KVM: arm64: Preamble for pKVM
Subsystems (4)
v2 cover KVM: arm64: Preamble for pKVM
Changes from V1:
- Rebased on Linux 6.9-rc3 -- kvmarm/next (9ac5bab4deee) [Marc]
- Fixed comments and tidied up [Marc, Mark]
- Moved fixes to beginning of series (patches 1-5) [Marc]
- Added a patch (patch 1) that allocates memory for fpsimd state in protected mode, needed after the host state changes
- Added patches that refactor code for checking fpsimd state ownership [Marc]
- Dropped patches that don't fit in this series [Marc, Mark]
- Fix build issue in "KVM: arm64: Add atomics-based checking refcount implementation at EL2" (Mostafa)
We are getting closer to upstreaming the remaining part of pKVM code [1]. To make the process easier for us and for our dear reviewers, we are sending out this patch series as a preamble to the upcoming patches.
This series is based on Linux 6.9-rc3 -- kvmarm/next (9ac5bab4deee). Most of the patches in this series are self-standing, without dependencies on other patches within the same series, and can be applied directly.
This series is a bit of a bombay-mix of patches we've been carrying. There's no one overarching theme, but they do improve the code by fixing existing bugs in pKVM, refactoring code to make it more readable and easier to re-use for pKVM, or adding functionality to the existing pKVM code upstream.
None of the patches in this series intentionally affect the functionality of non-protected modes. Patches 1 to 5 are bug and comment fixes.
For a technical deep dive into pKVM, please refer to Quentin Perret's KVM Forum Presentation [2, 3]. The pKVM core series, which we plan on sending for review next, the code is here [1].
Cheers,
Fuad, Quentin, Will, and Marc
[1] https://android-kvm.googlesource.com/linux/+/refs/heads/for-upstream/pkvm-core
[2] Protected KVM on arm64 (slides)
https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/kvmforum2022/88/KVM%20forum%202022%20-%20pKVM%20deep%20dive.pdf
[3] Protected KVM on arm64 (video)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9npebeVFbFw
Fuad Tabba (26):
KVM: arm64: Allocate per-cpu memory for the host fpsimd state in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Do not re-initialize the KVM lock
KVM: arm64: Fix comment for __pkvm_vcpu_init_traps()
KVM: arm64: Change kvm_handle_mmio_return() return polarity
KVM: arm64: Move setting the page as dirty out of the critical section
KVM: arm64: Split up nvhe/fixed_config.h
KVM: arm64: Move pstate reset value definitions to kvm_arm.h
KVM: arm64: Clarify rationale for ZCR_EL1 value restored on guest exit
KVM: arm64: Refactor calculating SVE state size to use helpers
KVM: arm64: Do not map the host fpsimd state to hyp in pKVM
KVM: arm64: Move some kvm_psci functions to a shared header
KVM: arm64: Refactor reset_mpidr() to extract its computation
KVM: arm64: Refactor kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth() for hyp use
KVM: arm64: Introduce gfn_to_memslot_prot()
KVM: arm64: Do not use the hva in kvm_handle_guest_abort()
KVM: arm64: Do not set the virtual timer offset for protected vCPUs
KVM: arm64: Check directly whether a vcpu is protected
KVM: arm64: Trap debug break and watch from guest
KVM: arm64: Restrict protected VM capabilities
KVM: arm64: Do not support MTE for protected VMs
KVM: arm64: Move pkvm_vcpu_init_traps() to hyp vcpu init
KVM: arm64: Fix initializing traps in protected mode
KVM: arm64: Remove unused vcpu parameter from guest_owns_fp_regs()
KVM: arm64: Move guest_owns_fp_regs() to enable use in KVM code
KVM: arm64: Add host_owns_fp_regs()
KVM: arm64: Refactor checks for FP state ownership
Marc Zyngier (6):
KVM: arm64: Check for PTE validity when checking for
executable/cacheable
KVM: arm64: Simplify vgic-v3 hypercalls
KVM: arm64: Introduce predicates to check for protected state
KVM: arm64: Add PC_UPDATE_REQ flags covering all PC updates
KVM: arm64: Add vcpu flag copy primitive
KVM: arm64: Force injection of a data abort on NISV MMIO exit
Quentin Perret (5):
KVM: arm64: Issue CMOs when tearing down guest s2 pages
KVM: arm64: Avoid BUG-ing from the host abort path
KVM: arm64: Add is_pkvm_initialized() helper
KVM: arm64: Refactor enter_exception64()
KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing .hyp.data
Will Deacon (10):
KVM: arm64: Avoid BBM when changing only s/w bits in Stage-2 PTE
KVM: arm64: Support TLB invalidation in guest context
KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_rwlock_t
KVM: arm64: Add atomics-based checking refcount implementation at EL2
KVM: arm64: Use atomic refcount helpers for 'struct
hyp_page::refcount'
KVM: arm64: Remove locking from EL2 allocation fast-paths
KVM: arm64: Reformat/beautify PTP hypercall documentation
KVM: arm64: Rename firmware pseudo-register documentation file
KVM: arm64: Document the KVM/arm64-specific calls in hypercalls.rst
KVM: arm64: Advertise GICv3 sysreg interface to protected guests
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 7 + .../virt/kvm/arm/fw-pseudo-registers.rst | 138 +++++++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst | 180 ++++---------- Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst | 38 +-- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 12 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 9 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 28 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 42 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 234 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h | 12 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c | 20 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 102 ++++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 59 +++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c | 100 ++++---- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 8 +- .../arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/fixed_config.h | 223 ----------------- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/gfp.h | 6 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/memory.h | 18 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 19 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/refcount.h | 76 ++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/rwlock.h | 129 ++++++++++ .../arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/trap_handler.h | 2 - arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 32 +-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c | 10 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/page_alloc.c | 21 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 72 ++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 12 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 13 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/tlb.c | 115 +++++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c | 21 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vgic-v3-sr.c | 27 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c | 13 +- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 25 +- arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c | 28 --- arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 20 +- arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 14 +- arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.h | 19 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v2.c | 9 +- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v3.c | 23 +- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c | 11 - arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h | 2 - include/kvm/arm_psci.h | 29 +++ include/kvm/arm_vgic.h | 1 - include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 22 ++ 50 files changed, 1271 insertions(+), 744 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/fw-pseudo-registers.rst delete mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/fixed_config.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/refcount.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/rwlock.h
base-commit: 9ac5bab4deeeeb99f36695250b99c2f9bfae2379
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 1/47 KVM: arm64: Allocate per-cpu memory for the host fpsimd state in pKVM
Allocate a per-cpu fpsimd_state to store the host's state when in protected mode. Since the host_fpsimd_state pointer has been excluded from kvm_vcpu_arch, no memory has been allocated to store it in protected mode, and its value hasn't been set.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h +1 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) }void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init (void *tbl); +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void );int __pkvm_init_vm (struct kvm *host_kvm,unsigned long vm_hva,unsigned long pgd_hva);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +18 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ unsigned long __icache_flags;/* Used by kvm_get_vttbr(). */ unsigned int kvm_arm_vmid_bits; +/* +* Host FPSIMD state. Written to when the guest accesses its own FPSIMD state, +* and read when the guest state is live and we need to switch back to the host. +* +* Only valid when guest_owns_fp_regs() is true. +*/ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, host_fpsimd_state); +/* * Set trap register values based on features in ID_AA64PFR0. */
@@ -247,6 +255,16 @@ void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) vm_table = tbl; } +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void ) +{ +unsigned long i; + +for (i =0 ; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) { +per_cpu_ptr (&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = +per_cpu_ptr (&host_fpsimd_state, i); + } +} +/* * Return the hyp vm structure corresponding to the handle. */
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c +1 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ void __noreturn __pkvm_init_finalise(void) goto out;pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init (vm_table_base); +pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (); out:/* * We tail-called to here from handle___pkvm_init() and will not return,
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 01/47] KVM: arm64: Allocate per-cpu memory for the host fpsimd state in pKVM
Quoted 4 lines · Fuad Tabba
Allocate a per-cpu
fpsimd_stateto store the host's state when in protected mode. Since thehost_fpsimd_statepointer has been excluded fromkvm_vcpu_arch, no memory has been allocated to store it in protected mode, and its value hasn't been set.
Marc Zyngier
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 01/47] KVM: arm64: Allocate per-cpu memory for the host fpsimd state in pKVM
In reply to Fuad TabbaQuoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
Allocate a per-cpu
fpsimd_stateto store the host's state when in protected mode. Since thehost_fpsimd_statepointer has been excluded fromkvm_vcpu_arch, no memory has been allocated to store it in protected mode, and its value hasn't been set.
Why do we need this? The EL2 already has its own private host state, which has a full FP state already.
On non-pKVM, we save the host's view directly into the process state. Obviously, we can't do that with pKVM. But we can absolutely use the host context for that, and we shouldn't need any extra allocation.
Quoted 41 lines
Fixes 51e09b5572d6 ("KVM: arm64: Exclude host_fpsimd_state pointer from kvm_vcpu_arch")Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h +1
-0@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) }void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init (void *tbl); +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void );int __pkvm_init_vm (struct kvm *host_kvm,unsigned long vm_hva,unsigned long pgd_hva);arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +8
-0@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ unsigned long __icache_flags;/* Used by kvm_get_vttbr(). */ unsigned int kvm_arm_vmid_bits; +/* +* Host FPSIMD state. Written to when the guest accesses its own FPSIMD state, +* and read when the guest state is live and we need to switch back to the host. +* +* Only valid when guest_owns_fp_regs() is true. +*/ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, host_fpsimd_state); +/* * Set trap register values based on features in ID_AA64PFR0. */ @@ -247,6 +255,16 @@ void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) vm_table = tbl;
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) · line 265
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +8
-0} +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void ) +{ +unsigned long i; + +for (i =0 ; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) { +per_cpu_ptr (&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = +per_cpu_ptr (&host_fpsimd_state, i); + }
I'd expect this to be instead:
for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = &(per_cpu_ptr(&host_host_data, i)->fp_regs);
and the static allocation to go away.
Thanks,
M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Marc Zyngier
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 01/47] KVM: arm64: Allocate per-cpu memory for the host fpsimd state in pKVM
Quoted 71 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
Allocate a per-cpu
fpsimd_stateto store the host's state when in protected mode. Since thehost_fpsimd_statepointer has been excluded fromkvm_vcpu_arch, no memory has been allocated to store it in protected mode, and its value hasn't been set.Why do we need this? The EL2 already has its own private host state, which has a full FP state already.
On non-pKVM, we save the host's view directly into the process state. Obviously, we can't do that with pKVM. But we can absolutely use the host context for that, and we shouldn't need any extra allocation.
Quoted 41 lines
Fixes 51e09b5572d6 ("KVM: arm64: Exclude host_fpsimd_state pointer from kvm_vcpu_arch")Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h +1
-0@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) }void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init (void *tbl); +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void );int __pkvm_init_vm (struct kvm *host_kvm,unsigned long vm_hva,unsigned long pgd_hva);arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +8
-0@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ unsigned long __icache_flags;/* Used by kvm_get_vttbr(). */ unsigned int kvm_arm_vmid_bits; +/* +* Host FPSIMD state. Written to when the guest accesses its own FPSIMD state, +* and read when the guest state is live and we need to switch back to the host. +* +* Only valid when guest_owns_fp_regs() is true. +*/ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, host_fpsimd_state); +/* * Set trap register values based on features in ID_AA64PFR0. */ @@ -247,6 +255,16 @@ void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) vm_table = tbl;arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) · line 265
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +8
-0} +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void ) +{ +unsigned long i; + +for (i =0 ; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) { +per_cpu_ptr (&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = +per_cpu_ptr (&host_fpsimd_state, i); + }I'd expect this to be instead:
Quoted 3 lines
for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = &(per_cpu_ptr(&host_host_data, i)->fp_regs);
The astute reader will have noticed that this should actually be:
for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++)
per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = &(per_cpu_ptr(&host_host_data, i)->host_ctxt.fp_regs);
Everything else still stands for at least another 5 minutes.
Thanks,
M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
Re: [PATCH v2 01/47] KVM: arm64: Allocate per-cpu memory for the host fpsimd state in pKVM
Hi Marc,
Quoted 78 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 71 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
Allocate a per-cpu
fpsimd_stateto store the host's state when in protected mode. Since thehost_fpsimd_statepointer has been excluded fromkvm_vcpu_arch, no memory has been allocated to store it in protected mode, and its value hasn't been set.Why do we need this? The EL2 already has its own private host state, which has a full FP state already.
On non-pKVM, we save the host's view directly into the process state. Obviously, we can't do that with pKVM. But we can absolutely use the host context for that, and we shouldn't need any extra allocation.
Quoted 41 lines
Fixes 51e09b5572d6 ("KVM: arm64: Exclude host_fpsimd_state pointer from kvm_vcpu_arch")Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h +1
-0@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) }void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init (void *tbl); +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void );int __pkvm_init_vm (struct kvm *host_kvm,unsigned long vm_hva,unsigned long pgd_hva);arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +8
-0@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ unsigned long __icache_flags;/* Used by kvm_get_vttbr(). */ unsigned int kvm_arm_vmid_bits; +/* +* Host FPSIMD state. Written to when the guest accesses its own FPSIMD state, +* and read when the guest state is live and we need to switch back to the host. +* +* Only valid when guest_owns_fp_regs() is true. +*/ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, host_fpsimd_state); +/* * Set trap register values based on features in ID_AA64PFR0. */ @@ -247,6 +255,16 @@ void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) vm_table = tbl;arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init(void *tbl) · line 265
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +8
-0} +void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void ) +{ +unsigned long i; + +for (i =0 ; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) { +per_cpu_ptr (&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = +per_cpu_ptr (&host_fpsimd_state, i); + }I'd expect this to be instead:
Quoted 3 lines
for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = &(per_cpu_ptr(&host_host_data, i)->fp_regs);
Quoted 6 lines
The astute reader will have noticed that this should actually be:
for (i = 0; i < hyp_nr_cpus; i++) per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_data, i)->fpsimd_state = &(per_cpu_ptr(&host_host_data, i)->host_ctxt.fp_regs);Everything else still stands for at least another 5 minutes.
:D
Yes, I was about to reply with that. The reason I went with the static allocation is that I missed it, being hidden behind another level of indirection.
Either way, you're right. I'll fix this on the respin.
Thanks,
/fuad
Quoted 7 lines
Thanks,
M.--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
PATCH v2 2/47 KVM: arm64: Do not re-initialize the KVM lock
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe lock is already initialized in core KVM code at kvm_create_vm().
--- arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c +0 -1
@@ -222,7 +222,6 @@ void pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm)int pkvm_init_host_vm (struct kvm *host_kvm) { -mutex_init (&host_kvm->lock);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 3/47 KVM: arm64: Issue CMOs when tearing down guest s2 pages
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Quentin Perret <[email protected]>
On the guest teardown path, pKVM will zero the pages used to back the guest data structures before returning them to the host as they may contain secrets (e.g. in the vCPU registers). However, the zeroing is done using a cacheable alias, and CMOs are missing, hence giving the host a potential opportunity to read the original content of the guest structs from memory.
Fix this by issuing CMOs after zeroing the pages.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +1 -0
@@ -448,6 +448,7 @@ static void *map_donated_memory(unsigned long host_va, size_t size)static void __unmap_donated_memory (void *va,size_t size) { +kvm_flush_dcache_to_poc (va, size);WARN_ON (__pkvm_hyp_donate_host (hyp_virt_to_pfn (va),PAGE_ALIGN (size) >>PAGE_SHIFT )); }
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 4/47 KVM: arm64: Avoid BUG-ing from the host abort path
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Quentin Perret <[email protected]>
Under certain circumstances __get_fault_info() may resolve the faulting address using the AT instruction. Given that this is being done outside of the host lock critical section, it is racy and the resolution via AT may fail. We currently BUG() in this situation, which is obviously less than ideal. Moving the address resolution to the critical section may have a performance impact, so let's keep it where it is, but bail out and return to the host to try a second time.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c +7 -1
@@ -533,7 +533,13 @@ void handle_host_mem_abort(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)int ret =0 ; esr =read_sysreg_el2 (SYS_ESR ); -BUG_ON (!__get_fault_info (esr, &fault)); +if (!__get_fault_info (esr, &fault)) { +/* +* We've presumably raced with a page-table change which caused +* AT to fail, try again. +*/ +return ; + } addr = (fault.hpfar_el2 &HPFAR_MASK ) <<8 ; ret =host_stage2_idmap (addr);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 5/47 KVM: arm64: Fix comment for __pkvm_vcpu_init_traps()
In reply to Fuad TabbaFix the comment to clarify that __pkvm_vcpu_init_traps() initializes traps for all VMs in protected mode, and not only for protected VMs.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +1 -1
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static void pvm_init_trap_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }/* -* Initialize trap register values for protected VMs. +* Initialize trap register values in protected mode. */ void __pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 6/47 KVM: arm64: Change kvm_handle_mmio_return() return polarity
In reply to Fuad TabbaMost exit handlers return <= 0 to indicate that the host needs to handle the exit. Make kvm_handle_mmio_return() consistent with the exit handlers in handle_exit(). This makes the code easier to reason about, and makes it easier to add other handlers in future patches.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +1 -1
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (run->exit_reason ==KVM_EXIT_MMIO ) { ret =kvm_handle_mmio_return (vcpu); -if (ret) +if (ret <=0 )return ret; }
arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c +2 -2
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* Detect an already handled MMIO return */ if (unlikely (!vcpu->mmio_needed)) -return 0 ; +return 1 ; vcpu->mmio_needed =0 ;
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)*/ kvm_incr_pc (vcpu); -return 0 ; +return 1 ; }int io_mem_abort (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,phys_addr_t fault_ipa)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 7/47 KVM: arm64: Move setting the page as dirty out of the critical section
In reply to Fuad TabbaMove the unlock earlier in user_mem_abort() to shorten the critical section. This also helps for future refactoring and reuse of similar code.
This moves out marking the page as dirty outside of the critical section. That code does not interact with the stage-2 page tables, which the read lock in the critical section protects.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +5 -3
@@ -1522,8 +1522,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,read_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock); pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt; -if (mmu_invalidate_retry (kvm, mmu_seq)) +if (mmu_invalidate_retry (kvm, mmu_seq)) { + ret = -EAGAIN ; goto out_unlock; + }/* * If we are not forced to use page mapping, check if we are
@@ -1581,6 +1583,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, memcache,KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT | KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED); +out_unlock: +read_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);/* Mark the page dirty only if the fault is handled successfully */ if (writable && !ret) {
@@ -1588,8 +1592,6 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,mark_page_dirty_in_slot (kvm, memslot, gfn); } -out_unlock: -read_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);kvm_release_pfn_clean (pfn);return ret != -EAGAIN ? ret :0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 8/47 KVM: arm64: Check for PTE validity when checking for executable/cacheable
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Don't just assume that the PTE is valid when checking whether it describes an executable or cacheable mapping.
This makes sure that we don't issue CMOs for invalid mappings.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c +3 -3
@@ -914,12 +914,12 @@ static void stage2_unmap_put_pte(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx,static bool stage2_pte_cacheable (struct kvm_pgtable *pgt,kvm_pte_t pte) {u64 memattr = pte &KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_LO_S2_MEMATTR ; -return memattr ==KVM_S2_MEMATTR (pgt,NORMAL ); +return kvm_pte_valid (pte) && memattr ==KVM_S2_MEMATTR (pgt,NORMAL ); }static bool stage2_pte_executable (kvm_pte_t pte) { -return !(pte &KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_S2_XN ); +return kvm_pte_valid (pte) && !(pte &KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_S2_XN ); } static u64 stage2_map_walker_phys_addr(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx,
@@ -1370,7 +1370,7 @@ static int stage2_flush_walker(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx,struct kvm_pgtable *pgt = ctx->arg;struct kvm_pgtable_mm_ops *mm_ops = pgt->mm_ops; -if (!kvm_pte_valid (ctx->old) || !stage2_pte_cacheable (pgt, ctx->old)) +if (!stage2_pte_cacheable (pgt, ctx->old))return 0 ;if (mm_ops->dcache_clean_inval_poc)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 9/47 KVM: arm64: Avoid BBM when changing only s/w bits in Stage-2 PTE
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Break-before-make (BBM) can be expensive, as transitioning via an invalid mapping (i.e. the "break" step) requires the completion of TLB invalidation and can also cause other agents to fault concurrently on the invalid mapping.
Since BBM is not required when changing only the software bits of a PTE, avoid the sequence in this case and just update the PTE directly.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c +15 -0
@@ -979,6 +979,21 @@ static int stage2_map_walker_try_leaf(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx,if (!stage2_pte_needs_update (ctx->old, new))return -EAGAIN ; +/* If we're only changing software bits, then store them and go! */ +if (!kvm_pgtable_walk_shared (ctx) && + !((ctx->old ^ new) & ~KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_SW )) { +bool old_is_counted =stage2_pte_is_counted (ctx->old); + +if (old_is_counted !=stage2_pte_is_counted (new)) { +if (old_is_counted) + mm_ops->put_page (ctx->ptep); +else + mm_ops->get_page (ctx->ptep); + } +WRITE_ONCE (*ctx->ptep, new); +return 0 ; + } +if (!stage2_try_break_pte (ctx, data->mmu))return -EAGAIN ;
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 09/47] KVM: arm64: Avoid BBM when changing only s/w bits in Stage-2 PTE
Hi Fuad,
Quoted 26 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Break-before-make (BBM) can be expensive, as transitioning via an invalid mapping (i.e. the "break" step) requires the completion of TLB invalidation and can also cause other agents to fault concurrently on the invalid mapping.
Since BBM is not required when changing only the software bits of a PTE, avoid the sequence in this case and just update the PTE directly.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c +2
-0@@ -979,6 +979,21 @@ static int stage2_map_walker_try_leaf(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx,if (!stage2_pte_needs_update (ctx->old, new))return -EAGAIN ; +/* If we're only changing software bits, then store them and go! */ + if (!kvm_pgtable_walk_shared(ctx) &&
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c static int stage2_map_walker_try_leaf(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx, · line 993
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c +10
-0+ !((ctx->old ^ new) & ~KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_SW)) { +bool old_is_counted =stage2_pte_is_counted (ctx->old); + +if (old_is_counted !=stage2_pte_is_counted (new)) { +if (old_is_counted) + mm_ops->put_page (ctx->ptep); +else + mm_ops->get_page (ctx->ptep); + } +WRITE_ONCE (*ctx->ptep, new);
IIUC, you're using a naked WRITE_ONCE() to avoid a error path that cleans up the reference count. That's fine, but can you change this to a WARN_ON_ONCE(stage2_try_set_pte())? Should this ever be changed to become a shared walk w/o gracefully handling a cleanup here I'd hope the warning would catch someone's attention.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Oliver
Re: [PATCH v2 09/47] KVM: arm64: Avoid BBM when changing only s/w bits in Stage-2 PTE
Hi Oliver,
Quoted 38 lines · Oliver Upton
Hi Fuad,
Quoted 34 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Break-before-make (BBM) can be expensive, as transitioning via an invalid mapping (i.e. the "break" step) requires the completion of TLB invalidation and can also cause other agents to fault concurrently on the invalid mapping.
Since BBM is not required when changing only the software bits of a PTE, avoid the sequence in this case and just update the PTE directly.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c +10
-0@@ -979,6 +979,21 @@ static int stage2_map_walker_try_leaf(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx,if (!stage2_pte_needs_update (ctx->old, new))return -EAGAIN ; +/* If we're only changing software bits, then store them and go! */ +if (!kvm_pgtable_walk_shared (ctx) && + !((ctx->old ^ new) & ~KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_SW )) { +bool old_is_counted =stage2_pte_is_counted (ctx->old); + +if (old_is_counted !=stage2_pte_is_counted (new)) { +if (old_is_counted) + mm_ops->put_page (ctx->ptep); +else + mm_ops->get_page (ctx->ptep);
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c static int stage2_map_walker_try_leaf(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx, · line 993
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c +2
-0+ } +WRITE_ONCE (*ctx->ptep, new);IIUC, you're using a naked
WRITE_ONCE()to avoid a error path that cleans up the reference count. That's fine, but can you change this to a WARN_ON_ONCE(stage2_try_set_pte())? Should this ever be changed to become a shared walk w/o gracefully handling a cleanup here I'd hope the warning would catch someone's attention.
I think you mean WARN_ON_ONCE(!stage2_try_set_pte(...)). I can do that, but for now, warnings in protected mode are fatal. Should I do that anyway?
Cheers,
/fuad
Quoted 3 lines
--
Thanks,
Oliver
Re: [PATCH v2 09/47] KVM: arm64: Avoid BBM when changing only s/w bits in Stage-2 PTE
Quoted 13 lines · Fuad Tabba
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/pgtable.c +12
-0+/* If we're only changing software bits, then store them and go! */ +if (!kvm_pgtable_walk_shared (ctx) && + !((ctx->old ^ new) & ~KVM_PTE_LEAF_ATTR_HI_SW )) { +bool old_is_counted =stage2_pte_is_counted (ctx->old); + +if (old_is_counted !=stage2_pte_is_counted (new)) { +if (old_is_counted) + mm_ops->put_page (ctx->ptep); +else + mm_ops->get_page (ctx->ptep); + } +WRITE_ONCE (*ctx->ptep, new);
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
IIUC, you're using a naked
WRITE_ONCE()to avoid a error path that cleans up the reference count. That's fine, but can you change this to a WARN_ON_ONCE(stage2_try_set_pte())? Should this ever be changed to become a shared walk w/o gracefully handling a cleanup here I'd hope the warning would catch someone's attention.I think you mean WARN_ON_ONCE(!stage2_try_set_pte(...)).
Oops :) Yeah, that.
Quoted 2 lines
I can do that, but for now, warnings in protected mode are fatal. Should I do that anyway?
I think so. It'd express the expectations of the walk and could avoid *silently* making this PTE write racy / prone to failure.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Oliver
PATCH v2 10/47 KVM: arm64: Support TLB invalidation in guest context
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Typically, TLB invalidation of guest stage-2 mappings using nVHE is performed by a hypercall originating from the host. For the invalidation instruction to be effective, therefore, __tlb_switch_to_{guest,host}() swizzle the active stage-2 context around the TLBI instruction.
With guest-to-host memory sharing and unsharing hypercalls originating from the guest under pKVM, there is need to support both guest and host VMID invalidations issued from guest context.
Replace the __tlb_switch_to_{guest,host}() functions with a more general {enter,exit}_vmid_context() implementation which supports being invoked from guest context and acts as a no-op if the target context matches the running context.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/tlb.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/tlb.c +91 -24
@@ -11,13 +11,23 @@#include <nvhe/mem_protect.h> struct tlb_inv_context { -u64 tcr; +struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu; +u64 tcr; +u64 sctlr; }; -static void __tlb_switch_to_guest (struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, -struct tlb_inv_context *cxt, -bool nsh) +static void enter_vmid_context (struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, +struct tlb_inv_context *cxt, +bool nsh) { +struct kvm_s2_mmu *host_s2_mmu = &host_mmu.arch.mmu; +struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt; +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + + host_ctxt = &this_cpu_ptr (&kvm_host_data)->host_ctxt; + vcpu = host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu; + cxt->mmu =NULL ; +/* * We have two requirements: *
@@ -40,20 +50,55 @@ static void __tlb_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,else dsb (ish); +/* +* If we're already in the desired context, then there's nothing to do. +*/ +if (vcpu) { +/* +* We're in guest context. However, for this to work, this needs +* to be called from within __kvm_vcpu_run(), which ensures that +* __hyp_running_vcpu is set to the current guest vcpu. +*/ +if (mmu == vcpu->arch.hw_mmu ||WARN_ON (mmu != host_s2_mmu)) +return ; + + cxt->mmu = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu; + }else { +/* We're in host context. */ +if (mmu == host_s2_mmu) +return ; + + cxt->mmu = host_s2_mmu; + } +if (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT )) {u64 val;/* * For CPUs that are affected by ARM 1319367, we need to -* avoid a host Stage-1 walk while we have the guest's -* VMID set in the VTTBR in order to invalidate TLBs. -* We're guaranteed that the S1 MMU is enabled, so we can -* simply set the EPD bits to avoid any further TLB fill. +* avoid a Stage-1 walk with the old VMID while we have +* the new VMID set in the VTTBR in order to invalidate TLBs. +* We're guaranteed that the host S1 MMU is enabled, so +* we can simply set the EPD bits to avoid any further +* TLB fill. For guests, we ensure that the S1 MMU is +* temporarily enabled in the next context. */ val = cxt->tcr =read_sysreg_el1 (SYS_TCR ); val |=TCR_EPD1_MASK |TCR_EPD0_MASK ;write_sysreg_el1 (val,SYS_TCR );isb (); + +if (vcpu) { + val = cxt->sctlr =read_sysreg_el1 (SYS_SCTLR ); +if (!(val & SCTLR_ELx_M)) { + val |= SCTLR_ELx_M; +write_sysreg_el1 (val,SYS_SCTLR ); +isb (); + } + }else { +/* The host S1 MMU is always enabled. */ + cxt->sctlr = SCTLR_ELx_M; + } }/*
@@ -62,18 +107,40 @@ static void __tlb_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,* ensuring that we always have an ISB, but not two ISBs back * to back. */ -__load_stage2 (mmu,kern_hyp_va (mmu->arch)); +if (vcpu) +__load_host_stage2 (); +else +__load_stage2 (mmu,kern_hyp_va (mmu->arch)); + asm(ALTERNATIVE("isb", "nop", ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT)); } -static void __tlb_switch_to_host (struct tlb_inv_context *cxt) +static void exit_vmid_context (struct tlb_inv_context *cxt) { -__load_host_stage2 (); +struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu = cxt->mmu; +struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt; +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + + host_ctxt = &this_cpu_ptr (&kvm_host_data)->host_ctxt; + vcpu = host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu; + +if (!mmu) +return ; + +if (vcpu) +__load_stage2 (mmu,kern_hyp_va (mmu->arch)); +else +__load_host_stage2 ();if (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT )) { -/* Ensure write of the host VMID */ +/* Ensure write of the old VMID */ isb (); -/* Restore the host's TCR_EL1 */ + +if (!(cxt->sctlr & SCTLR_ELx_M)) { +write_sysreg_el1 (cxt->sctlr,SYS_SCTLR ); +isb (); + } +write_sysreg_el1 (cxt->tcr,SYS_TCR ); } }
@@ -84,7 +151,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,struct tlb_inv_context cxt;/* Switch to requested VMID */ -__tlb_switch_to_guest (mmu, &cxt, false); +enter_vmid_context (mmu, &cxt, false);/* * We could do so much better if we had the VA as well.
@@ -105,7 +172,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,dsb (ish);isb (); -__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt); +exit_vmid_context (&cxt); } void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa_nsh(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,
@@ -114,7 +181,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa_nsh(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,struct tlb_inv_context cxt;/* Switch to requested VMID */ -__tlb_switch_to_guest (mmu, &cxt, true); +enter_vmid_context (mmu, &cxt, true);/* * We could do so much better if we had the VA as well.
@@ -135,7 +202,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa_nsh(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,dsb (nsh);isb (); -__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt); +exit_vmid_context (&cxt); } void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,
@@ -152,7 +219,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, start =round_down (start, stride);/* Switch to requested VMID */ -__tlb_switch_to_guest (mmu, &cxt, false); +enter_vmid_context (mmu, &cxt, false);__flush_s2_tlb_range_op (ipas2e1is, start, pages, stride,TLBI_TTL_UNKNOWN );
@@ -162,7 +229,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,dsb (ish);isb (); -__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt); +exit_vmid_context (&cxt); }void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid (struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
@@ -170,13 +237,13 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)struct tlb_inv_context cxt;/* Switch to requested VMID */ -__tlb_switch_to_guest (mmu, &cxt, false); +enter_vmid_context (mmu, &cxt, false);__tlbi (vmalls12e1is);dsb (ish);isb (); -__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt); +exit_vmid_context (&cxt); }void __kvm_flush_cpu_context (struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
@@ -184,19 +251,19 @@ void __kvm_flush_cpu_context(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)struct tlb_inv_context cxt;/* Switch to requested VMID */ -__tlb_switch_to_guest (mmu, &cxt, false); +enter_vmid_context (mmu, &cxt, false);__tlbi (vmalle1); asmvolatile ("ic iallu" );dsb (nsh);isb (); -__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt); +exit_vmid_context (&cxt); }void __kvm_flush_vm_context (void ) { -/* Same remark as in __tlb_switch_to_guest() */ +/* Same remark as in enter_vmid_context() */ dsb (ish);__tlbi (alle1is);dsb (ish);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 11/47 KVM: arm64: Simplify vgic-v3 hypercalls
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Consolidate the GICv3 VMCR accessor hypercalls into the APR save/restore hypercalls so that all of the EL2 GICv3 state is covered by a single pair of hypercalls.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 8 ++------ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 5 ++--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 24 ++++++------------------ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vgic-v3-sr.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v2.c | 9 +-------- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v3.c | 23 ++--------------------- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c | 11 ----------- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h | 2 -- include/kvm/arm_vgic.h | 1 - 10 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +2 -6
@@ -73,10 +73,8 @@ enum __kvm_host_smccc_func { __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___kvm_flush_cpu_context, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___kvm_timer_set_cntvoff, - __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_read_vmcr, - __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_write_vmcr, - __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_save_aprs, - __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_restore_aprs, + __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs, + __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_init_traps, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_init_vm, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_init_vcpu,
@@ -241,8 +239,6 @@ extern int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);extern void __kvm_adjust_pc (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);extern u64 __vgic_v3_get_gic_config (void ); -extern u64 __vgic_v3_read_vmcr (void ); -extern void __vgic_v3_write_vmcr (u32 vmcr);extern void __vgic_v3_init_lrs (void );extern u64 __kvm_get_mdcr_el2 (void );
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h +2 -2
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ void __vgic_v3_save_state(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if);void __vgic_v3_restore_state (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if);void __vgic_v3_activate_traps (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if);void __vgic_v3_deactivate_traps (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if); -void __vgic_v3_save_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if); -void __vgic_v3_restore_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if); +void __vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if); +void __vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if);int __vgic_v3_perform_cpuif_access (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#ifdef __KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +2 -3
@@ -784,9 +784,8 @@ void kvm_vcpu_wfi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)* doorbells to be signalled, should an interrupt become pending. */ preempt_disable (); -kvm_vgic_vmcr_sync (vcpu);vcpu_set_flag (vcpu,IN_WFI ); -vgic_v4_put (vcpu); +kvm_vgic_put (vcpu);preempt_enable ();kvm_vcpu_halt (vcpu);
@@ -794,7 +793,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_wfi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)preempt_disable ();vcpu_clear_flag (vcpu,IN_WFI ); -vgic_v4_load (vcpu); +kvm_vgic_load (vcpu);preempt_enable (); }
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +6 -18
@@ -175,16 +175,6 @@ static void handle___vgic_v3_get_gic_config(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)cpu_reg (host_ctxt,1 ) =__vgic_v3_get_gic_config (); } -static void handle___vgic_v3_read_vmcr (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) -{ -cpu_reg (host_ctxt,1 ) =__vgic_v3_read_vmcr (); -} - -static void handle___vgic_v3_write_vmcr (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) -{ -__vgic_v3_write_vmcr (cpu_reg (host_ctxt,1 )); -} -static void handle___vgic_v3_init_lrs (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) {__vgic_v3_init_lrs ();
@@ -195,18 +185,18 @@ static void handle___kvm_get_mdcr_el2(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)cpu_reg (host_ctxt,1 ) =__kvm_get_mdcr_el2 (); } -static void handle___vgic_v3_save_aprs (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) +static void handle___vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) { DECLARE_REG(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *, cpu_if, host_ctxt, 1); -__vgic_v3_save_aprs (kern_hyp_va (cpu_if)); +__vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs (kern_hyp_va (cpu_if)); } -static void handle___vgic_v3_restore_aprs (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) +static void handle___vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) { DECLARE_REG(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *, cpu_if, host_ctxt, 1); -__vgic_v3_restore_aprs (kern_hyp_va (cpu_if)); +__vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs (kern_hyp_va (cpu_if)); }static void handle___pkvm_init (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
@@ -337,10 +327,8 @@ static const hcall_t host_hcall[] = {HANDLE_FUNC (__kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range),HANDLE_FUNC (__kvm_flush_cpu_context),HANDLE_FUNC (__kvm_timer_set_cntvoff), -HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_read_vmcr), -HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_write_vmcr), -HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_save_aprs), -HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_restore_aprs), +HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs), +HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs),HANDLE_FUNC (__pkvm_vcpu_init_traps),HANDLE_FUNC (__pkvm_init_vm), HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_init_vcpu),
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vgic-v3-sr.c +23 -4
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ void __vgic_v3_deactivate_traps(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if)write_gicreg (0 ,ICH_HCR_EL2 ); } -void __vgic_v3_save_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if) +static void __vgic_v3_save_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if) {u64 val;u32 nr_pre_bits;
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ void __vgic_v3_save_aprs(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if) } } -void __vgic_v3_restore_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if) +static void __vgic_v3_restore_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if) {u64 val;u32 nr_pre_bits;
@@ -455,16 +455,35 @@ u64 __vgic_v3_get_gic_config(void)return val; } -u64 __vgic_v3_read_vmcr (void ) +static u64 __vgic_v3_read_vmcr (void ) {return read_gicreg (ICH_VMCR_EL2 ); } -void __vgic_v3_write_vmcr (u32 vmcr) +static void __vgic_v3_write_vmcr (u32 vmcr) {write_gicreg (vmcr,ICH_VMCR_EL2 ); } +void __vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if) +{ +__vgic_v3_save_aprs (cpu_if); +if (cpu_if->vgic_sre) + cpu_if->vgic_vmcr =__vgic_v3_read_vmcr (); +} + +void __vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs (struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if) +{ +/* +* If dealing with a GICv2 emulation on GICv3, VMCR_EL2.VFIQen +* is dependent on ICC_SRE_EL1.SRE, and we have to perform the +* VMCR_EL2 save/restore in the world switch. +*/ +if (cpu_if->vgic_sre) +__vgic_v3_write_vmcr (cpu_if->vgic_vmcr); +__vgic_v3_restore_aprs (cpu_if); +} +static int __vgic_v3_bpr_min (void ) {/* See Pseudocode for VPriorityGroup */
arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v2.c +1 -8
@@ -464,17 +464,10 @@ void vgic_v2_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_vgic_global_state.vctrl_base + GICH_APR); } -void vgic_v2_vmcr_sync (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -struct vgic_v2_cpu_if *cpu_if = &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v2; - - cpu_if->vgic_vmcr =readl_relaxed (kvm_vgic_global_state.vctrl_base +GICH_VMCR ); -} -void vgic_v2_put (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct vgic_v2_cpu_if *cpu_if = &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v2; -vgic_v2_vmcr_sync (vcpu); + cpu_if->vgic_vmcr =readl_relaxed (kvm_vgic_global_state.vctrl_base +GICH_VMCR ); cpu_if->vgic_apr =readl_relaxed (kvm_vgic_global_state.vctrl_base +GICH_APR ); }
arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v3.c +2 -21
@@ -722,15 +722,7 @@ void vgic_v3_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if = &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3; -/* -* If dealing with a GICv2 emulation on GICv3, VMCR_EL2.VFIQen -* is dependent on ICC_SRE_EL1.SRE, and we have to perform the -* VMCR_EL2 save/restore in the world switch. -*/ -if (likely (cpu_if->vgic_sre)) -kvm_call_hyp (__vgic_v3_write_vmcr, cpu_if->vgic_vmcr); - -kvm_call_hyp (__vgic_v3_restore_aprs, cpu_if); +kvm_call_hyp (__vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs, cpu_if);if (has_vhe ())__vgic_v3_activate_traps (cpu_if);
@@ -738,24 +730,13 @@ void vgic_v3_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)WARN_ON (vgic_v4_load (vcpu)); } -void vgic_v3_vmcr_sync (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if = &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3; - -if (likely (cpu_if->vgic_sre)) - cpu_if->vgic_vmcr =kvm_call_hyp_ret (__vgic_v3_read_vmcr); -} -void vgic_v3_put (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *cpu_if = &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3; +kvm_call_hyp (__vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs, cpu_if);WARN_ON (vgic_v4_put (vcpu)); -vgic_v3_vmcr_sync (vcpu); - -kvm_call_hyp (__vgic_v3_save_aprs, cpu_if); -if (has_vhe ())__vgic_v3_deactivate_traps (cpu_if); }
arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c +0 -11
@@ -939,17 +939,6 @@ void kvm_vgic_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)vgic_v3_put (vcpu); } -void kvm_vgic_vmcr_sync (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -if (unlikely (!irqchip_in_kernel (vcpu->kvm))) -return ; - -if (kvm_vgic_global_state.type ==VGIC_V2 ) -vgic_v2_vmcr_sync (vcpu); -else -vgic_v3_vmcr_sync (vcpu); -} -int kvm_vgic_vcpu_pending_irq (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct vgic_cpu *vgic_cpu = &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu;
arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.h +0 -2
@@ -214,7 +214,6 @@ int vgic_register_dist_iodev(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t dist_base_address,void vgic_v2_init_lrs (void );void vgic_v2_load (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void vgic_v2_put (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void vgic_v2_vmcr_sync (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void vgic_v2_save_state (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void vgic_v2_restore_state (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -253,7 +252,6 @@ bool vgic_v3_check_base(struct kvm *kvm);void vgic_v3_load (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void vgic_v3_put (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void vgic_v3_vmcr_sync (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);bool vgic_has_its (struct kvm *kvm);int kvm_vgic_register_its_device (void );
include/kvm/arm_vgic.h +0 -1
@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ int kvm_vgic_vcpu_pending_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_vgic_load (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_vgic_put (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void kvm_vgic_vmcr_sync (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);#define irqchip_in_kernel (k) (!!((k)->arch.vgic.in_kernel))#define vgic_initialized (k) ((k)->arch.vgic.initialized)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 12/47 KVM: arm64: Add is_pkvm_initialized() helper
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Quentin Perret <[email protected]>
Add a helper allowing to check when the pkvm static key is enabled to ease the introduction of pkvm hooks in other parts of the code.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/virt.h +8 -4
@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ bool is_kvm_arm_initialised(void);DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (kvm_protected_mode_initialized); +static inline bool is_pkvm_initialized (void ) +{ +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM ) && +static_branch_likely (&kvm_protected_mode_initialized); +} +/* Reports the availability of HYP mode */ static inline bool is_hyp_mode_available (void ) {
@@ -89,8 +95,7 @@ static inline bool is_hyp_mode_available(void)* If KVM protected mode is initialized, all CPUs must have been booted * in EL2. Avoid checking __boot_cpu_mode as CPUs now come up in EL1. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM ) && -static_branch_likely (&kvm_protected_mode_initialized)) +if (is_pkvm_initialized ())return true; return (__boot_cpu_mode[0] == BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 &&
@@ -104,8 +109,7 @@ static inline bool is_hyp_mode_mismatched(void)* If KVM protected mode is initialized, all CPUs must have been booted * in EL2. Avoid checking __boot_cpu_mode as CPUs now come up in EL1. */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM ) && -static_branch_likely (&kvm_protected_mode_initialized)) +if (is_pkvm_initialized ())return false;return __boot_cpu_mode[0 ] != __boot_cpu_mode[1 ];
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 13/47 KVM: arm64: Introduce predicates to check for protected state
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
In order to determine whether or not a VM or (hyp) vCPU are protected, introduce a helper function to query this state. For now, these will always return 'false' as the underlying field is never configured.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -4
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ typedef unsigned int pkvm_handle_t;struct kvm_protected_vm {pkvm_handle_t handle;struct kvm_hyp_memcache teardown_mc; +bool enabled; };struct kvm_mpidr_data {
@@ -1286,10 +1287,7 @@ struct kvm *kvm_arch_alloc_vm(void);#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_FLUSH_REMOTE_TLBS_RANGE -static inline bool kvm_vm_is_protected (struct kvm *kvm) -{ -return false; -} +#define kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.pkvm.enabled)int kvm_arm_vcpu_finalize (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int feature);bool kvm_arm_vcpu_is_finalized (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h +13 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,19 @@ pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) return container_of(hyp_vcpu->vcpu.kvm, struct pkvm_hyp_vm, kvm); } +static inline bool vcpu_is_protected (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled ()) +return false; + +return vcpu->kvm->arch.pkvm.enabled; +} + +static inline bool pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected (struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) +{ +return vcpu_is_protected (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); +} +void pkvm_hyp_vm_table_init (void *tbl);void pkvm_host_fpsimd_state_init (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 13/47] KVM: arm64: Introduce predicates to check for protected state
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h struct kvm *kvm_arch_alloc_vm(void); · line 1290
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-4-static inline bool kvm_vm_is_protected (struct kvm *kvm) -{ -return false; -} +#define kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.pkvm.enabled)
Shouldn't this predicate check the static key (i.e. is_protected_kvm_enabled()) first? In fact, you could hoist that check here and just have vcpu_is_protected() call this. Unless I've missed something obvious...
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Oliver
Re: [PATCH v2 13/47] KVM: arm64: Introduce predicates to check for protected state
Hi,
Quoted 12 lines · Oliver Upton
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h struct kvm *kvm_arch_alloc_vm(void); · line 1290
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-4-static inline bool kvm_vm_is_protected (struct kvm *kvm) -{ -return false; -} +#define kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.pkvm.enabled)Shouldn't this predicate check the static key (i.e.
is_protected_kvm_enabled()) first? In fact, you could hoist that check here and just havevcpu_is_protected()call this. Unless I've missed something obvious...
This check is for whether this particular VM is protected, not whether we're running in protected mode.
Cheers,
/fuad
Quoted 4 lines
--
Thanks,
Oliver
Re: [PATCH v2 13/47] KVM: arm64: Introduce predicates to check for protected state
Quoted 16 lines · Fuad Tabba
Hi,
Quoted 12 lines · Oliver Upton
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h struct kvm *kvm_arch_alloc_vm(void); · line 1290
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-4-static inline bool kvm_vm_is_protected (struct kvm *kvm) -{ -return false; -} +#define kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.pkvm.enabled)Shouldn't this predicate check the static key (i.e.
is_protected_kvm_enabled()) first? In fact, you could hoist that check here and just havevcpu_is_protected()call this. Unless I've missed something obvious...
Quoted 2 lines
This check is for whether this particular VM is protected, not whether we're running in protected mode.
I get that, but pVMs don't exist outside of protected mode.
What I'm suggesting is:
#define kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm) (is_protected_kvm_enabled() && (kvm)->arch.pkvm.enabled)
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Oliver
Re: [PATCH v2 13/47] KVM: arm64: Introduce predicates to check for protected state
Hi,
Quoted 18 lines · Oliver Upton
Quoted 16 lines · Fuad Tabba
Hi,
Quoted 12 lines · Oliver Upton
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h struct kvm *kvm_arch_alloc_vm(void); · line 1290
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-4-static inline bool kvm_vm_is_protected (struct kvm *kvm) -{ -return false; -} +#define kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.pkvm.enabled)Shouldn't this predicate check the static key (i.e.
is_protected_kvm_enabled()) first? In fact, you could hoist that check here and just havevcpu_is_protected()call this. Unless I've missed something obvious...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This check is for whether this particular VM is protected, not whether we're running in protected mode.
I get that, but pVMs don't exist outside of protected mode.
What I'm suggesting is:
#define
kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm)(is_protected_kvm_enabled()&& (kvm)->arch.pkvm.enabled)
Sorry, I just realized that I misunderstood your comment as you were replying. Having vcpu_is_protected() call this make sense, and I think I even have that in a future patch that I should bring forward to this series.
And I will apply your suggestion on the respin.
Cheers,
/fuad
Quoted 3 lines
--
Thanks,
Oliver
PATCH v2 14/47 KVM: arm64: Split up nvhe/fixed_config.h
In reply to Fuad TabbaIn preparation for using some of the pKVM fixed configuration register definitions to filter the available VM CAPs in the host, split the nvhe/fixed_config.h header so that the definitions can be shared with the host, while keeping the hypervisor function prototypes in the nvhe/ namespace.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 205 ++++++++++++++++ .../arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/fixed_config.h | 223 ------------------ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 5 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/fixed_config.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h +205 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@/* * Copyright (C) 2020 - Google LLC * Author: Quentin Perret <[email protected]> +* Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]> */ #ifndef __ARM64_KVM_PKVM_H__#define __ARM64_KVM_PKVM_H__
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <asm/kvm_pgtable.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> /* Maximum number of VMs that can co-exist under pKVM. */ #define KVM_MAX_PVMS 255
@@ -20,6 +22,209 @@ int pkvm_init_host_vm(struct kvm *kvm);int pkvm_create_hyp_vm (struct kvm *kvm);void pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm (struct kvm *kvm); +/* +* Definitions for features to be allowed or restricted for guest virtual +* machines, depending on the mode KVM is running in and on the type of guest +* that is running. +* +* The ALLOW masks represent a bitmask of feature fields that are allowed +* without any restrictions as long as they are supported by the system. +* +* The RESTRICT_UNSIGNED masks, if present, represent unsigned fields for +* features that are restricted to support at most the specified feature. +* +* If a feature field is not present in either, than it is not supported. +* +* The approach taken for protected VMs is to allow features that are: +* - Needed by common Linux distributions (e.g., floating point) +* - Trivial to support, e.g., supporting the feature does not introduce or +* require tracking of additional state in KVM +* - Cannot be trapped or prevent the guest from using anyway +*/ + +/* +* Allow for protected VMs: +* - Floating-point and Advanced SIMD +* - Data Independent Timing +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_FP) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_AdvSIMD) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_DIT) \ + ) + +/* +* Restrict to the following *unsigned* features for protected VMs: +* - AArch64 guests only (no support for AArch32 guests): +* AArch32 adds complexity in trap handling, emulation, condition codes, +* etc... +* - RAS (v1) +* Supported by KVM +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED (\ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_EL0), ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_EL1), ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_EL2), ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_EL3), ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_ELx_64BIT_ONLY) | \ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_RAS), ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_RAS_IMP) \ + ) + +/* +* Allow for protected VMs: +* - Branch Target Identification +* - Speculative Store Bypassing +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64PFR1_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SSBS) \ + ) + +#define PVM_ID_AA64PFR2_ALLOW (0ULL) + +/* +* Allow for protected VMs: +* - Mixed-endian +* - Distinction between Secure and Non-secure Memory +* - Mixed-endian at EL0 only +* - Non-context synchronizing exception entry and exit +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR0_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_BIGEND) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_SNSMEM) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_BIGENDEL0) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_EXS) \ + ) + +/* +* Restrict to the following *unsigned* features for protected VMs: +* - 40-bit IPA +* - 16-bit ASID +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR0_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED (\ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_PARANGE), ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_PARANGE_40) | \ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_ASIDBITS), ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_ASIDBITS_16) \ + ) + +/* +* Allow for protected VMs: +* - Hardware translation table updates to Access flag and Dirty state +* - Number of VMID bits from CPU +* - Hierarchical Permission Disables +* - Privileged Access Never +* - SError interrupt exceptions from speculative reads +* - Enhanced Translation Synchronization +* - Control for cache maintenance permission +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR1_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_HAFDBS) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_VMIDBits) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_HPDS) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_PAN) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_SpecSEI) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_ETS) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_CMOW) \ + ) + +/* +* Allow for protected VMs: +* - Common not Private translations +* - User Access Override +* - IESB bit in the SCTLR_ELx registers +* - Unaligned single-copy atomicity and atomic functions +* - ESR_ELx.EC value on an exception by read access to feature ID space +* - TTL field in address operations. +* - Break-before-make sequences when changing translation block size +* - E0PDx mechanism +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR2_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_CnP) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_UAO) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_IESB) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_AT) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_IDS) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_TTL) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_BBM) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_E0PD) \ + ) + +#define PVM_ID_AA64MMFR3_ALLOW (0ULL) + +/* +* No support for Scalable Vectors for protected VMs: +* Requires additional support from KVM, e.g., context-switching and +* trapping at EL2 +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64ZFR0_ALLOW (0ULL) + +/* +* No support for debug, including breakpoints, and watchpoints for protected +* VMs: +* The Arm architecture mandates support for at least the Armv8 debug +* architecture, which would include at least 2 hardware breakpoints and +* watchpoints. Providing that support to protected guests adds +* considerable state and complexity. Therefore, the reserved value of 0 is +* used for debug-related fields. +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64DFR0_ALLOW (0ULL) +#define PVM_ID_AA64DFR1_ALLOW (0ULL) + +/* +* No support for implementation defined features. +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64AFR0_ALLOW (0ULL) +#define PVM_ID_AA64AFR1_ALLOW (0ULL) + +/* +* No restrictions on instructions implemented in AArch64. +*/ +#define PVM_ID_AA64ISAR0_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_AES) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_SHA1) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_SHA2) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_CRC32) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_ATOMIC) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_RDM) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_SHA3) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_SM3) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_SM4) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_DP) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_FHM) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_TS) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_TLB) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_RNDR) \ + ) + +/* Restrict pointer authentication to the basic version. */ +#define PVM_ID_AA64ISAR1_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED (\ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_APA), ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_APA_PAuth) | \ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_API), ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_API_PAuth) \ + ) + +#define PVM_ID_AA64ISAR2_RESTRICT_UNSIGNED (\ + FIELD_PREP(ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_APA3), ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_APA3_PAuth) \ + ) + +#define PVM_ID_AA64ISAR1_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_DPB) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_JSCVT) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_FCMA) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_LRCPC) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_GPA) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_GPI) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_FRINTTS) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_SB) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_SPECRES) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_BF16) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_DGH) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_I8MM) \ + ) + +#define PVM_ID_AA64ISAR2_ALLOW (\ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_ATS1A)| \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_GPA3) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_MOPS) \ + ) +extern struct memblock_region kvm_nvhe_sym (hyp_memory )[];extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym (hyp_memblock_nr );
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/fixed_config.h deleted +0 -223
223 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h +5 -0
@@ -79,4 +79,9 @@ struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *pkvm_load_hyp_vcpu(pkvm_handle_t handle, unsigned int vcpu_idx);void pkvm_put_hyp_vcpu (struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu); +u64 pvm_read_id_reg (const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 id); +bool kvm_handle_pvm_sysreg (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *exit_code); +bool kvm_handle_pvm_restricted (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *exit_code); +int kvm_check_pvm_sysreg_table (void ); +#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_PKVM_H__ */
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +0 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@#include <linux/kvm_host.h> #include <linux/mm.h> -#include <nvhe/fixed_config.h> #include <nvhe/mem_protect.h> #include <nvhe/memory.h> #include <nvhe/pkvm.h>
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@#include <nvhe/early_alloc.h> #include <nvhe/ffa.h> -#include <nvhe/fixed_config.h> #include <nvhe/gfp.h> #include <nvhe/memory.h> #include <nvhe/mem_protect.h>
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +1 -1
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@#include <asm/debug-monitors.h> #include <asm/processor.h> -#include <nvhe/fixed_config.h> #include <nvhe/mem_protect.h> +#include <nvhe/pkvm.h> /* Non-VHE specific context */ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_host_data, kvm_host_data);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c +1 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@#include <hyp/adjust_pc.h> -#include <nvhe/fixed_config.h> +#include <nvhe/pkvm.h> #include "../../sys_regs.h"
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 15/47 KVM: arm64: Move pstate reset value definitions to kvm_arm.h
In reply to Fuad TabbaMove the macro defines of the pstate reset values to a shared header to be used by hyp in future patches.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 12 ------------ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h +12 -0
@@ -432,4 +432,16 @@ { PSR_AA32_MODE_UND, "32-bit UND" }, \ { PSR_AA32_MODE_SYS, "32-bit SYS" } +/* +* ARMv8 Reset Values +*/ +#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_EL1 (PSR_MODE_EL1h | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | \ + PSR_F_BIT | PSR_D_BIT) + +#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_EL2 (PSR_MODE_EL2h | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | \ + PSR_F_BIT | PSR_D_BIT) + +#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_SVC (PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC | PSR_AA32_A_BIT | \ + PSR_AA32_I_BIT | PSR_AA32_F_BIT) +#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_ARM_H__ */
arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +0 -12
@@ -33,18 +33,6 @@/* Maximum phys_shift supported for any VM on this host */ static u32 __ro_after_init kvm_ipa_limit; -/* -* ARMv8 Reset Values -*/ -#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_EL1 (PSR_MODE_EL1h | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | \ - PSR_F_BIT | PSR_D_BIT) - -#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_EL2 (PSR_MODE_EL2h | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | \ - PSR_F_BIT | PSR_D_BIT) - -#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_SVC (PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC | PSR_AA32_A_BIT | \ - PSR_AA32_I_BIT | PSR_AA32_F_BIT) -unsigned int __ro_after_init kvm_sve_max_vl;int __init kvm_arm_init_sve (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 16/47 KVM: arm64: Clarify rationale for ZCR_EL1 value restored on guest exit
In reply to Fuad TabbaExpand comment clarifying why the host value representing SVE vector length being restored for ZCR_EL1 on guest exit isn't the same as it was on guest entry.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c +22 -1
@@ -199,12 +199,33 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (vcpu_has_sve (vcpu)) {__vcpu_sys_reg (vcpu,ZCR_EL1 ) =read_sysreg_el1 (SYS_ZCR ); -/* Restore the VL that was saved when bound to the CPU */ +/* +* Restore the VL that was saved when bound to the CPU, +* which is the maximum VL for the guest. Because the +* layout of the data when saving the sve state depends +* on the VL, we need to use a consistent VL. +* Note that this means that at guest exit ZCR_EL1 is +* not necessarily the same as on guest entry. +* +* Restoring the VL isn't needed in VHE mode since +* ZCR_EL1 fulfils the role of ZCR_EL2 when doing the +* save from EL2. +*/ if (!has_vhe ())sve_cond_update_zcr_vq (vcpu_sve_max_vq (vcpu) -1 ,SYS_ZCR_EL1 ); } +/* +* Flush (save and invalidate) the fpsimd/sve state so that if +* the host tries to use fpsimd/sve, it's not using stale data +* from the guest. +* +* Flushing the state sets the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE bit for the +* context unconditionally, in both nVHE and VHE. This allows +* the kernel to restore the fpsimd/sve state, including ZCR_EL1 +* when needed. +*/ fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state (); }else if (has_vhe () &&system_supports_sve ()) {/*
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 16/47] KVM: arm64: Clarify rationale for ZCR_EL1 value restored on guest exit
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
Expand comment clarifying why the host value representing SVE vector length being restored for
ZCR_EL1on guest exit isn't the same as it was on guest entry.Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
however if this gets respun:
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 212
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c +3
-0+* Restoring the VL isn't needed in VHE mode since +* ZCR_EL1 fulfils the role of ZCR_EL2 when doing the +* save from EL2.
It might be slighty more clear to say s/of ZCR_EL2/ZCR_EL2 would/ - it's a very marginal difference though.
Re: [PATCH v2 16/47] KVM: arm64: Clarify rationale for ZCR_EL1 value restored on guest exit
Thanks again for the reviews Mark.
Quoted 10 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
Expand comment clarifying why the host value representing SVE vector length being restored for
ZCR_EL1on guest exit isn't the same as it was on guest entry.Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
however if this gets respun:
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 212
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c +3
-0+* Restoring the VL isn't needed in VHE mode since +* ZCR_EL1 fulfils the role of ZCR_EL2 when doing the +* save from EL2. It might be slighty more clear to say s/of ZCR_EL2/ZCR_EL2 would/ - it's a very marginal difference though.
Applied it locally and will include this on a respin.
Cheers,
/fuad
PATCH v2 17/47 KVM: arm64: Refactor calculating SVE state size to use helpers
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe main factor for determining the SVE state size is the vector length, and future patches will need to calculate it without necessarily having a vcpu as a reference.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +9 -7
@@ -856,22 +856,24 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {#define vcpu_sve_pffr (vcpu) (kern_hyp_va((vcpu)->arch.sve_state) + \ sve_ffr_offset((vcpu)->arch.sve_max_vl)) -#define vcpu_sve_max_vq (vcpu) sve_vq_from_vl((vcpu)->arch.sve_max_vl) - -#define vcpu_sve_state_size (vcpu) ({ \ +#define sve_state_size (sve_max_vl) ({ \ size_t __size_ret; \ - unsigned int __vcpu_vq; \ + unsigned int __vq; \ \ - if (WARN_ON(!sve_vl_valid((vcpu)->arch.sve_max_vl))) { \ + if (WARN_ON(!sve_vl_valid(sve_max_vl))) { \ __size_ret = 0; \ } else { \ - __vcpu_vq = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu); \ - __size_ret = SVE_SIG_REGS_SIZE(__vcpu_vq); \ + __vq = sve_vq_from_vl(sve_max_vl); \ + __size_ret = SVE_SIG_REGS_SIZE(__vq); \ } \ \ __size_ret; \ }) +#define vcpu_sve_max_vq (vcpu) sve_vq_from_vl((vcpu)->arch.sve_max_vl) + +#define vcpu_sve_state_size (vcpu) sve_state_size((vcpu)->arch.sve_max_vl) +#define KVM_GUESTDBG_VALID_MASK (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | \ KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP | \ KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW | \
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 17/47] KVM: arm64: Refactor calculating SVE state size to use helpers
Quoted 3 lines · Fuad Tabba
The main factor for determining the SVE state size is the vector length, and future patches will need to calculate it without necessarily having a vcpu as a reference.
PATCH v2 18/47 KVM: arm64: Do not map the host fpsimd state to hyp in pKVM
In reply to Fuad TabbapKVM maintains its own state at EL2 for tracking the host fpsimd state. Therefore, no need to map and share the host's view with it.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 -- arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 31 ++++--------------------------- arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0 -2
@@ -664,7 +664,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {struct kvm_guest_debug_arch vcpu_debug_state;struct kvm_guest_debug_arch external_debug_state; -struct task_struct *parent_task;/* VGIC state */ struct vgic_cpu vgic_cpu;
@@ -1253,7 +1252,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxflush_fp (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);static inline bool kvm_pmu_counter_deferred (struct perf_event_attr *attr) {
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c +4 -27
@@ -14,19 +14,6 @@#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> -void kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -struct task_struct *p = vcpu->arch.parent_task; -struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd; - -if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled () || !p) -return ; - - fpsimd = &p->thread.uw.fpsimd_state; -kvm_unshare_hyp (fpsimd, fpsimd +1 ); -put_task_struct (p); -} -/* * Called on entry to KVM_RUN unless this vcpu previously ran at least * once and the most recent prior KVM_RUN for this vcpu was called from
@@ -38,28 +25,18 @@ void kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)*/ int kvm_arch_vcpu_run_map_fp (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { -int ret; -struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd = ¤t->thread.uw.fpsimd_state; +int ret; -kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp (vcpu); +/* pKVM has its own tracking of the host fpsimd state. */ +if (is_protected_kvm_enabled ()) +return 0 ;/* Make sure the host task fpsimd state is visible to hyp: */ ret =kvm_share_hyp (fpsimd, fpsimd +1 );if (ret)return ret; -/* -* We need to keep current's task_struct pinned until its data has been -* unshared with the hypervisor to make sure it is not re-used by the -* kernel and donated to someone else while already shared -- see -* kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp() for the matching put_task_struct(). -*/ -if (is_protected_kvm_enabled ()) { -get_task_struct (current); - vcpu->arch.parent_task = current; - } -return 0 ; }
arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +0 -1
@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ void kvm_arm_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {void *sve_state = vcpu->arch.sve_state; -kvm_vcpu_unshare_task_fp (vcpu);kvm_unshare_hyp (vcpu, vcpu +1 );if (sve_state)kvm_unshare_hyp (sve_state, sve_state +vcpu_sve_state_size (vcpu));
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 19/47 KVM: arm64: Move some kvm_psci functions to a shared header
In reply to Fuad TabbaMove some PSCI functions and macros to a shared header to be used by hyp in protected mode.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c | 28 ---------------------------- include/kvm/arm_psci.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c +0 -28
@@ -21,16 +21,6 @@* as described in ARM document number ARM DEN 0022A. */ -#define AFFINITY_MASK (level) ~((0x1UL << ((level) * MPIDR_LEVEL_BITS)) - 1) - -static unsigned long psci_affinity_mask (unsigned long affinity_level) -{ -if (affinity_level <=3 ) -return MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK &AFFINITY_MASK (affinity_level); - -return 0 ; -} -static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_suspend (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {/*
@@ -51,12 +41,6 @@ static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)return PSCI_RET_SUCCESS ; } -static inline bool kvm_psci_valid_affinity (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, -unsigned long affinity) -{ -return !(affinity & ~MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK ); -} -static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_on (struct kvm_vcpu *source_vcpu) {struct vcpu_reset_state *reset_state;
@@ -214,18 +198,6 @@ static void kvm_psci_system_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) run->exit_reason =KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT ; } -static void kvm_psci_narrow_to_32bit (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -int i; - -/* -* Zero the input registers' upper 32 bits. They will be fully -* zeroed on exit, so we're fine changing them in place. -*/ -for (i =1 ; i <4 ; i++) -vcpu_set_reg (vcpu, i,lower_32_bits (vcpu_get_reg (vcpu, i))); -} -static unsigned long kvm_psci_check_allowed_function (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 fn) {/*
include/kvm/arm_psci.h +29 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,35 @@ static inline int kvm_psci_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)return KVM_ARM_PSCI_0_1 ; } +/* Narrow the PSCI register arguments (r1 to r3) to 32 bits. */ +static inline void kvm_psci_narrow_to_32bit (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +int i; + +/* +* Zero the input registers' upper 32 bits. They will be fully +* zeroed on exit, so we're fine changing them in place. +*/ +for (i =1 ; i <4 ; i++) +vcpu_set_reg (vcpu, i,lower_32_bits (vcpu_get_reg (vcpu, i))); +} + +static inline bool kvm_psci_valid_affinity (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +unsigned long affinity) +{ +return !(affinity & ~MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK ); +} + + +#define AFFINITY_MASK (level) ~((0x1UL << ((level) * MPIDR_LEVEL_BITS)) - 1) + +static inline unsigned long psci_affinity_mask (unsigned long affinity_level) +{ +if (affinity_level <=3 ) +return MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK &AFFINITY_MASK (affinity_level); + +return 0 ; +}int kvm_psci_call (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 20/47 KVM: arm64: Refactor reset_mpidr() to extract its computation
In reply to Fuad TabbaMove the computation of the mpidr to its own function in a shared header, as the computation will be used by hyp in protected mode.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 14 +------------- arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +1 -13
@@ -816,21 +816,9 @@ static u64 reset_actlr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *r)static u64 reset_mpidr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,const struct sys_reg_desc *r) { -u64 mpidr; +u64 mpidr =calculate_mpidr (vcpu); -/* -* Map the vcpu_id into the first three affinity level fields of -* the MPIDR. We limit the number of VCPUs in level 0 due to a -* limitation to 16 CPUs in that level in the ICC_SGIxR registers -* of the GICv3 to be able to address each CPU directly when -* sending IPIs. -*/ - mpidr = (vcpu->vcpu_id &0x0f ) <<MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT (0 ); - mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >>4 ) &0xff ) <<MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT (1 ); - mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >>12 ) &0xff ) <<MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT (2 ); - mpidr |= (1ULL <<31 );vcpu_write_sys_reg (vcpu, mpidr,MPIDR_EL1 ); -return mpidr; }
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.h +19 -0
@@ -222,6 +222,25 @@ find_reg(const struct sys_reg_params *params, const struct sys_reg_desc table[],return __inline_bsearch ((void *)pval, table, num,sizeof (table[0 ]), match_sys_reg); } +static inline u64 calculate_mpidr (const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +u64 mpidr; + +/* +* Map the vcpu_id into the first three affinity level fields of +* the MPIDR. We limit the number of VCPUs in level 0 due to a +* limitation to 16 CPUs in that level in the ICC_SGIxR registers +* of the GICv3 to be able to address each CPU directly when +* sending IPIs. +*/ + mpidr = (vcpu->vcpu_id &0x0f ) <<MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT (0 ); + mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >>4 ) &0xff ) <<MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT (1 ); + mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >>12 ) &0xff ) <<MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT (2 ); + mpidr |= (1ULL <<31 ); + +return mpidr; +} +const struct sys_reg_desc *get_reg_by_id (u64 id,const struct sys_reg_desc table[],unsigned int num);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 21/47 KVM: arm64: Refactor kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth() for hyp use
In reply to Fuad TabbaMove kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth() to a shared header to be used by hyp in protected mode.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 7 +------ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +5 -0
@@ -611,4 +611,9 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_reset_cptr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_write_cptr_el2(val); } + +static inline void kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +vcpu_set_flag (vcpu,GUEST_HAS_PTRAUTH ); +}#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */
arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +1 -6
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_finalize_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kfree (buf);return ret; } - + vcpu->arch.sve_state = buf;vcpu_set_flag (vcpu,VCPU_SVE_FINALIZED );return 0 ;
@@ -152,11 +152,6 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_reset_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)memset (vcpu->arch.sve_state,0 ,vcpu_sve_state_size (vcpu)); } -static void kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ -vcpu_set_flag (vcpu,GUEST_HAS_PTRAUTH ); -} -/** * kvm_reset_vcpu - sets core registers and sys_regs to reset value * @vcpu: The VCPU pointer
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2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 22/47 KVM: arm64: Refactor enter_exception64()
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Quentin Perret <[email protected]>
In order to simplify the injection of exceptions in the host in pkvm context, let's factor out of enter_exception64() the code calculating the exception offset from VBAR_EL1 and the cpsr.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 5 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +5 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ void kvm_inject_dabt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long addr);void kvm_inject_pabt (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned long addr);void kvm_inject_size_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +unsigned long get_except64_offset (unsigned long psr,unsigned long target_mode, +enum exception_type type); +unsigned long get_except64_cpsr (unsigned long old,bool has_mte, +unsigned long sctlr,unsigned long mode); +void kvm_vcpu_wfi (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_emulate_nested_eret (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c +58 -42
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Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 23/47 KVM: arm64: Add PC_UPDATE_REQ flags covering all PC updates
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
In order to deal with PC updates (such as INCREMENT_PC and the collection of flags that come with PENDING_EXCEPTION), add a single mask that covers them all.
This will be used to manipulate these flags as a single entity.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
@@ -799,6 +799,8 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {#define INCREMENT_PC __vcpu_single_flag(iflags, BIT(1))/* Target EL/MODE (not a single flag, but let's abuse the macro) */ #define EXCEPT_MASK __vcpu_single_flag(iflags, GENMASK(3, 1)) +/* Cover both PENDING_EXCEPTION and EXCEPT_MASK for global operations */ +#define PC_UPDATE_REQ __vcpu_single_flag(iflags, GENMASK(3, 0))/* Helpers to encode exceptions with minimum fuss */ #define __EXCEPT_MASK_VAL unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_MASK)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 24/47 KVM: arm64: Add vcpu flag copy primitive
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Contrary to vanilla KVM, pKVM not only deals with flags in a vcpu, but also synchronises them across host and hypervisor views of the same vcpu.
Most of the time, this is about copying flags from one vcpu structure to another, so let's offer a primitive that does this.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +16 -0
@@ -777,9 +777,25 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {__vcpu_flags_preempt_enable (); \ } while (0) +#define __vcpu_copy_flag (vt, vs, flagset, f, m) \ + do { \ + typeof(vs->arch.flagset) tmp, val; \ + \ + __build_check_flag(vs, flagset, f, m); \ + \ + val = READ_ONCE(vs->arch.flagset); \ + val &= (m); \ + tmp = READ_ONCE(vt->arch.flagset); \ + tmp &= ~(m); \ + tmp |= val; \ + WRITE_ONCE(vt->arch.flagset, tmp); \ + } while (0) + +#define vcpu_get_flag (v, ...) __vcpu_get_flag((v), __VA_ARGS__)#define vcpu_set_flag (v, ...) __vcpu_set_flag((v), __VA_ARGS__)#define vcpu_clear_flag (v, ...) __vcpu_clear_flag((v), __VA_ARGS__) +#define vcpu_copy_flag (vt, vs, ...) __vcpu_copy_flag((vt), (vs), __VA_ARGS__)/* SVE exposed to guest */ #define GUEST_HAS_SVE __vcpu_single_flag(cflags, BIT(0))
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 25/47 KVM: arm64: Introduce gfn_to_memslot_prot()
In reply to Fuad TabbaReturns the memslot and whether it's writable without requiring a userspace address at the host.
The userspace address isn't needed to get this information. Future patches, where the userspace address might not be known, would need access to the memslot and whether it's writeable.
No functional change intended.
--- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1292,6 +1292,7 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,int kvm_clear_guest (struct kvm *kvm,gpa_t gpa,unsigned long len);struct kvm_memory_slot *gfn_to_memslot (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn); +struct kvm_memory_slot *gfn_to_memslot_prot (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn,bool *writable);bool kvm_is_visible_gfn (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn);bool kvm_vcpu_is_visible_gfn (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gfn_t gfn);unsigned long kvm_host_page_size (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gfn_t gfn);
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +22 -0
@@ -2709,6 +2709,28 @@ static bool memslot_is_readonly(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)return slot->flags &KVM_MEM_READONLY ; } +/* +* Return the memslot of a @gfn and the R/W attribute if slot is valid, or NULL +* if slot is not valid. +* +* @slot: the kvm_memory_slot which contains @gfn +* @gfn: the gfn to be translated +* @writable: used to return the read/write attribute of the @slot if the hva +* is valid and @writable is not NULL +*/ +struct kvm_memory_slot *gfn_to_memslot_prot (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn,bool *writable) +{ +struct kvm_memory_slot *slot =gfn_to_memslot (kvm, gfn); + +if (!slot || slot->flags &KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID ) +return NULL ; + +if (writable) + *writable = !memslot_is_readonly (slot); + +return slot; +} +static unsigned long __gfn_to_hva_many (const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn,gfn_t *nr_pages,bool write) {
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 26/47 KVM: arm64: Do not use the hva in kvm_handle_guest_abort()
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe hva isn't needed by kvm_handle_guest_abort(), but is used as a proxy for determining whether there's an error or a write fault. Use the newly introduced gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot() to determine errors or write faults.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 17 +++++++---------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +7 -10
@@ -1375,7 +1375,7 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma) }static int user_mem_abort (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,phys_addr_t fault_ipa, -struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,unsigned long hva, +struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,bool fault_is_perm) {int ret =0 ;
@@ -1387,12 +1387,13 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;struct vm_area_struct *vma;short vma_shift; -gfn_t gfn; +gfn_t gfn = fault_ipa >>PAGE_SHIFT ;kvm_pfn_t pfn;bool logging_active =memslot_is_logging (memslot);long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot =KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R ;struct kvm_pgtable *pgt; +unsigned long hva =gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot (memslot, gfn,NULL );if (fault_is_perm) fault_granule =kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule (vcpu);
@@ -1469,7 +1470,6 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,if (vma_pagesize ==PMD_SIZE || vma_pagesize ==PUD_SIZE ) fault_ipa &= ~(vma_pagesize -1 ); - gfn = fault_ipa >>PAGE_SHIFT ; mte_allowed =kvm_vma_mte_allowed (vma); vfio_allow_any_uc = vma->vm_flags &VM_ALLOW_ANY_UNCACHED ;
@@ -1629,7 +1629,6 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)unsigned long esr;phys_addr_t fault_ipa;struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; -unsigned long hva;bool is_iabt, write_fault, writable;gfn_t gfn;int ret, idx;
@@ -1687,10 +1686,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) idx =srcu_read_lock (&vcpu->kvm->srcu); gfn = fault_ipa >>PAGE_SHIFT ; - memslot =gfn_to_memslot (vcpu->kvm, gfn); - hva =gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot (memslot, gfn, &writable); + memslot =gfn_to_memslot_prot (vcpu->kvm, gfn, &writable); write_fault =kvm_is_write_fault (vcpu); -if (kvm_is_error_hva (hva) || (write_fault && !writable)) { +if (!memslot || (write_fault && !writable)) {/* * The guest has put either its instructions or its page-tables * somewhere it shouldn't have. Userspace won't be able to do
@@ -1718,7 +1716,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)* So let's assume that the guest is just being * cautious, and skip the instruction. */ -if (kvm_is_error_hva (hva) &&kvm_vcpu_dabt_is_cm (vcpu)) { +if (!memslot &&kvm_vcpu_dabt_is_cm (vcpu)) {kvm_incr_pc (vcpu); ret =1 ; goto out_unlock;
@@ -1744,8 +1742,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto out_unlock; } - ret =user_mem_abort (vcpu, fault_ipa, memslot, hva, -esr_fsc_is_permission_fault (esr)); + ret =user_mem_abort (vcpu, fault_ipa, memslot,esr_fsc_is_permission_fault (esr));if (ret ==0 ) ret =1 ; out:
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 27/47 KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_rwlock_t
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Introduce a simple counter-based rwlock for EL2 which can reduce locking contention on read-mostly data structures when compared to a spinlock.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/rwlock.h | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 129 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/rwlock.h
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/rwlock.h new file +129 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* A stand-alone rwlock implementation for use by the non-VHE KVM +* hypervisor code running at EL2. This is *not* a fair lock and is +* likely to scale very badly under contention. +* +* Copyright (C) 2022 Google LLC +* Author: Will Deacon <[email protected]> +* +* Heavily based on the implementation removed by 087133ac9076 which was: +* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#ifndef __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_RWLOCK_H__ +#define __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_RWLOCK_H__ + +#include <linux/bits.h> + +typedef struct { + u32 __val; +} hyp_rwlock_t; + +#define __HYP_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER \ + { .__val = 0 } + +#define __HYP_RWLOCK_UNLOCKED \ + ((hyp_rwlock_t) __HYP_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER) + +#define DEFINE_HYP_RWLOCK(x) hyp_rwlock_t x = __HYP_RWLOCK_UNLOCKED + +#define hyp_rwlock_init(l) \ +do { \ + *(l) = __HYP_RWLOCK_UNLOCKED; \ +} while (0) + +#define __HYP_RWLOCK_WRITER_BIT 31 + +static inline void hyp_write_lock(hyp_rwlock_t *lock) +{ + u32 tmp; + + asm volatile(ARM64_LSE_ATOMIC_INSN( + /* LL/SC */ + " sevl\n" + "1: wfe\n" + "2: ldaxr %w0, %1\n" + " cbnz %w0, 1b\n" + " stxr %w0, %w2, %1\n" + " cbnz %w0, 2b\n" + __nops(1), + /* LSE atomics */ + "1: mov %w0, wzr\n" + "2: casa %w0, %w2, %1\n" + " cbz %w0, 3f\n" + " ldxr %w0, %1\n" + " cbz %w0, 2b\n" + " wfe\n" + " b 1b\n" + "3:") + : "=&r" (tmp), "+Q" (lock->__val) + : "r" (BIT(__HYP_RWLOCK_WRITER_BIT)) + : "memory"); +} + +static inline void hyp_write_unlock(hyp_rwlock_t *lock) +{ + asm volatile(ARM64_LSE_ATOMIC_INSN( + " stlr wzr, %0", + " swpl wzr, wzr, %0") + : "=Q" (lock->__val) :: "memory"); +} + +static inline void hyp_read_lock(hyp_rwlock_t *lock) +{ + u32 tmp, tmp2; + + asm volatile( + " sevl\n" + ARM64_LSE_ATOMIC_INSN( + /* LL/SC */ + "1: wfe\n" + "2: ldaxr %w0, %2\n" + " add %w0, %w0, #1\n" + " tbnz %w0, %3, 1b\n" + " stxr %w1, %w0, %2\n" + " cbnz %w1, 2b\n" + __nops(1), + /* LSE atomics */ + "1: wfe\n" + "2: ldxr %w0, %2\n" + " adds %w1, %w0, #1\n" + " tbnz %w1, %3, 1b\n" + " casa %w0, %w1, %2\n" + " sbc %w0, %w1, %w0\n" + " cbnz %w0, 2b") + : "=&r" (tmp), "=&r" (tmp2), "+Q" (lock->__val) + : "i" (__HYP_RWLOCK_WRITER_BIT) + : "cc", "memory"); +} + +static inline void hyp_read_unlock(hyp_rwlock_t *lock) +{ + u32 tmp, tmp2; + + asm volatile(ARM64_LSE_ATOMIC_INSN( + /* LL/SC */ + "1: ldxr %w0, %2\n" + " sub %w0, %w0, #1\n" + " stlxr %w1, %w0, %2\n" + " cbnz %w1, 1b", + /* LSE atomics */ + " movn %w0, #0\n" + " staddl %w0, %2\n" + __nops(2)) + : "=&r" (tmp), "=&r" (tmp2), "+Q" (lock->__val) + : + : "memory"); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_NVHE_EL2_DEBUG +static inline void hyp_assert_write_lock_held(hyp_rwlock_t *lock) +{ + BUG_ON(!(READ_ONCE(lock->__val) & BIT(__HYP_RWLOCK_WRITER_BIT))); +} +#else +static inline void hyp_assert_write_lock_held(hyp_rwlock_t *lock) { } +#endif + +#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_RWLOCK_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 28/47 KVM: arm64: Add atomics-based checking refcount implementation at EL2
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
The current nVHE refcount implementation at EL2 uses a simple spinlock to serialise accesses. Although this works, it forces serialisation in places where it is not necessary, so introduce a simple atomics-based refcount implementation instead.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/refcount.h | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/refcount.h
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/refcount.h new file +76 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* Atomics-based checking refcount implementation. +* Copyright (C) 2023 Google LLC +* Author: Will Deacon <[email protected]> +*/ +#ifndef __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_REFCOUNT_H__ +#define __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_REFCOUNT_H__ + +#include <asm/lse.h> + +static inline s16 __ll_sc_refcount_fetch_add_16 (u16 *refcount,s16 addend) +{ +u16 new; +u32 flag; + + asmvolatile ( +" prfm pstl1strm, %[refcount]\n" +"1: ldxrh %w[new], %[refcount]\n" +" add %w[new], %w[new], %w[addend]\n" +" stxrh %w[flag], %w[new], %[refcount]\n" +" cbnz %w[flag], 1b" + : [refcount]"+Q" (*refcount), + [new]"=&r" (new), + [flag]"=&r" (flag) + : [addend]"Ir" (addend)); + +return new; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS + +static inline s16 __lse_refcount_fetch_add_16 (u16 *refcount,s16 addend) +{ +s16 old; + + asmvolatile (__LSE_PREAMBLE +" ldaddh %w[addend], %w[old], %[refcount]" + : [refcount]"+Q" (*refcount), + [old]"=r" (old) + : [addend]"r" (addend)); + +return old + addend; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS */ + +static inline u64 __hyp_refcount_fetch_add (void *refcount,const size_t size, +const s64 addend) +{ +s64 new; + +switch (size) { +case 2 : + new =__lse_ll_sc_body (refcount_fetch_add_16, refcount, addend); +break ; +default : +BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG (1 ,"Unsupported refcount size" ); +unreachable (); + } + +BUG_ON (new <0 ); +return new; +} + + +#define hyp_refcount_inc (r) __hyp_refcount_fetch_add(&(r), sizeof(r), 1) +#define hyp_refcount_dec (r) __hyp_refcount_fetch_add(&(r), sizeof(r), -1) +#define hyp_refcount_get (r) READ_ONCE(r) +#define hyp_refcount_set (r, v) do { \ + typeof(r) *__rp = &(r); \ + WARN_ON(hyp_refcount_get(*__rp)); \ + WRITE_ONCE(*__rp, v); \ +} while (0) + +#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_REFCOUNT_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 29/47 KVM: arm64: Use atomic refcount helpers for 'struct hyp_page::refcount'
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Convert the 'struct hyp_page' refcount manipulation functions over to the new atomic refcount helpers. For now, this will make absolutely no difference because the 'struct hyp_pool' locking is still serialising everything. One step at a time...
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/memory.h | 18 +++++++----------- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/page_alloc.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/memory.h +7 -11
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include <asm/page.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <nvhe/refcount.h> struct hyp_page {unsigned short refcount;
@@ -39,37 +40,32 @@ static inline phys_addr_t hyp_virt_to_phys(void *addr)#define hyp_page_to_pool (page) (((struct hyp_page *)page)->pool)/* -* Refcounting for 'struct hyp_page'. -* hyp_pool::lock must be held if atomic access to the refcount is required. +* Refcounting wrappers for 'struct hyp_page'. */ static inline int hyp_page_count (void *addr) {struct hyp_page *p =hyp_virt_to_page (addr); -return p->refcount; +return hyp_refcount_get (p->refcount); }static inline void hyp_page_ref_inc (struct hyp_page *p) { -BUG_ON (p->refcount ==USHRT_MAX ); - p->refcount++; +hyp_refcount_inc (p->refcount); }static inline void hyp_page_ref_dec (struct hyp_page *p) { -BUG_ON (!p->refcount); - p->refcount--; +hyp_refcount_dec (p->refcount); }static inline int hyp_page_ref_dec_and_test (struct hyp_page *p) { -hyp_page_ref_dec (p); -return (p->refcount ==0 ); +return hyp_refcount_dec (p->refcount) ==0 ; }static inline void hyp_set_page_refcounted (struct hyp_page *p) { -BUG_ON (p->refcount); - p->refcount =1 ; +hyp_refcount_set (p->refcount,1 ); }#endif /* __KVM_HYP_MEMORY_H */
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c +1 -1
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static void *guest_s2_zalloc_page(void *mc)memset (addr,0 ,PAGE_SIZE ); p =hyp_virt_to_page (addr);memset (p,0 ,sizeof (*p)); - p->refcount =1 ; +hyp_set_page_refcounted (p);return addr; }
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/page_alloc.c +4 -1
@@ -55,7 +55,10 @@ static struct hyp_page *__find_buddy_avail(struct hyp_pool *pool, {struct hyp_page *buddy =__find_buddy_nocheck (pool, p, order); -if (!buddy || buddy->order != order || buddy->refcount) +if (!buddy) +return NULL ; + +if (buddy->order != order ||hyp_refcount_get (buddy->refcount))return NULL ;return buddy;
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 30/47 KVM: arm64: Remove locking from EL2 allocation fast-paths
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
hyp_{get,put}_page() are called extensively from the page-table code to adjust reference counts on page-table pages. As a small step towards removing reader serialisation on these paths, drop the 'hyp_pool' lock in the case where the refcount remains positive, only taking the lock if the page is to be freed back to the allocator.
Remove a misleading comment at the same time, which implies that a page with a refcount of zero and which is not attached to a freelist is unsafe whereas in practice it's the other way around which can lead to problems.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/gfp.h | 6 +----- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/page_alloc.c | 16 ++++------------ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/gfp.h +1 -5
@@ -10,11 +10,7 @@#define HYP_NO_ORDER USHRT_MAXstruct hyp_pool { -/* -* Spinlock protecting concurrent changes to the memory pool as well as -* the struct hyp_page of the pool's pages until we have a proper atomic -* API at EL2. -*/ +/* lock protecting concurrent changes to the memory pool. */ hyp_spinlock_t lock;struct list_head free_area[NR_PAGE_ORDERS ];phys_addr_t range_start;
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/page_alloc.c +4 -12
@@ -155,33 +155,25 @@ static struct hyp_page *__hyp_extract_page(struct hyp_pool *pool,static void __hyp_put_page (struct hyp_pool *pool,struct hyp_page *p) { -if (hyp_page_ref_dec_and_test (p)) +if (hyp_page_ref_dec_and_test (p)) { +hyp_spin_lock (&pool->lock);__hyp_attach_page (pool, p); +hyp_spin_unlock (&pool->lock); + } } -/* -* Changes to the buddy tree and page refcounts must be done with the hyp_pool -* lock held. If a refcount change requires an update to the buddy tree (e.g. -* hyp_put_page()), both operations must be done within the same critical -* section to guarantee transient states (e.g. a page with null refcount but -* not yet attached to a free list) can't be observed by well-behaved readers. -*/ void hyp_put_page (struct hyp_pool *pool,void *addr) {struct hyp_page *p =hyp_virt_to_page (addr); -hyp_spin_lock (&pool->lock);__hyp_put_page (pool, p); -hyp_spin_unlock (&pool->lock); }void hyp_get_page (struct hyp_pool *pool,void *addr) {struct hyp_page *p =hyp_virt_to_page (addr); -hyp_spin_lock (&pool->lock);hyp_page_ref_inc (p); -hyp_spin_unlock (&pool->lock); }void hyp_split_page (struct hyp_page *p)
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 31/47 KVM: arm64: Reformat/beautify PTP hypercall documentation
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
The PTP hypercall documentation doesn't produce the best-looking table when formatting in HTML as all of the return value definitions end up on the same line.
Reformat the PTP hypercall documentation to follow the formatting used by hypercalls.rst.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst | 38 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst +24 -14
@@ -7,19 +7,29 @@ PTP_KVM is used for high precision time sync between host and guests. It relies on transferring the wall clock and counter value from the host to the guest using a KVM-specific hypercall. -* ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID: 0x86000001 +``ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID`` +---------------------------------------- -This hypercall uses the SMC32/HVC32 calling convention: +Retrieve current time information for the specific counter. There are no +endianness restrictions. -ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID - ============== ======== ===================================== - Function ID: (uint32) 0x86000001 - Arguments: (uint32) KVM_PTP_VIRT_COUNTER(0) - KVM_PTP_PHYS_COUNTER(1) - Return Values: (int32) NOT_SUPPORTED(-1) on error, or - (uint32) Upper 32 bits of wall clock time (r0) - (uint32) Lower 32 bits of wall clock time (r1) - (uint32) Upper 32 bits of counter (r2) - (uint32) Lower 32 bits of counter (r3) - Endianness: No Restrictions. - ============== ======== ===================================== ++---------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +| Presence: | Optional | ++---------------------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +| Calling convention: | HVC32 | ++---------------------+----------+--------------------------------------------+ +| Function ID: | (uint32) | 0x86000001 | ++---------------------+----------+----+---------------------------------------+ +| Arguments: | (uint32) | R1 | ``KVM_PTP_VIRT_COUNTER (0)`` | +| | | +---------------------------------------+ +| | | | ``KVM_PTP_PHYS_COUNTER (1)`` | ++---------------------+----------+----+---------------------------------------+ +| Return Values: | (int32) | R0 | ``NOT_SUPPORTED (-1)`` on error, else | +| | | | upper 32 bits of wall clock time | +| +----------+----+---------------------------------------+ +| | (uint32) | R1 | Lower 32 bits of wall clock time | +| +----------+----+---------------------------------------+ +| | (uint32) | R2 | Upper 32 bits of counter | +| +----------+----+---------------------------------------+ +| | (uint32) | R3 | Lower 32 bits of counter | ++---------------------+----------+----+---------------------------------------+
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 32/47 KVM: arm64: Rename firmware pseudo-register documentation file
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
In preparation for describing the guest view of KVM/arm64 hypercalls in hypercalls.rst, move the existing contents of the file concerning the firmware pseudo-registers elsewhere.
---
.../kvm/arm/{hypercalls.rst => fw-pseudo-registers.rst} | 6 +++---
Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
rename Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/{hypercalls.rst => fw-pseudo-registers.rst} (97%)Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/fw-pseudo-registers.rst renamed from Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst +3 -3
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -======================= -ARM Hypercall Interface -======================= +======================================= +ARM firmware pseudo-registers interface +======================================= KVM handles the hypercall services as requested by the guests. New hypercall services are regularly made available by the ARM specification or by KVM (as
Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst +1 -1
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ ARM .. toctree:: :maxdepth: 2 + fw-pseudo-registers hyp-abi - hypercalls pvtime ptp_kvm vcpu-features
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2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 33/47 KVM: arm64: Document the KVM/arm64-specific calls in hypercalls.rst
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
KVM/arm64 makes use of the SMCCC "Vendor Specific Hypervisor Service Call Range" to expose KVM-specific hypercalls to guests in a discoverable and extensible fashion.
Document the existence of this interface and the discovery hypercall.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst
Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.rst new file +46 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=============================================== +KVM/arm64-specific hypercalls exposed to guests +=============================================== + +This file documents the KVM/arm64-specific hypercalls which may be +exposed by KVM/arm64 to guest operating systems. These hypercalls are +issued using the HVC instruction according to version 1.1 of the Arm SMC +Calling Convention (DEN0028/C): + +https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0028/c + +All KVM/arm64-specific hypercalls are allocated within the "Vendor +Specific Hypervisor Service Call" range with a UID of +``28b46fb6-2ec5-11e9-a9ca-4b564d003a74``. This UID should be queried by the +guest using the standard "Call UID" function for the service range in +order to determine that the KVM/arm64-specific hypercalls are available. + +``ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_FEATURES_FUNC_ID`` +--------------------------------------------- + +Provides a discovery mechanism for other KVM/arm64 hypercalls. + ++---------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Presence: | Mandatory for the KVM/arm64 UID | ++---------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Calling convention: | HVC32 | ++---------------------+----------+--------------------------------------------------+ +| Function ID: | (uint32) | 0x86000000 | ++---------------------+----------+--------------------------------------------------+ +| Arguments: | None | ++---------------------+----------+----+---------------------------------------------+ +| Return Values: | (uint32) | R0 | Bitmap of available function numbers 0-31 | +| +----------+----+---------------------------------------------+ +| | (uint32) | R1 | Bitmap of available function numbers 32-63 | +| +----------+----+---------------------------------------------+ +| | (uint32) | R2 | Bitmap of available function numbers 64-95 | +| +----------+----+---------------------------------------------+ +| | (uint32) | R3 | Bitmap of available function numbers 96-127 | ++---------------------+----------+----+---------------------------------------------+ + +``ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID`` +---------------------------------------- + +See ptp_kvm.rst
Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ ARM fw-pseudo-registers hyp-abi + hypercalls pvtime ptp_kvm vcpu-features
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2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 34/47 KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing .hyp.data
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Quentin Perret <[email protected]>
We've added a .data section for the hypervisor, which kmemleak is eager to parse. This clearly doesn't go well, so add the section to kmemleak's block list.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c +1 -0
@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ static int __init finalize_pkvm(void)* at, which would end badly once inaccessible. */ kmemleak_free_part (__hyp_bss_start, __hyp_bss_end - __hyp_bss_start); +kmemleak_free_part (__hyp_rodata_start, __hyp_rodata_end - __hyp_rodata_start);kmemleak_free_part_phys (hyp_mem_base, hyp_mem_size); ret =pkvm_drop_host_privileges ();
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 35/47 KVM: arm64: Do not set the virtual timer offset for protected vCPUs
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe host shouldn't be able to access the virtual timer state for protected vCPUs. Moreover, protected vCPUs always run with a virtual counter offset of 0.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c +14 -6
@@ -162,8 +162,9 @@ static void timer_set_cval(struct arch_timer_context *ctxt, u64 cval)static void timer_set_offset (struct arch_timer_context *ctxt,u64 offset) { -if (!ctxt->offset.vm_offset) { -WARN (offset,"timer %ld\n" ,arch_timer_ctx_index (ctxt)); +if (unlikely (!ctxt->offset.vm_offset)) { +WARN (offset && !kvm_vm_is_protected (ctxt->vcpu->kvm), +"timer %ld\n" ,arch_timer_ctx_index (ctxt));return ; }
@@ -988,10 +989,14 @@ static void timer_context_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timerid) ctxt->vcpu = vcpu; -if (timerid ==TIMER_VTIMER ) - ctxt->offset.vm_offset = &kvm->arch.timer_data.voffset; -else - ctxt->offset.vm_offset = &kvm->arch.timer_data.poffset; +if (!kvm_vm_is_protected (vcpu->kvm)) { +if (timerid ==TIMER_VTIMER ) + ctxt->offset.vm_offset = &kvm->arch.timer_data.voffset; +else + ctxt->offset.vm_offset = &kvm->arch.timer_data.poffset; + }else { + ctxt->offset.vm_offset =NULL ; + }hrtimer_init (&ctxt->hrtimer,CLOCK_MONOTONIC ,HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD ); ctxt->hrtimer.function = kvm_hrtimer_expire;
@@ -1656,6 +1661,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_counter_offset(struct kvm *kvm,if (offset->reserved)return -EINVAL ; +if (kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm)) +return -EBUSY ; +mutex_lock (&kvm->lock);if (lock_all_vcpus (kvm)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 36/47 KVM: arm64: Check directly whether a vcpu is protected
In reply to Fuad TabbaUse the vcpu_is_protected() function instead of the more long-winded way of doing it through the kvm structure.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +2 -4
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static const exit_handler_fn pvm_exit_handlers[] = {static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { -if (unlikely (kvm_vm_is_protected (kern_hyp_va (vcpu->kvm)))) +if (unlikely (vcpu_is_protected (vcpu)))return pvm_exit_handlers;return hyp_exit_handlers;
@@ -228,9 +228,7 @@ static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)*/ static void early_exit_filter (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *exit_code) { -struct kvm *kvm =kern_hyp_va (vcpu->kvm); - -if (kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm) &&vcpu_mode_is_32bit (vcpu)) { +if (unlikely (vcpu_is_protected (vcpu) &&vcpu_mode_is_32bit (vcpu))) {/* * As we have caught the guest red-handed, decide that it isn't * fit for purpose anymore by making the vcpu invalid. The VMM
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2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 37/47 KVM: arm64: Trap debug break and watch from guest
In reply to Fuad TabbaDebug and trace are not currently supported for protected guests, so trap accesses to the related registers and emulate them as RAZ/WI.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +1 -1
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64dfr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* Trap Debug */ if (!FIELD_GET (ARM64_FEATURE_MASK (ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DebugVer), feature_ids)) - mdcr_set |=MDCR_EL2_TDRA |MDCR_EL2_TDA |MDCR_EL2_TDE ; + mdcr_set |=MDCR_EL2_TDRA |MDCR_EL2_TDA ;/* Trap OS Double Lock */ if (!FIELD_GET (ARM64_FEATURE_MASK (ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DoubleLock), feature_ids))
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c +11 -0
@@ -345,6 +345,17 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc pvm_sys_reg_descs[] = {/* Cache maintenance by set/way operations are restricted. */ /* Debug and Trace Registers are restricted. */ +RAZ_WI (SYS_DBGBVRn_EL1 (0 )), +RAZ_WI (SYS_DBGBCRn_EL1 (0 )), +RAZ_WI (SYS_DBGWVRn_EL1 (0 )), +RAZ_WI (SYS_DBGWCRn_EL1 (0 )), +RAZ_WI (SYS_MDSCR_EL1 ), +RAZ_WI (SYS_OSLAR_EL1 ), +RAZ_WI (SYS_OSLSR_EL1 ), +RAZ_WI (SYS_OSDLR_EL1 ), + +/* Group 1 ID registers */ +RAZ_WI (SYS_REVIDR_EL1 ),/* AArch64 mappings of the AArch32 ID registers */ /* CRm=1 */
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 38/47 KVM: arm64: Restrict protected VM capabilities
In reply to Fuad TabbaRestrict protected VM capabilities based on the
fixed-configuration for protected VMs.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 27 ++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h +27 -0
@@ -225,6 +225,33 @@ void pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(struct kvm *kvm); ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_MOPS) \ ) +/* +* Returns the maximum number of breakpoints supported for protected VMs. +*/ +static inline int pkvm_get_max_brps (void ) +{ +int num =FIELD_GET (ARM64_FEATURE_MASK (ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_BRPs), +PVM_ID_AA64DFR0_ALLOW ); + +/* +* If breakpoints are supported, the maximum number is 1 + the field. +* Otherwise, return 0, which is not compliant with the architecture, +* but is reserved and is used here to indicate no debug support. +*/ +return num ? num +1 :0 ; +} + +/* +* Returns the maximum number of watchpoints supported for protected VMs. +*/ +static inline int pkvm_get_max_wrps (void ) +{ +int num =FIELD_GET (ARM64_FEATURE_MASK (ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_WRPs), +PVM_ID_AA64DFR0_ALLOW ); + +return num ? num +1 :0 ; +} +extern struct memblock_region kvm_nvhe_sym (hyp_memory )[];extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym (hyp_memblock_nr );
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +68 -1
83 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 39/47 KVM: arm64: Do not support MTE for protected VMs
In reply to Fuad TabbaReturn an error (-EINVAL) if trying to enable MTE on a protected vm. MTE is still not supported in KVM in general. This check ensures that pKVM isn't caught off-guard when that support is added to KVM.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +3 -1
@@ -86,7 +86,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,break ;case KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE :mutex_lock (&kvm->lock); -if (!system_supports_mte () || kvm->created_vcpus) { +if (!system_supports_mte () || +kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm) || + kvm->created_vcpus) { r = -EINVAL ; }else { r =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 40/47 KVM: arm64: Move pkvm_vcpu_init_traps() to hyp vcpu init
In reply to Fuad TabbaMove pkvm_vcpu_init_traps() to the initialization of the hyp vcpu, and remove the associated hypercall. Traps need to be initialized at every vcpu init. This simplifies the code and saves a hypercall per vcpu initialization.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 8 -------- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/trap_handler.h | 2 -- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 8 -------- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 4 +++- 5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +0 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ enum __kvm_host_smccc_func { __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___kvm_timer_set_cntvoff, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs, - __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_init_traps, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_init_vm, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_init_vcpu, __KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_teardown_vm,
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +0 -8
@@ -770,14 +770,6 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static_branch_inc (&userspace_irqchip_in_use); } -/* -* Initialize traps for protected VMs. -* NOTE: Move to run in EL2 directly, rather than via a hypercall, once -* the code is in place for first run initialization at EL2. -*/ -if (kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm)) -kvm_call_hyp_nvhe (__pkvm_vcpu_init_traps, vcpu); -mutex_lock (&kvm->arch.config_lock);set_bit (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_HAS_RAN_ONCE , &kvm->arch.flags);mutex_unlock (&kvm->arch.config_lock);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/trap_handler.h +0 -2
@@ -15,6 +15,4 @@#define DECLARE_REG (type, name, ctxt, reg) \ type name = (type)cpu_reg(ctxt, (reg)) -void __pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_TRAP_HANDLER_H__ */
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -8
@@ -267,13 +267,6 @@ static void handle___pkvm_prot_finalize(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)cpu_reg (host_ctxt,1 ) =__pkvm_prot_finalize (); } -static void handle___pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) -{ - DECLARE_REG(struct kvm_vcpu *, vcpu, host_ctxt, 1); - -__pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (kern_hyp_va (vcpu)); -} -static void handle___pkvm_init_vm (struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) { DECLARE_REG(struct kvm *, host_kvm, host_ctxt, 1);
@@ -329,7 +322,6 @@ static const hcall_t host_hcall[] = {HANDLE_FUNC (__kvm_timer_set_cntvoff),HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_save_vmcr_aprs),HANDLE_FUNC (__vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs), -HANDLE_FUNC (__pkvm_vcpu_init_traps),HANDLE_FUNC (__pkvm_init_vm),HANDLE_FUNC (__pkvm_init_vcpu), HANDLE_FUNC(__pkvm_teardown_vm),
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +3 -1
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static void pvm_init_trap_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* * Initialize trap register values in protected mode. */ -void __pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static void pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {pvm_init_trap_regs (vcpu);pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr0 (vcpu);
@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hw_mmu = &hyp_vm->kvm.arch.mmu; hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cflags =READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.cflags); + +pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); done:if (ret)unpin_host_vcpu (host_vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 41/47 KVM: arm64: Fix initializing traps in protected mode
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe values of the trapping registers for protected VMs should be computed from the ground up, and not depend on potentially preexisting values.
Moreover, non-protected VMs should not be restricted in protected mode in the same manner as protected VMs.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c +33 -15
@@ -187,19 +187,27 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_aa64mmfr1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)*/ static void pvm_init_trap_regs (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { -const u64 hcr_trap_feat_regs =HCR_TID3 ; -const u64 hcr_trap_impdef =HCR_TACR |HCR_TIDCP |HCR_TID1 ; -/* * Always trap: * - Feature id registers: to control features exposed to guests * - Implementation-defined features */ - vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= hcr_trap_feat_regs | hcr_trap_impdef; + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 =HCR_GUEST_FLAGS | +HCR_TID3 |HCR_TACR |HCR_TIDCP |HCR_TID1 ; + +if (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN )) { +/* route synchronous external abort exceptions to EL2 */ + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |=HCR_TEA ; +/* trap error record accesses */ + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |=HCR_TERR ; + } + +if (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_HAS_STAGE2_FWB )) + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |=HCR_FWB ; + +if (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE )) + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |=HCR_TID2 ; -/* Clear res0 and set res1 bits to trap potential new features. */ - vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_RES0 ); - vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2 &= ~(MDCR_EL2_RES0 );if (!has_hvhe ()) { vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 |=CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1 ; vcpu->arch.cptr_el2 &= ~(CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES0 );
@@ -209,14 +217,24 @@ static void pvm_init_trap_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* * Initialize trap register values in protected mode. */ -static void pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static void pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) { -pvm_init_trap_regs (vcpu); -pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr0 (vcpu); -pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr1 (vcpu); -pvm_init_traps_aa64dfr0 (vcpu); -pvm_init_traps_aa64mmfr0 (vcpu); -pvm_init_traps_aa64mmfr1 (vcpu); + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2 =kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2 (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 =0 ; + +if (!pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected (hyp_vcpu)) { +u64 hcr =READ_ONCE (hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2); + + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 =HCR_GUEST_FLAGS | hcr; +return ; + } + +pvm_init_trap_regs (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); +pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr0 (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); +pvm_init_traps_aa64pfr1 (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); +pvm_init_traps_aa64dfr0 (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); +pvm_init_traps_aa64mmfr0 (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); +pvm_init_traps_aa64mmfr1 (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); }/*
@@ -351,7 +369,7 @@ static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hw_mmu = &hyp_vm->kvm.arch.mmu; hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cflags =READ_ONCE (host_vcpu->arch.cflags); -pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (&hyp_vcpu->vcpu); +pkvm_vcpu_init_traps (hyp_vcpu); done:if (ret)unpin_host_vcpu (host_vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 42/47 KVM: arm64: Advertise GICv3 sysreg interface to protected guests
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Advertise the system register GICv3 CPU interface to protected guests as that is the only supported configuration under pKVM.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h +2 -0
@@ -45,11 +45,13 @@ void pkvm_destroy_hyp_vm(struct kvm *kvm);/* * Allow for protected VMs: * - Floating-point and Advanced SIMD +* - GICv3(+) system register interface * - Data Independent Timing */ #define PVM_ID_AA64PFR0_ALLOW (\ ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_FP) | \ ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_AdvSIMD) | \ + ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_GIC) | \ ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_DIT) \ )
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 43/47 KVM: arm64: Force injection of a data abort on NISV MMIO exit
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
If a vcpu exits for a data abort with an invalid syndrome, the expectations are that userspace has a chance to save the day if it has requested to see such exits.
However, this is completely futile in the case of a protected VM, as none of the state is available. In this particular case, inject a data abort directly into the vcpu, consistent with what userspace could do.
This also helps with pKVM, which discards all syndrome information when forwarding data aborts that are not known to be MMIO.
Finally, hide the RETURN_NISV_IO_ABORT_TO_USER cap from userspace on protected VMs, and document this tweak to the API.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 7 +++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 14 ++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +7 -0
@@ -6894,6 +6894,13 @@ Note that KVM does not skip the faulting instruction as it does for KVM_EXIT_MMIO, but userspace has to emulate any change to the processing state if it decides to decode and emulate the instruction. +This feature isn't available to protected VMs, as userspace does not +have access to the state that is required to perform the emulation. +Instead, a data abort exception is directly injected in the guest. +Note that although KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER will be reported if +queried outside of a protected VM context, the feature will not be +exposed if queried on a protected VM file descriptor. + :: /* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +10 -4
@@ -80,9 +80,13 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,switch (cap->cap) {case KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER : - r =0 ; -set_bit (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_RETURN_NISV_IO_ABORT_TO_USER , - &kvm->arch.flags); +if (kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm)) { + r = -EINVAL ; + }else { + r =0 ; +set_bit (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_RETURN_NISV_IO_ABORT_TO_USER , + &kvm->arch.flags); + }break ;case KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE :mutex_lock (&kvm->lock);
@@ -240,7 +244,6 @@ static int kvm_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)case KVM_CAP_IMMEDIATE_EXIT :case KVM_CAP_VCPU_EVENTS :case KVM_CAP_ARM_IRQ_LINE_LAYOUT_2 : -case KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER :case KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT :case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG :case KVM_CAP_VCPU_ATTRIBUTES :
@@ -250,6 +253,9 @@ static int kvm_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)case KVM_CAP_COUNTER_OFFSET : r =1 ;break ; +case KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER : + r = !kvm || !kvm_vm_is_protected (kvm); +break ;case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2 :return KVM_GUESTDBG_VALID_MASK ;case KVM_CAP_ARM_SET_DEVICE_ADDR :
arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c +9 -0
@@ -133,11 +133,20 @@ int io_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa)/* * No valid syndrome? Ask userspace for help if it has * volunteered to do so, and bail out otherwise. +* +* In the protected VM case, there isn't much userspace can do +* though, so directly deliver an exception to the guest. */ if (!kvm_vcpu_dabt_isvalid (vcpu)) {trace_kvm_mmio_nisv (*vcpu_pc (vcpu),kvm_vcpu_get_esr (vcpu),kvm_vcpu_get_hfar (vcpu), fault_ipa); +if (is_protected_kvm_enabled () && +kvm_vm_is_protected (vcpu->kvm)) { +kvm_inject_dabt (vcpu,kvm_vcpu_get_hfar (vcpu)); +return 1 ; + } +if (test_bit (KVM_ARCH_FLAG_RETURN_NISV_IO_ABORT_TO_USER , &vcpu->kvm->arch.flags)) { run->exit_reason =KVM_EXIT_ARM_NISV ;
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
PATCH v2 44/47 KVM: arm64: Remove unused vcpu parameter from guest_owns_fp_regs()
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe host state is not per-vcpu anymore, and therefore, the vcpu parameter isn't used.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +1 -1
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ extern struct kvm_exception_table_entry __start___kvm_ex_table;extern struct kvm_exception_table_entry __stop___kvm_ex_table;/* Check whether the FP regs are owned by the guest */ -static inline bool guest_owns_fp_regs (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static inline bool guest_owns_fp_regs (void ) {return *host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ; }
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +1 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) val |=CPTR_EL2_TSM ; } -if (!guest_owns_fp_regs (vcpu)) { +if (!guest_owns_fp_regs ()) {if (has_hvhe ()) val &= ~(CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN |CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN |CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN |CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN );
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) val |=CPTR_EL2_TAM ; -if (guest_owns_fp_regs (vcpu)) { +if (guest_owns_fp_regs ()) {if (vcpu_has_sve (vcpu)) val |=CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN |CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN ; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 44/47] KVM: arm64: Remove unused vcpu parameter from guest_owns_fp_regs()
Quoted 2 lines · Fuad Tabba
The host state is not per-vcpu anymore, and therefore, the vcpu parameter isn't used.
PATCH v2 45/47 KVM: arm64: Move guest_owns_fp_regs() to enable use in KVM code
In reply to Fuad Tabbaguest_owns_fp_regs() will be used to check fpsimd state ownership across kvm/arm64. Therefore, move it to kvm_emulate.h to widen its scope.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 6 ------ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +6 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ static __always_inline bool vcpu_el1_is_32bit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }#endif +/* Check whether the FP regs are owned by the guest */ +static inline bool guest_owns_fp_regs (void ) +{ +return *host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ; +} +static inline void vcpu_reset_hcr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 =HCR_GUEST_FLAGS ;
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +0 -6
@@ -39,12 +39,6 @@ struct kvm_exception_table_entry {extern struct kvm_exception_table_entry __start___kvm_ex_table;extern struct kvm_exception_table_entry __stop___kvm_ex_table; -/* Check whether the FP regs are owned by the guest */ -static inline bool guest_owns_fp_regs (void ) -{ -return *host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ; -} -/* Save the 32-bit only FPSIMD system register state */ static inline void __fpsimd_save_fpexc32 (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 45/47] KVM: arm64: Move guest_owns_fp_regs() to enable use in KVM code
Quoted 3 lines · Fuad Tabba
guest_owns_fp_regs()will be used to check fpsimd state ownership across kvm/arm64. Therefore, move it tokvm_emulate.hto widen its scope.
PATCH v2 46/47 KVM: arm64: Add host_owns_fp_regs()
In reply to Fuad TabbaTo avoid direct comparison against the FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED, add a new function that performs the check, host_owns_fp_regs(), to complement the existing guest_owns_fp_regs().
The following patch will refactor the code to use these two helper functions.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +6 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ static inline bool guest_owns_fp_regs(void)return *host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ; } +/* Check whether the FP regs are owned by the host */ +static inline bool host_owns_fp_regs (void ) +{ +return *host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED ; +} +static inline void vcpu_reset_hcr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 =HCR_GUEST_FLAGS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 46/47] KVM: arm64: Add host_owns_fp_regs()
Quoted 3 lines · Fuad Tabba
To avoid direct comparison against the
FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED, add a new function that performs the check,host_owns_fp_regs(), to complement the existingguest_owns_fp_regs().
PATCH v2 47/47 KVM: arm64: Refactor checks for FP state ownership
In reply to Fuad TabbaTo check for fpsimd state ownership, use the helpers host_owns_fp_regs() and guest_owns_fp_regs() instead of directly using the enums.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 ++---- arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 5 ++--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +2 -4
@@ -604,16 +604,14 @@ static __always_inline u64 kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }else if (has_hvhe ()) { val = (CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN |CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN ); -if (!vcpu_has_sve (vcpu) || - (*host_data_ptr (fp_owner) !=FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED )) +if (!vcpu_has_sve (vcpu) || !guest_owns_fp_regs ()) val |=CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN |CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN ;if (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_SME )) val |=CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN |CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN ; }else { val =CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1 ; -if (vcpu_has_sve (vcpu) && - (*host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED )) +if (vcpu_has_sve (vcpu) &&guest_owns_fp_regs ()) val |=CPTR_EL2_TZ ;if (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_SME )) val &= ~CPTR_EL2_TSM ;
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c +2 -3
@@ -118,8 +118,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)WARN_ON_ONCE (!irqs_disabled ()); -if (*host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ) { - +if (guest_owns_fp_regs ()) {/* * Currently we do not support SME guests so SVCR is * always 0 and we just need a variable to point to.
@@ -172,7 +171,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)isb (); } -if (*host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ) { +if (guest_owns_fp_regs ()) {if (vcpu_has_sve (vcpu)) {__vcpu_sys_reg (vcpu,ZCR_EL1 ) =read_sysreg_el1 (SYS_ZCR );
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +1 -1
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)isb ();/* Write out the host state if it's in the registers */ -if (*host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED ) +if (host_owns_fp_regs ())__fpsimd_save_state (*host_data_ptr (fpsimd_state));/* Restore the guest state */
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +1 -1
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)__sysreg_restore_state_nvhe (host_ctxt); -if (*host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ) +if (guest_owns_fp_regs ())__fpsimd_save_fpexc32 (vcpu);__debug_switch_to_host (vcpu);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +1 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)sysreg_restore_host_state_vhe (host_ctxt); -if (*host_data_ptr (fp_owner) ==FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED ) +if (guest_owns_fp_regs ())__fpsimd_save_fpexc32 (vcpu);__debug_switch_to_host (vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 47/47] KVM: arm64: Refactor checks for FP state ownership
Quoted 3 lines · Fuad Tabba
To check for fpsimd state ownership, use the helpers
host_owns_fp_regs()andguest_owns_fp_regs()instead of directly using the enums.
It does occur to me that there's probably enough FP changes in this series to warrant a separate series, there didn't look to be much overlap, they look good and as you say in the cover letter this is a rather large grab bag so splitting out should make things a bit more digestable.
Marc Zyngier
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 47/47] KVM: arm64: Refactor checks for FP state ownership
Quoted 7 lines · Mark Brown
[1 <text/plain; us-ascii (7bit)>]
Quoted 3 lines · Fuad Tabba
To check for fpsimd state ownership, use the helpers
host_owns_fp_regs()andguest_owns_fp_regs()instead of directly using the enums.
Quoted 7 lines
Reviewed-by Mark Brown <[email protected]>It does occur to me that there's probably enough FP changes in this series to warrant a separate series, there didn't look to be much overlap, they look good and as you say in the cover letter this is a rather large grab bag so splitting out should make things a bit more digestable.
I'm already tracking this series as a whole, and splitting FP off the main series will only make it harder to track.
Plus, patch #1 really shows that there is a need to look at this code globally, and not with the narrow angle of the FP stuff.
M.
Signature · 1 line
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.