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6.8.7-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 8 participants 180 messages Apr 15, 2024 – Apr 16, 2024 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#147 lore raw

PATCH 147/172 x86/apic: Force native_apic_mem_read() to use the MOV instruction

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adam Dunlap <[email protected]>

commit 5ce344beaca688f4cdea07045e0b8f03dc537e74 upstream.

When done from a virtual machine, instructions that touch APIC memory must be emulated. By convention, MMIO accesses are typically performed via io.h helpers such as readl() or writeq() to simplify instruction emulation/decoding (ex: in KVM hosts and SEV guests) [0].

Currently, native_apic_mem_read() does not follow this convention, allowing the compiler to emit instructions other than the MOV instruction generated by readl(). In particular, when the kernel is compiled with clang and run as a SEV-ES or SEV-SNP guest, the compiler would emit a TESTL instruction which is not supported by the SEV-ES emulator, causing a boot failure in that environment. It is likely the same problem would happen in a TDX guest as that uses the same instruction emulator as SEV-ES.

To make sure all emulators can emulate APIC memory reads via MOV, use the readl() function in native_apic_mem_read(). It is expected that any emulator would support MOV in any addressing mode as it is the most generic and is what is usually emitted currently.

The TESTL instruction is emitted when native_apic_mem_read() is inlined into apic_mem_wait_icr_idle(). The emulator comes from insn_decode_mmio() in arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c. It's not worth it to extend insn_decode_mmio() to support more instructions since, in theory, the compiler could choose to output nearly any instruction for such reads which would bloat the emulator beyond reason.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

[ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos. ]

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +2 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <asm/mpspec.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/hardirq.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
 
 #define ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3	1
 
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ static inline void native_apic_mem_write
 
 static inline u32 native_apic_mem_read(u32 reg)
 {
-	return *((volatile u32 *)(APIC_BASE + reg));
+	return readl((void __iomem *)(APIC_BASE + reg));
 }
 
 static inline void native_apic_mem_eoi(void)
author maintainer
#148 lore raw

PATCH 148/172 irqflags: Explicitly ignore lockdep_hrtimer_exit() argument

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit c1d11fc2c8320871b40730991071dd0a0b405bc8 upstream.

When building with 'make W=1' but CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=n, the unused argument to lockdep_hrtimer_exit() causes a warning:

kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1655:14: error: variable 'expires_in_hardirq' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]

This is intentional behavior, so add a cast to void to shut up the warning.

---
 include/linux/irqflags.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/irqflags.h +1 -1
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ do {						\
 # define lockdep_softirq_enter()		do { } while (0)
 # define lockdep_softirq_exit()			do { } while (0)
 # define lockdep_hrtimer_enter(__hrtimer)	false
-# define lockdep_hrtimer_exit(__context)	do { } while (0)
+# define lockdep_hrtimer_exit(__context)	do { (void)(__context); } while (0)
 # define lockdep_posixtimer_enter()		do { } while (0)
 # define lockdep_posixtimer_exit()		do { } while (0)
 # define lockdep_irq_work_enter(__work)		do { } while (0)
author maintainer
#149 lore raw

PATCH 149/172 selftests: kselftest: Fix build failure with NOLIBC

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>

commit 16767502aa990cca2cb7d1372b31d328c4c85b40 upstream.

As Mark explains ksft_min_kernel_version() can't be compiled with nolibc, it doesn't implement uname().

---
 tools/testing/selftests/kselftest.h |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/kselftest.h +5 -0
@@ -350,6 +350,10 @@ static inline __noreturn __printf(1, 2)
 static inline int ksft_min_kernel_version(unsigned int min_major,
 					  unsigned int min_minor)
 {
+#ifdef NOLIBC
+	ksft_print_msg("NOLIBC: Can't check kernel version: Function not implemented\n");
+	return 0;
+#else
 	unsigned int major, minor;
 	struct utsname info;
 
@@ -357,6 +361,7 @@ static inline int ksft_min_kernel_versio
 		ksft_exit_fail_msg("Can't parse kernel version\n");
 
 	return major > min_major || (major == min_major && minor >= min_minor);
+#endif
 }
 
 #endif /* __KSELFTEST_H */
author maintainer
#150 lore raw

PATCH 150/172 kernfs: annotate different lockdep class for of->mutex of writable files

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

commit 16b52bbee4823b01ab7fe3919373c981a38f3797 upstream.

The writable file /sys/power/resume may call vfs lookup helpers for arbitrary paths and readonly files can be read by overlayfs from vfs helpers when sysfs is a lower layer of overalyfs.

To avoid a lockdep warning of circular dependency between overlayfs inode lock and kernfs of->mutex, use a different lockdep class for writable and readonly kernfs files.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 0fedefd4c4e3 ("kernfs: sysfs: support custom llseek method for sysfs entries")
---
 fs/kernfs/file.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/kernfs/file.c +8 -1
@@ -634,11 +634,18 @@ static int kernfs_fop_open(struct inode
 	 * each file a separate locking class.  Let's differentiate on
 	 * whether the file has mmap or not for now.
 	 *
-	 * Both paths of the branch look the same.  They're supposed to
+	 * For similar reasons, writable and readonly files are given different
+	 * lockdep key, because the writable file /sys/power/resume may call vfs
+	 * lookup helpers for arbitrary paths and readonly files can be read by
+	 * overlayfs from vfs helpers when sysfs is a lower layer of overalyfs.
+	 *
+	 * All three cases look the same.  They're supposed to
 	 * look that way and give @of->mutex different static lockdep keys.
 	 */
 	if (has_mmap)
 		mutex_init(&of->mutex);
+	else if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		mutex_init(&of->mutex);
 	else
 		mutex_init(&of->mutex);
 
author maintainer
#151 lore raw

PATCH 151/172 x86/bugs: Fix return type of spectre_bhi_state()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Sneddon <[email protected]>

commit 04f4230e2f86a4e961ea5466eda3db8c1762004d upstream.

The definition of spectre_bhi_state() incorrectly returns a const char
* const. This causes the a compiler warning when building with W=1:

warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers] 2812 | static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void)

Remove the const qualifier from the pointer.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -1
@@ -2808,7 +2808,7 @@ static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void)
+static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_BHI))
 		return "; BHI: Not affected";
author maintainer
#152 lore raw

PATCH 152/172 x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30 upstream.

Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   |   15 ++++++++-------
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |   12 +++++++-----
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +8 -7
@@ -439,11 +439,11 @@ The possible values in this file are:
    - System is protected by retpoline
  * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
    - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
- * - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
    - System is protected by software clearing sequence
  * - BHI: Syscall hardening
    - Syscalls are hardened against BHI
- * - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop
+ * - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop
    - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
 
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
@@ -666,13 +666,14 @@ kernel command line.
 		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
 
 		on
-			unconditionally enable.
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
 		off
-			unconditionally disable.
+			Disable the mitigation.
 		auto
-			enable if hardware mitigation
-			control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise
-			enable alternate mitigation in KVM.
+			Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
+			*don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM.
+			The system may be vulnerable.
 
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +7 -5
@@ -3419,6 +3419,7 @@
 					       reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86]
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_bhi=off [X86]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -6037,11 +6038,12 @@
 			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
 			clearing sequence.
 
-			on   - unconditionally enable.
-			off  - unconditionally disable.
-			auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation
-			       (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable
-			       alternate mitigation in KVM.
+			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+			       as needed.
+			off  - Disable the mitigation.
+			auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
+			       *don't* enable the SW mitigation except
+			       for KVM.  The system may be vulnerable.
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
author maintainer
#153 lore raw

PATCH 153/172 x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit cb2db5bb04d7f778fbc1a1ea2507aab436f1bff3 upstream.

There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and over. It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no. Just read it once and cache it.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   22 +++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +7 -15
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current)
 u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
 
+static u64 __ro_after_init ia32_cap;
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 void (*x86_return_thunk)(void) __ro_after_init = __x86_return_thunk;
@@ -144,6 +146,8 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
 	}
 
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
@@ -301,8 +305,6 @@ static const char * const taa_strings[]
 
 static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	u64 ia32_cap;
-
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
 		return;
@@ -341,7 +343,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation
 	 * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
 	 * update is required.
 	 */
-	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 	if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
 	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
@@ -401,8 +402,6 @@ static const char * const mmio_strings[]
 
 static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	u64 ia32_cap;
-
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
 	     boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
 	     cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -413,8 +412,6 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio
 	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
 		return;
 
-	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
-
 	/*
 	 * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
 	 * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
@@ -508,7 +505,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigatio
 	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
 		return;
 
-	if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 	else
 		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
@@ -659,8 +656,6 @@ void update_srbds_msr(void)
 
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	u64 ia32_cap;
-
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
 		return;
 
@@ -669,7 +664,6 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigati
 	 * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
 	 * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
 	 */
-	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
 		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
@@ -813,7 +807,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation
 	/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
 
 	/* No microcode */
-	if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
+	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
 		if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
 			/*
 			 * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
@@ -1907,8 +1901,6 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(voi
 /* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
 static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 {
-	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
-
 	/*
 	 * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
 	 * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@@ -2817,7 +2809,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voi
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-		 !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
+		 !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
 		return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
author maintainer
#154 lore raw

PATCH 154/172 x86/bugs: Rename various ia32_cap variables to x86_arch_cap_msr

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

commit d0485730d2189ffe5d986d4e9e191f1e4d5ffd24 upstream.

So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places, which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register.

But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_.

This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR:
x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix.

So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with its role and with the naming of the helper function.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c  |    6 ++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c   |   30 +++++++++++++-------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |   48 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +3 -3
@@ -1724,11 +1724,11 @@ static int x2apic_state;
 
 static bool x2apic_hw_locked(void)
 {
-	u64 ia32_cap;
+	u64 x86_arch_cap_msr;
 	u64 msr;
 
-	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
-	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE) {
+	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE) {
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS, msr);
 		return (msr & LEGACY_XAPIC_DISABLED);
 	}
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +15 -15
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current)
 u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
 
-static u64 __ro_after_init ia32_cap;
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_arch_cap_msr;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
 	}
 
-	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
@@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation
 	 * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
 	 * update is required.
 	 */
-	if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
-	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+	if ( (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+	    !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
 
 	/*
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio
 	 * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
 	 * is required irrespective of SMT state.
 	 */
-	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+	if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
 		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
 
 	/*
@@ -444,10 +444,10 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio
 	 * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
 	 * affected systems.
 	 */
-	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+	if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
 	    (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
 	     boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
-	     !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+	     !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
 		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
 	else
 		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigatio
 	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
 		return;
 
-	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+	if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 	else
 		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigati
 	 * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
 	 * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
 	 */
-	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+	if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
 		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation
 	/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
 
 	/* No microcode */
-	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
+	if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
 		if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
 			/*
 			 * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
@@ -1540,14 +1540,14 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init
 /* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
 static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
 {
-	u64 ia32_cap;
+	u64 x86_arch_cap_msr;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
 		return;
 
-	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
-	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
+	if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
 		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 	}
@@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 	if (sched_smt_active()) {
 		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
 	} else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
-		   (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
+		   (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
 		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
 	}
 }
@@ -2809,7 +2809,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voi
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-		 !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
+		 !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
 		return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +24 -24

134 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#155 lore raw

PATCH 155/172 x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit 1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898 upstream.

The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by the BHI mitigation itself if needed). In that case retpolines are fine.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +18 -12
@@ -1537,20 +1537,25 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init
 	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 }
 
+static bool __ro_after_init rrsba_disabled;
+
 /* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
 static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
 {
-	u64 x86_arch_cap_msr;
+	if (rrsba_disabled)
+		return;
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
+	if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) {
+		rrsba_disabled = true;
 		return;
+	}
 
-	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
+		return;
 
-	if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
-		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-	}
+	x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
+	update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	rrsba_disabled = true;
 }
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
@@ -1651,9 +1656,11 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation
 		return;
 
 	/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-	    !(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
-		return;
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) {
+		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+		if (rrsba_disabled)
+			return;
+	}
 
 	if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
 		return;
@@ -2808,8 +2815,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voi
 		return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S";
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
-	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-		 !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled)
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
 	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
 		return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
author maintainer
#156 lore raw

PATCH 156/172 x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isnt a BHI mitigation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit 5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a upstream.

While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   |   11 +++++------
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |    3 +--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      |    6 +++---
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +5 -6
@@ -441,10 +441,10 @@ The possible values in this file are:
    - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
  * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
    - System is protected by software clearing sequence
- * - BHI: Syscall hardening
-   - Syscalls are hardened against BHI
- * - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop
-   - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable
+   - System is vulnerable to BHI
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop
+   - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
 
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
@@ -661,8 +661,7 @@ kernel command line.
 	spectre_bhi=
 
 		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
-		(BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI
-		regardless of this setting. This setting affects the deployment
+		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
 		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
 
 		on
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +1 -2
@@ -6033,8 +6033,7 @@
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/laptops/sonypi.rst
 
 	spectre_bhi=	[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
-			(BHI) vulnerability. Syscalls are hardened against BHI
-			reglardless of this setting. This setting affects the
+			(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the
 			deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
 			clearing sequence.
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +3 -3
@@ -2817,10 +2817,10 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(voi
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled)
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
-	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
-		return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
+		return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop";
 
-	return "; BHI: Vulnerable (Syscall hardening enabled)";
+	return "; BHI: Vulnerable";
 }
 
 static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
author maintainer
#157 lore raw

PATCH 157/172 x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit 36d4fe147c870f6d3f6602befd7ef44393a1c87a upstream.

Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.

Remove it.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst   |    4 ----
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |    3 ---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                |    4 ----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      |   10 +---------
 4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 20 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +0 -4
@@ -669,10 +669,6 @@ kernel command line.
 			needed.
 		off
 			Disable the mitigation.
-		auto
-			Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
-			*don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM.
-			The system may be vulnerable.
 
 For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -3
@@ -6040,9 +6040,6 @@
 			on   - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
 			       as needed.
 			off  - Disable the mitigation.
-			auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
-			       *don't* enable the SW mitigation except
-			       for KVM.  The system may be vulnerable.
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -4
@@ -2630,10 +2630,6 @@ config SPECTRE_BHI_OFF
 	bool "off"
 	help
 	  Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=off command line parameter.
-config SPECTRE_BHI_AUTO
-	bool "auto"
-	help
-	  Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=auto command line parameter.
 
 endchoice
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -9
@@ -1624,13 +1624,10 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(voi
 enum bhi_mitigations {
 	BHI_MITIGATION_OFF,
 	BHI_MITIGATION_ON,
-	BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 };
 
 static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON)  ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON  :
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_OFF) ? BHI_MITIGATION_OFF :
-					     BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 {
@@ -1641,8 +1638,6 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdl
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
 	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
 		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
-	else if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
-		bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO;
 	else
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
 
@@ -1672,9 +1667,6 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT);
 	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n");
 
-	if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO)
-		return;
-
 	/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP);
 	pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n");
author maintainer
#158 lore raw

PATCH 158/172 x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit 4f511739c54b549061993b53fc0380f48dfca23b upstream.

For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.

[ mingo: Fix ]

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           |   17 +++--------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +3 -14
@@ -2612,27 +2612,16 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS
 	  stored in floating point, vector and integer registers.
 	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst>
 
-choice
-	prompt "Clear branch history"
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
+	bool "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
-	default SPECTRE_BHI_ON
+	default y
 	help
 	  Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks
 	  where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer
 	  indirect branches.
 	  See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
 
-config SPECTRE_BHI_ON
-	bool "on"
-	help
-	  Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=on command line parameter.
-config SPECTRE_BHI_OFF
-	bool "off"
-	help
-	  Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=off command line parameter.
-
-endchoice
-
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -1
@@ -1627,7 +1627,7 @@ enum bhi_mitigations {
 };
 
 static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 {
author maintainer
#159 lore raw

PATCH 159/172 drm/i915/cdclk: Fix CDCLK programming order when pipes are active

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit 7b1f6b5aaec0f849e19c3e99d4eea75876853cdd upstream.

Currently we always reprogram CDCLK from the intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update() when using squash/crawl. The code only works correctly for the cd2x update or full modeset cases, and it was simply never updated to deal with squash/crawl.

If the CDCLK frequency is increasing we must reprogram it before we do anything else that might depend on the new higher frequency, and conversely we must not decrease the frequency until everything that might still depend on the old higher frequency has been dealt with.

Since cdclk_state->pipe is only relevant when doing a cd2x update we can't use it to determine the correct sequence during squash/crawl. To that end introduce cdclk_state->disable_pipes which simply indicates that we must perform the update while the pipes are disable (ie. during intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update()). Otherwise we use the same old vs. new CDCLK frequency comparsiong as for cd2x updates.

The only remaining problem case is when the voltage_level needs to increase due to a DDI port, but the CDCLK frequency is decreasing (and not all pipes are being disabled). The current approach will not bump the voltage level up until after the port has already been enabled, which is too late. But we'll take care of that case separately.

v2: Don't break the "must disable pipes case"
v3: Keep the on stack 'pipe' for future use

Fixes d62686ba3b54 ("drm/i915/adl_p: CDCLK crawl support for ADL")
(cherry picked from commit 3aecee90ac12a351905f12dda7643d5b0676d6ca)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.c |    7 +++++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.h |    3 +++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.c +5 -2
@@ -2521,7 +2521,7 @@ intel_set_cdclk_pre_plane_update(struct
 	if (IS_DG2(i915))
 		intel_cdclk_pcode_pre_notify(state);
 
-	if (pipe == INVALID_PIPE ||
+	if (new_cdclk_state->disable_pipes ||
 	    old_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk <= new_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk) {
 		drm_WARN_ON(&i915->drm, !new_cdclk_state->base.changed);
 
@@ -2553,7 +2553,7 @@ intel_set_cdclk_post_plane_update(struct
 	if (IS_DG2(i915))
 		intel_cdclk_pcode_post_notify(state);
 
-	if (pipe != INVALID_PIPE &&
+	if (!new_cdclk_state->disable_pipes &&
 	    old_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk > new_cdclk_state->actual.cdclk) {
 		drm_WARN_ON(&i915->drm, !new_cdclk_state->base.changed);
 
@@ -3036,6 +3036,7 @@ static struct intel_global_state *intel_
 		return NULL;
 
 	cdclk_state->pipe = INVALID_PIPE;
+	cdclk_state->disable_pipes = false;
 
 	return &cdclk_state->base;
 }
@@ -3214,6 +3215,8 @@ int intel_modeset_calc_cdclk(struct inte
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 
+		new_cdclk_state->disable_pipes = true;
+
 		drm_dbg_kms(&dev_priv->drm,
 			    "Modeset required for cdclk change\n");
 	}
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_cdclk.h +3 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ struct intel_cdclk_state {
 
 	/* bitmask of active pipes */
 	u8 active_pipes;
+
+	/* update cdclk with pipes disabled */
+	bool disable_pipes;
 };
 
 int intel_crtc_compute_min_cdclk(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state);
author maintainer
#160 lore raw

PATCH 160/172 drm/i915/psr: Disable PSR when bigjoiner is used

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit e3d4ead4d48c05355bd3b99c8162428f68c3c1a5 upstream.

Bigjoiner seem to be causing all kinds of grief to the PSR code currently. I don't believe there is any hardware issue but the code simply not handling this correctly. For now just disable PSR when bigjoiner is needed.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c +11 -0
@@ -1368,6 +1368,17 @@ void intel_psr_compute_config(struct int
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * FIXME figure out what is wrong with PSR+bigjoiner and
+	 * fix it. Presumably something related to the fact that
+	 * PSR is a transcoder level feature.
+	 */
+	if (crtc_state->bigjoiner_pipes) {
+		drm_dbg_kms(&dev_priv->drm,
+			    "PSR disabled due to bigjoiner\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (CAN_PANEL_REPLAY(intel_dp))
 		crtc_state->has_panel_replay = true;
 	else
author maintainer
#161 lore raw

PATCH 161/172 drm/i915: Disable port sync when bigjoiner is used

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit 0653d501409eeb9f1deb7e4c12e4d0d2c9f1cba1 upstream.

The current modeset sequence can't handle port sync and bigjoiner at the same time. Refuse port sync when bigjoiner is needed, at least until we fix the modeset sequence.

v2: Add a FIXME (Vandite)

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_ddi.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_ddi.c +5 -0
@@ -4229,7 +4229,12 @@ static bool m_n_equal(const struct intel
 static bool crtcs_port_sync_compatible(const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state1,
 				       const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state2)
 {
+	/*
+	 * FIXME the modeset sequence is currently wrong and
+	 * can't deal with bigjoiner + port sync at the same time.
+	 */
 	return crtc_state1->hw.active && crtc_state2->hw.active &&
+		!crtc_state1->bigjoiner_pipes && !crtc_state2->bigjoiner_pipes &&
 		crtc_state1->output_types == crtc_state2->output_types &&
 		crtc_state1->output_format == crtc_state2->output_format &&
 		crtc_state1->lane_count == crtc_state2->lane_count &&
author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 162/172 drm/i915: Disable live M/N updates when using bigjoiner

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit 4a36e46df7aa781c756f09727d37dc2783f1ee75 upstream.

All joined pipes share the same transcoder/timing generator. Currently we just do the commits per-pipe, which doesn't really work if we need to change the timings at the same time. For now just disable live M/N updates when bigjoiner is needed.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dp.c +5 -1
@@ -2756,7 +2756,11 @@ intel_dp_drrs_compute_config(struct inte
 		intel_panel_downclock_mode(connector, &pipe_config->hw.adjusted_mode);
 	int pixel_clock;
 
-	if (has_seamless_m_n(connector))
+	/*
+	 * FIXME all joined pipes share the same transcoder.
+	 * Need to account for that when updating M/N live.
+	 */
+	if (has_seamless_m_n(connector) && !pipe_config->bigjoiner_pipes)
 		pipe_config->update_m_n = true;
 
 	if (!can_enable_drrs(connector, pipe_config, downclock_mode)) {
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 163/172 drm/amdgpu: Reset dGPU if suspend got aborted

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lijo Lazar <[email protected]>

commit 8b2be55f4d6c1099d7f629b0ed7535a5be788c83 upstream.

For SOC21 ASICs, there is an issue in re-enabling PM features if a suspend got aborted. In such cases, reset the device during resume phase. This is a workaround till a proper solution is finalized.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c +25 -0
@@ -832,10 +832,35 @@ static int soc21_common_suspend(void *ha
 	return soc21_common_hw_fini(adev);
 }
 
+static bool soc21_need_reset_on_resume(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
+{
+	u32 sol_reg1, sol_reg2;
+
+	/* Will reset for the following suspend abort cases.
+	 * 1) Only reset dGPU side.
+	 * 2) S3 suspend got aborted and TOS is active.
+	 */
+	if (!(adev->flags & AMD_IS_APU) && adev->in_s3 &&
+	    !adev->suspend_complete) {
+		sol_reg1 = RREG32_SOC15(MP0, 0, regMP0_SMN_C2PMSG_81);
+		msleep(100);
+		sol_reg2 = RREG32_SOC15(MP0, 0, regMP0_SMN_C2PMSG_81);
+
+		return (sol_reg1 != sol_reg2);
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 static int soc21_common_resume(void *handle)
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = (struct amdgpu_device *)handle;
 
+	if (soc21_need_reset_on_resume(adev)) {
+		dev_info(adev->dev, "S3 suspend aborted, resetting...");
+		soc21_asic_reset(adev);
+	}
+
 	return soc21_common_hw_init(adev);
 }
 
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 164/172 drm/amdgpu: always force full reset for SOC21

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 65ff8092e4802f96d87d3d7cde146961f5228265 upstream.

There are cases where soft reset seems to succeed, but does not, so always use mode1/2 for now.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c +0 -2
@@ -450,10 +450,8 @@ static bool soc21_need_full_reset(struct
 {
 	switch (amdgpu_ip_version(adev, GC_HWIP, 0)) {
 	case IP_VERSION(11, 0, 0):
-		return amdgpu_ras_is_supported(adev, AMDGPU_RAS_BLOCK__UMC);
 	case IP_VERSION(11, 0, 2):
 	case IP_VERSION(11, 0, 3):
-		return false;
 	default:
 		return true;
 	}
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 165/172 drm/amdgpu: fix incorrect number of active RBs for gfx11

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tim Huang <[email protected]>

commit bbca7f414ae9a12ea231cdbafd79c607e3337ea8 upstream.

The RB bitmap should be global active RB bitmap & active RB bitmap based on active SA.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v11_0.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v11_0.c +1 -1
@@ -1630,7 +1630,7 @@ static void gfx_v11_0_setup_rb(struct am
 			active_rb_bitmap |= (0x3 << (i * rb_bitmap_width_per_sa));
 	}
 
-	active_rb_bitmap |= global_active_rb_bitmap;
+	active_rb_bitmap &= global_active_rb_bitmap;
 	adev->gfx.config.backend_enable_mask = active_rb_bitmap;
 	adev->gfx.config.num_rbs = hweight32(active_rb_bitmap);
 }
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 166/172 drm/amdgpu: differentiate external rev id for gfx 11.5.0

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yifan Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 6dba20d23e85034901ccb765a7ca71199bcca4df upstream.

This patch to differentiate external rev id for gfx 11.5.0.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/soc21.c +4 -1
@@ -712,7 +712,10 @@ static int soc21_common_early_init(void
 			AMD_PG_SUPPORT_VCN |
 			AMD_PG_SUPPORT_JPEG |
 			AMD_PG_SUPPORT_GFX_PG;
-		adev->external_rev_id = adev->rev_id + 0x1;
+		if (adev->rev_id == 0)
+			adev->external_rev_id = 0x1;
+		else
+			adev->external_rev_id = adev->rev_id + 0x10;
 		break;
 	default:
 		/* FIXME: not supported yet */
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 167/172 drm/amd/display: Program VSC SDP colorimetry for all DP sinks >= 1.4

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit 9e61ef8d219877202d4ee51d0d2ad9072c99a262 upstream.

In order for display colorimetry to work correctly on DP displays we need to send the VSC SDP packet. We should only do so for panels with DPCD revision greater or equal to 1.4 as older receivers might have problems with it.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +5 -2
@@ -6257,7 +6257,9 @@ create_stream_for_sink(struct drm_connec
 	if (stream->signal == SIGNAL_TYPE_HDMI_TYPE_A)
 		mod_build_hf_vsif_infopacket(stream, &stream->vsp_infopacket);
 
-	if (stream->link->psr_settings.psr_feature_enabled || stream->link->replay_settings.replay_feature_enabled) {
+	if (stream->signal == SIGNAL_TYPE_DISPLAY_PORT ||
+	    stream->signal == SIGNAL_TYPE_DISPLAY_PORT_MST ||
+	    stream->signal == SIGNAL_TYPE_EDP) {
 		//
 		// should decide stream support vsc sdp colorimetry capability
 		// before building vsc info packet
@@ -6267,7 +6269,8 @@ create_stream_for_sink(struct drm_connec
 			stream->use_vsc_sdp_for_colorimetry =
 				aconnector->dc_sink->is_vsc_sdp_colorimetry_supported;
 		} else {
-			if (stream->link->dpcd_caps.dprx_feature.bits.VSC_SDP_COLORIMETRY_SUPPORTED)
+			if (stream->link->dpcd_caps.dpcd_rev.raw >= 0x14 &&
+			    stream->link->dpcd_caps.dprx_feature.bits.VSC_SDP_COLORIMETRY_SUPPORTED)
 				stream->use_vsc_sdp_for_colorimetry = true;
 		}
 		if (stream->out_transfer_func->tf == TRANSFER_FUNCTION_GAMMA22)
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 168/172 drm/amd/display: Set VSC SDP Colorimetry same way for MST and SST

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit c3e2a5f2da904a18661335e8be2b961738574998 upstream.

The previous check for the is_vsc_sdp_colorimetry_supported flag for MST sink signals did nothing. Simplify the code and use the same check for MST and SST.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c |   12 +++---------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +3 -9
@@ -6264,15 +6264,9 @@ create_stream_for_sink(struct drm_connec
 		// should decide stream support vsc sdp colorimetry capability
 		// before building vsc info packet
 		//
-		stream->use_vsc_sdp_for_colorimetry = false;
-		if (aconnector->dc_sink->sink_signal == SIGNAL_TYPE_DISPLAY_PORT_MST) {
-			stream->use_vsc_sdp_for_colorimetry =
-				aconnector->dc_sink->is_vsc_sdp_colorimetry_supported;
-		} else {
-			if (stream->link->dpcd_caps.dpcd_rev.raw >= 0x14 &&
-			    stream->link->dpcd_caps.dprx_feature.bits.VSC_SDP_COLORIMETRY_SUPPORTED)
-				stream->use_vsc_sdp_for_colorimetry = true;
-		}
+		stream->use_vsc_sdp_for_colorimetry = stream->link->dpcd_caps.dpcd_rev.raw >= 0x14 &&
+						      stream->link->dpcd_caps.dprx_feature.bits.VSC_SDP_COLORIMETRY_SUPPORTED;
+
 		if (stream->out_transfer_func->tf == TRANSFER_FUNCTION_GAMMA22)
 			tf = TRANSFER_FUNC_GAMMA_22;
 		mod_build_vsc_infopacket(stream, &stream->vsc_infopacket, stream->output_color_space, tf);
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 169/172 drm/amd/display: Do not recursively call manual trigger programming

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dillon Varone <[email protected]>

commit 953927587f37b731abdeabe46ad44a3b3ec67a52 upstream.

[WHY&HOW]
We should not be recursively calling the manual trigger programming function when FAMS is not in use.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/optc/dcn32/dcn32_optc.c |    3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/optc/dcn32/dcn32_optc.c +0 -3
@@ -267,9 +267,6 @@ static void optc32_setup_manual_trigger(
 				OTG_V_TOTAL_MAX_SEL, 1,
 				OTG_FORCE_LOCK_ON_EVENT, 0,
 				OTG_SET_V_TOTAL_MIN_MASK, (1 << 1)); /* TRIGA */
-
-		// Setup manual flow control for EOF via TRIG_A
-		optc->funcs->setup_manual_trigger(optc);
 	}
 }
 
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 170/172 drm/amd/display: Return max resolution supported by DWB

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Hung <[email protected]>

commit 2cc69a10d83180f3de9f5afe3a98e972b1453d4c upstream.

mode_config's max width x height is 4096x2160 and is higher than DWB's max resolution 3840x2160 which is returned instead.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_wb.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_wb.c +2 -4
@@ -76,10 +76,8 @@ static int amdgpu_dm_wb_encoder_atomic_c
 
 static int amdgpu_dm_wb_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 {
-	struct drm_device *dev = connector->dev;
-
-	return drm_add_modes_noedid(connector, dev->mode_config.max_width,
-				    dev->mode_config.max_height);
+	/* Maximum resolution supported by DWB */
+	return drm_add_modes_noedid(connector, 3840, 2160);
 }
 
 static int amdgpu_dm_wb_prepare_job(struct drm_writeback_connector *wb_connector,
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 171/172 drm/amd/display: always reset ODM mode in context when adding first plane

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wenjing Liu <[email protected]>

commit 81901d8d0472e9a19d294ae1dea76b950548195d upstream.

[why]
In current implemenation ODM mode is only reset when the last plane is removed from dc state. For any dc validate we will always remove all current planes and add new planes. However when switching from no planes to 1 plane, ODM mode is not reset because no planes get removed. This has caused an issue where we kept ODM combine when it should have been remove when a plane is added. The change is to reset ODM mode when adding the first plane.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_state.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_state.c +9 -0
@@ -436,6 +436,15 @@ bool dc_state_add_plane(
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (stream_status->plane_count == 0 && dc->config.enable_windowed_mpo_odm)
+		/* ODM combine could prevent us from supporting more planes
+		 * we will reset ODM slice count back to 1 when all planes have
+		 * been removed to maximize the amount of planes supported when
+		 * new planes are added.
+		 */
+		resource_update_pipes_for_stream_with_slice_count(
+				state, dc->current_state, dc->res_pool, stream, 1);
+
 	otg_master_pipe = resource_get_otg_master_for_stream(
 			&state->res_ctx, stream);
 	if (otg_master_pipe)
author maintainer
#172 lore raw

PATCH 172/172 drm/amd/display: fix disable otg wa logic in DCN316

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.8-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fudongwang <[email protected]>

commit cf79814cb0bf5749b9f0db53ca231aa540c02768 upstream.

[Why]
Wrong logic cause screen corruption.

[How]
Port logic from DCN35/314.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dcn316/dcn316_clk_mgr.c |   19 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dcn316/dcn316_clk_mgr.c +12 -7
@@ -99,20 +99,25 @@ static int dcn316_get_active_display_cnt
 	return display_count;
 }
 
-static void dcn316_disable_otg_wa(struct clk_mgr *clk_mgr_base, struct dc_state *context, bool disable)
+static void dcn316_disable_otg_wa(struct clk_mgr *clk_mgr_base, struct dc_state *context,
+		bool safe_to_lower, bool disable)
 {
 	struct dc *dc = clk_mgr_base->ctx->dc;
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < dc->res_pool->pipe_count; ++i) {
-		struct pipe_ctx *pipe = &dc->current_state->res_ctx.pipe_ctx[i];
+		struct pipe_ctx *pipe = safe_to_lower
+			? &context->res_ctx.pipe_ctx[i]
+			: &dc->current_state->res_ctx.pipe_ctx[i];
 
 		if (pipe->top_pipe || pipe->prev_odm_pipe)
 			continue;
-		if (pipe->stream && (pipe->stream->dpms_off || pipe->plane_state == NULL ||
-				     dc_is_virtual_signal(pipe->stream->signal))) {
+		if (pipe->stream && (pipe->stream->dpms_off || dc_is_virtual_signal(pipe->stream->signal) ||
+				     !pipe->stream->link_enc)) {
 			if (disable) {
-				pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->immediate_disable_crtc(pipe->stream_res.tg);
+				if (pipe->stream_res.tg && pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->immediate_disable_crtc)
+					pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->immediate_disable_crtc(pipe->stream_res.tg);
+
 				reset_sync_context_for_pipe(dc, context, i);
 			} else
 				pipe->stream_res.tg->funcs->enable_crtc(pipe->stream_res.tg);
@@ -207,11 +212,11 @@ static void dcn316_update_clocks(struct
 	}
 
 	if (should_set_clock(safe_to_lower, new_clocks->dispclk_khz, clk_mgr_base->clks.dispclk_khz)) {
-		dcn316_disable_otg_wa(clk_mgr_base, context, true);
+		dcn316_disable_otg_wa(clk_mgr_base, context, safe_to_lower, true);
 
 		clk_mgr_base->clks.dispclk_khz = new_clocks->dispclk_khz;
 		dcn316_smu_set_dispclk(clk_mgr, clk_mgr_base->clks.dispclk_khz);
-		dcn316_disable_otg_wa(clk_mgr_base, context, false);
+		dcn316_disable_otg_wa(clk_mgr_base, context, safe_to_lower, false);
 
 		update_dispclk = true;
 	}
Tested-by on the v1 series
#173 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.8.7 release. There are 172 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.8.7-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.8.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:

Signature · 1 line
Florian
Tested-by on the v1 series
#175 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.8.7 release. There are 172 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Successfully compiled and installed the kernel on my computer (Acer Aspire E15, Intel Core i3 Haswell). No noticeable regressions.

Signature · 1 line
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara
Tested-by on the v1 series
#176 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.8.7 release. There are 172 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.8.7-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.8.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).

maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#177 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.8.7 release. There are 172 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.8.7-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.8.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

No new regressions for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v6.8:

    10 builds:	10 pass, 0 fail
    26 boots:	26 pass, 0 fail
    106 tests:	105 pass, 1 fail

Linux version: 6.8.7-rc1-g367141eaada2
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000,
                tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180,
                tegra210-p3450-0000, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Test failures: tegra194-p2972-0000: boot.py

Jon

Signature · 1 line
nvpublic
#178 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

[2024-04-15 16:18] Greg Kroah-Hartman:

Quoted 9 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.8.7 release. There are 172 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.8.7-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.8.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Hi, 6.8.7-rc1 is running fine on various x86_64 bare metal and virtual machines of mine (Haswell, Kaby Lake, Coffee Lake).

Regards
Pascal

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#179 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.8.7 release. There are 172 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:19:30 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.8.7-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.8.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

## Build
* kernel: 6.8.7-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-6.8.y
* git commit: 367141eaada2c7635234576914bcd1f480d62731
* git describe: v6.8.6-173-g367141eaada2
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.8.y/build/v6.8.6-173-g367141eaada2

## Test Regressions (compared to v6.8.6)

## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.8.6)

## Test Fixes (compared to v6.8.6)

## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.8.6)

## Test result summary
total: 285130, pass: 247210, fail: 3619, skip: 33930, xfail: 371

## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 133 total, 131 passed, 2 failed
* arm64: 41 total, 41 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 32 total, 32 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 25 total, 25 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 4 total, 4 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 36 total, 36 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 19 total, 19 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 13 total, 13 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 8 total, 6 passed, 2 failed
* x86_64: 37 total, 36 passed, 1 failed

## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-filesystems-epoll
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mm
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-watchdog
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* libgpiod
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-io[
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-smoketest
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org