xen: arm: Split MMU code in preparation for MPU work (part 2)
v4 cover xen: arm: Split MMU code in preparation for MPU work (part 2)
Hi,
In https://patchew.org/Xen/[email protected]/, Henry has reorganized some of the code between the MMU specific and generic files.
In this patch serie, we address the remaining code reorg so that MMU specific code is cleanly separated and we have added stubs wherever necessary to avoid introducing if-def.
Changes from :-
v1..v2 - mentioned in individual patches.
v3 - Reordered the patches so that first 3 can be committed (as they have been reviewed).
Ayan Kumar Halder (4):
xen: arm: Add a new helper update_boot_mapping()
xen: arm: Move domain_page.c to MMU specific
xen: arm: Enclose access to EL2 MMU specific registers under
CONFIG_MMU
xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
xen/arch/arm/Kconfig | 4 +++-
xen/arch/arm/Makefile | 1 -
xen/arch/arm/arm64/mmu/mm.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
xen/arch/arm/arm64/smpboot.c | 6 +++---
xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/mm.h | 9 +--------
xen/arch/arm/mmu/Makefile | 1 +
xen/arch/arm/{ => mmu}/domain_page.c | 0
xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 2 ++
xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 10 ++++++++++
xen/arch/ppc/Kconfig | 1 +
xen/arch/riscv/Kconfig | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
xen/common/Kconfig | 3 +++
xen/common/Makefile | 2 +-
xen/common/vmap.c | 2 --
xen/include/xen/vmap.h | 2 ++
16 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
rename xen/arch/arm/{ => mmu}/domain_page.c (100%)Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 1/4 xen: arm: Add a new helper update_boot_mapping()
update_boot_mapping() invokes update_identity_mapping() for the MMU specific code.
Later when the MPU code is added, update_boot_mapping() will invoke the equivalent.
The common code now invokes update_boot_mapping() instead of update_identity_mapping(). So, that there is clear abstraction between the common and MMU/MPU specific logic.
This is in continuation to commitf661a20aa880: "Extract MMU-specific MM code".
update_identity_mapping() is now marked as static as it is called from xen/arch/arm/arm64/mmu/mm.c only. Also, amend the prototype to update_boot_mapping() which is now invoked from other files.
---
Changes from :-
v1 - 1. Introduced update_boot_mapping() which invokes update_identity_mapping() in MMU specific code.
v2 - 1. Make update_identity_mapping() static and update the prototype.
v3 - 1. The comment for "update_identity_mapping()" is moved to the correct place.
2. Added R-b.
xen/arch/arm/arm64/mmu/mm.c | 14 +++++++++++++- xen/arch/arm/arm64/smpboot.c | 6 +++--- xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/mm.h | 9 +-------- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
xen/arch/arm/arm64/mmu/mm.c +13 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,14 @@ void __init arch_setup_page_tables(void)prepare_runtime_identity_mapping (); } -void update_identity_mapping (bool enable) +/* +* Enable/disable the identity mapping in the live page-tables (i.e. +* the one pointed by TTBR_EL2). +* +* Note that nested call (e.g. enable=true, enable=true) is not +* supported. +*/ +static void update_identity_mapping (bool enable) {paddr_t id_addr =virt_to_maddr (_start);int rc;
@@ -125,6 +132,11 @@ void update_identity_mapping(bool enable)BUG_ON (rc); } +void update_boot_mapping (bool enable) +{ +update_identity_mapping (enable); +} +extern void switch_ttbr_id (uint64_t ttbr);typedef void (switch_ttbr_fn )(uint64_t ttbr);
xen/arch/arm/arm64/smpboot.c +3 -3
@@ -112,18 +112,18 @@ int arch_cpu_up(int cpu)if ( !smp_enable_ops[cpu].prepare_cpu )return -ENODEV ; -update_identity_mapping (true); +update_boot_mapping (true); rc = smp_enable_ops[cpu].prepare_cpu (cpu);if ( rc ) -update_identity_mapping (false); +update_boot_mapping (false);return rc; }void arch_cpu_up_finish (void ) { -update_identity_mapping (false); +update_boot_mapping (false); }/*
xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/mm.h +1 -8
@@ -14,14 +14,7 @@ static inline bool arch_mfns_in_directmap(unsigned long mfn, unsigned long nr)void arch_setup_page_tables (void ); -/* -* Enable/disable the identity mapping in the live page-tables (i.e. -* the one pointed by TTBR_EL2). -* -* Note that nested call (e.g. enable=true, enable=true) is not -* supported. -*/ -void update_identity_mapping (bool enable); +void update_boot_mapping (bool enable);#endif /* __ARM_ARM64_MM_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 2/4 xen: arm: Move domain_page.c to MMU specific
In reply to Ayan Kumar Halderdomain_page.c is moved to mmu/domain_page.c. The reason being this file implements MMU specific logic for mapping, unmapping, etc domain page.
---
Changes from :-
v1 - Moved domain_page.c to mmu/domain_page.c.
v2 - Updated arm/Makefile.
v3 - 1. Used the same commit message as v2.
2. Added R-b.
xen/arch/arm/Makefile | 1 -
xen/arch/arm/mmu/Makefile | 1 +
xen/arch/arm/{ => mmu}/domain_page.c | 0
3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename xen/arch/arm/{ => mmu}/domain_page.c (100%)xen/arch/arm/Makefile +0 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IOREQ_SERVER) += dm.o obj-$(CONFIG_DOM0LESS_BOOT) += dom0less-build.init.o obj-y += domain.o obj-y += domain_build.init.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_MAP_DOMAIN_PAGE) += domain_page.o obj-y += domctl.o obj-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += early_printk.o obj-y += efi/
xen/arch/arm/mmu/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ obj-y += p2m.o obj-y += pt.o obj-y += setup.o obj-y += smpboot.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_MAP_DOMAIN_PAGE) += domain_page.o
xen/arch/arm/mmu/domain_page.c renamed from xen/arch/arm/domain_page.c +0 -0
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v4 3/4 xen: arm: Enclose access to EL2 MMU specific registers under CONFIG_MMU
In reply to Ayan Kumar HalderAll the EL2 MMU specific registers are enclosed within CONFIG_MMU. Also, protect vttbr_el2 field of struct reg_ctxt and accesses to it.
---
Changes from :
v1 -
1. 'vttbr_el2' field is enclosed with ifdef.
2. No movement of code.
v2 -
1. Enclosed 'vttbr_el2' access in show_registers() and vcpu_show_registers().
v3 -
1. Updated the commit message.
2. Added R-b.
xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
xen/arch/arm/traps.c +10 -0
@@ -720,8 +720,10 @@ struct reg_ctxt {uint32_t ifsr32_el2;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU /* Hypervisor-side state */ uint64_t vttbr_el2; +#endif };static const char *mode_string (register_t cpsr)
@@ -919,12 +921,16 @@ static void _show_registers(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs,#endif }printk (" VTCR_EL2: %" PRIregister"\n" ,READ_SYSREG (VTCR_EL2 )); +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU printk (" VTTBR_EL2: %016" PRIx64"\n" , ctxt->vttbr_el2); +#endif printk ("\n" );printk (" SCTLR_EL2: %" PRIregister"\n" ,READ_SYSREG (SCTLR_EL2 ));printk (" HCR_EL2: %" PRIregister"\n" ,READ_SYSREG (HCR_EL2 )); +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU printk (" TTBR0_EL2: %016" PRIx64"\n" ,READ_SYSREG64 (TTBR0_EL2 )); +#endif printk ("\n" );printk (" ESR_EL2: %" PRIregister"\n" , regs->hsr);printk (" HPFAR_EL2: %" PRIregister"\n" ,READ_SYSREG (HPFAR_EL2 ));
@@ -956,7 +962,9 @@ void show_registers(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)if (guest_mode (regs) &&is_32bit_domain (current->domain) ) ctxt.ifsr32_el2 =READ_SYSREG (IFSR32_EL2 );#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU ctxt.vttbr_el2 =READ_SYSREG64 (VTTBR_EL2 ); +#endif _show_registers (regs, &ctxt,guest_mode (regs), current); }
@@ -979,7 +987,9 @@ void vcpu_show_registers(const struct vcpu *v) ctxt.ifsr32_el2 = v->arch.ifsr;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU ctxt.vttbr_el2 = v->domain->arch.p2m.vttbr; +#endif _show_registers (&v->arch.cpu_info->guest_cpu_user_regs, &ctxt,1 , v); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/1 xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
In reply to Ayan Kumar HalderFrom: Penny Zheng <[email protected]>
Introduce CONFIG_VMAP which is selected by the architectures that use MMU. vm_init() does not do anything if CONFIG_VMAP is not enabled.
VMAP is widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual address translation, we choose to fold VMAP in MMU system.
In this patch, we introduce a new Kconfig CONFIG_HAS_VMAP, and make it only support in MMU system on ARM architecture. And ALTERNATIVE now depends on VMAP.
HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is now gated on MMU as speculative
attacks are not possible on non MMU based systems (ie Cortex-R52, R82).
See https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability.
Also took the opportunity to remove "#ifdef VMAP_VIRT_START .. endif" from vmap.c. Instead vmap.c is compiled when HAS_VMAP is enabled. Thus, HAS_VMAP is now enabled from x86, ppc and riscv architectures as all of them use MMU and has VMAP_VIRT_START defined.
---
Changes from :-
v1 - 1. HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is now gated on HAS_VMAP.
2. cpuerrata.c is not gated on HAS_VMAP.
v2 - 1. Introduced CONFIG_VMAP in common/Kconfig.
2. Architectures using MMU select this config.
3. vm_init() now uses CONFIG_VMAP.
v3 - 1. HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is now gated on MMU.
2. vmap.c is compiled when CONFIG_HAS_VMAP is enabled.
3. HAS_VMAP is enabled from x86, ppc and riscv architectures.
xen/arch/arm/Kconfig | 4 +++- xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 2 ++ xen/arch/ppc/Kconfig | 1 + xen/arch/riscv/Kconfig | 1 + xen/arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + xen/common/Kconfig | 3 +++ xen/common/Makefile | 2 +- xen/common/vmap.c | 2 -- xen/include/xen/vmap.h | 2 ++ 9 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
xen/arch/arm/Kconfig +3 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ config ARM_64 config ARM def_bool y select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B - select HAS_ALTERNATIVE + select HAS_ALTERNATIVE if HAS_VMAP select HAS_DEVICE_TREE select HAS_PASSTHROUGH select HAS_UBSAN
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ config PADDR_BITS config MMU def_bool y select HAS_PMAP + select HAS_VMAP source "arch/Kconfig"
@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ config ARM_SSBD config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT + depends on MMU default y help Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +2 -0
@@ -447,7 +447,9 @@ void asmlinkage __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,* It needs to be called after do_initcalls to be able to use * stop_machine (tasklets initialized via an initcall). */ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_ALTERNATIVE apply_alternatives_all (); +#endif enable_errata_workarounds ();enable_cpu_features ();
xen/arch/ppc/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ config PPC def_bool y select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B select HAS_DEVICE_TREE + select HAS_VMAP config PPC64 def_bool y
xen/arch/riscv/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config RISCV select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B select GENERIC_BUG_FRAME select HAS_DEVICE_TREE + select HAS_VMAP config RISCV_64 def_bool y
xen/arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ config X86 select HAS_PIRQ select HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY select HAS_UBSAN + select HAS_VMAP select HAS_VPCI if HVM select NEEDS_LIBELF
xen/common/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ config HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY config HAS_UBSAN bool +config HAS_VMAP + bool + config MEM_ACCESS_ALWAYS_ON bool
xen/common/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEBUFFER) += trace.o obj-y += version.o obj-y += virtual_region.o obj-y += vm_event.o -obj-y += vmap.o +obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_VMAP) += vmap.o obj-y += vsprintf.o obj-y += wait.o obj-bin-y += warning.init.o
xen/common/vmap.c +0 -2
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -#ifdef VMAP_VIRT_START #include <xen/bitmap.h> #include <xen/sections.h> #include <xen/init.h>
@@ -427,4 +426,3 @@ void *_xvrealloc(void *va, size_t size, unsigned int align)return ptr; } -#endif
xen/include/xen/vmap.h +2 -0
@@ -141,7 +141,9 @@ void *arch_vmap_virt_end(void);/* Initialises the VMAP_DEFAULT virtual range */ static inline void vm_init (void ) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_VMAP vm_init_type (VMAP_DEFAULT , (void *)VMAP_VIRT_START ,arch_vmap_virt_end ()); +#endif }#endif /* __XEN_VMAP_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH] xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
Quoted 5 lines · Ayan Kumar Halder
From: Penny Zheng <[email protected]>
Introduce
CONFIG_VMAPwhich is selected by the architectures that use MMU.vm_init()does not do anything ifCONFIG_VMAPis not enabled.
Quoted 7 lines
VMAP is widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual address translation, we choose to fold VMAP in MMU system.
In this patch, we introduce a new
KconfigCONFIG_HAS_VMAP, and make it only support in MMU system on ARM architecture. And ALTERNATIVE now depends on VMAP.
There is a mix of VMAP and HAS_VMAP throughout here. Once that's sorted I think there'll be redundancy in what is being said, which likely will want consolidating then, too.
Quoted 3 lines
HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTORis now gated on MMU as speculative
attacks are not possible on non MMU based systems (ie Cortex-R52, R82).
See https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability.
I think that increasingly this wants to be a separate change. It's entirely unrelated to what the patch's purpose is (or else the connection isn't clear to me, and also isn't being made in the description).
Apart from this the code changes look okay to me now.
Jan
Re: [PATCH] xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
In reply to Ayan Kumar HalderHi Ayan,
Quoted 9 lines · Ayan Kumar Halder
From: Penny Zheng <[email protected]>
Introduce
CONFIG_VMAPwhich is selected by the architectures that use MMU.vm_init()does not do anything ifCONFIG_VMAPis not enabled.VMAP is widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual address translation, we choose to fold VMAP in MMU system.
Quoted 7 lines
In this patch, we introduce a new
KconfigCONFIG_HAS_VMAP, and make it only support in MMU system on ARM architecture. And ALTERNATIVE now depends on VMAP.
HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTORis now gated on MMU as speculative
attacks are not possible on non MMU based systems (ie Cortex-R52, R82).
See https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability.
I don't have a strong opinion on whether it should be split. But I do agree this deserves a bit more explanation.
Also, as I mentioned before, speculative attacks may be possible on non-MMU based systems. In fact some the Cortex-R are in the affected list... The R82 and R52 are not listed, but note:
"For information about any unlisted processors please contact Arm".
So how about the following explanation:
"At the moment, the users of HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR requires to use the vmap() to update the exceptions vectors. While it might be possible to rework the code, it is believed that speculative attackes would be difficult to exploit on non-MMU because the software is tightly controlled. So for now make HARDEN_PREDICTOR to depend on the !MMU.
Quoted 9 lines
Also took the opportunity to remove "#ifdef
VMAP_VIRT_START.. endif" fromvmap.c. Insteadvmap.cis compiled whenHAS_VMAPis enabled. Thus,HAS_VMAPis now enabled from x86, ppc and riscv architectures as all of them use MMU and hasVMAP_VIRT_STARTdefined.Signed-off-by Penny Zheng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Wei Chen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ayan Kumar Halder <[email protected]>
With the typo pointed out by Jan:
Cheers,
Signature · 1 line
Julien Grall
Re: [PATCH] xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
Quoted 1 line · Julien Grall
Hi Ayan,
Hi Julien,
Quoted 21 lines · Ayan Kumar Halder
Quoted 9 lines
From: Penny Zheng <[email protected]>
Introduce
CONFIG_VMAPwhich is selected by the architectures that use MMU.vm_init()does not do anything ifCONFIG_VMAPis not enabled.VMAP is widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual address translation, we choose to fold VMAP in MMU system.
Quoted 7 lines
In this patch, we introduce a new
KconfigCONFIG_HAS_VMAP, and make it only support in MMU system on ARM architecture. And ALTERNATIVE now depends on VMAP.
HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTORis now gated on MMU as speculative
attacks are not possible on non MMU based systems (ie Cortex-R52, R82).
See https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability.I don't have a strong opinion on whether it should be split. But I do agree this deserves a bit more explanation.
Quoted 7 lines
Also, as I mentioned before, speculative attacks may be possible on non-MMU based systems. In fact some the Cortex-R are in the affected list... The R82 and R52 are not listed, but note:
"For information about any unlisted processors please contact Arm".
So how about the following explanation:
"At the moment, the users of
HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTORrequires to use thevmap()to update the exceptions vectors. While it might be possible to rework the code, it is believed that speculative attackes would be difficult to exploit on non-MMU because the software is tightly controlled. So for now makeHARDEN_PREDICTORto depend on the !MMU.
This makes sense. However, I think you mean
..... make HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to depend on the **MMU**.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Also took the opportunity to remove "#ifdef
VMAP_VIRT_START.. endif" fromvmap.c. Insteadvmap.cis compiled whenHAS_VMAPis enabled. Thus,HAS_VMAPis now enabled from x86, ppc and riscv architectures as all of them use MMU and hasVMAP_VIRT_STARTdefined.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Penny Zheng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Wei Chen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ayan Kumar Halder <[email protected]>With the typo pointed out by Jan:
Yes, I will use HAS_VMAP.
I will update the commit message as below. Let me know if this makes sense.
``` xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only Introduce CONFIG_HAS_VMAP which is selected by the architectures that use MMU. vm_init() does not do anything if CONFIG_HAS_VMAP is not enabled. HAS_VMAP is widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual address translation, we choose to fold HAS_VMAP in MMU. And ALTERNATIVE depends on HAS_VMAP. At the moment, the users of HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR requires to use the vmap() to update the exceptions vectors. While it might be possible to rework the code, it is believed that speculative attackes would be difficult to exploit on non-MMU because the software is tightly controlled. So for now make HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to depend on the MMU. Also took the opportunity to remove "#ifdef VMAP_VIRT_START .. endif" from vmap.c. Instead vmap.c is compiled when HAS_VMAP is enabled. Thus, HAS_VMAP is now enabled from x86, ppc and riscv architectures as all of them use MMU and has VMAP_VIRT_START defined. ```
- Ayan
Quoted 5 lines
Acked-by Julien Grall <[email protected]>Cheers,
Re: [PATCH] xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
Quoted 2 lines · Ayan Kumar Halder
I will update the commit message as below. Let me know if this makes
sense.
Certainly better. One more question though:
Quoted 11 lines
```
xen: make VMAP support in MMU system onlyIntroduce
CONFIG_HAS_VMAPwhich is selected by the architectures that use MMU.vm_init()does not do anything ifCONFIG_HAS_VMAPis not enabled.
HAS_VMAPis widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual address translation, we choose to foldHAS_VMAPin MMU. And ALTERNATIVE depends onHAS_VMAP.
What is "fold HAS_VMAP in MMU"? I see no folding anywhere. My only guess is that this means to describe the "select HAS_VMAP" being added to MMU. But then why the word "fold"?
Jan
Quoted 21 lines
At the moment, the users of
HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTORrequires to use thevmap()to update the exceptions vectors. While it might be possible to rework the code, it is believed that speculative attackes would be difficult to exploit on non-MMU because the software is tightly controlled. So for now makeHARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTORto depend on the MMU.Also took the opportunity to remove "#ifdef
VMAP_VIRT_START.. endif" fromvmap.c. Insteadvmap.cis compiled whenHAS_VMAPis enabled. Thus,HAS_VMAPis now enabled from x86, ppc and riscv architectures as all of them use MMU and hasVMAP_VIRT_STARTdefined.```
- Ayan
Quoted 5 lines
Acked-by Julien Grall <[email protected]>Cheers,
Re: [PATCH] xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
Hi Jan,
Quoted 12 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 2 lines · Ayan Kumar Halder
I will update the commit message as below. Let me know if this makes
sense.Certainly better. One more question though:
Quoted 7 lines
```
xen: make VMAP support in MMU system onlyIntroduce
CONFIG_HAS_VMAPwhich is selected by the architectures that use MMU.vm_init()does not do anything ifCONFIG_HAS_VMAPis not enabled.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
HAS_VMAPis widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual address translation, we choose to foldHAS_VMAPin MMU. And ALTERNATIVE depends onHAS_VMAP.What is "fold
HAS_VMAPin MMU"? I see no folding anywhere. My only guess is that this means to describe the "selectHAS_VMAP" being added to MMU. But then why the word "fold"?
Sorry, I used the incorrect word. Rather I should say
"... we choose to make HAS_VMAP selected by MMU. And ALTERNATIVE depends ..."
- Ayan
Hi Ayan,
Quoted 15 lines · Ayan Kumar Halder
Hi,
In https://patchew.org/Xen/[email protected]/, Henry has reorganized some of the code between the MMU specific and generic files.
In this patch serie, we address the remaining code reorg so that MMU specific code is cleanly separated and we have added stubs wherever necessary to avoid introducing if-def.
Changes from :-
v1..v2 - mentioned in individual patches.
v3 - Reordered the patches so that first 3 can be committed (as they have been reviewed).
Quoted 5 lines
Ayan Kumar Halder (4):
xen: arm: Add a new helperupdate_boot_mapping()
xen: arm: Movedomain_page.cto MMU specific
xen: arm: Enclose access to EL2 MMU specific registers under
CONFIG_MMU
I have committed the above 3 patches. AFAICT...
Quoted 1 line
xen: make VMAP support in MMU system only
... this patch may require a respin and definitely needs more acks.
Cheers,
Signature · 1 line
Julien Grall