6.1.113-rc1 review

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans P. Moller <[email protected]>

commit 703235a244e533652346844cfa42623afb36eed1 upstream.

Add hw monitor volume control for POD HD500X. This is done adding LINE6_CAP_HWMON_CTL to the capabilities

---
 sound/usb/line6/podhd.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static const struct line6_properties pod
 	[LINE6_PODHD500X] = {
 		.id = "PODHD500X",
 		.name = "POD HD500X",
-		.capabilities	= LINE6_CAP_CONTROL
+		.capabilities	= LINE6_CAP_CONTROL | LINE6_CAP_HWMON_CTL
 				| LINE6_CAP_PCM | LINE6_CAP_HWMON,
 		.altsetting = 1,
 		.ep_ctrl_r = 0x81,

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ai Chao <[email protected]>

commit dee476950cbd83125655a3f49e00d63b79f6114e upstream.

The headset mic requires a fixup to be properly detected/used.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -10175,6 +10175,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0xa233, "Positivo Master C6300", ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x19e5, 0x3204, "Huawei MACH-WX9", ALC256_FIXUP_HUAWEI_MACH_WX9_PINS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x19e5, 0x320f, "Huawei WRT-WX9 ", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x19e5, 0x3212, "Huawei KLV-WX9 ", ALC256_FIXUP_ACER_HEADSET_MIC),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x1235, "CZC B20", ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_B20),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x1236, "CZC TMI", ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_TMI),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1b35, 0x1237, "CZC L101", ALC269_FIXUP_CZC_L101),

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Abhishek Tamboli <[email protected]>

commit d75dba49744478c32f6ce1c16b5f391c2d5cef5f upstream.

Add the quirk for HP Pavilion Gaming laptop 15z-ec200 for enabling the mute led. The fix apply the ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED quirk for this model.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -9767,6 +9767,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8896, "HP EliteBook 855 G8 Notebook PC", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8898, "HP EliteBook 845 G8 Notebook PC", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_LIMIT_INT_MIC_BOOST),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x88d0, "HP Pavilion 15-eh1xxx (mainboard 88D0)", ALC287_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x88dd, "HP Pavilion 15z-ec200", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8902, "HP OMEN 16", ALC285_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x890e, "HP 255 G8 Notebook PC", ALC236_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_COEFBIT2),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8919, "HP Pavilion Aero Laptop 13-be0xxx", ALC287_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED),

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>

commit 1a00a393d6a7fb1e745a41edd09019bd6a0ad64c upstream.

---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2047,7 +2047,7 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split
 		split = count/2;
 
 	hash2 = map[split].hash;
-	continued = hash2 == map[split - 1].hash;
+	continued = split > 0 ? hash2 == map[split - 1].hash : 0;
 	dxtrace(printk(KERN_INFO "Split block %lu at %x, %i/%i\n",
 			(unsigned long)dx_get_block(frame->at),
 					hash2, split, count-split));

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: yao.ly <[email protected]>

commit 70dd7b573afeba9b8f8a33f2ae1e4a9a2ec8c1ec upstream.

EXT4_DIRENT_HASH and EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH will access struct ext4_dir_entry_hash followed ext4_dir_entry. But there is no ext4_dir_entry_hash followed when inode is encrypted and not casefolded

---
 fs/ext4/dir.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -279,12 +279,20 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil
 					struct fscrypt_str de_name =
 							FSTR_INIT(de->name,
 								de->name_len);
+					u32 hash;
+					u32 minor_hash;
+
+					if (IS_CASEFOLDED(inode)) {
+						hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de);
+						minor_hash = EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de);
+					} else {
+						hash = 0;
+						minor_hash = 0;
+					}
 
 					/* Directory is encrypted */
 					err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode,
-						EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de),
-						EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de),
-						&de_name, &fstr);
+						hash, minor_hash, &de_name, &fstr);
 					de_name = fstr;
 					fstr.len = save_len;
 					if (err)

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit c26ab35702f8cd0cdc78f96aa5856bfb77be798f upstream.

We hit the following use-after-free:

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_split_extent_at+0xba8/0xcc0
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810548ed08 by task kworker/u20:0/40
CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u20:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-dirty #724
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 kasan_report+0x93/0xc0
 ext4_split_extent_at+0xba8/0xcc0
 ext4_split_extent.isra.0+0x18f/0x500
 ext4_split_convert_extents+0x275/0x750
 ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents+0x73e/0x1580
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe20/0x2dc0
 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700
 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70

[...]

Allocated by task 40:
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1ac/0x480
 ext4_find_extent+0xf3b/0x1e70
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x188/0x2dc0
 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700
 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70

[...]

Freed by task 40:
 kfree+0xf1/0x2b0
 ext4_find_extent+0xa71/0x1e70
 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0xa22/0x3260
 ext4_split_extent_at+0x3ef/0xcc0
 ext4_split_extent.isra.0+0x18f/0x500
 ext4_split_convert_extents+0x275/0x750
 ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents+0x73e/0x1580
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe20/0x2dc0
 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700
 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70

[...]
==================================================================

The flow of issue triggering is as follows:

ext4_split_extent_at
path = *ppath ext4_ext_insert_extent(ppath)
ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(ppath)
ext4_find_extent(orig_path)
path = *orig_path read_extent_tree_block
// return -ENOMEM or -EIO
ext4_free_ext_path(path)
kfree(path)
*orig_path = NULL
a. If err is -ENOMEM:
ext4_ext_dirty(path + path->p_depth)
// path use-after-free !!!
b. If err is -EIO and we have EXT_DEBUG defined:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(path)
eh = path[depth].p_hdr
// path also use-after-free !!!

So when trying to zeroout or fix the extent length, call ext4_find_extent() to update the path.

In addition we use *ppath directly as an ext4_ext_show_leaf() input to avoid possible use-after-free when EXT_DEBUG is defined, and to avoid unnecessary path updates.

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |   21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3232,6 +3232,25 @@ static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t
 	if (err != -ENOSPC && err != -EDQUOT && err != -ENOMEM)
 		goto out;
 
+	/*
+	 * Update path is required because previous ext4_ext_insert_extent()
+	 * may have freed or reallocated the path. Using EXT4_EX_NOFAIL
+	 * guarantees that ext4_find_extent() will not return -ENOMEM,
+	 * otherwise -ENOMEM will cause a retry in do_writepages(), and a
+	 * WARN_ON may be triggered in ext4_da_update_reserve_space() due to
+	 * an incorrect ee_len causing the i_reserved_data_blocks exception.
+	 */
+	path = ext4_find_extent(inode, ee_block, ppath,
+				flags | EXT4_EX_NOFAIL);
+	if (IS_ERR(path)) {
+		EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "Failed split extent on %u, err %ld",
+				 split, PTR_ERR(path));
+		return PTR_ERR(path);
+	}
+	depth = ext_depth(inode);
+	ex = path[depth].p_ext;
+	*ppath = path;
+
 	if (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag) {
 		if (split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1|EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)) {
 			if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1) {

@@ -3284,7 +3303,7 @@ fix_extent_len:
 	ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
 	return err;
 out:
-	ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
+	ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, *ppath);
 	return err;
 }
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 369c944ed1d7c3fb7b35f24e4735761153afe7b3 upstream.

Even though ext4_find_extent() returns an error, ext4_insert_range() still returns 0. This may confuse the user as to why fallocate returns success, but the contents of the file are not as expected. So propagate the error returned by ext4_find_extent() to avoid inconsistencies.

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -5570,6 +5570,7 @@ static int ext4_insert_range(struct file
 	path = ext4_find_extent(inode, offset_lblk, NULL, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(path)) {
 		up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(path);
 		goto out_stop;
 	}
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <[email protected]>

commit ebc4b2c1ac92fc0f8bf3f5a9c285a871d5084a6b upstream.

Function jbd2_journal_shrink_checkpoint_list() assumes that '0' is not a valid value for transaction IDs, which is incorrect.

Furthermore, the sbi->s_fc_ineligible_tid handling also makes the same assumption by being initialised to '0'. Fortunately, the sb flag EXT4_MF_FC_INELIGIBLE can be used to check whether sbi->s_fc_ineligible_tid has been previously set instead of comparing it with '0'.

---
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -339,22 +339,29 @@ void ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(struct supe
 {
 	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
 	tid_t tid;
+	bool has_transaction = true;
+	bool is_ineligible;
 
 	if (ext4_fc_disabled(sb))
 		return;
 
-	ext4_set_mount_flag(sb, EXT4_MF_FC_INELIGIBLE);
 	if (handle && !IS_ERR(handle))
 		tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
 	else {
 		read_lock(&sbi->s_journal->j_state_lock);
-		tid = sbi->s_journal->j_running_transaction ?
-				sbi->s_journal->j_running_transaction->t_tid : 0;
+		if (sbi->s_journal->j_running_transaction)
+			tid = sbi->s_journal->j_running_transaction->t_tid;
+		else
+			has_transaction = false;
 		read_unlock(&sbi->s_journal->j_state_lock);
 	}
 	spin_lock(&sbi->s_fc_lock);
-	if (tid_gt(tid, sbi->s_fc_ineligible_tid))
+	is_ineligible = ext4_test_mount_flag(sb, EXT4_MF_FC_INELIGIBLE);
+	if (has_transaction &&
+	    (!is_ineligible ||
+	     (is_ineligible && tid_gt(tid, sbi->s_fc_ineligible_tid))))
 		sbi->s_fc_ineligible_tid = tid;
+	ext4_set_mount_flag(sb, EXT4_MF_FC_INELIGIBLE);
 	spin_unlock(&sbi->s_fc_lock);
 	WARN_ON(reason >= EXT4_FC_REASON_MAX);
 	sbi->s_fc_stats.fc_ineligible_reason_count[reason]++;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhihao Cheng <[email protected]>

commit dda898d7ffe85931f9cca6d702a51f33717c501e upstream.

The dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocks and copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signal handling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and added on inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceed the inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:

dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1
dax_iomap_rw
iomap_iter // round 1
ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data
iomap_iter // round 2
iomap_iter_advance

    iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M

ext4_iomap_begin
ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag)
dax_iomap_iter
fatal_signal_pending
done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M
ext4_handle_inode_extension
ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2M

fsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?

Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smaller than expected.

---
 fs/ext4/file.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -324,10 +324,10 @@ static ssize_t ext4_handle_inode_extensi
  * Clean up the inode after DIO or DAX extending write has completed and the
  * inode size has been updated using ext4_handle_inode_extension().
  */
-static void ext4_inode_extension_cleanup(struct inode *inode, ssize_t count)
+static void ext4_inode_extension_cleanup(struct inode *inode, bool need_trunc)
 {
 	lockdep_assert_held_write(&inode->i_rwsem);
-	if (count < 0) {
+	if (need_trunc) {
 		ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
 		/*
 		 * If the truncate operation failed early, then the inode may

@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static ssize_t ext4_dio_write_iter(struc
 		 * writeback of delalloc blocks.
 		 */
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EIOCBQUEUED);
-		ext4_inode_extension_cleanup(inode, ret);
+		ext4_inode_extension_cleanup(inode, ret < 0);
 	}
 
 out:

@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ ext4_dax_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb,
 
 	if (extend) {
 		ret = ext4_handle_inode_extension(inode, offset, ret);
-		ext4_inode_extension_cleanup(inode, ret);
+		ext4_inode_extension_cleanup(inode, ret < (ssize_t)count);
 	}
 out:
 	inode_unlock(inode);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <[email protected]>

commit 972090651ee15e51abfb2160e986fa050cfc7a40 upstream.

Function __jbd2_log_wait_for_space() assumes that '0' is not a valid value for transaction IDs, which is incorrect. Don't assume that and invoke jbd2_log_wait_commit() if the journal had a committing transaction instead.

---
 fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ __releases(&journal->j_state_lock)
 		if (space_left < nblocks) {
 			int chkpt = journal->j_checkpoint_transactions != NULL;
 			tid_t tid = 0;
+			bool has_transaction = false;
 
-			if (journal->j_committing_transaction)
+			if (journal->j_committing_transaction) {
 				tid = journal->j_committing_transaction->t_tid;
+				has_transaction = true;
+			}
 			spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
 			write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
 			if (chkpt) {

@@ -101,7 +104,7 @@ __releases(&journal->j_state_lock)
 			} else if (jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail(journal) == 0) {
 				/* We were able to recover space; yay! */
 				;
-			} else if (tid) {
+			} else if (has_transaction) {
 				/*
 				 * jbd2_journal_commit_transaction() may want
 				 * to take the checkpoint_mutex if JBD2_FLUSHED

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 5c0f4cc84d3a601c99bc5e6e6eb1cbda542cce95 upstream.

When calling ext4_force_split_extent_at() in ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(), the 'ppath' is updated but it is the 'path' that is freed, thus potentially triggering a double-free in the following process:

ext4_ext_replay_update_ex
ppath = path
ext4_force_split_extent_at(&ppath)

    ext4_split_extent_at
      ext4_ext_insert_extent
        ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
          ext4_ext_grow_indepth
            ext4_find_extent
              if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth)
                kfree(path)                 ---> path First freed
                *orig_path = path = NULL    ---> null ppath

kfree(path) ---> path double-free !!!

So drop the unnecessary ppath and use path directly to avoid this problem. And use ext4_find_extent() directly to update path, avoiding unnecessary memory allocation and freeing. Also, propagate the error returned by ext4_find_extent() instead of using strange error codes.

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |   21 ++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

@@ -5926,7 +5926,7 @@ out:
 int ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t start,
 			      int len, int unwritten, ext4_fsblk_t pblk)
 {
-	struct ext4_ext_path *path = NULL, *ppath;
+	struct ext4_ext_path *path;
 	struct ext4_extent *ex;
 	int ret;
 

@@ -5942,30 +5942,29 @@ int ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(struct ino
 	if (le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) != start ||
 		ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex) != len) {
 		/* We need to split this extent to match our extent first */
-		ppath = path;
 		down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
-		ret = ext4_force_split_extent_at(NULL, inode, &ppath, start, 1);
+		ret = ext4_force_split_extent_at(NULL, inode, &path, start, 1);
 		up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
-		kfree(path);
-		path = ext4_find_extent(inode, start, NULL, 0);
+
+		path = ext4_find_extent(inode, start, &path, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(path))
-			return -1;
-		ppath = path;
+			return PTR_ERR(path);
 		ex = path[path->p_depth].p_ext;
 		WARN_ON(le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) != start);
+
 		if (ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex) != len) {
 			down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
-			ret = ext4_force_split_extent_at(NULL, inode, &ppath,
+			ret = ext4_force_split_extent_at(NULL, inode, &path,
 							 start + len, 1);
 			up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
 			if (ret)
 				goto out;
-			kfree(path);
-			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, start, NULL, 0);
+
+			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, start, &path, 0);
 			if (IS_ERR(path))
-				return -EINVAL;
+				return PTR_ERR(path);
 			ex = path[path->p_depth].p_ext;
 		}
 	}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit a164f3a432aae62ca23d03e6d926b122ee5b860d upstream.

As Ojaswin mentioned in Link, in ext4_ext_insert_extent(), if the path is reallocated in ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(), we'll use the stale path and cause UAF. Below is a sample trace with dummy values:

ext4_ext_insert_extent
path = *ppath = 2000
ext4_ext_create_new_leaf(ppath)

    ext4_find_extent(ppath)
      path = *ppath = 2000
      if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth)
            kfree(path = 2000);
            *ppath = path = NULL;
      path = kcalloc() = 3000
      *ppath = 3000;
      return path;

/* here path is still 2000, UAF! */
eh = path[depth].p_hdr

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x26d4/0x3330
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881027bf7d0 by task kworker/u36:1/179
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: kworker/u6:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-dirty #866
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x26d4/0x3330
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe22/0x2d40
 ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700
 ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800

[...]

Allocated by task 179:
 ext4_find_extent+0x81c/0x1f70
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x146/0x2d40
 ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700
 ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800
 ext4_writepages+0x26d/0x4e0
 do_writepages+0x175/0x700

[...]

Freed by task 179:
 kfree+0xcb/0x240
 ext4_find_extent+0x7c0/0x1f70
 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0xa26/0x3330
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xe22/0x2d40
 ext4_map_blocks+0x71e/0x1700
 ext4_do_writepages+0x1290/0x2800
 ext4_writepages+0x26d/0x4e0
 do_writepages+0x175/0x700

[...]
==================================================================

So use *ppath to update the path to avoid the above problem.

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2103,6 +2103,7 @@ prepend:
 				       ppath, newext);
 	if (err)
 		goto cleanup;
+	path = *ppath;
 	depth = ext_depth(inode);
 	eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit dcaa6c31134c0f515600111c38ed7750003e1b9c upstream.

In ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(), set path[1].p_bh to NULL after it has been released, otherwise it may be released twice. An example of what triggers this is as follows:

split2 map split1
|--------|-------|--------|

ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents
ext4_split_convert_extents
// path->p_depth == 0
ext4_split_extent

     // 1. do split1
     ext4_split_extent_at
       |ext4_ext_insert_extent
       |  ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
       |    ext4_ext_grow_indepth
       |      le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1)
       |    ext4_find_extent
       |      // return -ENOMEM
       |// get error and try zeroout
       |path = ext4_find_extent
       |  path->p_depth = 1
       |ext4_ext_try_to_merge
       |  ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up
       |    path->p_depth = 0
       |    brelse(path[1].p_bh)  ---> not set to NULL here
       |// zeroout success
     // 2. update path
     ext4_find_extent
     // 3. do split2
     ext4_split_extent_at
       ext4_ext_insert_extent
         ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
           ext4_ext_grow_indepth
             le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1)
           ext4_find_extent
             path[0].p_bh = NULL;
             path->p_depth = 1
             read_extent_tree_block  ---> return err
             // path[1].p_bh is still the old value
             ext4_free_ext_path
               ext4_ext_drop_refs
                 // path->p_depth == 1
                 brelse(path[1].p_bh)  ---> brelse a buffer twice

Finally got the following WARRNING when removing the buffer from lru:

============================================
VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer

WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 72 at fs/buffer.c:1241 __brelse+0x58/0x90
CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u19:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-dirty #716
RIP: 0010:__brelse+0x58/0x90
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __find_get_block+0x6e7/0x810
 bdev_getblk+0x2b/0x480
 __ext4_get_inode_loc+0x48a/0x1240
 ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x150
 ext4_reserve_inode_write+0xb7/0x230
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x144/0x6a0
 ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x9c8/0x3230
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xf45/0x2dc0
 ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700
 ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70

[...]
============================================

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -1877,6 +1877,7 @@ static void ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(han
 	path[0].p_hdr->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(max_root);
 
 	brelse(path[1].p_bh);
+	path[1].p_bh = NULL;
 	ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, blk, 1,
 			 EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA | EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
 }

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 5b4b2dcace35f618fe361a87bae6f0d13af31bc1 upstream.

In ext4_find_extent(), if the path is not big enough, we free it and set *orig_path to NULL. But after reallocating and successfully initializing the path, we don't update *orig_path, in which case the caller gets a valid path but a NULL ppath, and this may cause a NULL pointer dereference or a path memory leak. For example:

ext4_split_extent
path = *ppath = 2000
ext4_find_extent

    if (depth > path[0].p_maxdepth)
      kfree(path = 2000);
      *orig_path = path = NULL;
      path = kcalloc() = 3000
  ext4_split_extent_at(*ppath = NULL)
    path = *ppath;
    ex = path[depth].p_ext;
    // NULL pointer dereference!

==================================================================

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 576 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-dirty #847
RIP: 0010:ext4_split_extent_at+0x6d/0x560
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ext4_split_extent.isra.0+0xcb/0x1b0
 ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized+0x168/0x6c0
 ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents+0x325/0x4d0
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x520/0xdb0
 ext4_map_blocks+0x2b0/0x690
 ext4_iomap_begin+0x20e/0x2c0

[...]
==================================================================

Therefore, *orig_path is updated when the extent lookup succeeds, so that the caller can safely use path or *ppath.

---
 fs/ext4/extents.c     |    3 ++-
 fs/ext4/move_extent.c |    1 -
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -957,6 +957,8 @@ ext4_find_extent(struct inode *inode, ex
 
 	ext4_ext_show_path(inode, path);
 
+	if (orig_path)
+		*orig_path = path;
 	return path;
 
 err:

@@ -3251,7 +3253,6 @@ static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t
 	}
 	depth = ext_depth(inode);
 	ex = path[depth].p_ext;
-	*ppath = path;
 
 	if (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag) {
 		if (split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1|EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)) {

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ get_ext_path(struct inode *inode, ext4_l
 		*ppath = NULL;
 		return -ENODATA;
 	}
-	*ppath = path;
 	return 0;
 }
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <[email protected]>

commit dd589b0f1445e1ea1085b98edca6e4d5dedb98d0 upstream.

Function ext4_wait_for_tail_page_commit() assumes that '0' is not a valid value for transaction IDs, which is incorrect. Don't assume that and invoke jbd2_log_wait_commit() if the journal had a committing transaction instead.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |   11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -5350,8 +5350,9 @@ static void ext4_wait_for_tail_page_comm
 {
 	unsigned offset;
 	journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal;
-	tid_t commit_tid = 0;
+	tid_t commit_tid;
 	int ret;
+	bool has_transaction;
 
 	offset = inode->i_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
 	/*

@@ -5376,12 +5377,14 @@ static void ext4_wait_for_tail_page_comm
 		folio_put(folio);
 		if (ret != -EBUSY)
 			return;
-		commit_tid = 0;
+		has_transaction = false;
 		read_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
-		if (journal->j_committing_transaction)
+		if (journal->j_committing_transaction) {
 			commit_tid = journal->j_committing_transaction->t_tid;
+			has_transaction = true;
+		}
 		read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
-		if (commit_tid)
+		if (has_transaction)
 			jbd2_log_wait_commit(journal, commit_tid);
 	}
 }

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <[email protected]>

commit 7a6443e1dad70281f99f0bd394d7fd342481a632 upstream.

Function jbd2_journal_shrink_checkpoint_list() assumes that '0' is not a valid value for transaction IDs, which is incorrect. Don't assume that and use two extra boolean variables to control the loop iterations and keep track of the first and last tid.

---
 fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -424,6 +424,7 @@ unsigned long jbd2_journal_shrink_checkp
 	tid_t tid = 0;
 	unsigned long nr_freed = 0;
 	unsigned long freed;
+	bool first_set = false;
 
 again:
 	spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);

@@ -443,8 +444,10 @@ again:
 	else
 		transaction = journal->j_checkpoint_transactions;
 
-	if (!first_tid)
+	if (!first_set) {
 		first_tid = transaction->t_tid;
+		first_set = true;
+	}
 	last_transaction = journal->j_checkpoint_transactions->t_cpprev;
 	next_transaction = transaction;
 	last_tid = last_transaction->t_tid;

@@ -474,7 +477,7 @@ again:
 	spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
 	cond_resched();
 
-	if (*nr_to_scan && next_tid)
+	if (*nr_to_scan && journal->j_shrink_transaction)
 		goto again;
 out:
 	trace_jbd2_shrink_checkpoint_list(journal, first_tid, tid, last_tid,

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <[email protected]>

commit 6db3c1575a750fd417a70e0178bdf6efa0dd5037 upstream.

When a full journal commit is on-going, any fast commit has to be enqueued into a different queue: FC_Q_STAGING instead of FC_Q_MAIN. This enqueueing is done only once, i.e. if an inode is already queued in a previous fast commit entry it won't be enqueued again. However, if a full commit starts _after_ the inode is enqueued into FC_Q_MAIN, the next fast commit needs to be done into FC_Q_STAGING. And this is not being done in function ext4_fc_track_template().

This patch fixes the issue by re-enqueuing an inode into the STAGING queue during the fast commit clean-up callback when doing a full commit. However, to prevent a race with a fast-commit, the clean-up callback has to be called with the journal locked.

This bug was found using fstest generic/047. This test creates several 32k bytes files, sync'ing each of them after it's creation, and then shutting down the filesystem. Some data may be loss in this operation; for example a file may have it's size truncated to zero.

---
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 fs/jbd2/journal.c     |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1317,8 +1317,21 @@ static void ext4_fc_cleanup(journal_t *j
 		list_del_init(&iter->i_fc_list);
 		ext4_clear_inode_state(&iter->vfs_inode,
 				       EXT4_STATE_FC_COMMITTING);
-		if (tid_geq(tid, iter->i_sync_tid))
+		if (tid_geq(tid, iter->i_sync_tid)) {
 			ext4_fc_reset_inode(&iter->vfs_inode);
+		} else if (full) {
+			/*
+			 * We are called after a full commit, inode has been
+			 * modified while the commit was running. Re-enqueue
+			 * the inode into STAGING, which will then be splice
+			 * back into MAIN. This cannot happen during
+			 * fastcommit because the journal is locked all the
+			 * time in that case (and tid doesn't increase so
+			 * tid check above isn't reliable).
+			 */
+			list_add_tail(&EXT4_I(&iter->vfs_inode)->i_fc_list,
+				      &sbi->s_fc_q[FC_Q_STAGING]);
+		}
 		/* Make sure EXT4_STATE_FC_COMMITTING bit is clear */
 		smp_mb();
 #if (BITS_PER_LONG < 64)

@@ -767,9 +767,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_fc_begin_commit);
  */
 static int __jbd2_fc_end_commit(journal_t *journal, tid_t tid, bool fallback)
 {
-	jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal);
 	if (journal->j_fc_cleanup_callback)
 		journal->j_fc_cleanup_callback(journal, 0, tid);
+	jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal);
 	write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
 	journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_FAST_COMMIT_ONGOING;
 	if (fallback)

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <[email protected]>

commit faab35a0370fd6e0821c7a8dd213492946fc776f upstream.

Calling ext4_fc_mark_ineligible() with a NULL handle is racy and may result in a fast-commit being done before the filesystem is effectively marked as ineligible. This patch fixes the calls to this function in __track_dentry_update() by adding an extra parameter to the callback used in ext4_fc_track_template().

---
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |   19 +++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ void ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(struct supe
  */
 static int ext4_fc_track_template(
 	handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
-	int (*__fc_track_fn)(struct inode *, void *, bool),
+	int (*__fc_track_fn)(handle_t *handle, struct inode *, void *, bool),
 	void *args, int enqueue)
 {
 	bool update = false;

@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_track_template(
 		ext4_fc_reset_inode(inode);
 		ei->i_sync_tid = tid;
 	}
-	ret = __fc_track_fn(inode, args, update);
+	ret = __fc_track_fn(handle, inode, args, update);
 	mutex_unlock(&ei->i_fc_lock);
 
 	if (!enqueue)

@@ -420,7 +420,8 @@ struct __track_dentry_update_args {
 };
 
 /* __track_fn for directory entry updates. Called with ei->i_fc_lock. */
-static int __track_dentry_update(struct inode *inode, void *arg, bool update)
+static int __track_dentry_update(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
+				 void *arg, bool update)
 {
 	struct ext4_fc_dentry_update *node;
 	struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);

@@ -435,14 +436,14 @@ static int __track_dentry_update(struct
 
 	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) {
 		ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME,
-					NULL);
+					handle);
 		mutex_lock(&ei->i_fc_lock);
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
 	node = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_fc_dentry_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!node) {
-		ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_NOMEM, NULL);
+		ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_NOMEM, handle);
 		mutex_lock(&ei->i_fc_lock);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}

@@ -454,7 +455,7 @@ static int __track_dentry_update(struct
 		node->fcd_name.name = kmalloc(dentry->d_name.len, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!node->fcd_name.name) {
 			kmem_cache_free(ext4_fc_dentry_cachep, node);
-			ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_NOMEM, NULL);
+			ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_NOMEM, handle);
 			mutex_lock(&ei->i_fc_lock);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}

@@ -576,7 +577,8 @@ void ext4_fc_track_create(handle_t *hand
 }
 
 /* __track_fn for inode tracking */
-static int __track_inode(struct inode *inode, void *arg, bool update)
+static int __track_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, void *arg,
+			 bool update)
 {
 	if (update)
 		return -EEXIST;

@@ -614,7 +616,8 @@ struct __track_range_args {
 };
 
 /* __track_fn for tracking data updates */
-static int __track_range(struct inode *inode, void *arg, bool update)
+static int __track_range(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, void *arg,
+			 bool update)
 {
 	struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
 	ext4_lblk_t oldstart;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luis Henriques (SUSE) <[email protected]>

commit 04e6ce8f06d161399e5afde3df5dcfa9455b4952 upstream.

Calling ext4_fc_mark_ineligible() with a NULL handle is racy and may result in a fast-commit being done before the filesystem is effectively marked as ineligible. This patch moves the call to this function so that an handle can be used. If a transaction fails to start, then there's not point in trying to mark the filesystem as ineligible, and an error will eventually be returned to user-space.

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2505,6 +2505,8 @@ retry:
 
 		error = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, name_index, name,
 					      value, value_len, flags);
+		ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(inode->i_sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_XATTR,
+					handle);
 		error2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
 		if (error == -ENOSPC &&
 		    ext4_should_retry_alloc(sb, &retries))

@@ -2512,7 +2514,6 @@ retry:
 		if (error == 0)
 			error = error2;
 	}
-	ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(inode->i_sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_XATTR, NULL);
 
 	return error;
 }

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit d24449864da5838936669618356b0e30ca2999c3 upstream.

Currently the glibc isn't yet ported to 64-bit for hppa, so there is no usable userspace available yet.
But it's possible to manually build a static 64-bit binary and run that for testing. One such 64-bit test program is available at http://ftp.parisc-linux.org/src/64bit.tar.gz
and it shows various issues with the existing 64-bit syscall path in the kernel.
This patch fixes those issues.

---
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscall.S |   14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -232,10 +232,10 @@ linux_gateway_entry:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
 	ldil	L%sys_call_table, %r1
-	or,=	%r2,%r2,%r2
-	addil	L%(sys_call_table64-sys_call_table), %r1
+	or,ev	%r2,%r2,%r2
+	ldil	L%sys_call_table64, %r1
 	ldo	R%sys_call_table(%r1), %r19
-	or,=	%r2,%r2,%r2
+	or,ev	%r2,%r2,%r2
 	ldo	R%sys_call_table64(%r1), %r19
 #else
 	load32	sys_call_table, %r19

@@ -368,10 +368,10 @@ tracesys_next:
 	extrd,u	%r19,63,1,%r2			/* W hidden in bottom bit */
 
 	ldil	L%sys_call_table, %r1
-	or,=	%r2,%r2,%r2
-	addil	L%(sys_call_table64-sys_call_table), %r1
+	or,ev	%r2,%r2,%r2
+	ldil	L%sys_call_table64, %r1
 	ldo	R%sys_call_table(%r1), %r19
-	or,=	%r2,%r2,%r2
+	or,ev	%r2,%r2,%r2
 	ldo	R%sys_call_table64(%r1), %r19
 #else
 	load32	sys_call_table, %r19

@@ -1310,6 +1310,8 @@ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
 END(sys_call_table)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#undef __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT
+#define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT(nr, native, compat)	__SYSCALL(nr, native)
 	.align 8
 ENTRY(sys_call_table64)
 #include <asm/syscall_table_64.h>    /* 64-bit syscalls */

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit f31b256994acec6929306dfa86ac29716e7503d6 upstream.

Fix the stack start address calculation for the parisc architecture in setup_arg_pages() when address randomization is disabled. When the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE process personality is disabled there is no need to add additional space for the stack.
Note that this patch touches code inside an #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP hunk, which is why only the parisc architecture is affected since it's the only Linux architecture where the stack grows upwards.

Without this patch you will find the stack in the middle of some mapped libaries and suddenly limited to 6MB instead of 8MB:

root@parisc:~# setarch -R /bin/bash -c "cat /proc/self/maps"
00010000-00019000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 1182034           /usr/bin/cat
00019000-0001a000 rwxp 00009000 08:05 1182034           /usr/bin/cat
0001a000-0003b000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                 [heap]
f90c4000-f9283000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 1573004           /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
f9283000-f9285000 r--p 001bf000 08:05 1573004           /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
f9285000-f928a000 rwxp 001c1000 08:05 1573004           /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
f928a000-f9294000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
f9301000-f9323000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                 [stack]
f98b4000-f98e4000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 1572869           /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1
f98e4000-f98e5000 r--p 00030000 08:05 1572869           /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1
f98e5000-f98e9000 rwxp 00031000 08:05 1572869           /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1
f9ad8000-f9b00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f9b00000-f9b01000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                 [vdso]

With the patch the stack gets correctly mapped at the end of the process memory map:

root@panama:~# setarch -R /bin/bash -c "cat /proc/self/maps"
00010000-00019000 r-xp 00000000 08:13 16385582          /usr/bin/cat
00019000-0001a000 rwxp 00009000 08:13 16385582          /usr/bin/cat
0001a000-0003b000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                 [heap]
fef29000-ff0eb000 r-xp 00000000 08:13 16122400          /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
ff0eb000-ff0ed000 r--p 001c2000 08:13 16122400          /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
ff0ed000-ff0f2000 rwxp 001c4000 08:13 16122400          /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
ff0f2000-ff0fc000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
ff4b4000-ff4e4000 r-xp 00000000 08:13 16121913          /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1
ff4e4000-ff4e6000 r--p 00030000 08:13 16121913          /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1
ff4e6000-ff4ea000 rwxp 00032000 08:13 16121913          /usr/lib/hppa-linux-gnu/ld.so.1
ff6d7000-ff6ff000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
ff6ff000-ff700000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                 [vdso]
ff700000-ff722000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                 [stack]

---
 fs/exec.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -771,7 +771,8 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
 	stack_base = calc_max_stack_size(stack_base);
 
 	/* Add space for stack randomization. */
-	stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
+		stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
 
 	/* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */
 	if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base)

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Val Packett <[email protected]>

commit 6b44aa559d6c7f4ea591ef9d2352a7250138d62a upstream.

The RK3066 VOP sets a dma_stop bit when it's done scanning out a frame and needs the driver to acknowledge that by clearing the bit.

Unless we clear it "between" frames, the RGB output only shows noise instead of the picture. atomic_flush is the place for it that least affects other code (doing it on vblank would require converting all other usages of the reg_lock to spin_(un)lock_irq, which would affect performance for everyone).

This seems to be a redundant synchronization mechanism that was removed in later iterations of the VOP hardware block.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c |    4 ++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.h |    1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_vop_reg.c |    1 +
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -1559,6 +1559,10 @@ static void vop_crtc_atomic_flush(struct
 	VOP_AFBC_SET(vop, enable, s->enable_afbc);
 	vop_cfg_done(vop);
 
+	/* Ack the DMA transfer of the previous frame (RK3066). */
+	if (VOP_HAS_REG(vop, common, dma_stop))
+		VOP_REG_SET(vop, common, dma_stop, 0);
+
 	spin_unlock(&vop->reg_lock);
 
 	/*

@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ struct vop_common {
 	struct vop_reg lut_buffer_index;
 	struct vop_reg gate_en;
 	struct vop_reg mmu_en;
+	struct vop_reg dma_stop;
 	struct vop_reg out_mode;
 	struct vop_reg standby;
 };

@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ static const struct vop_output rk3066_ou
 };
 
 static const struct vop_common rk3066_common = {
+	.dma_stop = VOP_REG(RK3066_SYS_CTRL0, 0x1, 0),
 	.standby = VOP_REG(RK3066_SYS_CTRL0, 0x1, 1),
 	.out_mode = VOP_REG(RK3066_DSP_CTRL0, 0xf, 0),
 	.cfg_done = VOP_REG(RK3066_REG_CFG_DONE, 0x1, 0),

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrew Jones <[email protected]>

commit db8e81132cf051843c9a59b46fa5a071c45baeb3 upstream.

An 'msi-parent' property with a single entry and no accompanying '#msi-cells' property is considered the legacy definition as opposed to its definition after being expanded with commit 126b16e2ad98 ("Docs: dt: add generic MSI bindings"). However, the legacy definition is completely compatible with the current definition and, since of_phandle_iterator_next() tolerates missing and present-but- zero *cells properties since commit e42ee61017f5 ("of: Let of_for_each_phandle fallback to non-negative cell_count"), there's no need anymore to special case the legacy definition in of_msi_get_domain().

Indeed, special casing has turned out to be harmful, because, as of commit 7c025238b47a ("dt-bindings: irqchip: Describe the IMX MU block as a MSI controller"), MSI controller DT bindings have started specifying '#msi-cells' as a required property (even when the value must be zero) as an effort to make the bindings more explicit. But, since the special casing of 'msi-parent' only uses the existence of '#msi-cells' for its heuristic, and not whether or not it's also nonzero, the legacy path is not taken. Furthermore, the path to support the new, broader definition isn't taken either since that path has been restricted to the platform-msi bus.

But, neither the definition of 'msi-parent' nor the definition of '#msi-cells' is platform-msi-specific (the platform-msi bus was just the first bus that needed '#msi-cells'), so remove both the special casing and the restriction. The code removal also requires changing to of_parse_phandle_with_optional_args() in order to ensure the legacy (but compatible) use of 'msi-parent' remains supported. This not only simplifies the code but also resolves an issue with PCI devices finding their MSI controllers on riscv, as the riscv,imsics binding requires '#msi-cells=<0>'.

---
 drivers/of/irq.c |   34 +++++++---------------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

@@ -710,8 +710,7 @@ struct irq_domain *of_msi_map_get_device
  * @np: device node for @dev
  * @token: bus type for this domain
  *
- * Parse the msi-parent property (both the simple and the complex
- * versions), and returns the corresponding MSI domain.
+ * Parse the msi-parent property and returns the corresponding MSI domain.
  *
  * Returns: the MSI domain for this device (or NULL on failure).
  */

@@ -719,33 +718,14 @@ struct irq_domain *of_msi_get_domain(str
 				     struct device_node *np,
 				     enum irq_domain_bus_token token)
 {
-	struct device_node *msi_np;
+	struct of_phandle_iterator it;
 	struct irq_domain *d;
+	int err;
 
-	/* Check for a single msi-parent property */
-	msi_np = of_parse_phandle(np, "msi-parent", 0);
-	if (msi_np && !of_property_read_bool(msi_np, "#msi-cells")) {
-		d = irq_find_matching_host(msi_np, token);
-		if (!d)
-			of_node_put(msi_np);
-		return d;
-	}
-
-	if (token == DOMAIN_BUS_PLATFORM_MSI) {
-		/* Check for the complex msi-parent version */
-		struct of_phandle_args args;
-		int index = 0;
-
-		while (!of_parse_phandle_with_args(np, "msi-parent",
-						   "#msi-cells",
-						   index, &args)) {
-			d = irq_find_matching_host(args.np, token);
-			if (d)
-				return d;
-
-			of_node_put(args.np);
-			index++;
-		}
+	of_for_each_phandle(&it, err, np, "msi-parent", "#msi-cells", 0) {
+		d = irq_find_matching_host(it.node, token);
+		if (d)
+			return d;
 	}
 
 	return NULL;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ma Ke <[email protected]>

commit e794b7b9b92977365c693760a259f8eef940c536 upstream.

As it may return NULL pointer and cause NULL pointer dereference. Add check for the return value of alloc_ordered_workqueue.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/omap_drv.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -746,6 +746,10 @@ static int omapdrm_init(struct omap_drm_
 	soc = soc_device_match(omapdrm_soc_devices);
 	priv->omaprev = soc ? (uintptr_t)soc->data : 0;
 	priv->wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("omapdrm", 0);
+	if (!priv->wq) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_alloc_workqueue;
+	}
 
 	mutex_init(&priv->list_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->obj_list);

@@ -808,6 +812,7 @@ err_gem_deinit:
 	drm_mode_config_cleanup(ddev);
 	omap_gem_deinit(ddev);
 	destroy_workqueue(priv->wq);
+err_alloc_workqueue:
 	omap_disconnect_pipelines(ddev);
 	drm_dev_put(ddev);
 	return ret;

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huang Ying <[email protected]>

commit b4afe4183ec77f230851ea139d91e5cf2644c68b upstream.

On a system with CXL memory, the resource tree (/proc/iomem) related to CXL memory may look like something as follows.

490000000-50fffffff : CXL Window 0
490000000-50fffffff : region0

    490000000-50fffffff : dax0.0
      490000000-50fffffff : System RAM (kmem)

Because drivers/dax/kmem.c calls add_memory_driver_managed() during onlining CXL memory, which makes "System RAM (kmem)" a descendant of "CXL Window X". This confuses region_intersects(), which expects all "System RAM" resources to be at the top level of iomem_resource. This can lead to bugs.

For example, when the following command line is executed to write some memory in CXL memory range via /dev/mem,

 $ dd if=data of=/dev/mem bs=$((1 << 10)) seek=$((0x490000000 >> 10)) count=1
 dd: error writing '/dev/mem': Bad address
 1+0 records in
 0+0 records out
 0 bytes copied, 0.0283507 s, 0.0 kB/s

the command fails as expected. However, the error code is wrong. It should be "Operation not permitted" instead of "Bad address". More seriously, the /dev/mem permission checking in devmem_is_allowed() passes incorrectly. Although the accessing is prevented later because ioremap() isn't allowed to map system RAM, it is a potential security issue. During command executing, the following warning is reported in the kernel log for calling ioremap() on system RAM.

ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000490000000 - 0x0000000490000fff

 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 416 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:216 __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x131/0x35d
 Call Trace:
  memremap+0xcb/0x184
  xlate_dev_mem_ptr+0x25/0x2f
  write_mem+0x94/0xfb
  vfs_write+0x128/0x26d
  ksys_write+0xac/0xfe
  do_syscall_64+0x9a/0xfd
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

The details of command execution process are as follows. In the above resource tree, "System RAM" is a descendant of "CXL Window 0" instead of a top level resource. So, region_intersects() will report no System RAM resources in the CXL memory region incorrectly, because it only checks the top level resources. Consequently, devmem_is_allowed() will return 1 (allow access via /dev/mem) for CXL memory region incorrectly. Fortunately, ioremap() doesn't allow to map System RAM and reject the access.

So, region_intersects() needs to be fixed to work correctly with the resource tree with "System RAM" not at top level as above. To fix it, if we found a unmatched resource in the top level, we will continue to search matched resources in its descendant resources. So, we will not miss any matched resources in resource tree anymore.

In the new implementation, an example resource tree

|------------- "CXL Window 0" ------------|
|-- "System RAM" --|

will behave similar as the following fake resource tree for region_intersects(, IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM, ),

|-- "System RAM" --||-- "CXL Window 0a" --|

Where "CXL Window 0a" is part of the original "CXL Window 0" that isn't covered by "System RAM".

---
 kernel/resource.c |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -493,20 +493,62 @@ static int __region_intersects(struct re
 			       size_t size, unsigned long flags,
 			       unsigned long desc)
 {
-	struct resource res;
+	resource_size_t ostart, oend;
 	int type = 0; int other = 0;
-	struct resource *p;
+	struct resource *p, *dp;
+	bool is_type, covered;
+	struct resource res;
 
 	res.start = start;
 	res.end = start + size - 1;
 
 	for (p = parent->child; p ; p = p->sibling) {
-		bool is_type = (((p->flags & flags) == flags) &&
-				((desc == IORES_DESC_NONE) ||
-				 (desc == p->desc)));
-
-		if (resource_overlaps(p, &res))
-			is_type ? type++ : other++;
+		if (!resource_overlaps(p, &res))
+			continue;
+		is_type = (p->flags & flags) == flags &&
+			(desc == IORES_DESC_NONE || desc == p->desc);
+		if (is_type) {
+			type++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Continue to search in descendant resources as if the
+		 * matched descendant resources cover some ranges of 'p'.
+		 *
+		 * |------------- "CXL Window 0" ------------|
+		 * |-- "System RAM" --|
+		 *
+		 * will behave similar as the following fake resource
+		 * tree when searching "System RAM".
+		 *
+		 * |-- "System RAM" --||-- "CXL Window 0a" --|
+		 */
+		covered = false;
+		ostart = max(res.start, p->start);
+		oend = min(res.end, p->end);
+		for_each_resource(p, dp, false) {
+			if (!resource_overlaps(dp, &res))
+				continue;
+			is_type = (dp->flags & flags) == flags &&
+				(desc == IORES_DESC_NONE || desc == dp->desc);
+			if (is_type) {
+				type++;
+				/*
+				 * Range from 'ostart' to 'dp->start'
+				 * isn't covered by matched resource.
+				 */
+				if (dp->start > ostart)
+					break;
+				if (dp->end >= oend) {
+					covered = true;
+					break;
+				}
+				/* Remove covered range */
+				ostart = max(ostart, dp->end + 1);
+			}
+		}
+		if (!covered)
+			other++;
 	}
 
 	if (type == 0)

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit f5cacdc6f2bb2a9bf214469dd7112b43dd2dd68a upstream.

In __jbd2_log_wait_for_space(), we might call jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() to recover some journal space. But if an error occurs while executing jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() (e.g., an EIO), we don't stop waiting for free space right away, we try other branches, and if j_committing_transaction is NULL (i.e., the tid is 0), we will get the following complain:

============================================
JBD2: I/O error when updating journal superblock for sdd-8. __jbd2_log_wait_for_space: needed 256 blocks and only had 217 space available __jbd2_log_wait_for_space: no way to get more journal space in sdd-8

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 139804 at fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c:109 __jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 139804 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #1
RIP: 0010:__jbd2_log_wait_for_space+0x251/0x2e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 add_transaction_credits+0x5d1/0x5e0
 start_this_handle+0x1ef/0x6a0
 jbd2__journal_start+0x18b/0x340
 ext4_dirty_inode+0x5d/0xb0
 __mark_inode_dirty+0xe4/0x5d0
 generic_update_time+0x60/0x70

[...]
============================================

So only if jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail() returns 1, i.e., there is nothing to clean up at the moment, continue to try to reclaim free space in other ways.

Note that this fix relies on commit 6f6a6fda2945 ("jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when updating journal superblock fails") to make jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail return the correct error code.

---
 fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -101,8 +101,11 @@ __releases(&journal->j_state_lock)
 			write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
 			if (chkpt) {
 				jbd2_log_do_checkpoint(journal);
-			} else if (jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail(journal) == 0) {
-				/* We were able to recover space; yay! */
+			} else if (jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail(journal) <= 0) {
+				/*
+				 * We were able to recover space or the
+				 * journal was aborted due to an error.
+				 */
 				;
 			} else if (has_transaction) {
 				/*

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kemeng Shi <[email protected]>

commit f0e3c14802515f60a47e6ef347ea59c2733402aa upstream.

Use tid_geq to compare tids to work over sequence number wraps.

---
 fs/jbd2/journal.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ int jbd2_fc_begin_commit(journal_t *jour
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
-	if (tid <= journal->j_commit_sequence) {
+	if (tid_geq(journal->j_commit_sequence, tid)) {
 		write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
 		return -EALREADY;
 	}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>

commit 1a83a716ec233990e1fd5b6fbb1200ade63bf450 upstream.

As long as krealloc() is called with __GFP_ZERO consistently, starting with the initial memory allocation, __GFP_ZERO should be fully honored.

However, if for an existing allocation krealloc() is called with a decreased size, it is not ensured that the spare portion the allocation is zeroed. Thus, if krealloc() is subsequently called with a larger size again, __GFP_ZERO can't be fully honored, since we don't know the previous size, but only the bucket size.

Example:

	buf = kzalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
	memset(buf, 0xff, 64);

	buf = krealloc(buf, 48, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

	/* After this call the last 16 bytes are still 0xff. */
	buf = krealloc(buf, 64, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);

Fix this, by explicitly setting spare memory to zero, when shrinking an allocation with __GFP_ZERO flag set or init_on_alloc enabled.

---
 mm/slab_common.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -1322,6 +1322,13 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_
 
 	/* If the object still fits, repoison it precisely. */
 	if (ks >= new_size) {
+		/* Zero out spare memory. */
+		if (want_init_on_alloc(flags)) {
+			kasan_disable_current();
+			memset((void *)p + new_size, 0, ks - new_size);
+			kasan_enable_current();
+		}
+
 		p = kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size, flags);
 		return (void *)p;
 	}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>

commit dfe6c5692fb525e5e90cefe306ee0dffae13d35f upstream.

This bug has existed since the initial OCFS2 code. The code logic in ocfs2_sync_local_to_main() is wrong, as it ignores the last contiguous free bits, which causes an OCFS2 volume to lose the last free clusters of LA window on each umount command.

---
 fs/ocfs2/localalloc.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

@@ -1008,6 +1008,25 @@ static int ocfs2_sync_local_to_main(stru
 		start = bit_off + 1;
 	}
 
+	/* clear the contiguous bits until the end boundary */
+	if (count) {
+		blkno = la_start_blk +
+			ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(osb->sb,
+					start - count);
+
+		trace_ocfs2_sync_local_to_main_free(
+				count, start - count,
+				(unsigned long long)la_start_blk,
+				(unsigned long long)blkno);
+
+		status = ocfs2_release_clusters(handle,
+				main_bm_inode,
+				main_bm_bh, blkno,
+				count);
+		if (status < 0)
+			mlog_errno(status);
+	}
+
 bail:
 	if (status)
 		mlog_errno(status);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>

commit 2af148ef8549a12f8025286b8825c2833ee6bcb8 upstream.

syzbot reported an uninit-value BUG:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ocfs2_get_block+0xed2/0x2710 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:159
ocfs2_get_block+0xed2/0x2710 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:159
do_mpage_readpage+0xc45/0x2780 fs/mpage.c:225
mpage_readahead+0x43f/0x840 fs/mpage.c:374
ocfs2_readahead+0x269/0x320 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:381
read_pages+0x193/0x1110 mm/readahead.c:160
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x901/0x9f0 mm/readahead.c:273
do_page_cache_ra mm/readahead.c:303 [inline]
force_page_cache_ra+0x3b1/0x4b0 mm/readahead.c:332
force_page_cache_readahead mm/internal.h:347 [inline]
generic_fadvise+0x6b0/0xa90 mm/fadvise.c:106
vfs_fadvise mm/fadvise.c:185 [inline]
ksys_fadvise64_64 mm/fadvise.c:199 [inline]
__do_sys_fadvise64 mm/fadvise.c:214 [inline]
__se_sys_fadvise64 mm/fadvise.c:212 [inline]
__x64_sys_fadvise64+0x1fb/0x3a0 mm/fadvise.c:212
x64_sys_call+0xe11/0x3ba0
arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:222
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

This is because when ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks() fails, p_blkno is uninitialized. So the error log will trigger the above uninit-value access.

The error log is out-of-date since get_blocks() was removed long time ago. And the error code will be logged in ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks() once ocfs2_get_cluster() fails, so fix this by only logging inode and block.

---
 fs/ocfs2/aops.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -156,9 +156,8 @@ int ocfs2_get_block(struct inode *inode,
 	err = ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks(inode, iblock, &p_blkno, &count,
 					  &ext_flags);
 	if (err) {
-		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Error %d from get_blocks(0x%p, %llu, 1, "
-		     "%llu, NULL)\n", err, inode, (unsigned long long)iblock,
-		     (unsigned long long)p_blkno);
+		mlog(ML_ERROR, "get_blocks() failed, inode: 0x%p, "
+		     "block: %llu\n", inode, (unsigned long long)iblock);
 		goto bail;
 	}
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gautham Ananthakrishna <[email protected]>

commit 5ca60b86f57a4d9648f68418a725b3a7de2816b0 upstream.

One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption

[EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n

The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block.

        Inode: 33080590   Mode: 0640   Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856)
        FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49)
        CRC32: 00000000   ECC: 0000
        Type: Regular   Attr: 0x0   Flags: Valid
        Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted
        Extended Attributes Block: 0  Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256
        User: 0 (root)   Group: 0 (root)   Size: 281320357888
        Links: 1   Clusters: 141738
        ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024
        atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024
        mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024
        dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969
        Refcount Block: 2777346
        Last Extblk: 2886943   Orphan Slot: 0
        Sub Alloc Slot: 0   Sub Alloc Bit: 14
        Tree Depth: 1   Count: 227   Next Free Rec: 230
        ## Offset        Clusters       Block#
        0  0             2310           2776351
        1  2310          2139           2777375
        2  4449          1221           2778399
        3  5670          731            2779423
        4  6401          566            2780447
        .......          ....           .......
        .......          ....           .......

The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case up to 230), thereby causing corruption.

The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix.

---
 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c        |   11 +----------
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "namei.h"
 #include "ocfs2_trace.h"
 #include "file.h"
+#include "symlink.h"
 
 #include <linux/bio.h>
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>

@@ -4154,8 +4155,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry
 	int ret;
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry);
 	struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL;
+	struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
 
-	if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
+	if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		mlog_errno(ret);
 		goto out;

@@ -4181,6 +4183,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
+	if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) &&
+	    (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) {
+		/*
+		 * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
+		 * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
+		 */
+		struct ocfs2_inode_info *new_oi = OCFS2_I(new_inode);
+
+		if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
+		    !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) {
+			struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)new_bh->b_data;
+			struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)old_bh->b_data;
+			struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
+			int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size);
+
+			le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
+					sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
+		}
+	}
+
 	ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh,
 					new_inode, new_bh, preserve);
 	if (ret) {

@@ -4188,7 +4210,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry
 		goto inode_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
+	if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) {
 		ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh,
 					   new_inode, new_bh,
 					   preserve);

@@ -6524,16 +6524,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(st
 	}
 
 	new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode);
-	/*
-	 * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute.
-	 * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data().
-	 */
-	if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) &&
-	    !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) {
-		struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list;
-		le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size /
-					sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec)));
-	}
+
 	spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock);
 	new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL;
 	new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>

commit 35fccce29feb3706f649726d410122dd81b92c18 upstream.

ocfs2_global_read_info() will initialize and schedule dqi_sync_work at the end, if error occurs after successfully reading global quota, it will trigger the following warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_* enabled:

ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: 00000000d8b0ce28 object type: timer_list hint: qsync_work_fn+0x0/0x16c

This reports that there is an active delayed work when freeing oinfo in error handling, so cancel dqi_sync_work first. BTW, return status instead of -1 when .read_file_info fails.

---
 fs/ocfs2/quota_local.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static int ocfs2_local_read_info(struct
 	int status;
 	struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
 	struct ocfs2_quota_recovery *rec;
-	int locked = 0;
+	int locked = 0, global_read = 0;
 
 	info->dqi_max_spc_limit = 0x7fffffffffffffffLL;
 	info->dqi_max_ino_limit = 0x7fffffffffffffffLL;

@@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ static int ocfs2_local_read_info(struct
 	if (!oinfo) {
 		mlog(ML_ERROR, "failed to allocate memory for ocfs2 quota"
 			       " info.");
+		status = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 	info->dqi_priv = oinfo;

@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ static int ocfs2_local_read_info(struct
 	status = ocfs2_global_read_info(sb, type);
 	if (status < 0)
 		goto out_err;
+	global_read = 1;
 
 	status = ocfs2_inode_lock(lqinode, &oinfo->dqi_lqi_bh, 1);
 	if (status < 0) {

@@ -779,10 +781,12 @@ out_err:
 		if (locked)
 			ocfs2_inode_unlock(lqinode, 1);
 		ocfs2_release_local_quota_bitmaps(&oinfo->dqi_chunk);
+		if (global_read)
+			cancel_delayed_work_sync(&oinfo->dqi_sync_work);
 		kfree(oinfo);
 	}
 	brelse(bh);
-	return -1;
+	return status;
 }
 
 /* Write local info to quota file */

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]>

commit c03a82b4a0c935774afa01fd6d128b444fd930a1 upstream.

Patch series "Misc fixes for ocfs2_read_blocks", v5.

This series contains 2 fixes for ocfs2_read_blocks(). The first patch fix the issue reported by syzbot, which detects bad unlock balance in ocfs2_read_blocks(). The second patch fixes an issue reported by Heming Zhao when reviewing above fix.

This patch (of 2):

There was a lock release before exiting, so remove the unreasonable unlock.

---
 fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -235,7 +235,6 @@ int ocfs2_read_blocks(struct ocfs2_cachi
 		if (bhs[i] == NULL) {
 			bhs[i] = sb_getblk(sb, block++);
 			if (bhs[i] == NULL) {
-				ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock(ci);
 				status = -ENOMEM;
 				mlog_errno(status);
 				/* Don't forget to put previous bh! */

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julian Sun <[email protected]>

commit 5784d9fcfd43bd853654bb80c87ef293b9e8e80a upstream.

During the mounting process, if journal_reset() fails because of too short journal, then lead to jbd2_journal_load() fails with NULL j_sb_buffer. Subsequently, ocfs2_journal_shutdown() calls jbd2_journal_flush()->jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail()-> __jbd2_update_log_tail()->jbd2_journal_update_sb_log_tail() ->lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer), resulting in a null-pointer dereference error.

To resolve this issue, we should check the JBD2_LOADED flag to ensure the journal was properly loaded. Additionally, use journal instead of osb->journal directly to simplify the code.

---
 fs/ocfs2/journal.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ void ocfs2_journal_shutdown(struct ocfs2
 	if (!igrab(inode))
 		BUG();
 
-	num_running_trans = atomic_read(&(osb->journal->j_num_trans));
+	num_running_trans = atomic_read(&(journal->j_num_trans));
 	trace_ocfs2_journal_shutdown(num_running_trans);
 
 	/* Do a commit_cache here. It will flush our journal, *and*

@@ -1041,9 +1041,10 @@ void ocfs2_journal_shutdown(struct ocfs2
 		osb->commit_task = NULL;
 	}
 
-	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(osb->journal->j_num_trans)) != 0);
+	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(journal->j_num_trans)) != 0);
 
-	if (ocfs2_mount_local(osb)) {
+	if (ocfs2_mount_local(osb) &&
+	    (journal->j_journal->j_flags & JBD2_LOADED)) {
 		jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal->j_journal);
 		status = jbd2_journal_flush(journal->j_journal, 0);
 		jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal->j_journal);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]>

commit 33b525cef4cff49e216e4133cc48452e11c0391e upstream.

When doing cleanup, if flags without OCFS2_BH_READAHEAD, it may trigger NULL pointer dereference in the following ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate() if bh is NULL.

---
 fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -388,7 +388,8 @@ read_failure:
 		/* Always set the buffer in the cache, even if it was
 		 * a forced read, or read-ahead which hasn't yet
 		 * completed. */
-		ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate(ci, bh);
+		if (bh)
+			ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate(ci, bh);
 	}
 	ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock(ci);
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jisheng Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 5c178472af247c7b50f962495bb7462ba453b9fb upstream.

This is used in poison.h for poison pointer offset. Based on current SV39, SV48 and SV57 vm layout, 0xdead000000000000 is a proper value that is not mappable, this can avoid potentially turning an oops to an expolit.

---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -216,6 +216,11 @@ config GENERIC_HWEIGHT
 config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
 	def_bool MMU
 
+config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
+	hex
+	default 0 if 32BIT
+	default 0xdead000000000000 if 64BIT
+
 config PGTABLE_LEVELS
 	int
 	default 5 if 64BIT

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuezhang Mo <[email protected]>

commit d2b537b3e533f28e0d97293fe9293161fe8cd137 upstream.

If the first directory entry in the root directory is not a bitmap directory entry, 'bh' will not be released and reassigned, which will cause a memory leak.

---
 fs/exfat/balloc.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -110,11 +110,8 @@ int exfat_load_bitmap(struct super_block
 				return -EIO;
 
 			type = exfat_get_entry_type(ep);
-			if (type == TYPE_UNUSED)
-				break;
-			if (type != TYPE_BITMAP)
-				continue;
-			if (ep->dentry.bitmap.flags == 0x0) {
+			if (type == TYPE_BITMAP &&
+			    ep->dentry.bitmap.flags == 0x0) {
 				int err;
 
 				err = exfat_allocate_bitmap(sb, ep);

@@ -122,6 +119,9 @@ int exfat_load_bitmap(struct super_block
 				return err;
 			}
 			brelse(bh);
+
+			if (type == TYPE_UNUSED)
+				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		if (exfat_get_next_cluster(sb, &clu.dir))

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>

commit ac01c8c4246546fd8340a232f3ada1921dc0ee48 upstream.

AddressSanitizer found a use-after-free bug in the symbol code which manifested as 'perf top' segfaulting.

==1238389==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b00c48844b at pc 0x5650d8035961 bp 0x7f751aaecc90 sp 0x7f751aaecc80 READ of size 1 at 0x60b00c48844b thread T193

      #0 0x5650d8035960 in _sort__sym_cmp util/sort.c:310
      #1 0x5650d8043744 in hist_entry__cmp util/hist.c:1286
      #2 0x5650d8043951 in hists__findnew_entry util/hist.c:614
      #3 0x5650d804568f in __hists__add_entry util/hist.c:754
      #4 0x5650d8045bf9 in hists__add_entry util/hist.c:772
      #5 0x5650d8045df1 in iter_add_single_normal_entry util/hist.c:997
      #6 0x5650d8043326 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1242
      #7 0x5650d7ceeefe in perf_event__process_sample /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:845
      #8 0x5650d7ceeefe in deliver_event /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1208
      #9 0x5650d7fdb51b in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
      #10 0x5650d7fdb51b in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
      #11 0x5650d7ced743 in process_thread /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1120
      #12 0x7f757ef1f133 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:442
      #13 0x7f757ef9f7db in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

When updating hist maps it's also necessary to update the hist symbol reference because the old one gets freed in map__put().

While this bug was probably introduced with 5c24b67aae72f54c ("perf
tools: Replace map->referenced & maps->removed_maps with map->refcnt"), the symbol objects were leaked until c087e9480cf33672 ("perf machine:
Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL") was merged so the bug was masked.

---
 tools/perf/util/hist.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -634,6 +634,11 @@ static struct hist_entry *hists__findnew
 			 * the history counter to increment.
 			 */
 			if (he->ms.map != entry->ms.map) {
+				if (he->ms.sym) {
+					u64 addr = he->ms.sym->start;
+					he->ms.sym = map__find_symbol(entry->ms.map, addr);
+				}
+
 				map__put(he->ms.map);
 				he->ms.map = map__get(entry->ms.map);
 			}

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: NeilBrown <[email protected]>

commit 45bb63ed20e02ae146336412889fe5450316a84f upstream.

The pair of bloom filtered used by delegation_blocked() was intended to block delegations on given filehandles for between 30 and 60 seconds. A new filehandle would be recorded in the "new" bit set. That would then be switch to the "old" bit set between 0 and 30 seconds later, and it would remain as the "old" bit set for 30 seconds.

Unfortunately the code intended to clear the old bit set once it reached 30 seconds old, preparing it to be the next new bit set, instead cleared the *new* bit set before switching it to be the old bit set. This means that the "old" bit set is always empty and delegations are blocked between 0 and 30 seconds.

This patch updates bd->new before clearing the set with that index, instead of afterwards.

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1090,7 +1090,8 @@ static void nfs4_free_deleg(struct nfs4_
  * When a delegation is recalled, the filehandle is stored in the "new"
  * filter.
  * Every 30 seconds we swap the filters and clear the "new" one,
- * unless both are empty of course.
+ * unless both are empty of course.  This results in delegations for a
+ * given filehandle being blocked for between 30 and 60 seconds.
  *
  * Each filter is 256 bits.  We hash the filehandle to 32bit and use the
  * low 3 bytes as hash-table indices.

@@ -1119,9 +1120,9 @@ static int delegation_blocked(struct knf
 		if (ktime_get_seconds() - bd->swap_time > 30) {
 			bd->entries -= bd->old_entries;
 			bd->old_entries = bd->entries;
+			bd->new = 1-bd->new;
 			memset(bd->set[bd->new], 0,
 			       sizeof(bd->set[0]));
-			bd->new = 1-bd->new;
 			bd->swap_time = ktime_get_seconds();
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&blocked_delegations_lock);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]>

commit 340e61e44c1d2a15c42ec72ade9195ad525fd048 upstream.

Ext4 will throw -EBADMSG through ext4_readdir when a checksum error occurs, resulting in the following WARNING.

Fix it by mapping EBADMSG to nfserr_io.

nfsd_buffered_readdir
iterate_dir // -EBADMSG -74
ext4_readdir // .iterate_shared
ext4_dx_readdir
ext4_htree_fill_tree
htree_dirblock_to_tree
ext4_read_dirblock
__ext4_read_dirblock
ext4_dirblock_csum_verify
warn_no_space_for_csum
__warn_no_space_for_csum
return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC) // -EBADMSG -74
nfserrno // WARNING

[  161.115610] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  161.116465] nfsd: non-standard errno: -74
[  161.117315] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 780 at fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c:878 nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[  161.118596] Modules linked in:
[  161.119243] CPU: 1 PID: 780 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.0-00014-g79679361fd5d #138
[  161.120684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qe
mu.org 04/01/2014
[  161.123601] RIP: 0010:nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[  161.124676] Code: 0f 87 da 30 dd 00 83 e3 01 b8 00 00 00 05 75 d7 44 89 ee 48 c7 c7 c0 57 24 98 89 44 24 04 c6
 05 ce 2b 61 03 01 e8 99 20 d8 00 <0f> 0b 8b 44 24 04 eb b5 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 6d a4 99 e8 cc 15 33
[  161.127797] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e2f9c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  161.128794] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  161.130089] RDX: 1ffff1103ee16f6d RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff520001c5f2a
[  161.131379] RBP: 0000000000000022 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8881f70c1827
[  161.132664] R10: ffffed103ee18304 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000021
[  161.133949] R13: 00000000ffffffb6 R14: ffff8881317c0000 R15: ffffc90000e2fbd8
[  161.135244] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  161.136695] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  161.137761] CR2: 00007fcaad70b348 CR3: 0000000144256006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[  161.139041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  161.140291] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  161.141519] PKRU: 55555554
[  161.142076] Call Trace:
[  161.142575]  ? __warn+0x9b/0x140
[  161.143229]  ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[  161.143872]  ? report_bug+0x125/0x150
[  161.144595]  ? handle_bug+0x41/0x90
[  161.145284]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  161.146009]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
[  161.146816]  ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[  161.147487]  nfsd_buffered_readdir+0x28b/0x2b0
[  161.148333]  ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[  161.149258]  ? nfsd_buffered_filldir+0xf0/0xf0
[  161.150093]  ? wait_for_concurrent_writes+0x170/0x170
[  161.151004]  ? generic_file_llseek_size+0x48/0x160
[  161.151895]  nfsd_readdir+0x132/0x190
[  161.152606]  ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[  161.153516]  ? nfsd_unlink+0x380/0x380
[  161.154256]  ? override_creds+0x45/0x60
[  161.155006]  nfsd4_encode_readdir+0x21a/0x3d0
[  161.155850]  ? nfsd4_encode_readlink+0x210/0x210
[  161.156731]  ? write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0x97/0xe0
[  161.157598]  ? __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0xd0/0xd0
[  161.158494]  ? lock_downgrade+0x90/0x90
[  161.159232]  ? nfs4svc_decode_voidarg+0x10/0x10
[  161.160092]  nfsd4_encode_operation+0x15a/0x440
[  161.160959]  nfsd4_proc_compound+0x718/0xe90
[  161.161818]  nfsd_dispatch+0x18e/0x2c0
[  161.162586]  svc_process_common+0x786/0xc50
[  161.163403]  ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[  161.164137]  ? svc_printk+0x160/0x160
[  161.164846]  ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue.part.0+0x365/0x380
[  161.165808]  ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[  161.166523]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x40
[  161.167309]  svc_process+0x1a5/0x200
[  161.168019]  nfsd+0x1f5/0x380
[  161.168663]  ? nfsd_shutdown_threads+0x260/0x260
[  161.169554]  kthread+0x1c4/0x210
[  161.170224]  ? kthread_insert_work_sanity_check+0x80/0x80
[  161.171246]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

---
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ nfserrno (int errno)
 		{ nfserr_io, -EUCLEAN },
 		{ nfserr_perm, -ENOKEY },
 		{ nfserr_no_grace, -ENOGRACE},
+		{ nfserr_io, -EBADMSG },
 	};
 	int	i;
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>

commit 202f39039a11402dcbcd5fece8d9fa6be83f49ae upstream.

According to RFC 8881, all minor versions of NFSv4 support PUTPUBFH.

Replace the XDR decoder for PUTPUBFH with a "noop" since we no longer want the minorversion check, and PUTPUBFH has no arguments to decode. (Ideally nfsd4_decode_noop should really be called nfsd4_decode_void).

PUTPUBFH should now behave just like PUTROOTFH.

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c |   10 +---------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -1246,14 +1246,6 @@ nfsd4_decode_putfh(struct nfsd4_compound
 }
 
 static __be32
-nfsd4_decode_putpubfh(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, union nfsd4_op_u *p)
-{
-	if (argp->minorversion == 0)
-		return nfs_ok;
-	return nfserr_notsupp;
-}
-
-static __be32
 nfsd4_decode_read(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, union nfsd4_op_u *u)
 {
 	struct nfsd4_read *read = &u->read;

@@ -2345,7 +2337,7 @@ static const nfsd4_dec nfsd4_dec_ops[] =
 	[OP_OPEN_CONFIRM]	= nfsd4_decode_open_confirm,
 	[OP_OPEN_DOWNGRADE]	= nfsd4_decode_open_downgrade,
 	[OP_PUTFH]		= nfsd4_decode_putfh,
-	[OP_PUTPUBFH]		= nfsd4_decode_putpubfh,
+	[OP_PUTPUBFH]		= nfsd4_decode_noop,
 	[OP_PUTROOTFH]		= nfsd4_decode_noop,
 	[OP_READ]		= nfsd4_decode_read,
 	[OP_READDIR]		= nfsd4_decode_readdir,

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chun-Yi Lee <[email protected]>

commit 6d6e54fc71ad1ab0a87047fd9c211e75d86084a3 upstream.

For fixing CVE-2023-6270, f98364e92662 ("aoe: fix the potential use-after-free problem in aoecmd_cfg_pkts") makes tx() calling dev_put() instead of doing in aoecmd_cfg_pkts(). It avoids that the tx() runs into use-after-free.

Then Nicolai Stange found more places in aoe have potential use-after-free problem with tx(). e.g. revalidate(), aoecmd_ata_rw(), resend(), probe() and aoecmd_cfg_rsp(). Those functions also use aoenet_xmit() to push packet to tx queue. So they should also use dev_hold() to increase the refcnt of skb->dev.

On the other hand, moving dev_put() to tx() causes that the refcnt of skb->dev be reduced to a negative value, because corresponding dev_hold() are not called in revalidate(), aoecmd_ata_rw(), resend(), probe(), and aoecmd_cfg_rsp(). This patch fixed this issue.

---
 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ ata_rw_frameinit(struct frame *f)
 	}
 
 	ah->cmdstat = ATA_CMD_PIO_READ | writebit | extbit;
+	dev_hold(t->ifp->nd);
 	skb->dev = t->ifp->nd;
 }
 

@@ -401,6 +402,8 @@ aoecmd_ata_rw(struct aoedev *d)
 		__skb_queue_head_init(&queue);
 		__skb_queue_tail(&queue, skb);
 		aoenet_xmit(&queue);
+	} else {
+		dev_put(f->t->ifp->nd);
 	}
 	return 1;
 }

@@ -483,10 +486,13 @@ resend(struct aoedev *d, struct frame *f
 	memcpy(h->dst, t->addr, sizeof h->dst);
 	memcpy(h->src, t->ifp->nd->dev_addr, sizeof h->src);
 
+	dev_hold(t->ifp->nd);
 	skb->dev = t->ifp->nd;
 	skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (skb == NULL)
+	if (skb == NULL) {
+		dev_put(t->ifp->nd);
 		return;
+	}
 	f->sent = ktime_get();
 	__skb_queue_head_init(&queue);
 	__skb_queue_tail(&queue, skb);

@@ -617,6 +623,8 @@ probe(struct aoetgt *t)
 		__skb_queue_head_init(&queue);
 		__skb_queue_tail(&queue, skb);
 		aoenet_xmit(&queue);
+	} else {
+		dev_put(f->t->ifp->nd);
 	}
 }
 

@@ -1395,6 +1403,7 @@ aoecmd_ata_id(struct aoedev *d)
 	ah->cmdstat = ATA_CMD_ID_ATA;
 	ah->lba3 = 0xa0;
 
+	dev_hold(t->ifp->nd);
 	skb->dev = t->ifp->nd;
 
 	d->rttavg = RTTAVG_INIT;

@@ -1404,6 +1413,8 @@ aoecmd_ata_id(struct aoedev *d)
 	skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (skb)
 		f->sent = ktime_get();
+	else
+		dev_put(t->ifp->nd);
 
 	return skb;
 }

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>

commit 12fd64babaca4dc09d072f63eda76ba44119816a upstream.

There is a clk == NULL check after the switch to check for unsupported clk types. Since clk is re-assigned in a loop, this check is useless right now for anything but the first round. Let's fix this up by assigning clk = NULL in the loop before the switch statement.

---
 drivers/clk/rockchip/clk.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -438,12 +438,13 @@ void rockchip_clk_register_branches(stru
 				    struct rockchip_clk_branch *list,
 				    unsigned int nr_clk)
 {
-	struct clk *clk = NULL;
+	struct clk *clk;
 	unsigned int idx;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	for (idx = 0; idx < nr_clk; idx++, list++) {
 		flags = list->flags;
+		clk = NULL;
 
 		/* catch simple muxes */
 		switch (list->branch_type) {

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>

commit 9ab27eb5866ccbf57715cfdba4b03d57776092fb upstream.

By simply bailing out, the driver was violating its rule and internal assumptions that either both or no rproc should be initialized. E.g., this could cause the first core to be available but not the second one, leading to crashes on its shutdown later on while trying to dereference that second instance.

---
 drivers/remoteproc/ti_k3_r5_remoteproc.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ init_rmem:
 			dev_err(dev,
 				"Timed out waiting for %s core to power up!\n",
 				rproc->name);
-			return ret;
+			goto err_powerup;
 		}
 	}
 

@@ -1340,6 +1340,7 @@ err_split:
 		}
 	}
 
+err_powerup:
 	rproc_del(rproc);
 err_add:
 	k3_r5_reserved_mem_exit(kproc);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>

commit 0e93c6320ecde0583de09f3fe801ce8822886fec upstream.

Add CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT for several branch clocks. Such clocks don't have a way to change the rate, so set the parent rate instead.

---
 drivers/clk/qcom/dispcc-sm8250.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -837,6 +837,7 @@ static struct clk_branch disp_cc_mdss_dp
 				&disp_cc_mdss_dp_link1_div_clk_src.clkr.hw,
 			},
 			.num_parents = 1,
+			.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
 			.ops = &clk_branch2_ops,
 		},
 	},

@@ -872,6 +873,7 @@ static struct clk_branch disp_cc_mdss_dp
 				&disp_cc_mdss_dp_link_div_clk_src.clkr.hw,
 			},
 			.num_parents = 1,
+			.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
 			.ops = &clk_branch2_ops,
 		},
 	},

@@ -997,6 +999,7 @@ static struct clk_branch disp_cc_mdss_md
 				&disp_cc_mdss_mdp_clk_src.clkr.hw,
 			},
 			.num_parents = 1,
+			.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
 			.ops = &clk_branch2_ops,
 		},
 	},

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>

commit 2dc5d5d401f5c6cecd97800ffef82e8d17d228f0 upstream.

The sun4i_csi driver doesn't implement link validation for the subdev it registers, leaving the link between the subdev and its source unvalidated. Fix it, using the v4l2_subdev_link_validate() helper.

---
 drivers/media/platform/sunxi/sun4i-csi/sun4i_csi.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ static const struct media_entity_operati
 	.link_validate = v4l2_subdev_link_validate,
 };
 
+static const struct media_entity_operations sun4i_csi_subdev_entity_ops = {
+	.link_validate = v4l2_subdev_link_validate,
+};
+
 static int sun4i_csi_notify_bound(struct v4l2_async_notifier *notifier,
 				  struct v4l2_subdev *subdev,
 				  struct v4l2_async_subdev *asd)

@@ -214,6 +218,7 @@ static int sun4i_csi_probe(struct platfo
 	v4l2_subdev_init(subdev, &sun4i_csi_subdev_ops);
 	subdev->flags = V4L2_SUBDEV_FL_HAS_DEVNODE | V4L2_SUBDEV_FL_HAS_EVENTS;
 	subdev->entity.function = MEDIA_ENT_F_VID_IF_BRIDGE;
+	subdev->entity.ops = &sun4i_csi_subdev_entity_ops;
 	subdev->owner = THIS_MODULE;
 	snprintf(subdev->name, sizeof(subdev->name), "sun4i-csi-0");
 	v4l2_set_subdevdata(subdev, csi);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>

commit 889e1332310656961855c0dcedbb4dbe78e39d22 upstream.

With PWRSTS_OFF_ON, PCIe GDSCs are turned off during gdsc_disable(). This can happen during scenarios such as system suspend and breaks the resume of PCIe controllers from suspend.

So use PWRSTS_RET_ON to indicate the GDSC driver to not turn off the GDSCs during gdsc_disable() and allow the hardware to transition the GDSCs to retention when the parent domain enters low power state during system suspend.

---
 drivers/clk/qcom/gcc-sm8450.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2934,7 +2934,7 @@ static struct gdsc pcie_0_gdsc = {
 	.pd = {
 		.name = "pcie_0_gdsc",
 	},
-	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_OFF_ON,
+	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_RET_ON,
 };
 
 static struct gdsc pcie_1_gdsc = {

@@ -2942,7 +2942,7 @@ static struct gdsc pcie_1_gdsc = {
 	.pd = {
 		.name = "pcie_1_gdsc",
 	},
-	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_OFF_ON,
+	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_RET_ON,
 };
 
 static struct gdsc ufs_phy_gdsc = {

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit 599f6899051cb70c4e0aa9fd591b9ee220cb6f14 upstream.

The cec_msg_set_reply_to() helper function never zeroed the struct cec_msg flags field, this can cause unexpected behavior if flags was uninitialized to begin with.

---
 include/uapi/linux/cec.h |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static inline void cec_msg_init(struct c
  * Set the msg destination to the orig initiator and the msg initiator to the
  * orig destination. Note that msg and orig may be the same pointer, in which
  * case the change is done in place.
+ *
+ * It also zeroes the reply, timeout and flags fields.
  */
 static inline void cec_msg_set_reply_to(struct cec_msg *msg,
 					struct cec_msg *orig)

@@ -139,7 +141,9 @@ static inline void cec_msg_set_reply_to(
 	/* The destination becomes the initiator and vice versa */
 	msg->msg[0] = (cec_msg_destination(orig) << 4) |
 		      cec_msg_initiator(orig);
-	msg->reply = msg->timeout = 0;
+	msg->reply = 0;
+	msg->timeout = 0;
+	msg->flags = 0;
 }
 
 /**

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mike Tipton <[email protected]>

commit a4e5af27e6f6a8b0d14bc0d7eb04f4a6c7291586 upstream.

Valid frequencies may result in BCM votes that exceed the max HW value. Set vote ceiling to BCM_TCS_CMD_VOTE_MASK to ensure the votes aren't truncated, which can result in lower frequencies than desired.

---
 drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rpmh.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -266,6 +266,8 @@ static int clk_rpmh_bcm_send_cmd(struct
 		cmd_state = 0;
 	}
 
+	cmd_state = min(cmd_state, BCM_TCS_CMD_VOTE_MASK);
+
 	if (c->last_sent_aggr_state != cmd_state) {
 		cmd.addr = c->res_addr;
 		cmd.data = BCM_TCS_CMD(1, enable, 0, cmd_state);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Satya Priya Kakitapalli <[email protected]>

commit bab0c7a0bc586e736b7cd2aac8e6391709a70ef2 upstream.

The branch clocks of gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src are marked critical and hence these clocks vote on XO blocking the suspend. De-register these clocks and its source as there is no rate setting happening on them.

---
 drivers/clk/qcom/gcc-sc8180x.c |   63 -----------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 63 deletions(-)

@@ -261,28 +261,6 @@ static const struct clk_parent_data gcc_
 	{ .hw = &gpll0_out_even.clkr.hw },
 };
 
-static const struct freq_tbl ftbl_gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src[] = {
-	F(19200000, P_BI_TCXO, 1, 0, 0),
-	F(50000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 12, 0, 0),
-	F(100000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 6, 0, 0),
-	{ }
-};
-
-static struct clk_rcg2 gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src = {
-	.cmd_rcgr = 0x48014,
-	.mnd_width = 0,
-	.hid_width = 5,
-	.parent_map = gcc_parent_map_0,
-	.freq_tbl = ftbl_gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src,
-	.clkr.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
-		.name = "gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src",
-		.parent_data = gcc_parents_0,
-		.num_parents = ARRAY_SIZE(gcc_parents_0),
-		.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
-		.ops = &clk_rcg2_ops,
-	},
-};
-
 static const struct freq_tbl ftbl_gcc_emac_ptp_clk_src[] = {
 	F(19200000, P_BI_TCXO, 1, 0, 0),
 	F(50000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_EVEN, 6, 0, 0),

@@ -1600,25 +1578,6 @@ static struct clk_branch gcc_cfg_noc_usb
 	},
 };
 
-/* For CPUSS functionality the AHB clock needs to be left enabled */
-static struct clk_branch gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk = {
-	.halt_reg = 0x48000,
-	.halt_check = BRANCH_HALT_VOTED,
-	.clkr = {
-		.enable_reg = 0x52004,
-		.enable_mask = BIT(21),
-		.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
-			.name = "gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk",
-			.parent_hws = (const struct clk_hw *[]){
-				      &gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src.clkr.hw
-			},
-			.num_parents = 1,
-			.flags = CLK_IS_CRITICAL | CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
-			.ops = &clk_branch2_ops,
-		},
-	},
-};
-
 static struct clk_branch gcc_cpuss_rbcpr_clk = {
 	.halt_reg = 0x48008,
 	.halt_check = BRANCH_HALT,

@@ -3151,25 +3110,6 @@ static struct clk_branch gcc_sdcc4_apps_
 	},
 };
 
-/* For CPUSS functionality the SYS NOC clock needs to be left enabled */
-static struct clk_branch gcc_sys_noc_cpuss_ahb_clk = {
-	.halt_reg = 0x4819c,
-	.halt_check = BRANCH_HALT_VOTED,
-	.clkr = {
-		.enable_reg = 0x52004,
-		.enable_mask = BIT(0),
-		.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
-			.name = "gcc_sys_noc_cpuss_ahb_clk",
-			.parent_hws = (const struct clk_hw *[]){
-				      &gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src.clkr.hw
-			},
-			.num_parents = 1,
-			.flags = CLK_IS_CRITICAL | CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
-			.ops = &clk_branch2_ops,
-		},
-	},
-};
-
 static struct clk_branch gcc_tsif_ahb_clk = {
 	.halt_reg = 0x36004,
 	.halt_check = BRANCH_HALT,

@@ -4259,8 +4199,6 @@ static struct clk_regmap *gcc_sc8180x_cl
 	[GCC_CFG_NOC_USB3_MP_AXI_CLK] = &gcc_cfg_noc_usb3_mp_axi_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_CFG_NOC_USB3_PRIM_AXI_CLK] = &gcc_cfg_noc_usb3_prim_axi_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_CFG_NOC_USB3_SEC_AXI_CLK] = &gcc_cfg_noc_usb3_sec_axi_clk.clkr,
-	[GCC_CPUSS_AHB_CLK] = &gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk.clkr,
-	[GCC_CPUSS_AHB_CLK_SRC] = &gcc_cpuss_ahb_clk_src.clkr,
 	[GCC_CPUSS_RBCPR_CLK] = &gcc_cpuss_rbcpr_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_DDRSS_GPU_AXI_CLK] = &gcc_ddrss_gpu_axi_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_DISP_HF_AXI_CLK] = &gcc_disp_hf_axi_clk.clkr,

@@ -4397,7 +4335,6 @@ static struct clk_regmap *gcc_sc8180x_cl
 	[GCC_SDCC4_AHB_CLK] = &gcc_sdcc4_ahb_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_SDCC4_APPS_CLK] = &gcc_sdcc4_apps_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_SDCC4_APPS_CLK_SRC] = &gcc_sdcc4_apps_clk_src.clkr,
-	[GCC_SYS_NOC_CPUSS_AHB_CLK] = &gcc_sys_noc_cpuss_ahb_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_TSIF_AHB_CLK] = &gcc_tsif_ahb_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_TSIF_INACTIVITY_TIMERS_CLK] = &gcc_tsif_inactivity_timers_clk.clkr,
 	[GCC_TSIF_REF_CLK] = &gcc_tsif_ref_clk.clkr,

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zheng Wang <[email protected]>

commit c5a85ed88e043474161bbfe54002c89c1cb50ee2 upstream.

in venus_probe, core->work is bound with venus_sys_error_handler, which is used to handle error. The code use core->sys_err_done to make sync work. The core->work is started in venus_event_notify.

If we call venus_remove, there might be an unfished work. The possible sequence is as follows:

CPU0 CPU1

|venus_sys_error_handler
venus_remove |
hfi_destroy |
venus_hfi_destroy |
kfree(hdev); |

                     |hfi_reinit
					 |venus_hfi_queues_reinit
                     |//use hdev

Fix it by canceling the work in venus_remove.

---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ static int venus_remove(struct platform_
 	struct device *dev = core->dev;
 	int ret;
 
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&core->work);
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
 	WARN_ON(ret < 0);
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>

commit ade508b545c969c72cd68479f275a5dd640fd8b9 upstream.

With PWRSTS_OFF_ON, PCIe GDSCs are turned off during gdsc_disable(). This can happen during scenarios such as system suspend and breaks the resume of PCIe controllers from suspend.

So use PWRSTS_RET_ON to indicate the GDSC driver to not turn off the GDSCs during gdsc_disable() and allow the hardware to transition the GDSCs to retention when the parent domain enters low power state during system suspend.

---
 drivers/clk/qcom/gcc-sm8250.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -3228,7 +3228,7 @@ static struct gdsc pcie_0_gdsc = {
 	.pd = {
 		.name = "pcie_0_gdsc",
 	},
-	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_OFF_ON,
+	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_RET_ON,
 };
 
 static struct gdsc pcie_1_gdsc = {

@@ -3236,7 +3236,7 @@ static struct gdsc pcie_1_gdsc = {
 	.pd = {
 		.name = "pcie_1_gdsc",
 	},
-	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_OFF_ON,
+	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_RET_ON,
 };
 
 static struct gdsc pcie_2_gdsc = {

@@ -3244,7 +3244,7 @@ static struct gdsc pcie_2_gdsc = {
 	.pd = {
 		.name = "pcie_2_gdsc",
 	},
-	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_OFF_ON,
+	.pwrsts = PWRSTS_RET_ON,
 };
 
 static struct gdsc ufs_card_gdsc = {

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryan O'Donoghue <[email protected]>

commit a151766bd3688f6803e706c6433a7c8d3c6a6a94 upstream.

pm_runtime_enable() should happen prior to vfe_get() since vfe_get() calls pm_runtime_resume_and_get().

This is a basic race condition that doesn't show up for most users so is not widely reported. If you blacklist qcom-camss in modules.d and then subsequently modprobe the module post-boot it is possible to reliably show this error up.

The kernel log for this error looks like this:

qcom-camss ac5a000.camss: Failed to power up pipeline: -13

---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ static int camss_probe(struct platform_d
 
 	v4l2_async_nf_init(&camss->notifier);
 
+	pm_runtime_enable(dev);
+
 	num_subdevs = camss_of_parse_ports(camss);
 	if (num_subdevs < 0) {
 		ret = num_subdevs;

@@ -1700,8 +1702,6 @@ static int camss_probe(struct platform_d
 		}
 	}
 
-	pm_runtime_enable(dev);
-
 	return 0;
 
 err_register_subdevs:

@@ -1709,6 +1709,7 @@ err_register_subdevs:
 err_v4l2_device_unregister:
 	v4l2_device_unregister(&camss->v4l2_dev);
 	v4l2_async_nf_cleanup(&camss->notifier);
+	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
 err_genpd_cleanup:
 	camss_genpd_cleanup(camss);
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Satya Priya Kakitapalli <[email protected]>

commit b8acaf2de8081371761ab4cf1e7a8ee4e7acc139 upstream.

Update the frequency tables of gcc_sdcc2_apps_clk and gcc_sdcc4_apps_clk as per the latest frequency plan.

---
 drivers/clk/qcom/gcc-sc8180x.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static const struct freq_tbl ftbl_gcc_sd
 	F(25000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 12, 1, 2),
 	F(50000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 12, 0, 0),
 	F(100000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 6, 0, 0),
-	F(200000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 3, 0, 0),
+	F(202000000, P_GPLL9_OUT_MAIN, 4, 0, 0),
 	{ }
 };
 

@@ -918,9 +918,8 @@ static const struct freq_tbl ftbl_gcc_sd
 	F(400000, P_BI_TCXO, 12, 1, 4),
 	F(9600000, P_BI_TCXO, 2, 0, 0),
 	F(19200000, P_BI_TCXO, 1, 0, 0),
-	F(37500000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 16, 0, 0),
 	F(50000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 12, 0, 0),
-	F(75000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 8, 0, 0),
+	F(100000000, P_GPLL0_OUT_MAIN, 6, 0, 0),
 	{ }
 };
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ajit Pandey <[email protected]>

commit fff617979f97c773aaa9432c31cf62444b3bdbd4 upstream.

In LUCID EVO PLL CAL_L_VAL and L_VAL bitfields are part of single PLL_L_VAL register. Update for L_VAL bitfield values in PLL_L_VAL register using regmap_write() API in __alpha_pll_trion_set_rate callback will override LUCID EVO PLL initial configuration related to PLL_CAL_L_VAL bit fields in PLL_L_VAL register.

Observed random PLL lock failures during PLL enable due to such override in PLL calibration value. Use regmap_update_bits() with L_VAL bitfield mask instead of regmap_write() API to update only PLL_L_VAL bitfields in __alpha_pll_trion_set_rate callback.

---
 drivers/clk/qcom/clk-alpha-pll.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@ static int __alpha_pll_trion_set_rate(st
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	regmap_write(pll->clkr.regmap, PLL_L_VAL(pll), l);
+	regmap_update_bits(pll->clkr.regmap, PLL_L_VAL(pll), LUCID_EVO_PLL_L_VAL_MASK,  l);
 	regmap_write(pll->clkr.regmap, PLL_ALPHA_VAL(pll), a);
 
 	/* Latch the PLL input */

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: wangrong <[email protected]>

commit a421e3fe0e6abe27395078f4f0cec5daf466caea upstream.

Due to server permission control, the client does not have access to the shared root directory, but can access subdirectories normally, so users usually mount the shared subdirectories directly. In this case, queryfs should use the actual path instead of the root directory to avoid the call returning an error (EACCES).

---
 fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c   |   13 ++++++++++++-
 fs/smb/client/cifsglob.h |    2 +-
 fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c  |    2 +-
 fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c  |   19 ++++++++++++-------
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -311,8 +311,17 @@ cifs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struc
 	struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
 	unsigned int xid;
 	int rc = 0;
+	const char *full_path;
+	void *page;
 
 	xid = get_xid();
+	page = alloc_dentry_path();
+
+	full_path = build_path_from_dentry(dentry, page);
+	if (IS_ERR(full_path)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(full_path);
+		goto statfs_out;
+	}
 
 	if (le32_to_cpu(tcon->fsAttrInfo.MaxPathNameComponentLength) > 0)
 		buf->f_namelen =

@@ -328,8 +337,10 @@ cifs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struc
 	buf->f_ffree = 0;	/* unlimited */
 
 	if (server->ops->queryfs)
-		rc = server->ops->queryfs(xid, tcon, cifs_sb, buf);
+		rc = server->ops->queryfs(xid, tcon, full_path, cifs_sb, buf);
 
+statfs_out:
+	free_dentry_path(page);
 	free_xid(xid);
 	return rc;
 }

@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations {
 			__u16 net_fid, struct cifsInodeInfo *cifs_inode);
 	/* query remote filesystem */
 	int (*queryfs)(const unsigned int, struct cifs_tcon *,
-		       struct cifs_sb_info *, struct kstatfs *);
+		       const char *, struct cifs_sb_info *, struct kstatfs *);
 	/* send mandatory brlock to the server */
 	int (*mand_lock)(const unsigned int, struct cifsFileInfo *, __u64,
 			 __u64, __u32, int, int, bool);

@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ cifs_oplock_response(struct cifs_tcon *t
 
 static int
 cifs_queryfs(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
-	     struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct kstatfs *buf)
+	     const char *path, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct kstatfs *buf)
 {
 	int rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 

@@ -2677,7 +2677,7 @@ smb2_query_info_compound(const unsigned
 
 static int
 smb2_queryfs(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
-	     struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct kstatfs *buf)
+	     const char *path, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct kstatfs *buf)
 {
 	struct smb2_query_info_rsp *rsp;
 	struct smb2_fs_full_size_info *info = NULL;

@@ -2686,7 +2686,7 @@ smb2_queryfs(const unsigned int xid, str
 	int rc;
 
 
-	rc = smb2_query_info_compound(xid, tcon, "",
+	rc = smb2_query_info_compound(xid, tcon, path,
 				      FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES,
 				      FS_FULL_SIZE_INFORMATION,
 				      SMB2_O_INFO_FILESYSTEM,

@@ -2713,28 +2713,33 @@ qfs_exit:
 
 static int
 smb311_queryfs(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
-	       struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct kstatfs *buf)
+	       const char *path, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct kstatfs *buf)
 {
 	int rc;
-	__le16 srch_path = 0; /* Null - open root of share */
+	__le16 *utf16_path = NULL;
 	u8 oplock = SMB2_OPLOCK_LEVEL_NONE;
 	struct cifs_open_parms oparms;
 	struct cifs_fid fid;
 
 	if (!tcon->posix_extensions)
-		return smb2_queryfs(xid, tcon, cifs_sb, buf);
+		return smb2_queryfs(xid, tcon, path, cifs_sb, buf);
 
 	oparms = (struct cifs_open_parms) {
 		.tcon = tcon,
-		.path = "",
+		.path = path,
 		.desired_access = FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES,
 		.disposition = FILE_OPEN,
 		.create_options = cifs_create_options(cifs_sb, 0),
 		.fid = &fid,
 	};
 
-	rc = SMB2_open(xid, &oparms, &srch_path, &oplock, NULL, NULL,
+	utf16_path = cifs_convert_path_to_utf16(path, cifs_sb);
+	if (utf16_path == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = SMB2_open(xid, &oparms, utf16_path, &oplock, NULL, NULL,
 		       NULL, NULL);
+	kfree(utf16_path);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Barnabás Czémán <[email protected]>

commit 129464e86c7445a858b790ac2d28d35f58256bbe upstream.

Move ST2 reading with overflow handling after measurement data reading.
ST2 register read have to be read after read measurment data, because it means end of the reading and realease the lock on the data. Remove ST2 read skip on interrupt based waiting because ST2 required to be read out at and of the axis read.

---
 drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

@@ -692,22 +692,8 @@ static int ak8975_start_read_axis(struct
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	/* This will be executed only for non-interrupt based waiting case */
-	if (ret & data->def->ctrl_masks[ST1_DRDY]) {
-		ret = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(client,
-					       data->def->ctrl_regs[ST2]);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			dev_err(&client->dev, "Error in reading ST2\n");
-			return ret;
-		}
-		if (ret & (data->def->ctrl_masks[ST2_DERR] |
-			   data->def->ctrl_masks[ST2_HOFL])) {
-			dev_err(&client->dev, "ST2 status error 0x%x\n", ret);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return 0;
+	/* Return with zero if the data is ready. */
+	return !data->def->ctrl_regs[ST1_DRDY];
 }
 
 /* Retrieve raw flux value for one of the x, y, or z axis.  */

@@ -734,6 +720,20 @@ static int ak8975_read_axis(struct iio_d
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto exit;
 
+	/* Read out ST2 for release lock on measurment data. */
+	ret = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(client, data->def->ctrl_regs[ST2]);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(&client->dev, "Error in reading ST2\n");
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	if (ret & (data->def->ctrl_masks[ST2_DERR] |
+		   data->def->ctrl_masks[ST2_HOFL])) {
+		dev_err(&client->dev, "ST2 status error 0x%x\n", ret);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
 
 	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(&data->client->dev);

6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>

commit a1e40ac5b5e9077fe1f7ae0eb88034db0f9ae1ab upstream.

Detect gso fraglist skbs with corrupted geometry (see below) and pass these to skb_segment instead of skb_segment_list, as the first can segment them correctly.

Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs
- consist of two or more segments
- the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size
- one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment
- all but the last must be gso_size

Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can modify these skbs, breaking these invariants.

In extreme cases they pull all data into skb linear. For UDP, this causes a NULL ptr deref in __udpv4_gso_segment_list_csum at udp_hdr(seg->next)->dest.

Detect invalid geometry due to pull, by checking head_skb size. Don't just drop, as this may blackhole a destination. Convert to be able to pass to regular skb_segment.

---
 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -289,8 +289,26 @@ struct sk_buff *__udp_gso_segment(struct
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	if (skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)
-		return __udp_gso_segment_list(gso_skb, features, is_ipv6);
+	if (skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) {
+		 /* Detect modified geometry and pass those to skb_segment. */
+		if (skb_pagelen(gso_skb) - sizeof(*uh) == skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_size)
+			return __udp_gso_segment_list(gso_skb, features, is_ipv6);
+
+		 /* Setup csum, as fraglist skips this in udp4_gro_receive. */
+		gso_skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(gso_skb) - gso_skb->head;
+		gso_skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check);
+		gso_skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
+
+		uh = udp_hdr(gso_skb);
+		if (is_ipv6)
+			uh->check = ~udp_v6_check(gso_skb->len,
+						  &ipv6_hdr(gso_skb)->saddr,
+						  &ipv6_hdr(gso_skb)->daddr, 0);
+		else
+			uh->check = ~udp_v4_check(gso_skb->len,
+						  ip_hdr(gso_skb)->saddr,
+						  ip_hdr(gso_skb)->daddr, 0);
+	}
 
 	skb_pull(gso_skb, sizeof(*uh));