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Enable writing xattr from BPF programs

PATCH Superseded Song Liu 5 participants 12 messages Dec 10, 2024 – Dec 12, 2024

Subsystems (6)
VFS Kselftest BPF Security (LSM) +2 more subsystems

v3 of 12 Superseded Latest is v12 →

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Song Liu

author reviewer
#0 lore raw

v3 cover Enable writing xattr from BPF programs

Add support to set and remove xattr from BPF program. Also add security.bpf. xattr name prefix.

kfuncs are added to set and remove xattrs with security.bpf. name prefix. Update kfuncs bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr to read xattrs with security.bpf. name prefix. Note that BPF programs can read user. xattrs, but not write and remove them.

Cover letter of v1 and v2:

Follow up discussion in LPC 2024 [1], that we need security.bpf xattr prefix. This set adds "security.bpf." xattr name prefix, and allows bpf kfuncs bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr() to read these xattrs.

[1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1940/

Changes v2 => v3
1. Add kfuncs to set and remove xattr from BPF programs.

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/

Changes v1 => v2
1. Update comment of bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr. (Jiri Olsa)
2. Fix comment for return value of bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/

Song Liu (6):
fs/xattr: bpf: Introduce security.bpf. xattr name prefix selftests/bpf: Extend test fs_kfuncs to cover security.bpf. xattr
names
bpf: lsm: Add two more sleepable hooks
bpf: fs/xattr: Add BPF kfuncs to set and remove xattrs selftests/bpf: Test kfuncs that set and remove xattr from BPF programs selftests/bpf: Add __failure tests for set/remove xattr kfuncs

 fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c                            | 258 +++++++++++++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/xattr.h                    |   4 +
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                          |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h      |  10 +
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c      | 165 ++++++++++-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c      |  28 +-
 .../bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr.c         | 129 +++++++++
 .../bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr_failure.c |  56 ++++
 8 files changed, 632 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr_failure.c

--
2.43.5

author reviewer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/6 fs/xattr: bpf: Introduce security.bpf. xattr name prefix

Introduct new xattr name prefix security.bpf., and enable reading these xattrs from bpf kfuncs bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr().

As we are on it, correct the comments for return value of bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr(), i.e. return length the xattr value on success.

---
 fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c         | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 include/uapi/linux/xattr.h |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +14 -5
index 3fe9f59ef867..8a65184c8c2c 100644
@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_path_d_path(struct path *path, char *buf, size_t buf__sz)
 	return len;
 }
 
+static bool match_security_bpf_prefix(const char *name__str)
+{
+	return !strncmp(name__str, XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM, XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM_LEN);
+}
+
 /**
  * bpf_get_dentry_xattr - get xattr of a dentry
  * @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
@@ -101,9 +106,10 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_path_d_path(struct path *path, char *buf, size_t buf__sz)
  *
  * Get xattr *name__str* of *dentry* and store the output in *value_ptr*.
  *
- * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." is allowed.
+ * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." or
+ * "security.bpf." is allowed.
  *
- * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ * Return: length of the xattr value on success, a negative value on error.
  */
 __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
 				     struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
@@ -117,7 +123,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__st
 	if (WARN_ON(!inode))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (strncmp(name__str, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+	/* Allow reading xattr with user. and security.bpf. prefix */
+	if (strncmp(name__str, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN) &&
+	    !match_security_bpf_prefix(name__str))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
@@ -139,9 +147,10 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__st
  *
  * Get xattr *name__str* of *file* and store the output in *value_ptr*.
  *
- * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." is allowed.
+ * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." or
+ * "security.bpf." is allowed.
  *
- * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ * Return: length of the xattr value on success, a negative value on error.
  */
 __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,
 				   struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
include/uapi/linux/xattr.h +4 -0
index 9854f9cff3c6..c7c85bb504ba 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ struct xattr_args {
 #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
 #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
 
+#define XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX "bpf."
+#define XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX)
+#define XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM_LEN (sizeof(XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM) - 1)
+
 #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS  "posix_acl_access"
 #define XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS
 #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT  "posix_acl_default"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
author reviewer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/6 selftests/bpf: Extend test fs_kfuncs to cover security.bpf. xattr names

In reply to Song Liu

Extend test_progs fs_kfuncs to cover different xattr names. Specifically:
xattr name "user.kfuncs" and "security.bpf.xxx" can be read from BPF program with kfuncs bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr(); while "security.bpf" and "security.selinux" cannot be read.

---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c      | 37 ++++++++++++++-----
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c      | 28 ++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c +27 -10
index 5a0b51157451..419f45b56472 100644
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 
 static const char testfile[] = "/tmp/test_progs_fs_kfuncs";
 
-static void test_xattr(void)
+static void test_get_xattr(const char *name, const char *value, bool allow_access)
 {
 	struct test_get_xattr *skel = NULL;
 	int fd = -1, err;
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static void test_xattr(void)
 	close(fd);
 	fd = -1;
 
-	err = setxattr(testfile, "user.kfuncs", "hello", sizeof("hello"), 0);
+	err = setxattr(testfile, name, value, strlen(value) + 1, 0);
 	if (err && errno == EOPNOTSUPP) {
 		printf("%s:SKIP:local fs doesn't support xattr (%d)\n"
 		       "To run this test, make sure /tmp filesystem supports xattr.\n",
@@ -48,16 +48,23 @@ static void test_xattr(void)
 		goto out;
 
 	fd = open(testfile, O_RDONLY, 0644);
+
 	if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "open_file"))
 		goto out;
 
-	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->found_xattr_from_file, 1, "found_xattr_from_file");
-
 	/* Trigger security_inode_getxattr */
-	err = getxattr(testfile, "user.kfuncs", v, sizeof(v));
-	ASSERT_EQ(err, -1, "getxattr_return");
-	ASSERT_EQ(errno, EINVAL, "getxattr_errno");
-	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->found_xattr_from_dentry, 1, "found_xattr_from_dentry");
+	err = getxattr(testfile, name, v, sizeof(v));
+
+	if (allow_access) {
+		ASSERT_EQ(err, -1, "getxattr_return");
+		ASSERT_EQ(errno, EINVAL, "getxattr_errno");
+		ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->found_xattr_from_file, 1, "found_xattr_from_file");
+		ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->found_xattr_from_dentry, 1, "found_xattr_from_dentry");
+	} else {
+		ASSERT_EQ(err, strlen(value) + 1, "getxattr_return");
+		ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->found_xattr_from_file, 0, "found_xattr_from_file");
+		ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->found_xattr_from_dentry, 0, "found_xattr_from_dentry");
+	}
 
 out:
 	close(fd);
@@ -141,8 +148,18 @@ static void test_fsverity(void)
 
 void test_fs_kfuncs(void)
 {
-	if (test__start_subtest("xattr"))
-		test_xattr();
+	/* Matches xattr_names in progs/test_get_xattr.c */
+	if (test__start_subtest("user_xattr"))
+		test_get_xattr("user.kfuncs", "hello", true);
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("security_bpf_xattr"))
+		test_get_xattr("security.bpf.xxx", "hello", true);
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("security_bpf_xattr_error"))
+		test_get_xattr("security.bpf", "hello", false);
+
+	if (test__start_subtest("security_selinux_xattr_error"))
+		test_get_xattr("security.selinux", "hello", false);
 
 	if (test__start_subtest("fsverity"))
 		test_fsverity();
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_xattr.c +24 -4
index 66e737720f7c..358e3506e5b0 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
 #include "bpf_kfuncs.h"
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
@@ -17,12 +18,23 @@ static const char expected_value[] = "hello";
 char value1[32];
 char value2[32];
 
+/* Matches caller of test_get_xattr() in prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c */
+static const char * const xattr_names[] = {
+	/* The following work. */
+	"user.kfuncs",
+	"security.bpf.xxx",
+
+	/* The following do not work. */
+	"security.bpf",
+	"security.selinux"
+};
+
 SEC("lsm.s/file_open")
 int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
 {
 	struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr;
 	__u32 pid;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, i;
 
 	pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
 	if (pid != monitored_pid)
@@ -30,7 +42,11 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_file_open, struct file *f)
 
 	bpf_dynptr_from_mem(value1, sizeof(value1), 0, &value_ptr);
 
-	ret = bpf_get_file_xattr(f, "user.kfuncs", &value_ptr);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xattr_names); i++) {
+		ret = bpf_get_file_xattr(f, xattr_names[i], &value_ptr);
+		if (ret == sizeof(expected_value))
+			break;
+	}
 	if (ret != sizeof(expected_value))
 		return 0;
 	if (bpf_strncmp(value1, ret, expected_value))
@@ -44,7 +60,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 {
 	struct bpf_dynptr value_ptr;
 	__u32 pid;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, i;
 
 	pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
 	if (pid != monitored_pid)
@@ -52,7 +68,11 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 
 	bpf_dynptr_from_mem(value2, sizeof(value2), 0, &value_ptr);
 
-	ret = bpf_get_dentry_xattr(dentry, "user.kfuncs", &value_ptr);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xattr_names); i++) {
+		ret = bpf_get_dentry_xattr(dentry, xattr_names[i], &value_ptr);
+		if (ret == sizeof(expected_value))
+			break;
+	}
 	if (ret != sizeof(expected_value))
 		return 0;
 	if (bpf_strncmp(value2, ret, expected_value))
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
author reviewer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/6 bpf: lsm: Add two more sleepable hooks

In reply to Song Liu

Add bpf_lsm_inode_removexattr and bpf_lsm_inode_post_removexattr to list sleepable_lsm_hooks. These two hooks are always called from sleepable context.

---
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +2 -0
index 967492b65185..0a59df1c550a 100644
@@ -316,7 +316,9 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_getxattr)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_mknod)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_need_killpriv)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setxattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_removexattr)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_readlink)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_removexattr)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_rename)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_rmdir)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setattr)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
author reviewer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v3 4/6 bpf: fs/xattr: Add BPF kfuncs to set and remove xattrs

In reply to Song Liu

Add the following kfuncs to set and remove xattrs from BPF programs:

bpf_set_dentry_xattr
bpf_remove_dentry_xattr
bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked
bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked

The _locked version of these kfuncs are called from hooks where dentry->d_inode is already locked.

---
 fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c | 239 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 238 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +238 -1
index 8a65184c8c2c..2b6e5be57ff3 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -161,6 +162,160 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,
 	return bpf_get_dentry_xattr(dentry, name__str, value_p);
 }
 
+static int bpf_xattr_write_permission(const char *name, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON(!inode))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Only allow setting and removing security.bpf. xattrs */
+	if (!match_security_bpf_prefix(name))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+static int __bpf_set_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				  const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags, bool lock_inode)
+{
+	struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	const void *value;
+	u32 value_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name, inode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
+	value = __bpf_dynptr_data(value_ptr, value_len);
+	if (!value)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (lock_inode)
+		inode_lock(inode);
+	ret = __vfs_setxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, inode, name,
+			     value, value_len, flags);
+	if (!ret) {
+		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+
+		/* This xattr is set by BPF LSM, so we do not call
+		 * security_inode_post_setxattr. This is the same as
+		 * security_inode_setsecurity().
+		 */
+	}
+	if (lock_inode)
+		inode_unlock(inode);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_set_dentry_xattr - set a xattr of a dentry
+ * @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
+ * @name__str: name of the xattr
+ * @value_p: xattr value
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
+ *
+ * Set xattr *name__str* of *dentry* to the value in *value_ptr*.
+ *
+ * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
+ * is allowed.
+ *
+ * The caller has not locked dentry->d_inode.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_set_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
+				     const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags)
+{
+	return __bpf_set_dentry_xattr(dentry, name__str, value_p, flags, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked - set a xattr of a dentry
+ * @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
+ * @name__str: name of the xattr
+ * @value_p: xattr value
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
+ *
+ * Set xattr *name__str* of *dentry* to the value in *value_ptr*.
+ *
+ * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
+ * is allowed.
+ *
+ * The caller already locked dentry->d_inode.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
+					    const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags)
+{
+	return __bpf_set_dentry_xattr(dentry, name__str, value_p, flags, false);
+}
+
+static int __bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
+				     bool lock_inode)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name__str, inode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (lock_inode)
+		inode_lock(inode);
+	ret = __vfs_removexattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, name__str);
+	if (!ret) {
+		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+
+		/* This xattr is removed by BPF LSM, so we do not call
+		 * security_inode_post_removexattr.
+		 */
+	}
+	if (lock_inode)
+		inode_unlock(inode);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_remove_dentry_xattr - remove a xattr of a dentry
+ * @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
+ * @name__str: name of the xattr
+ *
+ * Rmove xattr *name__str* of *dentry*.
+ *
+ * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
+ * is allowed.
+ *
+ * The caller has not locked dentry->d_inode.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str)
+{
+	return __bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(dentry, name__str, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked - remove a xattr of a dentry
+ * @dentry: dentry to get xattr from
+ * @name__str: name of the xattr
+ *
+ * Rmove xattr *name__str* of *dentry*.
+ *
+ * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "security.bpf."
+ * is allowed.
+ *
+ * The caller already locked dentry->d_inode.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str)
+{
+	return __bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(dentry, name__str, false);
+}
+
 __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
 
 BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
@@ -186,9 +341,91 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_fs_kfunc_set = {
 	.filter = bpf_fs_kfuncs_filter,
 };
 
+/* bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr.* hooks have KF_TRUSTED_ARGS and
+ * KF_SLEEPABLE, so they are only available to sleepable hooks with
+ * dentry arguments.
+ *
+ * Setting and removing xattr requires exclusive lock on dentry->d_inode.
+ * Some hooks already locked d_inode, while some hooks have not locked
+ * d_inode. Therefore, we need different kfuncs for different hooks.
+ * Specifically, hooks in the following list (d_inode_locked_hooks)
+ * should call bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr_locked; while other hooks
+ * should call bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr.
+ */
+BTF_SET_START(d_inode_locked_hooks)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_removexattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setxattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_removexattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_rmdir)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setxattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_unlink)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_unlink)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_rmdir)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+BTF_SET_END(d_inode_locked_hooks)
+
+static bool bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	return btf_id_set_contains(&d_inode_locked_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id);
+}
+
+BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_write_xattr_set_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_write_xattr_set_ids)
+
+static int bpf_write_xattr_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
+{
+	if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&bpf_write_xattr_set_ids, kfunc_id))
+		return 0;
+	if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_write_xattr_set = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.set = &bpf_write_xattr_set_ids,
+	.filter = bpf_write_xattr_filter,
+};
+
+BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_write_xattr_locked_set_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_write_xattr_locked_set_ids)
+
+static int bpf_write_xattr_locked_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
+{
+	if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&bpf_write_xattr_locked_set_ids, kfunc_id))
+		return 0;
+	if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (!bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_write_xattr_locked_set = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.set = &bpf_write_xattr_locked_set_ids,
+	.filter = bpf_write_xattr_locked_filter,
+};
+
 static int __init bpf_fs_kfuncs_init(void)
 {
-	return register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_fs_kfunc_set);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_fs_kfunc_set);
+	ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_write_xattr_set);
+	ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, &bpf_write_xattr_locked_set);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 late_initcall(bpf_fs_kfuncs_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
reviewer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 4/6] bpf: fs/xattr: Add BPF kfuncs to set and remove xattrs

Quoted 11 lines · Song Liu

Add the following kfuncs to set and remove xattrs from BPF programs:

bpf_set_dentry_xattr
bpf_remove_dentry_xattr
bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked
bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked

The _locked version of these kfuncs are called from hooks where dentry->d_inode is already locked.

A few comments below.

Quoted 18 lines
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +14 -0
@@ -161,6 +162,160 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,
 	return bpf_get_dentry_xattr(dentry, name__str, value_p);
 }
 
+static int bpf_xattr_write_permission(const char *name, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON(!inode))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Only allow setting and removing security.bpf. xattrs */
+	if (!match_security_bpf_prefix(name))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+static int __bpf_set_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				  const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags, bool lock_inode)

fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str, · line 188

Quoted 10 lines
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +10 -0
+{
+	struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	const void *value;
+	u32 value_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name, inode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;

The permission checking should already happen under inode lock. Otherwise you'll have TTCTTU races.

fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str, · line 200

Quoted 12 lines
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +12 -0
+
+	value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
+	value = __bpf_dynptr_data(value_ptr, value_len);
+	if (!value)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (lock_inode)
+		inode_lock(inode);
+	ret = __vfs_setxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, inode, name,
+			     value, value_len, flags);
+	if (!ret) {
+		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);

Do we really want to generate fsnotify event for this? I expect security.bpf is an internal bookkeeping of a BPF security module and generating fsnotify event for it seems a bit like generating it for filesystem metadata modifications. On the other hand as I'm checking IMA generates fsnotify events when modifying its xattrs as well. So probably this fine. OK.

...

fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str, · line 266

Quoted 11 lines
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +11 -0
+static int __bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
+				     bool lock_inode)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name__str, inode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (lock_inode)

+ inode_lock(inode);

The same comment WRT inode lock as above.

fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str, · line 279

Quoted 12 lines
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +12 -0
+	ret = __vfs_removexattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, name__str);
+	if (!ret) {
+		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+
+		/* This xattr is removed by BPF LSM, so we do not call
+		 * security_inode_post_removexattr.
+		 */
+	}
+	if (lock_inode)
+		inode_unlock(inode);
+	return ret;
+}

Honza

Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, CR
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 4/6] bpf: fs/xattr: Add BPF kfuncs to set and remove xattrs

Hi Jan,

Thanks for your review!

Quoted 5 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line · Song Liu

Add the following kfuncs to set and remove xattrs from BPF programs:

[...]

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines

+ return -EPERM;

fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +11 -0
+
+ return inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+static int __bpf_set_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+  const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags, bool lock_inode)
+{
+ struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ const void *value;
+ u32 value_len;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

+ int ret;
+
+ ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name, inode);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;

The permission checking should already happen under inode lock. Otherwise you'll have TTCTTU races.

Great catch! I will fix this in the next version.

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +11 -0
+
+ value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
+ value = __bpf_dynptr_data(value_ptr, value_len);
+ if (!value)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (lock_inode)
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ ret = __vfs_setxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, inode, name,
+     value, value_len, flags);
+ if (!ret) {
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

+ fsnotify_xattr(dentry);

Do we really want to generate fsnotify event for this? I expect security.bpf is an internal bookkeeping of a BPF security module and generating fsnotify event for it seems a bit like generating it for filesystem metadata modifications. On the other hand as I'm checking IMA generates fsnotify events when modifying its xattrs as well. So probably this fine. OK.

Both SELinux and smack generate fsnotify events when setting xattrs:
[selinux|smack]_inode_setsecctx() -> __vfs_setxattr_locked(). So I add the same logic here.

Quoted 16 lines

...

fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str, · line 266

Quoted 11 lines
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c +11 -0
+static int __bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
+     bool lock_inode)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = bpf_xattr_write_permission(name__str, inode);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (lock_inode)

+ inode_lock(inode);

Quoted 6 lines

The same comment WRT inode lock as above.

Quoted 4 lines

+ ret = __vfs_removexattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, name__str);
+ if (!ret) {
+ fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+

Thanks again,
Song

author reviewer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/6 selftests/bpf: Test kfuncs that set and remove xattr from BPF programs

In reply to Song Liu

Two sets of tests are added to exercise the not _locked and _locked version of the kfuncs. For both tests, user space accesses xattr security.bpf.foo on a testfile. The BPF program is triggered by user space access (on LSM hook inode_[set|get]_xattr) and sets or removes xattr security.bpf.bar. Then user space then validates that xattr security.bpf.bar is set or removed as expected.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h      |  10 ++
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c      | 125 +++++++++++++++++
 .../bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr.c         | 129 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 264 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h +10 -0
index 2eb3483f2fb0..e53f3f5304e2 100644
@@ -87,4 +87,14 @@ struct dentry;
  */
 extern int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			      struct bpf_dynptr *value_ptr) __ksym __weak;
+
+extern int bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
+				       const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags) __ksym __weak;
+extern int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry,
+					  const char *name__str) __ksym __weak;
+
+extern int bpf_set_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
+				const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags) __ksym __weak;
+extern int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str) __ksym __weak;
+
 #endif
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c +125 -0

143 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr.c new file +129 -0

129 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
author reviewer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v3 6/6 selftests/bpf: Add __failure tests for set/remove xattr kfuncs

In reply to Song Liu

Different LSM hooks should call different versions of set/remove xattr kfuncs (with _locked or not). Add __failure tests to make sure the verifier can detect when the user uses the wrong kfuncs.

---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c      |  3 +
 .../bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr_failure.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr_failure.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c +3 -0
index 41532df79fdd..614335a3ff53 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <test_progs.h>
 #include "test_get_xattr.skel.h"
 #include "test_set_remove_xattr.skel.h"
+#include "test_set_remove_xattr_failure.skel.h"
 #include "test_fsverity.skel.h"
 
 static const char testfile[] = "/tmp/test_progs_fs_kfuncs";
@@ -286,6 +287,8 @@ void test_fs_kfuncs(void)
 	if (test__start_subtest("set_remove_xattr"))
 		test_set_remove_xattr();
 
+	RUN_TESTS(test_set_remove_xattr_failure);
+
 	if (test__start_subtest("fsverity"))
 		test_fsverity();
 }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_set_remove_xattr_failure.c new file +56 -0

56 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
#9 lore raw
In reply to Song Liu
Quoted 2 lines · Song Liu

Add support to set and remove xattr from BPF program. Also add security.bpf. xattr name prefix.

If the system allows for the execution of unprivileged BPF programs (e.g., ones where a random user can load their own BPF programs), will they have hte ability to set and remove security.bpf.* xattrs? If the answer is yes, should this be disallowed?

I note that one of the use cases seems to be BPF-based LSM's, so we may want to have something even more restrictive since otherwise any BPF program could potentially have the same power as the LSM?

- Ted

#10 lore raw

Hi Ted,

Quoted 6 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 2 lines · Song Liu

Add support to set and remove xattr from BPF program. Also add security.bpf. xattr name prefix.

Quoted 8 lines

If the system allows for the execution of unprivileged BPF programs (e.g., ones where a random user can load their own BPF programs), will they have hte ability to set and remove security.bpf.* xattrs? If the answer is yes, should this be disallowed?

I note that one of the use cases seems to be BPF-based LSM's, so we may want to have something even more restrictive since otherwise any BPF program could potentially have the same power as the LSM?

These kfuncs are only allowed in BPF LSM programs. Therefore, other program types (tracing, XDP, etc.) cannot use these kfuncs.

Thanks,
Song

#11 lore raw
In reply to Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 9 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 2 lines · Song Liu

Add support to set and remove xattr from BPF program. Also add security.bpf. xattr name prefix.

If the system allows for the execution of unprivileged BPF programs (e.g., ones where a random user can load their own BPF programs), will they have hte ability to set and remove security.bpf.* xattrs? If the answer is yes, should this be disallowed?

It's not 100% clear from Song's reply, but the answer is "no". You can't use this from unprivileged BPF programs (BPF LSM is privileged and requires root, effectively).

Quoted 6 lines

I note that one of the use cases seems to be BPF-based LSM's, so we may want to have something even more restrictive since otherwise any BPF program could potentially have the same power as the LSM?

- Ted