GPM & Emacs broken in Linux 6.7 -- ok to relax check?
Subsystems (3)
The change to restrict access to TIOCLINUX that was added in Linux 6.7 breaks Emacs rendering of the mouse pointer. This change was previous discussed in https://lwn.net/ml/kernel-hardening/[email protected]/. An associated Emacs bug report, bug #74220, is discussed at https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnu-emacs/2024-11/msg00275.html.
I wanted to ask if it made sense for the restriction to not apply to the following three selection modes for TIOCL_SETSEL:
TIOCL_SELPOINTER 3 /* show the pointer */TIOCL_SELCLEAR 4 /* clear visibility of selection */TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT 16 /* report beginning of selection */
On a glance over the selection code, none of these interact with vc_sel.buffer and therefore are unrelated to the exploit linked in the original report. Only SELPOINTER is necessary to be available to fix Emacs bug #74220. I imagine such a change would involve moving the capability check from tioclinux(), case TIOCL_SETSEL to inside vc_do_selection().
Note: This is my first time emailing a Linux kernel mailing list, so please let me know if there's any additional conventions I should be following here.
Thank you for your time.
-- MJF
+regression list, LKML, maintainers, patch authors
Quoted 4 lines · Jared Finder
The change to restrict access to TIOCLINUX that was added in Linux 6.7 breaks Emacs rendering of the mouse pointer. This change was previous discussed in
https://lwn.net/ml/kernel-hardening/[email protected]/.
This landed as commit 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands").
#regzbot introduced: 8d1b43f6a6df
Quoted 17 lines
An associated Emacs bug report, bug #74220, is discussed at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnu-emacs/2024-11/msg00275.html.I wanted to ask if it made sense for the restriction to not apply to the following three selection modes for
TIOCL_SETSEL:
TIOCL_SELPOINTER3 /* show the pointer */TIOCL_SELCLEAR4 /* clear visibility of selection */TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT16 /* report beginning of selection */On a glance over the selection code, none of these interact with vc_sel.buffer and therefore are unrelated to the exploit linked in the original report. Only SELPOINTER is necessary to be available to fix Emacs bug #74220. I imagine such a change would involve moving the capability check from
tioclinux(), caseTIOCL_SETSELto insidevc_do_selection().
Quoted 3 lines
Note: This is my first time emailing a Linux kernel mailing list, so please let me know if there's any additional conventions I should be following here.
FYI, for next time: There is some documentation at
https://docs.kernel.org/admin-guide/reporting-regressions.html
specifically for reporting regressions (with a focus on what to do so that your regression report doesn't get lost).
Quoted 4 lines
Thank you for your time.
-- MJF
Hello!
Quoted 8 lines · Jann Horn
+regression list, LKML, maintainers, patch authors
Quoted 4 lines · Jared Finder
The change to restrict access to TIOCLINUX that was added in Linux 6.7 breaks Emacs rendering of the mouse pointer. This change was previous discussed in
https://lwn.net/ml/kernel-hardening/[email protected]/.
Quoted 4 lines
This landed as commit
8d1b43f6a6df("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands").#regzbot introduced:
8d1b43f6a6df
Thank you for reporting the bug, and thanks for forwarding, Jann!
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
An associated Emacs bug report, bug #74220, is discussed at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnu-emacs/2024-11/msg00275.html.I wanted to ask if it made sense for the restriction to not apply to the following three selection modes for
TIOCL_SETSEL:
TIOCL_SELPOINTER3 /* show the pointer */TIOCL_SELCLEAR4 /* clear visibility of selection */TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT16 /* report beginning of selection */
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
On a glance over the selection code, none of these interact with vc_sel.buffer and therefore are unrelated to the exploit linked in the original report. Only SELPOINTER is necessary to be available to fix Emacs bug #74220. I imagine such a change would involve moving the capability check from
tioclinux(), caseTIOCL_SETSELto insidevc_do_selection().
We did indeed miss that Emacs is using these IOCTLs directly.
To paraphrase what is happening, so that we are on the same page:
* Emacs includes the GPM header gpm.h and calls Gpm_DrawPointer(x, y, fd).
* Gpm_DrawPointer is implemented as a macro, which hardcodes all IOCTL constants (as it is the case in the entire GPM codebase), and it invokes ioctl(2) directly from the macro.
The Gpm_DrawPointer also gets called from other packages, including mc (Midnight Commander), elinks and libt3widget (which supports the Tilde text editor).
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=Gpm_DrawPointer&literal=1&perpkg=1
* Midnight Commander and the Tilde text editor display the mouse cursor fine, also as a regular user.
* Elinks does not display the mouse cursor at all, independent of whether it is being run as root or not. (Which makes me suspect that it might be an independent bug.)
* Emacs does not display the mouse cursor when run as normal user, but it works as root.
I can see how the three selection modes TIOCL_SELPOINTER, TIOCL_SELCLEAR and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are related - TIOCL_SELPOINTER is the one that we need, but TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELCLEAR are the other two which can happen leading up to that at the top of vc_selection()?
I also believe that what we *actually* want to guard here is the change to vc_sel, so to propose a (somewhat simple-minded) patch, I guess we could put the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check in vc_do_selection() right before the place where vc_sel.start and vc_sel.end are being assigned?
Hanno, you are the original author of this patch and you have done a more detailed analysis on the TIOCLINUX problems than me -- do you agree that this weakened check would still be sufficient to protect against the TIOCLINUX problems? (Or in other words, if we permitted TIOCL_SELPOINTER, TIOCL_SELCLEAR and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT for non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes, would you still see a way to misuse that functionality?)
Thanks,
—Günther
Quoted 6 lines · Günther Noack
Hanno, you are the original author of this patch and you have done a more detailed analysis on the TIOCLINUX problems than me -- do you agree that this weakened check would still be sufficient to protect against the TIOCLINUX problems? (Or in other words, if we permitted
TIOCL_SELPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTfor non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes, would you still see a way to misuse that functionality?)
P.S.: For reference, some more detailed reasoning why I think that that proposal would be OK:
It would protect at least against the "minittyjack.c" example that was attached to https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/03/14/3
The trick used there was:
* ioctl() with TIOCLINUX with TIOCL_SETSEL with TIOCL_SELLINE, to make a selection (a.k.a. changing the contents of vc_sel)
* ioctl() with TIOCLINUX and TIOCL_PASTESEL to paste the selection. (The implementation for that is in selection.c/paste_selection() and is just copying from vc_sel.)
So as long as we are protecting the change to vc_sel, that should be OK in my mind.
—Günther
Quoted 16 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 6 lines · Günther Noack
Hanno, you are the original author of this patch and you have done a more detailed analysis on the TIOCLINUX problems than me -- do you agree that this weakened check would still be sufficient to protect against the TIOCLINUX problems? (Or in other words, if we permitted
TIOCL_SELPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTfor non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes, would you still see a way to misuse that functionality?)
P.S.: For reference, some more detailed reasoning why I think that that proposal would be OK:It would protect at least against the "
minittyjack.c" example that was attached to https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/03/14/3The trick used there was:
Quoted 8 lines
*
ioctl()with TIOCLINUX withTIOCL_SETSELwithTIOCL_SELLINE, to make a selection (a.k.a. changing the contents ofvc_sel)
*ioctl()with TIOCLINUX andTIOCL_PASTESELto paste the selection. (The implementation for that is in selection.c/paste_selection() and is just copying fromvc_sel.)So as long as we are protecting the change to
vc_sel, that should be OK in my mind.
It's been silent for about a week and a half here. How long do we wait before creating a patch here? This is a regression so I'm assuming we shouldn't wait too long.
I'm happy to create the patch if that's helpful. I'd need help with process for submitting it for inclusion in the latest kernel as well as backports to earlier impacted versions. I've never submitted code to Linux before.
-- MJF
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 34 lines · Jared Finder
Quoted 29 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 11 lines · Günther Noack
Hanno, you are the original author of this patch and you have done a more
detailed analysis on the TIOCLINUX problems than me -- do you agree that this
weakened check would still be sufficient to protect against the TIOCLINUX
problems? (Or in other words, if we permittedTIOCL_SELPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEAR
andTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTfor non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes, would you still see a
way to misuse that functionality?)
P.S.: For reference, some more detailed reasoning why I think that that proposal
would be OK:It would protect at least against the "
minittyjack.c" example that was attached
to https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/03/14/3The trick used there was:
*
ioctl()with TIOCLINUX withTIOCL_SETSELwithTIOCL_SELLINE, to make a selection (a.k.a. changing the contents ofvc_sel)
*ioctl()with TIOCLINUX andTIOCL_PASTESELto paste the selection. (The implementation for that is in selection.c/paste_selection() and is just copying fromvc_sel.)Quoted 3 lines
So as long as we are protecting the change to
vc_sel, that should be OK in my
mind.
Quoted 7 lines
It's been silent for about a week and a half here. How long do we wait before creating a patch here? This is a regression so I'm assuming we shouldn't wait too long.
I'm happy to create the patch if that's helpful. I'd need help with process for submitting it for inclusion in the latest kernel as well as backports to earlier impacted versions. I've never submitted code to Linux before.
Sure, make a patch and we will be glad to help you out in getting it accepted if it looks good.
thanks,
greg k-h
PATCH 1/1 tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
With this, processes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN are able to use TIOCLINUX with subcode TIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modes TIOCL_SETPOINTER, TIOCL_SELCLEAR and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSEL was previously changed to require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These three TIOCL_SETSEL selection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.
This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +14 -0
@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ; +/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + } +return set_selection_kernel (&v, tty); }
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +1 -2
@@ -3345,8 +3345,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)switch (type) {case TIOCL_SETSEL : -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; +/* CAP_SYS_ADMIN check happens in set_selection_user(). */ return set_selection_user (param, tty);case TIOCL_PASTESEL :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoted 12 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Quoted 7 lines
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Hi,
This is the friendly patch-bot of Greg Kroah-Hartman. You have sent him a patch that has triggered this response. He used to manually respond to these common problems, but in order to save his sanity (he kept writing the same thing over and over, yet to different people), I was created. Hopefully you will not take offence and will fix the problem in your patch and resubmit it so that it can be accepted into the Linux kernel tree.
You are receiving this message because of the following common error(s) as indicated below:
- Your patch breaks the build.
- Your patch contains warnings and/or errors noticed by the scripts/checkpatch.pl tool.
- You have marked a patch with a "Fixes:" tag for a commit that is in an older released kernel, yet you do not have a cc: stable line in the signed-off-by area at all, which means that the patch will not be applied to any older kernel releases. To properly fix this, please follow the documented rules in the Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst file for how to resolve this.
If you wish to discuss this problem further, or you have questions about how to resolve this issue, please feel free to respond to this email and Greg will reply once he has dug out from the pending patches received from other developers.
thanks,
greg k-h's patch email bot
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
In reply to Günther NoackQuoted 31 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +3
-0@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ; +/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection.
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel, · line 207
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +10
-0+*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + }
Shouldn't you check this _before_ doing the copy_from_user() to emulate the previous logic properly?
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +1
-0+return set_selection_kernel (&v, tty); }drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +0
-0
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg) · line 3348
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +1
-2@@ -3345,8 +3345,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)switch (type) {case TIOCL_SETSEL : -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; +/* CAP_SYS_ADMIN check happens in set_selection_user(). */
No need to mention this here, it's obvious in the function itself.
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Hello!
Quoted 29 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 28 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +0
-0@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ;
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel, · line 207
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +13
-0+/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + }Shouldn't you check this _before_ doing the
copy_from_user()to emulate the previous logic properly?
You are right, I believe this can technically return a different error code.
There is a data dependency between the two though - the capability check should only happen for certain values of v.sel_mode, and v is only populated by copy_from_user().
As far as I can tell, this only makes a difference in scenarios where both copy_from_user() and the capability check would fail.
Do you think we have to emulate it down to this level of detail?
As background, we have only introduced the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check recently in 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands") The patch landed in Linux 6.7 and was discussed in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/.
I suspect that existing callers of the TIOCL_SETSEL IOCTL are probably all written at a time before the capability check existed. ((a) These IOCTLs are used for the console mouse support, and (b) these "modes" for the TIOCL_SETSEL subcode for the TIOCLINUX IOCTL are not documented in the man page either.)
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +1
-0+return set_selection_kernel (&v, tty); }drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +0
-0@@ -3345,8 +3345,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg) · line 3348
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +1
-2switch (type) {case TIOCL_SETSEL : -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; +/* CAP_SYS_ADMIN check happens in set_selection_user(). */ No need to mention this here, it's obvious in the function itself.
OK, thanks. I will remove it in the next version.
—Günther
Re: [PATCH] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Hello Greg, Hanno and everyone else!
Quoted 49 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 29 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 28 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +0
-0@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ;Quoted 16 lines
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel, · line 207
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +13
-0+/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + }Shouldn't you check this _before_ doing the
copy_from_user()to emulate the previous logic properly?You are right, I believe this can technically return a different error code.
Quoted 8 lines
There is a data dependency between the two though - the capability check should only happen for certain values of v.sel_mode, and v is only populated by
copy_from_user().As far as I can tell, this only makes a difference in scenarios where both
copy_from_user()and the capability check would fail.Do you think we have to emulate it down to this level of detail?
Another observation which makes it clearer that copy_from_user() failing here should really not happen in practice:
The 'argp' pointer that gets passed to ioctl(2) here is a pointer to a region in memory whose first byte is a TIOCLINUX subcommand, and at the time we do the copy_from_user(), this subcommand byte has already been successfully copied over from user space. The region that we are now copying with copy_from_user() here is directly after this byte, and should under normal circumstances work as well -- I believe that callers would have to construct a specifically crafted ioctl() so that the first copy-from-userspace works and the second one fails (referring to a byte just before a page boundary, or something like that...?)
I'll send a V2 of this patch with the comment removed, the 'Cc: stable' added, but where the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check is still done after copy_from_user(), with the reasoning that:
1. A previous get_user() from an adjacent memory region already worked (making this a very unlikely failure)
2. I do not see a good alternative to reorder the code here, because we need the data from copy_from_user() in order to know whether the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check even needs to be performed.
Hanno: If you are OK with this patch, I'd still appreciate a more formal "Reviewed-By" or "Tested-By" from you. :)
Thanks, and Happy Holidays!
—Günther
PATCH v2 1/1 tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
With this, processes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN are able to use TIOCLINUX with subcode TIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modes TIOCL_SETPOINTER, TIOCL_SELCLEAR and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSEL was previously changed to require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These three TIOCL_SETSEL selection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.
This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +14 -0
@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ; +/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + } +return set_selection_kernel (&v, tty); }
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +0 -2
@@ -3345,8 +3345,6 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)switch (type) {case TIOCL_SETSEL : -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ;return set_selection_user (param, tty);case TIOCL_PASTESEL :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoted 63 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +14
-0@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ; +/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + } +return set_selection_kernel (&v, tty); }drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +0
-2@@ -3345,8 +3345,6 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)switch (type) {case TIOCL_SETSEL : -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ;return set_selection_user (param, tty);case TIOCL_PASTESEL :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))Signature · 1 line
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog
Hi,
This is the friendly patch-bot of Greg Kroah-Hartman. You have sent him a patch that has triggered this response. He used to manually respond to these common problems, but in order to save his sanity (he kept writing the same thing over and over, yet to different people), I was created. Hopefully you will not take offence and will fix the problem in your patch and resubmit it so that it can be accepted into the Linux kernel tree.
You are receiving this message because of the following common error(s) as indicated below:
- This looks like a new version of a previously submitted patch, but you did not list below the --- line any changes from the previous version. Please read the section entitled "The canonical patch format" in the kernel file, Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst for what needs to be done here to properly describe this.
If you wish to discuss this problem further, or you have questions about how to resolve this issue, please feel free to respond to this email and Greg will reply once he has dug out from the pending patches received from other developers.
thanks,
greg k-h's patch email bot
PATCH v2 1/1 tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
In reply to Günther NoackWith this, processes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN are able to use TIOCLINUX with subcode TIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modes TIOCL_SETPOINTER, TIOCL_SELCLEAR and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSEL was previously changed to require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These three TIOCL_SETSEL selection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.
This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
---
Changes in V2:
* Removed comment in vt.c (per Greg's suggestion)
* CC'd stable@
* I *kept* the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check *after* copy_from_user(), with the reasoning that:
1. I do not see a good alternative to reorder the code here. We need the data from copy_from_user() in order to know whether the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check even needs to be performed.
2. A previous get_user() from an adjacent memory region already worked (making this a very unlikely failure)
I would still appreciate a more formal Tested-by from Hanno (hint, hint) :)
--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +14 -0
@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ; +/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + } +return set_selection_kernel (&v, tty); }
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +0 -2
@@ -3345,8 +3345,6 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)switch (type) {case TIOCL_SETSEL : -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ;return set_selection_user (param, tty);case TIOCL_PASTESEL :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog
Re: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoted 9 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.
Quoted 7 lines
This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Re: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Hi, I'm the original reporter of this regression (noticed because it impacted GNU Emacs) and I'm wondering if there's any traction on creating an updated patch? This thread appears to have stalled out. I haven't seen any reply for three weeks.
-- MJF
Greg KH
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoted 4 lines · Jared Finder
Hi, I'm the original reporter of this regression (noticed because it impacted GNU Emacs) and I'm wondering if there's any traction on creating an updated patch? This thread appears to have stalled out. I haven't seen any reply for three weeks.
It's already in 6.14-rc1 as commit 2f83e38a095f ("tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN").
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · Jared Finder
Hi, I'm the original reporter of this regression (noticed because it impacted GNU Emacs) and I'm wondering if there's any traction on creating an updated patch? This thread appears to have stalled out. I haven't seen any reply for three weeks.
It's already in 6.14-rc1 as commit
2f83e38a095f("tty: Permit someTIOCL_SETSELmodes withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN").
Great! Is this expected to get backported to 6.7 through 6.13? I would like to note the expected resolution correctly in Emacs' bug tracker.
-- MJF
Greg KH
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoted 9 lines · Jared Finder
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 6 lines · Jared Finder
Hi, I'm the original reporter of this regression (noticed because it impacted GNU Emacs) and I'm wondering if there's any traction on creating an
updated patch? This thread appears to have stalled out. I haven't seen any
reply for three weeks.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It's already in 6.14-rc1 as commit
2f83e38a095f("tty: Permit someTIOCL_SETSELmodes withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN").Great! Is this expected to get backported to 6.7 through 6.13? I would like to note the expected resolution correctly in Emacs' bug tracker.
Yes, it should show up in the next round of stable kernel updates later this week.
But note, it will only show up in the 6.12.y and 6.13.y kernels, as all others in your range are end-of-life and shouldn't be used by anyone at this point in time.
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
In reply to Jared FinderHello Jared and Hanno!
Quoted 6 lines · Jared Finder
Hi, I'm the original reporter of this regression (noticed because it impacted GNU Emacs) and I'm wondering if there's any traction on creating an updated patch? This thread appears to have stalled out. I haven't seen any reply for three weeks.
-- MJF
Jared, can you please confirm whether Emacs works now with this patch in the kernel?
I am asking this because I realized that the patch had a bug. We are erring in the "secure" direction, but not all TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT invocations work without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
(TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT has to be put into the sel_mode field of the argument struct, and that field looked like an enum to me, but as it turns out, the TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT is 16 and the lower 4 bits of that integer are used as an additional argument to indicate the mouse button status and modifier keys. I had overlooked that the implementation was doing this. As a result, TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT works without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but only if all four lower bits are 0.)
So, I apologize for the oversight. -- Jared, can you please confirm whether TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT is called directly from Emacs (rather than from gpm)? I tried to trace it with perf but could not reproduce a scenario where Emacs called it.
If this specific selection mode is not needed by Emacs, I think *the best thing would be to keep it guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN, after all*.
As it turns out, the following scenario is possible:
* A root shell invokes malicious program P and changes its UID to a less privileged user, but it passes a FD to the TTY. (Instead of UID switch, it can also be a sandboxed program or another way of lowering privileges.)
* Program P enables mouse tracking mode by writing "\033[?1000h".
* Program P sends IOCTL TIOCLINUX with TIOCL_SETSEL with TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT and passes suitable mouse coordinate and button press arguments. As a response, the terminal writes the escape sequence \033[MBXY, where B, X and Y are bytes indicating the button press mask and the 1-based mouse X and Y coordinates, all added to 0x20 (space).
It is an obscure scenario and probably requires a console with a character width and height above 256 (to control the full byte range), but it seems that this can in principle be used to simulate short keyboard inputs to programs (like bash) that are not expecting this old mouse protocol. - This sort of keypress-simulation is exactly why we created the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction for TIOCL_SETSEL in the first place.
For background on this mouse tracking mechanism, I had to read up on it myself, but found the following two links helpful:
https://invisible-island.net/xterm/ctlseqs/ctlseqs.html#h3-Normal-tracking-mode
https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/aix/7.2?topic=x-xterm-command#xterm__mouse
(Remark on the side, the GPM client library normally gets its mouse coordinates through a Unix Domain socket from the GPM daemon. It has support for this xterm emulation mode as well, but it is only enabled if $TERM starts with "xterm".)
In summary:
If it is not absolutely needed, I think it would be better to not permit access to TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT after all. It does not let attackers simulate keypresses quite as easily as the other features, but it does let them send such input with more limited control, and it seems like an unnecessary risk if the feature is not needed by anything but mouse daemons running as root, such as GPM and Consolation.
Does this seem reasonable? (Hanno, do you agree with this assessment?) I am by no means an expert in this terminal-mouse interaction, I am happy to stand corrected if I am wrong here.
–Günther
Re: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Quoted 7 lines · Günther Noack
Jared, can you please confirm whether Emacs works now with this patch in the kernel?
I am asking this because I realized that the patch had a bug. We are erring in the "secure" direction, but not all
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTinvocations work withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN.
I confirmed that Emacs worked fine with 6.14-rc1. My understanding is that the Emacs process relies only on TIOCL_SELPOINTER which it needs to do to draw the mouse pointer after Emacs' redisplay. It's fine for TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT to not work in an unpriviliged Emacs.
Quoted 2 lines
If this specific selection mode is not needed by Emacs, I think *the best thing would be to keep it guarded by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, after all*.
This sounds good to me.
Reading over a documentation proposal for TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT (https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/7/6/249), I can not imagine how a userspace program that was not acting as the mouse daemon could successfully use SELMOUSEREPORT as the mouse daemon will be fighting with it. Any legitimate setting of mouse state (for example, setting the mouse x/y coordinate) would need to be done with the mouse daemon in the loop, in which case the mouse daemon might as well send the message itself.
-- MJF
PATCH 1/1 tty: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all usages of TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT
This requirement was overeagerly loosened in commit 2f83e38a095f ("tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN"), but as it turns out,
(1) the logic I implemented there was inconsistent (apologies!),
(2) TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT might actually be a small security risk after all, and
(3) TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT is only meant to be used by the mouse daemon (GPM or Consolation), which runs as CAP_SYS_ADMIN already.
In more detail:
1. The previous patch has inconsistent logic:
In commit 2f83e38a095f ("tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN"), we checked for sel_mode == TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT, but overlooked that the lower four bits of this "mode" parameter were actually used as an additional way to pass an argument. So the patch did actually still require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, if any of the mouse button bits are set, but did not require it if none of the mouse buttons bits are set.
This logic is inconsistent and was not intentional. We should have the same policies for using TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT independent of the value of the "hidden" mouse button argument.
I sent a separate documentation patch to the man page list with more details on TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
2. TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT is indeed a potential security risk which can let an attacker simulate "keyboard" input to command line applications on the same terminal, like TIOCSTI and some other TIOCLINUX "selection mode" IOCTLs.
By enabling mouse reporting on a terminal and then injecting mouse reports through TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT, an attacker can simulate mouse movements on the same terminal, similar to the TIOCSTI keystroke injection attacks that were previously possible with TIOCSTI and other TIOCL_SETSEL selection modes.
Many programs (including libreadline/bash) are then prone to misinterpret these mouse reports as normal keyboard input because they do not expect input in the X11 mouse protocol form. The attacker does not have complete control over the escape sequence, but they can at least control the values of two consecutive bytes in the binary mouse reporting escape sequence.
I went into more detail on that in the discussion at
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
It is not equally trivial to simulate arbitrary keystrokes as it was with TIOCSTI (commit 83efeeeb3d04 ("tty: Allow TIOCSTI to be disabled")), but the general mechanism is there, and together with the small number of existing legit use cases (see below), it would be better to revert back to requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT, as it was already the case before commit 2f83e38a095f ("tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN").
3. TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT is only used by the mouse daemons (GPM or Consolation), and they are the only legit use case:
To quote console_codes(4):
The mouse tracking facility is intended to return xterm(1)-compatible mouse status reports. Because the console driver has no way to know the device or type of the mouse, these reports are returned in the console input stream only when the virtual terminal driver receives a mouse update ioctl. These ioctls must be generated by a mouse-aware user-mode application such as the gpm(8) daemon.
Jared Finder has also confirmed in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
that Emacs does not call TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT directly, and it would be difficult to find good reasons for doing that, given that it would interfere with the reports that GPM is sending.
More information on the interaction between GPM, terminals and the kernel with additional pointers is also available in this patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/a773e48920aa104a65073671effbdee665c105fc.1603963593.git.tammo.block@gmail.com/
For background on who else uses TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT: Debian Code search finds one page of results, the only two known callers are the two mouse daemons GPM and Consolation. (GPM does not show up in the search results because it uses literal numbers to refer to TIOCLINUX-related enums. I looked through GPM by hand instead. TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT is also not used from libgpm.)
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT
--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +2 -3
@@ -193,13 +193,12 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,return -EFAULT ;/* -* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to -* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR and TIOCL_SELPOINTER are OK to use without +* CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. */ switch (v.sel_mode) {case TIOCL_SELCLEAR :case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : -case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT :break ;default :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))
base-commit: 27102b38b8ca7ffb1622f27bcb41475d121fb67f
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Re: [PATCH] tty: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all usages of TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT
Quoted 4 lines · Günther Noack
This requirement was overeagerly loosened in commit
2f83e38a095f("tty: Permit someTIOCL_SETSELmodes withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN"), but as it turns out,
Quoted 8 lines
(1) the logic I implemented there was inconsistent (apologies!),
(2)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTmight actually be a small security risk after all, and(3)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTis only meant to be used by the mouse daemon (GPM or Consolation), which runs asCAP_SYS_ADMINalready.
Greg and Jared: Friendly ping on this patch.
Could you please have a look if you can find the time?
To maybe explain in an overview again why this is safe:
The TIOCLINUX ioctl has various subcommands (uapi/linux/tiocl.h), and one of these has in turn more subcommands. The structure is:
* TIOCLINUX, with "subcodes":
* TIOCL_SETSEL, with "selection modes":
* TIOCL_SELCHAR
* TIOCL_SELWORD
* TIOCL_SELLINE
* TIOCL_SELPOINTER
* TIOCL_SELCLEAR
* TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT
* TIOCL_PASTESEL
* TIOCL_SELLOADLUT
* ...
While securing TIOCLINUX, we restricted access to various subcommands with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but permitted different subcommands.
This table gives an overview of which TIOCL_SETSEL subcommands required CAP_SYS_ADMIN at which point in time:
point in time
TIOCL_SETSEL sel_mode | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 ----------------------|---|---|---|--- TIOCL_SELCHAR | | x | x | x TIOCL_SELWORD | | x | x | x TIOCL_SELLINE | | x | x | x TIOCL_SELPOINTER | | x | | TIOCL_SELCLEAR | | x | | TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT | | x | ? | x <-- This is the change
"x" means "requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
"?" means "inconsistently requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
The points in time are:
(0) before we required CAP_SYS_ADMIN on TIOCLINUX subcommands
(1) after commit 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")
(2) after commit 2f83e38a095f ("tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
")
(3) after this patch ("tty: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all usages of TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT")
This patch **reverts the behaviour for TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT back to what it was in phase (1)** after commit 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands"). We have double checked this in Emacs and GPM's source code earlier in this mail thread [1] and have confidence that this is better, because:
(a) TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT can maybe be abused after all,
(b) it is not required for Emacs as we thought in patch (2)
(c) the behavior I implemented in patch (2) was accidentally inconsistent
Again, apologies for the pointless back-and-forth on this fix, but it will be better after this iteration. I hope that this summary helps in the review. Please let me know if you have further questions.
Thanks,
–Günther
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH] tty: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all usages of TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT
Quoted 10 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 9 lines · Günther Noack
This requirement was overeagerly loosened in commit
2f83e38a095f("tty: Permit someTIOCL_SETSELmodes withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN"), but as it turns out,(1) the logic I implemented there was inconsistent (apologies!),
(2)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTmight actually be a small security risk after all, and
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
(3)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTis only meant to be used by the mouse daemon (GPM or Consolation), which runs asCAP_SYS_ADMINalready.Greg and Jared: Friendly ping on this patch.
I think my bot found a problem with the v2 version so I was waiting for a new one to meet the issues there, right?
Other than that I don't have a problem with this change.
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH] tty: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all usages of TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT
Hello Greg!
Quoted 16 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 15 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 12 lines · Günther Noack
This requirement was overeagerly loosened in commit
2f83e38a095f("tty: Permit someTIOCL_SETSELmodes withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN"), but as it turns out,(1) the logic I implemented there was inconsistent (apologies!),
(2)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTmight actually be a small security risk after all, and(3)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTis only meant to be used by the mouse daemon (GPM or Consolation), which runs asCAP_SYS_ADMINalready.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Greg and Jared: Friendly ping on this patch.
I think my bot found a problem with the v2 version so I was waiting for a new one to meet the issues there, right?
I made a submission mistake with the previous patch, which your bot tripped over, but you already merged it into master and stable as commit 2f83e38a095f ("tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN"):
https://lore.kernel.org/all/2025011205-spinout-rewrap-2dfa@gregkh/
The patch I am submitting here is a new bugfix on top, for which I am seeking your approval, since the previous patch is already merged. (I should have sent it as a new mail thread, I guess. :-/)
(If that helps, I explained the relationship between these different patches more visually in the table in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/.)
Thanks,
–Günther
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH] tty: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all usages of TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT
Quoted 30 lines · Günther Noack
Hello Greg!
Quoted 16 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 15 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 12 lines · Günther Noack
This requirement was overeagerly loosened in commit
2f83e38a095f("tty: Permit someTIOCL_SETSELmodes withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN"), but as it turns out,(1) the logic I implemented there was inconsistent (apologies!),
(2)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTmight actually be a small security risk after all, and(3)
TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTis only meant to be used by the mouse daemon (GPM or Consolation), which runs asCAP_SYS_ADMINalready.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Greg and Jared: Friendly ping on this patch.
I think my bot found a problem with the v2 version so I was waiting for a new one to meet the issues there, right?
I made a submission mistake with the previous patch, which your bot tripped over, but you already merged it into master and stable as commit
2f83e38a095f("tty: Permit someTIOCL_SETSELmodes withoutCAP_SYS_ADMIN"):
https://lore.kernel.org/all/2025011205-spinout-rewrap-2dfa@gregkh/
Quoted 7 lines
The patch I am submitting here is a new bugfix on top, for which I am seeking your approval, since the previous patch is already merged. (I should have sent it as a new mail thread, I guess. :-/)
(If that helps, I explained the relationship between these different patches more visually in the table in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/.)
Ok, I am totally lost. Ah, I see this patch now in my queue, it's in my "grab-bag" of patches to get to "last" as it wasn't cc: to the proper list (hint, use scripts/get_maintainer.pl, it would have shown you that the linux-serial list should have been cc:ed.)
So don't worry, it's not lost, just sitting next to a bunch of other patches I need to review "soon".
thanks,
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
In reply to Günther NoackQuoted 26 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>---
Changes in V2:* Removed comment in
vt.c(per Greg's suggestion)* CC'd stable@
* I *kept* the
CAP_SYS_ADMINcheck *after*copy_from_user(), with the reasoning that:
Quoted 7 lines
1. I do not see a good alternative to reorder the code here. We need the data from
copy_from_user()in order to know whether theCAP_SYS_ADMINcheck even needs to be performed.
2. A previousget_user()from an adjacent memory region already worked (making this a very unlikely failure)I would still appreciate a more formal Tested-by from Hanno (hint, hint) :)
This really is v3, as you sent a v2 last year, right?
b4 got really confused, but I think I figured it out. Whenever you resend, bump the version number please, otherwise it causes problems. Remember, some of use deal with thousands of patches a week...
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH] tty: Permit some TIOCL_SETSEL modes without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
In reply to Günther NoackFYI, I have tested this locally - it makes the mouse curser show up again in Emacs. (I do also believe that is it fine security-wise, but will also very happily add a Reviewed-By or Tested-By from Hanno or others in the next iteration :))
—Günther
Quoted 62 lines · Günther Noack
With this, processes without
CAP_SYS_ADMINare able to use TIOCLINUX with subcodeTIOCL_SETSEL, in the selection modesTIOCL_SETPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT.
TIOCL_SETSELwas previously changed to requireCAP_SYS_ADMIN, as this IOCTL let callers change the selection buffer and could be used to simulate keypresses. These threeTIOCL_SETSELselection modes, however, are safe to use, as they do not modify the selection buffer.This fixes a mouse support regression that affected Emacs (invisible mouse cursor).
Fixes 8d1b43f6a6df ("tty: Restrict access to TIOCLINUX' copy-and-paste subcommands")Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/vt/selection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/tty/vt/selection.c +14
-0@@ -192,6 +192,20 @@ int set_selection_user(const struct tiocl_selection __user *sel,if (copy_from_user (&v, sel,sizeof (*sel)))return -EFAULT ; +/* +* TIOCL_SELCLEAR, TIOCL_SELPOINTER and TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT are OK to +* use without CAP_SYS_ADMIN as they do not modify the selection. +*/ +switch (v.sel_mode) { +case TIOCL_SELCLEAR : +case TIOCL_SELPOINTER : +case TIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORT : +break ; +default : +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + } +return set_selection_kernel (&v, tty); }drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +1
-2@@ -3345,8 +3345,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)switch (type) {case TIOCL_SETSEL : -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EPERM ; +/* CAP_SYS_ADMIN check happens in set_selection_user(). */ return set_selection_user (param, tty);case TIOCL_PASTESEL :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))Signature · 1 line
2.47.1.613.gc27f4b7a9f-goog
Hello,
Quoted 7 lines · On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 14:53:27 +0100 "Günther Noack" <[email protected]> wrote:
Hanno, you are the original author of this patch and you have done a more detailed analysis on the TIOCLINUX problems than me -- do you agree that this weakened check would still be sufficient to protect against the TIOCLINUX problems? (Or in other words, if we permitted
TIOCL_SELPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTfor non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes, would you still see a way to misuse that functionality?)
Sorry for the late feedback.
I believe that this is correct, and permitting these functionalities still preserves the security fix. I also checked with Jakub Wilk, who was the original author of the exploit.
The patch you posted in the meantime[1] should be fine.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/[email protected]/T/#u
Signature · 2 lines
Hanno Böck https://hboeck.de/
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Hanno Böck
Hello,
Quoted 7 lines · On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 14:53:27 +0100 "Günther Noack" <[email protected]> wrote:
Hanno, you are the original author of this patch and you have done a more detailed analysis on the TIOCLINUX problems than me -- do you agree that this weakened check would still be sufficient to protect against the TIOCLINUX problems? (Or in other words, if we permitted
TIOCL_SELPOINTER,TIOCL_SELCLEARandTIOCL_SELMOUSEREPORTfor non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes, would you still see a way to misuse that functionality?)
Quoted 8 lines
Sorry for the late feedback.
I believe that this is correct, and permitting these functionalities still preserves the security fix. I also checked with Jakub Wilk, who was the original author of the exploit.
The patch you posted in the meantime[1] should be fine.https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/[email protected]/T/#u
Great, can you test that and if it works for you, provide a tested-by line?
thanks,
greg k-h