5.15.174-rc1 review

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hariprasad Kelam <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ebbbb23ea5b6d051509cb11399afac5042c9266 ]

Due to a bug in the previous patch, there is a mismatch between the lmac type reported by the driver and the actual hardware configuration.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rpm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 3ac26ba31e2f3..35ece52977bcf 100644
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ u8 rpm_get_lmac_type(void *rpmd, int lmac_id)
 	int err;
 
 	req = FIELD_SET(CMDREG_ID, CGX_CMD_GET_LINK_STS, req);
-	err = cgx_fwi_cmd_generic(req, &resp, rpm, 0);
+	err = cgx_fwi_cmd_generic(req, &resp, rpm, lmac_id);
 	if (!err)
 		return FIELD_GET(RESP_LINKSTAT_LMAC_TYPE, resp);
 	return err;

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Csókás, Bence <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2ac40e6d0ccdd93031f8b1af61b0fe5cdd704923 ]

atmel_qspi_reg_name() is used for pretty-printing register offsets for verbose logging of register accesses. However, due to a typo (likely a copy-paste error), QSPI_RD's offset prints as "MR", the name of the previous register. Fix this typo.

---
 drivers/spi/atmel-quadspi.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 938017a60c8ed..0a4d060a71065 100644
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static const char *atmel_qspi_reg_name(u32 offset, char *tmp, size_t sz)
 	case QSPI_MR:
 		return "MR";
 	case QSPI_RD:
-		return "MR";
+		return "RD";
 	case QSPI_TD:
 		return "TD";
 	case QSPI_SR:

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9cfb5e7f0ded2bfaabc270ceb5f91d13f0e805b9 ]

Following sequence in hsr_init_sk() is invalid :

    skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
    skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
    skb_reset_network_header(skb);
    skb_reset_transport_header(skb);

It is invalid because skb_reset_mac_len() needs the correct network header, which should be after the mac header.

This patch moves the skb_reset_network_header() and skb_reset_transport_header() before
the call to dev_hard_header().

As a result skb->mac_len is no longer set to a value close to 65535.

---
 net/hsr/hsr_device.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 4a50ffc2a70c8..0ffb28406fdc0 100644
@@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *hsr_init_skb(struct hsr_port *master)
 	skb->dev = master->dev;
 	skb->priority = TC_PRIO_CONTROL;
 
+	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
+	skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
 	if (dev_hard_header(skb, skb->dev, ETH_P_PRP,
 			    hsr->sup_multicast_addr,
 			    skb->dev->dev_addr, skb->len) <= 0)

@@ -263,8 +265,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *hsr_init_skb(struct hsr_port *master)
 
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
 	skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
-	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
-	skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
 
 	return skb;
 out:

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Saravanan Vajravel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5311598f7f3293683cdc761df71ae3469327332c ]

After successful PCIe AER recovery, FW will reset all resource reservations. If it is IF_UP, the driver will call bnxt_open() and all resources will be reserved again. It it is IF_DOWN, we should call bnxt_reserve_rings() so that we can reserve resources including RoCE resources to allow RoCE to resume after AER. Without this patch, RoCE fails to resume in this IF_DOWN scenario.

Later, if it becomes IF_UP, bnxt_open() will see that resources have been reserved and will not reserve again.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index f3c6a122a079a..127f7d238a041 100644
@@ -13692,8 +13692,12 @@ static void bnxt_io_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	rtnl_lock();
 
 	err = bnxt_hwrm_func_qcaps(bp);
-	if (!err && netif_running(netdev))
-		err = bnxt_open(netdev);
+	if (!err) {
+		if (netif_running(netdev))
+			err = bnxt_open(netdev);
+		else
+			err = bnxt_reserve_rings(bp, true);
+	}
 
 	bnxt_ulp_start(bp, err);
 	if (!err) {

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c31e72d021db2714df03df6c42855a1db592716c ]

The cited commit replaced inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put() with __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop() and reqsk_put() in reqsk_timer_handler().

Then, oreq should be passed to reqsk_put() instead of req; otherwise use-after-free of nreq could happen when reqsk is migrated but the retry attempt failed (e.g. due to timeout).

Let's pass oreq to reqsk_put().

---
 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 63e5aa6d4b0bc..73ef8b4f57049 100644
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static void reqsk_timer_handler(struct timer_list *t)
 
 drop:
 	__inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk_listener, oreq, true);
-	reqsk_put(req);
+	reqsk_put(oreq);
 }
 
 static bool reqsk_queue_hash_req(struct request_sock *req,

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a4b7064d34186cf4970fe0333c3b27346cf8f819 ]

If i2c_smbus_write_byte_data() fails in al3010_init(), al3010_set_pwr(false) is not called.

In order to avoid such a situation, move the devm_add_action_or_reset() witch calls al3010_set_pwr(false) right after a successful al3010_set_pwr(true).

---
 drivers/iio/light/al3010.c | 11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

index b4e9924094cd1..bd83e73e68026 100644
@@ -87,7 +87,12 @@ static int al3010_init(struct al3010_data *data)
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = al3010_set_pwr(data->client, true);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
 
+	ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&data->client->dev,
+				       al3010_set_pwr_off,
+				       data);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 

@@ -191,12 +196,6 @@ static int al3010_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&client->dev,
-					al3010_set_pwr_off,
-					data);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
-
 	return devm_iio_device_register(&client->dev, indio_dev);
 }
 

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 44feafbaa66ec86232b123bb8437a6a262442025 ]

iowarrior_read() uses the iowarrior dev structure, but does not use any lock on the structure. This can cause various bugs including data-races, so it is more appropriate to use a mutex lock to safely protect the iowarrior dev structure. When using a mutex lock, you should split the branch to prevent blocking when the O_NONBLOCK flag is set.

In addition, it is unnecessary to check for NULL on the iowarrior dev structure obtained by reading file->private_data. Therefore, it is better to remove the check.

---
 drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

index b421f13260875..2fde8dd0b3e21 100644
@@ -277,28 +277,45 @@ static ssize_t iowarrior_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
 	struct iowarrior *dev;
 	int read_idx;
 	int offset;
+	int retval;
 
 	dev = file->private_data;
 
+	if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
+		retval = mutex_trylock(&dev->mutex);
+		if (!retval)
+			return -EAGAIN;
+	} else {
+		retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->mutex);
+		if (retval)
+			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+	}
+
 	/* verify that the device wasn't unplugged */
-	if (!dev || !dev->present)
-		return -ENODEV;
+	if (!dev->present) {
+		retval = -ENODEV;
+		goto exit;
+	}
 
 	dev_dbg(&dev->interface->dev, "minor %d, count = %zd\n",
 		dev->minor, count);
 
 	/* read count must be packet size (+ time stamp) */
 	if ((count != dev->report_size)
-	    && (count != (dev->report_size + 1)))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	    && (count != (dev->report_size + 1))) {
+		retval = -EINVAL;
+		goto exit;
+	}
 
 	/* repeat until no buffer overrun in callback handler occur */
 	do {
 		atomic_set(&dev->overflow_flag, 0);
 		if ((read_idx = read_index(dev)) == -1) {
 			/* queue empty */
-			if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
-				return -EAGAIN;
+			if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
+				retval = -EAGAIN;
+				goto exit;
+			}
 			else {
 				//next line will return when there is either new data, or the device is unplugged
 				int r = wait_event_interruptible(dev->read_wait,

@@ -309,28 +326,37 @@ static ssize_t iowarrior_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
 								  -1));
 				if (r) {
 					//we were interrupted by a signal
-					return -ERESTART;
+					retval = -ERESTART;
+					goto exit;
 				}
 				if (!dev->present) {
 					//The device was unplugged
-					return -ENODEV;
+					retval = -ENODEV;
+					goto exit;
 				}
 				if (read_idx == -1) {
 					// Can this happen ???
-					return 0;
+					retval = 0;
+					goto exit;
 				}
 			}
 		}
 
 		offset = read_idx * (dev->report_size + 1);
 		if (copy_to_user(buffer, dev->read_queue + offset, count)) {
-			return -EFAULT;
+			retval = -EFAULT;
+			goto exit;
 		}
 	} while (atomic_read(&dev->overflow_flag));
 
 	read_idx = ++read_idx == MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER ? 0 : read_idx;
 	atomic_set(&dev->read_idx, read_idx);
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
 	return count;
+
+exit:
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
+	return retval;
 }
 
 /*

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e0aa9614ab0fd35b404e4b16ebe879f9fc152591 ]

The IO yurex_write() needs to wait for in order to have a device ready for writing again can take a long time time. Consequently the sleep is done in an interruptible state. Therefore others waiting for yurex_write() itself to finish should use mutex_lock_interruptible.

Rule: add

---
 drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 4 ----
 drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c     | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 2fde8dd0b3e21..5606c5a2624a7 100644
@@ -912,7 +912,6 @@ static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 static void iowarrior_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
 {
 	struct iowarrior *dev = usb_get_intfdata(interface);
-	int minor = dev->minor;
 
 	usb_deregister_dev(interface, &iowarrior_class);
 

@@ -936,9 +935,6 @@ static void iowarrior_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
 		iowarrior_delete(dev);
 	}
-
-	dev_info(&interface->dev, "I/O-Warror #%d now disconnected\n",
-		 minor - IOWARRIOR_MINOR_BASE);
 }
 
 /* usb specific object needed to register this driver with the usb subsystem */

index c313cd41f7a5a..0eed614ac1273 100644
@@ -441,7 +441,10 @@ static ssize_t yurex_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buffer,
 	if (count == 0)
 		goto error;
 
-	mutex_lock(&dev->io_mutex);
+	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&dev->io_mutex);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		return -EINTR;
+
 	if (dev->disconnected) {		/* already disconnected */
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex);
 		retval = -ENODEV;

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 422dc0a4d12d0b80dd3aab3fe5943f665ba8f041 ]

chaoskey_open() takes the lock only to increase the counter of openings. That means that the mutual exclusion with chaoskey_disconnect() cannot prevent an increase of the counter and chaoskey_open() returning a success.

If that race is hit, chaoskey_disconnect() will happily free all resources associated with the device after it has dropped the lock, as it has read the counter as zero.

To prevent this race chaoskey_open() has to check the presence of the device under the lock. However, the current per device lock cannot be used, because it is a part of the data structure to be freed. Hence an additional global mutex is needed. The issue is as old as the driver.

Rule: add

---
 drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

index 87067c3d6109b..32fa7fd50c380 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ static struct usb_class_driver chaoskey_class;
 static int chaoskey_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data,
 			     size_t max, bool wait);
 
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(chaoskey_list_lock);
+
 #define usb_dbg(usb_if, format, arg...) \
 	dev_dbg(&(usb_if)->dev, format, ## arg)
 

@@ -231,6 +233,7 @@ static void chaoskey_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
 	if (dev->hwrng_registered)
 		hwrng_unregister(&dev->hwrng);
 
+	mutex_lock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	usb_deregister_dev(interface, &chaoskey_class);
 
 	usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL);

@@ -245,6 +248,7 @@ static void chaoskey_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
 	} else
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
 
+	mutex_unlock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	usb_dbg(interface, "disconnect done");
 }
 

@@ -252,6 +256,7 @@ static int chaoskey_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct chaoskey *dev;
 	struct usb_interface *interface;
+	int rv = 0;
 
 	/* get the interface from minor number and driver information */
 	interface = usb_find_interface(&chaoskey_driver, iminor(inode));

@@ -267,18 +272,23 @@ static int chaoskey_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	}
 
 	file->private_data = dev;
+	mutex_lock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
-	++dev->open;
+	if (dev->present)
+		++dev->open;
+	else
+		rv = -ENODEV;
 	mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 
-	usb_dbg(interface, "open success");
-	return 0;
+	return rv;
 }
 
 static int chaoskey_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct chaoskey *dev = file->private_data;
 	struct usb_interface *interface;
+	int rv = 0;
 
 	if (dev == NULL)
 		return -ENODEV;

@@ -287,14 +297,15 @@ static int chaoskey_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	usb_dbg(interface, "release");
 
+	mutex_lock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
 
 	usb_dbg(interface, "open count at release is %d", dev->open);
 
 	if (dev->open <= 0) {
 		usb_dbg(interface, "invalid open count (%d)", dev->open);
-		mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
-		return -ENODEV;
+		rv = -ENODEV;
+		goto bail;
 	}
 
 	--dev->open;

@@ -303,13 +314,15 @@ static int chaoskey_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 		if (dev->open == 0) {
 			mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
 			chaoskey_free(dev);
-		} else
-			mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
-	} else
-		mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
-
+			goto destruction;
+		}
+	}
+bail:
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
+destruction:
+	mutex_lock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	usb_dbg(interface, "release success");
-	return 0;
+	return rv;
 }
 
 static void chaos_read_callback(struct urb *urb)

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d73dc7b182be4238b75278bfae16afb4c5564a58 ]

[Syzbot reported two possible deadlocks]
The first possible deadlock is:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller-00027-g4a9fe2a8ac53 #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor363/2651 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff89b120e8 (chaoskey_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: chaoskey_release+0x15d/0x2c0 drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:322

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff89b120e8 (chaoskey_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: chaoskey_release+0x7f/0x2c0 drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:299

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----

lock(chaoskey_list_lock);
lock(chaoskey_list_lock);

*** DEADLOCK ***

The second possible deadlock is:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller-00027-g4a9fe2a8ac53 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/0:2/804 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff899dadb0 (minor_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: usb_deregister_dev+0x7c/0x1e0 drivers/usb/core/file.c:186

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff89b120e8 (chaoskey_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: chaoskey_disconnect+0xa8/0x2a0 drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:235

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (chaoskey_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:

       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x175/0x9c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
       chaoskey_open+0xdd/0x220 drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:274
       usb_open+0x186/0x220 drivers/usb/core/file.c:47
       chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414
       do_dentry_open+0x6cb/0x1390 fs/open.c:958
       vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1088
       do_open fs/namei.c:3774 [inline]
       path_openat+0x1e6a/0x2d60 fs/namei.c:3933
       do_filp_open+0x1dc/0x430 fs/namei.c:3960
       do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1415
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1430 [inline]
       __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1446 [inline]
       __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1441 [inline]
       __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1441
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-> #0 (minor_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:

       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x250b/0x3ce0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202
       lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
       down_write+0x93/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1577
       usb_deregister_dev+0x7c/0x1e0 drivers/usb/core/file.c:186
       chaoskey_disconnect+0xb7/0x2a0 drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:236
       usb_unbind_interface+0x1e8/0x970 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:461
       device_remove drivers/base/dd.c:569 [inline]
       device_remove+0x122/0x170 drivers/base/dd.c:561
       __device_release_driver drivers/base/dd.c:1273 [inline]
       device_release_driver_internal+0x44a/0x610 drivers/base/dd.c:1296
       bus_remove_device+0x22f/0x420 drivers/base/bus.c:576
       device_del+0x396/0x9f0 drivers/base/core.c:3864
       usb_disable_device+0x36c/0x7f0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1418
       usb_disconnect+0x2e1/0x920 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2304
       hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5361 [inline]
       hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5661 [inline]
       port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5821 [inline]
       hub_event+0x1bed/0x4f40 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5903
       process_one_work+0x9c5/0x1ba0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229
       process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3310 [inline]
       worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf00 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
       kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
       ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(chaoskey_list_lock);
                               lock(minor_rwsem);
                               lock(chaoskey_list_lock);

lock(minor_rwsem);

*** DEADLOCK ***
[Analysis]
The first is AA lock, it because wrong logic, it need a unlock. The second is AB lock, it needs to rearrange the order of lock usage.

---
 drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 32fa7fd50c380..d99d424c05a7a 100644
@@ -233,10 +233,10 @@ static void chaoskey_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
 	if (dev->hwrng_registered)
 		hwrng_unregister(&dev->hwrng);
 
-	mutex_lock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	usb_deregister_dev(interface, &chaoskey_class);
 
 	usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL);
+	mutex_lock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
 
 	dev->present = false;

@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int chaoskey_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 bail:
 	mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
 destruction:
-	mutex_lock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
 	usb_dbg(interface, "release success");
 	return rv;
 }

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3c5d8b819d27012264edd17e6ae7fffda382fe44 ]

The pm_runtime_disable() is missing in probe error path, so add it to fix it.

---
 drivers/misc/apds990x.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 45f5b997a0e10..5b17288ecc2f0 100644
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ static int apds990x_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 		err = chip->pdata->setup_resources();
 		if (err) {
 			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto fail3;
+			goto fail4;
 		}
 	}
 

@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ static int apds990x_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 				apds990x_attribute_group);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		dev_err(&chip->client->dev, "Sysfs registration failed\n");
-		goto fail4;
+		goto fail5;
 	}
 
 	err = request_threaded_irq(client->irq, NULL,

@@ -1167,15 +1167,17 @@ static int apds990x_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(&client->dev, "could not get IRQ %d\n",
 			client->irq);
-		goto fail5;
+		goto fail6;
 	}
 	return err;
-fail5:
+fail6:
 	sysfs_remove_group(&chip->client->dev.kobj,
 			&apds990x_attribute_group[0]);
-fail4:
+fail5:
 	if (chip->pdata && chip->pdata->release_resources)
 		chip->pdata->release_resources();
+fail4:
+	pm_runtime_disable(&client->dev);
 fail3:
 	regulator_bulk_disable(ARRAY_SIZE(chip->regs), chip->regs);
 fail2:

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiasheng Jiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 842c3755a6bfbfcafa4a1438078d2485a9eb1d87 ]

Add check for the return value of clk_enable() in order to catch the potential exception.

---
 drivers/counter/stm32-timer-cnt.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 0546e932db0c1..8d668d5cfd0df 100644
@@ -196,11 +196,17 @@ static int stm32_count_enable_write(struct counter_device *counter,
 {
 	struct stm32_timer_cnt *const priv = counter->priv;
 	u32 cr1;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (enable) {
 		regmap_read(priv->regmap, TIM_CR1, &cr1);
-		if (!(cr1 & TIM_CR1_CEN))
-			clk_enable(priv->clk);
+		if (!(cr1 & TIM_CR1_CEN)) {
+			ret = clk_enable(priv->clk);
+			if (ret) {
+				dev_err(counter->parent, "Cannot enable clock %d\n", ret);
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
 
 		regmap_update_bits(priv->regmap, TIM_CR1, TIM_CR1_CEN,
 				   TIM_CR1_CEN);

@@ -374,7 +380,11 @@ static int __maybe_unused stm32_timer_cnt_resume(struct device *dev)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (priv->enabled) {
-		clk_enable(priv->clk);
+		ret = clk_enable(priv->clk);
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Cannot enable clock %d\n", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
 
 		/* Restore registers that may have been lost */
 		regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_SMCR, priv->bak.smcr);

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc3d0b5dd989d3238d456f9fd385946379a9c13d ]

Old procedure has a chance to meet Headphone no output.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

index 637180c774d7d..abba6c71fa2e1 100644
@@ -3593,25 +3593,22 @@ static void alc256_init(struct hda_codec *codec)
 
 	hp_pin_sense = snd_hda_jack_detect(codec, hp_pin);
 
-	if (hp_pin_sense)
+	if (hp_pin_sense) {
 		msleep(2);
+		alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x1); /* Low power */
 
-	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x1); /* Low power */
-
-	snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
-			    AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_MUTE);
-
-	if (hp_pin_sense || spec->ultra_low_power)
-		msleep(85);
-
-	snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
+		snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
 			    AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, PIN_OUT);
 
-	if (hp_pin_sense || spec->ultra_low_power)
-		msleep(100);
+		msleep(75);
+
+		snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
+			    AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_UNMUTE);
 
+		msleep(75);
+		alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */
+	}
 	alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x46, 3 << 12, 0);
-	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */
 	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Clear bit */
 	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 0 << 15);
 	/*

@@ -3635,29 +3632,28 @@ static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec)
 	alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x1); /* Low power */
 	hp_pin_sense = snd_hda_jack_detect(codec, hp_pin);
 
-	if (hp_pin_sense)
+	if (hp_pin_sense) {
 		msleep(2);
 
-	snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
+		snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
 			    AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_MUTE);
 
-	if (hp_pin_sense || spec->ultra_low_power)
-		msleep(85);
+		msleep(75);
 
 	/* 3k pull low control for Headset jack. */
 	/* NOTE: call this before clearing the pin, otherwise codec stalls */
 	/* If disable 3k pulldown control for alc257, the Mic detection will not work correctly
 	 * when booting with headset plugged. So skip setting it for the codec alc257
 	 */
-	if (spec->en_3kpull_low)
-		alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x46, 0, 3 << 12);
+		if (spec->en_3kpull_low)
+			alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x46, 0, 3 << 12);
 
-	if (!spec->no_shutup_pins)
-		snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
+		if (!spec->no_shutup_pins)
+			snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0,
 				    AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, 0x0);
 
-	if (hp_pin_sense || spec->ultra_low_power)
-		msleep(100);
+		msleep(75);
+	}
 
 	alc_auto_setup_eapd(codec, false);
 	alc_shutup_pins(codec);

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: chao liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9b897132424fe76bf6c61f22f9cf12af7f1d1e6a ]

Multiple profiles shared 'ent->caps', so some logs missed.

---
 security/apparmor/capability.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index deccea8654ad8..1b13fd89d5a9f 100644
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 		return error;
 	} else {
 		aa_put_profile(ent->profile);
+		if (profile != ent->profile)
+			cap_clear(ent->caps);
 		ent->profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
 		cap_raise(ent->caps, cap);
 	}

2.43.0

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 7ae04ba36b381bffe2471eff3a93edced843240f upstream.

ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN was defined as 16 - this is too small - it may be possible that two unrelated 16-byte allocations share a cache line. If one of these allocations is written using DMA and the other is written using cached write, the value that was written with DMA may be corrupted.

This commit changes ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN to be 128 on PA20 and 32 on PA1.1 - that's the largest possible cache line size.

As different parisc microarchitectures have different cache line size, we define arch_slab_minalign(), cache_line_size() and dma_get_cache_alignment() so that the kernel may tune slab cache parameters dynamically, based on the detected cache line size.

---
 arch/parisc/Kconfig             |    1 +
 arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h |   11 ++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ config PARISC
 	select ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64 if !64BIT
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS if PA20
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_MEMORY_FAILURE
+	select ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
 	select DMA_OPS
 	select RTC_CLASS
 	select RTC_DRV_GENERIC

@@ -20,7 +20,16 @@
 
 #define SMP_CACHE_BYTES L1_CACHE_BYTES
 
-#define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN	L1_CACHE_BYTES
+#ifdef CONFIG_PA20
+#define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN	128
+#else
+#define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN	32
+#endif
+#define ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN	16	/* ldcw requires 16-byte alignment */
+
+#define arch_slab_minalign()	((unsigned)dcache_stride)
+#define cache_line_size()	dcache_stride
+#define dma_get_cache_alignment cache_line_size
 
 #define __read_mostly __section(".data..read_mostly")
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>

commit b8fc56fbca7482c1e5c0e3351c6ae78982e25ada upstream.

ksmbd_user_session_put should be called under smb3_preauth_hash_rsp(). It will avoid freeing session before calling smb3_preauth_hash_rsp().

---
 fs/ksmbd/server.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -238,11 +238,11 @@ static void __handle_ksmbd_work(struct k
 	} while (is_chained == true);
 
 send:
-	if (work->sess)
-		ksmbd_user_session_put(work->sess);
 	if (work->tcon)
 		ksmbd_tree_connect_put(work->tcon);
 	smb3_preauth_hash_rsp(work);
+	if (work->sess)
+		ksmbd_user_session_put(work->sess);
 	if (work->sess && work->sess->enc && work->encrypted &&
 	    conn->ops->encrypt_resp) {
 		rc = conn->ops->encrypt_resp(work);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qiu-ji Chen <[email protected]>

commit afc545da381ba0c651b2658966ac737032676f01 upstream.

This patch fixes an issue in the function xenbus_dev_probe(). In the xenbus_dev_probe() function, within the if (err) branch at line 313, the program incorrectly returns err directly without releasing the resources allocated by err = drv->probe(dev, id). As the return value is non-zero, the upper layers assume the processing logic has failed. However, the probe operation was performed earlier without a corresponding remove operation. Since the probe actually allocates resources, failing to perform the remove operation could lead to problems.

To fix this issue, we followed the resource release logic of the xenbus_dev_remove() function by adding a new block fail_remove before the fail_put block. After entering the branch if (err) at line 313, the function will use a goto statement to jump to the fail_remove block, ensuring that the previously acquired resources are correctly released, thus preventing the reference count leak.

This bug was identified by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team. The tool specializes in analyzing reference count operations and detecting potential issues where resources are not properly managed. In this case, the tool flagged the missing release operation as a potential problem, which led to the development of this patch.

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ int xenbus_dev_probe(struct device *_dev
 	if (err) {
 		dev_warn(&dev->dev, "watch_otherend on %s failed.\n",
 		       dev->nodename);
-		return err;
+		goto fail_remove;
 	}
 
 	dev->spurious_threshold = 1;

@@ -317,6 +317,12 @@ int xenbus_dev_probe(struct device *_dev
 			 dev->nodename);
 
 	return 0;
+fail_remove:
+	if (drv->remove) {
+		down(&dev->reclaim_sem);
+		drv->remove(dev);
+		up(&dev->reclaim_sem);
+	}
 fail_put:
 	module_put(drv->driver.owner);
 fail:

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit a3dd4d63eeb452cfb064a13862fb376ab108f6a6 upstream.

The current USB-audio driver code doesn't check bLength of each descriptor at traversing for clock descriptors. That is, when a device provides a bogus descriptor with a shorter bLength, the driver might hit out-of-bounds reads.

For addressing it, this patch adds sanity checks to the validator functions for the clock descriptor traversal. When the descriptor length is shorter than expected, it's skipped in the loop.

For the clock source and clock multiplier descriptors, we can just check bLength against the sizeof() of each descriptor type. OTOH, the clock selector descriptor of UAC2 and UAC3 has an array of bNrInPins elements and two more fields at its tail, hence those have to be checked in addition to the sizeof() check.

---
 sound/usb/clock.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ union uac23_clock_multiplier_desc {
 	struct uac_clock_multiplier_descriptor v3;
 };
 
+/* check whether the descriptor bLength has the minimal length */
+#define DESC_LENGTH_CHECK(p, proto) \
+	((proto) == UAC_VERSION_3 ? \
+	 ((p)->v3.bLength >= sizeof((p)->v3)) :	\
+	 ((p)->v2.bLength >= sizeof((p)->v2)))
+
 #define GET_VAL(p, proto, field) \
 	((proto) == UAC_VERSION_3 ? (p)->v3.field : (p)->v2.field)
 

@@ -58,6 +64,8 @@ static bool validate_clock_source(void *
 {
 	union uac23_clock_source_desc *cs = p;
 
+	if (!DESC_LENGTH_CHECK(cs, proto))
+		return false;
 	return GET_VAL(cs, proto, bClockID) == id;
 }
 

@@ -65,13 +73,27 @@ static bool validate_clock_selector(void
 {
 	union uac23_clock_selector_desc *cs = p;
 
-	return GET_VAL(cs, proto, bClockID) == id;
+	if (!DESC_LENGTH_CHECK(cs, proto))
+		return false;
+	if (GET_VAL(cs, proto, bClockID) != id)
+		return false;
+	/* additional length check for baCSourceID array (in bNrInPins size)
+	 * and two more fields (which sizes depend on the protocol)
+	 */
+	if (proto == UAC_VERSION_3)
+		return cs->v3.bLength >= sizeof(cs->v3) + cs->v3.bNrInPins +
+			4 /* bmControls */ + 2 /* wCSelectorDescrStr */;
+	else
+		return cs->v2.bLength >= sizeof(cs->v2) + cs->v2.bNrInPins +
+			1 /* bmControls */ + 1 /* iClockSelector */;
 }
 
 static bool validate_clock_multiplier(void *p, int id, int proto)
 {
 	union uac23_clock_multiplier_desc *cs = p;
 
+	if (!DESC_LENGTH_CHECK(cs, proto))
+		return false;
 	return GET_VAL(cs, proto, bClockID) == id;
 }
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vitalii Mordan <[email protected]>

commit 40c974826734836402abfd44efbf04f63a2cc1c1 upstream.

If the clock sehci->clk was not enabled in spear_ehci_hcd_drv_probe, it should not be disabled in any path.

Conversely, if it was enabled in spear_ehci_hcd_drv_probe, it must be disabled in all error paths to ensure proper cleanup.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Klever.

---
 drivers/usb/host/ehci-spear.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -108,7 +108,9 @@ static int spear_ehci_hcd_drv_probe(stru
 	/* registers start at offset 0x0 */
 	hcd_to_ehci(hcd)->caps = hcd->regs;
 
-	clk_prepare_enable(sehci->clk);
+	retval = clk_prepare_enable(sehci->clk);
+	if (retval)
+		goto err_put_hcd;
 	retval = usb_add_hcd(hcd, irq, IRQF_SHARED);
 	if (retval)
 		goto err_stop_ehci;

@@ -133,8 +135,7 @@ static int spear_ehci_hcd_drv_remove(str
 
 	usb_remove_hcd(hcd);
 
-	if (sehci->clk)
-		clk_disable_unprepare(sehci->clk);
+	clk_disable_unprepare(sehci->clk);
 	usb_put_hcd(hcd);
 
 	return 0;

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joel Guittet <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 9117fc44fd3a9538261e530ba5a022dfc9519620 which is commit 1fe15be1fb613534ecbac5f8c3f8744f757d237d upstream.

It is reported to cause regressions in the 5.15.y tree, so revert it for now.

---
 drivers/clk/zynqmp/divider.c |   66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -110,6 +110,52 @@ static unsigned long zynqmp_clk_divider_
 	return DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(parent_rate, value);
 }
 
+static void zynqmp_get_divider2_val(struct clk_hw *hw,
+				    unsigned long rate,
+				    struct zynqmp_clk_divider *divider,
+				    u32 *bestdiv)
+{
+	int div1;
+	int div2;
+	long error = LONG_MAX;
+	unsigned long div1_prate;
+	struct clk_hw *div1_parent_hw;
+	struct zynqmp_clk_divider *pdivider;
+	struct clk_hw *div2_parent_hw = clk_hw_get_parent(hw);
+
+	if (!div2_parent_hw)
+		return;
+
+	pdivider = to_zynqmp_clk_divider(div2_parent_hw);
+	if (!pdivider)
+		return;
+
+	div1_parent_hw = clk_hw_get_parent(div2_parent_hw);
+	if (!div1_parent_hw)
+		return;
+
+	div1_prate = clk_hw_get_rate(div1_parent_hw);
+	*bestdiv = 1;
+	for (div1 = 1; div1 <= pdivider->max_div;) {
+		for (div2 = 1; div2 <= divider->max_div;) {
+			long new_error = ((div1_prate / div1) / div2) - rate;
+
+			if (abs(new_error) < abs(error)) {
+				*bestdiv = div2;
+				error = new_error;
+			}
+			if (divider->flags & CLK_DIVIDER_POWER_OF_TWO)
+				div2 = div2 << 1;
+			else
+				div2++;
+		}
+		if (pdivider->flags & CLK_DIVIDER_POWER_OF_TWO)
+			div1 = div1 << 1;
+		else
+			div1++;
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * zynqmp_clk_divider_round_rate() - Round rate of divider clock
  * @hw:			handle between common and hardware-specific interfaces

@@ -128,7 +174,6 @@ static long zynqmp_clk_divider_round_rat
 	u32 div_type = divider->div_type;
 	u32 bestdiv;
 	int ret;
-	u8 width;
 
 	/* if read only, just return current value */
 	if (divider->flags & CLK_DIVIDER_READ_ONLY) {

@@ -148,12 +193,23 @@ static long zynqmp_clk_divider_round_rat
 		return DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL((u64)*prate, bestdiv);
 	}
 
-	width = fls(divider->max_div);
+	bestdiv = zynqmp_divider_get_val(*prate, rate, divider->flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * In case of two divisors, compute best divider values and return
+	 * divider2 value based on compute value. div1 will  be automatically
+	 * set to optimum based on required total divider value.
+	 */
+	if (div_type == TYPE_DIV2 &&
+	    (clk_hw_get_flags(hw) & CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT)) {
+		zynqmp_get_divider2_val(hw, rate, divider, &bestdiv);
+	}
 
-	rate = divider_round_rate(hw, rate, prate, NULL, width, divider->flags);
+	if ((clk_hw_get_flags(hw) & CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT) && divider->is_frac)
+		bestdiv = rate % *prate ? 1 : bestdiv;
 
-	if (divider->is_frac && (clk_hw_get_flags(hw) & CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT) && (rate % *prate))
-		*prate = rate;
+	bestdiv = min_t(u32, bestdiv, divider->max_div);
+	*prate = rate * bestdiv;
 
 	return rate;
 }

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

commit c1895ba181e560144601fafe46aeedbafdf4dbc4 upstream.

Fix the new "LPE0F28" code path using the uninitialized ctx variable to log an error.

---
 sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_acpi.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static int sst_acpi_probe(struct platfor
 		rsrc = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM,
 					     pdata->res_info->acpi_lpe_res_index);
 		if (!rsrc) {
-			dev_err(ctx->dev, "Invalid SHIM base\n");
+			dev_err(dev, "Invalid SHIM base\n");
 			return -EIO;
 		}
 		rsrc->start -= pdata->res_info->shim_offset;

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Manikanta Mylavarapu <[email protected]>

commit 128fdbf36cddc2a901c4889ba1c89fa9f2643f2c upstream.

In success case, the revision holds a non-null pointer. The current logic incorrectly returns an error for a non-null pointer, whereas it should return an error for a null pointer.

The socinfo driver for IPQ9574 and IPQ5332 is currently broken, resulting in the following error message
qcom-socinfo qcom-socinfo: probe with driver qcom-socinfo failed with error -12

Add a null check for the revision to ensure it returns an error only in failure case (null pointer).

---
 drivers/soc/qcom/socinfo.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static int qcom_socinfo_probe(struct pla
 	qs->attr.revision = devm_kasprintf(&pdev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "%u.%u",
 					   SOCINFO_MAJOR(le32_to_cpu(info->ver)),
 					   SOCINFO_MINOR(le32_to_cpu(info->ver)));
-	if (!qs->attr.soc_id || qs->attr.revision)
+	if (!qs->attr.soc_id || !qs->attr.revision)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (offsetof(struct socinfo, serial_num) <= item_size) {

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Benoît Sevens <[email protected]>

commit b909df18ce2a998afef81d58bbd1a05dc0788c40 upstream.

A bogus device can provide a bNumConfigurations value that exceeds the initial value used in usb_get_configuration for allocating dev->config.

This can lead to out-of-bounds accesses later, e.g. in usb_destroy_configuration.

---
 sound/usb/quirks.c |   19 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -591,6 +591,7 @@ int snd_usb_create_quirk(struct snd_usb_
 static int snd_usb_extigy_boot_quirk(struct usb_device *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
 {
 	struct usb_host_config *config = dev->actconfig;
+	struct usb_device_descriptor new_device_descriptor;
 	int err;
 
 	if (le16_to_cpu(get_cfg_desc(config)->wTotalLength) == EXTIGY_FIRMWARE_SIZE_OLD ||

@@ -602,10 +603,14 @@ static int snd_usb_extigy_boot_quirk(str
 		if (err < 0)
 			dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error sending boot message: %d\n", err);
 		err = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_DEVICE, 0,
-				&dev->descriptor, sizeof(dev->descriptor));
-		config = dev->actconfig;
+				&new_device_descriptor, sizeof(new_device_descriptor));
 		if (err < 0)
 			dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error usb_get_descriptor: %d\n", err);
+		if (new_device_descriptor.bNumConfigurations > dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations)
+			dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error too large bNumConfigurations: %d\n",
+				new_device_descriptor.bNumConfigurations);
+		else
+			memcpy(&dev->descriptor, &new_device_descriptor, sizeof(dev->descriptor));
 		err = usb_reset_configuration(dev);
 		if (err < 0)
 			dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error usb_reset_configuration: %d\n", err);

@@ -937,6 +942,7 @@ static void mbox2_setup_48_24_magic(stru
 static int snd_usb_mbox2_boot_quirk(struct usb_device *dev)
 {
 	struct usb_host_config *config = dev->actconfig;
+	struct usb_device_descriptor new_device_descriptor;
 	int err;
 	u8 bootresponse[0x12];
 	int fwsize;

@@ -972,10 +978,14 @@ static int snd_usb_mbox2_boot_quirk(stru
 	dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "device initialised!\n");
 
 	err = usb_get_descriptor(dev, USB_DT_DEVICE, 0,
-		&dev->descriptor, sizeof(dev->descriptor));
-	config = dev->actconfig;
+		&new_device_descriptor, sizeof(new_device_descriptor));
 	if (err < 0)
 		dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error usb_get_descriptor: %d\n", err);
+	if (new_device_descriptor.bNumConfigurations > dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations)
+		dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "error too large bNumConfigurations: %d\n",
+			new_device_descriptor.bNumConfigurations);
+	else
+		memcpy(&dev->descriptor, &new_device_descriptor, sizeof(dev->descriptor));
 
 	err = usb_reset_configuration(dev);
 	if (err < 0)

@@ -1020,7 +1030,6 @@ static int snd_usb_axefx3_boot_quirk(str
 	return 0;
 }
 
-
 #define MICROBOOK_BUF_SIZE 128
 
 static int snd_usb_motu_microbookii_communicate(struct usb_device *dev, u8 *buf,

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>

commit 902cc179c931a033cd7f4242353aa2733bf8524c upstream.

find_group_other() and find_group_orlov() read *_lo, *_hi with ext4_free_inodes_count without additional locking. This can cause data-race warning, but since the lock is held for most writes and free inodes value is generally not a problem even if it is incorrect, it is more appropriate to use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() than to add locking.

==================================================================

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_free_inodes_count / ext4_free_inodes_set

write to 0xffff88810404300e of 2 bytes by task 6254 on cpu 1:

 ext4_free_inodes_set+0x1f/0x80 fs/ext4/super.c:405
 __ext4_new_inode+0x15ca/0x2200 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:1216
 ext4_symlink+0x242/0x5a0 fs/ext4/namei.c:3391
 vfs_symlink+0xca/0x1d0 fs/namei.c:4615
 do_symlinkat+0xe3/0x340 fs/namei.c:4641
 __do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4657 [inline]
 __se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4654 [inline]
 __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x5e/0x70 fs/namei.c:4654
 x64_sys_call+0x1dda/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:267
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

read to 0xffff88810404300e of 2 bytes by task 6257 on cpu 0:

 ext4_free_inodes_count+0x1c/0x80 fs/ext4/super.c:349
 find_group_other fs/ext4/ialloc.c:594 [inline]
 __ext4_new_inode+0x6ec/0x2200 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:1017
 ext4_symlink+0x242/0x5a0 fs/ext4/namei.c:3391
 vfs_symlink+0xca/0x1d0 fs/namei.c:4615
 do_symlinkat+0xe3/0x340 fs/namei.c:4641
 __do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4657 [inline]
 __se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4654 [inline]
 __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x5e/0x70 fs/namei.c:4654
 x64_sys_call+0x1dda/0x2d60 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:267
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

---
 fs/ext4/super.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -320,9 +320,9 @@ __u32 ext4_free_group_clusters(struct su
 __u32 ext4_free_inodes_count(struct super_block *sb,
 			      struct ext4_group_desc *bg)
 {
-	return le16_to_cpu(bg->bg_free_inodes_count_lo) |
+	return le16_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(bg->bg_free_inodes_count_lo)) |
 		(EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb) >= EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ?
-		 (__u32)le16_to_cpu(bg->bg_free_inodes_count_hi) << 16 : 0);
+		 (__u32)le16_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(bg->bg_free_inodes_count_hi)) << 16 : 0);
 }
 
 __u32 ext4_used_dirs_count(struct super_block *sb,

@@ -376,9 +376,9 @@ void ext4_free_group_clusters_set(struct
 void ext4_free_inodes_set(struct super_block *sb,
 			  struct ext4_group_desc *bg, __u32 count)
 {
-	bg->bg_free_inodes_count_lo = cpu_to_le16((__u16)count);
+	WRITE_ONCE(bg->bg_free_inodes_count_lo, cpu_to_le16((__u16)count));
 	if (EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb) >= EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT)
-		bg->bg_free_inodes_count_hi = cpu_to_le16(count >> 16);
+		WRITE_ONCE(bg->bg_free_inodes_count_hi, cpu_to_le16(count >> 16));
 }
 
 void ext4_used_dirs_set(struct super_block *sb,

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

commit 4a622e4d477bb12ad5ed4abbc7ad1365de1fa347 upstream.

The original implementation ext4's FS_IOC_GETFSMAP handling only worked when the range of queried blocks included at least one free (unallocated) block range. This is because how the metadata blocks were emitted was as a side effect of ext4_mballoc_query_range() calling ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper(), and that function was only called when a free block range was identified. As a result, this caused generic/365 to fail.

Fix this by creating a new function ext4_getfsmap_meta_helper() which gets called so that blocks before the first free block range in a block group can get properly reported.

---
 fs/ext4/fsmap.c   |   54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c |   18 ++++++++++++++----
 fs/ext4/mballoc.h |    1 +
 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -185,6 +185,56 @@ static inline ext4_fsblk_t ext4_fsmap_ne
 	return fmr->fmr_physical + fmr->fmr_length;
 }
 
+static int ext4_getfsmap_meta_helper(struct super_block *sb,
+				     ext4_group_t agno, ext4_grpblk_t start,
+				     ext4_grpblk_t len, void *priv)
+{
+	struct ext4_getfsmap_info *info = priv;
+	struct ext4_fsmap *p;
+	struct ext4_fsmap *tmp;
+	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+	ext4_fsblk_t fsb, fs_start, fs_end;
+	int error;
+
+	fs_start = fsb = (EXT4_C2B(sbi, start) +
+			  ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, agno));
+	fs_end = fs_start + EXT4_C2B(sbi, len);
+
+	/* Return relevant extents from the meta_list */
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &info->gfi_meta_list, fmr_list) {
+		if (p->fmr_physical < info->gfi_next_fsblk) {
+			list_del(&p->fmr_list);
+			kfree(p);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (p->fmr_physical <= fs_start ||
+		    p->fmr_physical + p->fmr_length <= fs_end) {
+			/* Emit the retained free extent record if present */
+			if (info->gfi_lastfree.fmr_owner) {
+				error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info,
+							&info->gfi_lastfree);
+				if (error)
+					return error;
+				info->gfi_lastfree.fmr_owner = 0;
+			}
+			error = ext4_getfsmap_helper(sb, info, p);
+			if (error)
+				return error;
+			fsb = p->fmr_physical + p->fmr_length;
+			if (info->gfi_next_fsblk < fsb)
+				info->gfi_next_fsblk = fsb;
+			list_del(&p->fmr_list);
+			kfree(p);
+			continue;
+		}
+	}
+	if (info->gfi_next_fsblk < fsb)
+		info->gfi_next_fsblk = fsb;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
 /* Transform a blockgroup's free record into a fsmap */
 static int ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper(struct super_block *sb,
 					ext4_group_t agno, ext4_grpblk_t start,

@@ -539,6 +589,7 @@ static int ext4_getfsmap_datadev(struct
 		error = ext4_mballoc_query_range(sb, info->gfi_agno,
 				EXT4_B2C(sbi, info->gfi_low.fmr_physical),
 				EXT4_B2C(sbi, info->gfi_high.fmr_physical),
+				ext4_getfsmap_meta_helper,
 				ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper, info);
 		if (error)
 			goto err;

@@ -560,7 +611,8 @@ static int ext4_getfsmap_datadev(struct
 
 	/* Report any gaps at the end of the bg */
 	info->gfi_last = true;
-	error = ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper(sb, end_ag, last_cluster, 0, info);
+	error = ext4_getfsmap_datadev_helper(sb, end_ag, last_cluster + 1,
+					     0, info);
 	if (error)
 		goto err;
 

@@ -6698,13 +6698,14 @@ int
 ext4_mballoc_query_range(
 	struct super_block		*sb,
 	ext4_group_t			group,
-	ext4_grpblk_t			start,
+	ext4_grpblk_t			first,
 	ext4_grpblk_t			end,
+	ext4_mballoc_query_range_fn	meta_formatter,
 	ext4_mballoc_query_range_fn	formatter,
 	void				*priv)
 {
 	void				*bitmap;
-	ext4_grpblk_t			next;
+	ext4_grpblk_t			start, next;
 	struct ext4_buddy		e4b;
 	int				error;
 

@@ -6715,10 +6716,19 @@ ext4_mballoc_query_range(
 
 	ext4_lock_group(sb, group);
 
-	start = max(e4b.bd_info->bb_first_free, start);
+	start = max(e4b.bd_info->bb_first_free, first);
 	if (end >= EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb))
 		end = EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1;
-
+	if (meta_formatter && start != first) {
+		if (start > end)
+			start = end;
+		ext4_unlock_group(sb, group);
+		error = meta_formatter(sb, group, first, start - first,
+				       priv);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_unload;
+		ext4_lock_group(sb, group);
+	}
 	while (start <= end) {
 		start = mb_find_next_zero_bit(bitmap, end + 1, start);
 		if (start > end)

@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ ext4_mballoc_query_range(
 	ext4_group_t			agno,
 	ext4_grpblk_t			start,
 	ext4_grpblk_t			end,
+	ext4_mballoc_query_range_fn	meta_formatter,
 	ext4_mballoc_query_range_fn	formatter,
 	void				*priv);
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Artem Sadovnikov <[email protected]>

commit d9f9d96136cba8fedd647d2c024342ce090133c2 upstream.

Commit 7c55b78818cf ("jfs: xattr: fix buffer overflow for invalid xattr") also addresses this issue but it only fixes it for positive values, while ea_size is an integer type and can take negative values, e.g. in case of a corrupted filesystem. This still breaks validation and would overflow because of implicit conversion from int to size_t in print_hex_dump().

Fix this issue by clamping the ea_size value instead.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

---
 fs/jfs/xattr.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, s
 
       size_check:
 	if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) {
-		int size = min_t(int, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr), ea_size);
+		int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
 
 		printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
 		print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qiu-ji Chen <[email protected]>

commit 1157733344651ca505e259d6554591ff156922fa upstream.

An atomicity violation occurs when the validity of the variables da7219->clk_src and da7219->mclk_rate is being assessed. Since the entire assessment is not protected by a lock, the da7219 variable might still be in flux during the assessment, rendering this check invalid.

To fix this issue, we recommend adding a lock before the block if ((da7219->clk_src == clk_id) && (da7219->mclk_rate == freq)) so that the legitimacy check for da7219->clk_src and da7219->mclk_rate is protected by the lock, ensuring the validity of the check.

This possible bug is found by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team. This tool analyzes the locking APIs to extract function pairs that can be concurrently executed, and then analyzes the instructions in the paired functions to identify possible concurrency bugs including data races and atomicity violations.

---
 sound/soc/codecs/da7219.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1167,17 +1167,20 @@ static int da7219_set_dai_sysclk(struct
 	struct da7219_priv *da7219 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component);
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if ((da7219->clk_src == clk_id) && (da7219->mclk_rate == freq))
+	mutex_lock(&da7219->pll_lock);
+
+	if ((da7219->clk_src == clk_id) && (da7219->mclk_rate == freq)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&da7219->pll_lock);
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	if ((freq < 2000000) || (freq > 54000000)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&da7219->pll_lock);
 		dev_err(codec_dai->dev, "Unsupported MCLK value %d\n",
 			freq);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&da7219->pll_lock);
-
 	switch (clk_id) {
 	case DA7219_CLKSRC_MCLK_SQR:
 		snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, DA7219_PLL_CTRL,

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>

commit 5b590160d2cf776b304eb054afafea2bd55e3620 upstream.

If the trace data buffer becomes full, a truncated flag [T] is reported in PERF_RECORD_AUX. In some cases, the size reported is 0, even though data must have been added to make the buffer full.

That happens when the buffer fills up from empty to full before the Intel PT driver has updated the buffer position. Then the driver calculates the new buffer position before calculating the data size. If the old and new positions are the same, the data size is reported as 0, even though it is really the whole buffer size.

Fix by detecting when the buffer position is wrapped, and adjust the data size calculation accordingly.

Example

Use a very small buffer size (8K) and observe the size of truncated [T] data. Before the fix, it is possible to see records of 0 size.

Before:

    $ perf record -m,8K -e intel_pt// uname
    Linux
    [ perf record: Woken up 2 times to write data ]
    [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.105 MB perf.data ]
    $ perf script -D --no-itrace | grep AUX | grep -F '[T]'
    Warning:
    AUX data lost 2 times out of 3!

    5 19462712368111 0x19710 [0x40]: PERF_RECORD_AUX offset: 0 size: 0 flags: 0x1 [T]
    5 19462712700046 0x19ba8 [0x40]: PERF_RECORD_AUX offset: 0x170 size: 0xe90 flags: 0x1 [T]

After:

    $ perf record -m,8K -e intel_pt// uname
    Linux
    [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ]
    [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.040 MB perf.data ]
    $ perf script -D --no-itrace | grep AUX | grep -F '[T]'
    Warning:
    AUX data lost 2 times out of 3!

    1 113720802995 0x4948 [0x40]: PERF_RECORD_AUX offset: 0 size: 0x2000 flags: 0x1 [T]
    1 113720979812 0x6b10 [0x40]: PERF_RECORD_AUX offset: 0x2000 size: 0x2000 flags: 0x1 [T]

---
 arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c |   11 ++++++++---
 arch/x86/events/intel/pt.h |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -811,11 +811,13 @@ static void pt_buffer_advance(struct pt_
 	buf->cur_idx++;
 
 	if (buf->cur_idx == buf->cur->last) {
-		if (buf->cur == buf->last)
+		if (buf->cur == buf->last) {
 			buf->cur = buf->first;
-		else
+			buf->wrapped = true;
+		} else {
 			buf->cur = list_entry(buf->cur->list.next, struct topa,
 					      list);
+		}
 		buf->cur_idx = 0;
 	}
 }

@@ -829,8 +831,11 @@ static void pt_buffer_advance(struct pt_
 static void pt_update_head(struct pt *pt)
 {
 	struct pt_buffer *buf = perf_get_aux(&pt->handle);
+	bool wrapped = buf->wrapped;
 	u64 topa_idx, base, old;
 
+	buf->wrapped = false;
+
 	if (buf->single) {
 		local_set(&buf->data_size, buf->output_off);
 		return;

@@ -848,7 +853,7 @@ static void pt_update_head(struct pt *pt
 	} else {
 		old = (local64_xchg(&buf->head, base) &
 		       ((buf->nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1));
-		if (base < old)
+		if (base < old || (base == old && wrapped))
 			base += buf->nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 		local_add(base - old, &buf->data_size);

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct pt_pmu {
  * @head:	logical write offset inside the buffer
  * @snapshot:	if this is for a snapshot/overwrite counter
  * @single:	use Single Range Output instead of ToPA
+ * @wrapped:	buffer advance wrapped back to the first topa table
  * @stop_pos:	STOP topa entry index
  * @intr_pos:	INT topa entry index
  * @stop_te:	STOP topa entry pointer

@@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ struct pt_buffer {
 	local64_t		head;
 	bool			snapshot;
 	bool			single;
+	bool			wrapped;
 	long			stop_pos, intr_pos;
 	struct topa_entry	*stop_te, *intr_te;
 	void			**data_pages;

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit 3b2f2d22fb424e9bebda4dbf6676cbfc7f9f62cd upstream.

Fix the AEGIS assembly code to access 'unsigned int' arguments as 32-bit values instead of 64-bit, since the upper bits of the corresponding 64-bit registers are not guaranteed to be zero.

Note: there haven't been any reports of this bug actually causing incorrect behavior. Neither gcc nor clang guarantee zero-extension to 64 bits, but zero-extension is likely to happen in practice because most instructions that operate on 32-bit registers zero-extend to 64 bits.

---
 arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-asm.S |   29 +++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #define T1	%xmm7
 
 #define STATEP	%rdi
-#define LEN	%rsi
+#define LEN	%esi
 #define SRC	%rdx
 #define DST	%rcx
 

@@ -75,32 +75,32 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__load_partial)
 	xor %r9d, %r9d
 	pxor MSG, MSG
 
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x1, %r8
 	jz .Lld_partial_1
 
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x1E, %r8
 	add SRC, %r8
 	mov (%r8), %r9b
 
 .Lld_partial_1:
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x2, %r8
 	jz .Lld_partial_2
 
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x1C, %r8
 	add SRC, %r8
 	shl $0x10, %r9
 	mov (%r8), %r9w
 
 .Lld_partial_2:
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x4, %r8
 	jz .Lld_partial_4
 
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x18, %r8
 	add SRC, %r8
 	shl $32, %r9

@@ -110,11 +110,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__load_partial)
 .Lld_partial_4:
 	movq %r9, MSG
 
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x8, %r8
 	jz .Lld_partial_8
 
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	and $0x10, %r8
 	add SRC, %r8
 	pslldq $8, MSG

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__load_partial)
  *   %r10
  */
 SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__store_partial)
-	mov LEN, %r8
+	mov LEN, %r8d
 	mov DST, %r9
 
 	movq T0, %r10

@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec
 	call __store_partial
 
 	/* mask with byte count: */
-	movq LEN, T0
+	movd LEN, T0
 	punpcklbw T0, T0
 	punpcklbw T0, T0
 	punpcklbw T0, T0

@@ -701,7 +701,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(crypto_aegis128_aesni_dec_t
 
 /*
  * void crypto_aegis128_aesni_final(void *state, void *tag_xor,
- *                                  u64 assoclen, u64 cryptlen);
+ *                                  unsigned int assoclen,
+ *                                  unsigned int cryptlen);
  */
 SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_final)
 	FRAME_BEGIN

@@ -714,8 +715,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(crypto_aegis128_aesni_fin
 	movdqu 0x40(STATEP), STATE4
 
 	/* prepare length block: */
-	movq %rdx, MSG
-	movq %rcx, T0
+	movd %edx, MSG
+	movd %ecx, T0
 	pslldq $8, T0
 	pxor T0, MSG
 	psllq $3, MSG /* multiply by 8 (to get bit count) */

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gautam Menghani <[email protected]>

commit 44e5d21e6d3fd2a1fed7f0327cf72e99397e2eaf upstream.

As per the kernel documentation[1], hardlockup detector should be disabled in KVM guests as it may give false positives. On PPC, hardlockup detector is enabled inside KVM guests because disable_hardlockup_detector() is marked as early_initcall and it relies on kvm_guest static key (is_kvm_guest()) which is initialized later during boot by check_kvm_guest(), which is a core_initcall. check_kvm_guest() is also called in pSeries_smp_probe(), which is called before initcalls, but it is skipped if KVM guest does not have doorbell support or if the guest is launched with SMT=1.

Call check_kvm_guest() in disable_hardlockup_detector() so that is_kvm_guest() check goes through fine and hardlockup detector can be disabled inside the KVM guest.

[1]: Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -952,6 +952,7 @@ static int __init disable_hardlockup_det
 	hardlockup_detector_disable();
 #else
 	if (firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_LPAR)) {
+		check_kvm_guest();
 		if (is_kvm_guest())
 			hardlockup_detector_disable();
 	}

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raghavendra Rao Ananta <[email protected]>

commit 54bbee190d42166209185d89070c58a343bf514b upstream.

DDI0487K.a D13.3.1 describes the PMU overflow condition, which evaluates to true if any counter's global enable (PMCR_EL0.E), overflow flag (PMOVSSET_EL0[n]), and interrupt enable (PMINTENSET_EL1[n]) are all 1. Of note, this does not require a counter to be enabled
(i.e. PMCNTENSET_EL0[n] = 1) to generate an overflow.

Align kvm_pmu_overflow_status() with the reality of the architecture and stop using PMCNTENSET_EL0 as part of the overflow condition. The bug was discovered while running an SBSA PMU test [*], which only sets PMCR.E, PMOVSSET<0>, PMINTENSET<0>, and expects an overflow interrupt.

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -371,7 +371,6 @@ static u64 kvm_pmu_overflow_status(struc
 
 	if ((__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMCR_EL0) & ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_E)) {
 		reg = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMOVSSET_EL0);
-		reg &= __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMCNTENSET_EL0);
 		reg &= __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMINTENSET_EL1);
 	}
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>

commit c7acef99642b763ba585f4a43af999fcdbcc3dc4 upstream.

Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock.

Since commit 0fc70886569c ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5f3dbd ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver.

The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock.

The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream
Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus.

In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device().

However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device().

In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free.

One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming.

If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change.

Abridged stacktrace:

pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156
pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12
pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present
...
pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1
  RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40
  pci_destroy_slot
  pciehp_remove
  pcie_port_remove_service
  device_release_driver_internal
  bus_remove_device
  device_del
  device_unregister
  remove_iter
  device_for_each_child
  pcie_portdrv_remove
  pci_device_remove
  device_release_driver_internal
  bus_remove_device
  device_del
  pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation)
  pci_remove_bus_device
  pciehp_unconfigure_device
  pciehp_disable_slot
  pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change
  pciehp_ist

---
 drivers/pci/slot.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void pci_slot_release(struct kobj
 	up_read(&pci_bus_sem);
 
 	list_del(&slot->list);
+	pci_bus_put(slot->bus);
 
 	kfree(slot);
 }

@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ placeholder:
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	slot->bus = parent;
+	slot->bus = pci_bus_get(parent);
 	slot->number = slot_nr;
 
 	slot->kobj.kset = pci_slots_kset;

@@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ placeholder:
 	slot_name = make_slot_name(name);
 	if (!slot_name) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
+		pci_bus_put(slot->bus);
 		kfree(slot);
 		goto err;
 	}

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

commit aa52c54da40d9eee3ba87c05cdcb0cd07c04fa13 upstream.

We got a report that adding a fanotify filsystem watch prevents tail -f from receiving events.

Reproducer:

1. Create 3 windows / login sessions. Become root in each session.
2. Choose a mounted filesystem that is pretty quiet; I picked /boot.
3. In the first window, run: fsnotifywait -S -m /boot
4. In the second window, run: echo data >> /boot/foo
5. In the third window, run: tail -f /boot/foo
6. Go back to the second window and run: echo more data >> /boot/foo
7. Observe that the tail command doesn't show the new data.
8. In the first window, hit control-C to interrupt fsnotifywait.
9. In the second window, run: echo still more data >> /boot/foo
10. Observe that the tail command in the third window has now printed the missing data.

When stracing tail, we observed that when fanotify filesystem mark is set, tail does get the inotify event, but the event is receieved with the filename:

read(4, "\1\0\0\0\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\20\0\0\0foo\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",
50) = 32

This is unexpected, because tail is watching the file itself and not its parent and is inconsistent with the inotify event received by tail when fanotify filesystem mark is not set:

read(4, "\1\0\0\0\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 50) = 16

The inteference between different fsnotify groups was caused by the fact that the mark on the sb requires the filename, so the filename is passed to fsnotify(). Later on, fsnotify_handle_event() tries to take care of not passing the filename to groups (such as inotify) that are interested in the filename only when the parent is watching.

But the logic was incorrect for the case that no group is watching the parent, some groups are watching the sb and some watching the inode.

---
 fs/notify/fsnotify.c |   23 +++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -310,16 +310,19 @@ static int fsnotify_handle_event(struct
 	if (!inode_mark)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD) {
-		/*
-		 * Some events can be sent on both parent dir and child marks
-		 * (e.g. FS_ATTRIB).  If both parent dir and child are
-		 * watching, report the event once to parent dir with name (if
-		 * interested) and once to child without name (if interested).
-		 * The child watcher is expecting an event without a file name
-		 * and without the FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD flag.
-		 */
-		mask &= ~FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
+	/*
+	 * Some events can be sent on both parent dir and child marks (e.g.
+	 * FS_ATTRIB).  If both parent dir and child are watching, report the
+	 * event once to parent dir with name (if interested) and once to child
+	 * without name (if interested).
+	 *
+	 * In any case regardless whether the parent is watching or not, the
+	 * child watcher is expecting an event without the FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD
+	 * flag. The file name is expected if and only if this is a directory
+	 * event.
+	 */
+	mask &= ~FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
+	if (!(mask & ALL_FSNOTIFY_DIRENT_EVENTS)) {
 		dir = NULL;
 		name = NULL;
 	}

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit ce8f9fb651fac95dd41f69afe54d935420b945bd upstream.

If some remap_pfn_range() calls succeeded before one failed, we still have buffer pages mapped into the userspace page tables when we drop the buffer reference with comedi_buf_map_put(bm). The userspace mappings are only cleaned up later in the mmap error path.

Fix it by explicitly flushing all mappings in our VMA on the error path.

See commit 79a61cc3fc04 ("mm: avoid leaving partial pfn mappings around in error case").

---
 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -2402,6 +2402,18 @@ static int comedi_mmap(struct file *file
 
 			start += PAGE_SIZE;
 		}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+		/*
+		 * Leaving behind a partial mapping of a buffer we're about to
+		 * drop is unsafe, see remap_pfn_range_notrack().
+		 * We need to zap the range here ourselves instead of relying
+		 * on the automatic zapping in remap_pfn_range() because we call
+		 * remap_pfn_range() in a loop.
+		 */
+		if (retval)
+			zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start, size);
+#endif
 	}
 
 	if (retval == 0) {

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>

commit 7290f59231910ccba427d441a6e8b8c6f6112448 upstream.

The string allocated by kmemdup() in aa_unpack_strdup() is not freed and cause following memory leaks, free them to fix it.

	unreferenced object 0xffffff80c6af8a50 (size 8):
	  comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 225, jiffies 4294894407
	  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
	    74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00                          testing.
	  backtrace (crc 5eab668b):
	    [<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
	    [<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0
	    [<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60
	    [<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c
	    [<000000008ecde918>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_null_name+0xf8/0x3ec
	    [<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
	    [<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
	    [<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
	    [<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
	unreferenced object 0xffffff80c2a29090 (size 8):
	  comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 227, jiffies 4294894409
	  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
	    74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00                          testing.
	  backtrace (crc 5eab668b):
	    [<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
	    [<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0
	    [<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60
	    [<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c
	    [<0000000046a45c1a>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_name+0xd0/0x3c4
	    [<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
	    [<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
	    [<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
	    [<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

---
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -283,6 +283,8 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_st
 			   ((uintptr_t)puf->e->start <= (uintptr_t)string)
 			   && ((uintptr_t)string <= (uintptr_t)puf->e->end));
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, string, TEST_STRING_DATA);
+
+	kfree(string);
 }
 
 static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_name(struct kunit *test)

@@ -298,6 +300,8 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_st
 			   ((uintptr_t)puf->e->start <= (uintptr_t)string)
 			   && ((uintptr_t)string <= (uintptr_t)puf->e->end));
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, string, TEST_STRING_DATA);
+
+	kfree(string);
 }
 
 static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_out_of_bounds(struct kunit *test)

@@ -315,6 +319,8 @@ static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_st
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, size, 0);
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, string, (char *)NULL);
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, puf->e->pos, start);
+
+	kfree(string);
 }
 
 static void policy_unpack_test_unpack_nameX_with_null_name(struct kunit *test)

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

commit 635a9fca54f4f4148be1ae1c7c6bd37af80f5773 upstream.

Commit 7c0cca7c847e ("tty: ldisc: add sysctl to prevent autoloading of ldiscs") introduces the tty_ldisc_autoload sysctl with the wrong proc_handler. .extra1 and .extra2 parameters are set to avoid other values thant SYSCTL_ZERO or SYSCTL_ONE to be set but proc_dointvec do not uses them.

This commit fixes this by using proc_dointvec_minmax instead of proc_dointvec.

---
 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static struct ctl_table tty_table[] = {
 		.data		= &tty_ldisc_autoload,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(tty_ldisc_autoload),
 		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
 		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
 		.extra2		= SYSCTL_ONE,
 	},

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ahmed Ehab <[email protected]>

commit d7fe143cb115076fed0126ad8cf5ba6c3e575e43 upstream.

Syzbot reports a problem that a warning will be triggered while searching a lock class in look_up_lock_class().

The cause of the issue is that a new name is created and used by lockdep_set_subclass() instead of using the existing one. This results in a lock instance has a different name pointer than previous registered one stored in lock class, and WARN_ONCE() is triggered because of that in look_up_lock_class().

To fix this, change lockdep_set_subclass() to use the existing name instead of a new one. Hence, no new name will be created by lockdep_set_subclass(). Hence, the warning is avoided.

[boqun: Reword the commit log to state the correct issue]

---
 include/linux/lockdep.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static inline void lockdep_init_map(stru
 			      (lock)->dep_map.lock_type)
 
 #define lockdep_set_subclass(lock, sub)					\
-	lockdep_init_map_type(&(lock)->dep_map, #lock, (lock)->dep_map.key, sub,\
+	lockdep_init_map_type(&(lock)->dep_map, (lock)->dep_map.name, (lock)->dep_map.key, sub,\
 			      (lock)->dep_map.wait_type_inner,		\
 			      (lock)->dep_map.wait_type_outer,		\
 			      (lock)->dep_map.lock_type)

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>

commit 02dffe9ab092fc4c8800aee68cb7eafd37a980c4 upstream.

There is no check if stream size and start_clu are invalid. If start_clu is EOF cluster and stream size is 4096, It will cause uninit value access. because ei->hint_femp.eidx could be 128(if cluster size is 4K) and wrong hint will allocate next cluster. and this cluster will be same with the cluster that is allocated by exfat_extend_valid_size(). The previous patch will check invalid start_clu, but for clarity, initialize hint_femp.eidx to zero.

---
 fs/exfat/namei.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ static int exfat_find_empty_entry(struct
 		if (ei->start_clu == EXFAT_EOF_CLUSTER) {
 			ei->start_clu = clu.dir;
 			p_dir->dir = clu.dir;
+			hint_femp.eidx = 0;
 		}
 
 		/* append to the FAT chain */

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrej Shadura <[email protected]>

commit 5fe6caa62b07fd39cd6a28acc8f92ba2955e11a6 upstream.

Commit 9bf4e919ccad worked around an issue introduced after an innocuous optimisation change in LLVM main:

The same issue occurs in rfcomm in functions rfcomm_sock_getsockopt and rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old.

Change the type of len to size_t in both rfcomm_sock_getsockopt and rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old and replace min_t() with min().

Improves: 9bf4e919ccad ("Bluetooth: Fix type of len in {l2cap,sco}_sock_getsockopt_old()")

---
 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -740,7 +740,8 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(st
 	struct sock *l2cap_sk;
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
 	struct rfcomm_conninfo cinfo;
-	int len, err = 0;
+	int err = 0;
+	size_t len;
 	u32 opt;
 
 	BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);

@@ -794,7 +795,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(st
 		cinfo.hci_handle = conn->hcon->handle;
 		memcpy(cinfo.dev_class, conn->hcon->dev_class, 3);
 
-		len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(cinfo));
+		len = min(len, sizeof(cinfo));
 		if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &cinfo, len))
 			err = -EFAULT;
 

@@ -813,7 +814,8 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct bt_security sec;
-	int len, err = 0;
+	int err = 0;
+	size_t len;
 
 	BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
 

@@ -838,7 +840,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct
 		sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
 		sec.key_size = 0;
 
-		len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
+		len = min(len, sizeof(sec));
 		if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
 			err = -EFAULT;
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Pecio <[email protected]>

commit 484c3bab2d5dfa13ff659a51a06e9a393141eefc upstream.

xhci_invalidate_cancelled_tds() may not work correctly if the hardware is modifying endpoint or stream contexts at the same time by executing a Set TR Dequeue command. And even if it worked, it would be unable to queue Set TR Dequeue for the next stream, failing to clear xHC cache.

On stream endpoints, a chain of Set TR Dequeue commands may take some time to execute and we may want to cancel more TDs during this time. Currently this leads to Stop Endpoint completion handler calling this function without testing for SET_DEQ_PENDING, which will trigger the aforementioned problems when it happens.

On all endpoints, a halt condition causes Reset Endpoint to be queued and an error status given to the class driver, which may unlink more URBs in response. Stop Endpoint is queued and its handler may execute concurrently with Set TR Dequeue queued by Reset Endpoint handler.

(Reset Endpoint handler calls this function too, but there seems to be no possibility of it running concurrently with Set TR Dequeue).

Fix xhci_invalidate_cancelled_tds() to work correctly under a pending Set TR Dequeue. Bail out of the function when SET_DEQ_PENDING is set, then make the completion handler call the function again and also call xhci_giveback_invalidated_tds(), which needs to be called next.

This seems to fix another potential bug, where the handler would call xhci_invalidate_cancelled_tds(), which may clear some deferred TDs if a sanity check fails, and the TDs wouldn't be given back promptly.

Said sanity check seems to be wrong and prone to false positives when the endpoint halts, but fixing it is beyond the scope of this change, besides ensuring that cleared TDs are given back properly.

---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c |   18 +++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -961,6 +961,13 @@ static int xhci_invalidate_cancelled_tds
 	unsigned int		slot_id = ep->vdev->slot_id;
 	int			err;
 
+	/*
+	 * This is not going to work if the hardware is changing its dequeue
+	 * pointers as we look at them. Completion handler will call us later.
+	 */
+	if (ep->ep_state & SET_DEQ_PENDING)
+		return 0;
+
 	xhci = ep->xhci;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(td, tmp_td, &ep->cancelled_td_list, cancelled_td_list) {

@@ -1386,7 +1393,6 @@ static void xhci_handle_cmd_set_deq(stru
 	struct xhci_ep_ctx *ep_ctx;
 	struct xhci_slot_ctx *slot_ctx;
 	struct xhci_td *td, *tmp_td;
-	bool deferred = false;
 
 	ep_index = TRB_TO_EP_INDEX(le32_to_cpu(trb->generic.field[3]));
 	stream_id = TRB_TO_STREAM_ID(le32_to_cpu(trb->generic.field[2]));

@@ -1487,8 +1493,6 @@ static void xhci_handle_cmd_set_deq(stru
 			xhci_dbg(ep->xhci, "%s: Giveback cancelled URB %p TD\n",
 				 __func__, td->urb);
 			xhci_td_cleanup(ep->xhci, td, ep_ring, td->status);
-		} else if (td->cancel_status == TD_CLEARING_CACHE_DEFERRED) {
-			deferred = true;
 		} else {
 			xhci_dbg(ep->xhci, "%s: Keep cancelled URB %p TD as cancel_status is %d\n",
 				 __func__, td->urb, td->cancel_status);

@@ -1499,11 +1503,15 @@ cleanup:
 	ep->queued_deq_seg = NULL;
 	ep->queued_deq_ptr = NULL;
 
-	if (deferred) {
-		/* We have more streams to clear */
+	/* Check for deferred or newly cancelled TDs */
+	if (!list_empty(&ep->cancelled_td_list)) {
 		xhci_dbg(ep->xhci, "%s: Pending TDs to clear, continuing with invalidation\n",
 			 __func__);
 		xhci_invalidate_cancelled_tds(ep);
+		/* Try to restart the endpoint if all is done */
+		ring_doorbell_for_active_rings(xhci, slot_id, ep_index);
+		/* Start giving back any TDs invalidated above */
+		xhci_giveback_invalidated_tds(ep);
 	} else {
 		/* Restart any rings with pending URBs */
 		xhci_dbg(ep->xhci, "%s: All TDs cleared, ring doorbell\n", __func__);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zijun Hu <[email protected]>

commit bfa54a793ba77ef696755b66f3ac4ed00c7d1248 upstream.

For bus_register(), any error which happens after kset_register() will cause that @priv are freed twice, fixed by setting @priv with NULL after the first free.

---
 drivers/base/bus.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -853,6 +853,8 @@ bus_devices_fail:
 	bus_remove_file(bus, &bus_attr_uevent);
 bus_uevent_fail:
 	kset_unregister(&bus->p->subsys);
+	/* Above kset_unregister() will kfree @bus->p */
+	bus->p = NULL;
 out:
 	kfree(bus->p);
 	bus->p = NULL;

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Vrastil <[email protected]>

commit 51cdd69d6a857f527d6d0697a2e1f0fa8bca1005 upstream.

This reverts commit ec6ce7075ef879b91a8710829016005dc8170f17.

Fix installation of WinUSB driver using OS descriptors. Without the fix the drivers are not installed correctly and the property 'DeviceInterfaceGUID' is missing on host side.

The original change was based on the assumption that the interface number is in the high byte of wValue but it is in the low byte, instead. Unfortunately, the fix is based on MS documentation which is also wrong.

The actual USB request for OS descriptors (using USB analyzer) looks like:

Offset  0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
0x000   C1  A1  02  00  05  00  0A  00

C1: bmRequestType (device to host, vendor, interface)
A1: nas magic number
0002: wValue (2: nas interface)
0005: wIndex (5: get extended property i.e. nas interface GUID) 008E: wLength (142)

The fix was tested on Windows 10 and Windows 11.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c |   18 +++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -2017,8 +2017,20 @@ unknown:
 			memset(buf, 0, w_length);
 			buf[5] = 0x01;
 			switch (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_RECIP_MASK) {
+			/*
+			 * The Microsoft CompatID OS Descriptor Spec(w_index = 0x4) and
+			 * Extended Prop OS Desc Spec(w_index = 0x5) state that the
+			 * HighByte of wValue is the InterfaceNumber and the LowByte is
+			 * the PageNumber. This high/low byte ordering is incorrectly
+			 * documented in the Spec. USB analyzer output on the below
+			 * request packets show the high/low byte inverted i.e LowByte
+			 * is the InterfaceNumber and the HighByte is the PageNumber.
+			 * Since we dont support >64KB CompatID/ExtendedProp descriptors,
+			 * PageNumber is set to 0. Hence verify that the HighByte is 0
+			 * for below two cases.
+			 */
 			case USB_RECIP_DEVICE:
-				if (w_index != 0x4 || (w_value & 0xff))
+				if (w_index != 0x4 || (w_value >> 8))
 					break;
 				buf[6] = w_index;
 				/* Number of ext compat interfaces */

@@ -2034,9 +2046,9 @@ unknown:
 				}
 				break;
 			case USB_RECIP_INTERFACE:
-				if (w_index != 0x5 || (w_value & 0xff))
+				if (w_index != 0x5 || (w_value >> 8))
 					break;
-				interface = w_value >> 8;
+				interface = w_value & 0xFF;
 				if (interface >= MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES ||
 				    !os_desc_cfg->interface[interface])
 					break;

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Claudiu Beznea <[email protected]>

commit 3791ea69a4858b81e0277f695ca40f5aae40f312 upstream.

The early_console_setup() function initializes the sci_ports[0].port with an object of type struct uart_port obtained from the object of type struct earlycon_device received as argument by the early_console_setup().

It may happen that later, when the rest of the serial ports are probed, the serial port that was used as earlycon (e.g., port A) to be mapped to a different position in sci_ports[] and the slot 0 to be used by a different serial port (e.g., port B), as follows:

sci_ports[0] = port A
sci_ports[X] = port B

In this case, the new port mapped at index zero will have associated data that was used for earlycon.

In case this happens, after Linux boot, any access to the serial port that maps on sci_ports[0] (port A) will block the serial port that was used as earlycon (port B).

To fix this, add early_console_exit() that clean the sci_ports[0] at earlycon exit time.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

@@ -3433,6 +3433,32 @@ sh_early_platform_init_buffer("earlyprin
 #ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_SH_SCI_EARLYCON
 static struct plat_sci_port port_cfg __initdata;
 
+static int early_console_exit(struct console *co)
+{
+	struct sci_port *sci_port = &sci_ports[0];
+	struct uart_port *port = &sci_port->port;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int locked = 1;
+
+	if (port->sysrq)
+		locked = 0;
+	else if (oops_in_progress)
+		locked = uart_port_trylock_irqsave(port, &flags);
+	else
+		uart_port_lock_irqsave(port, &flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clean the slot used by earlycon. A new SCI device might
+	 * map to this slot.
+	 */
+	memset(sci_ports, 0, sizeof(*sci_port));
+
+	if (locked)
+		uart_port_unlock_irqrestore(port, flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int __init early_console_setup(struct earlycon_device *device,
 				      int type)
 {

@@ -3451,6 +3477,8 @@ static int __init early_console_setup(st
 		       SCSCR_RE | SCSCR_TE | port_cfg.scscr);
 
 	device->con->write = serial_console_write;
+	device->con->exit = early_console_exit;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 static int __init sci_early_console_setup(struct earlycon_device *device,

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 718632467d88e98816fa01ab12681ef1c2aa56f8 upstream.

This reverts commit 3791ea69a4858b81e0277f695ca40f5aae40f312.

It was reported to cause boot-time issues, so revert it for now.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c |   28 ----------------------------
 1 file changed, 28 deletions(-)

@@ -3433,32 +3433,6 @@ sh_early_platform_init_buffer("earlyprin
 #ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_SH_SCI_EARLYCON
 static struct plat_sci_port port_cfg __initdata;
 
-static int early_console_exit(struct console *co)
-{
-	struct sci_port *sci_port = &sci_ports[0];
-	struct uart_port *port = &sci_port->port;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	int locked = 1;
-
-	if (port->sysrq)
-		locked = 0;
-	else if (oops_in_progress)
-		locked = uart_port_trylock_irqsave(port, &flags);
-	else
-		uart_port_lock_irqsave(port, &flags);
-
-	/*
-	 * Clean the slot used by earlycon. A new SCI device might
-	 * map to this slot.
-	 */
-	memset(sci_ports, 0, sizeof(*sci_port));
-
-	if (locked)
-		uart_port_unlock_irqrestore(port, flags);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int __init early_console_setup(struct earlycon_device *device,
 				      int type)
 {

@@ -3477,8 +3451,6 @@ static int __init early_console_setup(st
 		       SCSCR_RE | SCSCR_TE | port_cfg.scscr);
 
 	device->con->write = serial_console_write;
-	device->con->exit = early_console_exit;
-
 	return 0;
 }
 static int __init sci_early_console_setup(struct earlycon_device *device,

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sai Kumar Cholleti <[email protected]>

commit 72cef64180de04a7b055b4773c138d78f4ebdb77 upstream.

Setting GPIO direction = high, sometimes results in GPIO value = 0.

If a GPIO is pulled high, the following construction results in the value being 0 when the desired value is 1:

$ echo "high" > /sys/class/gpio/gpio336/direction
$ cat /sys/class/gpio/gpio336/value
0

Before the GPIO direction is changed from an input to an output, exar_set_value() is called with value = 1, but since the GPIO is an input when exar_set_value() is called, _regmap_update_bits() reads a 1 due to an external pull-up. regmap_set_bits() sets force_write = false, so the value (1) is not written. When the direction is then changed, the GPIO becomes an output with the value of 0 (the hardware default).

regmap_write_bits() sets force_write = true, so the value is always written by exar_set_value() and an external pull-up doesn't affect the outcome of setting direction = high.

The same can happen when a GPIO is pulled low, but the scenario is a little more complicated.

$ echo high > /sys/class/gpio/gpio351/direction
$ cat /sys/class/gpio/gpio351/value
1

$ echo in > /sys/class/gpio/gpio351/direction
$ cat /sys/class/gpio/gpio351/value
0

$ echo low > /sys/class/gpio/gpio351/direction
$ cat /sys/class/gpio/gpio351/value
1

---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-exar.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -80,11 +80,13 @@ static void exar_set_value(struct gpio_c
 	struct exar_gpio_chip *exar_gpio = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
 	unsigned int addr = exar_offset_to_lvl_addr(exar_gpio, offset);
 	unsigned int bit = exar_offset_to_bit(exar_gpio, offset);
+	unsigned int bit_value = value ? BIT(bit) : 0;
 
-	if (value)
-		regmap_set_bits(exar_gpio->regmap, addr, BIT(bit));
-	else
-		regmap_clear_bits(exar_gpio->regmap, addr, BIT(bit));
+	/*
+	 * regmap_write_bits() forces value to be written when an external
+	 * pull up/down might otherwise indicate value was already set.
+	 */
+	regmap_write_bits(exar_gpio->regmap, addr, BIT(bit), bit_value);
 }
 
 static int exar_direction_output(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int offset,

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>

commit 35f56c554eb1b56b77b3cf197a6b00922d49033d upstream.

When tb[IPSET_ATTR_IP_TO] is not present but tb[IPSET_ATTR_CIDR] exists, the values of ip and ip_to are slightly swapped. Therefore, the range check for ip should be done later, but this part is missing and it seems that the vulnerability occurs.

So we should add missing range checks and remove unnecessary range checks.

---
 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c |    7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -163,11 +163,8 @@ bitmap_ip_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struc
 		ret = ip_set_get_hostipaddr4(tb[IPSET_ATTR_IP_TO], &ip_to);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-		if (ip > ip_to) {
+		if (ip > ip_to)
 			swap(ip, ip_to);
-			if (ip < map->first_ip)
-				return -IPSET_ERR_BITMAP_RANGE;
-		}
 	} else if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_CIDR]) {
 		u8 cidr = nla_get_u8(tb[IPSET_ATTR_CIDR]);
 

@@ -178,7 +175,7 @@ bitmap_ip_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struc
 		ip_to = ip;
 	}
 
-	if (ip_to > map->last_ip)
+	if (ip < map->first_ip || ip_to > map->last_ip)
 		return -IPSET_ERR_BITMAP_RANGE;
 
 	for (; !before(ip_to, ip); ip += map->hosts) {

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>

commit d24cfee7f63d6b44d45a67c5662bd1cc48e8b3ca upstream.

When probing spi device take care of deferred probe of ACPI irq gpio similar like for OF/DT case.

Dell XP 9340 laptop, which try to request interrupt with spi->irq equal to -EPROBE_DEFER and fail to probe with the following error:

vsc-tp spi-INTC10D0:00: probe with driver vsc-tp failed with error -22

---
 drivers/spi/spi.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -400,6 +400,16 @@ static int spi_probe(struct device *dev)
 			spi->irq = 0;
 	}
 
+	if (has_acpi_companion(dev) && spi->irq < 0) {
+		struct acpi_device *adev = to_acpi_device_node(dev->fwnode);
+
+		spi->irq = acpi_dev_gpio_irq_get(adev, 0);
+		if (spi->irq == -EPROBE_DEFER)
+			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
+		if (spi->irq < 0)
+			spi->irq = 0;
+	}
+
 	ret = dev_pm_domain_attach(dev, true);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;

@@ -2406,9 +2416,6 @@ static acpi_status acpi_register_spi_dev
 	acpi_set_modalias(adev, acpi_device_hid(adev), spi->modalias,
 			  sizeof(spi->modalias));
 
-	if (spi->irq < 0)
-		spi->irq = acpi_dev_gpio_irq_get(adev, 0);
-
 	acpi_device_set_enumerated(adev);
 
 	adev->power.flags.ignore_parent = true;

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cheng Ming Lin <[email protected]>

commit 98d1fb94ce75f39febd456d6d3cbbe58b6678795 upstream.

The default dummy cycle for Macronix SPI NOR flash in Octal Output Read Mode(1-1-8) is 20.

Currently, the dummy buswidth is set according to the address bus width. In the 1-1-8 mode, this means the dummy buswidth is 1. When converting dummy cycles to bytes, this results in 20 x 1 / 8 = 2 bytes, causing the host to read data 4 cycles too early.

Since the protocol data buswidth is always greater than or equal to the address buswidth. Setting the dummy buswidth to match the data buswidth increases the likelihood that the dummy cycle-to-byte conversion will be divisible, preventing the host from reading data prematurely.

---
 drivers/mtd/spi-nor/core.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ void spi_nor_spimem_setup_op(const struc
 		op->addr.buswidth = spi_nor_get_protocol_addr_nbits(proto);
 
 	if (op->dummy.nbytes)
-		op->dummy.buswidth = spi_nor_get_protocol_addr_nbits(proto);
+		op->dummy.buswidth = spi_nor_get_protocol_data_nbits(proto);
 
 	if (op->data.nbytes)
 		op->data.buswidth = spi_nor_get_protocol_data_nbits(proto);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jinjie Ruan <[email protected]>

commit 172bf5ed04cb6c9e66d58de003938ed5c8756570 upstream.

mtk_cpufreq_get_cpu_power() return 0 if the policy is NULL. Then in em_create_perf_table(), the later zero check for power is not invalid as power is uninitialized. As Lukasz suggested, it must return -EINVAL when the 'policy' is not found. So return -EINVAL to fix it.

---
 drivers/cpufreq/mediatek-cpufreq-hw.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ mtk_cpufreq_get_cpu_power(unsigned long
 
 	policy = cpufreq_cpu_get_raw(cpu_dev->id);
 	if (!policy)
-		return 0;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	data = policy->driver_data;
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Javier Carrasco <[email protected]>

commit 9c41f371457bd9a24874e3c7934d9745e87fbc58 upstream.

The device_for_each_child_node() macro requires explicit calls to fwnode_handle_put() upon early exits (return, break, goto) to decrement the fwnode's refcount, and avoid levaing a node reference behind.

Add the missing fwnode_handle_put() after the common label for all error paths.

---
 drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_typec.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static int cros_typec_init_ports(struct
 	return 0;
 
 unregister_ports:
+	fwnode_handle_put(fwnode);
 	cros_unregister_ports(typec);
 	return ret;
 }

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhihao Cheng <[email protected]>

commit d610020f030bec819f42de327c2bd5437d2766b3 upstream.

During wear-leveing work, the source PEB will be moved into scrub list when source LEB cannot be locked in ubi_eba_copy_leb(), which is wrong for non-scrub type source PEB. The problem could bring extra and ineffective wear-leveing jobs, which makes more or less negative effects for the life time of flash. Specifically, the process is divided 2 steps:
1. wear_leveling_worker // generate false scrub type PEB ubi_eba_copy_leb // MOVE_RETRY is returned leb_write_trylock // trylock failed
scrubbing = 1;
e1 is put into ubi->scrub
2. wear_leveling_worker // schedule false scrub type PEB for wl scrubbing = 1
e1 = rb_entry(rb_first(&ubi->scrub))

The problem can be reproduced easily by running fsstress on a small UBIFS partition(<64M, simulated by nandsim) for 5~10mins (CONFIG_MTD_UBI_FASTMAP=y,CONFIG_MTD_UBI_WL_THRESHOLD=50). Following message is shown:
ubi0: scrubbed PEB 66 (LEB 0:10), data moved to PEB 165

Since scrub type source PEB has set variable scrubbing as '1', and variable scrubbing is checked before variable keep, so the problem can be fixed by setting keep variable as 1 directly if the source LEB cannot be locked.

---
 drivers/mtd/ubi/wl.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -830,7 +830,14 @@ static int wear_leveling_worker(struct u
 			goto out_not_moved;
 		}
 		if (err == MOVE_RETRY) {
-			scrubbing = 1;
+			/*
+			 * For source PEB:
+			 * 1. The scrubbing is set for scrub type PEB, it will
+			 *    be put back into ubi->scrub list.
+			 * 2. Non-scrub type PEB will be put back into ubi->used
+			 *    list.
+			 */
+			keep = 1;
 			dst_leb_clean = 1;
 			goto out_not_moved;
 		}

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tiwei Bie <[email protected]>

commit 5bee35e5389f450a7eea7318deb9073e9414d3b1 upstream.

The drvdata is not available in release. Let's just use container_of() to get the ubd instance. Otherwise, removing a ubd device will result in a crash:

RIP: 0033:blk_mq_free_tag_set+0x1f/0xba
RSP: 00000000e2083bf0  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000006021463a RBX: 0000000000000348 RCX: 0000000062604d00
RDX: 0000000004208060 RSI: 00000000605241a0 RDI: 0000000000000348
RBP: 00000000e2083c10 R08: 0000000062414010 R09: 00000000601603f7
R10: 000000000000133a R11: 000000006038c4bd R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000060213a5c R14: 0000000062405d20 R15: 00000000604f7aa0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Segfault with no mm
CPU: 0 PID: 17 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-00107-gba3f67c11638 #1
Workqueue: events mc_work_proc
Stack:
 00000000 604f7ef0 62c5d000 62405d20
 e2083c30 6002c776 6002c755 600e47ff
 e2083c60 6025ffe3 04208060 603d36e0
Call Trace:
 [<6002c776>] ubd_device_release+0x21/0x55
 [<6002c755>] ? ubd_device_release+0x0/0x55
 [<600e47ff>] ? kfree+0x0/0x100
 [<6025ffe3>] device_release+0x70/0xba
 [<60381d6a>] kobject_put+0xb5/0xe2
 [<6026027b>] put_device+0x19/0x1c
 [<6026a036>] platform_device_put+0x26/0x29
 [<6026ac5a>] platform_device_unregister+0x2c/0x2e
 [<6002c52e>] ubd_remove+0xb8/0xd6
 [<6002bb74>] ? mconsole_reply+0x0/0x50
 [<6002b926>] mconsole_remove+0x160/0x1cc
 [<6002bbbc>] ? mconsole_reply+0x48/0x50
 [<6003379c>] ? um_set_signals+0x3b/0x43
 [<60061c55>] ? update_min_vruntime+0x14/0x70
 [<6006251f>] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x164/0x235
 [<600620aa>] ? update_cfs_group+0x0/0x40
 [<603a0e77>] ? __schedule+0x0/0x3ed
 [<60033761>] ? um_set_signals+0x0/0x43
 [<6002af6a>] mc_work_proc+0x77/0x91
 [<600520b4>] process_scheduled_works+0x1af/0x2c3
 [<6004ede3>] ? assign_work+0x0/0x58
 [<600527a1>] worker_thread+0x2f7/0x37a
 [<6004ee3b>] ? set_pf_worker+0x0/0x64
 [<6005765d>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x0/0x2d
 [<60058e07>] ? kthread_exit+0x0/0x3a
 [<600524aa>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x37a
 [<60058f9f>] kthread+0x130/0x135
 [<6002068e>] new_thread_handler+0x85/0xb6

---
 arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static int ubd_open_dev(struct ubd *ubd_
 
 static void ubd_device_release(struct device *dev)
 {
-	struct ubd *ubd_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct ubd *ubd_dev = container_of(dev, struct ubd, pdev.dev);
 
 	blk_mq_free_tag_set(&ubd_dev->tag_set);
 	*ubd_dev = ((struct ubd) DEFAULT_UBD);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tiwei Bie <[email protected]>

commit d1db692a9be3b4bd3473b64fcae996afaffe8438 upstream.

The drvdata is not available in release. Let's just use container_of() to get the uml_net instance. Otherwise, removing a network device will result in a crash:

RIP: 0033:net_device_release+0x10/0x6f
RSP: 00000000e20c7c40  EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 000000006002e4e7 RBX: 00000000600f1baf RCX: 00000000624074e0
RDX: 0000000062778000 RSI: 0000000060551c80 RDI: 00000000627af028
RBP: 00000000e20c7c50 R08: 00000000603ad594 R09: 00000000e20c7b70
R10: 000000000000135a R11: 00000000603ad422 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000062c7af00 R14: 0000000062406d60 R15: 00000000627700b6
Kernel panic - not syncing: Segfault with no mm
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 29 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-g59b723cd2adb #1
Workqueue: events mc_work_proc
Stack:
 627af028 62c7af00 e20c7c80 60276fcd
 62778000 603f5820 627af028 00000000
 e20c7cb0 603a2bcd 627af000 62770010
Call Trace:
 [<60276fcd>] device_release+0x70/0xba
 [<603a2bcd>] kobject_put+0xba/0xe7
 [<60277265>] put_device+0x19/0x1c
 [<60281266>] platform_device_put+0x26/0x29
 [<60281e5f>] platform_device_unregister+0x2c/0x2e
 [<6002ec9c>] net_remove+0x63/0x69
 [<60031316>] ? mconsole_reply+0x0/0x50
 [<600310c8>] mconsole_remove+0x160/0x1cc
 [<60087d40>] ? __remove_hrtimer+0x38/0x74
 [<60087ff8>] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x8c/0x98
 [<6006b3cf>] ? dl_server_stop+0x3f/0x48
 [<6006b390>] ? dl_server_stop+0x0/0x48
 [<600672e8>] ? dequeue_entities+0x327/0x390
 [<60038fa6>] ? um_set_signals+0x0/0x43
 [<6003070c>] mc_work_proc+0x77/0x91
 [<60057664>] process_scheduled_works+0x1b3/0x2dd
 [<60055f32>] ? assign_work+0x0/0x58
 [<60057f0a>] worker_thread+0x1e9/0x293
 [<6005406f>] ? set_pf_worker+0x0/0x64
 [<6005d65d>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x0/0x2d
 [<6005d748>] ? kthread_exit+0x0/0x3a
 [<60057d21>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x293
 [<6005dbf1>] kthread+0x126/0x12b
 [<600219c5>] new_thread_handler+0x85/0xb6

---
 arch/um/drivers/net_kern.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static struct platform_driver uml_net_dr
 
 static void net_device_release(struct device *dev)
 {
-	struct uml_net *device = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct uml_net *device = container_of(dev, struct uml_net, pdev.dev);
 	struct net_device *netdev = device->dev;
 	struct uml_net_private *lp = netdev_priv(netdev);
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bin Liu <[email protected]>

commit bcc7ba668818dcadd2f1db66b39ed860a63ecf97 upstream.

Currently in omap_8250_shutdown, the dma->rx_running flag is set to zero in omap_8250_rx_dma_flush. Next pm_runtime_get_sync is called, which is a runtime resume call stack which can re-set the flag. When the call omap_8250_shutdown returns, the flag is expected to be UN-SET, but this is not the case. This is causing issues the next time UART is re-opened and omap_8250_rx_dma is called. Fix by moving pm_runtime_get_sync before the omap_8250_rx_dma_flush.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -763,12 +763,12 @@ static void omap_8250_shutdown(struct ua
 	struct uart_8250_port *up = up_to_u8250p(port);
 	struct omap8250_priv *priv = port->private_data;
 
+	pm_runtime_get_sync(port->dev);
+
 	flush_work(&priv->qos_work);
 	if (up->dma)
 		omap_8250_rx_dma_flush(up);
 
-	pm_runtime_get_sync(port->dev);
-
 	serial_out(up, UART_OMAP_WER, 0);
 	if (priv->habit & UART_HAS_EFR2)
 		serial_out(up, UART_OMAP_EFR2, 0x0);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tiwei Bie <[email protected]>

commit 51b39d741970742a5c41136241a9c48ac607cf82 upstream.

The drvdata is not available in release. Let's just use container_of() to get the vector_device instance. Otherwise, removing a vector device will result in a crash:

RIP: 0033:vector_device_release+0xf/0x50
RSP: 00000000e187bc40  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000060028f61 RBX: 00000000600f1baf RCX: 00000000620074e0
RDX: 000000006220b9c0 RSI: 0000000060551c80 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00000000e187bc50 R08: 00000000603ad594 R09: 00000000e187bb70
R10: 000000000000135a R11: 00000000603ad422 R12: 00000000623ae028
R13: 000000006287a200 R14: 0000000062006d30 R15: 00000000623700b6
Kernel panic - not syncing: Segfault with no mm
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-g59b723cd2adb #1
Workqueue: events mc_work_proc
Stack:
 60028f61 623ae028 e187bc80 60276fcd
 6220b9c0 603f5820 623ae028 00000000
 e187bcb0 603a2bcd 623ae000 62370010
Call Trace:
 [<60028f61>] ? vector_device_release+0x0/0x50
 [<60276fcd>] device_release+0x70/0xba
 [<603a2bcd>] kobject_put+0xba/0xe7
 [<60277265>] put_device+0x19/0x1c
 [<60281266>] platform_device_put+0x26/0x29
 [<60281e5f>] platform_device_unregister+0x2c/0x2e
 [<60029422>] vector_remove+0x52/0x58
 [<60031316>] ? mconsole_reply+0x0/0x50
 [<600310c8>] mconsole_remove+0x160/0x1cc
 [<603b19f4>] ? strlen+0x0/0x15
 [<60066611>] ? __dequeue_entity+0x1a9/0x206
 [<600666a7>] ? set_next_entity+0x39/0x63
 [<6006666e>] ? set_next_entity+0x0/0x63
 [<60038fa6>] ? um_set_signals+0x0/0x43
 [<6003070c>] mc_work_proc+0x77/0x91
 [<60057664>] process_scheduled_works+0x1b3/0x2dd
 [<60055f32>] ? assign_work+0x0/0x58
 [<60057f0a>] worker_thread+0x1e9/0x293
 [<6005406f>] ? set_pf_worker+0x0/0x64
 [<6005d65d>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x0/0x2d
 [<6005d748>] ? kthread_exit+0x0/0x3a
 [<60057d21>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x293
 [<6005dbf1>] kthread+0x126/0x12b
 [<600219c5>] new_thread_handler+0x85/0xb6

---
 arch/um/drivers/vector_kern.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -826,7 +826,8 @@ static struct platform_driver uml_net_dr
 
 static void vector_device_release(struct device *dev)
 {
-	struct vector_device *device = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct vector_device *device =
+		container_of(dev, struct vector_device, pdev.dev);
 	struct net_device *netdev = device->dev;
 
 	list_del(&device->list);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>

commit 3c891f7c6a4e90bb1199497552f24b26e46383bc upstream.

When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK and CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS are selected, cpu_max_bits_warn() generates a runtime warning similar as below when showing /proc/cpuinfo. Fix this by using nr_cpu_ids (the runtime limit) instead of NR_CPUS to iterate CPUs.

[    3.052463] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    3.059679] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at include/linux/cpumask.h:108 show_cpuinfo+0x5e8/0x5f0
[    3.070072] Modules linked in: efivarfs autofs4
[    3.076257] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.19-rc5+ #1052
[    3.099465] Stack : 9000000100157b08 9000000000f18530 9000000000cf846c 9000000100154000
[    3.109127]         9000000100157a50 0000000000000000 9000000100157a58 9000000000ef7430
[    3.118774]         90000001001578e8 0000000000000040 0000000000000020 ffffffffffffffff
[    3.128412]         0000000000aaaaaa 1ab25f00eec96a37 900000010021de80 900000000101c890
[    3.138056]         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000aaaaaa
[    3.147711]         ffff8000339dc220 0000000000000001 0000000006ab4000 0000000000000000
[    3.157364]         900000000101c998 0000000000000004 9000000000ef7430 0000000000000000
[    3.167012]         0000000000000009 000000000000006c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[    3.176641]         9000000000d3de08 9000000001639390 90000000002086d8 00007ffff0080286
[    3.186260]         00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1c
[    3.195868]         ...
[    3.199917] Call Trace:
[    3.203941] [<90000000002086d8>] show_stack+0x38/0x14c
[    3.210666] [<9000000000cf846c>] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x88
[    3.217625] [<900000000023d268>] __warn+0xd0/0x100
[    3.223958] [<9000000000cf3c90>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x7c/0xcc
[    3.231150] [<9000000000210220>] show_cpuinfo+0x5e8/0x5f0
[    3.238080] [<90000000004f578c>] seq_read_iter+0x354/0x4b4
[    3.245098] [<90000000004c2e90>] new_sync_read+0x17c/0x1c4
[    3.252114] [<90000000004c5174>] vfs_read+0x138/0x1d0
[    3.258694] [<90000000004c55f8>] ksys_read+0x70/0x100
[    3.265265] [<9000000000cfde9c>] do_syscall+0x7c/0x94
[    3.271820] [<9000000000202fe4>] handle_syscall+0xc4/0x160
[    3.281824] ---[ end trace 8b484262b4b8c24c ]---

---
 arch/sh/kernel/cpu/proc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file
 
 static void *c_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	return *pos < NR_CPUS ? cpu_data + *pos : NULL;
+	return *pos < nr_cpu_ids ? cpu_data + *pos : NULL;
 }
 static void *c_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 {

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

commit 67ab51cbdfee02ef07fb9d7d14cc0bf6cb5a5e5c upstream.

Commit 18011eac28c7 ("arm64: tls: Avoid unconditional zeroing of tpidrro_el0 for native tasks") tried to optimise the context switching of tpidrro_el0 by eliding the clearing of the register when switching to a native task with kpti enabled, on the erroneous assumption that the kpti trampoline entry code would already have taken care of the write.

Although the kpti trampoline does zero the register on entry from a native task, the check in tls_thread_switch() is on the *next* task and so we can end up leaving a stale, non-zero value in the register if the previous task was 32-bit.

Drop the broken optimisation and zero tpidrro_el0 unconditionally when switching to a native 64-bit task.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/process.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static void tls_thread_switch(struct tas
 
 	if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(next)))
 		write_sysreg(next->thread.uw.tp_value, tpidrro_el0);
-	else if (!arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
+	else
 		write_sysreg(0, tpidrro_el0);
 
 	write_sysreg(*task_user_tls(next), tpidr_el0);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Muchun Song <[email protected]>

commit 96a9fe64bfd486ebeeacf1e6011801ffe89dae18 upstream.

Supposing first scenario with a virtio_blk driver.

CPU0 CPU1

blk_mq_try_issue_directly()
__blk_mq_issue_directly()

    q->mq_ops->queue_rq()
      virtio_queue_rq()
        blk_mq_stop_hw_queue()
                            virtblk_done()
  blk_mq_request_bypass_insert()  1) store
                              blk_mq_start_stopped_hw_queue()
                                clear_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED)       3) store
                                blk_mq_run_hw_queue()
                                  if (!blk_mq_hctx_has_pending()) 4) load
                                    return
                                  blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests()
  blk_mq_run_hw_queue()
    if (!blk_mq_hctx_has_pending())
      return
    blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests()
      if (blk_mq_hctx_stopped())  2) load
        return
      __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests()

Supposing another scenario.

CPU0 CPU1

blk_mq_requeue_work()
blk_mq_insert_request() 1) store
virtblk_done()
blk_mq_start_stopped_hw_queue()
blk_mq_run_hw_queues() clear_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED) 3) store

                                blk_mq_run_hw_queue()
                                  if (!blk_mq_hctx_has_pending()) 4) load
                                    return
                                  blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests()
    if (blk_mq_hctx_stopped())  2) load
      continue
    blk_mq_run_hw_queue()

Both scenarios are similar, the full memory barrier should be inserted between 1) and 2), as well as between 3) and 4) to make sure that either CPU0 sees BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED is cleared or CPU1 sees dispatch list. Otherwise, either CPU will not rerun the hardware queue causing starvation of the request.

The easy way to fix it is to add the essential full memory barrier into helper of blk_mq_hctx_stopped(). In order to not affect the fast path (hardware queue is not stopped most of the time), we only insert the barrier into the slow path. Actually, only slow path needs to care about missing of dispatching the request to the low-level device driver.

---
 block/blk-mq.c |    6 ++++++
 block/blk-mq.h |   13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)

@@ -1813,6 +1813,12 @@ void blk_mq_start_stopped_hw_queue(struc
 		return;
 
 	clear_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state);
+	/*
+	 * Pairs with the smp_mb() in blk_mq_hctx_stopped() to order the
+	 * clearing of BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED above and the checking of dispatch
+	 * list in the subsequent routine.
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
 	blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx, async);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_mq_start_stopped_hw_queue);

@@ -177,6 +177,19 @@ static inline struct blk_mq_tags *blk_mq
 
 static inline bool blk_mq_hctx_stopped(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
 {
+	/* Fast path: hardware queue is not stopped most of the time. */
+	if (likely(!test_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state)))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * This barrier is used to order adding of dispatch list before and
+	 * the test of BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED below. Pairs with the memory barrier
+	 * in blk_mq_start_stopped_hw_queue() so that dispatch code could
+	 * either see BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED is cleared or dispatch list is not
+	 * empty to avoid missing dispatching requests.
+	 */
+	smp_mb();
+
 	return test_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state);
 }
 

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Gerecke <[email protected]>

commit 49a397ad24ee5e2c53a59dada2780d7e71bd3f77 upstream.

The tilt data contained in the Bluetooth packets of an Intuos Pro are supposed to be interpreted as signed values. Simply casting the values to type char is not guaranteed to work since it is implementation- defined whether it is signed or unsigned. At least one user has noticed the data being reported incorrectly on their system. To ensure that the data is interpreted properly, we specifically cast to signed char instead.

---
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1401,9 +1401,9 @@ static void wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen(str
 					rotation -= 1800;
 
 				input_report_abs(pen_input, ABS_TILT_X,
-						 (char)frame[7]);
+						 (signed char)frame[7]);
 				input_report_abs(pen_input, ABS_TILT_Y,
-						 (char)frame[8]);
+						 (signed char)frame[8]);
 				input_report_abs(pen_input, ABS_Z, rotation);
 				input_report_abs(pen_input, ABS_WHEEL,
 						 get_unaligned_le16(&frame[11]));

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qiu-ji Chen <[email protected]>

commit ca59f9956d4519ab18ab2270be47c6b8c6ced091 upstream.

Atomicity violation occurs when the fmc_send_cmd() function is executed simultaneously with the modification of the fmdev->resp_skb value. Consider a scenario where, after passing the validity check within the function, a non-null fmdev->resp_skb variable is assigned a null value. This results in an invalid fmdev->resp_skb variable passing the validity check. As seen in the later part of the function, skb = fmdev->resp_skb; when the invalid fmdev->resp_skb passes the check, a null pointer dereference error may occur at line 478, evt_hdr = (void *)skb->data;

To address this issue, it is recommended to include the validity check of fmdev->resp_skb within the locked section of the function. This modification ensures that the value of fmdev->resp_skb does not change during the validation process, thereby maintaining its validity.

This possible bug is found by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team. This tool analyzes the locking APIs to extract function pairs that can be concurrently executed, and then analyzes the instructions in the paired functions to identify possible concurrency bugs including data races and atomicity violations.

---
 drivers/media/radio/wl128x/fmdrv_common.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -465,11 +465,12 @@ int fmc_send_cmd(struct fmdev *fmdev, u8
 			   jiffies_to_msecs(FM_DRV_TX_TIMEOUT) / 1000);
 		return -ETIMEDOUT;
 	}
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&fmdev->resp_skb_lock, flags);
 	if (!fmdev->resp_skb) {
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fmdev->resp_skb_lock, flags);
 		fmerr("Response SKB is missing\n");
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&fmdev->resp_skb_lock, flags);
 	skb = fmdev->resp_skb;
 	fmdev->resp_skb = NULL;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fmdev->resp_skb_lock, flags);

5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Javier Carrasco <[email protected]>

commit c9f1efabf8e3b3ff886a42669f7093789dbeca94 upstream.

of_find_compatible_node() requires a call to of_node_put() when the pointer to the node is not required anymore to decrement its refcount and avoid leaking memory.

Add the missing call to of_node_put() after the node has been used.