KVM: SVM: Fix an STI shadow on VMRUN bug
Sean Christopherson
maintainerv2 cover KVM: SVM: Fix an STI shadow on VMRUN bug
Fix a bug where KVM puts VMRUN in an STI shadow, which AMD CPUs bleed into guest state if a #VMEXIT occurs before completing the VMRUN, e.g. if vectoring an injected exception triggers an exit.
v2: Use "raw" variants to avoid tracing in noinstr code. [kernel test robot]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Sean Christopherson (2):
KVM: SVM: Set RFLAGS.IF=1 in C code, to get VMRUN out of the STI
shadow
KVM: selftests: Assert that STI blocking isn't set after event
injection
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 10 +--------- .../selftests/kvm/x86/nested_exceptions_test.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
base-commit: fed48e2967f402f561d80075a20c5c9e16866e53
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 1/2 KVM: SVM: Set RFLAGS.IF=1 in C code, to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow
Enable/disable local IRQs, i.e. set/clear RFLAGS.IF, in the common svm_vcpu_enter_exit() just after/before guest_state_{enter,exit}_irqoff() so that VMRUN is not executed in an STI shadow. AMD CPUs have a quirk (some would say "bug"), where the STI shadow bleeds into the guest's intr_state field if a #VMEXIT occurs during injection of an event, i.e. if the VMRUN doesn't complete before the subsequent #VMEXIT.
The spurious "interrupts masked" state is relatively benign, as it only occurs during event injection and is transient. Because KVM is already injecting an event, the guest can't be in HLT, and if KVM is querying IRQ blocking for injection, then KVM would need to force an immediate exit anyways since injecting multiple events is impossible.
However, because KVM copies int_state verbatim from vmcb02 to vmcb12, the spurious STI shadow is visible to L1 when running a nested VM, which can trip sanity checks, e.g. in VMware's VMM.
Hoist the STI+CLI all the way to C code, as the aforementioned calls to guest_state_{enter,exit}_irqoff() already inform lockdep that IRQs are enabled/disabled, and taking a fault on VMRUN with RFLAGS.IF=1 is already possible. I.e. if there's kernel code that is confused by running with RFLAGS.IF=1, then it's already a problem. In practice, since GIF=0 also blocks NMIs, the only change in exposure to non-KVM code (relative to surrounding VMRUN with STI+CLI) is exception handling code, and except for the kvm_rebooting=1 case, all exception in the core VM-Enter/VM-Exit path are fatal.
Use the "raw" variants to enable/disable IRQs to avoid tracing in the "no instrumentation" code; the guest state helpers also take care of tracing IRQ state.
Oppurtunstically document why KVM needs to do STI in the first place.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 10 +--------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +14 -0
@@ -4189,6 +4189,18 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool spec_ctrl_inguest_state_enter_irqoff (); +/* +* Set RFLAGS.IF prior to VMRUN, as the host's RFLAGS.IF at the time of +* VMRUN controls whether or not physical IRQs are masked (KVM always +* runs with V_INTR_MASKING_MASK). Toggle RFLAGS.IF here to avoid the +* temptation to do STI+VMRUN+CLI, as AMD CPUs bleed the STI shadow +* into guest state if delivery of an event during VMRUN triggers a +* #VMEXIT, and the guest_state transitions already tell lockdep that +* IRQs are being enabled/disabled. Note! GIF=0 for the entirety of +* this path, so IRQs aren't actually unmasked while running host code. +*/ +raw_local_irq_enable (); +amd_clear_divider ();if (sev_es_guest (vcpu->kvm))
@@ -4197,6 +4209,8 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool spec_ctrl_inelse __svm_vcpu_run (svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted); +raw_local_irq_disable (); +guest_state_exit_irqoff (); }
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +1 -9
@@ -170,12 +170,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) mov VCPU_RDI(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_DI /* Enter guest mode */ - sti - 3: vmrun %_ASM_AX 4: - cli - /* Pop @svm to RAX while it's the only available register. */ pop %_ASM_AX
@@ -340,12 +336,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run) mov KVM_VMCB_pa(%rax), %rax /* Enter guest mode */ - sti - 1: vmrun %rax - -2: cli - +2: /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: SVM: Set RFLAGS.IF=1 in C code, to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow
Quoted 32 lines · Sean Christopherson
Enable/disable local IRQs, i.e. set/clear RFLAGS.IF, in the common
svm_vcpu_enter_exit()just after/before guest_state_{enter,exit}_irqoff() so that VMRUN is not executed in an STI shadow. AMD CPUs have a quirk (some would say "bug"), where the STI shadow bleeds into the guest'sintr_statefield if a #VMEXIT occurs during injection of an event, i.e. if the VMRUN doesn't complete before the subsequent #VMEXIT.The spurious "interrupts masked" state is relatively benign, as it only occurs during event injection and is transient. Because KVM is already injecting an event, the guest can't be in HLT, and if KVM is querying IRQ blocking for injection, then KVM would need to force an immediate exit anyways since injecting multiple events is impossible.
However, because KVM copies
int_stateverbatim from vmcb02 to vmcb12, the spurious STI shadow is visible to L1 when running a nested VM, which can trip sanity checks, e.g. in VMware's VMM.Hoist the STI+CLI all the way to C code, as the aforementioned calls to guest_state_{enter,exit}_irqoff() already inform lockdep that IRQs are enabled/disabled, and taking a fault on VMRUN with RFLAGS.IF=1 is already possible. I.e. if there's kernel code that is confused by running with RFLAGS.IF=1, then it's already a problem. In practice, since GIF=0 also blocks NMIs, the only change in exposure to non-KVM code (relative to surrounding VMRUN with STI+CLI) is exception handling code, and except for the kvm_rebooting=1 case, all exception in the core VM-Enter/VM-Exit path are fatal.
Use the "raw" variants to enable/disable IRQs to avoid tracing in the "no instrumentation" code; the guest state helpers also take care of tracing IRQ state.
Quoted 7 lines
Oppurtunstically document why KVM needs to do STI in the first place.
Reported-by Doug Covelli <[email protected]>Closes https://lore.kernel.org/all/CADH9ctBs1YPmE4aCfGPNBwA10cA8RuAk2gO7542DjMZgs4uzJQ@mail.gmail.com open hereFixes f14eec0a3203 ("KVM: SVM: move more vmentry code to assembly")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 2/2 KVM: selftests: Assert that STI blocking isn't set after event injection
In reply to Sean ChristophersonAdd an L1 (guest) assert to the nested exceptions test to verify that KVM doesn't put VMRUN in an STI shadow (AMD CPUs bleed the shadow into the guest's int_state if a #VMEXIT occurs before VMRUN fully completes).
Add a similar assert to the VMX side as well, because why not.
--- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_exceptions_test.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/nested_exceptions_test.c +2 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static void svm_run_l2(struct svm_test_data *svm, void *l2_code, int vector,GUEST_ASSERT_EQ (ctrl->exit_code, (SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + vector));GUEST_ASSERT_EQ (ctrl->exit_info_1, error_code); +GUEST_ASSERT (!ctrl->int_state); }static void l1_svm_code (struct svm_test_data *svm)
@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ static void vmx_run_l2(void *l2_code, int vector, uint32_t error_code)GUEST_ASSERT_EQ (vmreadz (VM_EXIT_REASON ),EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI );GUEST_ASSERT_EQ ((vmreadz (VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO ) &0xff ), vector);GUEST_ASSERT_EQ (vmreadz (VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE ), error_code); +GUEST_ASSERT (!vmreadz (GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO )); }static void l1_vmx_code (struct vmx_pages *vmx)
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: selftests: Assert that STI blocking isn't set after event injection
Quoted 8 lines · Sean Christopherson
Add an L1 (guest) assert to the nested exceptions test to verify that KVM doesn't put VMRUN in an STI shadow (AMD CPUs bleed the shadow into the guest's
int_stateif a #VMEXIT occurs before VMRUN fully completes).Add a similar assert to the VMX side as well, because why not.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Fix a bug where KVM puts VMRUN in an STI shadow, which AMD CPUs bleed into guest state if a #VMEXIT occurs before completing the VMRUN, e.g. if vectoring an injected exception triggers an exit.
v2: Use "raw" variants to avoid tracing in noinstr code. [kernel test robot]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[...]
Applied to kvm-x86 fixes, thanks!
[1/2] KVM: SVM: Set RFLAGS.IF=1 in C code, to get VMRUN out of the STI shadow
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/be45bc4eff33 [2/2] KVM: selftests: Assert that STI blocking isn't set after event injection https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/f3513a335e71