5.4.285-rc1 review

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yunke Cao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6a9c97ab6b7e85697e0b74e86062192a5ffffd99 ]

Clear vb2_plane's memory related fields in __vb2_plane_dmabuf_put(), including bytesused, length, fd and data_offset.

Remove the duplicated code in __prepare_dmabuf().

---
 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 13602939906fc..98651c934d4e0 100644
@@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ static void __vb2_plane_dmabuf_put(struct vb2_buffer *vb, struct vb2_plane *p)
 	p->mem_priv = NULL;
 	p->dbuf = NULL;
 	p->dbuf_mapped = 0;
+	p->bytesused = 0;
+	p->length = 0;
+	p->m.fd = 0;
+	p->data_offset = 0;
 }
 
 /*

@@ -1177,10 +1181,6 @@ static int __prepare_dmabuf(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
 
 		/* Release previously acquired memory if present */
 		__vb2_plane_dmabuf_put(vb, &vb->planes[plane]);
-		vb->planes[plane].bytesused = 0;
-		vb->planes[plane].length = 0;
-		vb->planes[plane].m.fd = 0;
-		vb->planes[plane].data_offset = 0;
 
 		/* Acquire each plane's memory */
 		mem_priv = call_ptr_memop(vb, attach_dmabuf,

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xu Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4fdcc10092fb244218013bfe8ff01c55d54e8e4 ]

Currently, suspend interrupt is enabled before pullup enable operation. This will cause a suspend interrupt assert right after pullup DP. This suspend interrupt is meaningless, so this will ignore such interrupt by enable it after usb reset completed.

---
 drivers/usb/chipidea/udc.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 21c299c85505d..72d62abb6f285 100644
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int hw_device_state(struct ci_hdrc *ci, u32 dma)
 		hw_write(ci, OP_ENDPTLISTADDR, ~0, dma);
 		/* interrupt, error, port change, reset, sleep/suspend */
 		hw_write(ci, OP_USBINTR, ~0,
-			     USBi_UI|USBi_UEI|USBi_PCI|USBi_URI|USBi_SLI);
+			     USBi_UI|USBi_UEI|USBi_PCI|USBi_URI);
 	} else {
 		hw_write(ci, OP_USBINTR, ~0, 0);
 	}

@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ __releases(ci->lock)
 __acquires(ci->lock)
 {
 	int retval;
+	u32 intr;
 
 	spin_unlock(&ci->lock);
 	if (ci->gadget.speed != USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN)

@@ -762,6 +763,11 @@ __acquires(ci->lock)
 	if (retval)
 		goto done;
 
+	/* clear SLI */
+	hw_write(ci, OP_USBSTS, USBi_SLI, USBi_SLI);
+	intr = hw_read(ci, OP_USBINTR, ~0);
+	hw_write(ci, OP_USBINTR, ~0, intr | USBi_SLI);
+
 	ci->status = usb_ep_alloc_request(&ci->ep0in->ep, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (ci->status == NULL)
 		retval = -ENOMEM;

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shawn Shao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4058c39bd176daf11a826802d940d86292a6b02b ]

The issue is that before entering the crash kernel, the DWC USB controller did not perform operations such as resetting the interrupt mask bits. After entering the crash kernel,before the USB interrupt handler registration was completed while loading the DWC USB driver,an GINTSTS_SOF interrupt was received.This triggered the misroute_irq process within the GIC handling framework,ultimately leading to the misrouting of the interrupt,causing it to be handled by the wrong interrupt handler and resulting in the issue.

Summary:In a scenario where the kernel triggers a panic and enters the crash kernel,it is necessary to ensure that the interrupt mask bit is not enabled before the interrupt registration is complete. If an interrupt reaches the CPU at this moment,it will certainly not be handled correctly,especially in cases where this interrupt is reported frequently.

Please refer to the Crashkernel dmesg information as follows (the message on line 3 was added before devm_request_irq is called by the dwc2_driver_probe function):

[    5.866837][    T1] dwc2 JMIC0010:01: supply vusb_d not found, using dummy regulator
[    5.874588][    T1] dwc2 JMIC0010:01: supply vusb_a not found, using dummy regulator
[    5.882335][    T1] dwc2 JMIC0010:01: before devm_request_irq  irq: [71], gintmsk[0xf300080e], gintsts[0x04200009]
[    5.892686][    C0] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.0-jmnd1.2_RC #18
[    5.900327][    C0] Hardware name: CMSS HyperCard4-25G/HyperCard4-25G, BIOS 1.6.4 Jul  8 2024
[    5.908836][    C0] Call trace:
[    5.911965][    C0]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1f0
[    5.916308][    C0]  show_stack+0x20/0x30
[    5.920304][    C0]  dump_stack+0xd8/0x140
[    5.924387][    C0]  pcie_xxx_handler+0x3c/0x1d8
[    5.930121][    C0]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x64/0x1e0
[    5.935506][    C0]  handle_irq_event+0x80/0x1d0
[    5.940109][    C0]  try_one_irq+0x138/0x174
[    5.944365][    C0]  misrouted_irq+0x134/0x140
[    5.948795][    C0]  note_interrupt+0x1d0/0x30c
[    5.953311][    C0]  handle_irq_event+0x13c/0x1d0
[    5.958001][    C0]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xd4/0x260
[    5.962779][    C0]  __handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xf0
[    5.967555][    C0]  gic_handle_irq+0x9c/0x2f0
[    5.971985][    C0]  el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[    5.975807][    C0]  __setup_irq+0x3dc/0x7cc
[    5.980064][    C0]  request_threaded_irq+0xf4/0x1b4
[    5.985015][    C0]  devm_request_threaded_irq+0x80/0x100
[    5.990400][    C0]  dwc2_driver_probe+0x1b8/0x6b0
[    5.995178][    C0]  platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0
[    5.999868][    C0]  really_probe+0xf8/0x51c
[    6.004125][    C0]  driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x170
[    6.008989][    C0]  device_driver_attach+0xc8/0xd0
[    6.013853][    C0]  __driver_attach+0xe8/0x1b0
[    6.018369][    C0]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xdc
[    6.022886][    C0]  driver_attach+0x2c/0x3c
[    6.027143][    C0]  bus_add_driver+0xdc/0x240
[    6.031573][    C0]  driver_register+0x80/0x13c
[    6.036090][    C0]  __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x5c
[    6.041476][    C0]  dwc2_platform_driver_init+0x24/0x30
[    6.046774][    C0]  do_one_initcall+0x50/0x25c
[    6.051291][    C0]  do_initcall_level+0xe4/0xfc
[    6.055894][    C0]  do_initcalls+0x80/0xa4
[    6.060064][    C0]  kernel_init_freeable+0x198/0x240
[    6.065102][    C0]  kernel_init+0x1c/0x12c

---
 drivers/usb/dwc2/platform.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

index 4f640c0c51b39..717fd0c0bccca 100644
@@ -407,18 +407,6 @@ static int dwc2_driver_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
 
 	spin_lock_init(&hsotg->lock);
 
-	hsotg->irq = platform_get_irq(dev, 0);
-	if (hsotg->irq < 0)
-		return hsotg->irq;
-
-	dev_dbg(hsotg->dev, "registering common handler for irq%d\n",
-		hsotg->irq);
-	retval = devm_request_irq(hsotg->dev, hsotg->irq,
-				  dwc2_handle_common_intr, IRQF_SHARED,
-				  dev_name(hsotg->dev), hsotg);
-	if (retval)
-		return retval;
-
 	hsotg->vbus_supply = devm_regulator_get_optional(hsotg->dev, "vbus");
 	if (IS_ERR(hsotg->vbus_supply)) {
 		retval = PTR_ERR(hsotg->vbus_supply);

@@ -454,6 +442,20 @@ static int dwc2_driver_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
 	if (retval)
 		goto error;
 
+	hsotg->irq = platform_get_irq(dev, 0);
+	if (hsotg->irq < 0) {
+		retval = hsotg->irq;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	dev_dbg(hsotg->dev, "registering common handler for irq%d\n",
+		hsotg->irq);
+	retval = devm_request_irq(hsotg->dev, hsotg->irq,
+				  dwc2_handle_common_intr, IRQF_SHARED,
+				  dev_name(hsotg->dev), hsotg);
+	if (retval)
+		goto error;
+
 	/*
 	 * For OTG cores, set the force mode bits to reflect the value
 	 * of dr_mode. Force mode bits should not be touched at any

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Philip Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e25fbcd97cf52c3c9824d44b5c56c19673c3dd50 ]

If a pmem device is in a bad status, the driver side could wait for host ack forever in virtio_pmem_flush(), causing the system to hang.

So add a status check in the beginning of virtio_pmem_flush() to return early if the device is not activated.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 drivers/nvdimm/nd_virtio.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

index 10351d5b49fac..41e97c6567cf9 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,15 @@ static int virtio_pmem_flush(struct nd_region *nd_region)
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int err, err1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Don't bother to submit the request to the device if the device is
+	 * not activated.
+	 */
+	if (vdev->config->get_status(vdev) & VIRTIO_CONFIG_S_NEEDS_RESET) {
+		dev_info(&vdev->dev, "virtio pmem device needs a reset\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	might_sleep();
 	req_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*req_data), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!req_data)

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhu Jun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3c6b818b097dd6932859bcc3d6722a74ec5931c1 ]

Added a check to handle memory allocation failure for trigger_name and return -ENOMEM.

---
 tools/iio/iio_generic_buffer.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

index 2fd10eab75b53..5ef09ac6e7cf7 100644
@@ -479,6 +479,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		trigger_name = malloc(IIO_MAX_NAME_LENGTH);
+		if (!trigger_name) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto error;
+		}
 		ret = read_sysfs_string("name", trig_dev_name, trigger_name);
 		free(trig_dev_name);
 		if (ret < 0) {

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zijun Hu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c0fd973c108cdc22a384854bc4b3e288a9717bb2 ]

Return -EIO instead of 0 for below erroneous bus attribute operations:
- read a bus attribute without show().
- write a bus attribute without store().

---
 drivers/base/bus.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 7d7d28f498edd..f970a40a2f7ad 100644
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ static ssize_t bus_attr_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
 {
 	struct bus_attribute *bus_attr = to_bus_attr(attr);
 	struct subsys_private *subsys_priv = to_subsys_private(kobj);
-	ssize_t ret = 0;
+	/* return -EIO for reading a bus attribute without show() */
+	ssize_t ret = -EIO;
 
 	if (bus_attr->show)
 		ret = bus_attr->show(subsys_priv->bus, buf);

@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ static ssize_t bus_attr_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
 {
 	struct bus_attribute *bus_attr = to_bus_attr(attr);
 	struct subsys_private *subsys_priv = to_subsys_private(kobj);
-	ssize_t ret = 0;
+	/* return -EIO for writing a bus attribute without store() */
+	ssize_t ret = -EIO;
 
 	if (bus_attr->store)
 		ret = bus_attr->store(subsys_priv->bus, buf, count);

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Shumilin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9cf14f5a2746c19455ce9cb44341b5527b5e19c3 ]

The values of the variables xres and yres are placed in strbuf. These variables are obtained from strbuf1.
The strbuf1 array contains digit characters
and a space if the array contains non-digit characters. Then, when executing sprintf(strbuf, "%ux%ux8", xres, yres); more than 16 bytes will be written to strbuf.
It is suggested to increase the size of the strbuf array to 24.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/sis/sis_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 2fdd02e51f5fc..db745dc3cebe2 100644
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static void sisfb_search_mode(char *name, bool quiet)
 {
 	unsigned int j = 0, xres = 0, yres = 0, depth = 0, rate = 0;
 	int i = 0;
-	char strbuf[16], strbuf1[20];
+	char strbuf[24], strbuf1[20];
 	char *nameptr = name;
 
 	/* We don't know the hardware specs yet and there is no ivideo */

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bob Pearson <[email protected]>

commit 2b23b6097303ed0ba5f4bc036a1c07b6027af5c6 upstream.

In rxe_comp_queue_pkt() an incoming response packet skb is enqueued to the resp_pkts queue and then a decision is made whether to run the completer task inline or schedule it. Finally the skb is dereferenced to bump a 'hw' performance counter. This is wrong because if the completer task is already running in a separate thread it may have already processed the skb and freed it which can cause a seg fault. This has been observed infrequently in testing at high scale.

This patch fixes this by changing the order of enqueuing the packet until after the counter is accessed.

[Sherry: bp to fix CVE-2024-38544. Fix conflict due to missing commit:
dccb23f6c312 ("RDMA/rxe: Split rxe_run_task() into two subroutines") which is not necessary to backport]

---
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -150,12 +150,12 @@ void rxe_comp_queue_pkt(struct rxe_qp *q
 {
 	int must_sched;
 
-	skb_queue_tail(&qp->resp_pkts, skb);
-
-	must_sched = skb_queue_len(&qp->resp_pkts) > 1;
+	must_sched = skb_queue_len(&qp->resp_pkts) > 0;
 	if (must_sched != 0)
 		rxe_counter_inc(SKB_TO_PKT(skb)->rxe, RXE_CNT_COMPLETER_SCHED);
 
+	skb_queue_tail(&qp->resp_pkts, skb);
+
 	rxe_run_task(&qp->comp.task, must_sched);
 }
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Ertman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0eae2c136cb624e4050092feb59f18159b4f2512 ]

There is a bug currently when there are more than one VLAN defined and any reset that affects the PF is initiated, after the reset rebuild no traffic will pass on any VLAN but the last one created.

This is caused by the iteration though the VLANs during replay each clearing the vsi_map bitmap of the VSI that is being replayed. The problem is that during rhe replay, the pointer to the vsi_map bitmap is used by each successive vlan to determine if it should be replayed on this VSI.

The logic was that the replay of the VLAN would replace the bit in the map before the next VLAN would iterate through. But, since the replay copies the old bitmap pointer to filt_replay_rules and creates a new one for the recreated VLANS, it does not do this, and leaves the old bitmap broken to be used to replay the remaining VLANs.

Since the old bitmap will be cleaned up in post replay cleanup, there is no need to alter it and break following VLAN replay, so don't clear the bit.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_switch.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

index de520466f23a3..0d8fa189d2d44 100644
@@ -2751,8 +2751,6 @@ ice_replay_vsi_fltr(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vsi_handle, u8 recp_id,
 		if (!itr->vsi_list_info ||
 		    !test_bit(vsi_handle, itr->vsi_list_info->vsi_map))
 			continue;
-		/* Clearing it so that the logic can add it back */
-		clear_bit(vsi_handle, itr->vsi_list_info->vsi_map);
 		f_entry.fltr_info.vsi_handle = vsi_handle;
 		f_entry.fltr_info.fltr_act = ICE_FWD_TO_VSI;
 		/* update the src in case it is VSI num */

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6dbf1f341b6b35bcc20ff95b6b315e509f6c5369 ]

The math in "rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)" could have an integer overflow. Add bounds checking on rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls to fix that.

---
 fs/nfs/callback_xdr.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index 04d27f0ed39ac..1b860995e6bcf 100644
@@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ static __be32 decode_rc_list(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
 
 	rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls = ntohl(*p++);
 	if (rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls) {
+		if (unlikely(rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls > xdr->buf->len))
+			goto out;
 		p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr,
 			     rc_list->rcl_nrefcalls * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
 		if (unlikely(p == NULL))

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e37ab7373696e650d3b6262a5b882aadad69bb9e ]

Fix the TCP loss recovery undo logic in tcp_packet_delayed() so that it can trigger undo even if TSQ prevents a fast recovery episode from reaching tcp_retransmit_skb().

Geumhwan Yu <[email protected]> recently reported that after this commit from 2019:

commit bc9f38c8328e ("tcp: avoid unconditional congestion window undo on SYN retransmit")

...and before this fix we could have buggy scenarios like the following:

+ Due to reordering, a TCP connection receives some SACKs and enters a spurious fast recovery.

+ TSQ prevents all invocations of tcp_retransmit_skb(), because many skbs are queued in lower layers of the sending machine's network stack; thus tp->retrans_stamp remains 0.

+ The connection receives a TCP timestamp ECR value echoing a timestamp before the fast recovery, indicating that the fast recovery was spurious.

+ The connection fails to undo the spurious fast recovery because tp->retrans_stamp is 0, and thus tcp_packet_delayed() returns false, due to the new logic in the 2019 commit: commit bc9f38c8328e ("tcp:
avoid unconditional congestion window undo on SYN retransmit")

This fix tweaks the logic to be more similar to the tcp_packet_delayed() logic before bc9f38c8328e, except that we take care not to be fooled by the FLAG_SYN_ACKED code path zeroing out tp->retrans_stamp (the bug noted and fixed by Yuchung in bc9f38c8328e).

Note that this returns the high-level behavior of tcp_packet_delayed() to again match the comment for the function, which says: "Nothing was retransmitted or returned timestamp is less than timestamp of the first retransmission." Note that this comment is in the original 2005-04-16 Linux git commit, so this is evidently long-standing behavior.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index cf6221e9fda50..75e954590bdd5 100644
@@ -2294,8 +2294,22 @@ static bool tcp_skb_spurious_retrans(const struct tcp_sock *tp,
  */
 static inline bool tcp_packet_delayed(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
 {
-	return tp->retrans_stamp &&
-	       tcp_tsopt_ecr_before(tp, tp->retrans_stamp);
+	const struct sock *sk = (const struct sock *)tp;
+
+	if (tp->retrans_stamp &&
+	    tcp_tsopt_ecr_before(tp, tp->retrans_stamp))
+		return true;  /* got echoed TS before first retransmission */
+
+	/* Check if nothing was retransmitted (retrans_stamp==0), which may
+	 * happen in fast recovery due to TSQ. But we ignore zero retrans_stamp
+	 * in TCP_SYN_SENT, since when we set FLAG_SYN_ACKED we also clear
+	 * retrans_stamp even if we had retransmitted the SYN.
+	 */
+	if (!tp->retrans_stamp &&	   /* no record of a retransmit/SYN? */
+	    sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT)  /* not the FLAG_SYN_ACKED case? */
+		return true;  /* nothing was retransmitted */
+
+	return false;
 }
 
 /* Undo procedures. */

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b41b4cbd9655bcebcce941bef3601db8110335be ]

Fix tcp_enter_recovery() so that if there are no retransmits out then we zero retrans_stamp when entering fast recovery. This is necessary to fix two buggy behaviors.

Currently a non-zero retrans_stamp value can persist across multiple back-to-back loss recovery episodes. This is because we generally only clears retrans_stamp if we are completely done with loss recoveries, and get to tcp_try_to_open() and find !tcp_any_retrans_done(sk). This behavior causes two bugs:

(1) When a loss recovery episode (CA_Loss or CA_Recovery) is followed immediately by a new CA_Recovery, the retrans_stamp value can persist and can be a time before this new CA_Recovery episode starts. That means that timestamp-based undo will be using the wrong retrans_stamp (a value that is too old) when comparing incoming TS ecr values to retrans_stamp to see if the current fast recovery episode can be undone.

(2) If there is a roughly minutes-long sequence of back-to-back fast recovery episodes, one after another (e.g. in a shallow-buffered or policed bottleneck), where each fast recovery successfully makes forward progress and recovers one window of sequence space (but leaves at least one retransmit in flight at the end of the recovery), followed by several RTOs, then the ETIMEDOUT check may be using the wrong retrans_stamp (a value set at the start of the first fast recovery in the sequence). This can cause a very premature ETIMEDOUT, killing the connection prematurely.

This commit changes the code to zero retrans_stamp when entering fast recovery, when this is known to be safe (no retransmits are out in the network). That ensures that when starting a fast recovery episode, and it is safe to do so, retrans_stamp is set when we send the fast retransmit packet. That addresses both bug (1) and bug (2) by ensuring that (if no retransmits are out when we start a fast recovery) we use the initial fast retransmit of this fast recovery as the time value for undo and ETIMEDOUT calculations.

This makes intuitive sense, since the start of a new fast recovery episode (in a scenario where no lost packets are out in the network) means that the connection has made forward progress since the last RTO or fast recovery, and we should thus "restart the clock" used for both undo and ETIMEDOUT logic.

Note that if when we start fast recovery there *are* retransmits out in the network, there can still be undesirable (1)/(2) issues. For example, after this patch we can still have the (1) and (2) problems in cases like this:

+ round 1: sender sends flight 1

+ round 2: sender receives SACKs and enters fast recovery 1, retransmits some packets in flight 1 and then sends some new data as flight 2

+ round 3: sender receives some SACKs for flight 2, notes losses, and retransmits some packets to fill the holes in flight 2

+ fast recovery has some lost retransmits in flight 1 and continues for one or more rounds sending retransmits for flight 1 and flight 2

+ fast recovery 1 completes when snd_una reaches high_seq at end of flight 1

+ there are still holes in the SACK scoreboard in flight 2, so we enter fast recovery 2, but some retransmits in the flight 2 sequence range are still in flight (retrans_out > 0), so we can't execute the new retrans_stamp=0 added here to clear retrans_stamp

It's not yet clear how to fix these remaining (1)/(2) issues in an efficient way without breaking undo behavior, given that retrans_stamp is currently used for undo and ETIMEDOUT. Perhaps the optimal (but expensive) strategy would be to set retrans_stamp to the timestamp of the earliest outstanding retransmit when entering fast recovery. But at least this commit makes things better.

Note that this does not change the semantics of retrans_stamp; it simply makes retrans_stamp accurate in some cases where it was not before:

(1) Some loss recovery, followed by an immediate entry into a fast recovery, where there are no retransmits out when entering the fast recovery.

(2) When a TFO server has a SYNACK retransmit that sets retrans_stamp, and then the ACK that completes the 3-way handshake has SACK blocks that trigger a fast recovery. In this case when entering fast recovery we want to zero out the retrans_stamp from the TFO SYNACK retransmit, and set the retrans_stamp based on the timestamp of the fast recovery.

We introduce a tcp_retrans_stamp_cleanup() helper, because this two-line sequence already appears in 3 places and is about to appear in 2 more as a result of this bug fix patch series. Once this bug fix patches series in the net branch makes it into the net-next branch we'll update the 3 other call sites to use the new helper.

This is a long-standing issue. The Fixes tag below is chosen to be the oldest commit at which the patch will apply cleanly, which is from Linux v3.5 in 2012.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

index 75e954590bdd5..5923261312912 100644
@@ -2343,6 +2343,16 @@ static bool tcp_any_retrans_done(const struct sock *sk)
 	return false;
 }
 
+/* If loss recovery is finished and there are no retransmits out in the
+ * network, then we clear retrans_stamp so that upon the next loss recovery
+ * retransmits_timed_out() and timestamp-undo are using the correct value.
+ */
+static void tcp_retrans_stamp_cleanup(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
+		tcp_sk(sk)->retrans_stamp = 0;
+}
+
 static void DBGUNDO(struct sock *sk, const char *msg)
 {
 #if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 1

@@ -2685,6 +2695,9 @@ void tcp_enter_recovery(struct sock *sk, bool ece_ack)
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	int mib_idx;
 
+	/* Start the clock with our fast retransmit, for undo and ETIMEDOUT. */
+	tcp_retrans_stamp_cleanup(sk);
+
 	if (tcp_is_reno(tp))
 		mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPRENORECOVERY;
 	else

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Roulin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f9ff7665cd128012868098bbd07e28993e314fdb ]

Fix a kernel panic in the br_netfilter module when sending untagged traffic via a VxLAN device.
This happens during the check for fragmentation in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit.

It is dependent on:
1) the br_netfilter module being loaded;
2) net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables set to 1;
3) a bridge with a VxLAN (single-vxlan-device) netdevice as a bridge port;
4) untagged frames with size higher than the VxLAN MTU forwarded/flooded

When forwarding the untagged packet to the VxLAN bridge port, before the netfilter hooks are called, br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel is called and changes the skb_dst to the tunnel dst. The tunnel_dst is a metadata type of dst, i.e., skb_valid_dst(skb) is false, and metadata->dst.dev is NULL.

Then in the br_netfilter hooks, in br_nf_dev_queue_xmit, there's a check for frames that needs to be fragmented: frames with higher MTU than the VxLAN device end up calling br_nf_ip_fragment, which in turns call ip_skb_dst_mtu.

The ip_dst_mtu tries to use the skb_dst(skb) as if it was a valid dst with valid dst->dev, thus the crash.

This case was never supported in the first place, so drop the packet instead.

PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) from 0.0.0.0 h1-eth0: 2000(2028) bytes of data.

[  176.291791] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
virtual address 0000000000000110
[  176.292101] Mem abort info:
[  176.292184]   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[  176.292322]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[  176.292530]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[  176.292709]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[  176.292862]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[  176.293013] Data abort info:
[  176.293104]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[  176.293488]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[  176.293787]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[  176.293995] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043ef5000
[  176.294166] [0000000000000110] pgd=0000000000000000,
p4d=0000000000000000
[  176.294827] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  176.295252] Modules linked in: vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel veth
br_netfilter bridge stp llc ipv6 crct10dif_ce
[  176.295923] CPU: 0 PID: 188 Comm: ping Not tainted
6.8.0-rc3-g5b3fbd61b9d1 #2
[  176.296314] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[  176.296535] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS
BTYPE=--)
[  176.296808] pc : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[  176.297382] lr : br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x2ac/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[  176.297636] sp : ffff800080003630
[  176.297743] x29: ffff800080003630 x28: 0000000000000008 x27:
ffff6828c49ad9f8
[  176.298093] x26: ffff6828c49ad000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24:
00000000000003e8
[  176.298430] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff6828c4960b40 x21:
ffff6828c3b16d28
[  176.298652] x20: ffff6828c3167048 x19: ffff6828c3b16d00 x18:
0000000000000014
[  176.298926] x17: ffffb0476322f000 x16: ffffb7e164023730 x15:
0000000095744632
[  176.299296] x14: ffff6828c3f1c880 x13: 0000000000000002 x12:
ffffb7e137926a70
[  176.299574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff6828c3f1c898 x9 :
0000000000000000
[  176.300049] x8 : ffff6828c49bf070 x7 : 0008460f18d5f20e x6 :
f20e0100bebafeca
[  176.300302] x5 : ffff6828c7f918fe x4 : ffff6828c49bf070 x3 :
0000000000000000
[  176.300586] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff6828c3c7ad00 x0 :
ffff6828c7f918f0
[  176.300889] Call trace:
[  176.301123]  br_nf_dev_queue_xmit+0x390/0x4ec [br_netfilter]
[  176.301411]  br_nf_post_routing+0x2a8/0x3e4 [br_netfilter]
[  176.301703]  nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[  176.302060]  br_forward_finish+0xc8/0xe8 [bridge]
[  176.302371]  br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter]
[  176.302605]  br_nf_forward_finish+0x118/0x22c [br_netfilter]
[  176.302824]  br_nf_forward_ip.part.0+0x264/0x290 [br_netfilter]
[  176.303136]  br_nf_forward+0x2b8/0x4e0 [br_netfilter]
[  176.303359]  nf_hook_slow+0x48/0x124
[  176.303803]  __br_forward+0xc4/0x194 [bridge]
[  176.304013]  br_flood+0xd4/0x168 [bridge]
[  176.304300]  br_handle_frame_finish+0x1d4/0x5c4 [bridge]
[  176.304536]  br_nf_hook_thresh+0x124/0x134 [br_netfilter]
[  176.304978]  br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x29c/0x494 [br_netfilter]
[  176.305188]  br_nf_pre_routing+0x250/0x524 [br_netfilter]
[  176.305428]  br_handle_frame+0x244/0x3cc [bridge]
[  176.305695]  __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x33c/0xecc
[  176.306080]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x40/0x8c
[  176.306197]  __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x64
[  176.306369]  process_backlog+0x80/0x124
[  176.306540]  __napi_poll+0x38/0x17c
[  176.306636]  net_rx_action+0x124/0x26c
[  176.306758]  __do_softirq+0x100/0x26c
[  176.307051]  ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
[  176.307162]  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c
[  176.307289]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c
[  176.307396]  do_softirq+0x54/0x6c
[  176.307485]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0x98
[  176.307637]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x22c/0xd28
[  176.307775]  neigh_resolve_output+0xf4/0x1a0
[  176.308018]  ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628
[  176.308137]  ip_do_fragment+0x5b4/0x658
[  176.308279]  ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x48/0xec
[  176.308420]  __ip_finish_output+0xa4/0x254
[  176.308593]  ip_finish_output+0x34/0x130
[  176.308814]  ip_output+0x6c/0x108
[  176.308929]  ip_send_skb+0x50/0xf0
[  176.309095]  ip_push_pending_frames+0x30/0x54
[  176.309254]  raw_sendmsg+0x758/0xaec
[  176.309568]  inet_sendmsg+0x44/0x70
[  176.309667]  __sys_sendto+0x110/0x178
[  176.309758]  __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x38
[  176.309918]  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
[  176.310211]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
[  176.310353]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[  176.310434]  el0_svc+0x34/0xb4
[  176.310551]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
[  176.310690]  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[  176.311066] Code: f9402e61 79402aa2 927ff821 f9400023 (f9408860)
[  176.315743] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  176.316060] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in
interrupt
[  176.316371] Kernel Offset: 0x37e0e3000000 from 0xffff800080000000
[  176.316564] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff97d780000000
[  176.316782] CPU features: 0x0,88000203,3c020000,0100421b
[  176.317210] Memory Limit: none
[  176.317527] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal

Exception in interrupt ]---\

---
 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

index 277b6fb92ac5f..a16559140541c 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/addrconf.h>
+#include <net/dst_metadata.h>
 #include <net/route.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/br_netfilter.h>
 #include <net/netns/generic.h>

@@ -753,6 +754,10 @@ static int br_nf_dev_queue_xmit(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff
 		return br_dev_queue_push_xmit(net, sk, skb);
 	}
 
+	/* Fragmentation on metadata/template dst is not supported */
+	if (unlikely(!skb_valid_dst(skb)))
+		goto drop;
+
 	/* This is wrong! We should preserve the original fragment
 	 * boundaries by preserving frag_list rather than refragmenting.
 	 */

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08d1914293dae38350b8088980e59fbc699a72fe ]

rfcomm_sk_state_change attempts to use sock_lock so it must never be called with it locked but rfcomm_sock_ioctl always attempt to lock it causing the following trace:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor386/5093 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807c396258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1671 [inline] ffff88807c396258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rfcomm_sk_state_change+0x5b/0x310 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:73

but task is already holding lock:
ffff88807badfd28 (&d->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __rfcomm_dlc_close+0x226/0x6a0 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c:491

---
 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

index e67310a749d27..c52e2f7ff84bd 100644
@@ -872,9 +872,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned lon
 
 	if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_BT_RFCOMM_TTY
-		lock_sock(sk);
 		err = rfcomm_dev_ioctl(sk, cmd, (void __user *) arg);
-		release_sock(sk);
 #else
 		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 #endif

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Billy Tsai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1bb5a99e1f3fd27accb804aa0443a789161f843c ]

Performing a dummy read ensures that the register write operation is fully completed, mitigating any potential bus delays that could otherwise impact the frequency of bitbang usage. E.g., if the JTAG application uses GPIO to control the JTAG pins (TCK, TMS, TDI, TDO, and TRST), and the application sets the TCK clock to 1 MHz, the GPIO's high/low transitions will rely on a delay function to ensure the clock frequency does not exceed 1 MHz. However, this can lead to rapid toggling of the GPIO because the write operation is POSTed and does not wait for a bus acknowledgment.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-aspeed.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index b7e93d10a6ab6..24bd00a6ae423 100644
@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ static void __aspeed_gpio_set(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned int offset,
 	gpio->dcache[GPIO_BANK(offset)] = reg;
 
 	iowrite32(reg, addr);
+	/* Flush write */
+	ioread32(addr);
 }
 
 static void aspeed_gpio_set(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned int offset,

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Billy Tsai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6191a3d18119184237f4ee600039081ad992320 ]

Replace of_clk_get with devm_clk_get_enabled to manage the clock source.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-aspeed.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 24bd00a6ae423..9df73ae84841a 100644
@@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ static int __init aspeed_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (!gpio_id)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	gpio->clk = of_clk_get(pdev->dev.of_node, 0);
+	gpio->clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(gpio->clk)) {
 		dev_warn(&pdev->dev,
 				"Failed to get clock from devicetree, debouncing disabled\n");

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mohamed Khalfella <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 330a699ecbfc9c26ec92c6310686da1230b4e7eb ]

Commit 004d25060c78 ("igb: Fix igb_down hung on surprise removal") changed igb_io_error_detected() to ignore non-fatal pcie errors in order to avoid hung task that can happen when igb_down() is called multiple times. This caused an issue when processing transient non-fatal errors. igb_io_resume(), which is called after igb_io_error_detected(), assumes that device is brought down by igb_io_error_detected() if the interface is up. This resulted in panic with stacktrace below.

[ T3256] igb 0000:09:00.0 haeth0: igb: haeth0 NIC Link is Down

[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) error received: 0000:09:00.0
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fatal), type=Transaction Layer, (Requester ID)
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0:   device [8086:1537] error status/mask=00004000/00000000
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0:    [14] CmpltTO [  200.105524,009][  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: AER:   TLP Header: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast error_detected message
[  T292] igb 0000:09:00.0: Non-correctable non-fatal error reported.
[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast mmio_enabled message
[  T292] pcieport 0000:00:1c.5: AER: broadcast resume message
[  T292] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  T292] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6539!
[  T292] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  T292] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292] Call Trace:
[  T292]  <TASK>
[  T292]  ? die+0x33/0x90
[  T292]  ? do_trap+0xdc/0x110
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? do_error_trap+0x70/0xb0
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  T292]  ? napi_enable+0x37/0x40
[  T292]  igb_up+0x41/0x150
[  T292]  igb_io_resume+0x25/0x70
[  T292]  report_resume+0x54/0x70
[  T292]  ? report_frozen_detected+0x20/0x20
[  T292]  pci_walk_bus+0x6c/0x90
[  T292]  ? aer_print_port_info+0xa0/0xa0
[  T292]  pcie_do_recovery+0x22f/0x380
[  T292]  aer_process_err_devices+0x110/0x160
[  T292]  aer_isr+0x1c1/0x1e0
[  T292]  ? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10
[  T292]  irq_thread_fn+0x1a/0x60
[  T292]  irq_thread+0xe3/0x1a0
[  T292]  ? irq_set_affinity_notifier+0x120/0x120
[  T292]  ? irq_affinity_notify+0x100/0x100
[  T292]  kthread+0xe2/0x110
[  T292]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[  T292]  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[  T292]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[  T292]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[  T292]  </TASK>

To fix this issue igb_io_resume() checks if the interface is running and the device is not down this means igb_io_error_detected() did not bring the device down and there is no need to bring it up.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

index 884beeb67a1fb..1e9967657248a 100644
@@ -9111,6 +9111,10 @@ static void igb_io_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	struct igb_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
 
 	if (netif_running(netdev)) {
+		if (!test_bit(__IGB_DOWN, &adapter->state)) {
+			dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "Resuming from non-fatal error, do nothing.\n");
+			return;
+		}
 		if (igb_up(adapter)) {
 			dev_err(&pdev->dev, "igb_up failed after reset\n");
 			return;

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3cb7cf1540ddff5473d6baeb530228d19bc97b8a ]

Most qdiscs maintain their backlog using qdisc_pkt_len(skb) on the assumption it is invariant between the enqueue() and dequeue() handlers.

Unfortunately syzbot can crash a host rather easily using a TBF + SFQ combination, with an STAB on SFQ [1]

We can't support TCA_STAB on arbitrary level, this would require to maintain per-qdisc storage.

[1]

[   88.796496] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[   88.798611] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   88.799014] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   88.799506] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   88.799829] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   88.800569] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2053 Comm: b371744477 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-virtme #1117
[   88.801107] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   88.801779] RIP: 0010:sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq
[ 88.802544] Code: 0f b7 50 12 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 00 48 89 d6 48 29 d0 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 48 c1 e0 03 48 01 c2 66 83 7a 1a 00 7e c0 48 8b 3a <4c> 8b 07 4c 89 02 49 89 50 08 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c7 07 00

All code
========
0: 0f b7 50 12 movzwl 0x12(%rax),%edx
4: 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 lea 0x0(,%rdx,8),%rax
b: 00

   c:	48 89 d6             	mov    %rdx,%rsi
   f:	48 29 d0             	sub    %rdx,%rax
  12:	48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 	mov    0x1c0(%rcx),%rdx
  19:	48 c1 e0 03          	shl    $0x3,%rax
  1d:	48 01 c2             	add    %rax,%rdx
  20:	66 83 7a 1a 00       	cmpw   $0x0,0x1a(%rdx)
  25:	7e c0                	jle    0xffffffffffffffe7
  27:	48 8b 3a             	mov    (%rdx),%rdi
  2a:*	4c 8b 07             	mov    (%rdi),%r8		<-- trapping instruction
  2d:	4c 89 02             	mov    %r8,(%rdx)
  30:	49 89 50 08          	mov    %rdx,0x8(%r8)
  34:	48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,0x8(%rdi)
  3b:	00
  3c:	48                   	rex.W
  3d:	c7                   	.byte 0xc7
  3e:	07                   	(bad)
	...

Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================

   0:	4c 8b 07             	mov    (%rdi),%r8
   3:	4c 89 02             	mov    %r8,(%rdx)
   6:	49 89 50 08          	mov    %rdx,0x8(%r8)
   a:	48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 	movq   $0x0,0x8(%rdi)
  11:	00
  12:	48                   	rex.W
  13:	c7                   	.byte 0xc7
  14:	07                   	(bad)
	...
[   88.803721] RSP: 0018:ffff9a1f892b7d58 EFLAGS: 00000206
[   88.804032] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a1f8420c800 RCX: ffff9a1f8420c800
[   88.804560] RDX: ffff9a1f81bc1440 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   88.805056] RBP: ffffffffc04bb0e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000ff7f9a1f
[   88.805473] R10: 000000000001001b R11: 0000000000009a1f R12: 0000000000000140
[   88.806194] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9a1f886df400 R15: ffff9a1f886df4ac
[   88.806734] FS:  00007f445601a740(0000) GS:ffff9a2e7fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   88.807225] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   88.807672] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000050cc46000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   88.808165] Call Trace:
[   88.808459]  <TASK>
[   88.808710] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
[   88.809261] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715)
[   88.809561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:87 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:147 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1489 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539)
[   88.809806] ? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623)
[   88.810074] ? sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq
[   88.810411] sfq_reset (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525) sch_sfq
[   88.810671] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036)
[   88.810950] tbf_reset (./include/linux/timekeeping.h:169 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:334) sch_tbf
[   88.811208] qdisc_reset (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2135 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2441 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3304 ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3310 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036)
[   88.811484] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues (./include/linux/spinlock.h:396 ./include/net/sch_generic.h:768 net/core/dev.c:2958)
[   88.811870] __tun_detach (drivers/net/tun.c:590 drivers/net/tun.c:673)
[   88.812271] tun_chr_close (drivers/net/tun.c:702 drivers/net/tun.c:3517)
[   88.812505] __fput (fs/file_table.c:432 (discriminator 1))
[   88.812735] task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:230)
[   88.813016] do_exit (kernel/exit.c:940)
[   88.813372] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:58 (discriminator 4))
[   88.813639] ? handle_mm_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:97 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:155 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1022 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1045 ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:1052 mm/memory.c:5928 mm/memory.c:6088)
[   88.813867] do_group_exit (kernel/exit.c:1070)
[   88.814138] __x64_sys_exit_group (kernel/exit.c:1099)
[   88.814490] x64_sys_call (??:?)
[   88.814791] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
[   88.815012] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   88.815495] RIP: 0033:0x7f44560f1975

---
 include/net/sch_generic.h | 1 -
 net/sched/sch_api.c       | 7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index e8034756cbf8e..6d934ce54c8dd 100644
@@ -827,7 +827,6 @@ static inline void qdisc_calculate_pkt_len(struct sk_buff *skb,
 static inline int qdisc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 				struct sk_buff **to_free)
 {
-	qdisc_calculate_pkt_len(skb, sch);
 	return sch->enqueue(skb, sch, to_free);
 }
 

index d07146a2d0bba..069d0d8a89397 100644
@@ -586,7 +586,6 @@ void __qdisc_calculate_pkt_len(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		pkt_len = 1;
 	qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len = pkt_len;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__qdisc_calculate_pkt_len);
 
 void qdisc_warn_nonwc(const char *txt, struct Qdisc *qdisc)
 {

@@ -1110,6 +1109,12 @@ static int qdisc_graft(struct net_device *dev, struct Qdisc *parent,
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
+		if (new &&
+		    !(parent->flags & TCQ_F_MQROOT) &&
+		    rcu_access_pointer(new->stab)) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "STAB not supported on a non root");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		err = cops->graft(parent, cl, new, &old, extack);
 		if (err)
 			return err;

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rosen Penev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08c8acc9d8f3f70d62dd928571368d5018206490 ]

dcr_map is called in the previous if and therefore needs to be unmapped.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/emac/mal.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 075c07303f165..b095d5057b5eb 100644
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int mal_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%pOF: Support for 405EZ not enabled!\n",
 				ofdev->dev.of_node);
 		err = -ENODEV;
-		goto fail;
+		goto fail_unmap;
 #endif
 	}
 

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 288efe8606b62d0753ba6722b36ef241877251fd ]

sk->sk_ack_backlog can be read without any lock being held. We need to use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to avoid load/store tearing and/or potential KCSAN warnings.

Stable-dep-of: 4d5c70e6155d ("sctp: ensure sk_state is set to CLOSED if hashing fails in sctp_listen_start")

---
 include/net/sock.h  | 6 +++---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c      | 2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c | 2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +-
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +-
 net/sched/em_meta.c | 2 +-
 net/sctp/diag.c     | 2 +-
 7 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

index 250d5a6c508cb..c0d5775bc62c0 100644
@@ -873,17 +873,17 @@ static inline gfp_t sk_gfp_mask(const struct sock *sk, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 
 static inline void sk_acceptq_removed(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	sk->sk_ack_backlog--;
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog, sk->sk_ack_backlog - 1);
 }
 
 static inline void sk_acceptq_added(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	sk->sk_ack_backlog++;
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog, sk->sk_ack_backlog + 1);
 }
 
 static inline bool sk_acceptq_is_full(const struct sock *sk)
 {
-	return sk->sk_ack_backlog > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
+	return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
 }
 
 /*

index 54399256a4380..4800422169f95 100644
@@ -3280,7 +3280,7 @@ void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
 		 * tcpi_unacked -> Number of children ready for accept()
 		 * tcpi_sacked  -> max backlog
 		 */
-		info->tcpi_unacked = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
+		info->tcpi_unacked = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
 		info->tcpi_sacked = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
 		return;
 	}

index 549506162ddec..edfbab54c46f4 100644
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static void tcp_diag_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct inet_diag_msg *r,
 	struct tcp_info *info = _info;
 
 	if (inet_sk_state_load(sk) == TCP_LISTEN) {
-		r->idiag_rqueue = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
+		r->idiag_rqueue = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
 		r->idiag_wqueue = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
 	} else if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
 		const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

index a0a4dbcf8c12f..1f8a9b323a0dd 100644
@@ -2500,7 +2500,7 @@ static void get_tcp4_sock(struct sock *sk, struct seq_file *f, int i)
 
 	state = inet_sk_state_load(sk);
 	if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
-		rx_queue = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
+		rx_queue = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
 	else
 		/* Because we don't lock the socket,
 		 * we might find a transient negative value.

index 81b7ef21180bf..8be41d6c4278b 100644
@@ -1921,7 +1921,7 @@ static void get_tcp6_sock(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, int i)
 
 	state = inet_sk_state_load(sp);
 	if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
-		rx_queue = sp->sk_ack_backlog;
+		rx_queue = READ_ONCE(sp->sk_ack_backlog);
 	else
 		/* Because we don't lock the socket,
 		 * we might find a transient negative value.

index ad007cdcec978..c4c297627feac 100644
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ META_COLLECTOR(int_sk_ack_bl)
 		*err = -1;
 		return;
 	}
-	dst->value = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
+	dst->value = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
 }
 
 META_COLLECTOR(int_sk_max_ack_bl)

index 2d0318a7352c2..e0785592fdd63 100644
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static void sctp_diag_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct inet_diag_msg *r,
 		r->idiag_rqueue = atomic_read(&infox->asoc->rmem_alloc);
 		r->idiag_wqueue = infox->asoc->sndbuf_used;
 	} else {
-		r->idiag_rqueue = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
+		r->idiag_rqueue = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
 		r->idiag_wqueue = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
 	}
 	if (infox->sctpinfo)

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 099ecf59f05b5f30f42ebac0ab8cb94f9b18c90c ]

sk->sk_max_ack_backlog can be read without any lock being held at least in TCP/DCCP cases.

We need to use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to avoid load/store tearing and/or potential KCSAN warnings.

Stable-dep-of: 4d5c70e6155d ("sctp: ensure sk_state is set to CLOSED if hashing fails in sctp_listen_start")

---
 include/net/sock.h              | 2 +-
 net/dccp/proto.c                | 2 +-
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c              | 2 +-
 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                  | 2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c             | 2 +-
 net/sched/em_meta.c             | 2 +-
 net/sctp/diag.c                 | 2 +-
 net/sctp/socket.c               | 4 ++--
 9 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

index c0d5775bc62c0..986f9724da8d0 100644
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static inline void sk_acceptq_added(struct sock *sk)
 
 static inline bool sk_acceptq_is_full(const struct sock *sk)
 {
-	return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
+	return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog) > READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog);
 }
 
 /*

index 491b148afa8f0..add742af1c8b9 100644
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ int inet_dccp_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 	if (!((1 << old_state) & (DCCPF_CLOSED | DCCPF_LISTEN)))
 		goto out;
 
-	sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog, backlog);
 	/* Really, if the socket is already in listen state
 	 * we can only allow the backlog to be adjusted.
 	 */

index e0d0aae343ac8..be2b786cee2bd 100644
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 	if (!((1 << old_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)))
 		goto out;
 
-	sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog, backlog);
 	/* Really, if the socket is already in listen state
 	 * we can only allow the backlog to be adjusted.
 	 */

index 091999dbef335..6766a154ff854 100644
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ static void reqsk_timer_handler(struct timer_list *t)
 	 * ones are about to clog our table.
 	 */
 	qlen = reqsk_queue_len(queue);
-	if ((qlen << 1) > max(8U, sk_listener->sk_max_ack_backlog)) {
+	if ((qlen << 1) > max(8U, READ_ONCE(sk_listener->sk_max_ack_backlog))) {
 		int young = reqsk_queue_len_young(queue) << 1;
 
 		while (thresh > 2) {

index 4800422169f95..55754bf176d99 100644
@@ -3281,7 +3281,7 @@ void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
 		 * tcpi_sacked  -> max backlog
 		 */
 		info->tcpi_unacked = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
-		info->tcpi_sacked = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
+		info->tcpi_sacked = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog);
 		return;
 	}
 

index edfbab54c46f4..0d08f9e2d8d03 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static void tcp_diag_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct inet_diag_msg *r,
 
 	if (inet_sk_state_load(sk) == TCP_LISTEN) {
 		r->idiag_rqueue = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
-		r->idiag_wqueue = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
+		r->idiag_wqueue = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog);
 	} else if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
 		const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 

index c4c297627feac..46254968d390f 100644
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ META_COLLECTOR(int_sk_max_ack_bl)
 		*err = -1;
 		return;
 	}
-	dst->value = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
+	dst->value = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog);
 }
 
 META_COLLECTOR(int_sk_prio)

index e0785592fdd63..2fcfb8cc8bd12 100644
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void sctp_diag_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct inet_diag_msg *r,
 		r->idiag_wqueue = infox->asoc->sndbuf_used;
 	} else {
 		r->idiag_rqueue = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
-		r->idiag_wqueue = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
+		r->idiag_wqueue = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog);
 	}
 	if (infox->sctpinfo)
 		sctp_get_sctp_info(sk, infox->asoc, infox->sctpinfo);

index eef807edd61da..efc9981481c5f 100644
@@ -8407,7 +8407,7 @@ static int sctp_listen_start(struct sock *sk, int backlog)
 		}
 	}
 
-	sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog, backlog);
 	return sctp_hash_endpoint(ep);
 }
 

@@ -8461,7 +8461,7 @@ int sctp_inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 
 	/* If we are already listening, just update the backlog */
 	if (sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING))
-		sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
+		WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog, backlog);
 	else {
 		err = sctp_listen_start(sk, backlog);
 		if (err)

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4d5c70e6155d5eae198bade4afeab3c1b15073b6 ]

If hashing fails in sctp_listen_start(), the socket remains in the LISTENING state, even though it was not added to the hash table. This can lead to a scenario where a socket appears to be listening without actually being accessible.

This patch ensures that if the hashing operation fails, the sk_state is set back to CLOSED before returning an error.

Note that there is no need to undo the autobind operation if hashing fails, as the bind port can still be used for next listen() call on the same socket.

---
 net/sctp/socket.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index efc9981481c5f..4aee4fc05ba7c 100644
@@ -8370,6 +8370,7 @@ static int sctp_listen_start(struct sock *sk, int backlog)
 	struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep;
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
 	char alg[32];
+	int err;
 
 	/* Allocate HMAC for generating cookie. */
 	if (!sp->hmac && sp->sctp_hmac_alg) {

@@ -8397,18 +8398,25 @@ static int sctp_listen_start(struct sock *sk, int backlog)
 	inet_sk_set_state(sk, SCTP_SS_LISTENING);
 	if (!ep->base.bind_addr.port) {
 		if (sctp_autobind(sk)) {
-			inet_sk_set_state(sk, SCTP_SS_CLOSED);
-			return -EAGAIN;
+			err = -EAGAIN;
+			goto err;
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (sctp_get_port(sk, inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)) {
-			inet_sk_set_state(sk, SCTP_SS_CLOSED);
-			return -EADDRINUSE;
+			err = -EADDRINUSE;
+			goto err;
 		}
 	}
 
 	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_max_ack_backlog, backlog);
-	return sctp_hash_endpoint(ep);
+	err = sctp_hash_endpoint(ep);
+	if (err)
+		goto err;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	inet_sk_set_state(sk, SCTP_SS_CLOSED);
+	return err;
 }
 
 /*

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 40dddd4b8bd08a69471efd96107a4e1c73fabefc ]

syzbot reported an issue in ppp_async_encode() [1]

In this case, pppoe_sendmsg() is called with a zero size. Then ppp_async_encode() is called with an empty skb.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ppp_async_encode drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:545 [inline]
 BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ppp_async_push+0xb4f/0x2660 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:675
  ppp_async_encode drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:545 [inline]
  ppp_async_push+0xb4f/0x2660 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:675
  ppp_async_send+0x130/0x1b0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:634
  ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2280 [inline]
  ppp_input+0x1f1/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2304
  pppoe_rcv_core+0x1d3/0x720 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379
  sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1113
  __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3072
  release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3626
  pppoe_sendmsg+0x2b8/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:903
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768
  x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was created at:

  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4092 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4187
  kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587
  __alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678
  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1322 [inline]
  sock_wmalloc+0xfe/0x1a0 net/core/sock.c:2732
  pppoe_sendmsg+0x3a7/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:867
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768
  x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5411 Comm: syz.1.14 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller-00165-g360c1f1f24c6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024

---
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 34c31d6da734c..c41eeecb5a106 100644
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ ppp_async_encode(struct asyncppp *ap)
 	 * and 7 (code-reject) must be sent as though no options
 	 * had been negotiated.
 	 */
-	islcp = proto == PPP_LCP && 1 <= data[2] && data[2] <= 7;
+	islcp = proto == PPP_LCP && count >= 3 && 1 <= data[2] && data[2] <= 7;
 
 	if (i == 0) {
 		if (islcp)

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d3fce8cbe3a70a1c7c06c9b53696be5d5d8dd5c ]

syzbot found that slhc_remember() was missing checks against malicious packets [1].

slhc_remember() only checked the size of the packet was at least 20, which is not good enough.

We need to make sure the packet includes the IPv4 and TCP header that are supposed to be carried.

Add iph and th pointers to make the code more readable.

[1]

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in slhc_remember+0x2e8/0x7b0 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:666
  slhc_remember+0x2e8/0x7b0 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:666
  ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0xe45/0x35e0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2455
  ppp_receive_frame drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2372 [inline]
  ppp_do_recv+0x65f/0x40d0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2212
  ppp_input+0x7dc/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2327
  pppoe_rcv_core+0x1d3/0x720 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379
  sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1113
  __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3072
  release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3626
  pppoe_sendmsg+0x2b8/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:903
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768
  x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was created at:

  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4091 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4134 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4186
  kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587
  __alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678
  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1322 [inline]
  sock_wmalloc+0xfe/0x1a0 net/core/sock.c:2732
  pppoe_sendmsg+0x3a7/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:867
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768
  x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5460 Comm: syz.2.33 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00006-g87d6aab2389e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024

---
 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

index f78ceba42e57e..603a29f3905ba 100644
@@ -643,46 +643,57 @@ slhc_uncompress(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 int
 slhc_remember(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 {
-	struct cstate *cs;
-	unsigned ihl;
-
+	const struct tcphdr *th;
 	unsigned char index;
+	struct iphdr *iph;
+	struct cstate *cs;
+	unsigned int ihl;
 
-	if(isize < 20) {
-		/* The packet is shorter than a legal IP header */
+	/* The packet is shorter than a legal IP header.
+	 * Also make sure isize is positive.
+	 */
+	if (isize < (int)sizeof(struct iphdr)) {
+runt:
 		comp->sls_i_runt++;
-		return slhc_toss( comp );
+		return slhc_toss(comp);
 	}
+	iph = (struct iphdr *)icp;
 	/* Peek at the IP header's IHL field to find its length */
-	ihl = icp[0] & 0xf;
-	if(ihl < 20 / 4){
-		/* The IP header length field is too small */
-		comp->sls_i_runt++;
-		return slhc_toss( comp );
-	}
-	index = icp[9];
-	icp[9] = IPPROTO_TCP;
+	ihl = iph->ihl;
+	/* The IP header length field is too small,
+	 * or packet is shorter than the IP header followed
+	 * by minimal tcp header.
+	 */
+	if (ihl < 5 || isize < ihl * 4 + sizeof(struct tcphdr))
+		goto runt;
+
+	index = iph->protocol;
+	iph->protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
 
 	if (ip_fast_csum(icp, ihl)) {
 		/* Bad IP header checksum; discard */
 		comp->sls_i_badcheck++;
-		return slhc_toss( comp );
+		return slhc_toss(comp);
 	}
-	if(index > comp->rslot_limit) {
+	if (index > comp->rslot_limit) {
 		comp->sls_i_error++;
 		return slhc_toss(comp);
 	}
-
+	th = (struct tcphdr *)(icp + ihl * 4);
+	if (th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4)
+		goto runt;
+	if (isize < ihl * 4 + th->doff * 4)
+		goto runt;
 	/* Update local state */
 	cs = &comp->rstate[comp->recv_current = index];
 	comp->flags &=~ SLF_TOSS;
-	memcpy(&cs->cs_ip,icp,20);
-	memcpy(&cs->cs_tcp,icp + ihl*4,20);
+	memcpy(&cs->cs_ip, iph, sizeof(*iph));
+	memcpy(&cs->cs_tcp, th, sizeof(*th));
 	if (ihl > 5)
-	  memcpy(cs->cs_ipopt, icp + sizeof(struct iphdr), (ihl - 5) * 4);
-	if (cs->cs_tcp.doff > 5)
-	  memcpy(cs->cs_tcpopt, icp + ihl*4 + sizeof(struct tcphdr), (cs->cs_tcp.doff - 5) * 4);
-	cs->cs_hsize = ihl*2 + cs->cs_tcp.doff*2;
+	  memcpy(cs->cs_ipopt, &iph[1], (ihl - 5) * 4);
+	if (th->doff > 5)
+	  memcpy(cs->cs_tcpopt, &th[1], (th->doff - 5) * 4);
+	cs->cs_hsize = ihl*2 + th->doff*2;
 	cs->initialized = true;
 	/* Put headers back on packet
 	 * Neither header checksum is recalculated

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit 10476e6304222ced7df9b3d5fb0a043b3c2a1ad8 upstream.

There were two patterns for lockdep_recursion:

Pattern-A:

	if (current->lockdep_recursion)
		return

	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
	/* do stuff */
	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;

Pattern-B:

	current->lockdep_recursion++;
	/* do stuff */
	current->lockdep_recursion--;

But a third pattern has emerged:

Pattern-C:

	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
	/* do stuff */
	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;

And while this isn't broken per-se, it is highly dangerous because it doesn't nest properly.

Get rid of all Pattern-C instances and shore up Pattern-A with a warning.

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

index 0d9ff8b621e6d..0a2be60e4aa7b 100644
@@ -389,6 +389,12 @@ void lockdep_on(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(lockdep_on);
 
+static inline void lockdep_recursion_finish(void)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(--current->lockdep_recursion))
+		current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+}
+
 void lockdep_set_selftest_task(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	lockdep_selftest_task_struct = task;

@@ -1720,11 +1726,11 @@ unsigned long lockdep_count_forward_deps(struct lock_class *class)
 	this.class = class;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
 	ret = __lockdep_count_forward_deps(&this);
 	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	current->lockdep_recursion--;
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	return ret;

@@ -1749,11 +1755,11 @@ unsigned long lockdep_count_backward_deps(struct lock_class *class)
 	this.class = class;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
 	ret = __lockdep_count_backward_deps(&this);
 	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	current->lockdep_recursion--;
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	return ret;

@@ -3550,9 +3556,9 @@ void lockdep_hardirqs_on(unsigned long ip)
 	if (DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirq_context))
 		return;
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	__trace_hardirqs_on_caller(ip);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(lockdep_hardirqs_on);
 

@@ -3608,7 +3614,7 @@ void trace_softirqs_on(unsigned long ip)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	/*
 	 * We'll do an OFF -> ON transition:
 	 */

@@ -3623,7 +3629,7 @@ void trace_softirqs_on(unsigned long ip)
 	 */
 	if (curr->hardirqs_enabled)
 		mark_held_locks(curr, LOCK_ENABLED_SOFTIRQ);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 }
 
 /*

@@ -3877,9 +3883,9 @@ void lockdep_init_map(struct lockdep_map *lock, const char *name,
 			return;
 
 		raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-		current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+		current->lockdep_recursion++;
 		register_lock_class(lock, subclass, 1);
-		current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+		lockdep_recursion_finish();
 		raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 	}
 }

@@ -4561,11 +4567,11 @@ void lock_set_class(struct lockdep_map *lock, const char *name,
 		return;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	check_flags(flags);
 	if (__lock_set_class(lock, name, key, subclass, ip))
 		check_chain_key(current);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_set_class);

@@ -4578,11 +4584,11 @@ void lock_downgrade(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned long ip)
 		return;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	check_flags(flags);
 	if (__lock_downgrade(lock, ip))
 		check_chain_key(current);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_downgrade);

@@ -4603,11 +4609,11 @@ void lock_acquire(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned int subclass,
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	trace_lock_acquire(lock, subclass, trylock, read, check, nest_lock, ip);
 	__lock_acquire(lock, subclass, trylock, read, check,
 		       irqs_disabled_flags(flags), nest_lock, ip, 0, 0);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_acquire);

@@ -4622,11 +4628,11 @@ void lock_release(struct lockdep_map *lock, int nested,
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	trace_lock_release(lock, ip);
 	if (__lock_release(lock, ip))
 		check_chain_key(current);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_release);

@@ -4642,9 +4648,9 @@ int lock_is_held_type(const struct lockdep_map *lock, int read)
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	ret = __lock_is_held(lock, read);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	return ret;

@@ -4663,9 +4669,9 @@ struct pin_cookie lock_pin_lock(struct lockdep_map *lock)
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	cookie = __lock_pin_lock(lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	return cookie;

@@ -4682,9 +4688,9 @@ void lock_repin_lock(struct lockdep_map *lock, struct pin_cookie cookie)
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	__lock_repin_lock(lock, cookie);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_repin_lock);

@@ -4699,9 +4705,9 @@ void lock_unpin_lock(struct lockdep_map *lock, struct pin_cookie cookie)
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	__lock_unpin_lock(lock, cookie);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_unpin_lock);

@@ -4837,10 +4843,10 @@ void lock_contended(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned long ip)
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	trace_lock_contended(lock, ip);
 	__lock_contended(lock, ip);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_contended);

@@ -4857,9 +4863,9 @@ void lock_acquired(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned long ip)
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	check_flags(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	__lock_acquired(lock, ip);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	lockdep_recursion_finish();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lock_acquired);

@@ -5087,7 +5093,7 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch)
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 
 	/* closed head */
 	pf = delayed_free.pf + (delayed_free.index ^ 1);

@@ -5099,7 +5105,7 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch)
 	 */
 	call_rcu_zapped(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index);
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	current->lockdep_recursion--;
 	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }

@@ -5146,11 +5152,11 @@ static void lockdep_free_key_range_reg(void *start, unsigned long size)
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 1;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	pf = get_pending_free();
 	__lockdep_free_key_range(pf, start, size);
 	call_rcu_zapped(pf);
-	current->lockdep_recursion = 0;
+	current->lockdep_recursion--;
 	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit 248efb2158f1e23750728e92ad9db3ab60c14485 upstream.

A few sites want to assert we own the graph_lock/lockdep_lock, provide a more conventional lock interface for it with a number of trivial debug checks.

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

index 0a2be60e4aa7b..b9fabbab39183 100644
@@ -84,12 +84,39 @@ module_param(lock_stat, int, 0644);
  * to use a raw spinlock - we really dont want the spinlock
  * code to recurse back into the lockdep code...
  */
-static arch_spinlock_t lockdep_lock = (arch_spinlock_t)__ARCH_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+static arch_spinlock_t __lock = (arch_spinlock_t)__ARCH_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+static struct task_struct *__owner;
+
+static inline void lockdep_lock(void)
+{
+	DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+	arch_spin_lock(&__lock);
+	__owner = current;
+	current->lockdep_recursion++;
+}
+
+static inline void lockdep_unlock(void)
+{
+	if (debug_locks && DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(__owner != current))
+		return;
+
+	current->lockdep_recursion--;
+	__owner = NULL;
+	arch_spin_unlock(&__lock);
+}
+
+static inline bool lockdep_assert_locked(void)
+{
+	return DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(__owner != current);
+}
+
 static struct task_struct *lockdep_selftest_task_struct;
 
+
 static int graph_lock(void)
 {
-	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_lock();
 	/*
 	 * Make sure that if another CPU detected a bug while
 	 * walking the graph we dont change it (while the other

@@ -97,27 +124,15 @@ static int graph_lock(void)
 	 * dropped already)
 	 */
 	if (!debug_locks) {
-		arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
+		lockdep_unlock();
 		return 0;
 	}
-	/* prevent any recursions within lockdep from causing deadlocks */
-	current->lockdep_recursion++;
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int graph_unlock(void)
+static inline void graph_unlock(void)
 {
-	if (debug_locks && !arch_spin_is_locked(&lockdep_lock)) {
-		/*
-		 * The lockdep graph lock isn't locked while we expect it to
-		 * be, we're confused now, bye!
-		 */
-		return DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1);
-	}
-
-	current->lockdep_recursion--;
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
-	return 0;
+	lockdep_unlock();
 }
 
 /*

@@ -128,7 +143,7 @@ static inline int debug_locks_off_graph_unlock(void)
 {
 	int ret = debug_locks_off();
 
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_unlock();
 
 	return ret;
 }

@@ -1476,6 +1491,8 @@ static int __bfs(struct lock_list *source_entry,
 	struct circular_queue *cq = &lock_cq;
 	int ret = 1;
 
+	lockdep_assert_locked();
+
 	if (match(source_entry, data)) {
 		*target_entry = source_entry;
 		ret = 0;

@@ -1498,8 +1515,6 @@ static int __bfs(struct lock_list *source_entry,
 
 		head = get_dep_list(lock, offset);
 
-		DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, head, entry) {
 			if (!lock_accessed(entry)) {
 				unsigned int cq_depth;

@@ -1726,11 +1741,9 @@ unsigned long lockdep_count_forward_deps(struct lock_class *class)
 	this.class = class;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion++;
-	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_lock();
 	ret = __lockdep_count_forward_deps(&this);
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion--;
+	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	return ret;

@@ -1755,11 +1768,9 @@ unsigned long lockdep_count_backward_deps(struct lock_class *class)
 	this.class = class;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	current->lockdep_recursion++;
-	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_lock();
 	ret = __lockdep_count_backward_deps(&this);
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion--;
+	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	return ret;

@@ -2930,7 +2941,7 @@ static inline int add_chain_cache(struct task_struct *curr,
 	 * disabled to make this an IRQ-safe lock.. for recursion reasons
 	 * lockdep won't complain about its own locking errors.
 	 */
-	if (DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled()))
+	if (lockdep_assert_locked())
 		return 0;
 
 	chain = alloc_lock_chain();

@@ -5092,8 +5103,7 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch)
 		return;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion++;
+	lockdep_lock();
 
 	/* closed head */
 	pf = delayed_free.pf + (delayed_free.index ^ 1);

@@ -5105,8 +5115,7 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch)
 	 */
 	call_rcu_zapped(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index);
 
-	current->lockdep_recursion--;
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 

@@ -5151,13 +5160,11 @@ static void lockdep_free_key_range_reg(void *start, unsigned long size)
 	init_data_structures_once();
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
-	current->lockdep_recursion++;
+	lockdep_lock();
 	pf = get_pending_free();
 	__lockdep_free_key_range(pf, start, size);
 	call_rcu_zapped(pf);
-	current->lockdep_recursion--;
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	/*

@@ -5179,10 +5186,10 @@ static void lockdep_free_key_range_imm(void *start, unsigned long size)
 	init_data_structures_once();
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_lock();
 	__lockdep_free_key_range(pf, start, size);
 	__free_zapped_classes(pf);
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 

@@ -5278,10 +5285,10 @@ static void lockdep_reset_lock_imm(struct lockdep_map *lock)
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	arch_spin_lock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_lock();
 	__lockdep_reset_lock(pf, lock);
 	__free_zapped_classes(pf);
-	arch_spin_unlock(&lockdep_lock);
+	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

commit 61cc4534b6550997c97a03759ab46b29d44c0017 upstream.

It was found that reading /proc/lockdep after a lockdep splat may potentially cause an access to freed memory if lockdep_unregister_key() is called after the splat but before access to /proc/lockdep [1]. This is due to the fact that graph_lock() call in lockdep_unregister_key() fails after the clearing of debug_locks by the splat process.

After lockdep_unregister_key() is called, the lock_name may be freed but the corresponding lock_class structure still have a reference to it. That invalid memory pointer will then be accessed when /proc/lockdep is read by a user and a use-after-free (UAF) error will be reported if KASAN is enabled.

To fix this problem, lockdep_unregister_key() is now modified to always search for a matching key irrespective of the debug_locks state and zap the corresponding lock class if a matching one is found.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

index b9fabbab39183..8e0351970a1da 100644
@@ -5302,7 +5302,13 @@ void lockdep_reset_lock(struct lockdep_map *lock)
 		lockdep_reset_lock_reg(lock);
 }
 
-/* Unregister a dynamically allocated key. */
+/*
+ * Unregister a dynamically allocated key.
+ *
+ * Unlike lockdep_register_key(), a search is always done to find a matching
+ * key irrespective of debug_locks to avoid potential invalid access to freed
+ * memory in lock_class entry.
+ */
 void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
 {
 	struct hlist_head *hash_head = keyhashentry(key);

@@ -5317,10 +5323,8 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
 		return;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
-	if (!graph_lock())
-		goto out_irq;
+	lockdep_lock();
 
-	pf = get_pending_free();
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(k, hash_head, hash_entry) {
 		if (k == key) {
 			hlist_del_rcu(&k->hash_entry);

@@ -5328,11 +5332,13 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!found);
-	__lockdep_free_key_range(pf, key, 1);
-	call_rcu_zapped(pf);
-	graph_unlock();
-out_irq:
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!found && debug_locks);
+	if (found) {
+		pf = get_pending_free();
+		__lockdep_free_key_range(pf, key, 1);
+		call_rcu_zapped(pf);
+	}
+	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	/* Wait until is_dynamic_key() has finished accessing k->hash_entry. */

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhiguo Niu <[email protected]>

commit a6f88ac32c6e63e69c595bfae220d8641704c9b7 upstream.

There is a deadlock scenario between lockdep and rcu when rcu nocb feature is enabled, just as following call stack:

rcuop/x

-000|queued_spin_lock_slowpath(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80, val = ?)
-001|queued_spin_lock(inline) // try to hold nocb_gp_lock
-001|do_raw_spin_lock(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80)
-002|__raw_spin_lock_irqsave(inline)
-002|_raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80)
-003|wake_nocb_gp_defer(inline)
-003|__call_rcu_nocb_wake(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F30B680)
-004|__call_rcu_common(inline)
-004|call_rcu(head = 0xFFFFFFC082EECC28, func = ?)
-005|call_rcu_zapped(inline)
-005|free_zapped_rcu(ch = ?)// hold graph lock
-006|rcu_do_batch(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F245680)
-007|nocb_cb_wait(inline)
-007|rcu_nocb_cb_kthread(arg = 0xFFFFFF817F245680)
-008|kthread(_create = 0xFFFFFF80803122C0)
-009|ret_from_fork(asm)

rcuop/y

-000|queued_spin_lock_slowpath(lock = 0xFFFFFFC08291BBC8, val = 0)
-001|queued_spin_lock()
-001|lockdep_lock()
-001|graph_lock() // try to hold graph lock
-002|lookup_chain_cache_add()
-002|validate_chain()
-003|lock_acquire
-004|_raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F211D80)
-005|lock_timer_base(inline)
-006|mod_timer(inline)
-006|wake_nocb_gp_defer(inline)// hold nocb_gp_lock
-006|__call_rcu_nocb_wake(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8680)
-007|__call_rcu_common(inline)
-007|call_rcu(head = 0xFFFFFFC0822E0B58, func = ?)
-008|call_rcu_hurry(inline)
-008|rcu_sync_call(inline)
-008|rcu_sync_func(rhp = 0xFFFFFFC0822E0B58)
-009|rcu_do_batch(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F266680)
-010|nocb_cb_wait(inline)
-010|rcu_nocb_cb_kthread(arg = 0xFFFFFF817F266680)
-011|kthread(_create = 0xFFFFFF8080363740)
-012|ret_from_fork(asm)

rcuop/x and rcuop/y are rcu nocb threads with the same nocb gp thread. This patch release the graph lock before lockdep call_rcu.

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

index 8e0351970a1da..7cc790a262def 100644
@@ -5054,25 +5054,27 @@ static struct pending_free *get_pending_free(void)
 static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *cb);
 
 /*
- * Schedule an RCU callback if no RCU callback is pending. Must be called with
- * the graph lock held.
- */
-static void call_rcu_zapped(struct pending_free *pf)
+* See if we need to queue an RCU callback, must called with
+* the lockdep lock held, returns false if either we don't have
+* any pending free or the callback is already scheduled.
+* Otherwise, a call_rcu() must follow this function call.
+*/
+static bool prepare_call_rcu_zapped(struct pending_free *pf)
 {
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(inside_selftest());
 
 	if (list_empty(&pf->zapped))
-		return;
+		return false;
 
 	if (delayed_free.scheduled)
-		return;
+		return false;
 
 	delayed_free.scheduled = true;
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index != pf);
 	delayed_free.index ^= 1;
 
-	call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu);
+	return true;
 }
 
 /* The caller must hold the graph lock. May be called from RCU context. */

@@ -5098,6 +5100,7 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch)
 {
 	struct pending_free *pf;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	bool need_callback;
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ch != &delayed_free.rcu_head))
 		return;

@@ -5109,14 +5112,18 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch)
 	pf = delayed_free.pf + (delayed_free.index ^ 1);
 	__free_zapped_classes(pf);
 	delayed_free.scheduled = false;
+	need_callback =
+		prepare_call_rcu_zapped(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index);
+	lockdep_unlock();
+	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	/*
-	 * If there's anything on the open list, close and start a new callback.
-	 */
-	call_rcu_zapped(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index);
+	* If there's pending free and its callback has not been scheduled,
+	* queue an RCU callback.
+	*/
+	if (need_callback)
+		call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu);
 
-	lockdep_unlock();
-	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
 /*

@@ -5156,6 +5163,7 @@ static void lockdep_free_key_range_reg(void *start, unsigned long size)
 {
 	struct pending_free *pf;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	bool need_callback;
 
 	init_data_structures_once();
 

@@ -5163,10 +5171,11 @@ static void lockdep_free_key_range_reg(void *start, unsigned long size)
 	lockdep_lock();
 	pf = get_pending_free();
 	__lockdep_free_key_range(pf, start, size);
-	call_rcu_zapped(pf);
+	need_callback = prepare_call_rcu_zapped(pf);
 	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
-
+	if (need_callback)
+		call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu);
 	/*
 	 * Wait for any possible iterators from look_up_lock_class() to pass
 	 * before continuing to free the memory they refer to.

@@ -5260,6 +5269,7 @@ static void lockdep_reset_lock_reg(struct lockdep_map *lock)
 	struct pending_free *pf;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int locked;
+	bool need_callback = false;
 
 	raw_local_irq_save(flags);
 	locked = graph_lock();

@@ -5268,11 +5278,13 @@ static void lockdep_reset_lock_reg(struct lockdep_map *lock)
 
 	pf = get_pending_free();
 	__lockdep_reset_lock(pf, lock);
-	call_rcu_zapped(pf);
+	need_callback = prepare_call_rcu_zapped(pf);
 
 	graph_unlock();
 out_irq:
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
+	if (need_callback)
+		call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu);
 }
 
 /*

@@ -5316,6 +5328,7 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
 	struct pending_free *pf;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	bool found = false;
+	bool need_callback = false;
 
 	might_sleep();
 

@@ -5336,11 +5349,14 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key)
 	if (found) {
 		pf = get_pending_free();
 		__lockdep_free_key_range(pf, key, 1);
-		call_rcu_zapped(pf);
+		need_callback = prepare_call_rcu_zapped(pf);
 	}
 	lockdep_unlock();
 	raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
+	if (need_callback)
+		call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu);
+
 	/* Wait until is_dynamic_key() has finished accessing k->hash_entry. */
 	synchronize_rcu();
 }

2.43.0

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huang Ying <[email protected]>

commit b4afe4183ec77f230851ea139d91e5cf2644c68b upstream.

On a system with CXL memory, the resource tree (/proc/iomem) related to CXL memory may look like something as follows.

490000000-50fffffff : CXL Window 0
490000000-50fffffff : region0

    490000000-50fffffff : dax0.0
      490000000-50fffffff : System RAM (kmem)

Because drivers/dax/kmem.c calls add_memory_driver_managed() during onlining CXL memory, which makes "System RAM (kmem)" a descendant of "CXL Window X". This confuses region_intersects(), which expects all "System RAM" resources to be at the top level of iomem_resource. This can lead to bugs.

For example, when the following command line is executed to write some memory in CXL memory range via /dev/mem,

 $ dd if=data of=/dev/mem bs=$((1 << 10)) seek=$((0x490000000 >> 10)) count=1
 dd: error writing '/dev/mem': Bad address
 1+0 records in
 0+0 records out
 0 bytes copied, 0.0283507 s, 0.0 kB/s

the command fails as expected. However, the error code is wrong. It should be "Operation not permitted" instead of "Bad address". More seriously, the /dev/mem permission checking in devmem_is_allowed() passes incorrectly. Although the accessing is prevented later because ioremap() isn't allowed to map system RAM, it is a potential security issue. During command executing, the following warning is reported in the kernel log for calling ioremap() on system RAM.

ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000490000000 - 0x0000000490000fff

 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 416 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:216 __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x131/0x35d
 Call Trace:
  memremap+0xcb/0x184
  xlate_dev_mem_ptr+0x25/0x2f
  write_mem+0x94/0xfb
  vfs_write+0x128/0x26d
  ksys_write+0xac/0xfe
  do_syscall_64+0x9a/0xfd
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

The details of command execution process are as follows. In the above resource tree, "System RAM" is a descendant of "CXL Window 0" instead of a top level resource. So, region_intersects() will report no System RAM resources in the CXL memory region incorrectly, because it only checks the top level resources. Consequently, devmem_is_allowed() will return 1 (allow access via /dev/mem) for CXL memory region incorrectly. Fortunately, ioremap() doesn't allow to map System RAM and reject the access.

So, region_intersects() needs to be fixed to work correctly with the resource tree with "System RAM" not at top level as above. To fix it, if we found a unmatched resource in the top level, we will continue to search matched resources in its descendant resources. So, we will not miss any matched resources in resource tree anymore.

In the new implementation, an example resource tree

|------------- "CXL Window 0" ------------|
|-- "System RAM" --|

will behave similar as the following fake resource tree for region_intersects(, IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM, ),

|-- "System RAM" --||-- "CXL Window 0a" --|

Where "CXL Window 0a" is part of the original "CXL Window 0" that isn't covered by "System RAM".

---
 kernel/resource.c |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -536,21 +536,63 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(page_is_ram);
 int region_intersects(resource_size_t start, size_t size, unsigned long flags,
 		      unsigned long desc)
 {
-	struct resource res;
+	resource_size_t ostart, oend;
 	int type = 0; int other = 0;
-	struct resource *p;
+	struct resource *p, *dp;
+	bool is_type, covered;
+	struct resource res;
 
 	res.start = start;
 	res.end = start + size - 1;
 
 	read_lock(&resource_lock);
 	for (p = iomem_resource.child; p ; p = p->sibling) {
-		bool is_type = (((p->flags & flags) == flags) &&
-				((desc == IORES_DESC_NONE) ||
-				 (desc == p->desc)));
-
-		if (resource_overlaps(p, &res))
-			is_type ? type++ : other++;
+		if (!resource_overlaps(p, &res))
+			continue;
+		is_type = (p->flags & flags) == flags &&
+			(desc == IORES_DESC_NONE || desc == p->desc);
+		if (is_type) {
+			type++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Continue to search in descendant resources as if the
+		 * matched descendant resources cover some ranges of 'p'.
+		 *
+		 * |------------- "CXL Window 0" ------------|
+		 * |-- "System RAM" --|
+		 *
+		 * will behave similar as the following fake resource
+		 * tree when searching "System RAM".
+		 *
+		 * |-- "System RAM" --||-- "CXL Window 0a" --|
+		 */
+		covered = false;
+		ostart = max(res.start, p->start);
+		oend = min(res.end, p->end);
+		for (dp = p->child; dp; dp = next_resource(dp, false)) {
+			if (!resource_overlaps(dp, &res))
+				continue;
+			is_type = (dp->flags & flags) == flags &&
+				(desc == IORES_DESC_NONE || desc == dp->desc);
+			if (is_type) {
+				type++;
+				/*
+				 * Range from 'ostart' to 'dp->start'
+				 * isn't covered by matched resource.
+				 */
+				if (dp->start > ostart)
+					break;
+				if (dp->end >= oend) {
+					covered = true;
+					break;
+				}
+				/* Remove covered range */
+				ostart = max(ostart, dp->end + 1);
+			}
+		}
+		if (!covered)
+			other++;
 	}
 	read_unlock(&resource_lock);
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

commit 8d2b1a1ec9f559d30b724877da4ce592edc41fdc upstream.

A broken device may give an extreme offset like 0xFFF0 and a reasonable length for a fragment. In the sanity check as formulated now, this will create an integer overflow, defeating the sanity check. Both offset and offset + len need to be checked in such a manner that no overflow can occur.
And those quantities should be unsigned.

---
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1707,10 +1707,10 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev,
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
-	int len;
+	unsigned int len;
 	int nframes;
 	int x;
-	int offset;
+	unsigned int offset;
 	union {
 		struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;
 		struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32 *ndp32;

@@ -1782,8 +1782,8 @@ next_ndp:
 			break;
 		}
 
-		/* sanity checking */
-		if (((offset + len) > skb_in->len) ||
+		/* sanity checking - watch out for integer wrap*/
+		if ((offset > skb_in->len) || (len > skb_in->len - offset) ||
 				(len > ctx->rx_max) || (len < ETH_HLEN)) {
 			netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net,
 				  "invalid frame detected (ignored) offset[%u]=%u, length=%u, skb=%p\n",

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wade Wang <[email protected]>

commit 87b696209007b7c4ef7bdfe39ea0253404a43770 upstream.

Some Plantronics headset as the below send an unexcept opposite volume key's HID report for each volume key press after 200ms, like unecepted Volume Up Key following Volume Down key pressed by user. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics for these devices, which will ignore the second unexcepted opposite volume key if it happens within 220ms from the last one that was handled.

    Plantronics EncorePro 500 Series  (047f:431e)
    Plantronics Blackwire_3325 Series (047f:430c)

The patch was tested on the mentioned model, it shouldn't affect other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too. Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected per test result.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h         |    2 ++
 drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)

@@ -954,6 +954,8 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES	0xc056
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES	0xc057
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES	0xc058
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3325_SERIES	0x430c
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_ENCOREPRO_500_SERIES		0x431e
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_PANASONIC		0x04da
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PANABOARD_UBT780	0x1044

@@ -38,8 +38,10 @@
 			    (usage->hid & HID_USAGE_PAGE) == HID_UP_CONSUMER)
 
 #define PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS BIT(0)
+#define PLT_QUIRK_FOLLOWED_OPPOSITE_VOLUME_KEYS BIT(1)
 
 #define PLT_DOUBLE_KEY_TIMEOUT 5 /* ms */
+#define PLT_FOLLOWED_OPPOSITE_KEY_TIMEOUT 220 /* ms */
 
 struct plt_drv_data {
 	unsigned long device_type;

@@ -137,6 +139,21 @@ static int plantronics_event(struct hid_
 
 		drv_data->last_volume_key_ts = cur_ts;
 	}
+	if (drv_data->quirks & PLT_QUIRK_FOLLOWED_OPPOSITE_VOLUME_KEYS) {
+		unsigned long prev_ts, cur_ts;
+
+		/* Usages are filtered in plantronics_usages. */
+
+		if (!value) /* Handle key presses only. */
+			return 0;
+
+		prev_ts = drv_data->last_volume_key_ts;
+		cur_ts = jiffies;
+		if (jiffies_to_msecs(cur_ts - prev_ts) <= PLT_FOLLOWED_OPPOSITE_KEY_TIMEOUT)
+			return 1; /* Ignore the followed opposite volume key. */
+
+		drv_data->last_volume_key_ts = cur_ts;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -210,6 +227,12 @@ static const struct hid_device_id plantr
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
 					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES),
 		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3325_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_FOLLOWED_OPPOSITE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_ENCOREPRO_500_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_FOLLOWED_OPPOSITE_VOLUME_KEYS },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS, HID_ANY_ID) },
 	{ }
 };

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

commit 71c717cd8a2e180126932cc6851ff21c1d04d69a upstream.

This reverts commit 86b20af11e84c26ae3fde4dcc4f490948e3f8035.

This patch leads to passing 0 to simple_read_from_buffer() as a fifth argument, turning the read method into a nop. The change is fundamentally flawed, as it breaks the driver.

---
 drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c |   19 ++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@
 #define YUREX_BUF_SIZE		8
 #define YUREX_WRITE_TIMEOUT	(HZ*2)
 
-#define MAX_S64_STRLEN 20 /* {-}922337203685477580{7,8} */
-
 /* table of devices that work with this driver */
 static struct usb_device_id yurex_table[] = {
 	{ USB_DEVICE(YUREX_VENDOR_ID, YUREX_PRODUCT_ID) },

@@ -404,7 +402,8 @@ static ssize_t yurex_read(struct file *f
 {
 	struct usb_yurex *dev;
 	int len = 0;
-	char in_buffer[MAX_S64_STRLEN];
+	char in_buffer[20];
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	dev = file->private_data;
 

@@ -414,16 +413,14 @@ static ssize_t yurex_read(struct file *f
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dev->bbu > S64_MAX || dev->bbu < S64_MIN)) {
-		mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex);
-		return -EIO;
-	}
-
-	spin_lock_irq(&dev->lock);
-	scnprintf(in_buffer, MAX_S64_STRLEN, "%lld\n", dev->bbu);
-	spin_unlock_irq(&dev->lock);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
+	len = snprintf(in_buffer, 20, "%lld\n", dev->bbu);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 	mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex);
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len >= sizeof(in_buffer)))
+		return -EIO;
+
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, count, ppos, in_buffer, len);
 }
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Selvarasu Ganesan <[email protected]>

commit 0d410e8913f5cffebcca79ffdd596009d4a13a28 upstream.

This commit addresses an issue where events were being processed when the controller was in a halted state. To fix this issue by stop processing the events as the event count was considered stale or invalid when the controller was halted.

---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c   |   22 +++++++++++++++++++---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h   |    4 ----
 drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c |   11 -----------
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

@@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ static int dwc3_alloc_event_buffers(stru
 int dwc3_event_buffers_setup(struct dwc3 *dwc)
 {
 	struct dwc3_event_buffer	*evt;
+	u32				reg;
 
 	if (!dwc->ev_buf)
 		return 0;

@@ -430,8 +431,10 @@ int dwc3_event_buffers_setup(struct dwc3
 			upper_32_bits(evt->dma));
 	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTSIZ(0),
 			DWC3_GEVNTSIZ_SIZE(evt->length));
-	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(0), 0);
 
+	/* Clear any stale event */
+	reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(0));
+	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(0), reg);
 	return 0;
 }
 

@@ -458,7 +461,10 @@ void dwc3_event_buffers_cleanup(struct d
 	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTADRHI(0), 0);
 	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTSIZ(0), DWC3_GEVNTSIZ_INTMASK
 			| DWC3_GEVNTSIZ_SIZE(0));
-	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(0), 0);
+
+	/* Clear any stale event */
+	reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(0));
+	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(0), reg);
 }
 
 static int dwc3_alloc_scratch_buffers(struct dwc3 *dwc)

@@ -1799,7 +1805,11 @@ static int dwc3_runtime_resume(struct de
 
 	switch (dwc->current_dr_role) {
 	case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE:
-		dwc3_gadget_process_pending_events(dwc);
+		if (dwc->pending_events) {
+			pm_runtime_put(dwc->dev);
+			dwc->pending_events = false;
+			enable_irq(dwc->irq_gadget);
+		}
 		break;
 	case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST:
 	default:

@@ -1886,6 +1896,12 @@ static void dwc3_complete(struct device
 static const struct dev_pm_ops dwc3_dev_pm_ops = {
 	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(dwc3_suspend, dwc3_resume)
 	.complete = dwc3_complete,
+
+	/*
+	 * Runtime suspend halts the controller on disconnection. It relies on
+	 * platforms with custom connection notification to start the controller
+	 * again.
+	 */
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(dwc3_runtime_suspend, dwc3_runtime_resume,
 			dwc3_runtime_idle)
 };

@@ -1487,7 +1487,6 @@ static inline void dwc3_otg_host_init(st
 #if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_DWC3_HOST)
 int dwc3_gadget_suspend(struct dwc3 *dwc);
 int dwc3_gadget_resume(struct dwc3 *dwc);
-void dwc3_gadget_process_pending_events(struct dwc3 *dwc);
 #else
 static inline int dwc3_gadget_suspend(struct dwc3 *dwc)
 {

@@ -1499,9 +1498,6 @@ static inline int dwc3_gadget_resume(str
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void dwc3_gadget_process_pending_events(struct dwc3 *dwc)
-{
-}
 #endif /* !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_DWC3_HOST) */
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_DWC3_ULPI)

@@ -3827,14 +3827,3 @@ err1:
 err0:
 	return ret;
 }
-
-void dwc3_gadget_process_pending_events(struct dwc3 *dwc)
-{
-	if (dwc->pending_events) {
-		dwc3_interrupt(dwc->irq_gadget, dwc->ev_buf);
-		dwc3_thread_interrupt(dwc->irq_gadget, dwc->ev_buf);
-		pm_runtime_put(dwc->dev);
-		dwc->pending_events = false;
-		enable_irq(dwc->irq_gadget);
-	}
-}

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jose Alberto Reguero <[email protected]>

commit d44238d8254a36249d576c96473269dbe500f5e4 upstream.

I have a ASUS PN51 S mini pc that has two xhci devices. One from AMD, and other from ASMEDIA. The one from ASMEDIA have problems when resume from suspend, and keep broken until unplug the power cord. I use this kernel parameter: xhci-hcd.quirks=128 and then it works ok. I make a path to reset only the ASMEDIA xhci.

---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI		0x1142
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1142_XHCI			0x1242
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI			0x2142
+#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_3042_XHCI			0x3042
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_3242_XHCI			0x3242
 
 static const char hcd_name[] = "xhci_hcd";

@@ -305,6 +306,10 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct devic
 		pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI)
 		xhci->quirks |= XHCI_ASMEDIA_MODIFY_FLOWCONTROL;
 
+	if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA &&
+	    pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_3042_XHCI)
+		xhci->quirks |= XHCI_RESET_ON_RESUME;
+
 	if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_TI && pdev->device == 0x8241)
 		xhci->quirks |= XHCI_LIMIT_ENDPOINT_INTERVAL_7;
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Icenowy Zheng <[email protected]>

commit a6555cb1cb69db479d0760e392c175ba32426842 upstream.

JieLi tends to use SCSI via USB Mass Storage to implement their own proprietary commands instead of implementing another USB interface. Enumerating it as a generic mass storage device will lead to a Hardware Error sense key get reported.

Ignore this bogus device to prevent appearing a unusable sdX device file.

---
 drivers/usb/storage/unusual_devs.h |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

@@ -2412,6 +2412,17 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(  0xc251, 0x4003, 0x0100, 0x
 		USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
 		US_FL_NOT_LOCKABLE),
 
+/*
+ * Reported by Icenowy Zheng <[email protected]>
+ * This is an interface for vendor-specific cryptic commands instead
+ * of real USB storage device.
+ */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(  0xe5b7, 0x0811, 0x0100, 0x0100,
+		"ZhuHai JieLi Technology",
+		"JieLi BR21",
+		USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+		US_FL_IGNORE_DEVICE),
+
 /* Reported by Andrew Simmons <[email protected]> */
 UNUSUAL_DEV(  0xed06, 0x4500, 0x0001, 0x0001,
 		"DataStor",

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SurajSonawane2415 <[email protected]>

commit d41bff05a61fb539f21e9bf0d39fac77f457434e upstream.

Fix the uninitialized symbol 'rv' in the function ish_fw_xfer_direct_dma to resolve the following warning from the smatch tool:
drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp-fw-loader.c:714 ish_fw_xfer_direct_dma()
error: uninitialized symbol 'rv'.
Initialize 'rv' to 0 to prevent undefined behavior from uninitialized access.

---
 drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp-fw-loader.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static int ish_fw_xfer_direct_dma(struct
 				  const struct firmware *fw,
 				  const struct shim_fw_info fw_info)
 {
-	int rv;
+	int rv = 0;
 	void *dma_buf;
 	dma_addr_t dma_buf_phy;
 	u32 fragment_offset, fragment_size, payload_max_size;

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anastasia Kovaleva <[email protected]>

commit 1dae9f1187189bc09ff6d25ca97ead711f7e26f9 upstream.

The kernel may crash when deleting a genetlink family if there are still listeners for that family:

Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  ...
  NIP [c000000000c080bc] netlink_update_socket_mc+0x3c/0xc0
  LR [c000000000c0f764] __netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0
  Call Trace:
__netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x74/0xc0
genl_unregister_family+0xd4/0x2d0

Change the unsafe loop on the list to a safe one, because inside the loop there is an element removal from this list.

---
 include/net/sock.h       |    2 ++
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c |    3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -766,6 +766,8 @@ static inline void sk_add_bind_node(stru
 	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(__sk, tmp, list, sk_node)
 #define sk_for_each_bound(__sk, list) \
 	hlist_for_each_entry(__sk, list, sk_bind_node)
+#define sk_for_each_bound_safe(__sk, tmp, list) \
+	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(__sk, tmp, list, sk_bind_node)
 
 /**
  * sk_for_each_entry_offset_rcu - iterate over a list at a given struct offset

@@ -2153,8 +2153,9 @@ void __netlink_clear_multicast_users(str
 {
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct netlink_table *tbl = &nl_table[ksk->sk_protocol];
+	struct hlist_node *tmp;
 
-	sk_for_each_bound(sk, &tbl->mc_list)
+	sk_for_each_bound_safe(sk, tmp, &tbl->mc_list)
 		netlink_update_socket_mc(nlk_sk(sk), group, 0);
 }
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yonatan Maman <[email protected]>

commit 835745a377a4519decd1a36d6b926e369b3033e2 upstream.

The nouveau_dmem_copy_one function ensures that the copy push command is sent to the device firmware but does not track whether it was executed successfully.

In the case of a copy error (e.g., firmware or hardware failure), the copy push command will be sent via the firmware channel, and nouveau_dmem_copy_one will likely report success, leading to the migrate_to_ram function returning a dirty HIGH_USER page to the user.

This can result in a security vulnerability, as a HIGH_USER page that may contain sensitive or corrupted data could be returned to the user.

To prevent this vulnerability, we allocate a zero page. Thus, in case of an error, a non-dirty (zero) page will be returned to the user.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static vm_fault_t nouveau_dmem_fault_cop
 	if (!spage || !(args->src[0] & MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE))
 		return 0;
 
-	dpage = alloc_page_vma(GFP_HIGHUSER, vmf->vma, vmf->address);
+	dpage = alloc_page_vma(GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ZERO, vmf->vma, vmf->address);
 	if (!dpage)
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
 	lock_page(dpage);

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>

commit d8794ac20a299b647ba9958f6d657051fc51a540 upstream.

As Andrew pointed out, it will make sense that the PTP core checked timespec64 struct's tv_sec and tv_nsec range before calling ptp->info->settime64().

As the man manual of clock_settime() said, if tp.tv_sec is negative or tp.tv_nsec is outside the range [0..999,999,999], it should return EINVAL, which include dynamic clocks which handles PTP clock, and the condition is consistent with timespec64_valid(). As Thomas suggested, timespec64_valid() only check the timespec is valid, but not ensure that the time is in a valid range, so check it ahead using timespec64_valid_strict() in pc_clock_settime() and return -EINVAL if not valid.

There are some drivers that use tp->tv_sec and tp->tv_nsec directly to write registers without validity checks and assume that the higher layer has checked it, which is dangerous and will benefit from this, such as hclge_ptp_settime(), igb_ptp_settime_i210(), _rcar_gen4_ptp_settime(), and some drivers can remove the checks of itself.

---
 kernel/time/posix-clock.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -299,6 +299,9 @@ static int pc_clock_settime(clockid_t id
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (!timespec64_valid_strict(ts))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (cd.clk->ops.clock_settime)
 		err = cd.clk->ops.clock_settime(cd.clk, ts);
 	else

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

commit acc450aa07099d071b18174c22a1119c57da8227 upstream.

The simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() functions are unsafe to use for uprobes. Both functions were originally written for use with kprobes, and access memory with plain C accesses. When uprobes was added, these were reused unmodified even though they cannot safely access user memory.

There are three key problems:

1) The plain C accesses do not have corresponding extable entries, and thus if they encounter a fault the kernel will treat these as unintentional accesses to user memory, resulting in a BUG() which will kill the kernel thread, and likely lead to further issues (e.g. lockup or panic()).

2) The plain C accesses are subject to HW PAN and SW PAN, and so when either is in use, any attempt to simulate an access to user memory will fault. Thus neither simulate_ldr_literal() nor simulate_ldrsw_literal() can do anything useful when simulating a user instruction on any system with HW PAN or SW PAN.

3) The plain C accesses are privileged, as they run in kernel context, and in practice can access a small range of kernel virtual addresses. The instructions they simulate have a range of +/-1MiB, and since the simulated instructions must itself be a user instructions in the TTBR0 address range, these can address the final 1MiB of the TTBR1 acddress range by wrapping downwards from an address in the first 1MiB of the TTBR0 address range.

In contemporary kernels the last 8MiB of TTBR1 address range is reserved, and accesses to this will always fault, meaning this is no worse than (1).

Historically, it was theoretically possible for the linear map or vmemmap to spill into the final 8MiB of the TTBR1 address range, but in practice this is extremely unlikely to occur as this would require either:

* Having enough physical memory to fill the entire linear map all the way to the final 1MiB of the TTBR1 address range.

* Getting unlucky with KASLR randomization of the linear map such that the populated region happens to overlap with the last 1MiB of the TTBR address range.

... and in either case if we were to spill into the final page there would be larger problems as the final page would alias with error pointers.

Practically speaking, (1) and (2) are the big issues. Given there have been no reports of problems since the broken code was introduced, it appears that no-one is relying on probing these instructions with uprobes.

Avoid these issues by not allowing uprobes on LDR (literal) and LDRSW (literal), limiting the use of simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() to kprobes. Attempts to place uprobes on LDR (literal) and LDRSW (literal) will be rejected as arm_probe_decode_insn() will return INSN_REJECTED. In future we can consider introducing working uprobes support for these instructions, but this will require more significant work.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -96,10 +96,6 @@ arm_probe_decode_insn(probe_opcode_t ins
 	    aarch64_insn_is_blr(insn) ||
 	    aarch64_insn_is_ret(insn)) {
 		api->handler = simulate_br_blr_ret;
-	} else if (aarch64_insn_is_ldr_lit(insn)) {
-		api->handler = simulate_ldr_literal;
-	} else if (aarch64_insn_is_ldrsw_lit(insn)) {
-		api->handler = simulate_ldrsw_literal;
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * Instruction cannot be stepped out-of-line and we don't

@@ -137,6 +133,17 @@ arm_kprobe_decode_insn(kprobe_opcode_t *
 	probe_opcode_t insn = le32_to_cpu(*addr);
 	probe_opcode_t *scan_end = NULL;
 	unsigned long size = 0, offset = 0;
+	struct arch_probe_insn *api = &asi->api;
+
+	if (aarch64_insn_is_ldr_lit(insn)) {
+		api->handler = simulate_ldr_literal;
+		decoded = INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT;
+	} else if (aarch64_insn_is_ldrsw_lit(insn)) {
+		api->handler = simulate_ldrsw_literal;
+		decoded = INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT;
+	} else {
+		decoded = arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &asi->api);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If there's a symbol defined in front of and near enough to

@@ -154,7 +161,6 @@ arm_kprobe_decode_insn(kprobe_opcode_t *
 		else
 			scan_end = addr - MAX_ATOMIC_CONTEXT_SIZE;
 	}
-	decoded = arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &asi->api);
 
 	if (decoded != INSN_REJECTED && scan_end)
 		if (is_probed_address_atomic(addr - 1, scan_end))

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

commit 50f813e57601c22b6f26ced3193b9b94d70a2640 upstream.

The simulate_ldr_literal() code always loads a 64-bit quantity, and when simulating a 32-bit load into a 'W' register, it discards the most significant 32 bits. For big-endian kernels this means that the relevant bits are discarded, and the value returned is the the subsequent 32 bits in memory (i.e. the value at addr + 4).

Additionally, simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() use a plain C load, which the compiler may tear or elide (e.g. if the target is the zero register). Today this doesn't happen to matter, but it may matter in future if trampoline code uses a LDR (literal) or LDRSW (literal).

Update simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() to use an appropriately-sized READ_ONCE() to perform the access, which avoids these problems.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/probes/simulate-insn.c |   18 +++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

@@ -170,17 +170,15 @@ simulate_tbz_tbnz(u32 opcode, long addr,
 void __kprobes
 simulate_ldr_literal(u32 opcode, long addr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	u64 *load_addr;
+	unsigned long load_addr;
 	int xn = opcode & 0x1f;
-	int disp;
 
-	disp = ldr_displacement(opcode);
-	load_addr = (u64 *) (addr + disp);
+	load_addr = addr + ldr_displacement(opcode);
 
 	if (opcode & (1 << 30))	/* x0-x30 */
-		set_x_reg(regs, xn, *load_addr);
+		set_x_reg(regs, xn, READ_ONCE(*(u64 *)load_addr));
 	else			/* w0-w30 */
-		set_w_reg(regs, xn, *load_addr);
+		set_w_reg(regs, xn, READ_ONCE(*(u32 *)load_addr));
 
 	instruction_pointer_set(regs, instruction_pointer(regs) + 4);
 }

@@ -188,14 +186,12 @@ simulate_ldr_literal(u32 opcode, long ad
 void __kprobes
 simulate_ldrsw_literal(u32 opcode, long addr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	s32 *load_addr;
+	unsigned long load_addr;
 	int xn = opcode & 0x1f;
-	int disp;
 
-	disp = ldr_displacement(opcode);
-	load_addr = (s32 *) (addr + disp);
+	load_addr = addr + ldr_displacement(opcode);
 
-	set_x_reg(regs, xn, *load_addr);
+	set_x_reg(regs, xn, READ_ONCE(*(s32 *)load_addr));
 
 	instruction_pointer_set(regs, instruction_pointer(regs) + 4);
 }

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Francis Laniel <[email protected]>

commit b022f0c7e404887a7c5229788fc99eff9f9a80d5 upstream.

When a kprobe is attached to a function that's name is not unique (is static and shares the name with other functions in the kernel), the kprobe is attached to the first function it finds. This is a bug as the function that it is attaching to is not necessarily the one that the user wants to attach to.

Instead of blindly picking a function to attach to what is ambiguous, error with EADDRNOTAVAIL to let the user know that this function is not unique, and that the user must use another unique function with an address offset to get to the function they want to attach to.

[ Sherry: kselftest kprobe_non_uniq_symbol.tc failed on 5.4.y, because of missing
this commit, backport it to 5.4.y. Minor conflicts due to context change, ignore context change ]

---
 kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c |   74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/trace/trace_probe.h  |    1 
 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+)

@@ -714,6 +714,36 @@ static inline void sanitize_event_name(c
 			*name = '_';
 }
 
+struct count_symbols_struct {
+	const char *func_name;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
+
+static int count_symbols(void *data, const char *name, struct module *unused0,
+			 unsigned long unused1)
+{
+	struct count_symbols_struct *args = data;
+
+	if (strcmp(args->func_name, name))
+		return 0;
+
+	args->count++;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int number_of_same_symbols(char *func_name)
+{
+	struct count_symbols_struct args = {
+		.func_name = func_name,
+		.count = 0,
+	};
+
+	kallsyms_on_each_symbol(count_symbols, &args);
+
+	return args.count;
+}
+
 static int trace_kprobe_create(int argc, const char *argv[])
 {
 	/*

@@ -825,6 +855,31 @@ static int trace_kprobe_create(int argc,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (symbol && !strchr(symbol, ':')) {
+		unsigned int count;
+
+		count = number_of_same_symbols(symbol);
+		if (count > 1) {
+			/*
+			 * Users should use ADDR to remove the ambiguity of
+			 * using KSYM only.
+			 */
+			trace_probe_log_err(0, NON_UNIQ_SYMBOL);
+			ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+
+			goto error;
+		} else if (count == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * We can return ENOENT earlier than when register the
+			 * kprobe.
+			 */
+			trace_probe_log_err(0, BAD_PROBE_ADDR);
+			ret = -ENOENT;
+
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
 	trace_probe_log_set_index(0);
 	if (event) {
 		ret = traceprobe_parse_event_name(&event, &group, buf,

@@ -1596,6 +1651,7 @@ static int unregister_kprobe_event(struc
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+
 /* create a trace_kprobe, but don't add it to global lists */
 struct trace_event_call *
 create_local_trace_kprobe(char *func, void *addr, unsigned long offs,

@@ -1605,6 +1661,24 @@ create_local_trace_kprobe(char *func, vo
 	int ret;
 	char *event;
 
+	if (func) {
+		unsigned int count;
+
+		count = number_of_same_symbols(func);
+		if (count > 1)
+			/*
+			 * Users should use addr to remove the ambiguity of
+			 * using func only.
+			 */
+			return ERR_PTR(-EADDRNOTAVAIL);
+		else if (count == 0)
+			/*
+			 * We can return ENOENT earlier than when register the
+			 * kprobe.
+			 */
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * local trace_kprobes are not added to dyn_event, so they are never
 	 * searched in find_trace_kprobe(). Therefore, there is no concern of

@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ extern int traceprobe_define_arg_fields(
 	C(BAD_MAXACT,		"Invalid maxactive number"),		\
 	C(MAXACT_TOO_BIG,	"Maxactive is too big"),		\
 	C(BAD_PROBE_ADDR,	"Invalid probed address or symbol"),	\
+	C(NON_UNIQ_SYMBOL,	"The symbol is not unique"),		\
 	C(BAD_RETPROBE,		"Retprobe address must be an function entry"), \
 	C(NO_GROUP_NAME,	"Group name is not specified"),		\
 	C(GROUP_TOO_LONG,	"Group name is too long"),		\

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>

commit 926fe783c8a64b33997fec405cf1af3e61aed441 upstream.

Recent changes to count number of matching symbols when creating a kprobe event failed to take into account kernel modules. As such, it breaks kprobes on kernel module symbols, by assuming there is no match.

Fix this my calling module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol() in addition to kallsyms_on_each_match_symbol() to perform a proper counting.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -741,6 +741,8 @@ static unsigned int number_of_same_symbo
 
 	kallsyms_on_each_symbol(count_symbols, &args);
 
+	module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol(count_symbols, &args);
+
 	return args.count;
 }
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: WangYuli <[email protected]>

commit 9246b487ab3c3b5993aae7552b7a4c541cc14a49 upstream.

Add DMA support for audio function of Glenfly Arise chip, which uses Requester ID of function 0.

---
 drivers/pci/quirks.c    |    4 ++++
 include/linux/pci_ids.h |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -4138,6 +4138,10 @@ static void quirk_dma_func0_alias(struct
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_RICOH, 0xe832, quirk_dma_func0_alias);
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_RICOH, 0xe476, quirk_dma_func0_alias);
 
+/* Some Glenfly chips use function 0 as the PCIe Requester ID for DMA */
+DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_GLENFLY, 0x3d40, quirk_dma_func0_alias);
+DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_GLENFLY, 0x3d41, quirk_dma_func0_alias);
+
 static void quirk_dma_func1_alias(struct pci_dev *dev)
 {
 	if (PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn) != 1)

@@ -2654,6 +2654,8 @@
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_DCI_PCCOM8	0x0002
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_DCI_PCCOM2	0x0004
 
+#define PCI_VENDOR_ID_GLENFLY		0x6766
+
 #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL		0x8086
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_EESSC	0x0008
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PXHD_0	0x0320

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: OGAWA Hirofumi <[email protected]>

commit 963a7f4d3b90ee195b895ca06b95757fcba02d1a upstream.

syszbot produced this with a corrupted fs image. In theory, however an IO error would trigger this also.

This affects just an error report, so should not be a serious error.

---
 fs/fat/namei_vfat.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ error_inode:
 	if (corrupt < 0) {
 		fat_fs_error(new_dir->i_sb,
 			     "%s: Filesystem corrupted (i_pos %lld)",
-			     __func__, sinfo.i_pos);
+			     __func__, new_i_pos);
 	}
 	goto out;
 }

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Liu Shixin <[email protected]>

commit 7528c4fb1237512ee18049f852f014eba80bbe8d upstream.

I got a bad pud error and lost a 1GB HugeTLB when calling swapoff. The problem can be reproduced by the following steps:

1. Allocate an anonymous 1GB HugeTLB and some other anonymous memory.
2. Swapout the above anonymous memory.
3. run swapoff and we will get a bad pud error in kernel message:

mm/pgtable-generic.c:42: bad pud 00000000743d215d(84000001400000e7)

We can tell that pud_clear_bad is called by pud_none_or_clear_bad in unuse_pud_range() by ftrace. And therefore the HugeTLB pages will never be freed because we lost it from page table. We can skip HugeTLB pages for unuse_vma to fix it.

---
 mm/swapfile.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2091,7 +2091,7 @@ static int unuse_mm(struct mm_struct *mm
 
 	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 	for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
-		if (vma->anon_vma) {
+		if (vma->anon_vma && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
 			ret = unuse_vma(vma, type, frontswap,
 					fs_pages_to_unuse);
 			if (ret)

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

commit 31db78a4923ef5e2008f2eed321811ca79e7f71b upstream.

When ieee80211_key_link() is called by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() but returns 0 due to KRACK protection (identical key reinstall), ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() will still return a pointer into the key, in a potential use-after-free. This normally doesn't happen since it's only called by iwlwifi in case of WoWLAN rekey offload which has its own KRACK protection, but still better to fix, do that by returning an error code and converting that to success on the cfg80211 boundary only, leaving the error for bad callers of ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add().

[ Sherry: bp to fix CVE-2023-52530, resolved minor conflicts in
net/mac80211/cfg.c because of context change due to missing commit 23a5f0af6ff4 ("wifi: mac80211: remove cipher scheme support") ccdde7c74ffd ("wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling")]

---
 net/mac80211/cfg.c |    3 +++
 net/mac80211/key.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -491,6 +491,9 @@ static int ieee80211_add_key(struct wiph
 		sta->cipher_scheme = cs;
 
 	err = ieee80211_key_link(key, sdata, sta);
+	/* KRACK protection, shouldn't happen but just silently accept key */
+	if (err == -EALREADY)
+		err = 0;
 
  out_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&local->sta_mtx);

@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_
 	 */
 	if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) {
 		ieee80211_key_free_unused(key);
-		ret = 0;
+		ret = -EALREADY;
 		goto out;
 	}
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

commit 49f683b41f28918df3e51ddc0d928cb2e934ccdb upstream.

Use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to access kvm->last_boosted_vcpu to ensure the loads and stores are atomic. In the extremely unlikely scenario the compiler tears the stores, it's theoretically possible for KVM to attempt to get a vCPU using an out-of-bounds index, e.g. if the write is split into multiple 8-bit stores, and is paired with a 32-bit load on a VM with 257 vCPUs:

  CPU0                              CPU1
  last_boosted_vcpu = 0xff;

                                    (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x100)
                                    last_boosted_vcpu[15:8] = 0x01;
  i = (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x1ff)
                                    last_boosted_vcpu[7:0] = 0x00;

  vcpu = kvm->vcpu_array[0x1ff];

As detected by KCSAN:

  BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm] / kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm]

write to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4340 on cpu 16:
kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4112) kvm handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:?

		 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel
  vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm
  __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890)
  __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890)
  x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

read to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4342 on cpu 4:
kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4069) kvm handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:?

			arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel
  vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm
  __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890)
  __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890)
  x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

value changed: 0x00000012 -> 0x00000000

---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2714,12 +2714,13 @@ void kvm_vcpu_on_spin(struct kvm_vcpu *m
 {
 	struct kvm *kvm = me->kvm;
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
-	int last_boosted_vcpu = me->kvm->last_boosted_vcpu;
+	int last_boosted_vcpu;
 	int yielded = 0;
 	int try = 3;
 	int pass;
 	int i;
 
+	last_boosted_vcpu = READ_ONCE(kvm->last_boosted_vcpu);
 	kvm_vcpu_set_in_spin_loop(me, true);
 	/*
 	 * We boost the priority of a VCPU that is runnable but not

@@ -2749,7 +2750,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_on_spin(struct kvm_vcpu *m
 
 			yielded = kvm_vcpu_yield_to(vcpu);
 			if (yielded > 0) {
-				kvm->last_boosted_vcpu = i;
+				WRITE_ONCE(kvm->last_boosted_vcpu, i);
 				break;
 			} else if (yielded < 0) {
 				try--;

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>

commit dee3df68ab4b00fff6bdf9fc39541729af37307c upstream.

According to the VT220 specification the possible character combinations sent on RETURN are only CR or CRLF [0].

The Return key sends either a CR character (0/13) or a CR character (0/13) and an LF character (0/10), depending on the set/reset state of line feed/new line mode (LNM).

The sclp/vt220 driver however uses LFCR. This can confuse tools, for example the kunit runner.

---
 drivers/s390/char/sclp_vt220.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ sclp_vt220_add_msg(struct sclp_vt220_req
 	buffer = (void *) ((addr_t) sccb + sccb->header.length);
 
 	if (convertlf) {
-		/* Perform Linefeed conversion (0x0a -> 0x0a 0x0d)*/
+		/* Perform Linefeed conversion (0x0a -> 0x0d 0x0a)*/
 		for (from=0, to=0;
 		     (from < count) && (to < sclp_vt220_space_left(request));
 		     from++) {

@@ -334,8 +334,8 @@ sclp_vt220_add_msg(struct sclp_vt220_req
 			/* Perform conversion */
 			if (c == 0x0a) {
 				if (to + 1 < sclp_vt220_space_left(request)) {
-					((unsigned char *) buffer)[to++] = c;
 					((unsigned char *) buffer)[to++] = 0x0d;
+					((unsigned char *) buffer)[to++] = c;
 				} else
 					break;
 

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Mueller <[email protected]>

commit cad4b3d4ab1f062708fff33f44d246853f51e966 upstream.

The parameters for the diag 0x258 are real addresses, not virtual, but KVM was using them as virtual addresses. This only happened to work, since the Linux kernel as a guest used to have a 1:1 mapping for physical vs virtual addresses.

Fix KVM so that it correctly uses the addresses as real addresses.