seal system mappings
Subsystems (11)
cover seal system mappings
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect them from ever changing during the life time of the process.
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them from ever becoming writeable.
Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same as the process's lifetime [1], thus sealable.
The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the _install_special_mapping() function. As no other mappings utilize this function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within _install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.
The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure case of using vsyscall.
It is important to note that the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE feature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has been introduced to enable or disable this functionality. I tested CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYS with ChromeOS, which doesn’t use CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, to verify the sealing works.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
Jeff Xu (1):
exec: seal system mappings
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog
RFC PATCH 1/1 exec: seal system mappings
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect them from ever changing during the life time of the process.
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them from ever becoming writeable.
Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same as the process's lifetime [1], thus sealable.
The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the _install_special_mapping() function. As no other mappings utilize this function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within _install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.
The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure case of using vsyscall.
It is important to note that the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE feature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has been introduced to enable or disable this functionality. I tested CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYS with ChromeOS, which doesn’t use CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, to verify the sealing works.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -0
@@ -1535,6 +1535,15 @@ Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of current integrity status. + exec.seal_system_mappings = [KNL] + Format: { never | always } + Seal system mappings: vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes, + vsyscall. + This overwrites KCONFIG CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_* + - 'never': never seal system mappings. + - 'always': always seal system mappings. + If not specified or invalid, default is the KCONFIG value. + early_page_ext [KNL,EARLY] Enforces page_ext initialization to earlier stages so cover more early boot allocations. Please note that as side effect some optimizations
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +7 -2
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@#include <linux/mm_types.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> #include <asm/vsyscall.h> #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -366,8 +367,12 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits (swapper_pg_dir); } -if (vsyscall_mode ==XONLY ) -vm_flags_init (&gate_vma,VM_EXEC ); +if (vsyscall_mode ==XONLY ) { +unsigned long vm_flags =VM_EXEC ; + +update_seal_exec_system_mappings (&vm_flags); +vm_flags_init (&gate_vma, vm_flags); + }BUILD_BUG_ON ((unsigned long )__fix_to_virt (VSYSCALL_PAGE ) != (unsigned long )VSYSCALL_ADDR );
fs/exec.c +53 -0
62 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -3075,6 +3075,7 @@ ssize_t __kernel_read(struct file *file, void *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos);extern ssize_t kernel_write (struct file *,const void *,size_t ,loff_t *);extern ssize_t __kernel_write (struct file *,const void *,size_t ,loff_t *);extern struct file *open_exec (const char *); +extern void update_seal_exec_system_mappings (unsigned long *vm_flags);/* fs/dcache.c -- generic fs support functions */ extern bool is_subdir (struct dentry *,struct dentry *);
mm/mmap.c +1 -0
@@ -2115,6 +2115,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *_install_special_mapping( unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long vm_flags, const struct vm_special_mapping *spec) { + update_seal_exec_system_mappings(&vm_flags);return __install_special_mapping (mm, addr, len, vm_flags, (void *)spec, &special_mapping_vmops); }
security/Kconfig +26 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,32 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE endchoice +choice + prompt "Seal system mappings" + default SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER + help + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and + vsyscall. + Note: kernel command line exec.seal_system_mappings overwrite this. + +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER + bool "Traditional behavior - not sealed" + help + Do not seal system mappings. + This is default. + +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYS + bool "Always seal system mappings" + depends on 64BIT + depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE + help + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and + vsyscall. + Note: CHECKPOINT_RESTORE might relocate vdso mapping during restore, + and remap will fail if the mapping is sealed, therefore + !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is added as dependency. +endchoice + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS
Signature · 1 line
2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog
Oleg Nesterov
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
Quoted 5 lines · On 10/04, [email protected] wrote:
It is important to note that the
CHECKPOINT_RESTOREfeature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems.
Can't review.
But as for uprobes, I'd prefer a simpler patch which doesn't need the new CONFIG_ and/or kernel boot options, something like the patch below.
And I don't really like the fact that this patch changes the behaviour of the "generic" _install_special_mapping() helper, but I won't argue.
Oleg.
include/linux/mm.h +2 -0
@@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT /* VM is sealed, in vm_flags */ #define VM_SEALED _BITUL(63) +#else +#define VM_SEALED 0#endif /* Bits set in the VMA until the stack is in its final location */
kernel/events/uprobes.c +1 -1
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area) } vma =_install_special_mapping (mm, area->vaddr,PAGE_SIZE , -VM_EXEC |VM_MAYEXEC |VM_DONTCOPY |VM_IO , +VM_EXEC |VM_MAYEXEC |VM_DONTCOPY |VM_IO |VM_SEALED , &xol_mapping);if (IS_ERR (vma)) { ret =PTR_ERR (vma);
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
Quoted 8 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 5 lines · On 10/04, [email protected] wrote:
It is important to note that the
CHECKPOINT_RESTOREfeature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems.
Quoted 5 lines
Can't review.
But as for uprobes, I'd prefer a simpler patch which doesn't need the new
CONFIG_and/or kernel boot options, something like the patch below.
Ok.
Quoted 3 lines
And I don't really like the fact that this patch changes the behaviour of the "generic"
_install_special_mapping()helper, but I won't argue.
This makes the minimum code change currently.
If in the future, there is a special mapping type that can't be
sealed, we can refactor _install_special_mapping() to support that.
Quoted 19 lines
Oleg.
include/linux/mm.h +2
-0@@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT /* VM is sealed, in vm_flags */ #define VM_SEALED _BITUL(63) +#else +#define VM_SEALED 0#endif /* Bits set in the VMA until the stack is in its final location */ kernel/events/uprobes.c +0
-0
kernel/events/uprobes.c static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area) · line 1514
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/events/uprobes.c +1
-1@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area) } vma =_install_special_mapping (mm, area->vaddr,PAGE_SIZE , -VM_EXEC |VM_MAYEXEC |VM_DONTCOPY |VM_IO , +VM_EXEC |VM_MAYEXEC |VM_DONTCOPY |VM_IO |VM_SEALED , &xol_mapping);
OK.
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/events/uprobes.c +0
-0if (IS_ERR (vma)) { ret =PTR_ERR (vma);
Oleg Nesterov
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
In reply to [email protected]Sorry for the noise, forgot to mention...
Quoted 5 lines · On 10/04, [email protected] wrote:
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -1535,6 +1535,15 @@ Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 1545
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +8
-0current integrity status. + exec.seal_system_mappings = [KNL] + Format: { never | always } + Seal system mappings: vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes, + vsyscall. + This overwrites KCONFIG CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_* + - 'never': never seal system mappings. + - 'always': always seal system mappings. + If not specified or invalid, default is the KCONFIG value.
perhaps the documentation should also mention that this new parameter has no effect if CONFIG_64BIT=n.
Oleg.
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
Quoted 11 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Sorry for the noise, forgot to mention...
Quoted 7 lines · On 10/04, [email protected] wrote:
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -1535,6 +1535,15 @@ Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of current integrity status.
Quoted 11 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 1545
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +8
-0+ exec.seal_system_mappings = [KNL] + Format: { never | always } + Seal system mappings: vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes, + vsyscall. + This overwrites KCONFIG CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_* + - 'never': never seal system mappings. + - 'always': always seal system mappings. + If not specified or invalid, default is the KCONFIG value.perhaps the documentation should also mention that this new parameter has no effect if
CONFIG_64BIT=n.
Good point, I will add that.
Thanks
Quoted 3 lines
Oleg.
Randy Dunlap
reviewerRe: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
In reply to [email protected]Hi Jeff,
Quoted 23 lines · On 10/4/24 9:31 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Signed-off-by Jeff Xu <[email protected]>--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)security/Kconfig +0
-0
security/Kconfig config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE · line 60
Quoted 10 lines
security/Kconfig +7
-0@@ -51,6 +51,32 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE endchoice +choice + prompt "Seal system mappings" + default SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER + help + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and + vsyscall. + Note: kernel command line exec.seal_system_mappings overwrite this.
overwrites
Quoted 22 lines
security/Kconfig +19
-0+ +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER + bool "Traditional behavior - not sealed" + help + Do not seal system mappings. + This is default. + +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYS + bool "Always seal system mappings" + depends on 64BIT + depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE + help + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and + vsyscall. + Note: CHECKPOINT_RESTORE might relocate vdso mapping during restore, + and remap will fail if the mapping is sealed, therefore + !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is added as dependency. +endchoice + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
Quoted 30 lines · Randy Dunlap
Hi Jeff,
Quoted 26 lines · On 10/4/24 9:31 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Signed-off-by Jeff Xu <[email protected]>--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)security/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -51,6 +51,32 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE endchoice
Quoted 9 lines
security/Kconfig config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE · line 60
Quoted 7 lines
security/Kconfig +7
-0+choice + prompt "Seal system mappings" + default SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER + help + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and + vsyscall. + Note: kernel command line exec.seal_system_mappings overwrite this.overwrites
fixed.
Thanks
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 13 lines
security/Kconfig +12
-0+ +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER + bool "Traditional behavior - not sealed" + help + Do not seal system mappings. + This is default. + +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYS + bool "Always seal system mappings" + depends on 64BIT + depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE + helpsecurity/Kconfig config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE · line 82
Quoted 10 lines
security/Kconfig +7
-0+ Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and + vsyscall. + Note: CHECKPOINT_RESTORE might relocate vdso mapping during restore, + and remap will fail if the mapping is sealed, therefore + !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is added as dependency. +endchoice + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS--
~Randy
Quoted 11 lines · * [email protected] <[email protected]> [241004 12:32]:
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect them from ever changing during the life time of the process.
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them from ever becoming writeable.
But it also means they cannot be unmapped, right?
I'm not saying it's a thing people should, but recent conversations with the ppc people seem to indicate that people do 'things' to the vdso such as removing it.
Won't this change mean they cannot do that, at least if mseal is enabled on ppc64? In which case we would have a different special mapping for powerpc, or any other platform that wants to be able to unmap the vdso (or vvar or whatever else?)
In fact, I came across people removing the vdso to catch callers to those functions which they didn't want to allow. In this case enabling the security of mseal would not allow them to stop applications from vdso calls. Again, I'm not saying this is a good (or bad) idea but it happening.
Quoted 15 lines
Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same as the process's lifetime [1], thus sealable.
The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
_install_special_mapping()function. As no other mappings utilize this function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within_install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure case of using vsyscall.
Quoted 7 lines
It is important to note that the
CHECKPOINT_RESTOREfeature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has been introduced to enable or disable this functionality. I testedCONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYSwith ChromeOS, which doesn’t useCHECKPOINT_RESTORE, to verify the sealing works.
I am hesitant to say that CRIU is the only user of moving the vdso, as the ppc people wanted the ability for the fallback methods to still function when the vdso was unmapped.
I am not sure we can change the user expected behaviour based on a configuration option; users may be able to mmap/munmap but may not be able to boot their own kernel, but maybe it's okay?
Quoted 17 lines
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
Jeff Xu (1):
exec: seal system mappings.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog
Hi Liam,
Quoted 54 lines · Liam R. Howlett
Quoted 11 lines · * [email protected] <[email protected]> [241004 12:32]:
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect them from ever changing during the life time of the process.
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them from ever becoming writeable.
But it also means they cannot be unmapped, right?
I'm not saying it's a thing people should, but recent conversations with the ppc people seem to indicate that people do 'things' to the vdso such as removing it.
Won't this change mean they cannot do that, at least if mseal is enabled on ppc64? In which case we would have a different special mapping for powerpc, or any other platform that wants to be able to unmap the vdso (or vvar or whatever else?)
In fact, I came across people removing the vdso to catch callers to those functions which they didn't want to allow. In this case enabling the security of mseal would not allow them to stop applications from vdso calls. Again, I'm not saying this is a good (or bad) idea but it happening.
Quoted 15 lines
Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same as the process's lifetime [1], thus sealable.
The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
_install_special_mapping()function. As no other mappings utilize this function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within_install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure case of using vsyscall.
Quoted 7 lines
It is important to note that the
CHECKPOINT_RESTOREfeature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has been introduced to enable or disable this functionality. I testedCONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYSwith ChromeOS, which doesn’t useCHECKPOINT_RESTORE, to verify the sealing works.
Quoted 8 lines
I am hesitant to say that CRIU is the only user of moving the vdso, as the ppc people wanted the ability for the fallback methods to still function when the vdso was unmapped.
I am not sure we can change the user expected behaviour based on a configuration option; users may be able to mmap/munmap but may not be able to boot their own kernel, but maybe it's okay?
The text doesn't say CRIU is the **only** feature that is not compatible with this.
The default config is "CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER", and distribution needs to opt-in for this feature, such as ChromeOS or Android or other safe-by-default systems that doesn't allow to unmap or remap vdso in production build.
Thanks
-Jeff
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
Jeff Xu (1):
exec: seal system mappings.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)--
2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog
Quoted 61 lines · Jeff Xu
Hi Liam,
Quoted 58 lines · Liam R. Howlett
Quoted 11 lines · * [email protected] <[email protected]> [241004 12:32]:
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect them from ever changing during the life time of the process.
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them from ever becoming writeable.
But it also means they cannot be unmapped, right?
I'm not saying it's a thing people should, but recent conversations with the ppc people seem to indicate that people do 'things' to the vdso such as removing it.
Won't this change mean they cannot do that, at least if mseal is enabled on ppc64? In which case we would have a different special mapping for powerpc, or any other platform that wants to be able to unmap the vdso (or vvar or whatever else?)
In fact, I came across people removing the vdso to catch callers to those functions which they didn't want to allow. In this case enabling the security of mseal would not allow them to stop applications from vdso calls. Again, I'm not saying this is a good (or bad) idea but it happening.
Quoted 15 lines
Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same as the process's lifetime [1], thus sealable.
The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
_install_special_mapping()function. As no other mappings utilize this function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within_install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure case of using vsyscall.
Quoted 7 lines
It is important to note that the
CHECKPOINT_RESTOREfeature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has been introduced to enable or disable this functionality. I testedCONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYSwith ChromeOS, which doesn’t useCHECKPOINT_RESTORE, to verify the sealing works.I am hesitant to say that CRIU is the only user of moving the vdso, as the ppc people wanted the ability for the fallback methods to still function when the vdso was unmapped.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I am not sure we can change the user expected behaviour based on a configuration option; users may be able to mmap/munmap but may not be able to boot their own kernel, but maybe it's okay?
The text doesn't say CRIU is the **only** feature that is not compatible with this.
Fair enough.
I read it that way since you pointed out breaking criu is the reason for not enabling this by default, although it's probably the biggest reason against doing this.
Quoted 5 lines
The default config is "
CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER", and distribution needs to opt-in for this feature, such as ChromeOS or Android or other safe-by-default systems that doesn't allow to unmap or remap vdso in production build.
Okay, but you never stated that they can't be unmapped or remapped in this change; just that they will never become writeable. It is worth adding that detail in the description since it isn't entirely obvious unless you know the workings of mseal.
Quoted 22 lines
Thanks
-JeffQuoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
Jeff Xu (1):
exec: seal system mappings.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)--
2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog
Quoted 82 lines · Liam R. Howlett
Quoted 61 lines · Jeff Xu
Hi Liam,
Quoted 58 lines · Liam R. Howlett
Quoted 11 lines · * [email protected] <[email protected]> [241004 12:32]:
From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect them from ever changing during the life time of the process.
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them from ever becoming writeable.
But it also means they cannot be unmapped, right?
I'm not saying it's a thing people should, but recent conversations with the ppc people seem to indicate that people do 'things' to the vdso such as removing it.
Won't this change mean they cannot do that, at least if mseal is enabled on ppc64? In which case we would have a different special mapping for powerpc, or any other platform that wants to be able to unmap the vdso (or vvar or whatever else?)
In fact, I came across people removing the vdso to catch callers to those functions which they didn't want to allow. In this case enabling the security of mseal would not allow them to stop applications from vdso calls. Again, I'm not saying this is a good (or bad) idea but it happening.
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Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same as the process's lifetime [1], thus sealable.
The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
_install_special_mapping()function. As no other mappings utilize this function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within_install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure case of using vsyscall.
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It is important to note that the
CHECKPOINT_RESTOREfeature (CRIU) may alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has been introduced to enable or disable this functionality. I testedCONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYSwith ChromeOS, which doesn’t useCHECKPOINT_RESTORE, to verify the sealing works.I am hesitant to say that CRIU is the only user of moving the vdso, as the ppc people wanted the ability for the fallback methods to still function when the vdso was unmapped.
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I am not sure we can change the user expected behaviour based on a configuration option; users may be able to mmap/munmap but may not be able to boot their own kernel, but maybe it's okay?
The text doesn't say CRIU is the **only** feature that is not compatible with this.
Fair enough.
I read it that way since you pointed out breaking criu is the reason for not enabling this by default, although it's probably the biggest reason against doing this.
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The default config is "
CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER", and distribution needs to opt-in for this feature, such as ChromeOS or Android or other safe-by-default systems that doesn't allow to unmap or remap vdso in production build.
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Okay, but you never stated that they can't be unmapped or remapped in this change; just that they will never become writeable. It is worth adding that detail in the description since it isn't entirely obvious unless you know the workings of mseal.
Thanks, I will improve this section by adding more details on memory sealing or maybe point to the mseal.rst document.
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Thanks
-JeffQuoted 17 lines
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[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
Jeff Xu (1):
exec: seal system mappings.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++ arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++- fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 1 + security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)--
2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog