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wpa-supplicant: Upgrade 2.10 -> 2.11

PATCH In review Siddharth 2 participants 3 messages Aug 23, 2024

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PATCH 1/1 wpa-supplicant: Upgrade 2.10 -> 2.11

From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>

License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

CVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290 wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant loading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160 wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypass

Changes between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Note:
=====
Patche 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) is already fixed and hence removing it.

---
 ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------
 ...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} |   7 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 217 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (92%)
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0 -213
deleted file mode 100644
index bc2db972c3..0000000000
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
-Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
-
-The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
-authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
-during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
-specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
-is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
-the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
-unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
-devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
-user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
-
-Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
-authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
-resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
-configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
-authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
-strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
-issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
-session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
-
-Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
-configuration parameter option:
-'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
- * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
- * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-   not used (default)
- * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-52160
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c]
-
-Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard <[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_config.h          |  8 ++++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c      |  6 +++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h      |  5 ++++
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf |  7 ++++++
- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-index 3238f74..047eec2 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
- 	 * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
- 	 * 2 = require cryptobinding
- 	 *
-+	 * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+	 * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+	 * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+	 * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+	 *  (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+	 *  not used (default)
-+	 * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-+	 *
- 	 * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
- 	 * uuid=Device_UUID
- 	 *
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-index 12e30df..6080697 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
- 	u8 cmk[20];
- 	int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
- 		  * is enabled. */
-+	enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
- };
- 
- 
-@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
- 	}
- 
-+	if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
-+		data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
-+	} else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
-+		data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
-+	} else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
-+		data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
-+	}
- #ifdef EAP_TNC
- 	if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
- 		data->soh = 2;
-@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
- 	data->force_peap_version = -1;
- 	data->peap_outer_success = 2;
- 	data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
-+	data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
- 
- 	if (config && config->phase1)
- 		eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
-@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
- }
- 
- 
-+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
-+				   struct eap_peap_data *data)
-+{
-+	if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
-+	     (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
-+	      !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
-+	      !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
-+	     data->phase2_eap_started) &&
-+	    !data->phase2_eap_success)
-+		return false;
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+
- /**
-  * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
-  * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
-@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
- 					   " - force failed Phase 2");
- 				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
- 				ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-+			} else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-+				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+					   "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
-+				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-+				ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
- 			} else {
- 				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
- 				ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
-@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
- 			/* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
- 			 * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
- 			 * been completed. */
--			if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
--			    !data->phase2_eap_success) {
-+			if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
- 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
- 					   "Success used to indicate success, "
- 					   "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
-@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
- {
- 	struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
-+
- 	return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
--		data->phase2_success;
-+		data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
- }
- 
- 
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
- 
- 	sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
- 
-+	if (!phase2)
-+		data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
-+			params->client_cert_blob ||
-+			params->private_key ||
-+			params->private_key_blob;
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-index 9ac0012..3348634 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
- 	 * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
- 	 */
- 	int tls_v13;
-+
-+	/**
-+	 * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
-+	 */
-+	bool client_cert_conf;
- };
- 
- 
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
- #	 * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
- #	 * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
- #	 * 2 = require cryptobinding
-+#	'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+#	tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+#	 * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+#	 * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+#	   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+#	   not used (default)
-+#	 * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
- #	EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
- #	pbc=1.
- #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +3 -4
similarity index 92%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb
index 70f1fd6fc9..8b6bbf50eb 100644
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/"
 SECTION = "network"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \
-                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \
-                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705"
+                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \
+                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4"
 DEPENDS = "dbus libnl"
 RRECOMMENDS:${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli"
 
@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
-           file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \
            "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "wpa_supplicant"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

Updates like this are not eligible for stable branches. Please pay attention to what Randy said.

Alex

Quoted 289 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>

License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

CVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290 wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant loading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160 wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypass

Changes between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Note:
=====
Patche 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) is already fixed and hence removing it.

---
 ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------
 ...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} |   7 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 217 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (92%)
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0 -213
deleted file mode 100644
index bc2db972c3..0000000000
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
-Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
-
-The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
-authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
-during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
-specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
-is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
-the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
-unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
-devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
-user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
-
-Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
-authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
-resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
-configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
-authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
-strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
-issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
-session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
-
-Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
-configuration parameter option:
-'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
- * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
- * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-   not used (default)
- * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-52160
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c]
-
-Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard <[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_config.h          |  8 ++++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c      |  6 +++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h      |  5 ++++
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf |  7 ++++++
- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-index 3238f74..047eec2 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
-        * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
-        * 2 = require cryptobinding
-        *
-+       * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+       * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+       * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+       * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+       *  (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+       *  not used (default)
-+       * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-+       *
-        * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
-        * uuid=Device_UUID
-        *
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-index 12e30df..6080697 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
-       u8 cmk[20];
-       int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
-                 * is enabled. */
-+      enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
- };
-
-
-@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
-               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
-       }
-
-+      if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
-+              data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                         "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
-+      } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
-+              data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                         "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
-+      } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
-+              data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                         "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
-+      }
- #ifdef EAP_TNC
-       if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
-               data->soh = 2;
-@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
-       data->force_peap_version = -1;
-       data->peap_outer_success = 2;
-       data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
-+      data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-
-       if (config && config->phase1)
-               eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
-@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
- }
-
-
-+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
-+                                 struct eap_peap_data *data)
-+{
-+      if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
-+           (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
-+            !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
-+            !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
-+           data->phase2_eap_started) &&
-+          !data->phase2_eap_success)
-+              return false;
-+      return true;
-+}
-+
-+
- /**
-  * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
-  * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
-@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
-                                          " - force failed Phase 2");
-                               resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-                               ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-+                      } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-+                              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                                         "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
-+                              resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-+                              ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-                       } else {
-                               resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
-                               ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
-@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
-                       /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
-                        * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
-                        * been completed. */
--                      if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
--                          !data->phase2_eap_success) {
-+                      if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-                               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
-                                          "Success used to indicate success, "
-                                          "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
-@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
- {
-       struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
-+
-       return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
--              data->phase2_success;
-+              data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
- }
-
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
-
-       sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
-
-+      if (!phase2)
-+              data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
-+                      params->client_cert_blob ||
-+                      params->private_key ||
-+                      params->private_key_blob;
-+
-       return 0;
- }
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-index 9ac0012..3348634 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
-        * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
-        */
-       int tls_v13;
-+
-+      /**
-+       * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
-+       */
-+      bool client_cert_conf;
- };
-
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
- #      * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
- #      * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
- #      * 2 = require cryptobinding
-+#     'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+#     tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+#      * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+#      * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+#        (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+#        not used (default)
-+#      * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
- #     EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
- #     pbc=1.
- #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +3 -5
similarity index 92%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb
index 70f1fd6fc9..8b6bbf50eb 100644
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/"
 SECTION = "network"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \
-                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \
-                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705"
+                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \
+                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4"
 DEPENDS = "dbus libnl"
 RRECOMMENDS:${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli"
 
@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
-           file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \
            "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "wpa_supplicant"
 
--

2.34.1

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#2 lore raw

Hi Alex,

For some unknown reason, Randy's message was filtered to spam and i missed it. Else, would have replied before submitting the patch for kirkstone.

I did stat my own investigations and reasons for the upgrade -> https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/203703

However, if you still feel, i should be avoiding the upgrade for wpa-supplicant, let me know, i would submit CVE patch for the issues needed.

Regards,
Siddharth