wpa-supplicant: Upgrade 2.10 -> 2.11
PATCH 1/1 wpa-supplicant: Upgrade 2.10 -> 2.11
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
CVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290 wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant loading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160 wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypass
Changes between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
Note:
=====
Patche 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) is already fixed and hence removing it.
---
...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------
...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} | 7 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 217 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (92%)meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0 -213
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@ -From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> -Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements - -The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 -authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated -during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP -specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front -is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than -the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when -unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed -devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the -user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. - -Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 -authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session -resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been -configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed -authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more -strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability -issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS -session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. - -Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 -configuration parameter option: -'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS -tunnel) behavior for PEAP: - * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication - * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate - (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was - not used (default) - * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2023-52160 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c] - -Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++ - src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 +++++ - src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 ++++ - wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 ++++++ - 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h -index 3238f74..047eec2 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h -@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { - * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it - * 2 = require cryptobinding - * -+ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS -+ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: -+ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication -+ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate -+ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was -+ * not used (default) -+ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases -+ * - * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and - * uuid=Device_UUID - * -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c -index 12e30df..6080697 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { - u8 cmk[20]; - int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) - * is enabled. */ -+ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; - }; - - -@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data, - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); - } - -+ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { -+ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); -+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { -+ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); -+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { -+ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); -+ } - #ifdef EAP_TNC - if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { - data->soh = 2; -@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm) - data->force_peap_version = -1; - data->peap_outer_success = 2; - data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; -+ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; - - if (config && config->phase1) - eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); -@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm, - } - - -+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, -+ struct eap_peap_data *data) -+{ -+ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || -+ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && -+ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && -+ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || -+ data->phase2_eap_started) && -+ !data->phase2_eap_success) -+ return false; -+ return true; -+} -+ -+ - /** - * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response - * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() -@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data, - " - force failed Phase 2"); - resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; - ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; -+ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); -+ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; -+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; - } else { - resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; - ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; -@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: - /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate - * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has - * been completed. */ -- if (data->phase2_eap_started && -- !data->phase2_eap_success) { -+ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " - "Success used to indicate success, " - "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " -@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) - { - struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; -+ - return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && -- data->phase2_success; -+ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; - } - - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c -index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c -@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm, - - sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); - -+ if (!phase2) -+ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || -+ params->client_cert_blob || -+ params->private_key || -+ params->private_key_blob; -+ - return 0; - } - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h -index 9ac0012..3348634 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h -@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { - * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used - */ - int tls_v13; -+ -+ /** -+ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured -+ */ -+ bool client_cert_conf; - }; - - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 - # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) - # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it - # * 2 = require cryptobinding -+# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS -+# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: -+# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication -+# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate -+# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was -+# not used (default) -+# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases - # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or - # pbc=1. - #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +3 -4
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/" SECTION = "network" LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \ - file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \ - file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705" + file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \ + file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4" DEPENDS = "dbus libnl" RRECOMMENDS:${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli"
@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ - file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a" CVE_PRODUCT = "wpa_supplicant"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Updates like this are not eligible for stable branches. Please pay attention to what Randy said.
Alex
Quoted 289 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
-wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359afCVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290wpa_supplicant:wpa_supplicantloading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypassChanges between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359afNote:
=====
Patche 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) is already fixed and hence removing it.Signed-off-by Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>--- ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------ ...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} | 7 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 217 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (92%)meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0
-213@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@ -From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> -Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements - -The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 -authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated -during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP -specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front -is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than -the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when -unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed -devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the -user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. - -Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 -authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session -resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been -configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed -authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more -strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability -issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS -session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. - -Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 -configuration parameter option: -'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS -tunnel) behavior for PEAP: - * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication - * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate - (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was - not used (default) - * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2023-52160 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c] - -Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++ - src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 +++++ - src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 ++++ - wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 ++++++ - 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h -index 3238f74..047eec2 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h -@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { - * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it - * 2 = require cryptobinding - * -+ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS -+ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: -+ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication -+ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate -+ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was -+ * not used (default) -+ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases -+ * - * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and - * uuid=Device_UUID - * -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c -index 12e30df..6080697 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { - u8 cmk[20]; - int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) - * is enabled. */ -+ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; - }; - - -@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data, - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); - } - -+ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { -+ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); -+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { -+ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); -+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { -+ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); -+ } - #ifdef EAP_TNC - if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { - data->soh = 2; -@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm) - data->force_peap_version = -1; - data->peap_outer_success = 2; - data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; -+ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; - - if (config && config->phase1) - eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); -@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm, - } - - -+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, -+ struct eap_peap_data *data) -+{ -+ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || -+ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && -+ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && -+ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || -+ data->phase2_eap_started) && -+ !data->phase2_eap_success) -+ return false; -+ return true; -+} -+ -+ - /** - * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response - * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() -@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data, - " - force failed Phase 2"); - resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; - ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; -+ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); -+ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; -+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; - } else { - resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; - ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; -@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: - /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate - * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has - * been completed. */ -- if (data->phase2_eap_started && -- !data->phase2_eap_success) { -+ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " - "Success used to indicate success, " - "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " -@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) - { - struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; -+ - return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && -- data->phase2_success; -+ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; - } - - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c -index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c -@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm, - - sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); - -+ if (!phase2) -+ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || -+ params->client_cert_blob || -+ params->private_key || -+ params->private_key_blob; -+ - return 0; - } - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h -index 9ac0012..3348634 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h -@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { - * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used - */ - int tls_v13; -+ -+ /** -+ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured -+ */ -+ bool client_cert_conf; - }; - - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 - # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) - # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it - # * 2 = require cryptobinding -+# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS -+# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: -+# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication -+# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate -+# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was -+# not used (default) -+# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases - # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or - # pbc=1. - #meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +3
-5@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/" SECTION = "network" LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \ - file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \ - file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705" + file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \ + file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4" DEPENDS = "dbus libnl" RRECOMMENDS:${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli"@@ -25,9 +25,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ - file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a" CVE_PRODUCT = "wpa_supplicant" --2.34.1
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Hi Alex,
For some unknown reason, Randy's message was filtered to spam and i missed it. Else, would have replied before submitting the patch for kirkstone.
I did stat my own investigations and reasons for the upgrade -> https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/203703
However, if you still feel, i should be avoiding the upgrade for wpa-supplicant, let me know, i would submit CVE patch for the issues needed.
Regards,
Siddharth