--- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_edif.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_edif.c +1 -1
@@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ qla_edif_app_getstats(scsi_qla_host_t *vha, struct bsg_job *bsg_job)list_for_each_entry_safe (fcport, tf, &vha->vp_fcports, list) {if (fcport->edif.enable) { -if (pcnt > app_req.num_ports) +if (pcnt >= app_req.num_ports)break ; app_reply->elem[pcnt].rekey_count =
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/69 net: openvswitch: fix unwanted error log on timeout policy probing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4539f91f2a801c0c028c252bffae56030cfb2cae ]
On startup, ovs-vswitchd probes different datapath features including support for timeout policies. While probing, it tries to execute certain operations with OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PROBE or OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE attributes set. These attributes tell the openvswitch module to not log any errors when they occur as it is expected that some of the probes will fail.
For some reason, setting the timeout policy ignores the PROBE attribute and logs a failure anyway. This is causing the following kernel log on each re-start of ovs-vswitchd:
kernel: Failed to associated timeout policy `ovs_test_tp'
Fix that by using the same logging macro that all other messages are using. The message will still be printed at info level when needed and will be rate limited, but with a net rate limiter instead of generic printk one.
The nf_ct_set_timeout() itself will still print some info messages, but at least this change makes logging in openvswitch module more consistent.
--- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +3 -2
@@ -1711,8 +1711,9 @@ int ovs_ct_copy_action(struct net *net, const struct nlattr *attr,if (ct_info.timeout[0 ]) {if (nf_ct_set_timeout (net, ct_info.ct, family, key->ip.proto, ct_info.timeout)) -pr_info_ratelimited ("Failed to associated timeout " -"policy `%s'\n" , ct_info.timeout); +OVS_NLERR (log, +"Failed to associated timeout policy '%s'" , + ct_info.timeout);else ct_info.nf_ct_timeout =rcu_dereference (nf_ct_timeout_find (ct_info.ct)->timeout);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/69 u64_stats: fix u64_stats_init() for lockdep when used repeatedly in one file
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Petr Tesarik <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 38a15d0a50e0a43778561a5861403851f0b0194c ]
Fix bogus lockdep warnings if multiple u64_stats_sync variables are initialized in the same file.
With CONFIG_LOCKDEP, seqcount_init() is a macro which declares:
static struct lock_class_key __key;
Since u64_stats_init() is a function (albeit an inline one), all calls within the same file end up using the same instance, effectively treating them all as a single lock-class.
--- include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h +5 -4
@@ -135,10 +135,11 @@ static inline void u64_stats_inc(u64_stats_t *p) p->v++; } -static inline void u64_stats_init (struct u64_stats_sync *syncp) -{ -seqcount_init (&syncp->seq); -} +#define u64_stats_init (syncp) \ + do { \ + struct u64_stats_sync *__s = (syncp); \ + seqcount_init(&__s->seq); \ + } while (0)static inline void __u64_stats_update_begin (struct u64_stats_sync *syncp) {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/69 xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 237f3cf13b20db183d3706d997eedc3c49eacd44 ]
syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1]
Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549 CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08 </TASK> Allocated by task 7549: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
__alloc_pages+0x256/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4569
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2175
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2391
___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3525
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline]
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3965 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0x2db/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:3973
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline]
__vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:3197 [inline]
__vmalloc_node_range+0x5f9/0x14a0 mm/vmalloc.c:3392
__vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:3457 [inline]
vzalloc+0x79/0x90 mm/vmalloc.c:3530
bpf_check+0x260/0x19010 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:21162
bpf_prog_load+0x1667/0x20f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2895
__sys_bpf+0x4ee/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
page last free pid 6650 tgid 6647 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x95d/0xa80 mm/page_alloc.c:2346
free_unref_page_list+0x5a3/0x850 mm/page_alloc.c:2532
release_pages+0x2117/0x2400 mm/swap.c:1042
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0x34d/0x4e0 mm/mmu_gather.c:300
tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:392
exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3300
__mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1345
exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569
do_exit+0x99e/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:865
do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027
get_signal+0x176e/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2907
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc9/0x360 kernel/entry/common.c:212
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888028c6cc80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6cd00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 06 fc fc fc
>ffff888028c6cd80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc
^
ffff888028c6ce00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6ce80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc--- net/xdp/xsk.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/xdp/xsk.c +2 -0
@@ -1127,6 +1127,8 @@ static int xsk_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,struct xsk_queue **q;int entries; +if (optlen <sizeof (entries)) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_sockptr (&entries, optval,sizeof (entries)))return -EFAULT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/69 geneve: fix header validation in geneve[6]_xmit_skb
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d8a6213d70accb403b82924a1c229e733433a5ef ]
syzbot is able to trigger an uninit-value in geneve_xmit() [1]
Problem : While most ip tunnel helpers (like ip_tunnel_get_dsfield()) uses skb_protocol(skb, true), pskb_inet_may_pull() is only using skb->protocol.
If anything else than ETH_P_IPV6 or ETH_P_IP is found in skb->protocol, pskb_inet_may_pull() does nothing at all.
If a vlan tag was provided by the caller (af_packet in the syzbot case), the network header might not point to the correct location, and skb linear part could be smaller than expected.
Add skb_vlan_inet_prepare() to perform a complete mac validation.
Use this in geneve for the moment, I suspect we need to adopt this more broadly.
v4 - Jakub reported v3 broke l2_tos_ttl_inherit.sh selftest
- Only call __vlan_get_protocol() for vlan types.
v2,v3 - Addressed Sabrina comments on v1 and v2
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030 geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline] geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3547 __dev_queue_xmit+0x348d/0x52c0 net/core/dev.c:4335 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8bb0/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x722d/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 0 PID: 5033 Comm: syz-executor346 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-syzkaller-00005-g928a87efa423 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
--- drivers/net/geneve.c | 4 ++-- include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/geneve.c +2 -2
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static int geneve_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,__be16 sport;int err; -if (!pskb_inet_may_pull (skb)) +if (!skb_vlan_inet_prepare (skb))return -EINVAL ; sport =udp_flow_src_port (geneve->net, skb,1 ,USHRT_MAX , true);
@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ static int geneve6_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,__be16 sport;int err; -if (!pskb_inet_may_pull (skb)) +if (!skb_vlan_inet_prepare (skb))return -EINVAL ; sport =udp_flow_src_port (geneve->net, skb,1 ,USHRT_MAX , true);
include/net/ip_tunnels.h +33 -0
@@ -351,6 +351,39 @@ static inline bool pskb_inet_may_pull(struct sk_buff *skb)return pskb_network_may_pull (skb, nhlen); } +/* Variant of pskb_inet_may_pull(). +*/ +static inline bool skb_vlan_inet_prepare (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +int nhlen =0 , maclen =ETH_HLEN ; +__be16 type = skb->protocol; + +/* Essentially this is skb_protocol(skb, true) +* And we get MAC len. +*/ +if (eth_type_vlan (type)) + type =__vlan_get_protocol (skb, type, &maclen); + +switch (type) { +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) +case htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ): + nhlen =sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ); +break ; +#endif +case htons (ETH_P_IP ): + nhlen =sizeof (struct iphdr ); +break ; + } +/* For ETH_P_IPV6/ETH_P_IP we make sure to pull +* a base network header in skb->head. +*/ +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb, maclen + nhlen)) +return false; + +skb_set_network_header (skb, maclen); +return true; +} +static inline int ip_encap_hlen (struct ip_tunnel_encap *e) {const struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops *ops;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/69 bnxt_en: Reset PTP tx_avail after possible firmware reset
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit faa12ca245585379d612736a4b5e98e88481ea59 ]
It is possible that during error recovery and firmware reset, there is a pending TX PTP packet waiting for the timestamp. We need to reset this condition so that after recovery, the tx_avail count for PTP is reset back to the initial value. Otherwise, we may not accept any PTP TX timestamps after recovery.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +2 -0
@@ -10564,6 +10564,8 @@ static int __bnxt_open_nic(struct bnxt *bp, bool irq_re_init, bool link_re_init)/* VF-reps may need to be re-opened after the PF is re-opened */ if (BNXT_PF (bp))bnxt_vf_reps_open (bp); +if (bp->ptp_cfg) +atomic_set (&bp->ptp_cfg->tx_avail,BNXT_MAX_TX_TS );bnxt_ptp_init_rtc (bp, true);bnxt_ptp_cfg_tstamp_filters (bp);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/69 net: ks8851: Inline ks8851_rx_skb()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f96f700449b6d190e06272f1cf732ae8e45b73df ]
Both ks8851_rx_skb_par() and ks8851_rx_skb_spi() call netif_rx(skb), inline the netif_rx(skb) call directly into ks8851_common.c and drop the .rx_skb callback and ks8851_rx_skb() wrapper. This removes one indirect call from the driver, no functional change otherwise.
Stable-dep-of: be0384bf599c ("net: ks8851: Handle softirqs at the end of IRQ thread to fix hang")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h | 3 --- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c | 12 +----------- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c | 11 ----------- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c | 11 ----------- 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 36 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h +0 -3
@@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ union ks8851_tx_hdr {* @rdfifo: FIFO read callback * @wrfifo: FIFO write callback * @start_xmit: start_xmit() implementation callback -* @rx_skb: rx_skb() implementation callback * @flush_tx_work: flush_tx_work() implementation callback * * The @statelock is used to protect information in the structure which may
@@ -423,8 +422,6 @@ struct ks8851_net { struct sk_buff *txp, bool irq);netdev_tx_t (*start_xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev); -void (*rx_skb)(struct ks8851_net *ks, -struct sk_buff *skb);void (*flush_tx_work)(struct ks8851_net *ks); };
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c +1 -11
@@ -231,16 +231,6 @@ static void ks8851_dbg_dumpkkt(struct ks8851_net *ks, u8 *rxpkt) rxpkt[12], rxpkt[13], rxpkt[14], rxpkt[15]); } -/** -* ks8851_rx_skb - receive skbuff -* @ks: The device state. -* @skb: The skbuff -*/ -static void ks8851_rx_skb (struct ks8851_net *ks,struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - ks->rx_skb (ks, skb); -} -/** * ks8851_rx_pkts - receive packets from the host * @ks: The device information.
@@ -309,7 +299,7 @@ static void ks8851_rx_pkts(struct ks8851_net *ks)ks8851_dbg_dumpkkt (ks, rxpkt); skb->protocol =eth_type_trans (skb, ks->netdev); -ks8851_rx_skb (ks, skb); +netif_rx (skb); ks->netdev->stats.rx_packets++; ks->netdev->stats.rx_bytes += rxlen;
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c +0 -11
@@ -210,16 +210,6 @@ static void ks8851_wrfifo_par(struct ks8851_net *ks, struct sk_buff *txp,iowrite16_rep (ksp->hw_addr, txp->data, len /2 ); } -/** -* ks8851_rx_skb_par - receive skbuff -* @ks: The device state. -* @skb: The skbuff -*/ -static void ks8851_rx_skb_par (struct ks8851_net *ks,struct sk_buff *skb) -{ -netif_rx (skb); -} -static unsigned int ks8851_rdreg16_par_txqcr (struct ks8851_net *ks) {return ks8851_rdreg16_par (ks,KS_TXQCR );
@@ -298,7 +288,6 @@ static int ks8851_probe_par(struct platform_device *pdev) ks->rdfifo = ks8851_rdfifo_par; ks->wrfifo = ks8851_wrfifo_par; ks->start_xmit = ks8851_start_xmit_par; - ks->rx_skb = ks8851_rx_skb_par;#define STD_IRQ (IRQ_LCI |/* Link Change */ \ IRQ_RXI | /* RX done */ \
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c +0 -11
@@ -298,16 +298,6 @@ static unsigned int calc_txlen(unsigned int len)return ALIGN (len +4 ,4 ); } -/** -* ks8851_rx_skb_spi - receive skbuff -* @ks: The device state -* @skb: The skbuff -*/ -static void ks8851_rx_skb_spi (struct ks8851_net *ks,struct sk_buff *skb) -{ -netif_rx (skb); -} -/** * ks8851_tx_work - process tx packet(s) * @work: The work strucutre what was scheduled.
@@ -435,7 +425,6 @@ static int ks8851_probe_spi(struct spi_device *spi) ks->rdfifo = ks8851_rdfifo_spi; ks->wrfifo = ks8851_wrfifo_spi; ks->start_xmit = ks8851_start_xmit_spi; - ks->rx_skb = ks8851_rx_skb_spi; ks->flush_tx_work = ks8851_flush_tx_work_spi;#define STD_IRQ (IRQ_LCI |/* Link Change */ \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/69 net: ks8851: Handle softirqs at the end of IRQ thread to fix hang
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit be0384bf599cf1eb8d337517feeb732d71f75a6f ]
The ks8851_irq() thread may call ks8851_rx_pkts() in case there are any packets in the MAC FIFO, which calls netif_rx(). This netif_rx() implementation is guarded by local_bh_disable() and local_bh_enable(). The local_bh_enable() may call do_softirq() to run softirqs in case any are pending. One of the softirqs is net_rx_action, which ultimately reaches the driver .start_xmit callback. If that happens, the system hangs. The entire call chain is below:
ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit __dev_queue_xmit from __neigh_update __neigh_update from neigh_updateneigh_update from arp_process.constprop.0 arp_process.constprop.0 from __netif_receive_skb_one_core __netif_receive_skb_one_core from process_backlog process_backlog from __napi_poll.constprop.0 __napi_poll.constprop.0 from net_rx_action net_rx_action from __do_softirq__do_softirq from call_with_stack call_with_stack from do_softirqdo_softirq from __local_bh_enable_ip __local_bh_enable_ip from netif_rxnetif_rx from ks8851_irqks8851_irq from irq_thread_fnirq_thread_fn from irq_threadirq_thread from kthread
kthread from ret_from_fork
The hang happens because ks8851_irq() first locks a spinlock in ks8851_par.c ks8851_lock_par() spin_lock_irqsave(&ksp->lock, ...) and with that spinlock locked, calls netif_rx(). Once the execution reaches ks8851_start_xmit_par(), it calls ks8851_lock_par() again which attempts to claim the already locked spinlock again, and the hang happens.
Move the do_softirq() call outside of the spinlock protected section of ks8851_irq() by disabling BHs around the entire spinlock protected section of ks8851_irq() handler. Place local_bh_enable() outside of the spinlock protected section, so that it can trigger do_softirq() without the ks8851_par.c ks8851_lock_par() spinlock being held, and safely call ks8851_start_xmit_par() without attempting to lock the already locked spinlock.
Since ks8851_irq() is protected by local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable() now, replace netif_rx() with __netif_rx() which is not duplicating the local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable() calls.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c +5 -1
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static void ks8851_rx_pkts(struct ks8851_net *ks)ks8851_dbg_dumpkkt (ks, rxpkt); skb->protocol =eth_type_trans (skb, ks->netdev); -netif_rx (skb); +__netif_rx (skb); ks->netdev->stats.rx_packets++; ks->netdev->stats.rx_bytes += rxlen;
@@ -330,6 +330,8 @@ static irqreturn_t ks8851_irq(int irq, void *_ks)unsigned long flags;unsigned int status; +local_bh_disable (); +ks8851_lock (ks, &flags); status =ks8851_rdreg16 (ks,KS_ISR );
@@ -406,6 +408,8 @@ static irqreturn_t ks8851_irq(int irq, void *_ks)if (status &IRQ_LCI )mii_check_link (&ks->mii); +local_bh_enable (); +return IRQ_HANDLED ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/69 af_unix: Clear stale u->oob_skb.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b46f4eaa4f0ec38909fb0072eea3aeddb32f954e ]
syzkaller started to report deadlock of unix_gc_lock after commit 4090fa373f0e ("af_unix: Replace garbage collection algorithm."), but it just uncovers the bug that has been there since commit 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support").
The repro basically does the following.
from socket import *
from array import array
c1, c2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM)
c1.sendmsg([b'a'], [(SOL_SOCKET, SCM_RIGHTS, array("i", [c2.fileno()]))], MSG_OOB) c2.recv(1) # blocked as no normal data in recv queue
c2.close() # done async and unblock recv()
c1.close() # done async and trigger GC
A socket sends its file descriptor to itself as OOB data and tries to receive normal data, but finally recv() fails due to async close().
The problem here is wrong handling of OOB skb in manage_oob(). When recvmsg() is called without MSG_OOB, manage_oob() is called to check if the peeked skb is OOB skb. In such a case, manage_oob() pops it out of the receive queue but does not clear unix_sock(sk)->oob_skb. This is wrong in terms of uAPI.
Let's say we send "hello" with MSG_OOB, and "world" without MSG_OOB. The 'o' is handled as OOB data. When recv() is called twice without MSG_OOB, the OOB data should be lost.
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from socket import *
c1, c2 =socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)c1.send(b'hello', MSG_OOB)# 'o' is OOB data
5
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c1.send(b'world')
5
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c2.recv(5)# OOB data is not received
b'hell'
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c2.recv(5)# OOB date is skipped
b'world'
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c2.recv(5, MSG_OOB)# This should return an error
b'o'
In the same situation, TCP actually returns -EINVAL for the last recv().
Also, if we do not clear unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb, unix_poll() always set EPOLLPRI even though the data has passed through by previous recv().
To avoid these issues, we must clear unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb when dequeuing it from recv queue.
The reason why the old GC did not trigger the deadlock is because the old GC relied on the receive queue to detect the loop.
When it is triggered, the socket with OOB data is marked as GC candidate because file refcount == inflight count (1). However, after traversing all inflight sockets, the socket still has a positive inflight count (1), thus the socket is excluded from candidates. Then, the old GC lose the chance to garbage-collect the socket.
With the old GC, the repro continues to create true garbage that will never be freed nor detected by kmemleak as it's linked to the global inflight list. That's why we couldn't even notice the issue.
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +3 -1
@@ -2677,7 +2677,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *manage_oob(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, } }else if (!(flags &MSG_PEEK )) {skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); -consume_skb (skb); +WRITE_ONCE (u->oob_skb,NULL ); +if (!WARN_ON_ONCE (skb_unref (skb))) +kfree_skb (skb); skb =skb_peek (&sk->sk_receive_queue); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/69 octeontx2-af: Fix NIX SQ mode and BP config
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geetha sowjanya <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit faf23006185e777db18912685922c5ddb2df383f ]
NIX SQ mode and link backpressure configuration is required for all platforms. But in current driver this code is wrongly placed under specific platform check. This patch fixes the issue by moving the code out of platform check.
--- .../ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_nix.c | 20 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_nix.c +10 -10
@@ -4237,18 +4237,18 @@ static int rvu_nix_block_init(struct rvu *rvu, struct nix_hw *nix_hw)*/ rvu_write64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_CFG ,rvu_read64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_CFG ) |0x40ULL ); + } -/* Set chan/link to backpressure TL3 instead of TL2 */ -rvu_write64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_PSE_CHANNEL_LEVEL ,0x01 ); +/* Set chan/link to backpressure TL3 instead of TL2 */ +rvu_write64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_PSE_CHANNEL_LEVEL ,0x01 ); -/* Disable SQ manager's sticky mode operation (set TM6 = 0) -* This sticky mode is known to cause SQ stalls when multiple -* SQs are mapped to same SMQ and transmitting pkts at a time. -*/ - cfg =rvu_read64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_SQM_DBG_CTL_STATUS ); - cfg &= ~BIT_ULL (15 ); -rvu_write64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_SQM_DBG_CTL_STATUS , cfg); - } +/* Disable SQ manager's sticky mode operation (set TM6 = 0) +* This sticky mode is known to cause SQ stalls when multiple +* SQs are mapped to same SMQ and transmitting pkts at a time. +*/ + cfg =rvu_read64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_SQM_DBG_CTL_STATUS ); + cfg &= ~BIT_ULL (15 ); +rvu_write64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_SQM_DBG_CTL_STATUS , cfg); ltdefs = rvu->kpu.lt_def;/* Calibrate X2P bus to check if CGX/LBK links are fine */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/69 ipv6: fib: hide unused pn variable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 74043489fcb5e5ca4074133582b5b8011b67f9e7 ]
When CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is disabled, the only user is hidden, causing a 'make W=1' warning:
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c: In function 'fib6_add':net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1388:32: error: variable 'pn' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
Add another #ifdef around the variable declaration, matching the other uses in this file.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +5 -2
@@ -1376,7 +1376,10 @@ int fib6_add(struct fib6_node *root, struct fib6_info *rt, struct nl_info *info, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { struct fib6_table *table = rt->fib6_table; -struct fib6_node *fn, *pn =NULL ; +struct fib6_node *fn; +#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES +struct fib6_node *pn =NULL ; +#endif int err = -ENOMEM ;int allow_create =1 ;int replace_required =0 ;
@@ -1400,9 +1403,9 @@ int fib6_add(struct fib6_node *root, struct fib6_info *rt, goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES pn = fn; -#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES if (rt->fib6_src.plen) {struct fib6_node *sn;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/69 ipv4/route: avoid unused-but-set-variable warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cf1b7201df59fb936f40f4a807433fe3f2ce310a ]
The log_martians variable is only used in an #ifdef, causing a 'make W=1' warning with gcc:
net/ipv4/route.c: In function 'ip_rt_send_redirect':net/ipv4/route.c:880:13: error: variable 'log_martians' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
Change the #ifdef to an equivalent IS_ENABLED() to let the compiler see where the variable is used.
--- net/ipv4/route.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/route.c +1 -3
@@ -926,13 +926,11 @@ void ip_rt_send_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb)icmp_send (skb,ICMP_REDIRECT ,ICMP_REDIR_HOST , gw); peer->rate_last = jiffies; ++peer->n_redirects; -#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE -if (log_martians && +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE ) && log_martians && peer->n_redirects == ip_rt_redirect_number)net_warn_ratelimited ("host %pI4/if%d ignores redirects for %pI4 to %pI4\n" , &ip_hdr (skb)->saddr,inet_iif (skb), &ip_hdr (skb)->daddr, &gw); -#endif } out_put_peer:inet_putpeer (peer);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/69 ipv6: fix race condition between ipv6_get_ifaddr and ipv6_del_addr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7633c4da919ad51164acbf1aa322cc1a3ead6129 ]
Although ipv6_get_ifaddr walks inet6_addr_lst under the RCU lock, it still means hlist_for_each_entry_rcu can return an item that got removed from the list. The memory itself of such item is not freed thanks to RCU but nothing guarantees the actual content of the memory is sane.
In particular, the reference count can be zero. This can happen if ipv6_del_addr is called in parallel. ipv6_del_addr removes the entry from inet6_addr_lst (hlist_del_init_rcu(&ifp->addr_lst)) and drops all references (__in6_ifa_put(ifp) + in6_ifa_put(ifp)). With bad enough timing, this can happen:
1. In ipv6_get_ifaddr, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu returns an entry.
2. Then, the whole ipv6_del_addr is executed for the given entry. The reference count drops to zero and kfree_rcu is scheduled.
3. ipv6_get_ifaddr continues and tries to increments the reference count (in6_ifa_hold).
4. The rcu is unlocked and the entry is freed.
5. The freed entry is returned.
Prevent increasing of the reference count in such case. The name in6_ifa_hold_safe is chosen to mimic the existing fib6_info_hold_safe.
[ 41.506330] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. [ 41.506760] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 595 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.507413] Modules linked in: veth bridge stp llc [ 41.507821] CPU: 0 PID: 595 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2.main-00208-g49563be82afa #14 [ 41.508479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) [ 41.509163] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.509586] Code: ad ff 90 0f 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d c0 30 ad 01 00 75 a0 c6 05 b7 30 ad 01 01 90 48 c7 c7 38 cc 7a 8c e8 cc 18 ad ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 98 30 ad 01 00 0f 85 75 ff ff ff [ 41.510956] RSP: 0018:ffffbda3c026baf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 41.511368] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9c46914800 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 41.511910] RDX: ffff9e9c7ec29c00 RSI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 RDI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 [ 41.512445] RBP: ffff9e9c43660c9c R08: 0000000000009ffb R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 41.512998] R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff8ca58a40 R12: ffff9e9c4339a000 [ 41.513534] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9e9c438a0000 R15: ffffbda3c026bb48 [ 41.514086] FS: 00007fbc4cda1740(0000) GS:ffff9e9c7ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 41.514726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 41.515176] CR2: 000056233b337d88 CR3: 000000000376e006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 41.515713] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 41.516252] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 41.516799] Call Trace: [ 41.517037] <TASK> [ 41.517249] ? __warn+0x7b/0x120 [ 41.517535] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.517923] ? report_bug+0x164/0x190 [ 41.518240] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 41.518541] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 41.520972] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 41.521325] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.521708] ipv6_get_ifaddr+0xda/0xe0 [ 41.522035] inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x342/0x3f0 [ 41.522376] ? __pfx_inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x10/0x10 [ 41.522758] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x3d0 [ 41.523102] ? netlink_unicast+0x30f/0x390 [ 41.523445] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 41.523832] netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 [ 41.524157] netlink_unicast+0x23b/0x390 [ 41.524484] netlink_sendmsg+0x1f2/0x440 [ 41.524826] __sys_sendto+0x1d8/0x1f0 [ 41.525145] __x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30 [ 41.525467] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x1b0 [ 41.525794] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a [ 41.526213] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.526528] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 [ 41.527942] RSP: 002b:00007ffcf54012a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 41.528593] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcf5401368 RCX: 00007fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.529173] RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: 00007fbc4b9d9bd0 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 41.529786] RBP: 00007fbc4bafb040 R08: 00007ffcf54013e0 R09: 000000000000000c [ 41.530375] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 41.530977] R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007fbc4ca85d1b [ 41.531573] </TASK>
--- include/net/addrconf.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/net/addrconf.h +4 -0
@@ -437,6 +437,10 @@ static inline void in6_ifa_hold(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)refcount_inc (&ifp->refcnt); } +static inline bool in6_ifa_hold_safe (struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp) +{ +return refcount_inc_not_zero (&ifp->refcnt); +}/* * compute link-local solicited-node multicast address
net/ipv6/addrconf.c +4 -3
@@ -2050,9 +2050,10 @@ struct inet6_ifaddr *ipv6_get_ifaddr(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *addif (ipv6_addr_equal (&ifp->addr, addr)) {if (!dev || ifp->idev->dev == dev || !(ifp->scope&(IFA_LINK |IFA_HOST ) || strict)) { - result = ifp; -in6_ifa_hold (ifp); -break ; +if (in6_ifa_hold_safe (ifp)) { + result = ifp; +break ; + } } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/69 Bluetooth: SCO: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 51eda36d33e43201e7a4fd35232e069b2c850b01 ]
syzbot reported sco_sock_setsockopt() is copying data without checking user input length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sco_sock_setsockopt+0xc0b/0xf90 net/bluetooth/sco.c:893 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88805f7b15a3 by task syz-executor.5/12578
--- include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 9 +++++++++ net/bluetooth/sco.c | 23 ++++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h +9 -0
@@ -565,6 +565,15 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *bt_skb_sendmmsg(struct sock *sk,return skb; } +static inline int bt_copy_from_sockptr (void *dst,size_t dst_size, +sockptr_t src,size_t src_size) +{ +if (dst_size > src_size) +return -EINVAL ; + +return copy_from_sockptr (dst, src, dst_size); +} +int bt_to_errno (u16 code);__u8 bt_status (int err);
net/bluetooth/sco.c +10 -13
@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ static int sco_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) {struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -int len, err =0 ; +int err =0 ;struct bt_voice voice;u32 opt;struct bt_codecs *codecs;
@@ -850,10 +850,9 @@ static int sco_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ; } -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opt, optval,sizeof (u32))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (opt)set_bit (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP , &bt_sk (sk)->flags);
@@ -870,11 +869,10 @@ static int sco_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, voice.setting =sco_pi (sk)->setting; - len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(voice), optlen); -if (copy_from_sockptr (&voice, optval, len)) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&voice,sizeof (voice), optval, + optlen); +if (err)break ; - }/* Explicitly check for these values */ if (voice.setting != BT_VOICE_TRANSPARENT &&
@@ -897,10 +895,9 @@ static int sco_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ;case BT_PKT_STATUS : -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opt, optval,sizeof (u32))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (opt)sco_pi (sk)->cmsg_mask |=SCO_CMSG_PKT_STATUS ;
@@ -941,9 +938,9 @@ static int sco_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ; } -if (copy_from_sockptr (buffer, optval, optlen)) { + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (buffer, optlen, optval, optlen); +if (err) {hci_dev_put (hdev); - err = -EFAULT ;break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/69 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4f3951242ace5efc7131932e2e01e6ac6baed846 ]
Check user input length before copying data.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 52 +++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +20 -32
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,struct sock *sk = sock->sk;struct l2cap_chan *chan =l2cap_pi (sk)->chan;struct l2cap_options opts; -int len, err =0 ; +int err =0 ;u32 opt;BT_DBG ("sk %p" , sk);
@@ -772,11 +772,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname, opts.max_tx = chan->max_tx; opts.txwin_size = chan->tx_win; - len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(opts), optlen); -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opts, optval, len)) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&opts,sizeof (opts), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (opts.txwin_size >L2CAP_DEFAULT_EXT_WINDOW ) { err = -EINVAL ;
@@ -819,10 +817,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,break ;case L2CAP_LM : -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opt, optval,sizeof (u32))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (opt &L2CAP_LM_FIPS ) { err = -EINVAL ;
@@ -903,7 +900,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,struct bt_security sec;struct bt_power pwr;struct l2cap_conn *conn; -int len, err =0 ; +int err =0 ;u32 opt;u16 mtu;u8 mode;
@@ -929,11 +926,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, sec.level =BT_SECURITY_LOW ; - len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(sec), optlen); -if (copy_from_sockptr (&sec, optval, len)) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&sec,sizeof (sec), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (sec.level <BT_SECURITY_LOW || sec.level >BT_SECURITY_FIPS ) {
@@ -978,10 +973,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ; } -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opt, optval,sizeof (u32))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (opt) {set_bit (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP , &bt_sk (sk)->flags);
@@ -993,10 +987,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ;case BT_FLUSHABLE : -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opt, optval,sizeof (u32))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (opt >BT_FLUSHABLE_ON ) { err = -EINVAL ;
@@ -1028,11 +1021,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, pwr.force_active =BT_POWER_FORCE_ACTIVE_ON ; - len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(pwr), optlen); -if (copy_from_sockptr (&pwr, optval, len)) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&pwr,sizeof (pwr), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (pwr.force_active)set_bit (FLAG_FORCE_ACTIVE , &chan->flags);
@@ -1041,10 +1032,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ;case BT_CHANNEL_POLICY : -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opt, optval,sizeof (u32))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&opt,sizeof (opt), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (opt >BT_CHANNEL_POLICY_AMP_PREFERRED ) { err = -EINVAL ;
@@ -1089,10 +1079,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ; } -if (copy_from_sockptr (&mtu, optval,sizeof (u16))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&mtu,sizeof (mtu), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }if (chan->mode ==L2CAP_MODE_EXT_FLOWCTL && sk->sk_state ==BT_CONNECTED )
@@ -1120,10 +1109,9 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ; } -if (copy_from_sockptr (&mode, optval,sizeof (u8))) { - err = -EFAULT ; + err =bt_copy_from_sockptr (&mode,sizeof (mode), optval, optlen); +if (err)break ; - }BT_DBG ("mode %u" , mode);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/69 netfilter: complete validation of user input
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 65acf6e0501ac8880a4f73980d01b5d27648b956 ]
In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls.
In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check:
if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +4 -0
@@ -966,6 +966,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if ((u64 )len < (u64 )tmp.size +sizeof (tmp)) +return -EINVAL ; tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ;
@@ -1266,6 +1268,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if ((u64 )len < (u64 )tmp.size +sizeof (tmp)) +return -EINVAL ; tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ;
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +4 -0
@@ -1120,6 +1120,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if ((u64 )len < (u64 )tmp.size +sizeof (tmp)) +return -EINVAL ; tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ;
@@ -1506,6 +1508,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if ((u64 )len < (u64 )tmp.size +sizeof (tmp)) +return -EINVAL ; tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ;
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +4 -0
@@ -1137,6 +1137,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if ((u64 )len < (u64 )tmp.size +sizeof (tmp)) +return -EINVAL ; tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ;
@@ -1515,6 +1517,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if ((u64 )len < (u64 )tmp.size +sizeof (tmp)) +return -EINVAL ; tmp.name[sizeof (tmp.name)-1 ] =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/69 net/mlx5: Properly link new fs rules into the tree
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cosmin Ratiu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7c6782ad4911cbee874e85630226ed389ff2e453 ]
Previously, add_rule_fg would only add newly created rules from the handle into the tree when they had a refcount of 1. On the other hand, create_flow_handle tries hard to find and reference already existing identical rules instead of creating new ones.
These two behaviors can result in a situation where create_flow_handle
1) creates a new rule and references it, then
2) in a subsequent step during the same handle creation references it again,
resulting in a rule with a refcount of 2 that is not linked into the tree, will have a NULL parent and root and will result in a crash when the flow group is deleted because del_sw_hw_rule, invoked on rule deletion, assumes node->parent is != NULL.
This happened in the wild, due to another bug related to incorrect handling of duplicate pkt_reformat ids, which lead to the code in create_flow_handle incorrectly referencing a just-added rule in the same flow handle, resulting in the problem described above. Full details are at [1].
This patch changes add_rule_fg to add new rules without parents into the tree, properly initializing them and avoiding the crash. This makes it more consistent with how rules are added to an FTE in create_flow_handle.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c +2 -1
@@ -1752,8 +1752,9 @@ static struct mlx5_flow_handle *add_rule_fg(struct mlx5_flow_group *fg, }trace_mlx5_fs_set_fte (fte, false); +/* Link newly added rules into the tree. */ for (i =0 ; i < handle->num_rules; i++) { -if (refcount_read (&handle->rule[i]->node.refcount) ==1 ) { +if (!handle->rule[i]->node.parent) {tree_add_node (&handle->rule[i]->node, &fte->node);trace_mlx5_fs_add_rule (handle->rule[i]); }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/69 net/mlx5e: Fix mlx5e_priv_init() cleanup flow
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Carolina Jubran <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ecb829459a841198e142f72fadab56424ae96519 ]
When mlx5e_priv_init() fails, the cleanup flow calls mlx5e_selq_cleanup which calls mlx5e_selq_apply() that assures that the priv->state_lock is held using lockdep_is_held().
Acquire the state_lock in mlx5e_selq_cleanup().
Kernel log:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.8.0-rc3_net_next_841a9b5 #1 Not tainted
-----------------------------drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/selq.c:124 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
2 locks held by systemd-modules/293:
#0: ffffffffa05067b0 (devices_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ib_register_client+0x109/0x1b0 [ib_core] #1: ffff8881096c65c0 (&device->client_data_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: add_client_context+0x104/0x1c0 [ib_core]
stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 293 Comm: systemd-modules Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3_net_next_841a9b5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x8a/0xa0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x154/0x1a0 mlx5e_selq_apply+0x94/0xa0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_selq_cleanup+0x3a/0x60 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_priv_init+0x2be/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_rdma_setup_rn+0x7c/0x1a0 [mlx5_core] rdma_init_netdev+0x4e/0x80 [ib_core] ? mlx5_rdma_netdev_free+0x70/0x70 [mlx5_core] ipoib_intf_init+0x64/0x550 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_intf_alloc+0x4e/0xc0 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_add_one+0xb0/0x360 [ib_ipoib] add_client_context+0x112/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_register_client+0x166/0x1b0 [ib_core] ? 0xffffffffa0573000 ipoib_init_module+0xeb/0x1a0 [ib_ipoib] do_one_initcall+0x61/0x250 do_init_module+0x8a/0x270 init_module_from_file+0x8b/0xd0 idempotent_init_module+0x17d/0x230 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x61/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK>
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/selq.c | 2 ++ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/selq.c +2 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ int mlx5e_selq_init(struct mlx5e_selq *selq, struct mutex *state_lock)void mlx5e_selq_cleanup (struct mlx5e_selq *selq) { +mutex_lock (selq->state_lock);WARN_ON_ONCE (selq->is_prepared);kvfree (selq->standby);
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ void mlx5e_selq_cleanup(struct mlx5e_selq *selq)kvfree (selq->standby); selq->standby =NULL ; +mutex_unlock (selq->state_lock); }void mlx5e_selq_prepare_params (struct mlx5e_selq *selq,struct mlx5e_params *params)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +0 -2
@@ -5578,9 +5578,7 @@ void mlx5e_priv_cleanup(struct mlx5e_priv *priv)kfree (priv->tx_rates);kfree (priv->txq2sq);destroy_workqueue (priv->wq); -mutex_lock (&priv->state_lock);mlx5e_selq_cleanup (&priv->selq); -mutex_unlock (&priv->state_lock);free_cpumask_var (priv->scratchpad.cpumask);for (i =0 ; i < priv->htb_max_qos_sqs; i++)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/69 net/mlx5e: HTB, Fix inconsistencies with QoS SQs number
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Carolina Jubran <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2f436f1869771d46e1a9f85738d5a1a7c5653a4e ]
When creating a new HTB class while the interface is down, the variable that follows the number of QoS SQs (htb_max_qos_sqs) may not be consistent with the number of HTB classes.
Previously, we compared these two values to ensure that the node_qid is lower than the number of QoS SQs, and we allocated stats for that SQ when they are equal.
Change the check to compare the node_qid with the current number of leaf nodes and fix the checking conditions to ensure allocation of stats_list and stats for each node.
--- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/qos.c | 33 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/qos.c +17 -16
@@ -82,24 +82,25 @@ int mlx5e_open_qos_sq(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct mlx5e_channels *chs, txq_ix =mlx5e_qid_from_qos (chs, node_qid); -WARN_ON (node_qid > priv->htb_max_qos_sqs); -if (node_qid == priv->htb_max_qos_sqs) { -struct mlx5e_sq_stats *stats, **stats_list =NULL ; - -if (priv->htb_max_qos_sqs ==0 ) { - stats_list =kvcalloc (mlx5e_qos_max_leaf_nodes (priv->mdev), -sizeof (*stats_list), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!stats_list) -return -ENOMEM ; - } +WARN_ON (node_qid >=mlx5e_htb_cur_leaf_nodes (priv->htb)); +if (!priv->htb_qos_sq_stats) { +struct mlx5e_sq_stats **stats_list; + + stats_list =kvcalloc (mlx5e_qos_max_leaf_nodes (priv->mdev), +sizeof (*stats_list),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!stats_list) +return -ENOMEM ; + +WRITE_ONCE (priv->htb_qos_sq_stats, stats_list); + } + +if (!priv->htb_qos_sq_stats[node_qid]) { +struct mlx5e_sq_stats *stats; + stats =kzalloc (sizeof (*stats),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!stats) { -kvfree (stats_list); +if (!stats)return -ENOMEM ; - } -if (stats_list) -WRITE_ONCE (priv->htb_qos_sq_stats, stats_list); +WRITE_ONCE (priv->htb_qos_sq_stats[node_qid], stats);/* Order htb_max_qos_sqs increment after writing the array pointer. * Pairs with smp_load_acquire in en_stats.c.
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/69 net: sparx5: fix wrong config being used when reconfiguring PCS
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Machon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 33623113a48ea906f1955cbf71094f6aa4462e8f ]
The wrong port config is being used if the PCS is reconfigured. Fix this by correctly using the new config instead of the old one.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_port.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_port.c +2 -2
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ static int sparx5_port_pcs_low_set(struct sparx5 *sparx5,bool sgmii = false, inband_aneg = false;int err; -if (port->conf.inband) { +if (conf->inband) {if (conf->portmode ==PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII || conf->portmode ==PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_QSGMII ) inband_aneg = true;/* Cisco-SGMII in-band-aneg */
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ int sparx5_port_pcs_set(struct sparx5 *sparx5,if (err)return -EINVAL ; -if (port->conf.inband) { +if (conf->inband) {/* Enable/disable 1G counters in ASM */ spx5_rmw(ASM_PORT_CFG_CSC_STAT_DIS_SET(high_speed_dev), ASM_PORT_CFG_CSC_STAT_DIS,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/69 net: dsa: mt7530: trap link-local frames regardless of ST Port State
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arınç ÜNAL <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 17c560113231ddc20088553c7b499b289b664311 ]
In Clause 5 of IEEE Std 802-2014, two sublayers of the data link layer (DLL) of the Open Systems Interconnection basic reference model (OSI/RM) are described; the medium access control (MAC) and logical link control (LLC) sublayers. The MAC sublayer is the one facing the physical layer.
In 8.2 of IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022, the Bridge architecture is described. A Bridge component comprises a MAC Relay Entity for interconnecting the Ports of the Bridge, at least two Ports, and higher layer entities with at least a Spanning Tree Protocol Entity included.
Each Bridge Port also functions as an end station and shall provide the MAC Service to an LLC Entity. Each instance of the MAC Service is provided to a distinct LLC Entity that supports protocol identification, multiplexing, and demultiplexing, for protocol data unit (PDU) transmission and reception by one or more higher layer entities.
It is described in 8.13.9 of IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022 that in a Bridge, the LLC Entity associated with each Bridge Port is modeled as being directly connected to the attached Local Area Network (LAN).
On the switch with CPU port architecture, CPU port functions as Management Port, and the Management Port functionality is provided by software which functions as an end station. Software is connected to an IEEE 802 LAN that is wholly contained within the system that incorporates the Bridge. Software provides access to the LLC Entity associated with each Bridge Port by the value of the source port field on the special tag on the frame received by software.
We call frames that carry control information to determine the active topology and current extent of each Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN), i.e., spanning tree or Shortest Path Bridging (SPB) and Multiple VLAN Registration Protocol Data Units (MVRPDUs), and frames from other link constrained protocols, such as Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL) and Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP), link-local frames. They are not forwarded by a Bridge. Permanently configured entries in the filtering database (FDB) ensure that such frames are discarded by the Forwarding Process. In 8.6.3 of IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022, this is described in detail:
Each of the reserved MAC addresses specified in Table 8-1 (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0E,0F]) shall be permanently configured in the FDB in C-VLAN components and ERs.
Each of the reserved MAC addresses specified in Table 8-2 (01-80-C2-00-00-[01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0E]) shall be permanently configured in the FDB in S-VLAN components.
Each of the reserved MAC addresses specified in Table 8-3 (01-80-C2-00-00-[01,02,04,0E]) shall be permanently configured in the FDB in TPMR components.
The FDB entries for reserved MAC addresses shall specify filtering for all Bridge Ports and all VIDs. Management shall not provide the capability to modify or remove entries for reserved MAC addresses.
The addresses in Table 8-1, Table 8-2, and Table 8-3 determine the scope of propagation of PDUs within a Bridged Network, as follows:
The Nearest Bridge group address (01-80-C2-00-00-0E) is an address that no conformant Two-Port MAC Relay (TPMR) component, Service VLAN (S-VLAN) component, Customer VLAN (C-VLAN) component, or MAC Bridge can forward. PDUs transmitted using this destination address, or any other addresses that appear in Table 8-1, Table 8-2, and Table 8-3 (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0E,0F]), can therefore travel no further than those stations that can be reached via a single individual LAN from the originating station.
The Nearest non-TPMR Bridge group address (01-80-C2-00-00-03), is an address that no conformant S-VLAN component, C-VLAN component, or MAC Bridge can forward; however, this address is relayed by a TPMR component. PDUs using this destination address, or any of the other addresses that appear in both Table 8-1 and Table 8-2 but not in Table 8-3 (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,03,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0F]), will be relayed by any TPMRs but will propagate no further than the nearest S-VLAN component, C-VLAN component, or MAC Bridge.
The Nearest Customer Bridge group address (01-80-C2-00-00-00) is an address that no conformant C-VLAN component, MAC Bridge can forward; however, it is relayed by TPMR components and S-VLAN components. PDUs using this destination address, or any of the other addresses that appear in Table 8-1 but not in either Table 8-2 or Table 8-3 (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,0B,0C,0D,0F]), will be relayed by TPMR components and S-VLAN components but will propagate no further than the nearest C-VLAN component or MAC Bridge.
Because the LLC Entity associated with each Bridge Port is provided via CPU port, we must not filter these frames but forward them to CPU port.
In a Bridge, the transmission Port is majorly decided by ingress and egress rules, FDB, and spanning tree Port State functions of the Forwarding Process. For link-local frames, only CPU port should be designated as destination port in the FDB, and the other functions of the Forwarding Process must not interfere with the decision of the transmission Port. We call this process trapping frames to CPU port.
Therefore, on the switch with CPU port architecture, link-local frames must be trapped to CPU port, and certain link-local frames received by a Port of a Bridge comprising a TPMR component or an S-VLAN component must be excluded from it.
A Bridge of the switch with CPU port architecture cannot comprise a Two-Port MAC Relay (TPMR) component as a TPMR component supports only a subset of the functionality of a MAC Bridge. A Bridge comprising two Ports (Management Port doesn't count) of this architecture will either function as a standard MAC Bridge or a standard VLAN Bridge.
Therefore, a Bridge of this architecture can only comprise S-VLAN components, C-VLAN components, or MAC Bridge components. Since there's no TPMR component, we don't need to relay PDUs using the destination addresses specified on the Nearest non-TPMR section, and the proportion of the Nearest Customer Bridge section where they must be relayed by TPMR components.
One option to trap link-local frames to CPU port is to add static FDB entries with CPU port designated as destination port. However, because that Independent VLAN Learning (IVL) is being used on every VID, each entry only applies to a single VLAN Identifier (VID). For a Bridge comprising a MAC Bridge component or a C-VLAN component, there would have to be 16 times 4096 entries. This switch intellectual property can only hold a maximum of 2048 entries. Using this option, there also isn't a mechanism to prevent link-local frames from being discarded when the spanning tree Port State of the reception Port is discarding.
The remaining option is to utilise the BPC, RGAC1, RGAC2, RGAC3, and RGAC4 registers. Whilst this applies to every VID, it doesn't contain all of the reserved MAC addresses without affecting the remaining Standard Group MAC Addresses. The REV_UN frame tag utilised using the RGAC4 register covers the remaining 01-80-C2-00-00-[04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0F] destination addresses. It also includes the 01-80-C2-00-00-22 to 01-80-C2-00-00-FF destination addresses which may be relayed by MAC Bridges or VLAN Bridges. The latter option provides better but not complete conformance.
This switch intellectual property also does not provide a mechanism to trap link-local frames with specific destination addresses to CPU port by Bridge, to conform to the filtering rules for the distinct Bridge components.
Therefore, regardless of the type of the Bridge component, link-local frames with these destination addresses will be trapped to CPU port:
01-80-C2-00-00-[00,01,02,03,0E]
In a Bridge comprising a MAC Bridge component or a C-VLAN component:
Link-local frames with these destination addresses won't be trapped to CPU port which won't conform to IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022:
01-80-C2-00-00-[04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0F]
In a Bridge comprising an S-VLAN component:
Link-local frames with these destination addresses will be trapped to CPU port which won't conform to IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022:
01-80-C2-00-00-00
Link-local frames with these destination addresses won't be trapped to CPU port which won't conform to IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022:
01-80-C2-00-00-[04,05,06,07,08,09,0A]
Currently on this switch intellectual property, if the spanning tree Port State of the reception Port is discarding, link-local frames will be discarded.
To trap link-local frames regardless of the spanning tree Port State, make the switch regard them as Bridge Protocol Data Units (BPDUs). This switch intellectual property only lets the frames regarded as BPDUs bypass the spanning tree Port State function of the Forwarding Process.
With this change, the only remaining interference is the ingress rules. When the reception Port has no PVID assigned on software, VLAN-untagged frames won't be allowed in. There doesn't seem to be a mechanism on the switch intellectual property to have link-local frames bypass this function of the Forwarding Process.
--- drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c | 229 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h | 5 + 2 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c +195 -34
@@ -998,20 +998,173 @@ static void mt7530_setup_port5(struct dsa_switch *ds, phy_interface_t interface)mutex_unlock (&priv->reg_mutex); } -/* On page 205, section "8.6.3 Frame filtering" of the active standard, IEEE Std -* 802.1Q™-2022, it is stated that frames with 01:80:C2:00:00:00-0F as MAC DA -* must only be propagated to C-VLAN and MAC Bridge components. That means -* VLAN-aware and VLAN-unaware bridges. On the switch designs with CPU ports, -* these frames are supposed to be processed by the CPU (software). So we make -* the switch only forward them to the CPU port. And if received from a CPU -* port, forward to a single port. The software is responsible of making the -* switch conform to the latter by setting a single port as destination port on -* the special tag. +/* In Clause 5 of IEEE Std 802-2014, two sublayers of the data link layer (DLL) +* of the Open Systems Interconnection basic reference model (OSI/RM) are +* described; the medium access control (MAC) and logical link control (LLC) +* sublayers. The MAC sublayer is the one facing the physical layer. * -* This switch intellectual property cannot conform to this part of the standard -* fully. Whilst the REV_UN frame tag covers the remaining :04-0D and :0F MAC -* DAs, it also includes :22-FF which the scope of propagation is not supposed -* to be restricted for these MAC DAs. +* In 8.2 of IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022, the Bridge architecture is described. A +* Bridge component comprises a MAC Relay Entity for interconnecting the Ports +* of the Bridge, at least two Ports, and higher layer entities with at least a +* Spanning Tree Protocol Entity included. +* +* Each Bridge Port also functions as an end station and shall provide the MAC +* Service to an LLC Entity. Each instance of the MAC Service is provided to a +* distinct LLC Entity that supports protocol identification, multiplexing, and +* demultiplexing, for protocol data unit (PDU) transmission and reception by +* one or more higher layer entities. +* +* It is described in 8.13.9 of IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022 that in a Bridge, the LLC +* Entity associated with each Bridge Port is modeled as being directly +* connected to the attached Local Area Network (LAN). +* +* On the switch with CPU port architecture, CPU port functions as Management +* Port, and the Management Port functionality is provided by software which +* functions as an end station. Software is connected to an IEEE 802 LAN that is +* wholly contained within the system that incorporates the Bridge. Software +* provides access to the LLC Entity associated with each Bridge Port by the +* value of the source port field on the special tag on the frame received by +* software. +* +* We call frames that carry control information to determine the active +* topology and current extent of each Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN), i.e., +* spanning tree or Shortest Path Bridging (SPB) and Multiple VLAN Registration +* Protocol Data Units (MVRPDUs), and frames from other link constrained +* protocols, such as Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL) and +* Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP), link-local frames. They are not +* forwarded by a Bridge. Permanently configured entries in the filtering +* database (FDB) ensure that such frames are discarded by the Forwarding +* Process. In 8.6.3 of IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022, this is described in detail: +* +* Each of the reserved MAC addresses specified in Table 8-1 +* (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0E,0F]) shall be +* permanently configured in the FDB in C-VLAN components and ERs. +* +* Each of the reserved MAC addresses specified in Table 8-2 +* (01-80-C2-00-00-[01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0E]) shall be permanently +* configured in the FDB in S-VLAN components. +* +* Each of the reserved MAC addresses specified in Table 8-3 +* (01-80-C2-00-00-[01,02,04,0E]) shall be permanently configured in the FDB in +* TPMR components. +* +* The FDB entries for reserved MAC addresses shall specify filtering for all +* Bridge Ports and all VIDs. Management shall not provide the capability to +* modify or remove entries for reserved MAC addresses. +* +* The addresses in Table 8-1, Table 8-2, and Table 8-3 determine the scope of +* propagation of PDUs within a Bridged Network, as follows: +* +* The Nearest Bridge group address (01-80-C2-00-00-0E) is an address that no +* conformant Two-Port MAC Relay (TPMR) component, Service VLAN (S-VLAN) +* component, Customer VLAN (C-VLAN) component, or MAC Bridge can forward. +* PDUs transmitted using this destination address, or any other addresses +* that appear in Table 8-1, Table 8-2, and Table 8-3 +* (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,01,02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0E,0F]), can +* therefore travel no further than those stations that can be reached via a +* single individual LAN from the originating station. +* +* The Nearest non-TPMR Bridge group address (01-80-C2-00-00-03), is an +* address that no conformant S-VLAN component, C-VLAN component, or MAC +* Bridge can forward; however, this address is relayed by a TPMR component. +* PDUs using this destination address, or any of the other addresses that +* appear in both Table 8-1 and Table 8-2 but not in Table 8-3 +* (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,03,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0F]), will be relayed by +* any TPMRs but will propagate no further than the nearest S-VLAN component, +* C-VLAN component, or MAC Bridge. +* +* The Nearest Customer Bridge group address (01-80-C2-00-00-00) is an address +* that no conformant C-VLAN component, MAC Bridge can forward; however, it is +* relayed by TPMR components and S-VLAN components. PDUs using this +* destination address, or any of the other addresses that appear in Table 8-1 +* but not in either Table 8-2 or Table 8-3 (01-80-C2-00-00-[00,0B,0C,0D,0F]), +* will be relayed by TPMR components and S-VLAN components but will propagate +* no further than the nearest C-VLAN component or MAC Bridge. +* +* Because the LLC Entity associated with each Bridge Port is provided via CPU +* port, we must not filter these frames but forward them to CPU port. +* +* In a Bridge, the transmission Port is majorly decided by ingress and egress +* rules, FDB, and spanning tree Port State functions of the Forwarding Process. +* For link-local frames, only CPU port should be designated as destination port +* in the FDB, and the other functions of the Forwarding Process must not +* interfere with the decision of the transmission Port. We call this process +* trapping frames to CPU port. +* +* Therefore, on the switch with CPU port architecture, link-local frames must +* be trapped to CPU port, and certain link-local frames received by a Port of a +* Bridge comprising a TPMR component or an S-VLAN component must be excluded +* from it. +* +* A Bridge of the switch with CPU port architecture cannot comprise a Two-Port +* MAC Relay (TPMR) component as a TPMR component supports only a subset of the +* functionality of a MAC Bridge. A Bridge comprising two Ports (Management Port +* doesn't count) of this architecture will either function as a standard MAC +* Bridge or a standard VLAN Bridge. +* +* Therefore, a Bridge of this architecture can only comprise S-VLAN components, +* C-VLAN components, or MAC Bridge components. Since there's no TPMR component, +* we don't need to relay PDUs using the destination addresses specified on the +* Nearest non-TPMR section, and the proportion of the Nearest Customer Bridge +* section where they must be relayed by TPMR components. +* +* One option to trap link-local frames to CPU port is to add static FDB entries +* with CPU port designated as destination port. However, because that +* Independent VLAN Learning (IVL) is being used on every VID, each entry only +* applies to a single VLAN Identifier (VID). For a Bridge comprising a MAC +* Bridge component or a C-VLAN component, there would have to be 16 times 4096 +* entries. This switch intellectual property can only hold a maximum of 2048 +* entries. Using this option, there also isn't a mechanism to prevent +* link-local frames from being discarded when the spanning tree Port State of +* the reception Port is discarding. +* +* The remaining option is to utilise the BPC, RGAC1, RGAC2, RGAC3, and RGAC4 +* registers. Whilst this applies to every VID, it doesn't contain all of the +* reserved MAC addresses without affecting the remaining Standard Group MAC +* Addresses. The REV_UN frame tag utilised using the RGAC4 register covers the +* remaining 01-80-C2-00-00-[04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0F] destination +* addresses. It also includes the 01-80-C2-00-00-22 to 01-80-C2-00-00-FF +* destination addresses which may be relayed by MAC Bridges or VLAN Bridges. +* The latter option provides better but not complete conformance. +* +* This switch intellectual property also does not provide a mechanism to trap +* link-local frames with specific destination addresses to CPU port by Bridge, +* to conform to the filtering rules for the distinct Bridge components. +* +* Therefore, regardless of the type of the Bridge component, link-local frames +* with these destination addresses will be trapped to CPU port: +* +* 01-80-C2-00-00-[00,01,02,03,0E] +* +* In a Bridge comprising a MAC Bridge component or a C-VLAN component: +* +* Link-local frames with these destination addresses won't be trapped to CPU +* port which won't conform to IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022: +* +* 01-80-C2-00-00-[04,05,06,07,08,09,0A,0B,0C,0D,0F] +* +* In a Bridge comprising an S-VLAN component: +* +* Link-local frames with these destination addresses will be trapped to CPU +* port which won't conform to IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022: +* +* 01-80-C2-00-00-00 +* +* Link-local frames with these destination addresses won't be trapped to CPU +* port which won't conform to IEEE Std 802.1Q-2022: +* +* 01-80-C2-00-00-[04,05,06,07,08,09,0A] +* +* To trap link-local frames to CPU port as conformant as this switch +* intellectual property can allow, link-local frames are made to be regarded as +* Bridge Protocol Data Units (BPDUs). This is because this switch intellectual +* property only lets the frames regarded as BPDUs bypass the spanning tree Port +* State function of the Forwarding Process. +* +* The only remaining interference is the ingress rules. When the reception Port +* has no PVID assigned on software, VLAN-untagged frames won't be allowed in. +* There doesn't seem to be a mechanism on the switch intellectual property to +* have link-local frames bypass this function of the Forwarding Process. */ static void mt753x_trap_frames (struct mt7530_priv *priv)
@@ -1019,35 +1172,43 @@ mt753x_trap_frames(struct mt7530_priv *priv)/* Trap 802.1X PAE frames and BPDUs to the CPU port(s) and egress them * VLAN-untagged. */ -mt7530_rmw (priv,MT753X_BPC ,MT753X_PAE_EG_TAG_MASK | -MT753X_PAE_PORT_FW_MASK |MT753X_BPDU_EG_TAG_MASK | -MT753X_BPDU_PORT_FW_MASK , -MT753X_PAE_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | -MT753X_PAE_PORT_FW (MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ) | -MT753X_BPDU_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | -MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ); +mt7530_rmw (priv,MT753X_BPC , +MT753X_PAE_BPDU_FR |MT753X_PAE_EG_TAG_MASK | +MT753X_PAE_PORT_FW_MASK |MT753X_BPDU_EG_TAG_MASK | +MT753X_BPDU_PORT_FW_MASK , +MT753X_PAE_BPDU_FR | +MT753X_PAE_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | +MT753X_PAE_PORT_FW (MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ) | +MT753X_BPDU_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | +MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY );/* Trap frames with :01 and :02 MAC DAs to the CPU port(s) and egress * them VLAN-untagged. */ -mt7530_rmw (priv,MT753X_RGAC1 ,MT753X_R02_EG_TAG_MASK | -MT753X_R02_PORT_FW_MASK |MT753X_R01_EG_TAG_MASK | -MT753X_R01_PORT_FW_MASK , -MT753X_R02_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | -MT753X_R02_PORT_FW (MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ) | -MT753X_R01_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | -MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ); +mt7530_rmw (priv,MT753X_RGAC1 , +MT753X_R02_BPDU_FR |MT753X_R02_EG_TAG_MASK | +MT753X_R02_PORT_FW_MASK |MT753X_R01_BPDU_FR | +MT753X_R01_EG_TAG_MASK |MT753X_R01_PORT_FW_MASK , +MT753X_R02_BPDU_FR | +MT753X_R02_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | +MT753X_R02_PORT_FW (MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ) | +MT753X_R01_BPDU_FR | +MT753X_R01_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | +MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY );/* Trap frames with :03 and :0E MAC DAs to the CPU port(s) and egress * them VLAN-untagged. */ -mt7530_rmw (priv,MT753X_RGAC2 ,MT753X_R0E_EG_TAG_MASK | -MT753X_R0E_PORT_FW_MASK |MT753X_R03_EG_TAG_MASK | -MT753X_R03_PORT_FW_MASK , -MT753X_R0E_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | -MT753X_R0E_PORT_FW (MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ) | -MT753X_R03_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | -MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ); +mt7530_rmw (priv,MT753X_RGAC2 , +MT753X_R0E_BPDU_FR |MT753X_R0E_EG_TAG_MASK | +MT753X_R0E_PORT_FW_MASK |MT753X_R03_BPDU_FR | +MT753X_R03_EG_TAG_MASK |MT753X_R03_PORT_FW_MASK , +MT753X_R0E_BPDU_FR | +MT753X_R0E_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | +MT753X_R0E_PORT_FW (MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ) | +MT753X_R03_BPDU_FR | +MT753X_R03_EG_TAG (MT7530_VLAN_EG_UNTAGGED ) | +MT753X_BPDU_CPU_ONLY ); } static int
drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h +5 -0
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum mt753x_id {/* Registers for BPDU and PAE frame control*/ #define MT753X_BPC 0x24 +#define MT753X_PAE_BPDU_FR BIT(25)#define MT753X_PAE_EG_TAG_MASK GENMASK(24, 22)#define MT753X_PAE_EG_TAG (x) FIELD_PREP(MT753X_PAE_EG_TAG_MASK, x)#define MT753X_PAE_PORT_FW_MASK GENMASK(18, 16)
@@ -73,20 +74,24 @@ enum mt753x_id {/* Register for :01 and :02 MAC DA frame control */ #define MT753X_RGAC1 0x28 +#define MT753X_R02_BPDU_FR BIT(25)#define MT753X_R02_EG_TAG_MASK GENMASK(24, 22)#define MT753X_R02_EG_TAG (x) FIELD_PREP(MT753X_R02_EG_TAG_MASK, x)#define MT753X_R02_PORT_FW_MASK GENMASK(18, 16)#define MT753X_R02_PORT_FW (x) FIELD_PREP(MT753X_R02_PORT_FW_MASK, x) +#define MT753X_R01_BPDU_FR BIT(9)#define MT753X_R01_EG_TAG_MASK GENMASK(8, 6)#define MT753X_R01_EG_TAG (x) FIELD_PREP(MT753X_R01_EG_TAG_MASK, x)#define MT753X_R01_PORT_FW_MASK GENMASK(2, 0)/* Register for :03 and :0E MAC DA frame control */ #define MT753X_RGAC2 0x2c +#define MT753X_R0E_BPDU_FR BIT(25)#define MT753X_R0E_EG_TAG_MASK GENMASK(24, 22)#define MT753X_R0E_EG_TAG (x) FIELD_PREP(MT753X_R0E_EG_TAG_MASK, x)#define MT753X_R0E_PORT_FW_MASK GENMASK(18, 16)#define MT753X_R0E_PORT_FW (x) FIELD_PREP(MT753X_R0E_PORT_FW_MASK, x) +#define MT753X_R03_BPDU_FR BIT(9)#define MT753X_R03_EG_TAG_MASK GENMASK(8, 6)#define MT753X_R03_EG_TAG (x) FIELD_PREP(MT753X_R03_EG_TAG_MASK, x)#define MT753X_R03_PORT_FW_MASK GENMASK(2, 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/69 af_unix: Do not use atomic ops for unix_sk(sk)->inflight.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 97af84a6bba2ab2b9c704c08e67de3b5ea551bb2 ]
When touching unix_sk(sk)->inflight, we are always under spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock).
Let's convert unix_sk(sk)->inflight to the normal unsigned long.
Stable-dep-of: 47d8ac011fe1 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
--- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++-- net/unix/garbage.c | 17 ++++++++--------- net/unix/scm.c | 8 +++++--- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/net/af_unix.h +1 -1
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct unix_sock {struct mutex iolock, bindlock;struct sock *peer;struct list_head link; -atomic_long_t inflight; +unsigned long inflight;spinlock_t lock;unsigned long gc_flags;#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0
net/unix/af_unix.c +2 -2
@@ -968,11 +968,11 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern, sk->sk_write_space = unix_write_space; sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen; sk->sk_destruct = unix_sock_destructor; - u =unix_sk (sk); + u =unix_sk (sk); + u->inflight =0 ; u->path.dentry =NULL ; u->path.mnt =NULL ;spin_lock_init (&u->lock); -atomic_long_set (&u->inflight,0 );INIT_LIST_HEAD (&u->link);mutex_init (&u->iolock);/* single task reading lock */ mutex_init (&u->bindlock);/* single task binding lock */
net/unix/garbage.c +8 -9
@@ -166,17 +166,18 @@ static void scan_children(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),static void dec_inflight (struct unix_sock *usk) { -atomic_long_dec (&usk->inflight); + usk->inflight--; }static void inc_inflight (struct unix_sock *usk) { -atomic_long_inc (&usk->inflight); + usk->inflight++; }static void inc_inflight_move_tail (struct unix_sock *u) { -atomic_long_inc (&u->inflight); + u->inflight++; +/* If this still might be part of a cycle, move it to the end * of the list, so that it's checked even if it was already * passed over
@@ -237,14 +238,12 @@ void unix_gc(void)*/ list_for_each_entry_safe (u, next, &gc_inflight_list, link) {long total_refs; -long inflight_refs; total_refs =file_count (u->sk.sk_socket->file); - inflight_refs =atomic_long_read (&u->inflight); -BUG_ON (inflight_refs <1 ); -BUG_ON (total_refs < inflight_refs); -if (total_refs == inflight_refs) { +BUG_ON (!u->inflight); +BUG_ON (total_refs < u->inflight); +if (total_refs == u->inflight) {list_move_tail (&u->link, &gc_candidates);__set_bit (UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE , &u->gc_flags);__set_bit (UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE , &u->gc_flags);
@@ -271,7 +270,7 @@ void unix_gc(void)/* Move cursor to after the current position. */ list_move (&cursor, &u->link); -if (atomic_long_read (&u->inflight) >0 ) { +if (u->inflight) {list_move_tail (&u->link, ¬_cycle_list);__clear_bit (UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE , &u->gc_flags);scan_children (&u->sk, inc_inflight_move_tail,NULL );
net/unix/scm.c +5 -3
@@ -52,12 +52,13 @@ void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)if (s) {struct unix_sock *u =unix_sk (s); -if (atomic_long_inc_return (&u->inflight) ==1 ) { +if (!u->inflight) {BUG_ON (!list_empty (&u->link));list_add_tail (&u->link, &gc_inflight_list); }else {BUG_ON (list_empty (&u->link)); } + u->inflight++;/* Paired with READ_ONCE() in wait_for_unix_gc() */ WRITE_ONCE (unix_tot_inflight, unix_tot_inflight +1 ); }
@@ -74,10 +75,11 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)if (s) {struct unix_sock *u =unix_sk (s); -BUG_ON (!atomic_long_read (&u->inflight)); +BUG_ON (!u->inflight);BUG_ON (list_empty (&u->link)); -if (atomic_long_dec_and_test (&u->inflight)) + u->inflight--; +if (!u->inflight)list_del_init (&u->link);/* Paired with READ_ONCE() in wait_for_unix_gc() */ WRITE_ONCE (unix_tot_inflight, unix_tot_inflight -1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/69 af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 47d8ac011fe1c9251070e1bd64cb10b48193ec51 ]
Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.
sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM
S is an unconnected socket
L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped
connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()
---------------- ------------------------- -----------
NS = unix_create1()
skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)
L = unix_find_other(addr)unix_state_lock(L)unix_peer(S) = NS
// V count=1 inflight=0
NS = unix_peer(S)
skb2 = sock_alloc()
skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])
// V became in-flight
// V count=2 inflight=1
close(V)
// V count=1 inflight=1
// GC candidate condition met
for u in gc_inflight_list:
if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
add u to gc_candidates
// gc_candidates={L, V}
for u in gc_candidates:
scan_children(u, dec_inflight)
// embryo (skb1) was not
// reachable from L yet, so V's
// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)
unix_state_unlock(L)
for u in gc_candidates:
if (u.inflight)
scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)
// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
--- net/unix/garbage.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/garbage.c +17 -1
@@ -235,11 +235,22 @@ void unix_gc(void)* receive queues. Other, non candidate sockets _can_ be * added to queue, so we must make sure only to touch * candidates. +* +* Embryos, though never candidates themselves, affect which +* candidates are reachable by the garbage collector. Before +* being added to a listener's queue, an embryo may already +* receive data carrying SCM_RIGHTS, potentially making the +* passed socket a candidate that is not yet reachable by the +* collector. It becomes reachable once the embryo is +* enqueued. Therefore, we must ensure that no SCM-laden +* embryo appears in a (candidate) listener's queue between +* consecutive scan_children() calls. */ list_for_each_entry_safe (u, next, &gc_inflight_list, link) { +struct sock *sk = &u->sk;long total_refs; - total_refs =file_count (u->sk.sk_socket->file); + total_refs =file_count (sk->sk_socket->file);BUG_ON (!u->inflight);BUG_ON (total_refs < u->inflight);
@@ -247,6 +258,11 @@ void unix_gc(void)list_move_tail (&u->link, &gc_candidates);__set_bit (UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE , &u->gc_flags);__set_bit (UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE , &u->gc_flags); + +if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_LISTEN ) { +unix_state_lock (sk); +unix_state_unlock (sk); + } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/69 net: ena: Fix potential sign extension issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Arinzon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 713a85195aad25d8a26786a37b674e3e5ec09e3c ]
Small unsigned types are promoted to larger signed types in the case of multiplication, the result of which may overflow. In case the result of such a multiplication has its MSB turned on, it will be sign extended with '1's.
This changes the multiplication result.
Code example of the phenomenon:
-------------------------------
u16 x, y;size_t z1, z2;
x = y = 0xffff;printk("x=%x y=%x\n",x,y);
z1 = x*y;
z2 = (size_t)x*y;
printk("z1=%lx z2=%lx\n", z1, z2);
Output:
-------
x=ffff y=ffff
z1=fffffffffffe0001 z2=fffe0001
The expected result of ffff*ffff is fffe0001, and without the explicit casting to avoid the unwanted sign extension we got fffffffffffe0001.
This commit adds an explicit casting to avoid the sign extension issue.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_com.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_com.c +1 -1
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static int ena_com_init_io_sq(struct ena_com_dev *ena_dev,ENA_COM_BOUNCE_BUFFER_CNTRL_CNT ; io_sq->bounce_buf_ctrl.next_to_use =0 ; - size = io_sq->bounce_buf_ctrl.buffer_size * + size = (size_t )io_sq->bounce_buf_ctrl.buffer_size * io_sq->bounce_buf_ctrl.buffers_num; dev_node =dev_to_node (ena_dev->dmadev);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/69 net: ena: Wrong missing IO completions check order
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Arinzon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f7e417180665234fdb7af2ebe33d89aaa434d16f ]
Missing IO completions check is called every second (HZ jiffies). This commit fixes several issues with this check:
1. Duplicate queues check:
Max of 4 queues are scanned on each check due to monitor budget. Once reaching the budget, this check exits under the assumption that the next check will continue to scan the remainder of the queues, but in practice, next check will first scan the last already scanned queue which is not necessary and may cause the full queue scan to last a couple of seconds longer.
The fix is to start every check with the next queue to scan. For example, on 8 IO queues:
Bug: [0,1,2,3], [3,4,5,6], [6,7]
Fix: [0,1,2,3], [4,5,6,7]
2. Unbalanced queues check:
In case the number of active IO queues is not a multiple of budget, there will be checks which don't utilize the full budget because the full scan exits when reaching the last queue id. The fix is to run every TX completion check with exact queue budget regardless of the queue id.
For example, on 7 IO queues:
Bug: [0,1,2,3], [4,5,6], [0,1,2,3]
Fix: [0,1,2,3], [4,5,6,0], [1,2,3,4]
The budget may be lowered in case the number of IO queues is less than the budget (4) to make sure there are no duplicate queues on the same check.
For example, on 3 IO queues:
Bug: [0,1,2,0], [1,2,0,1]
Fix: [0,1,2], [0,1,2]
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c | 21 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c +12 -9
@@ -3797,10 +3797,11 @@ static void check_for_missing_completions(struct ena_adapter *adapter) {struct ena_ring *tx_ring;struct ena_ring *rx_ring; -int i, budget, rc; +int qid, budget, rc;int io_queue_count; io_queue_count = adapter->xdp_num_queues + adapter->num_io_queues; +/* Make sure the driver doesn't turn the device in other process */ smp_rmb ();
@@ -3813,27 +3814,29 @@ static void check_for_missing_completions(struct ena_adapter *adapter)if (adapter->missing_tx_completion_to ==ENA_HW_HINTS_NO_TIMEOUT )return ; - budget =ENA_MONITORED_TX_QUEUES ; + budget =min_t (u32, io_queue_count,ENA_MONITORED_TX_QUEUES ); -for (i = adapter->last_monitored_tx_qid; i < io_queue_count; i++) { - tx_ring = &adapter->tx_ring[i]; - rx_ring = &adapter->rx_ring[i]; + qid = adapter->last_monitored_tx_qid; + +while (budget) { + qid = (qid +1 ) % io_queue_count; + + tx_ring = &adapter->tx_ring[qid]; + rx_ring = &adapter->rx_ring[qid]; rc =check_missing_comp_in_tx_queue (adapter, tx_ring);if (unlikely (rc))return ; - rc = !ENA_IS_XDP_INDEX (adapter, i) ? + rc = !ENA_IS_XDP_INDEX (adapter, qid) ?check_for_rx_interrupt_queue (adapter, rx_ring) :0 ;if (unlikely (rc))return ; budget--; -if (!budget) -break ; } - adapter->last_monitored_tx_qid = i % io_queue_count; + adapter->last_monitored_tx_qid = qid; }/* trigger napi schedule after 2 consecutive detections */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/69 net: ena: Fix incorrect descriptor free behavior
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Arinzon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bf02d9fe00632d22fa91d34749c7aacf397b6cde ]
ENA has two types of TX queues:
- queues which only process TX packets arriving from the network stack
- queues which only process TX packets forwarded to it by XDP_REDIRECT or XDP_TX instructions
The ena_free_tx_bufs() cycles through all descriptors in a TX queue and unmaps + frees every descriptor that hasn't been acknowledged yet by the device (uncompleted TX transactions).
The function assumes that the processed TX queue is necessarily from the first category listed above and ends up using napi_consume_skb() for descriptors belonging to an XDP specific queue.
This patch solves a bug in which, in case of a VF reset, the descriptors aren't freed correctly, leading to crashes.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c +11 -3
@@ -1203,8 +1203,11 @@ static void ena_unmap_tx_buff(struct ena_ring *tx_ring,static void ena_free_tx_bufs (struct ena_ring *tx_ring) {bool print_once = true; +bool is_xdp_ring;u32 i; + is_xdp_ring =ENA_IS_XDP_INDEX (tx_ring->adapter, tx_ring->qid); +for (i =0 ; i < tx_ring->ring_size; i++) {struct ena_tx_buffer *tx_info = &tx_ring->tx_buffer_info[i];
@@ -1224,10 +1227,15 @@ static void ena_free_tx_bufs(struct ena_ring *tx_ring)ena_unmap_tx_buff (tx_ring, tx_info); -dev_kfree_skb_any (tx_info->skb); +if (is_xdp_ring) +xdp_return_frame (tx_info->xdpf); +else +dev_kfree_skb_any (tx_info->skb); } -netdev_tx_reset_queue (netdev_get_tx_queue (tx_ring->netdev, - tx_ring->qid)); + +if (!is_xdp_ring) +netdev_tx_reset_queue (netdev_get_tx_queue (tx_ring->netdev, + tx_ring->qid)); }static void ena_free_all_tx_bufs (struct ena_adapter *adapter)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/69 tracing: hide unused ftrace_event_id_fops
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5281ec83454d70d98b71f1836fb16512566c01cd ]
When CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS, a 'make W=1' build produces a warning about the unused ftrace_event_id_fops variable:
kernel/trace/trace_events.c:2155:37: error: 'ftrace_event_id_fops' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
2155 | static const struct file_operations ftrace_event_id_fops = {
Hide this in the same #ifdef as the reference to it.
--- kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/trace/trace_events.c +4 -0
@@ -1669,6 +1669,7 @@ static int trace_format_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)return 0 ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS static ssize_t event_id_read (struct file *filp,char __user *ubuf,size_t cnt,loff_t *ppos) {
@@ -1683,6 +1684,7 @@ event_id_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)return simple_read_from_buffer (ubuf, cnt, ppos, buf, len); } +#endif static ssize_t event_filter_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt,
@@ -2127,10 +2129,12 @@ static const struct file_operations ftrace_event_format_fops = { .release = seq_release, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS static const struct file_operations ftrace_event_id_fops = { .read = event_id_read, .llseek = default_llseek, }; +#endif static const struct file_operations ftrace_event_filter_fops = { .open = tracing_open_file_tr,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/69 iommu/vt-d: Allocate local memory for page request queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a34f3e20ddff02c4f12df2c0635367394e64c63d ]
The page request queue is per IOMMU, its allocation should be made NUMA-aware for performance reasons.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int intel_svm_enable_prq(struct intel_iommu *iommu)struct page *pages;int irq, ret; - pages =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,PRQ_ORDER ); + pages =alloc_pages_node (iommu->node,GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,PRQ_ORDER );if (!pages) {pr_warn ("IOMMU: %s: Failed to allocate page request queue\n" , iommu->name);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/69 btrfs: qgroup: correctly model root qgroup rsv in convert
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Boris Burkov <[email protected]>
commit 141fb8cd206ace23c02cd2791c6da52c1d77d42a upstream.
We use add_root_meta_rsv and sub_root_meta_rsv to track prealloc and pertrans reservations for subvolumes when quotas are enabled. The convert function does not properly increment pertrans after decrementing prealloc, so the count is not accurate.
Note: we check that the fs is not read-only to mirror the logic in qgroup_convert_meta, which checks that before adding to the pertrans rsv.
--- fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +2 -0
@@ -4154,6 +4154,8 @@ void btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta( BTRFS_QGROUP_RSV_META_PREALLOC);trace_qgroup_meta_convert (root, num_bytes);qgroup_convert_meta (fs_info, root->root_key.objectid, num_bytes); +if (!sb_rdonly (fs_info->sb)) +add_root_meta_rsv (root, num_bytes,BTRFS_QGROUP_RSV_META_PERTRANS ); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/69 btrfs: record delayed inode root in transaction
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Boris Burkov <[email protected]>
commit 71537e35c324ea6fbd68377a4f26bb93a831ae35 upstream.
When running delayed inode updates, we do not record the inode's root in the transaction, but we do allocate PREALLOC and thus converted PERTRANS space for it. To be sure we free that PERTRANS meta rsv, we must ensure that we record the root in the transaction.
--- fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c +3 -0
@@ -1115,6 +1115,9 @@ __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items(strucif (ret)return ret; + ret =btrfs_record_root_in_trans (trans, node->root); +if (ret) +return ret; ret =btrfs_update_delayed_inode (trans, node->root, path, node);return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/69 btrfs: qgroup: convert PREALLOC to PERTRANS after record_root_in_trans
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Boris Burkov <[email protected]>
commit 211de93367304ab395357f8cb12568a4d1e20701 upstream.
The transaction is only able to free PERTRANS reservations for a root once that root has been recorded with the TRANS tag on the roots radix tree. Therefore, until we are sure that this root will get tagged, it isn't safe to convert. Generally, this is not an issue as *some* transaction will likely tag the root before long and this reservation will get freed in that transaction, but technically it could stick around until unmount and result in a warning about leaked metadata reservation space.
This path is most exercised by running the generic/269 fstest with CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG.
--- fs/btrfs/transaction.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/transaction.c +8 -9
@@ -700,14 +700,6 @@ again: h->reloc_reserved = reloc_reserved; } -/* -* Now that we have found a transaction to be a part of, convert the -* qgroup reservation from prealloc to pertrans. A different transaction -* can't race in and free our pertrans out from under us. -*/ -if (qgroup_reserved) -btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta (root, qgroup_reserved); - got_it:if (!current->journal_info) current->journal_info = h;
@@ -741,8 +733,15 @@ got_it:* not just freed. */ btrfs_end_transaction (h); -return ERR_PTR (ret); + goto reserve_fail; } +/* +* Now that we have found a transaction to be a part of, convert the +* qgroup reservation from prealloc to pertrans. A different transaction +* can't race in and free our pertrans out from under us. +*/ +if (qgroup_reserved) +btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta (root, qgroup_reserved);return h;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/69 io_uring/net: restore msg_control on sendzc retry
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
commit 4fe82aedeb8a8cb09bfa60f55ab57b5c10a74ac4 upstream.
cac9e4418f4cb ("io_uring/net: save msghdr->msg_control for retries") reinstatiates msg_control before every __sys_sendmsg_sock(), since the function can overwrite the value in msghdr. We need to do same for zerocopy sendmsg.
--- io_uring/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
io_uring/net.c +1 -0
@@ -1229,6 +1229,7 @@ int io_sendmsg_zc(struct io_kiocb *req,if (req_has_async_data (req)) { kmsg = req->async_data; + kmsg->msg.msg_control_user = sr->msg_control; }else { ret =io_sendmsg_copy_hdr (req, &iomsg);if (ret)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/69 kprobes: Fix possible use-after-free issue on kprobe registration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>
commit 325f3fb551f8cd672dbbfc4cf58b14f9ee3fc9e8 upstream.
When unloading a module, its state is changing MODULE_STATE_LIVE ->
MODULE_STATE_GOING -> MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED. Each change will take
a time. is_module_text_address() and __module_text_address() works with MODULE_STATE_LIVE and MODULE_STATE_GOING.
If we use is_module_text_address() and __module_text_address() separately, there is a chance that the first one is succeeded but the next one is failed because module->state becomes MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED between those operations.
In check_kprobe_address_safe(), if the second __module_text_address() is failed, that is ignored because it expected a kernel_text address. But it may have failed simply because module->state has been changed to MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED. In this case, arm_kprobe() will try to modify non-exist module text address (use-after-free).
To fix this problem, we should not use separated is_module_text_address() and __module_text_address(), but use only __module_text_address() once and do try_module_get(module) which is only available with MODULE_STATE_LIVE.
--- kernel/kprobes.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +12 -6
@@ -1567,10 +1567,17 @@ static int check_kprobe_address_safe(strjump_label_lock ();preempt_disable (); -/* Ensure it is not in reserved area nor out of text */ - if (!(core_kernel_text((unsigned long) p->addr) || - is_module_text_address((unsigned long) p->addr)) || - in_gate_area_no_mm((unsigned long) p->addr) || +/* Ensure the address is in a text area, and find a module if exists. */ + *probed_mod =NULL ; +if (!core_kernel_text ((unsigned long ) p->addr)) { + *probed_mod =__module_text_address ((unsigned long ) p->addr); +if (!(*probed_mod)) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + } +/* Ensure it is not in reserved area. */ + if (in_gate_area_no_mm((unsigned long) p->addr) || within_kprobe_blacklist((unsigned long) p->addr) || jump_label_text_reserved(p->addr, p->addr) || static_call_text_reserved(p->addr, p->addr) ||
@@ -1580,8 +1587,7 @@ static int check_kprobe_address_safe(str goto out; } -/* Check if 'p' is probing a module. */ - *probed_mod =__module_text_address ((unsigned long ) p->addr); +/* Get module refcount and reject __init functions for loaded modules. */ if (*probed_mod) {/* * We must hold a refcount of the probed module while updating
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/69 drm/i915/vrr: Disable VRR when using bigjoiner
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
commit dcd8992e47f13afb5c11a61e8d9c141c35e23751 upstream.
All joined pipes share the same transcoder/timing generator. Currently we just do the commits per-pipe, which doesn't really work if we need to change switch between non-VRR and VRR timings generators on the fly, or even when sending the push to the transcoder. For now just disable VRR when bigjoiner is needed.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vrr.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vrr.c +7 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ intel_vrr_compute_config(struct intel_crif (!intel_vrr_is_capable (connector))return ; +/* +* FIXME all joined pipes share the same transcoder. +* Need to account for that during VRR toggle/push/etc. +*/ +if (crtc_state->bigjoiner_pipes) +return ; +if (adjusted_mode->flags &DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE )return ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/69 drm/amdkfd: Reset GPU on queue preemption failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harish Kasiviswanathan <[email protected]>
commit 8bdfb4ea95ca738d33ef71376c21eba20130f2eb upstream.
Currently, with F32 HWS GPU reset is only when unmap queue fails.
However, if compute queue doesn't repond to preemption request in time unmap will return without any error. In this case, only preemption error is logged and Reset is not triggered. Call GPU reset in this case also.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c +1 -0
@@ -1805,6 +1805,7 @@ static int unmap_queues_cpsch(struct devpr_err ("HIQ MQD's queue_doorbell_id0 is not 0, Queue preemption time out\n" );while (halt_if_hws_hang)schedule (); +kfd_hws_hang (dqm);return -ETIME ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/69 drm/ast: Fix soft lockup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jammy Huang <[email protected]>
commit bc004f5038220b1891ef4107134ccae44be55109 upstream.
There is a while-loop in ast_dp_set_on_off() that could lead to infinite-loop. This is because the register, VGACRI-Dx, checked in this API is a scratch register actually controlled by a MCU, named DPMCU, in BMC.
These scratch registers are protected by scu-lock. If suc-lock is not off, DPMCU can not update these registers and then host will have soft lockup due to never updated status.
DPMCU is used to control DP and relative registers to handshake with host's VGA driver. Even the most time-consuming task, DP's link training, is less than 100ms. 200ms should be enough.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_dp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_dp.c +3 -0
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ void ast_dp_set_on_off(struct drm_device {struct ast_private *ast =to_ast_private (dev);u8 video_on_off = on; +u32 i =0 ;// Video On/Off ast_set_index_reg_mask (ast,AST_IO_CRTC_PORT ,0xE3 , (u8 ) ~AST_DP_VIDEO_ENABLE , on);
@@ -202,6 +203,8 @@ void ast_dp_set_on_off(struct drm_device ASTDP_MIRROR_VIDEO_ENABLE) != video_on_off) {// wait 1 ms mdelay (1 ); +if (++i >200 ) +break ; } } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/69 drm/client: Fully protect modes[] with dev->mode_config.mutex
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
commit 3eadd887dbac1df8f25f701e5d404d1b90fd0fea upstream.
The modes[] array contains pointers to modes on the connectors' mode lists, which are protected by dev->mode_config.mutex. Thus we need to extend modes[] the same protection or by the time we use it the elements may already be pointing to freed/reused memory.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_client_modeset.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_client_modeset.c +2 -1
@@ -781,6 +781,7 @@ int drm_client_modeset_probe(struct drm_unsigned int total_modes_count =0 ;struct drm_client_offset *offsets;unsigned int connector_count =0 ; +/* points to modes protected by mode_config.mutex */ struct drm_display_mode **modes;struct drm_crtc **crtcs;int i, ret =0 ;
@@ -849,7 +850,6 @@ int drm_client_modeset_probe(struct drm_drm_client_pick_crtcs (client, connectors, connector_count, crtcs, modes,0 , width, height); } -mutex_unlock (&dev->mode_config.mutex);drm_client_modeset_release (client);
@@ -879,6 +879,7 @@ int drm_client_modeset_probe(struct drm_ modeset->y = offset->y; } } +mutex_unlock (&dev->mode_config.mutex);mutex_unlock (&client->modeset_mutex); out:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/69 vhost: Add smp_rmb() in vhost_vq_avail_empty()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
commit 22e1992cf7b034db5325660e98c41ca5afa5f519 upstream.
A smp_rmb() has been missed in vhost_vq_avail_empty(), spotted by Will. Otherwise, it's not ensured the available ring entries pushed by guest can be observed by vhost in time, leading to stale available ring entries fetched by vhost in vhost_get_vq_desc(), as reported by Yihuang Yu on NVidia's grace-hopper (ARM64) platform.
/home/gavin/sandbox/qemu.main/build/qemu-system-aarch64 \ -accel kvm -machine virt,gic-version=host -cpu host \ -smp maxcpus=1,cpus=1,sockets=1,clusters=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ -m 4096M,slots=16,maxmem=64G \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=mem0,size=4096M \ : \ -netdev tap,id=vnet0,vhost=true \ -device virtio-net-pci,bus=pcie.8,netdev=vnet0,mac=52:54:00:f1:26:b0 : guest# netperf -H 10.26.1.81 -l 60 -C -c -t UDP_STREAM virtio_net virtio0: output.0:id 100 is not a head!
Add the missed smp_rmb() in vhost_vq_avail_empty(). When tx_can_batch() returns true, it means there's still pending tx buffers. Since it might read indices, so it still can bypass the smp_rmb() in vhost_get_vq_desc(). Note that it should be safe until vq->avail_idx is changed by commit 275bf960ac697 ("vhost: better detection of available buffers").
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vhost/vhost.c +11 -1
@@ -2523,9 +2523,19 @@ bool vhost_vq_avail_empty(struct vhost_d r =vhost_get_avail_idx (vq, &avail_idx);if (unlikely (r))return false; + vq->avail_idx =vhost16_to_cpu (vq, avail_idx); +if (vq->avail_idx != vq->last_avail_idx) { +/* Since we have updated avail_idx, the following +* call to vhost_get_vq_desc() will read available +* ring entries. Make sure that read happens after +* the avail_idx read. +*/ +smp_rmb (); +return false; + } -return vq->avail_idx == vq->last_avail_idx; +return true; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vhost_vq_avail_empty);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/69 vhost: Add smp_rmb() in vhost_enable_notify()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
commit df9ace7647d4123209395bb9967e998d5758c645 upstream.
A smp_rmb() has been missed in vhost_enable_notify(), inspired by Will. Otherwise, it's not ensured the available ring entries pushed by guest can be observed by vhost in time, leading to stale available ring entries fetched by vhost in vhost_get_vq_desc(), as reported by Yihuang Yu on NVidia's grace-hopper (ARM64) platform.
/home/gavin/sandbox/qemu.main/build/qemu-system-aarch64 \ -accel kvm -machine virt,gic-version=host -cpu host \ -smp maxcpus=1,cpus=1,sockets=1,clusters=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ -m 4096M,slots=16,maxmem=64G \ -object memory-backend-ram,id=mem0,size=4096M \ : \ -netdev tap,id=vnet0,vhost=true \ -device virtio-net-pci,bus=pcie.8,netdev=vnet0,mac=52:54:00:f1:26:b0 : guest# netperf -H 10.26.1.81 -l 60 -C -c -t UDP_STREAM virtio_net virtio0: output.0:id 100 is not a head!
Add the missed smp_rmb() in vhost_enable_notify(). When it returns true, it means there's still pending tx buffers. Since it might read indices, so it still can bypass the smp_rmb() in vhost_get_vq_desc(). Note that it should be safe until vq->avail_idx is changed by commit d3bb267bbdcb ("vhost: cache avail index in vhost_enable_notify()").
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/vhost/vhost.c +11 -1
@@ -2572,9 +2572,19 @@ bool vhost_enable_notify(struct vhost_de &vq->avail->idx, r);return false; } + vq->avail_idx =vhost16_to_cpu (vq, avail_idx); +if (vq->avail_idx != vq->last_avail_idx) { +/* Since we have updated avail_idx, the following +* call to vhost_get_vq_desc() will read available +* ring entries. Make sure that read happens after +* the avail_idx read. +*/ +smp_rmb (); +return true; + } -return vq->avail_idx != vq->last_avail_idx; +return false; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vhost_enable_notify);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/69 perf/x86: Fix out of range data
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
commit dec8ced871e17eea46f097542dd074d022be4bd1 upstream.
On x86 each struct cpu_hw_events maintains a table for counter assignment but it missed to update one for the deleted event in x86_pmu_del(). This can make perf_clear_dirty_counters() reset used counter if it's called before event scheduling or enabling. Then it would return out of range data which doesn't make sense.
The following code can reproduce the problem.
$ cat repro.c #include <pthread.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/syscall.h>
struct perf_event_attr attr = {
.type = PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE,
.config = PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES,
.disabled = 1,
};
void *worker(void *arg)
{
int cpu = (long)arg;
int fd1 = syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, -1, cpu, -1, 0);
int fd2 = syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, -1, cpu, -1, 0);
void *p;
do {
ioctl(fd1, PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE, 0);
p = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd1, 0);
ioctl(fd2, PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE, 0);
ioctl(fd2, PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE, 0);
munmap(p, 4096);
ioctl(fd1, PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE, 0);
} while (1);
return NULL;
}
int main(void)
{
int i;
int n = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
pthread_t *th = calloc(n, sizeof(*th));
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
pthread_create(&th[i], NULL, worker, (void *)(long)i);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
pthread_join(th[i], NULL);
free(th);
return 0;
}And you can see the out of range data using perf stat like this. Probably it'd be easier to see on a large machine.
$ gcc -o repro repro.c -pthread
$ ./repro &
$ sudo perf stat -A -I 1000 2>&1 | awk '{ if (length($3) > 15) print }'
1.001028462 CPU6 196,719,295,683,763 cycles # 194290.996 GHz (71.54%)
1.001028462 CPU3 396,077,485,787,730 branch-misses # 15804359784.80% of all branches (71.07%)
1.001028462 CPU17 197,608,350,727,877 branch-misses # 14594186554.56% of all branches (71.22%)
2.020064073 CPU4 198,372,472,612,140 cycles # 194681.113 GHz (70.95%)
2.020064073 CPU6 199,419,277,896,696 cycles # 195720.007 GHz (70.57%)
2.020064073 CPU20 198,147,174,025,639 cycles # 194474.654 GHz (71.03%)
2.020064073 CPU20 198,421,240,580,145 stalled-cycles-frontend # 100.14% frontend cycles idle (70.93%)
3.037443155 CPU4 197,382,689,923,416 cycles # 194043.065 GHz (71.30%)
3.037443155 CPU20 196,324,797,879,414 cycles # 193003.773 GHz (71.69%)
3.037443155 CPU5 197,679,956,608,205 stalled-cycles-backend # 1315606428.66% backend cycles idle (71.19%)
3.037443155 CPU5 198,571,860,474,851 instructions # 13215422.58 insn per cycleIt should move the contents in the cpuc->assign as well.
--- arch/x86/events/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/events/core.c +1 -0
@@ -1644,6 +1644,7 @@ static void x86_pmu_del(struct perf_evenwhile (++i < cpuc->n_events) { cpuc->event_list[i-1 ] = cpuc->event_list[i]; cpuc->event_constraint[i-1 ] = cpuc->event_constraint[i]; + cpuc->assign[i-1 ] = cpuc->assign[i]; } cpuc->event_constraint[i-1 ] =NULL ; --cpuc->n_events;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/69 x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit f337a6a21e2fd67eadea471e93d05dd37baaa9be upstream.
Initialize cpu_mitigations to CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF if the kernel is built with CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n, as the help text quite clearly states that disabling SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is supposed to turn off all mitigations by default.
│ If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really │ should know what you are doing to say so.
As is, the kernel still defaults to CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO, which results in some mitigations being enabled in spite of SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n.
--- kernel/cpu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/cpu.c +2 -1
@@ -2788,7 +2788,8 @@ enum cpu_mitigations { };static enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations__ro_after_init = -CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO ; +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS ) ?CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO : +CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF ;static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline (char *arg) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/69 selftests: timers: Fix abs() warning in posix_timers test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Stultz <[email protected]>
commit ed366de8ec89d4f960d66c85fc37d9de22f7bf6d upstream.
Building with clang results in the following warning:
posix_timers.c:69:6: warning: absolute value function 'abs' given an
argument of type 'long long' but has parameter of type 'int' which may cause truncation of value [-Wabsolute-value]
if (abs(diff - DELAY * USECS_PER_SEC) > USECS_PER_SEC / 2) {
^
So switch to using llabs() instead.
--- tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c +1 -1
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int check_diff(struct timeval sta diff = end.tv_usec - start.tv_usec; diff += (end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec) *USECS_PER_SEC ; -if (abs (diff -DELAY *USECS_PER_SEC ) >USECS_PER_SEC /2 ) { +if (llabs (diff -DELAY *USECS_PER_SEC ) >USECS_PER_SEC /2 ) {printf ("Diff too high: %lld.." , diff);return -1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/69 x86/apic: Force native_apic_mem_read() to use the MOV instruction
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adam Dunlap <[email protected]>
commit 5ce344beaca688f4cdea07045e0b8f03dc537e74 upstream.
When done from a virtual machine, instructions that touch APIC memory must be emulated. By convention, MMIO accesses are typically performed via io.h helpers such as readl() or writeq() to simplify instruction emulation/decoding (ex: in KVM hosts and SEV guests) [0].
Currently, native_apic_mem_read() does not follow this convention, allowing the compiler to emit instructions other than the MOV instruction generated by readl(). In particular, when the kernel is compiled with clang and run as a SEV-ES or SEV-SNP guest, the compiler would emit a TESTL instruction which is not supported by the SEV-ES emulator, causing a boot failure in that environment. It is likely the same problem would happen in a TDX guest as that uses the same instruction emulator as SEV-ES.
To make sure all emulators can emulate APIC memory reads via MOV, use the readl() function in native_apic_mem_read(). It is expected that any emulator would support MOV in any addressing mode as it is the most generic and is what is usually emitted currently.
The TESTL instruction is emitted when native_apic_mem_read() is inlined into apic_mem_wait_icr_idle(). The emulator comes from insn_decode_mmio() in arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c. It's not worth it to extend insn_decode_mmio() to support more instructions since, in theory, the compiler could choose to output nearly any instruction for such reads which would bloat the emulator beyond reason.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +2 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <asm/mpspec.h> #include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/hardirq.h> +#include <asm/io.h> #define ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3 1
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static inline void native_apic_mem_writestatic inline u32 native_apic_mem_read (u32 reg) { -return *((volatile u32 *)(APIC_BASE + reg)); +return readl ((void __iomem *)(APIC_BASE + reg)); }extern void native_apic_wait_icr_idle (void );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/69 irqflags: Explicitly ignore lockdep_hrtimer_exit() argument
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit c1d11fc2c8320871b40730991071dd0a0b405bc8 upstream.
When building with 'make W=1' but CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=n, the unused argument to lockdep_hrtimer_exit() causes a warning:
kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1655:14: error: variable 'expires_in_hardirq' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
This is intentional behavior, so add a cast to void to shut up the warning.
--- include/linux/irqflags.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/irqflags.h +1 -1
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ do { \# define lockdep_softirq_enter () do { } while (0)# define lockdep_softirq_exit () do { } while (0)# define lockdep_hrtimer_enter (__hrtimer) false -# define lockdep_hrtimer_exit (__context) do { } while (0) +# define lockdep_hrtimer_exit (__context) do { (void)(__context); } while (0)# define lockdep_posixtimer_enter () do { } while (0)# define lockdep_posixtimer_exit () do { } while (0)# define lockdep_irq_work_enter (__work) do { } while (0)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/69 x86/bugs: Fix return type of spectre_bhi_state()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>
commit 04f4230e2f86a4e961ea5466eda3db8c1762004d upstream.
The definition of spectre_bhi_state() incorrectly returns a const char
* const. This causes the a compiler warning when building with W=1:
warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers] 2812 | static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void)
Remove the const qualifier from the pointer.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -1
@@ -2788,7 +2788,7 @@ static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void) } } -static const char *const spectre_bhi_state (void ) +static const char *spectre_bhi_state (void ) {if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_BHI ))return "; BHI: Not affected" ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/69 x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30 upstream.
Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 15 ++++++++------- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++----- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +8 -7
@@ -439,11 +439,11 @@ The possible values in this file are: - System is protected by retpoline * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S - * - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop + * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop - System is protected by software clearing sequence * - BHI: Syscall hardening - Syscalls are hardened against BHI - * - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop + * - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
@@ -666,13 +666,14 @@ kernel command line. of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. on - unconditionally enable. + (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. off - unconditionally disable. + Disable the mitigation. auto - enable if hardware mitigation - control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise - enable alternate mitigation in KVM. + Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but + *don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM. + The system may be vulnerable. For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +7 -5
@@ -3283,6 +3283,7 @@ reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86] retbleed=off [X86] spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] + spectre_bhi=off [X86] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] srbds=off [X86,INTEL] ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -5739,11 +5740,12 @@ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - unconditionally enable. - off - unconditionally disable. - auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation - (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable - alternate mitigation in KVM. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation + as needed. + off - Disable the mitigation. + auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but + *don't* enable the SW mitigation except + for KVM. The system may be vulnerable. spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/69 x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit cb2db5bb04d7f778fbc1a1ea2507aab436f1bff3 upstream.
There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and over. It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no. Just read it once and cache it.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 22 +++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +7 -15
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current)u64 x86_pred_cmd__ro_after_init =PRED_CMD_IBPB ;EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (x86_pred_cmd); +static u64 __ro_after_init ia32_cap; +static DEFINE_MUTEX (spec_ctrl_mutex);void (*x86_return_thunk)(void )__ro_after_init = &__x86_return_thunk;
@@ -143,6 +145,8 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK ; } + ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); +/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation ();spectre_v2_select_mitigation ();
@@ -300,8 +304,6 @@ static const char * const taa_strings[]static void __init taa_select_mitigation (void ) { -u64 ia32_cap; -if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_TAA )) { taa_mitigation =TAA_MITIGATION_OFF ;return ;
@@ -340,7 +342,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation* On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode * update is required. */ - ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr ();if ( (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ) && !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR )) taa_mitigation =TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED ;
@@ -400,8 +401,6 @@ static const char * const mmio_strings[]static void __init mmio_select_mitigation (void ) { -u64 ia32_cap; -if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA ) ||boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN ) ||cpu_mitigations_off ()) {
@@ -412,8 +411,6 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatioif (mmio_mitigation ==MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF )return ; - ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); -/* * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
@@ -507,7 +504,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigatioif (rfds_mitigation ==RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF )return ; -if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr () &ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR ) +if (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR )setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF );else rfds_mitigation =RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED ;
@@ -658,8 +655,6 @@ void update_srbds_msr(void)static void __init srbds_select_mitigation (void ) { -u64 ia32_cap; -if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_SRBDS ))return ;
@@ -668,7 +663,6 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigati* are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. */ - ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr ();if ((ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ) && !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RTM ) && !boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA )) srbds_mitigation =SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF ;
@@ -812,7 +806,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */ /* No microcode */ -if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr () &ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL )) { +if (!(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL )) {if (gds_mitigation ==GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE ) {/* * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
@@ -1884,8 +1878,6 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(voi/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */ static void update_mds_branch_idle (void ) { -u64 ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); -/* * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@@ -2797,7 +2789,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voielse if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ))return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop" ;else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ) && - !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr () &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA )) + !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA ))return "; BHI: Retpoline" ;else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ))return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop" ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/69 x86/bugs: Rename various ia32_cap variables to x86_arch_cap_msr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
commit d0485730d2189ffe5d986d4e9e191f1e4d5ffd24 upstream.
So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places, which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register.
But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_.
This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR:x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix.
So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with its role and with the naming of the helper function.
--- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 6 ++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 30 +++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +3 -3
@@ -1760,11 +1760,11 @@ static int x2apic_state;static bool x2apic_hw_locked (void ) { -u64 ia32_cap; +u64 x86_arch_cap_msr;u64 msr; - ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); -if (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE ) { + x86_arch_cap_msr =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); +if (x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE ) {rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS , msr);return (msr &LEGACY_XAPIC_DISABLED ); }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +15 -15
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current)u64 x86_pred_cmd__ro_after_init =PRED_CMD_IBPB ;EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (x86_pred_cmd); -static u64 __ro_after_init ia32_cap; +static u64 __ro_after_init x86_arch_cap_msr;static DEFINE_MUTEX (spec_ctrl_mutex);
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK ; } - ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); + x86_arch_cap_msr =x86_read_arch_cap_msr ();/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation ();
@@ -342,8 +342,8 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation* On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode * update is required. */ -if ( (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ) && - !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR )) +if ( (x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ) && + !(x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR )) taa_mitigation =TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED ;/*
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio* be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle * is required irrespective of SMT state. */ -if (!(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO )) +if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO ))static_branch_enable (&mds_idle_clear);/*
@@ -443,10 +443,10 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio* FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS * affected systems. */ -if ((ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR ) || +if ((x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR ) || (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR ) &&boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D ) && - !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ))) + !(x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ))) mmio_mitigation =MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW ;else mmio_mitigation =MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED ;
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigatioif (rfds_mitigation ==RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF )return ; -if (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR ) +if (x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR )setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF );else rfds_mitigation =RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED ;
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigati* are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. */ -if ((ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ) && !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RTM ) && +if ((x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO ) && !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RTM ) && !boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA )) srbds_mitigation =SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF ;else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR ))
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */ /* No microcode */ -if (!(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL )) { +if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL )) {if (gds_mitigation ==GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE ) {/* * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
@@ -1518,14 +1518,14 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba (void ) { -u64 ia32_cap; +u64 x86_arch_cap_msr;if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL ))return ; - ia32_cap =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); + x86_arch_cap_msr =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); -if (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA ) { +if (x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA ) { x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S ;update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); }
@@ -1892,7 +1892,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)if (sched_smt_active ()) {static_branch_enable (&mds_idle_clear); }else if (mmio_mitigation ==MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF || - (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO )) { + (x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO )) {static_branch_disable (&mds_idle_clear); } }
@@ -2789,7 +2789,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voielse if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ))return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop" ;else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ) && - !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA )) + !(x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA ))return "; BHI: Retpoline" ;else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ))return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop" ;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +24 -24
137 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/69 x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898 upstream.
The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by the BHI mitigation itself if needed). In that case retpolines are fine.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +18 -12
@@ -1515,20 +1515,25 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __initreturn SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ; } +static bool __ro_after_init rrsba_disabled; +/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba (void ) { -u64 x86_arch_cap_msr; +if (rrsba_disabled) +return ; -if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL )) +if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA )) { + rrsba_disabled = true;return ; + } - x86_arch_cap_msr =x86_read_arch_cap_msr (); +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL )) +return ; -if (x86_arch_cap_msr &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA ) { - x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S ; -update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); - } + x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S ; +update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); + rrsba_disabled = true; }static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
@@ -1629,9 +1634,11 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigationreturn ;/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */ -if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ) && - !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr () &ARCH_CAP_RRSBA )) -return ; +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE )) { +spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba (); +if (rrsba_disabled) +return ; + }if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;
@@ -2788,8 +2795,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voireturn "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S" ; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; - else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/69 x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isnt a BHI mitigation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a upstream.
While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 11 +++++------ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +5 -6
@@ -441,10 +441,10 @@ The possible values in this file are: - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop - System is protected by software clearing sequence - * - BHI: Syscall hardening - - Syscalls are hardened against BHI - * - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop - - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence + * - BHI: Vulnerable + - System is vulnerable to BHI + * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop + - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
@@ -661,8 +661,7 @@ kernel command line. spectre_bhi= [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection - (BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI - regardless of this setting. This setting affects the deployment + (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. on
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +1 -2
@@ -5735,8 +5735,7 @@ See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst spectre_bhi= [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection - (BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI - reglardless of this setting. This setting affects the + (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3 -3
@@ -2797,10 +2797,10 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voireturn "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop" ; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; - else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) - return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop"; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) + return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop"; -return "; BHI: Vulnerable (Syscall hardening enabled)" ; +return "; BHI: Vulnerable" ; }static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state (char *buf)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/69 x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a upstream.
Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.
Remove it.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 4 ---- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +--------- 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 20 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +0 -4
@@ -669,10 +669,6 @@ kernel command line. needed. off Disable the mitigation. - auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but - *don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM. - The system may be vulnerable. For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -3
@@ -5742,9 +5742,6 @@ on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as needed. off - Disable the mitigation. - auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but - *don't* enable the SW mitigation except - for KVM. The system may be vulnerable. spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -4
@@ -2581,10 +2581,6 @@ config SPECTRE_BHI_OFF bool "off" help Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=off command line parameter. -config SPECTRE_BHI_AUTO - bool "auto" - help - Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=auto command line parameter. endchoice
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -9
@@ -1602,13 +1602,10 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(voienum bhi_mitigations {BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ,BHI_MITIGATION_ON , -BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO , };static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation__ro_after_init = -IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON ) ?BHI_MITIGATION_ON : -IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_OFF ) ?BHI_MITIGATION_OFF : -BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO ; +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON ) ?BHI_MITIGATION_ON :BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ;static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline (char *str) {
@@ -1619,8 +1616,6 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdl bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; - else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) - bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO ; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
@@ -1650,9 +1645,6 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigationsetup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT );pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); -if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO ) -return ; -/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP );pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/69 x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit 4f511739c54b549061993b53fc0380f48dfca23b upstream.
For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.
[ mingo: Fix ]
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +++-------------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +3 -14
@@ -2563,27 +2563,16 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS stored in floating point, vector and integer registers. See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst> -choice - prompt "Clear branch history" +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI + bool "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)" depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL - default SPECTRE_BHI_ON + default y help Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer indirect branches. See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst> -config SPECTRE_BHI_ON - bool "on" - help - Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=on command line parameter. -config SPECTRE_BHI_OFF - bool "off" - help - Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=off command line parameter. - -endchoice - endif config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -1
@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ enum bhi_mitigations { };static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation__ro_after_init = -IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON ) ?BHI_MITIGATION_ON :BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI ) ?BHI_MITIGATION_ON :BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ;static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline (char *str) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/69 drm/i915/cdclk: Fix CDCLK programming order when pipes are active
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
commit 7b1f6b5aaec0f849e19c3e99d4eea75876853cdd upstream.
Currently we always reprogram CDCLK from the intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update() when using squash/crawl. The code only works correctly for the cd2x update or full modeset cases, and it was simply never updated to deal with squash/crawl.
If the CDCLK frequency is increasing we must reprogram it before we do anything else that might depend on the new higher frequency, and conversely we must not decrease the frequency until everything that might still depend on the old higher frequency has been dealt with.
Since cdclk_state->pipe is only relevant when doing a cd2x update we can't use it to determine the correct sequence during squash/crawl. To that end introduce cdclk_state->disable_pipes which simply indicates that we must perform the update while the pipes are disable (ie. during intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update()). Otherwise we use the same old vs. new CDCLK frequency comparsiong as for cd2x updates.
The only remaining problem case is when the voltage_level needs to increase due to a DDI port, but the CDCLK frequency is decreasing (and not all pipes are being disabled). The current approach will not bump the voltage level up until after the port has already been enabled, which is too late. But we'll take care of that case separately.
v2: Don't break the "must disable pipes case"
v3: Keep the on stack 'pipe' for future use
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.c | 7 +++++-- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.c +5 -2
@@ -2152,7 +2152,7 @@ intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update(struct &new_cdclk_state->actual))return ; -if (pipe ==INVALID_PIPE || +if (new_cdclk_state->disable_pipes || old_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk <= new_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk) {drm_WARN_ON (&dev_priv->drm, !new_cdclk_state->base.changed);
@@ -2181,7 +2181,7 @@ intel_set_cdclk_post_plane_update(struct &new_cdclk_state->actual))return ; -if (pipe !=INVALID_PIPE && +if (!new_cdclk_state->disable_pipes && old_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk > new_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk) {drm_WARN_ON (&dev_priv->drm, !new_cdclk_state->base.changed);
@@ -2634,6 +2634,7 @@ static struct intel_global_state *intel_return NULL ; cdclk_state->pipe =INVALID_PIPE ; + cdclk_state->disable_pipes = false;return &cdclk_state->base; }
@@ -2793,6 +2794,8 @@ int intel_modeset_calc_cdclk(struct inteif (ret)return ret; + new_cdclk_state->disable_pipes = true; +drm_dbg_kms (&dev_priv->drm,"Modeset required for cdclk change\n" ); }
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.h +3 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ struct intel_cdclk_state {/* bitmask of active pipes */ u8 active_pipes; + +/* update cdclk with pipes disabled */ +bool disable_pipes; };int intel_crtc_compute_min_cdclk (const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/69 drm/i915: Disable port sync when bigjoiner is used
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
commit 0653d501409eeb9f1deb7e4c12e4d0d2c9f1cba1 upstream.
The current modeset sequence can't handle port sync and bigjoiner at the same time. Refuse port sync when bigjoiner is needed, at least until we fix the modeset sequence.
v2: Add a FIXME (Vandite)
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_ddi.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_ddi.c +5 -0
@@ -3683,7 +3683,12 @@ static bool m_n_equal(const struct intelstatic bool crtcs_port_sync_compatible (const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state1,const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state2) { +/* +* FIXME the modeset sequence is currently wrong and +* can't deal with bigjoiner + port sync at the same time. +*/ return crtc_state1->hw.active && crtc_state2->hw.active && + !crtc_state1->bigjoiner_pipes && !crtc_state2->bigjoiner_pipes && crtc_state1->output_types == crtc_state2->output_types && crtc_state1->output_format == crtc_state2->output_format && crtc_state1->lane_count == crtc_state2->lane_count &&
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/69 drm/amdgpu: Reset dGPU if suspend got aborted
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lijo Lazar <[email protected]>
commit 8b2be55f4d6c1099d7f629b0ed7535a5be788c83 upstream.
For SOC21 ASICs, there is an issue in re-enabling PM features if a suspend got aborted. In such cases, reset the device during resume phase. This is a workaround till a proper solution is finalized.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c +25 -0
@@ -780,10 +780,35 @@ static int soc21_common_suspend(void *hareturn soc21_common_hw_fini (adev); } +static bool soc21_need_reset_on_resume (struct amdgpu_device *adev) +{ +u32 sol_reg1, sol_reg2; + +/* Will reset for the following suspend abort cases. +* 1) Only reset dGPU side. +* 2) S3 suspend got aborted and TOS is active. +*/ +if (!(adev->flags &AMD_IS_APU ) && adev->in_s3 && + !adev->suspend_complete) { + sol_reg1 =RREG32_SOC15 (MP0 ,0 , regMP0_SMN_C2PMSG_81); +msleep (100 ); + sol_reg2 =RREG32_SOC15 (MP0 ,0 , regMP0_SMN_C2PMSG_81); + +return (sol_reg1 != sol_reg2); + } + +return false; +} +static int soc21_common_resume (void *handle) {struct amdgpu_device *adev = (struct amdgpu_device *)handle; +if (soc21_need_reset_on_resume (adev)) { +dev_info (adev->dev,"S3 suspend aborted, resetting..." ); +soc21_asic_reset (adev); + } +return soc21_common_hw_init (adev); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 68/69 drm/amdgpu: always force full reset for SOC21
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 65ff8092e4802f96d87d3d7cde146961f5228265 upstream.
There are cases where soft reset seems to succeed, but does not, so always use mode1/2 for now.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c +0 -2
@@ -460,10 +460,8 @@ static bool soc21_need_full_reset(struct {switch (adev->ip_versions[GC_HWIP ][0 ]) {case IP_VERSION (11 ,0 ,0 ): -return amdgpu_ras_is_supported (adev,AMDGPU_RAS_BLOCK__UMC );case IP_VERSION (11 ,0 ,2 ):case IP_VERSION (11 ,0 ,3 ): -return false;default :return true; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/69 drm/amd/display: fix disable otg wa logic in DCN316
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fudongwang <[email protected]>
commit cf79814cb0bf5749b9f0db53ca231aa540c02768 upstream.
[Why]
Wrong logic cause screen corruption.
[How]
Port logic from DCN35/314.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dcn316/dcn316_clk_mgr.c | 19 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dcn316/dcn316_clk_mgr.c +12 -7
@@ -112,20 +112,25 @@ static int dcn316_get_active_display_cntreturn display_count; } -static void dcn316_disable_otg_wa (struct clk_mgr *clk_mgr_base,struct dc_state *context,bool disable) +static void dcn316_disable_otg_wa (struct clk_mgr *clk_mgr_base,struct dc_state *context, +bool safe_to_lower,bool disable) {struct dc *dc = clk_mgr_base->ctx->dc;int i;for (i =0 ; i < dc->res_pool->pipe_count; ++i) { -struct pipe_ctx *pipe = &dc->current_state->res_ctx.pipe_ctx[i]; +struct pipe_ctx *pipe = safe_to_lower + ? &context->res_ctx.pipe_ctx[i] + : &dc->current_state->res_ctx.pipe_ctx[i];if (pipe->top_pipe || pipe->prev_odm_pipe)continue ; -if (pipe->stream && (pipe->stream->dpms_off || pipe->plane_state ==NULL || -dc_is_virtual_signal (pipe->stream->signal))) { +if (pipe->stream && (pipe->stream->dpms_off ||dc_is_virtual_signal (pipe->stream->signal) || + !pipe->stream->link_enc)) {if (disable) { - pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->immediate_disable_crtc (pipe->stream_res.tg); +if (pipe->stream_res.tg && pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->immediate_disable_crtc) + pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->immediate_disable_crtc (pipe->stream_res.tg); +reset_sync_context_for_pipe (dc, context, i); }else pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->enable_crtc (pipe->stream_res.tg);
@@ -222,11 +227,11 @@ static void dcn316_update_clocks(struct }if (should_set_clock (safe_to_lower, new_clocks->dispclk_khz, clk_mgr_base->clks.dispclk_khz)) { -dcn316_disable_otg_wa (clk_mgr_base, context, true); +dcn316_disable_otg_wa (clk_mgr_base, context, safe_to_lower, true); clk_mgr_base->clks.dispclk_khz = new_clocks->dispclk_khz;dcn316_smu_set_dispclk (clk_mgr, clk_mgr_base->clks.dispclk_khz); -dcn316_disable_otg_wa (clk_mgr_base, context, false); +dcn316_disable_otg_wa (clk_mgr_base, context, safe_to_lower, false); update_dispclk = true; }
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Hi!
Quoted 4 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
CIP testing did not find any problems here:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.1.y
No problems detected in Linux 5.15.156-rc1 (8d83652ef6bf), Linux 6.6.28-rc1 (a4e5ff353287), Linux 6.8.7-rc1 (367141eaada2), either.
Best regards,
Pavel
Signature · 2 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Erika Unter HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
No regressions found on WSL (x86 and arm64).
Built, booted, and reviewed dmesg.
Thank you. :)
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Hi Greg,
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
I tested 6.1.87-rc1 (6745a5f2c806) on Kalray kvx arch (not upstream yet) and everything looks good!
It ran on real hw (k200, k200lp and k300 boards), on qemu as well as on our internal instruction set simulator (ISS).
Tests were run on several interfaces/drivers (usb, qsfp ethernet, eMMC, PCIe endpoint+RC, SPI, remoteproc, uart, iommu). LTP and uClibc-ng testsuites are also run without any regression.
Everything looks fine to us.
Signature · 1 line
Yann
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v6.1:
10 builds: 10 pass, 0 fail
26 boots: 26 pass, 0 fail
116 tests: 116 pass, 0 failLinux version: 6.1.87-rc1-g6745a5f2c806
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000,
tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180,
tegra210-p3450-0000, tegra30-cardhu-a04Jon
[2024-04-15 16:20] Greg Kroah-Hartman:
Quoted 9 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Hi, 6.1.87-rc1 is running fine on a TP-Link Archer C7 v4 (the SoC is a Qualcomm Atheros QCA9563, which has a 74Kc MIPS core).
Regards
Pascal
W dniu 15.04.2024 o 16:20, Greg Kroah-Hartman pisze:
Quoted 9 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Hello,
Tested on a HP 17-by0001nw laptop with an Intel Kaby Lake CPU and Ubuntu 20.04.
Stack:
- amd64,
- ext4 on top of LVM on top of LUKS on top of mdraid on top of NVMe and SATA drives (the SATA drive in the write-mostly mode).
Tested (lightly):
- suspend to RAM,
- suspend to disk,
- virtual machines in QEMU (both i386 and amd64 guests),
- GPU (Intel HD Graphics 620, with 2 Unigine benchmarks)
- WiFi (Realtek RTL8822BE),
- Bluetooth (Realtek RTL8822BE),
- PCI soundcard (Intel HD Audio),
- webcam.
Filesystems tested very lightly (mounting, listing and opening files):
- NFS,
- exFAT
- NTFS via FUSE
Nitpicks:
- sound output does not automatically switch from HDMI to speakers (also present on other kernels),
- sound issues in the Unigine tropics benchmark (no sound after switching of the sound output, program restart was necessary).
- problems with sending Bluetooth files from mobile phone, likely caused by previous BT experiments.
Greetings,
Mateusz
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.87 release. There are 69 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.87-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
## Build
* kernel: 6.1.87-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-6.1.y
* git commit: 6745a5f2c8063076bb5a9cd18ede5a5559258492
* git describe: v6.1.86-70-g6745a5f2c806
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.1.y/build/v6.1.86-70-g6745a5f2c806
## Test Regressions (compared to v6.1.86)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.1.86)
## Test Fixes (compared to v6.1.86)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.1.86)
## Test result summary
total: 237743, pass: 204447, fail: 4019, skip: 28994, xfail: 283
## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 138 total, 138 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 41 total, 41 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 31 total, 31 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 26 total, 26 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 4 total, 4 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 36 total, 36 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 11 total, 11 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 15 total, 15 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 7 total, 7 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 37 total, 36 passed, 1 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-filesystems-epoll
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mm
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-watchdog
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* libgpiod
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-smoketest
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org