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bpf: Add bpf_copy_from_user_str kfunc

PATCH Superseded Jordan Rome 3 participants 9 messages Aug 13, 2024

Subsystems (3)

v3 of 10 Superseded Latest is v10 →

lore
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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 bpf: Add bpf_copy_from_user_str kfunc

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +36 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
 	bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+	int ret;
+	int count;
+
+	if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+		return 0;
+
+	count = dst__szk - 1;
+	if (unlikely(!count)) {
+		((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+	if (ret >= 0) {
+		if (ret == count)
+			((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+		ret++;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
 
 BTF_KFUNCS_START(generic_btf_ids)
@@ -3024,6 +3059,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_preempt_enable)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_bits_new, KF_ITER_NEW)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_bits_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_bits_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_str, KF_SLEEPABLE)
 BTF_KFUNCS_END(common_btf_ids)
 
 static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set common_kfunc_set = {

--
2.43.5

#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 bpf: Add tests for bpf_copy_from_user_str kfunc

This adds tests for both the happy path and
the error path.

---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c   |  8 +++--
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/read_vsyscall.c  |  1 +
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/read_vsyscall.c       |  9 ++++-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_attach_probe.c   | 33 +++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c +5 -3
index 7175af39134f..329c7862b52d 100644
@@ -283,9 +283,11 @@ static void test_uprobe_sleepable(struct test_attach_probe *skel)
 	trigger_func3();
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uprobe_byname3_sleepable_res, 9, "check_uprobe_byname3_sleepable_res");
-	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uprobe_byname3_res, 10, "check_uprobe_byname3_res");
-	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uretprobe_byname3_sleepable_res, 11, "check_uretprobe_byname3_sleepable_res");
-	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uretprobe_byname3_res, 12, "check_uretprobe_byname3_res");
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res, 10, "check_uprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res");
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uprobe_byname3_res, 11, "check_uprobe_byname3_res");
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uretprobe_byname3_sleepable_res, 12, "check_uretprobe_byname3_sleepable_res");
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uretprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res, 13, "check_uretprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res");
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->uretprobe_byname3_res, 14, "check_uretprobe_byname3_res");
 }
 
 void test_attach_probe(void)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/read_vsyscall.c +1 -0
index 3405923fe4e6..c7b9ba8b1d06 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct read_ret_desc {
 	{ .name = "probe_read_user_str", .ret = -EFAULT },
 	{ .name = "copy_from_user", .ret = -EFAULT },
 	{ .name = "copy_from_user_task", .ret = -EFAULT },
+	{ .name = "copy_from_user_str", .ret = -EFAULT },
 };
 
 void test_read_vsyscall(void)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/read_vsyscall.c +8 -1
index 986f96687ae1..27de1e907754 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /* Copyright (C) 2024. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd */
+#include "vmlinux.h"
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
 
@@ -7,10 +8,15 @@
 
 int target_pid = 0;
 void *user_ptr = 0;
-int read_ret[8];
+int read_ret[9];
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
+/*
+ * This is the only kfunc, the others are helpers
+ */
+int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32, const void *) __weak __ksym;
+
 SEC("fentry/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_nanosleep")
 int do_probe_read(void *ctx)
 {
@@ -40,6 +46,7 @@ int do_copy_from_user(void *ctx)
 	read_ret[6] = bpf_copy_from_user(buf, sizeof(buf), user_ptr);
 	read_ret[7] = bpf_copy_from_user_task(buf, sizeof(buf), user_ptr,
 					      bpf_get_current_task_btf(), 0);
+	read_ret[8] = bpf_copy_from_user_str((char *)buf, sizeof(buf), user_ptr);
 
 	return 0;
 }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_attach_probe.c +30 -3
index 68466a6ad18c..bf59a5280776 100644
@@ -14,11 +14,15 @@ int uretprobe_byname_res = 0;
 int uprobe_byname2_res = 0;
 int uretprobe_byname2_res = 0;
 int uprobe_byname3_sleepable_res = 0;
+int uprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res = 0;
 int uprobe_byname3_res = 0;
 int uretprobe_byname3_sleepable_res = 0;
+int uretprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res = 0;
 int uretprobe_byname3_res = 0;
 void *user_ptr = 0;
 
+int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32, const void *) __weak __ksym;
+
 SEC("ksyscall/nanosleep")
 int BPF_KSYSCALL(handle_kprobe_auto, struct __kernel_timespec *req, struct __kernel_timespec *rem)
 {
@@ -87,11 +91,32 @@ static __always_inline bool verify_sleepable_user_copy(void)
 	return bpf_strncmp(data, sizeof(data), "test_data") == 0;
 }
 
+static __always_inline bool verify_sleepable_user_copy_str(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+	char data_long[20];
+	char data_short[4];
+
+	ret = bpf_copy_from_user_str(data_short, sizeof(data_short), user_ptr);
+
+	if (bpf_strncmp(data_short, 4, "tes\0") != 0 || ret != 4)
+		return false;
+
+	ret = bpf_copy_from_user_str(data_long, sizeof(data_long), user_ptr);
+
+	if (bpf_strncmp(data_long, 10, "test_data\0") != 0 || ret != 10)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 SEC("uprobe.s//proc/self/exe:trigger_func3")
 int handle_uprobe_byname3_sleepable(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 {
 	if (verify_sleepable_user_copy())
 		uprobe_byname3_sleepable_res = 9;
+	if (verify_sleepable_user_copy_str())
+		uprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res = 10;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -102,7 +127,7 @@ int handle_uprobe_byname3_sleepable(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 SEC("uprobe//proc/self/exe:trigger_func3")
 int handle_uprobe_byname3(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 {
-	uprobe_byname3_res = 10;
+	uprobe_byname3_res = 11;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -110,14 +135,16 @@ SEC("uretprobe.s//proc/self/exe:trigger_func3")
 int handle_uretprobe_byname3_sleepable(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 {
 	if (verify_sleepable_user_copy())
-		uretprobe_byname3_sleepable_res = 11;
+		uretprobe_byname3_sleepable_res = 12;
+	if (verify_sleepable_user_copy_str())
+		uretprobe_byname3_str_sleepable_res = 13;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 SEC("uretprobe//proc/self/exe:trigger_func3")
 int handle_uretprobe_byname3(struct pt_regs *ctx)
 {
-	uretprobe_byname3_res = 12;
+	uretprobe_byname3_res = 14;
 	return 0;
 }
 

--
2.43.5

#2 lore raw
In reply to Jordan Rome
Quoted 44 lines · Jordan Rome

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +24 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
        bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+       int ret;
+       int count;
+
+       if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+               return 0;
+
+       count = dst__szk - 1;
+       if (unlikely(!count)) {
+               ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+               return 1;
+       }

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it) · line 2975

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10 -0
+
+       ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               if (ret == count)
+                       ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+               ret++;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}

The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:

struct map_key {
char str[100];
};

struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, struct map_key);
} hash SEC(".maps");

struct map_key key;
bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);

The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized, but for short strings the key will have garbage.

bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.

pw-bot: cr

#3 lore raw
Quoted 71 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 44 lines · Jordan Rome

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +24 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
        bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+       int ret;
+       int count;
+
+       if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+               return 0;
+
+       count = dst__szk - 1;
+       if (unlikely(!count)) {
+               ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+               return 1;
+       }

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it) · line 2975

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10 -0
+
+       ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               if (ret == count)
+                       ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+               ret++;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}

The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:

struct map_key {
   char str[100];
};
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, struct map_key);
} hash SEC(".maps");

struct map_key key;
bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);

Quoted 7 lines

The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized, but for short strings the key will have garbage.

bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.

pw-bot: cr

You're saying we should always do a memset using dst__szk on success of copying the string?

#4 lore raw
Quoted 77 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 74 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 44 lines · Jordan Rome

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +24 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
        bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+       int ret;
+       int count;
+
+       if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+               return 0;
+
+       count = dst__szk - 1;
+       if (unlikely(!count)) {
+               ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+               return 1;
+       }

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it) · line 2975

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10 -0
+
+       ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               if (ret == count)
+                       ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+               ret++;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}

The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:

struct map_key {
   char str[100];
};
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, struct map_key);
} hash SEC(".maps");

struct map_key key;
bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);

The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized, but for short strings the key will have garbage.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.

pw-bot: cr

You're saying we should always do a memset using dst__szk on success of copying the string?

Something like this?

```
ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
  if (ret >= 0) {
    if (ret <= count)
       memset((char *)dst + ret, 0, dst__szk - ret);
    ret++;
}
```
#5 lore raw
Quoted 88 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 77 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 74 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 44 lines · Jordan Rome

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +24 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
        bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+       int ret;
+       int count;
+
+       if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+               return 0;
+
+       count = dst__szk - 1;
+       if (unlikely(!count)) {
+               ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+               return 1;
+       }

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it) · line 2975

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10 -0
+
+       ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               if (ret == count)
+                       ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+               ret++;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}

The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:

struct map_key {
   char str[100];
};
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, struct map_key);
} hash SEC(".maps");

struct map_key key;
bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);

The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized, but for short strings the key will have garbage.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.

pw-bot: cr

You're saying we should always do a memset using dst__szk on success of copying the string?

Something like this?

Quoted 8 lines
```
ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
  if (ret >= 0) {
    if (ret <= count)
       memset((char *)dst + ret, 0, dst__szk - ret);
    ret++;
}
```

yep. something like this. I didn't check the math.

#6 lore raw
Quoted 99 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 88 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 77 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 74 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 44 lines · Jordan Rome

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +24 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
        bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+       int ret;
+       int count;
+
+       if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+               return 0;
+
+       count = dst__szk - 1;
+       if (unlikely(!count)) {
+               ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+               return 1;
+       }

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it) · line 2975

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10 -0
+
+       ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               if (ret == count)
+                       ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+               ret++;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}

The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:

struct map_key {
   char str[100];
};
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, struct map_key);
} hash SEC(".maps");

struct map_key key;
bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);

The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized, but for short strings the key will have garbage.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.

pw-bot: cr

You're saying we should always do a memset using dst__szk on success of copying the string?

Something like this?

Quoted 8 lines
```
ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
  if (ret >= 0) {
    if (ret <= count)
       memset((char *)dst + ret, 0, dst__szk - ret);
    ret++;
}
```
Quoted 1 line

yep. something like this. I didn't check the math.

I'm a bit worried about this unconditional memset without having a way to disable it. In practice, lots of cases won't use the destination buffer as a map key, but rather just send it over ringbuf. So paying the price of zeroing out seems unnecessary.

It's quite often (I do that in retsnoop, for instance; and we have other cases in our production) that we have a pretty big buffer, but expect that most of the time strings will be much smaller. So we can have a 1K buffer, but get 20 bytes of string content (and we end up sending only actual useful size of data over ringbuf/perfbuf, so not even paying 1K memcpy() overhead). Paying for memset()'ing the entire 1K (and string reading can happen in a loop, so this memsetting will be happening over and over, unnecessarily), seems excessive.

Given it's pretty easy to do memset(0) using bpf_prober_read(dst, sz, NULL), maybe we shouldn't do memsetting unconditionally? We can add a loud comment stating the danger of using the resulting buffer as map key without clearing the unfilled part of the buffer and that should be sufficient?

#7 lore raw
Quoted 118 lines · Andrii Nakryiko
Quoted 99 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 88 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 77 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 74 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 44 lines · Jordan Rome

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +24 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
        bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+       int ret;
+       int count;
+
+       if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+               return 0;
+
+       count = dst__szk - 1;
+       if (unlikely(!count)) {
+               ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+               return 1;
+       }

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it) · line 2975

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10 -0
+
+       ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               if (ret == count)
+                       ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+               ret++;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}

The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:

struct map_key {
   char str[100];
};
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, struct map_key);
} hash SEC(".maps");

struct map_key key;
bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);

The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized, but for short strings the key will have garbage.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.

pw-bot: cr

You're saying we should always do a memset using dst__szk on success of copying the string?

Something like this?

Quoted 8 lines
```
ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
  if (ret >= 0) {
    if (ret <= count)
       memset((char *)dst + ret, 0, dst__szk - ret);
    ret++;
}
```
Quoted 1 line

yep. something like this. I didn't check the math.

I'm a bit worried about this unconditional memset without having a way to disable it. In practice, lots of cases won't use the destination buffer as a map key, but rather just send it over ringbuf. So paying the price of zeroing out seems unnecessary.

It's quite often (I do that in retsnoop, for instance; and we have other cases in our production) that we have a pretty big buffer, but expect that most of the time strings will be much smaller. So we can have a 1K buffer, but get 20 bytes of string content (and we end up sending only actual useful size of data over ringbuf/perfbuf, so not even paying 1K memcpy() overhead). Paying for memset()'ing the entire 1K (and string reading can happen in a loop, so this memsetting will be happening over and over, unnecessarily), seems excessive.

Quoted 5 lines

Given it's pretty easy to do memset(0) using bpf_prober_read(dst, sz, NULL), maybe we shouldn't do memsetting unconditionally? We can add a loud comment stating the danger of using the resulting buffer as map key without clearing the unfilled part of the buffer and that should be sufficient?

probe_read as memset is a quirk that folks learned to abuse. Let's add a flag to this bpf_copy_from_user_str() kfunc instead, so it behaves either like strscpy_pad or strscpy.

#8 lore raw
Quoted 127 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 118 lines · Andrii Nakryiko
Quoted 99 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 88 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 77 lines · Jordan Rome
Quoted 74 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 44 lines · Jordan Rome

This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user, which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.

This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str' helper.

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +24 -0
index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
@@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
        bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
 }
 
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
+ * @dst:             Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
+ *                   least @dst__szk bytes long.
+ * @dst__szk:        Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
+ *
+ * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
+ * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
+ * buffer size is 0.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
+{
+       int ret;
+       int count;
+
+       if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
+               return 0;
+
+       count = dst__szk - 1;
+       if (unlikely(!count)) {
+               ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
+               return 1;
+       }

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it) · line 2975

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10 -0
+
+       ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               if (ret == count)
+                       ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
+               ret++;
+       }
+
+       return ret;
+}

The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:

struct map_key {
   char str[100];
};
struct {
        __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
        __type(key, struct map_key);
} hash SEC(".maps");

struct map_key key;
bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);

The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized, but for short strings the key will have garbage.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.

pw-bot: cr

You're saying we should always do a memset using dst__szk on success of copying the string?

Something like this?

Quoted 8 lines
```
ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
  if (ret >= 0) {
    if (ret <= count)
       memset((char *)dst + ret, 0, dst__szk - ret);
    ret++;
}
```
Quoted 1 line

yep. something like this. I didn't check the math.

I'm a bit worried about this unconditional memset without having a way to disable it. In practice, lots of cases won't use the destination buffer as a map key, but rather just send it over ringbuf. So paying the price of zeroing out seems unnecessary.

It's quite often (I do that in retsnoop, for instance; and we have other cases in our production) that we have a pretty big buffer, but expect that most of the time strings will be much smaller. So we can have a 1K buffer, but get 20 bytes of string content (and we end up sending only actual useful size of data over ringbuf/perfbuf, so not even paying 1K memcpy() overhead). Paying for memset()'ing the entire 1K (and string reading can happen in a loop, so this memsetting will be happening over and over, unnecessarily), seems excessive.

Quoted 5 lines

Given it's pretty easy to do memset(0) using bpf_prober_read(dst, sz, NULL), maybe we shouldn't do memsetting unconditionally? We can add a loud comment stating the danger of using the resulting buffer as map key without clearing the unfilled part of the buffer and that should be sufficient?

Quoted 3 lines

probe_read as memset is a quirk that folks learned to abuse. Let's add a flag to this bpf_copy_from_user_str() kfunc instead, so it behaves either like strscpy_pad or strscpy.

agreed, a flag sounds good