IB/hfi1: fix buffer underflow in fault injection code
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 IB/hfi1: fix buffer underflow in fault injection code
[Why]
The fault injection code may have a buffer underflow, which may cause memory corruption by writing a newline character before the base address of the array. This can happen if the fault->opcodes bitmap is empty.
Since a file in debugfs is created with an empty bitmap, it is possible to read the file before any set bits are written to it.
[How]
Fix this by checking that the size variable is greater than zero, otherwise return zero as the number of bytes read.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +2 -1
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static ssize_t fault_opcodes_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, bit =find_next_bit (fault->opcodes, bitsize, zero); }debugfs_file_put (file->f_path.dentry); - data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; +if (size) + data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; data[size] ='\0' ; ret =simple_read_from_buffer (buf, len, pos, data, size); free_data:
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1
Dennis Dalessandro
maintainerQuoted 25 lines · Vitaliy Shevtsov
[Why]
The fault injection code may have a buffer underflow, which may cause memory corruption by writing a newline character before the base address of the array. This can happen if thefault->opcodesbitmap is empty.Since a file in debugfs is created with an empty bitmap, it is possible to read the file before any set bits are written to it.
[How]
Fix this by checking that the size variable is greater than zero, otherwise return zero as the number of bytes read.Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
Fixes a74d5307caba ("IB/hfi1: Rework fault injection machinery")Signed-off-by Vitaliy Shevtsov <[email protected]>--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +0
-0
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c static ssize_t fault_opcodes_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, · line 197
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +2
-1@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static ssize_t fault_opcodes_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, bit =find_next_bit (fault->opcodes, bitsize, zero); }debugfs_file_put (file->f_path.dentry); - data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; +if (size) + data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; data[size] ='\0' ; ret =simple_read_from_buffer (buf, len, pos, data, size); free_data:
I don't think size can ever be 0. No reason to change this I don't think.
-Denny
Quoted 38 lines · Dennis Dalessandro
Quoted 25 lines · Vitaliy Shevtsov
[Why]
The fault injection code may have a buffer underflow, which may cause memory corruption by writing a newline character before the base address of the array. This can happen if thefault->opcodesbitmap is empty.Since a file in debugfs is created with an empty bitmap, it is possible to read the file before any set bits are written to it.
[How]
Fix this by checking that the size variable is greater than zero, otherwise return zero as the number of bytes read.Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
Fixes a74d5307caba ("IB/hfi1: Rework fault injection machinery")Signed-off-by Vitaliy Shevtsov <[email protected]>--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +0
-0drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c static ssize_t fault_opcodes_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, · line 197
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +2
-1@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static ssize_t fault_opcodes_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, bit =find_next_bit (fault->opcodes, bitsize, zero); }debugfs_file_put (file->f_path.dentry); - data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; +if (size) + data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; data[size] ='\0' ; ret =simple_read_from_buffer (buf, len, pos, data, size); free_data:I don't think size can ever be 0. No reason to change this I don't think.
Quoted 2 lines
-Denny
Seems the patch description rather clearly shows the size can be zero in case the corresponding opcodes bitmap is empty. Which is the case when user reads the file before writing anything to it.
Quoted 39 lines · Fedor Pchelkin
Quoted 38 lines · Dennis Dalessandro
Quoted 25 lines · Vitaliy Shevtsov
[Why]
The fault injection code may have a buffer underflow, which may cause memory corruption by writing a newline character before the base address of the array. This can happen if thefault->opcodesbitmap is empty.Since a file in debugfs is created with an empty bitmap, it is possible to read the file before any set bits are written to it.
[How]
Fix this by checking that the size variable is greater than zero, otherwise return zero as the number of bytes read.Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
Fixes a74d5307caba ("IB/hfi1: Rework fault injection machinery")Signed-off-by Vitaliy Shevtsov <[email protected]>--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +0
-0drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c static ssize_t fault_opcodes_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, · line 197
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/fault.c +2
-1@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static ssize_t fault_opcodes_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, bit =find_next_bit (fault->opcodes, bitsize, zero); }debugfs_file_put (file->f_path.dentry); - data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; +if (size) + data[size -1 ] ='\n' ; data[size] ='\0' ; ret =simple_read_from_buffer (buf, len, pos, data, size); free_data:I don't think size can ever be 0. No reason to change this I don't think.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
-Denny
Seems the patch description rather clearly shows the size can be zero in case the corresponding opcodes bitmap is empty. Which is the case when user reads the file before writing anything to it.
Guess it's OK then.