ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section
Subsystems (8)
Mimi Zohar
maintainerPATCH 1/1 ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section
From: GUO Zihua <[email protected]>
A panic happens in ima_match_policy:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
path_openat+0x571/0x1720
do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xcaCommit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.
Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen.
The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
| Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
| | entry->action |
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.
To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.
---
Backport notes:
- Restore default return value parameter to call_int_hook() in security_audit_rule_init() in lieu of backporting commit 260017f31a8c ("lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()").
- Applies to linux-6.8.y -> linux-6.4.y
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++-- security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 +++--- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------ security/security.c | 6 ++++-- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 +++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- 11 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1 -1
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **buffer)#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)LSM_HOOK (void,LSM_RET_VOID , audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -1988,7 +1988,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule, +gfp_t gfp);int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule);int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void *lsmrule);void security_audit_rule_free (void *lsmrule);
@@ -1996,7 +1997,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);#else static inline int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr, -void **lsmrule) +void **lsmrule,gfp_t gfp) {return 0 ; }
kernel/auditfilter.c +3 -2
@@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f_val; f->lsm_str = str; err =security_audit_rule_init (f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, +GFP_KERNEL );/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL ) {
@@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret =security_audit_rule_init (df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule,GFP_KERNEL );/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL ) {
security/apparmor/audit.c +3 -3
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule,gfp_t gfp) {struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
@@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)return -EINVAL ; } - rule =kzalloc (sizeof (struct aa_audit_rule ),GFP_KERNEL ); + rule =kzalloc (sizeof (struct aa_audit_rule ), gfp);if (!rule)return -ENOMEM ;/* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label =aa_label_parse (&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, -GFP_KERNEL , true, false); + gfp, true, false);if (IS_ERR (rule->label)) {int err =PTR_ERR (rule->label);aa_audit_rule_free (rule);
security/apparmor/include/audit.h +1 -1
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) }void aa_audit_rule_free (void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule,gfp_t gfp);int aa_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *rule);int aa_audit_rule_match (u32 sid,u32 field,u32 op,void *vrule);
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -1
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)#else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr, -void **lsmrule) +void **lsmrule,gfp_t gfp) {return -EINVAL ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +9 -6
@@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)kfree (entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule (struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule (struct ima_rule_entry *entry, +gfp_t gfp) {struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;int i;
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)* Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry =kmemdup (entry,sizeof (*nentry),GFP_KERNEL ); + nentry =kmemdup (entry,sizeof (*nentry), gfp);if (!nentry)return NULL ;
@@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)ima_filter_rule_init (nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp);if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)int i;struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry =ima_lsm_copy_rule (entry); + nentry =ima_lsm_copy_rule (entry,GFP_KERNEL );if (!nentry)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, }if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule =ima_lsm_copy_rule (rule); + lsm_rule =ima_lsm_copy_rule (rule,GFP_ATOMIC );if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry;
@@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result =ima_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, +GFP_KERNEL );if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
security/security.c +4 -2
@@ -5350,15 +5350,17 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)* @op: rule operator * @rulestr: rule context * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct +* @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of * an invalid rule. */ -int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule, +gfp_t gfp) { -return call_int_hook (audit_rule_init,0 , field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); +return call_int_hook (audit_rule_init,0 , field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); }/**
security/selinux/include/audit.h +3 -1
@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@* @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this +* @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **rule, +gfp_t gfp);/** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
security/selinux/ss/services.c +3 -2
@@ -3508,7 +3508,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule, +gfp_t gfp) {struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;struct selinux_policy *policy;
@@ -3549,7 +3550,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)return -EINVAL ; } - tmprule =kzalloc (sizeof (struct selinux_audit_rule ),GFP_KERNEL ); + tmprule =kzalloc (sizeof (struct selinux_audit_rule ), gfp);if (!tmprule)return -ENOMEM ;context_init (&tmprule->au_ctxt);
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -1
@@ -4690,11 +4690,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,* @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) * @rulestr: smack label to be audited * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation +* @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule, +gfp_t gfp) {struct smack_known *skp;char **rule = (char **)vrule;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 85 lines · Mimi Zohar
From: GUO Zihua <[email protected]>
A panic happens in
ima_match_policy:BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xcaCommit
c7423dbdbc9e("ima: Handle-ESTALEreturned byima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call toima_lsm_copy_rulewithin a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc withGFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu()returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen.The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
| Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next|==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
| |entry->action|
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use
GFP_ATOMIC.Fixes c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")Signed-off-by GUO Zihua <[email protected]>Acked-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>(cherry picked from commit 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34)Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
---
Backport notes:
- Restore default return value parameter tocall_int_hook()insecurity_audit_rule_init()in lieu of backporting commit260017f31a8c("lsm: use default hook return value incall_int_hook()").
- Applies to linux-6.8.y -> linux-6.4.y
Now applied to 6.6.y, thanks.
greg k-h