Expose Landlock domain IDs via pidfd
Subsystems (3)
Mickaël Salaün
maintainercover Expose Landlock domain IDs via pidfd
Hi,
Landlock enables users to create unprivileged nested security sandboxes (i.e. domains). Each of these domains get a unique ID, which is used to identify and compare different domains. With the audit support, these IDs will be used in logs, but users also need a way to map these IDs to processes and directly read domain IDs of arbitrary tasks.
pidfd is a reference to a task that enables users to interact with it and read some of its properties with the PIDFD_GET_INFO IOCTL. This patch series extend this interface with two new properties:PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAIN and PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN.
Being able to read tasks' domain IDs is useful for telemetry, debugging, and tests. It enables users:
- to know if a task is well sandboxed;
- to know which tasks are part of the same sandbox;
- to map Landlock audit logs to running processes.
Furthermore, thanks to recvmsg(2)'s SCM_PIDFD, it is also possible to reliably identify a peer's sandbox.
This patch series is based on the audit support patch series v5:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I'll talk about this feature at FOSDEM:
https://fosdem.org/2025/schedule/event/fosdem-2025-6071-sandbox-ids-with-landlock/
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (3):
landlock: Add landlock_read_domain_id()
pidfd: Extend PIDFD_GET_INFO with PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN samples/landlock: Print domain ID
fs/pidfs.c | 24 +++++++++++- include/linux/landlock.h | 26 +++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h | 4 ++ samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 29 +++++++++++++- security/landlock/Makefile | 12 ++++-- security/landlock/domain.c | 2 - security/landlock/domain.h | 8 ++-- security/landlock/ruleset.c | 2 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h
base-commit: a4b76d5e6800121372b88c85628a7867a5fdc707
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRFC PATCH 1/3 landlock: Add landlock_read_domain_id()
This public landlock_read_domain_id() helper will be used in the next commit by the PIDFD_GET_INFO IOCTL to read a task's domain ID.
A task is only allowed to get information about its nested domains.
Being able to read tasks' domain IDs is useful for telemetry, debugging, and tests. It enables users:
- to know if a task is well sandboxed;
- to know which tasks are part of the same sandbox;
- to map Landlock audit logs to running processes.
Future changes will leverage this feature to improve Landlock observability.
Landlock domain IDs are now always generated at domain creation time.
--- include/linux/landlock.h | 26 +++++++++++++ security/landlock/Makefile | 12 ++++-- security/landlock/domain.c | 2 - security/landlock/domain.h | 8 ++-- security/landlock/ruleset.c | 2 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h
include/linux/landlock.h new file +26 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* Landlock public helpers +* +* Copyright © 2025 Microsoft Corporation +*/ + +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK + +int landlock_read_domain_id (const struct cred *const cred, +struct task_struct *const task,const bool last, +u64 *const id); + +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ + +static inline int landlock_read_domain_id (const struct cred *const cred, +struct task_struct *const task, +const bool last,u64 *const id) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
security/landlock/Makefile +9 -3
@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o -landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ - cred.o task.o fs.o +landlock-y := \ + setup.o \ + syscalls.o \ + object.o \ + ruleset.o \ + cred.o \ + task.o \ + fs.o \ + id.o landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o landlock-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += \ - id.o \ audit.o \ domain.o
security/landlock/domain.c +0 -2
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@#include "common.h" #include "domain.h" #include "fs.h" -#include "id.h" #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -125,7 +124,6 @@ int landlock_init_hierarchy_log(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)return PTR_ERR (details); hierarchy->details = details; - hierarchy->id =landlock_get_id_range (1 ); hierarchy->log_status =LANDLOCK_LOG_PENDING ; hierarchy->quiet_subdomains = false; hierarchy->log_cross_exec = false;
security/landlock/domain.h +4 -4
@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ struct landlock_hierarchy {* Landlock domain. */ struct landlock_hierarchy *parent; +/** +* @id: Landlock domain ID, sets once at domain creation time. +*/ +u64 id;/** * @usage: Number of potential children domains plus their parent * domain.
@@ -96,10 +100,6 @@ struct landlock_hierarchy {* Masked (i.e. never logged) denials are still counted. */ atomic64_t num_denials; -/** -* @id: Landlock domain ID, sets once at domain creation time. -*/ -u64 id;/** * @details: Information about the related domain. */
security/landlock/ruleset.c +2 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include "access.h" #include "audit.h" #include "domain.h" +#include "id.h" #include "limits.h" #include "object.h" #include "ruleset.h"
@@ -576,6 +577,7 @@ landlock_merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,if (err)return ERR_PTR (err); + new_dom->hierarchy->id =landlock_get_id_range (1 );return no_free_ptr (new_dom); }
security/landlock/syscalls.c +75 -0
84 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRFC PATCH 2/3 pidfd: Extend PIDFD_GET_INFO with PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN
In reply to Mickaël SalaünBecause Landlock enables users to create nested sandboxes (i.e. domains), we might need to identify the domain with all restrictions (latest), or the domain we created (i.e. closest domain). Indeed, because any process can create its own domain, the latest domain may not be known by the requester.
The PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAIN flag enables user space to get the latest (i.e. most nested) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info's landlock_last_domain field according to the related mask.
The PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN flag enables user space to get the closest (i.e. first hierarchy relative to the pidfd's credentials) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info's landlock_first_domain field according to the related mask.
It is only allowed to get information about a Landlock domain if the task's domain that created the pidfd is a parent of the PID's domain. Following the object-capability model, the pidfd's credentials are used instead of the caller's credentials. This makes this command idenmpotent wrt the referenced process's state.
If Landlock is not supported or if access to this information is denied, then the IOCTL does not set the PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN flag in the returned mask.
If PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAIN or PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN is specified but the provided struct pidfd_info is not large enough to contain the related field, then -EINVAL is returned.
--- fs/pidfs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/pidfs.c +22 -2
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/time_namespace.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <linux/landlock.h> #include "internal.h" #include "mount.h"
@@ -207,7 +208,8 @@ static __poll_t pidfd_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pts)return poll_flags; } -static long pidfd_info (struct task_struct *task,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) +static long pidfd_info (const struct cred *cred,struct task_struct *task, +unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) {struct pidfd_info __user *uinfo = (struct pidfd_info __user *)arg;size_t usize =_IOC_SIZE (cmd);
@@ -227,6 +229,14 @@ static long pidfd_info(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int cmd, unsigned longif (copy_from_user (&mask, &uinfo->mask,sizeof (mask)))return -EFAULT ; +if ((mask &PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAIN ) && + usize <offsetofend (typeof (*uinfo), landlock_last_domain)) +return -EINVAL ; + +if ((mask &PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN ) && + usize <offsetofend (typeof (*uinfo), landlock_first_domain)) +return -EINVAL ; + c =get_task_cred (task);if (!c)return -ESRCH ;
@@ -253,6 +263,16 @@ static long pidfd_info(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int cmd, unsigned longrcu_read_unlock ();#endif +if ((mask &PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAIN ) && + !landlock_read_domain_id (cred, task, true, + &kinfo.landlock_last_domain)) + kinfo.mask |=PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAIN ; + +if ((mask &PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN ) && + !landlock_read_domain_id (cred, task, false, + &kinfo.landlock_first_domain)) + kinfo.mask |=PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN ; +/* * Copy pid/tgid last, to reduce the chances the information might be * stale. Note that it is not possible to ensure it will be valid as the
@@ -328,7 +348,7 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)/* Extensible IOCTL that does not open namespace FDs, take a shortcut */ if (_IOC_NR (cmd) ==_IOC_NR (PIDFD_GET_INFO )) -return pidfd_info (task, cmd, arg); +return pidfd_info (file->f_cred, task, cmd, arg);if (arg)return -EINVAL ;
include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h +4 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@#define PIDFD_INFO_PID (1UL << 0)/* Always returned, even if not requested */ #define PIDFD_INFO_CREDS (1UL << 1)/* Always returned, even if not requested */ #define PIDFD_INFO_CGROUPID (1UL << 2)/* Always returned if available, even if not requested */ +#define PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAIN (1UL << 3)/* Only returned if requested */ +#define PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN (1UL << 4)/* Only returned if requested */ #define PIDFD_INFO_SIZE_VER0 64/* sizeof first published struct */
@@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ struct pidfd_info {__u32 fsuid;__u32 fsgid;__u32 spare0[1 ]; +__u64 landlock_last_domain; +__u64 landlock_first_domain; };#define PIDFS_IOCTL_MAGIC 0xFF
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] pidfd: Extend PIDFD_GET_INFO with PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN
Quoted 39 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Because Landlock enables users to create nested sandboxes (i.e. domains), we might need to identify the domain with all restrictions (latest), or the domain we created (i.e. closest domain). Indeed, because any process can create its own domain, the latest domain may not be known by the requester.
The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the latest (i.e. most nested) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_last_domainfield according to the related mask.The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the closest (i.e. first hierarchy relative to the pidfd's credentials) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_first_domainfield according to the related mask.It is only allowed to get information about a Landlock domain if the task's domain that created the pidfd is a parent of the PID's domain. Following the object-capability model, the pidfd's credentials are used instead of the caller's credentials. This makes this command idenmpotent wrt the referenced process's state.
If Landlock is not supported or if access to this information is denied, then the IOCTL does not set the PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN flag in the returned mask.
If
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINorPIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINis specified but the provided structpidfd_infois not large enough to contain the related field, then-EINVALis returned.Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Günther Noack <[email protected]>Cc Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>Cc Praveen K Paladugu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
--- fs/pidfs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
While there are exceptions, mostly for legacy things, we try very hard to avoid having the kernel call directly into a specific LSM, preferring to use LSM interfaces, both so that all LSMs can benefit from the change and also so that we can avoid having a lot of very similar, but LSM-specific, calls in various parts in the kernel.
There is an effort, albeit a slowly moving effort due to interrupts, to add LSM support via a PIDFS_GET_SECURITY API:
I don't see any reason why we couldn't support Landlock's domain info as part of that, the lsm_ctx struct was created to support various different LSM contexts/attributes. You could either add multiple lsm_ctx array entries for Landlock, one for each of the domain IDs, or you could place all of the domain IDs in an expanded lsm_ctx. Remember the lsm_ctx->ctx field can hold binary blobs and/or you can expand past the end of lsm_ctx->ctx so long as lsm_ctx->{len,ctx_len} are set accordingly.
If you want to work on the PIDFS_GET_SECURITY patch(set) as a means to add Landlock domain ID support, I think that would be great. Luca provided a basic skeleton in the link above, and I expect you would have no issue adding the missing LSM bits.
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] pidfd: Extend PIDFD_GET_INFO with PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN
Quoted 45 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 39 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Because Landlock enables users to create nested sandboxes (i.e. domains), we might need to identify the domain with all restrictions (latest), or the domain we created (i.e. closest domain). Indeed, because any process can create its own domain, the latest domain may not be known by the requester.
The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the latest (i.e. most nested) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_last_domainfield according to the related mask.The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the closest (i.e. first hierarchy relative to the pidfd's credentials) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_first_domainfield according to the related mask.It is only allowed to get information about a Landlock domain if the task's domain that created the pidfd is a parent of the PID's domain. Following the object-capability model, the pidfd's credentials are used instead of the caller's credentials. This makes this command idenmpotent wrt the referenced process's state.
If Landlock is not supported or if access to this information is denied, then the IOCTL does not set the PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN flag in the returned mask.
If
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINorPIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINis specified but the provided structpidfd_infois not large enough to contain the related field, then-EINVALis returned.Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Günther Noack <[email protected]>Cc Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>Cc Praveen K Paladugu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>Quoted 4 lines
--- fs/pidfs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Quoted 5 lines
While there are exceptions, mostly for legacy things, we try very hard to avoid having the kernel call directly into a specific LSM, preferring to use LSM interfaces, both so that all LSMs can benefit from the change and also so that we can avoid having a lot of very similar, but LSM-specific, calls in various parts in the kernel.
Making life easier for LSMs by sharing common code is a good thing, but making life easier for all kernel components by sharing common code is even better. The PIDFD_GET_INFO IOCTL was design to be very flexible, and it follows the principle of "pay for what you request" thanks to the "mask" bitfield.
Users specify a set of properties they want, and the kernel returns these properties if they are supported and allowed. Each of this property is well-specified and has a clear semantic. This patch series implements two Landlock properties, each clearly identified and independent.
One important difference between the current LSMs attributes and these two new Landlock properties, is that the Landlock domain IDs are u64 values instead of strings. This makes the implementation quite forward and it fits well with how PIDFD_GET_INFO currently works, so there is no need for a new (PIDFD_GET_SECURITY) IOCTL handling complex data structure composing a set of strings such as what is required for current LSMs' attributes.
Quoted 5 lines
There is an effort, albeit a slowly moving effort due to interrupts, to add LSM support via a
PIDFS_GET_SECURITYAPI:
This effort is good, but it is a separate effort which is independent from this patch series. This will be useful for LSMs (or hopefully other parts of the kernel as well) that deal with string-based attributes.
Even with a common hook and data structure, any LSM need to implement their own attribute management. This patch series just makes a call to the Landlock implementation the same way UID, cgroupid, and other properties are retrieved. There is no need for a wrapper interface for simple data types that are already handled by PIDFD_GET_INFO.
Simple property types should all be queryable with the PIDFD_GET_INFO IOCTL (compared to a dedicated LSM's PIDFD_GET_SECURITY IOCTL), which can batch queries, making it more efficient and easier to implement for user space.
Quoted 18 lines
I don't see any reason why we couldn't support Landlock's domain info as part of that, the
lsm_ctxstruct was created to support various different LSM contexts/attributes. You could either add multiplelsm_ctxarray entries for Landlock, one for each of the domain IDs, or you could place all of the domain IDs in an expandedlsm_ctx. Remember thelsm_ctx->ctxfield can hold binary blobs and/or you can expand past the end oflsm_ctx->ctxso long as lsm_ctx->{len,ctx_len} are set accordingly.If you want to work on the
PIDFS_GET_SECURITYpatch(set) as a means to add Landlock domain ID support, I think that would be great. Luca provided a basic skeleton in the link above, and I expect you would have no issue adding the missing LSM bits.Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Christian Brauner
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] pidfd: Extend PIDFD_GET_INFO with PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN
Quoted 89 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 45 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 39 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Because Landlock enables users to create nested sandboxes (i.e. domains), we might need to identify the domain with all restrictions (latest), or the domain we created (i.e. closest domain). Indeed, because any process can create its own domain, the latest domain may not be known by the requester.
The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the latest (i.e. most nested) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_last_domainfield according to the related mask.The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the closest (i.e. first hierarchy relative to the pidfd's credentials) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_first_domainfield according to the related mask.It is only allowed to get information about a Landlock domain if the task's domain that created the pidfd is a parent of the PID's domain. Following the object-capability model, the pidfd's credentials are used instead of the caller's credentials. This makes this command idenmpotent wrt the referenced process's state.
If Landlock is not supported or if access to this information is denied, then the IOCTL does not set the PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN flag in the returned mask.
If
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINorPIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINis specified but the provided structpidfd_infois not large enough to contain the related field, then-EINVALis returned.Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Günther Noack <[email protected]>Cc Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>Cc Praveen K Paladugu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>Quoted 4 lines
--- fs/pidfs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Quoted 5 lines
While there are exceptions, mostly for legacy things, we try very hard to avoid having the kernel call directly into a specific LSM, preferring to use LSM interfaces, both so that all LSMs can benefit from the change and also so that we can avoid having a lot of very similar, but LSM-specific, calls in various parts in the kernel.
Making life easier for LSMs by sharing common code is a good thing, but making life easier for all kernel components by sharing common code is even better. The
PIDFD_GET_INFOIOCTL was design to be very flexible, and it follows the principle of "pay for what you request" thanks to the "mask" bitfield.Users specify a set of properties they want, and the kernel returns these properties if they are supported and allowed. Each of this property is well-specified and has a clear semantic. This patch series implements two Landlock properties, each clearly identified and independent.
One important difference between the current LSMs attributes and these two new Landlock properties, is that the Landlock domain IDs are u64 values instead of strings. This makes the implementation quite forward and it fits well with how
PIDFD_GET_INFOcurrently works, so there is no need for a new (PIDFD_GET_SECURITY) IOCTL handling complex data structure composing a set of strings such as what is required for current LSMs' attributes.Quoted 5 lines
There is an effort, albeit a slowly moving effort due to interrupts, to add LSM support via a
PIDFS_GET_SECURITYAPI:This effort is good, but it is a separate effort which is independent from this patch series. This will be useful for LSMs (or hopefully other parts of the kernel as well) that deal with string-based attributes.
Even with a common hook and data structure, any LSM need to implement their own attribute management. This patch series just makes a call to the Landlock implementation the same way UID, cgroupid, and other properties are retrieved. There is no need for a wrapper interface for simple data types that are already handled by
PIDFD_GET_INFO.
Quoted 4 lines
Simple property types should all be queryable with the
PIDFD_GET_INFOIOCTL (compared to a dedicated LSM'sPIDFD_GET_SECURITYIOCTL), which can batch queries, making it more efficient and easier to implement for user space.
Hm, I agree with Paul here. I'd rather see a unified PIDFD_GET_SECURITY ioctl rather than plumbing bits of some LSMs into PIDFD_GET_INFO directly. You can design the PIDFD_GET_SECURITY in a way that you can get properties such as the landlock ids without any string handling. There must be other security properties that don't want to be strings.
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] pidfd: Extend PIDFD_GET_INFO with PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN
In reply to Mickaël SalaünQuoted 64 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 45 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 39 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Because Landlock enables users to create nested sandboxes (i.e. domains), we might need to identify the domain with all restrictions (latest), or the domain we created (i.e. closest domain). Indeed, because any process can create its own domain, the latest domain may not be known by the requester.
The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the latest (i.e. most nested) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_last_domainfield according to the related mask.The
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINflag enables user space to get the closest (i.e. first hierarchy relative to the pidfd's credentials) Landlock domain ID related to a sandboxed task, if any. The domain ID is set in the pidfd_info'slandlock_first_domainfield according to the related mask.It is only allowed to get information about a Landlock domain if the task's domain that created the pidfd is a parent of the PID's domain. Following the object-capability model, the pidfd's credentials are used instead of the caller's credentials. This makes this command idenmpotent wrt the referenced process's state.
If Landlock is not supported or if access to this information is denied, then the IOCTL does not set the PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAIN flag in the returned mask.
If
PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINorPIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAINis specified but the provided structpidfd_infois not large enough to contain the related field, then-EINVALis returned.Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Günther Noack <[email protected]>Cc Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>Cc Praveen K Paladugu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>Quoted 4 lines
---
fs/pidfs.c| 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h| 4 ++++2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Quoted 5 lines
While there are exceptions, mostly for legacy things, we try very hard to avoid having the kernel call directly into a specific LSM, preferring to use LSM interfaces, both so that all LSMs can benefit from the change and also so that we can avoid having a lot of very similar, but LSM-specific, calls in various parts in the kernel.
Making life easier for LSMs by sharing common code is a good thing, but making life easier for all kernel components by sharing common code is even better. The
PIDFD_GET_INFOIOCTL was design to be very flexible, and it follows the principle of "pay for what you request" thanks to the "mask" bitfield.Users specify a set of properties they want, and the kernel returns these properties if they are supported and allowed. Each of this property is well-specified and has a clear semantic. This patch series implements two Landlock properties, each clearly identified and independent.
Quoted 7 lines
One important difference between the current LSMs attributes and these two new Landlock properties, is that the Landlock domain IDs are u64 values instead of strings. This makes the implementation quite forward and it fits well with how
PIDFD_GET_INFOcurrently works, so there is no need for a new (PIDFD_GET_SECURITY) IOCTL handling complex data structure composing a set of strings such as what is required for current LSMs' attributes.
Landlock is a LSM. Landlock properties *are* LSM properties/attributes, regardless of data types. Look at a lot of the recent work to support arbitrary types in the LSM syscalls as well the very recent work to start moving away from the rigid secctx/secid concepts within the kernel.
Landlock is a LSM and just as all the other LSMs integrate with other areas of the kernel through the LSM framework, so should Landlock. Instead of adding landlock_* calls in the kernel, you need to adding security_* calls, or better yet, finding ways to work with existing security_* calls.
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 5 lines
There is an effort, albeit a slowly moving effort due to interrupts, to add LSM support via a
PIDFS_GET_SECURITYAPI:This effort is good, but it is a separate effort which is independent from this patch series. This will be useful for LSMs (or hopefully other parts of the kernel as well) that deal with string-based attributes.
Even with a common hook and data structure, any LSM need to implement their own attribute management. This patch series just makes a call to the Landlock implementation the same way UID, cgroupid, and other properties are retrieved. There is no need for a wrapper interface for simple data types that are already handled by
PIDFD_GET_INFO.
Quoted 4 lines
Simple property types should all be queryable with the
PIDFD_GET_INFOIOCTL (compared to a dedicated LSM'sPIDFD_GET_SECURITYIOCTL), which can batch queries, making it more efficient and easier to implement for user space.
I don't disagree that including LSM info in the existing PID_GET_INFO API would be preferable, see my request at the 2024 LPC session on this as well as some discussions with Luca, but you will see that Christian has blocked this idea and forced us into a LSM specific API. It's not ideal in my opinion, but it is better than nothing or having to do our solution in the LSM space.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
I don't see any reason why we couldn't support Landlock's domain info as part of that, the
lsm_ctxstruct was created to support various different LSM contexts/attributes. You could either add multiplelsm_ctxarray entries for Landlock, one for each of the domain IDs, or you could place all of the domain IDs in an expandedlsm_ctx. Remember thelsm_ctx->ctxfield can hold binary blobs and/or you can expand past the end oflsm_ctx->ctxso long as lsm_ctx->{len,ctx_len} are set accordingly.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
If you want to work on the
PIDFS_GET_SECURITYpatch(set) as a means to add Landlock domain ID support, I think that would be great. Luca provided a basic skeleton in the link above, and I expect you would have no issue adding the missing LSM bits.
--
paul-moore.com
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRFC PATCH 3/3 samples/landlock: Print domain ID
In reply to Mickaël SalaünIf the PIDFD_GET_INFO IOCTL command and the related PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN flag are supported, print the newly created domain before launching the sandboxed program.
--- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c +27 -2
@@ -15,15 +15,20 @@#include <linux/landlock.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/socket.h> +#include <stdbool.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> -#include <stdbool.h> + +/* Avoids conflict with fcntl.h */ +#define _LINUX_FCNTL_H +#include <linux/pidfd.h> #ifndef landlock_create_ruleset static inline int
@@ -53,6 +58,11 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd, }#endif +static inline int sys_pidfd_open (const pid_t pid,const unsigned int flags) +{ +return syscall (__NR_pidfd_open, pid, flags); +} +#define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO"#define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
@@ -343,7 +353,7 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) {const char *cmd_path;char *const *cmd_argv; -int ruleset_fd, abi; +int ruleset_fd, abi, pidfd;char *env_port_name, *env_force_log;__u64 access_fs_ro =ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ , access_fs_rw =ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ |ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE ;
@@ -510,6 +520,9 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) goto err_close_ruleset; } +/* Opens our own pidfd before sandboxing, if supported. */ + pidfd =sys_pidfd_open (getpid (),0 ); +if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS ,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 )) {perror ("Failed to restrict privileges" ); goto err_close_ruleset;
@@ -520,6 +533,18 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) }close (ruleset_fd); +if (pidfd >=0 ) { +struct pidfd_info info = { + .mask =PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN , + }; + +if (!ioctl (pidfd,PIDFD_GET_INFO , &info) && + (info.mask &PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN )) { +fprintf (stderr,"Entered the Landlock domain %llx.\n" , + info.landlock_first_domain); + } + } + cmd_path = argv[1 ]; cmd_argv = argv +1 ;fprintf (stderr,"Executing the sandboxed command...\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerQuoted 19 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Hi,
Landlock enables users to create unprivileged nested security sandboxes (i.e. domains). Each of these domains get a unique ID, which is used to identify and compare different domains. With the audit support, these IDs will be used in logs, but users also need a way to map these IDs to processes and directly read domain IDs of arbitrary tasks.
pidfd is a reference to a task that enables users to interact with it and read some of its properties with the
PIDFD_GET_INFOIOCTL. This patch series extend this interface with two new properties:PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_LAST_DOMAINandPIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_FIRST_DOMAIN.Being able to read tasks' domain IDs is useful for telemetry, debugging, and tests. It enables users:
- to know if a task is well sandboxed;
- to know which tasks are part of the same sandbox;
- to map Landlock audit logs to running processes.
Quoted 5 lines
Furthermore, thanks to recvmsg(2)'s
SCM_PIDFD, it is also possible to reliably identify a peer's sandbox.This patch series is based on the audit support patch series v5:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
That was the v4, here is the v5:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Quoted 29 lines
I'll talk about this feature at FOSDEM:
https://fosdem.org/2025/schedule/event/fosdem-2025-6071-sandbox-ids-with-landlock/Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (3):
landlock: Addlandlock_read_domain_id()
pidfd: ExtendPIDFD_GET_INFOwith PIDFD_INFO_LANDLOCK_*_DOMAINsamples/landlock: Print domain IDfs/pidfs.c | 24 +++++++++++- include/linux/landlock.h | 26 +++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/pidfd.h | 4 ++ samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 29 +++++++++++++- security/landlock/Makefile | 12 ++++-- security/landlock/domain.c | 2 - security/landlock/domain.h | 8 ++-- security/landlock/ruleset.c | 2 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.hbase-commit:
a4b76d5e6800121372b88c85628a7867a5fdc707Signature · 1 line
2.48.1