af_unix: Fix lockless access of sk->sk_state and others fields.
Subsystems (5)
v2 cover af_unix: Fix lockless access of sk->sk_state and others fields.
The patch 1 fixes a bug where SOCK_DGRAM's sk->sk_state is changed to TCP_CLOSE even if the socket is connect()ed to another socket.
The rest of this series annotates lockless accesses to the following fields.
* sk->sk_state
* sk->sk_sndbuf
* net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen
* sk->sk_receive_queue.qlen
* sk->sk_shutdown
Note that with this series there is skb_queue_empty() left in unix_dgram_disconnected() that needs to be changed to lockless version, and unix_peer(other) access there should be protected by unix_state_lock().
This will require some refactoring, so another series will follow.
Changes:
v2:
* Patch 1: Fix wrong double lock
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
Kuniyuki Iwashima (15):
af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly
disconencted peer.
af_unix: Annodate data-races around sk->sk_state for writers.
af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_inq_len().
af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in unix_write_space()
and poll().
af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_stream_connect().
af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_accept().
af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in sendmsg() and
recvmsg(). af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_stream_read_skb().
af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in UNIX_DIAG.
af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_sndbuf.
af_unix: Annotate data-race of net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen.
af_unix: Use unix_recvq_full_lockless() in unix_stream_connect().
af_unix: Use skb_queue_empty_lockless() in unix_release_sock().
af_unix: Use skb_queue_len_lockless() in sk_diag_show_rqlen().
af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_shutdown in sk_diag_fill().
net/unix/af_unix.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- net/unix/diag.c | 12 +++---- 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 1/15 af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
When a SOCK_DGRAM socket connect()s to another socket, the both sockets' sk->sk_state are changed to TCP_ESTABLISHED so that we can register them to BPF SOCKMAP.
When the socket disconnects from the peer by connect(AF_UNSPEC), the state is set back to TCP_CLOSE.
Then, the peer's state is also set to TCP_CLOSE, but the update is done locklessly and unconditionally.
Let's say socket A connect()ed to B, B connect()ed to C, and A disconnects from B.
After the first two connect()s, all three sockets' sk->sk_state are TCP_ESTABLISHED:
$ ss -xa Netid State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:PortProcess u_dgr ESTAB 0 0 @A 641 * 642 u_dgr ESTAB 0 0 @B 642 * 643 u_dgr ESTAB 0 0 @C 643 * 0
And after the disconnect, B's state is TCP_CLOSE even though it's still connected to C and C's state is TCP_ESTABLISHED.
$ ss -xa Netid State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:PortProcess u_dgr UNCONN 0 0 @A 641 * 0 u_dgr UNCONN 0 0 @B 642 * 643 u_dgr ESTAB 0 0 @C 643 * 0
In this case, we cannot register B to SOCKMAP.
So, when a socket disconnects from the peer, we should not set TCP_CLOSE to the peer if the peer is connected to yet another socket, and this must be done under unix_state_lock().
Note that we use WRITE_ONCE() for sk->sk_state as there are many lockless readers. These data-races will be fixed in the following patches.
---
CC: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +8 -2
@@ -570,7 +570,6 @@ static void unix_dgram_disconnected(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)sk_error_report (other); } } - other->sk_state =TCP_CLOSE ; }static void unix_sock_destructor (struct sock *sk)
@@ -1424,8 +1423,15 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,unix_state_double_unlock (sk, other); -if (other != old_peer) +if (other != old_peer) {unix_dgram_disconnected (sk, old_peer); + +unix_state_lock (old_peer); +if (!unix_peer (old_peer)) +WRITE_ONCE (old_peer->sk_state,TCP_CLOSE ); +unix_state_unlock (old_peer); + } +sock_put (old_peer); }else {unix_peer (sk) = other;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
Quoted 3 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
When a
SOCK_DGRAMsocket connect()s to another socket, the both sockets'sk->sk_stateare changed toTCP_ESTABLISHEDso that we can register them to BPF SOCKMAP. (...)
Speaking of af_unix and sockmap, SOCK_STREAM has a tiny window for bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM) and unix_stream_connect() to race: when sock_map_sk_state_allowed() passes (sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED), but unix_peer(sk) in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() _still_ returns NULL:
T0 bpf T1 connect ====== ========== WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)
sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)
...sk_pair = unix_peer(sk)sock_hold(sk_pair)
sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk unix_state_unlock(sk)
With mdelay(1) stuffed in unix_stream_connect():
[ 902.277593] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 [ 902.277633] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 902.277661] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 902.277688] PGD 107191067 P4D 107191067 PUD 10f63c067 PMD 0 [ 902.277716] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#23] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 902.277742] CPU: 2 PID: 1505 Comm: a.out Tainted: G D 6.10.0-rc1+ #130 [ 902.277769] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 902.277793] RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa1/0x150
Setting TCP_ESTABLISHED _after_ unix_peer() fixes the issue, so how about something like
@@ -1631,12 +1631,13 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
/* Set credentials */
copy_peercred(sk, other);- sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
- WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
sock_hold(newsk);
+ smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */
+ WRITE_ONCE(unix_peer(sk), newsk);
+ smp_wmb(); /* ensure peer is set before sk_state */- smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */ - unix_peer(sk) = newsk; + sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; + WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
unix_state_unlock(sk);
@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r
* be a single matching destroy operation.
*/
if (!psock->sk_pair) {
- sk_pair = unix_peer(sk);
+ smp_rmb();
+ sk_pair = READ_ONCE(unix_peer(sk));
sock_hold(sk_pair);
psock->sk_pair = sk_pair;
}This should keep things ordered and lockless... I hope.
Alternatively, maybe it would be better just to make BPF respect the unix state lock?
@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r
* be a single matching destroy operation.
*/
if (!psock->sk_pair) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk);
sk_pair = unix_peer(sk);+ unix_state_unlock(sk);
sock_hold(sk_pair);
psock->sk_pair = sk_pair;
What do you think?
Thanks,
Michal
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2024 13:28:34 +0200
Quoted 66 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 3 lines
When a
SOCK_DGRAMsocket connect()s to another socket, the both sockets'sk->sk_stateare changed toTCP_ESTABLISHEDso that we can register them to BPF SOCKMAP. (...)Speaking of
af_unixand sockmap,SOCK_STREAMhas a tiny window forbpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM)andunix_stream_connect()to race: whensock_map_sk_state_allowed()passes (sk_state==TCP_ESTABLISHED), butunix_peer(sk)inunix_stream_bpf_update_proto()_still_ returns NULL:T0 bpf T1 connect ====== ========== WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)
sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)
...sk_pair=unix_peer(sk)sock_hold(sk_pair)sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk unix_state_unlock(sk)With mdelay(1) stuffed in
unix_stream_connect():[ 902.277593] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 [ 902.277633] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 902.277661] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 902.277688] PGD 107191067 P4D 107191067 PUD 10f63c067 PMD 0 [ 902.277716] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#23] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 902.277742] CPU: 2 PID: 1505 Comm: a.out Tainted: G D 6.10.0-rc1+ #130 [ 902.277769] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 902.277793] RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa1/0x150Setting
TCP_ESTABLISHED_after_unix_peer()fixes the issue, so how about something like(quoted diff) +7
-5@@ -1631,12 +1631,13 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, /* Set credentials */ copy_peercred(sk, other); - sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; - WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED); sock_hold(newsk); + smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */ + WRITE_ONCE(unix_peer(sk), newsk); + smp_wmb(); /* ensure peer is set before sk_state */ - smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */ - unix_peer(sk) = newsk; + sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; + WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED); unix_state_unlock(sk);@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r * be a single matching destroy operation. */ if (!psock->sk_pair) { - sk_pair = unix_peer(sk); + smp_rmb(); + sk_pair = READ_ONCE(unix_peer(sk)); sock_hold(sk_pair); psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; }
Quoted 1 line
This should keep things ordered and lockless... I hope.
sock_map_update_elem() assumes that the socket is protected by lock_sock(), but AF_UNIX uses it only for the general path.
So, I think we should fix sock_map_sk_state_allowed() and then use smp_store_release()/smp_load_acquire() rather than smp_[rw]mb() for unix_peer(sk).
Could you test this with the mdelay(1) change ?
Note that we need not touch sock->state. I have a patch for net-next that removes sock->state uses completely from AF_UNIX as we don't use it. Even unix_seq_show() depends on sk->sk_state.
---8<---
net/core/sock_map.c +1 -1
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static bool sock_map_sk_state_allowed(const struct sock *sk)if (sk_is_tcp (sk))return (1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED |TCPF_LISTEN );if (sk_is_stream_unix (sk)) -return (1 << sk->sk_state) &TCPF_ESTABLISHED ; +return (1 <<READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state)) &TCPF_ESTABLISHED ;return true; }
net/unix/af_unix.c +2 -2
@@ -1632,11 +1632,11 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,copy_peercred (sk, other); sock->state =SS_CONNECTED ; -WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_ESTABLISHED );sock_hold (newsk);smp_mb__after_atomic ();/* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */ -unix_peer (sk) = newsk; +smp_store_release (&unix_peer (sk), newsk); +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_ESTABLISHED );unix_state_unlock (sk);
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +1 -1
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r* be a single matching destroy operation. */ if (!psock->sk_pair) { - sk_pair =unix_peer (sk); + sk_pair =smp_load_acquire (&unix_peer (sk));sock_hold (sk_pair); psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; }
---8<---
Quoted 14 lines
Alternatively, maybe it would be better just to make BPF respect the unix state lock?
(quoted diff) +2
-0@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r * be a single matching destroy operation. */ if (!psock->sk_pair) { + unix_state_lock(sk); sk_pair = unix_peer(sk); + unix_state_unlock(sk); sock_hold(sk_pair); psock->sk_pair = sk_pair;
Quoted 1 line
What do you think?
If we'd go this way, I'd change like this:
---8<---
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +3 -5
@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ int unix_dgram_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool reint unix_stream_bpf_update_proto (struct sock *sk,struct sk_psock *psock,bool restore) { -struct sock *sk_pair; -/* Restore does not decrement the sk_pair reference yet because we must * keep the a reference to the socket until after an RCU grace period * and any pending sends have completed.
@@ -180,9 +178,9 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r* be a single matching destroy operation. */ if (!psock->sk_pair) { - sk_pair =unix_peer (sk); -sock_hold (sk_pair); - psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; + psock->sk_pair =unix_peer_get (sk); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!psock->sk_pair)) +return -EINVAL ; }unix_stream_bpf_check_needs_rebuild (psock->sk_proto);
---8<---
And the _last_ option would be..., no :)
---8<---
include/net/af_unix.h +3 -3
@@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ struct unix_sock {#define unix_sk (ptr) container_of_const(ptr, struct unix_sock, sk)#define unix_peer (sk) (unix_sk(sk)->peer) -#define unix_state_lock (s) spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock) -#define unix_state_unlock (s) spin_unlock(&unix_sk(s)->lock) +#define unix_state_lock (s) lock_sock(s) +#define unix_state_unlock (s) release_sock(s)enum unix_socket_lock_class {U_LOCK_NORMAL ,U_LOCK_SECOND ,/* for double locking, see unix_state_double_lock(). */
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ enum unix_socket_lock_class {static inline void unix_state_lock_nested (struct sock *sk,enum unix_socket_lock_class subclass) { -spin_lock_nested (&unix_sk (sk)->lock, subclass); +lock_sock_nested (sk, subclass); }#define peer_wait peer_wq.wait
---8<---
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2024 12:53:20 -0700
Quoted 68 lines
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2024 13:28:34 +0200Quoted 66 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 3 lines
When a
SOCK_DGRAMsocket connect()s to another socket, the both sockets'sk->sk_stateare changed toTCP_ESTABLISHEDso that we can register them to BPF SOCKMAP. (...)Speaking of
af_unixand sockmap,SOCK_STREAMhas a tiny window forbpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM)andunix_stream_connect()to race: whensock_map_sk_state_allowed()passes (sk_state==TCP_ESTABLISHED), butunix_peer(sk)inunix_stream_bpf_update_proto()_still_ returns NULL:T0 bpf T1 connect ====== ========== WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)
sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)
...sk_pair=unix_peer(sk)sock_hold(sk_pair)sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk unix_state_unlock(sk)With mdelay(1) stuffed in
unix_stream_connect():[ 902.277593] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 [ 902.277633] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 902.277661] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 902.277688] PGD 107191067 P4D 107191067 PUD 10f63c067 PMD 0 [ 902.277716] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#23] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 902.277742] CPU: 2 PID: 1505 Comm: a.out Tainted: G D 6.10.0-rc1+ #130 [ 902.277769] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 902.277793] RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa1/0x150Setting
TCP_ESTABLISHED_after_unix_peer()fixes the issue, so how about something like(quoted diff) +7
-5@@ -1631,12 +1631,13 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, /* Set credentials */ copy_peercred(sk, other); - sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; - WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED); sock_hold(newsk); + smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */ + WRITE_ONCE(unix_peer(sk), newsk); + smp_wmb(); /* ensure peer is set before sk_state */ - smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */ - unix_peer(sk) = newsk; + sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; + WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED); unix_state_unlock(sk);@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r * be a single matching destroy operation. */ if (!psock->sk_pair) { - sk_pair = unix_peer(sk); + smp_rmb(); + sk_pair = READ_ONCE(unix_peer(sk)); sock_hold(sk_pair); psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; }
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
This should keep things ordered and lockless... I hope.
sock_map_update_elem()assumes that the socket is protected bylock_sock(), butAF_UNIXuses it only for the general path.So, I think we should fix
sock_map_sk_state_allowed()and then use smp_store_release()/smp_load_acquire() rather than smp_[rw]mb() forunix_peer(sk).
Sorry, I think I was wrong and we can't use smp_store_release() and smp_load_acquire(), and smp_[rw]mb() is needed.
Given we avoid adding code in the hotpath in the original fix 8866730aed510 [0], I prefer adding unix_state_lock() in the SOCKMAP path again.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
---8<---
net/core/sock_map.c +1 -1
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static bool sock_map_sk_state_allowed(const struct sock *sk)if (sk_is_tcp (sk))return (1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED |TCPF_LISTEN );if (sk_is_stream_unix (sk)) -return (1 << sk->sk_state) &TCPF_ESTABLISHED ; +return (1 <<READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state)) &TCPF_ESTABLISHED ;return true; }
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +3 -5
@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ int unix_dgram_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool reint unix_stream_bpf_update_proto (struct sock *sk,struct sk_psock *psock,bool restore) { -struct sock *sk_pair; -/* Restore does not decrement the sk_pair reference yet because we must * keep the a reference to the socket until after an RCU grace period * and any pending sends have completed.
@@ -180,9 +178,9 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r* be a single matching destroy operation. */ if (!psock->sk_pair) { - sk_pair =unix_peer (sk); -sock_hold (sk_pair); - psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; + psock->sk_pair =unix_peer_get (sk); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!psock->sk_pair)) +return -EINVAL ; }unix_stream_bpf_check_needs_rebuild (psock->sk_proto);
---8<---
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
Quoted 9 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
(...)
Sorry, I think I was wrong and we can't usesmp_store_release()andsmp_load_acquire(), and smp_[rw]mb() is needed.Given we avoid adding code in the hotpath in the original fix
8866730aed510[0], I prefer addingunix_state_lock()in the SOCKMAP path again.
You're saying smp_wmb() in connect() is too much for the hot path, do I understand correctly?
Quoted 31 lines
---8<---
net/core/sock_map.c +1
-1@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static bool sock_map_sk_state_allowed(const struct sock *sk)if (sk_is_tcp (sk))return (1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED |TCPF_LISTEN );if (sk_is_stream_unix (sk)) -return (1 << sk->sk_state) &TCPF_ESTABLISHED ; +return (1 <<READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state)) &TCPF_ESTABLISHED ;return true; }net/unix/unix_bpf.c +0
-2@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ int unix_dgram_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool reint unix_stream_bpf_update_proto (struct sock *sk,struct sk_psock *psock,bool restore) { -struct sock *sk_pair; -/* Restore does not decrement the sk_pair reference yet because we must * keep the a reference to the socket until after an RCU grace period * and any pending sends have completed. @@ -180,9 +178,9 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r* be a single matching destroy operation. */ if (!psock->sk_pair) {
net/unix/unix_bpf.c int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r
Quoted 10 lines
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +3
-4- sk_pair =unix_peer (sk); -sock_hold (sk_pair); - psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; + psock->sk_pair =unix_peer_get (sk); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!psock->sk_pair)) +return -EINVAL ; }unix_stream_bpf_check_needs_rebuild (psock->sk_proto); ---8<---
FWIW, we've passed sock_map_sk_state_allowed(), so critical section can be empty:
if (!psock->sk_pair) {
unix_state_lock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(sk);
sk_pair = READ_ONCE(unix_peer(sk));
...
}Thanks,
Michal
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 14:55:08 +0200
Quoted 5 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 4 lines
(...)
Sorry, I think I was wrong and we can't usesmp_store_release()andsmp_load_acquire(), and smp_[rw]mb() is needed.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Given we avoid adding code in the hotpath in the original fix
8866730aed510[0], I prefer addingunix_state_lock()in the SOCKMAP path again.You're saying
smp_wmb()inconnect()is too much for the hot path, do I understand correctly?
Yes, and now I think WARN_ON_ONCE() would be enough because it's unlikely that the delay happens between the two store ops and concurrent bpf() is in progress.
If syzkaller was able to hit this on vanilla kernel, we can revisit.
Then, probably we could just do s/WARN_ON_ONCE/unlikely/ because users who call bpf() in such a way know that the state was TCP_CLOSE while calling bpf().
---8<---
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +3 -0
@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r*/ if (!psock->sk_pair) { sk_pair =unix_peer (sk); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!sk_pair)) +return -EINVAL ; +sock_hold (sk_pair); psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; }
---8<---
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
Quoted 32 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 14:55:08 +0200Quoted 5 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 4 lines
(...)
Sorry, I think I was wrong and we can't usesmp_store_release()andsmp_load_acquire(), and smp_[rw]mb() is needed.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Given we avoid adding code in the hotpath in the original fix
8866730aed510[0], I prefer addingunix_state_lock()in the SOCKMAP path again.You're saying
smp_wmb()inconnect()is too much for the hot path, do I understand correctly?Yes, and now I think
WARN_ON_ONCE()would be enough because it's unlikely that the delay happens between the two store ops and concurrentbpf()is in progress.If syzkaller was able to hit this on vanilla kernel, we can revisit.
Then, probably we could just do s/WARN_ON_ONCE/unlikely/ because users who call
bpf()in such a way know that the state wasTCP_CLOSEwhile callingbpf().---8<---
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +0
-0
net/unix/unix_bpf.c int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r
Quoted 10 lines
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +3
-1@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r*/ if (!psock->sk_pair) { sk_pair =unix_peer (sk); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!sk_pair)) +return -EINVAL ; +sock_hold (sk_pair); psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; } ---8<---
Oh. That's a peculiar approach :) But, hey, it's your call.
Another AF_UNIX sockmap issue is with OOB. When OOB packet is sent, skb is added to recv queue, but also u->oob_skb is set. Here's the problem: when this skb goes through bpf_sk_redirect_map() and is moved between socks, oob_skb remains set on the original sock.
[ 23.688994] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 993 at net/unix/garbage.c:351 unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0 [ 23.689019] CPU: 2 PID: 993 Comm: kworker/u32:13 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #137 [ 23.689021] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 23.689024] Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc [ 23.689027] RIP: 0010:unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0
I wanted to write a patch, but then I realized I'm not sure what's the expected behaviour. Should the oob_skb setting follow to the skb's new sock or should it be dropped (similarly to what is happening today with scm_fp_list, i.e. redirect strips inflights)?
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 01:28:52 +0200
Quoted 46 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 32 lines
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 14:55:08 +0200Quoted 5 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 4 lines
(...)
Sorry, I think I was wrong and we can't usesmp_store_release()andsmp_load_acquire(), and smp_[rw]mb() is needed.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Given we avoid adding code in the hotpath in the original fix
8866730aed510[0], I prefer addingunix_state_lock()in the SOCKMAP path again.You're saying
smp_wmb()inconnect()is too much for the hot path, do I understand correctly?Yes, and now I think
WARN_ON_ONCE()would be enough because it's unlikely that the delay happens between the two store ops and concurrentbpf()is in progress.If syzkaller was able to hit this on vanilla kernel, we can revisit.
Then, probably we could just do s/WARN_ON_ONCE/unlikely/ because users who call
bpf()in such a way know that the state wasTCP_CLOSEwhile callingbpf().---8<---
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +0
-0net/unix/unix_bpf.c int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r
Quoted 10 lines
net/unix/unix_bpf.c +3
-1@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ int unix_stream_bpf_update_proto(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool r*/ if (!psock->sk_pair) { sk_pair =unix_peer (sk); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!sk_pair)) +return -EINVAL ; +sock_hold (sk_pair); psock->sk_pair = sk_pair; } ---8<---Oh. That's a peculiar approach :) But, hey, it's your call.
Quoted 4 lines
Another
AF_UNIXsockmap issue is with OOB. When OOB packet is sent, skb is added to recv queue, but alsou->oob_skbis set. Here's the problem: when this skb goes throughbpf_sk_redirect_map()and is moved between socks,oob_skbremains set on the original sock.
Good catch!
Quoted 11 lines
[ 23.688994] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 993 at net/unix/garbage.c:351 unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0 [ 23.689019] CPU: 2 PID: 993 Comm: kworker/u32:13 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #137 [ 23.689021] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 23.689024] Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc [ 23.689027] RIP: 0010:unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0I wanted to write a patch, but then I realized I'm not sure what's the expected behaviour. Should the
oob_skbsetting follow to the skb's new sock or should it be dropped (similarly to what is happening today withscm_fp_list, i.e. redirect strips inflights)?
The former will require large refactoring as we need to check if the redirect happens for BPF_F_INGRESS and if the redirected sk is also SOCK_STREAM etc.
So, I'd go with the latter. Probably we can check if skb is u->oob_skb and drop OOB data and retry next in unix_stream_read_skb(), and forbid MSG_OOB in unix_bpf_recvmsg().
Both features were merged in 5.15 and OOB was a month later than SOCKMAP, so the Fixes tag would be 314001f0bf927 again, where ioctl(SIOCATMARK) (and epoll(EPOLLPRI) after d9a232d435dcc was backported to all stable) is lying due to redirected OOB msg.
Thanks!
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
Quoted 22 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 01:28:52 +0200Quoted 5 lines
(...)
AnotherAF_UNIXsockmap issue is with OOB. When OOB packet is sent, skb is added to recv queue, but alsou->oob_skbis set. Here's the problem: when this skb goes throughbpf_sk_redirect_map()and is moved between socks,oob_skbremains set on the original sock.Good catch!
Quoted 11 lines
[ 23.688994] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 993 at net/unix/garbage.c:351 unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0 [ 23.689019] CPU: 2 PID: 993 Comm: kworker/u32:13 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #137 [ 23.689021] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 23.689024] Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc [ 23.689027] RIP: 0010:unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0I wanted to write a patch, but then I realized I'm not sure what's the expected behaviour. Should the
oob_skbsetting follow to the skb's new sock or should it be dropped (similarly to what is happening today withscm_fp_list, i.e. redirect strips inflights)?
Quoted 8 lines
The former will require large refactoring as we need to check if the redirect happens for
BPF_F_INGRESSand if the redirected sk is alsoSOCK_STREAMetc.So, I'd go with the latter. Probably we can check if skb is
u->oob_skband drop OOB data and retry next inunix_stream_read_skb(), and forbidMSG_OOBinunix_bpf_recvmsg().
(...)
Yeah, sounds reasonable. I'm just not sure I understand the retry part. For each skb_queue_tail() there's one ->sk_data_ready() (which does ->read_skb()). Why bother with a retry?
This is what I was thinking:
static int unix_stream_read_skb(struct sock *sk, skb_read_actor_t recv_actor) {
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
+
if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(sk->sk_state) != TCP_ESTABLISHED))
return -ENOTCONN;
- return unix_read_skb(sk, recv_actor);
+ mutex_lock(&u->iolock);
+ skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB)
+ if (skb) {
+ bool drop = false;
+
+ spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+ if (skb == u->oob_skb) {
+ WRITE_ONCE(u->oob_skb, NULL);
+ drop = true;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
+
+ if (drop) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_unref(skb));
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ skb = NULL;
+ err = 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ mutex_unlock(&u->iolock);
+ return skb ? recv_actor(sk, skb) : err;
}
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2024 20:14:48 +0200
Quoted 27 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 26 lines
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 01:28:52 +0200Quoted 5 lines
(...)
AnotherAF_UNIXsockmap issue is with OOB. When OOB packet is sent, skb is added to recv queue, but alsou->oob_skbis set. Here's the problem: when this skb goes throughbpf_sk_redirect_map()and is moved between socks,oob_skbremains set on the original sock.Good catch!
Quoted 11 lines
[ 23.688994] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 993 at net/unix/garbage.c:351 unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0 [ 23.689019] CPU: 2 PID: 993 Comm: kworker/u32:13 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #137 [ 23.689021] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 23.689024] Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc [ 23.689027] RIP: 0010:unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0I wanted to write a patch, but then I realized I'm not sure what's the expected behaviour. Should the
oob_skbsetting follow to the skb's new sock or should it be dropped (similarly to what is happening today withscm_fp_list, i.e. redirect strips inflights)?The former will require large refactoring as we need to check if the redirect happens for
BPF_F_INGRESSand if the redirected sk is alsoSOCK_STREAMetc.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
So, I'd go with the latter. Probably we can check if skb is
u->oob_skband drop OOB data and retry next inunix_stream_read_skb(), and forbidMSG_OOBinunix_bpf_recvmsg().
(...)Yeah, sounds reasonable. I'm just not sure I understand the retry part. For each
skb_queue_tail()there's one ->sk_data_ready() (which does ->read_skb()). Why bother with a retry?
Exactly.
Quoted 3 lines
This is what I was thinking:
When you post it, please make sure to CC bpf@ and sockmap maintainers too.
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
Quoted 38 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2024 20:14:48 +0200Quoted 27 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 26 lines
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 01:28:52 +0200Quoted 5 lines
(...)
AnotherAF_UNIXsockmap issue is with OOB. When OOB packet is sent, skb is added to recv queue, but alsou->oob_skbis set. Here's the problem: when this skb goes throughbpf_sk_redirect_map()and is moved between socks,oob_skbremains set on the original sock.Good catch!
Quoted 11 lines
[ 23.688994] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 993 at net/unix/garbage.c:351 unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0 [ 23.689019] CPU: 2 PID: 993 Comm: kworker/u32:13 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #137 [ 23.689021] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 23.689024] Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc [ 23.689027] RIP: 0010:unix_collect_queue+0x6c/0xb0I wanted to write a patch, but then I realized I'm not sure what's the expected behaviour. Should the
oob_skbsetting follow to the skb's new sock or should it be dropped (similarly to what is happening today withscm_fp_list, i.e. redirect strips inflights)?The former will require large refactoring as we need to check if the redirect happens for
BPF_F_INGRESSand if the redirected sk is alsoSOCK_STREAMetc.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
So, I'd go with the latter. Probably we can check if skb is
u->oob_skband drop OOB data and retry next inunix_stream_read_skb(), and forbidMSG_OOBinunix_bpf_recvmsg().
(...)Yeah, sounds reasonable. I'm just not sure I understand the retry part. For each
skb_queue_tail()there's one ->sk_data_ready() (which does ->read_skb()). Why bother with a retry?
Quoted 8 lines
Exactly.
Quoted 3 lines
This is what I was thinking:
When you post it, please make sure to CC bpf@ and sockmap maintainers too.
Done: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
Thanks!
In fact, should I try to document those not-so-obvious OOB/sockmap interaction? And speaking of documentation, an astute reader noted that man unix is lying:
Sockets API
...
UNIX domain sockets do not support the transmission of out-of-band data (the MSG_OOB flag for send(2) and recv(2)).
NOTES
...
UNIX domain stream sockets do not support the notion of out-of-band data.
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 22:35:55 +0200
Quoted 3 lines
In fact, should I try to document those not-so-obvious OOB/sockmap interaction? And speaking of documentation, an astute reader noted that
man unixis lying:
At least I wouldn't update man until we can say AF_UNIX MSG_OOB handling is stable enough; the behaviour is not compliant with TCP now.
While rewriting the oob test thoroughly, I found few more weird behaviours, and patches will follow.
For example:
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
from socket import *
c1, c2 =socketpair(AF_UNIX)c1.send(b'hello', MSG_OOB)
5
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
c1.send(b'world')
5
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
c2.recv(10)
b'hell'
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
c2.recv(1, MSG_OOB)
b'o'
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
c2.setblocking(False)# This causes-EAGAINeven with available datac2.recv(5)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
BlockingIOError: [Errno 11] Resource temporarily unavailable
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
c2.recv(5)
b'world'
And we need
---8<---
net/unix/af_unix.c +14 -3
@@ -2614,9 +2614,20 @@ static struct sk_buff *manage_oob(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,struct unix_sock *u =unix_sk (sk);if (!unix_skb_len (skb) && !(flags &MSG_PEEK )) { -skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); -consume_skb (skb); - skb =NULL ; +struct sk_buff *unlinked_skb = skb; + +spin_lock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); + +__skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); + +if (copied) + skb =NULL ; +else + skb =skb_peek (&sk->sk_receive_queue); + +spin_unlock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); + +consume_skb (unlinked_skb); }else {struct sk_buff *unlinked_skb =NULL ;
---8<---
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
Quoted 8 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 22:35:55 +0200Quoted 3 lines
In fact, should I try to document those not-so-obvious OOB/sockmap interaction? And speaking of documentation, an astute reader noted that
man unixis lying:At least I wouldn't update man until we can say
AF_UNIXMSG_OOBhandling is stable enough; the behaviour is not compliant with TCP now.
Sure, I get it.
Quoted 23 lines
(...)
And we need---8<---
net/unix/af_unix.c +8
-3@@ -2614,9 +2614,20 @@ static struct sk_buff *manage_oob(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,struct unix_sock *u =unix_sk (sk);if (!unix_skb_len (skb) && !(flags &MSG_PEEK )) { -skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); -consume_skb (skb); - skb =NULL ; +struct sk_buff *unlinked_skb = skb; + +spin_lock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); + +__skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); + +if (copied) + skb =NULL ;
net/unix/af_unix.c static struct sk_buff *manage_oob(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,
Quoted 10 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +6
-1+else + skb =skb_peek (&sk->sk_receive_queue); + +spin_unlock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); + +consume_skb (unlinked_skb); }else {struct sk_buff *unlinked_skb =NULL ; ---8<---
I gotta ask, is there a reason for unlinking an already consumed ('consumed' as in 'unix_skb_len(skb) == 0') skb so late, in manage_oob()? IOW, can't it be unlinked immediately once it's consumed in unix_stream_recv_urg()? I suppose that would simplify things.
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2024 00:43:27 +0200
Quoted 44 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 8 lines
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 22:35:55 +0200Quoted 3 lines
In fact, should I try to document those not-so-obvious OOB/sockmap interaction? And speaking of documentation, an astute reader noted that
man unixis lying:At least I wouldn't update man until we can say
AF_UNIXMSG_OOBhandling is stable enough; the behaviour is not compliant with TCP now.Sure, I get it.
Quoted 32 lines
(...)
And we need---8<---
net/unix/af_unix.c +14
-3@@ -2614,9 +2614,20 @@ static struct sk_buff *manage_oob(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,struct unix_sock *u =unix_sk (sk);if (!unix_skb_len (skb) && !(flags &MSG_PEEK )) { -skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); -consume_skb (skb); - skb =NULL ; +struct sk_buff *unlinked_skb = skb; + +spin_lock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); + +__skb_unlink (skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); + +if (copied) + skb =NULL ; +else + skb =skb_peek (&sk->sk_receive_queue); + +spin_unlock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); + +consume_skb (unlinked_skb); }else {struct sk_buff *unlinked_skb =NULL ;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
---8<---
I gotta ask, is there a reason for unlinking an already consumed ('consumed' as in '
unix_skb_len(skb)== 0') skb so late, inmanage_oob()? IOW, can't it be unlinked immediately once it's consumed inunix_stream_recv_urg()? I suppose that would simplify things.
I also thought that before, but we can't do that.
Even after reading OOB data, we need to remember the position and break recv() at that point. That's why the skb is unlinked in manage_oob() rather than unix_stream_recv_urg().
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
Quoted 7 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2024 00:43:27 +0200Quoted 4 lines
I gotta ask, is there a reason for unlinking an already consumed ('consumed' as in '
unix_skb_len(skb)== 0') skb so late, inmanage_oob()? IOW, can't it be unlinked immediately once it's consumed inunix_stream_recv_urg()? I suppose that would simplify things.
Quoted 5 lines
I also thought that before, but we can't do that.
Even after reading OOB data, we need to remember the position and break
recv()at that point. That's why the skb is unlinked inmanage_oob()rather thanunix_stream_recv_urg().
Ahh, I see. Thanks for explaining.
One more thing about unix sockmap. AF_UNIX SOCK_DGRAM supports 0-length packets. But sockmap doesn't handle that; once a 0-length skb/msg is in the psock queue, unix_bpf_recvmsg() starts throwing -EFAULT. Sockmap'ed AF_INET SOCK_DGRAM does the same, so is this a bug or a feature?
Re: [PATCH v2 net 01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2024 12:48:27 +0200
Quoted 14 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 7 lines
From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2024 00:43:27 +0200Quoted 4 lines
I gotta ask, is there a reason for unlinking an already consumed ('consumed' as in '
unix_skb_len(skb)== 0') skb so late, inmanage_oob()? IOW, can't it be unlinked immediately once it's consumed inunix_stream_recv_urg()? I suppose that would simplify things.Quoted 5 lines
I also thought that before, but we can't do that.
Even after reading OOB data, we need to remember the position and break
recv()at that point. That's why the skb is unlinked inmanage_oob()rather thanunix_stream_recv_urg().
Quoted 6 lines
Ahh, I see. Thanks for explaining.
One more thing about unix sockmap.
AF_UNIXSOCK_DGRAMsupports 0-length packets. But sockmap doesn't handle that; once a 0-length skb/msg is in the psock queue,unix_bpf_recvmsg()starts throwing-EFAULT. Sockmap'edAF_INETSOCK_DGRAMdoes the same, so is this a bug or a feature?
I guess it's kind of safeguard.
The retval 0 has special meaning for SOCK_STREAM as EOF/shutdown(). If we bypass 0-byte dgram to SOCK_STREAM sk, the application will be confused as if the original peer has disconnected.
At least, -EFAULT avoids such confusion so that can only the true peer trigger 0-byte via the saved ->recvmsg().
So, the requirement would be similar to scm handling, we need to recognize the sockmap verdict and destination to support full features.
PATCH v2 2/15 af_unix: Annodate data-races around sk->sk_state for writers.
In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashimask->sk_state is changed under unix_state_lock(), but it's read locklessly in many places.
This patch adds WRITE_ONCE() on the writer side.
We will add READ_ONCE() to the lockless readers in the following patches.
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +8 -6
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion) u->path.dentry =NULL ; u->path.mnt =NULL ; state = sk->sk_state; - sk->sk_state =TCP_CLOSE ; +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_CLOSE ); skpair =unix_peer (sk);unix_peer (sk) =NULL ;
@@ -738,7 +738,8 @@ static int unix_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)if (backlog > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)wake_up_interruptible_all (&u->peer_wait); sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog; - sk->sk_state =TCP_LISTEN ; +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_LISTEN ); +/* set credentials so connect can copy them */ init_peercred (sk); err =0 ;
@@ -1401,7 +1402,8 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,if (err) goto out_unlock; - sk->sk_state = other->sk_state =TCP_ESTABLISHED ; +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_ESTABLISHED ); +WRITE_ONCE (other->sk_state,TCP_ESTABLISHED ); }else {/* * 1003.1g breaking connected state with AF_UNSPEC
@@ -1418,7 +1420,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,unix_peer (sk) = other;if (!other) - sk->sk_state =TCP_CLOSE ; +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_CLOSE );unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup (sk, old_peer);unix_state_double_unlock (sk, other);
@@ -1639,7 +1641,7 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,copy_peercred (sk, other); sock->state =SS_CONNECTED ; - sk->sk_state =TCP_ESTABLISHED ; +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_ESTABLISHED );sock_hold (newsk);smp_mb__after_atomic ();/* sock_hold() does an atomic_inc() */
@@ -2050,7 +2052,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,unix_peer (sk) =NULL ;unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup (sk, other); - sk->sk_state =TCP_CLOSE ; +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_state,TCP_CLOSE );unix_state_unlock (sk);unix_dgram_disconnected (sk, other);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 3/15 af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_inq_len().
In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashimaioctl(SIOCINQ) calls unix_inq_len() that checks sk->sk_state first and returns -EINVAL if it's TCP_LISTEN.
Then, for SOCK_STREAM sockets, unix_inq_len() returns the number of bytes in recvq.
However, unix_inq_len() does not hold unix_state_lock(), and the concurrent listen() might change the state after checking sk->sk_state.
If the race occurs, 0 is returned for the listener, instead of -EINVAL, because the length of skb with embryo is 0.
We could hold unix_state_lock() in unix_inq_len(), but it's overkill given the result is true for pre-listen() TCP_CLOSE state.
So, let's use READ_ONCE() for sk->sk_state in unix_inq_len().
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -1
@@ -3017,7 +3017,7 @@ long unix_inq_len(struct sock *sk)struct sk_buff *skb;long amount =0 ; -if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_LISTEN ) +if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) ==TCP_LISTEN )return -EINVAL ;spin_lock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 4/15 af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in unix_write_space() and poll().
In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashimaunix_poll() and unix_dgram_poll() read sk->sk_state locklessly and calls unix_writable() which also reads sk->sk_state without holding unix_state_lock().
Let's use READ_ONCE() in unix_poll() and unix_dgram_poll() and pass it to unix_writable().
While at it, we remove TCP_SYN_SENT check in unix_dgram_poll() as that state does not exist for AF_UNIX socket since the code was added.
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 25 ++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +12 -13
@@ -530,9 +530,9 @@ static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)return 0 ; } -static int unix_writable (const struct sock *sk) +static int unix_writable (const struct sock *sk,unsigned char state) { -return sk->sk_state !=TCP_LISTEN && +return state !=TCP_LISTEN && (refcount_read (&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <<2 ) <= sk->sk_sndbuf; }
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static void unix_write_space(struct sock *sk)struct socket_wq *wq;rcu_read_lock (); -if (unix_writable (sk)) { +if (unix_writable (sk,READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state))) { wq =rcu_dereference (sk->sk_wq);if (skwq_has_sleeper (wq)) wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&wq->wait,
@@ -3129,12 +3129,14 @@ static int unix_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned lonstatic __poll_t unix_poll (struct file *file,struct socket *sock,poll_table *wait) {struct sock *sk = sock->sk; +unsigned char state;__poll_t mask;u8 shutdown;sock_poll_wait (file, sock, wait); mask =0 ; shutdown =READ_ONCE (sk->sk_shutdown); + state =READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state);/* exceptional events? */ if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_err))
@@ -3156,14 +3158,14 @@ static __poll_t unix_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wa/* Connection-based need to check for termination and startup */ if ((sk->sk_type ==SOCK_STREAM || sk->sk_type ==SOCK_SEQPACKET ) && - sk->sk_state ==TCP_CLOSE ) + state ==TCP_CLOSE ) mask |=EPOLLHUP ;/* * we set writable also when the other side has shut down the * connection. This prevents stuck sockets. */ -if (unix_writable (sk)) +if (unix_writable (sk, state)) mask |=EPOLLOUT |EPOLLWRNORM |EPOLLWRBAND ;return mask;
@@ -3174,12 +3176,14 @@ static __poll_t unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, {struct sock *sk = sock->sk, *other;unsigned int writable; +unsigned char state;__poll_t mask;u8 shutdown;sock_poll_wait (file, sock, wait); mask =0 ; shutdown =READ_ONCE (sk->sk_shutdown); + state =READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state);/* exceptional events? */ if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err) ||
@@ -3199,19 +3203,14 @@ static __poll_t unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, mask |=EPOLLIN |EPOLLRDNORM ;/* Connection-based need to check for termination and startup */ -if (sk->sk_type ==SOCK_SEQPACKET ) { -if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_CLOSE ) - mask |=EPOLLHUP ; -/* connection hasn't started yet? */ -if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_SYN_SENT ) -return mask; - } +if (sk->sk_type ==SOCK_SEQPACKET && state ==TCP_CLOSE ) + mask |=EPOLLHUP ;/* No write status requested, avoid expensive OUT tests. */ if (!(poll_requested_events (wait) & (EPOLLWRBAND |EPOLLWRNORM |EPOLLOUT )))return mask; - writable =unix_writable (sk); + writable =unix_writable (sk, state);if (writable) {unix_state_lock (sk);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 5/15 af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_stream_connect().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaAs small optimisation, unix_stream_connect() prefetches the client's sk->sk_state without unix_state_lock() and checks if it's TCP_CLOSE.
Later, sk->sk_state is checked again under unix_state_lock().
Let's use READ_ONCE() for the first check and TCP_CLOSE directly for the second check.
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +2 -5
@@ -1481,7 +1481,6 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,struct sk_buff *skb =NULL ;long timeo;int err; -int st; err =unix_validate_addr (sunaddr, addr_len);if (err)
@@ -1571,9 +1570,7 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,Well, and we have to recheck the state after socket locked. */ - st = sk->sk_state; - -switch (st) { +switch (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state)) {case TCP_CLOSE :/* This is ok... continue with connect */ break ;
@@ -1588,7 +1585,7 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,unix_state_lock_nested (sk,U_LOCK_SECOND ); -if (sk->sk_state != st) { +if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_CLOSE ) {unix_state_unlock (sk);unix_state_unlock (other);sock_put (other);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 6/15 af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_accept().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaOnce sk->sk_state is changed to TCP_LISTEN, it never changes.
unix_accept() takes the advantage and reads sk->sk_state without holding unix_state_lock().
Let's use READ_ONCE() there.
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -1
@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ static int unix_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, goto out; arg->err = -EINVAL ; -if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_LISTEN ) +if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) !=TCP_LISTEN ) goto out;/* If socket state is TCP_LISTEN it cannot change (for now...),
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 7/15 af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in sendmsg() and recvmsg().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaThe following functions read sk->sk_state locklessly and proceed only if the state is TCP_ESTABLISHED.
* unix_stream_sendmsg
* unix_stream_read_generic
* unix_seqpacket_sendmsg
* unix_seqpacket_recvmsg
Let's use READ_ONCE() there.
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +4 -4
@@ -2226,7 +2226,7 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, }if (msg->msg_namelen) { - err = sk->sk_state ==TCP_ESTABLISHED ? -EISCONN : -EOPNOTSUPP ; + err =READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) ==TCP_ESTABLISHED ? -EISCONN : -EOPNOTSUPP ; goto out_err; }else { err = -ENOTCONN ;
@@ -2340,7 +2340,7 @@ static int unix_seqpacket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,if (err)return err; -if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED ) +if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )return -ENOTCONN ;if (msg->msg_namelen)
@@ -2354,7 +2354,7 @@ static int unix_seqpacket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, {struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED ) +if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )return -ENOTCONN ;return unix_dgram_recvmsg (sock, msg, size, flags);
@@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state,size_t size = state->size;unsigned int last_len; -if (unlikely (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )) { +if (unlikely (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )) { err = -EINVAL ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 8/15 af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_stream_read_skb().
In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashimaunix_stream_read_skb() is called from sk->sk_data_ready() context where unix_state_lock() is not held.
Let's use READ_ONCE() there.
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -1
@@ -2659,7 +2659,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *manage_oob(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,static int unix_stream_read_skb (struct sock *sk,skb_read_actor_t recv_actor) { -if (unlikely (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )) +if (unlikely (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) !=TCP_ESTABLISHED ))return -ENOTCONN ;return unix_read_skb (sk, recv_actor);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 9/15 af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in UNIX_DIAG.
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaWhile dumping AF_UNIX sockets via UNIX_DIAG, sk->sk_state is read locklessly.
Let's use READ_ONCE() there.
Note that the result could be inconsistent if the socket is dumped during the state change. This is common for other SOCK_DIAG and similar interfaces.
--- net/unix/diag.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/unix/diag.c +4 -4
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int sk_diag_dump_icons(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *nlskb)u32 *buf;int i; -if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_LISTEN ) { +if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) ==TCP_LISTEN ) {spin_lock (&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); attr = nla_reserve(nlskb, UNIX_DIAG_ICONS,
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int sk_diag_show_rqlen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *nlskb) {struct unix_diag_rqlen rql; -if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_LISTEN ) { +if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) ==TCP_LISTEN ) { rql.udiag_rqueue = sk->sk_receive_queue.qlen; rql.udiag_wqueue = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog; }else {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct unix_diag_r rep =nlmsg_data (nlh); rep->udiag_family =AF_UNIX ; rep->udiag_type = sk->sk_type; - rep->udiag_state = sk->sk_state; + rep->udiag_state =READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state); rep->pad =0 ; rep->udiag_ino = sk_ino;sock_diag_save_cookie (sk, rep->udiag_cookie);
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int unix_diag_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)sk_for_each (sk, &net->unx.table.buckets[slot]) {if (num < s_num) goto next; -if (!(req->udiag_states & (1 << sk->sk_state))) +if (!(req->udiag_states & (1 <<READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state)))) goto next; if (sk_diag_dump(sk, skb, req, sk_user_ns(skb->sk), NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 10/15 af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_sndbuf.
In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashimask_setsockopt() changes sk->sk_sndbuf under lock_sock(), but it's not used in af_unix.c.
Let's use READ_ONCE() to read sk->sk_sndbuf in unix_writable(), unix_dgram_sendmsg(), and unix_stream_sendmsg().
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +3 -3
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)static int unix_writable (const struct sock *sk,unsigned char state) {return state !=TCP_LISTEN && - (refcount_read (&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <<2 ) <= sk->sk_sndbuf; + (refcount_read (&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <<2 ) <=READ_ONCE (sk->sk_sndbuf); }static void unix_write_space (struct sock *sk)
@@ -1967,7 +1967,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } err = -EMSGSIZE ; -if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf -32 ) +if (len >READ_ONCE (sk->sk_sndbuf) -32 ) goto out;if (len >SKB_MAX_ALLOC ) {
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, &err, 0); }else {/* Keep two messages in the pipe so it schedules better */ - size =min_t (int, size, (sk->sk_sndbuf >>1 ) -64 ); + size =min_t (int, size, (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_sndbuf) >>1 ) -64 );/* allow fallback to order-0 allocations */ size =min_t (int, size,SKB_MAX_HEAD (0 ) +UNIX_SKB_FRAGS_SZ );
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 11/15 af_unix: Annotate data-race of net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen.
In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashimanet->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen is exposed as a sysctl knob and can be changed concurrently.
Let's use READ_ONCE() in unix_create1().
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -1
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern, sk->sk_hash =unix_unbound_hash (sk); sk->sk_allocation =GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ; sk->sk_write_space = unix_write_space; - sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen; + sk->sk_max_ack_backlog =READ_ONCE (net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen); sk->sk_destruct = unix_sock_destructor; u =unix_sk (sk); u->listener =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 12/15 af_unix: Use unix_recvq_full_lockless() in unix_stream_connect().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaOnce sk->sk_state is changed to TCP_LISTEN, it never changes.
unix_accept() takes advantage of this characteristics; it does not hold the listener's unix_state_lock() and only acquires recvq lock to pop one skb.
It means unix_state_lock() does not prevent the queue length from changing in unix_stream_connect().
Thus, we need to use unix_recvq_full_lockless() to avoid data-race.
Now we remove unix_recvq_full() as no one uses it.
Note that we can remove READ_ONCE() for sk->sk_max_ack_backlog in unix_recvq_full_lockless() because of the following reasons:
(1) For SOCK_DGRAM, it is a written-once field in unix_create1()
(2) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET, it is changed under the listener's unix_state_lock() in unix_listen(), and we hold the lock in unix_stream_connect()
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +2 -8
@@ -221,15 +221,9 @@ static inline int unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk)return unix_peer (osk) ==NULL ||unix_our_peer (sk, osk); } -static inline int unix_recvq_full (const struct sock *sk) -{ -return skb_queue_len (&sk->sk_receive_queue) > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog; -} -static inline int unix_recvq_full_lockless (const struct sock *sk) { -return skb_queue_len_lockless (&sk->sk_receive_queue) > -READ_ONCE (sk->sk_max_ack_backlog); +return skb_queue_len_lockless (&sk->sk_receive_queue) > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog; }struct sock *unix_peer_get (struct sock *s)
@@ -1545,7 +1539,7 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,if (other->sk_shutdown &RCV_SHUTDOWN ) goto out_unlock; -if (unix_recvq_full (other)) { +if (unix_recvq_full_lockless (other)) { err = -EAGAIN ;if (!timeo) goto out_unlock;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 13/15 af_unix: Use skb_queue_empty_lockless() in unix_release_sock().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaIf the socket type is SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_SEQPACKET, unix_release_sock() checks the length of the peer socket's recvq under unix_state_lock().
However, unix_stream_read_generic() calls skb_unlink() after releasing the lock. Also, for SOCK_SEQPACKET, __skb_try_recv_datagram() unlinks skb without unix_state_lock().
Thues, unix_state_lock() does not protect qlen.
Let's use skb_queue_empty_lockless() in unix_release_sock().
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -1
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)unix_state_lock (skpair);/* No more writes */ WRITE_ONCE (skpair->sk_shutdown,SHUTDOWN_MASK ); -if (!skb_queue_empty (&sk->sk_receive_queue) || embrion) +if (!skb_queue_empty_lockless (&sk->sk_receive_queue) || embrion)WRITE_ONCE (skpair->sk_err,ECONNRESET );unix_state_unlock (skpair); skpair->sk_state_change (skpair);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 14/15 af_unix: Use skb_queue_len_lockless() in sk_diag_show_rqlen().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaWe can dump the socket queue length via UNIX_DIAG by specifying UDIAG_SHOW_RQLEN.
If sk->sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, we return the recv queue length, but here we do not hold recvq lock.
Let's use skb_queue_len_lockless() in sk_diag_show_rqlen().
--- net/unix/diag.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/diag.c +1 -1
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int sk_diag_show_rqlen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *nlskb)struct unix_diag_rqlen rql;if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_state) ==TCP_LISTEN ) { - rql.udiag_rqueue = sk->sk_receive_queue.qlen; + rql.udiag_rqueue =skb_queue_len_lockless (&sk->sk_receive_queue); rql.udiag_wqueue = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog; }else { rql.udiag_rqueue = (u32 )unix_inq_len (sk);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 15/15 af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_shutdown in sk_diag_fill().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaWhile dumping sockets via UNIX_DIAG, we do not hold unix_state_lock().
Let's use READ_ONCE() to read sk->sk_shutdown.
--- net/unix/diag.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/unix/diag.c +1 -1
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct unix_diag_r sock_diag_put_meminfo(sk, skb, UNIX_DIAG_MEMINFO)) goto out_nlmsg_trim; -if (nla_put_u8 (skb,UNIX_DIAG_SHUTDOWN , sk->sk_shutdown)) +if (nla_put_u8 (skb,UNIX_DIAG_SHUTDOWN ,READ_ONCE (sk->sk_shutdown))) goto out_nlmsg_trim; if ((req->udiag_show & UDIAG_SHOW_UID) &&
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Quoted 6 lines · On Tue, 4 Jun 2024 09:52:26 -0700 you wrote:
The patch 1 fixes a bug where SOCK_DGRAM's
sk->sk_stateis changed toTCP_CLOSEeven if the socket is connect()ed to another socket.The rest of this series annotates lockless accesses to the following fields.
Quoted 7 lines
*
sk->sk_state
*sk->sk_sndbuf
*net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen
*sk->sk_receive_queue.qlen
*sk->sk_shutdown[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v2,net,01/15] af_unix: Set sk->sk_state under unix_state_lock() for truly disconencted peer.
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/26bfb8b57063 - [v2,net,02/15] af_unix: Annodate data-races around sk->sk_state for writers. https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/942238f9735a - [v2,net,03/15] af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_inq_len(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/3a0f38eb285c - [v2,net,04/15] af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in unix_write_space() and poll(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/eb0718fb3e97 - [v2,net,05/15] af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_stream_connect(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/a9bf9c7dc6a5 - [v2,net,06/15] af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_accept(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/1b536948e805 - [v2,net,07/15] af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in sendmsg() and recvmsg(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/8a34d4e8d974 - [v2,net,08/15] af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_state in unix_stream_read_skb(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/af4c733b6b1a - [v2,net,09/15] af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_state in UNIX_DIAG. https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/0aa3be7b3e1f - [v2,net,10/15] af_unix: Annotate data-races around sk->sk_sndbuf. https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/b0632e53e0da - [v2,net,11/15] af_unix: Annotate data-race of net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen. https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/bd9f2d05731f - [v2,net,12/15] af_unix: Use unix_recvq_full_lockless() in unix_stream_connect(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/45d872f0e655 - [v2,net,13/15] af_unix: Use skb_queue_empty_lockless() in unix_release_sock(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/83690b82d228 - [v2,net,14/15] af_unix: Use skb_queue_len_lockless() in sk_diag_show_rqlen(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/5d915e584d84 - [v2,net,15/15] af_unix: Annotate data-race of sk->sk_shutdown in sk_diag_fill(). https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/efaf24e30ec3
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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