Initramfs-crypt-hook patches, encryption on update
cover Initramfs-crypt-hook patches, encryption on update
Hi,
I have a couple patches for initramfs-crypt-hook scripts. The first three are general fixes/cleanup patches and the last two are about enabling support for encryption via and update, while not touching the fallback system.
I also have a patch that makes the 'reencrypt' continue, if the power fails while it happens, but to do that, the initramfs needs to know the temporary password that was used after a reboot, which currently does not work with the random temporary passwords used here. My current solution is to use a static temporary password for the reencryption process. Any ideas?
kind regards,
Claudius
Claudius Heine (5):
initramfs-crypt-hook: make sure that mount path exists
initramfs-crypt-hook: fix inconsistent whitespace
initramfs-crypt-hook: use real device path in luksFormat case
initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
initramfs-crypt-hook: add 'format-if-empty' feature
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 4 +- .../files/local-bottom-complete | 1 + .../files/local-top-complete | 49 ++++++++++++++++--- .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 2 +- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
PATCH 1/5 initramfs-crypt-hook: make sure that mount path exists
In case the mount path does not exist, try to create it instead of failing.
--- .../initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-bottom-complete | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-bottom-complete +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ mount_partition() { partition_mountpoint=$2 [ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "mount device: '$partition_dev_path' to '$partition_mountpoint'" if ! mountpoint -q "${partition_mountpoint}"; then + mkdir -p "${partition_mountpoint}" if ! mount -t "$(get_fstype "${partition_dev_path}")" "${partition_dev_path}" \ "${partition_mountpoint}"; then panic "Can't mount partition '${partition_dev_path}'!"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Re: [PATCH 1/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: make sure that mount path exists
Quoted 3 lines · Claudius Heine
In case the mount path does not exist, try to create it instead of failing.
Please specify the "why" here. As you know, (almost) every commit message should cover that, and obvious ones do not even have to talk about how they do that.
Jan
Quoted 17 lines
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- .../initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-bottom-complete | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-bottom-complete +1
-0@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ mount_partition() { partition_mountpoint=$2 [ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "mount device: '$partition_dev_path' to '$partition_mountpoint'" if ! mountpoint -q "${partition_mountpoint}"; then + mkdir -p "${partition_mountpoint}" if ! mount -t "$(get_fstype "${partition_dev_path}")" "${partition_dev_path}" \ "${partition_mountpoint}"; then panic "Can't mount partition '${partition_dev_path}'!"
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
PATCH 2/5 initramfs-crypt-hook: fix inconsistent whitespace
In reply to Claudius Heine--- recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +1 -1
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do ;; *) panic "Unknown value ${partition_format}. Cannot create a encrypted partition !" - ;; + ;; esac finalize_tpm2_encryption "$part_device"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Jan Kiszka
AppliedRe: [PATCH 2/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: fix inconsistent whitespace
Quoted 10 lines · Claudius Heine
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 268
Quoted 8 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +1
-1@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do ;; *) panic "Unknown value ${partition_format}. Cannot create a encrypted partition !" - ;; + ;; esac finalize_tpm2_encryption "$part_device"
Thanks, applied already.
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
PATCH 3/5 initramfs-crypt-hook: use real device path in luksFormat case
In reply to Claudius HeineIn the 'format' case the $partition variable is used instead of $part_device, which is likely an error, because all other cases use $part_device.
$part_device is the real path to the block device, while $partition is the 'name' of the partition in the $PARITIONS variable, as defined in the recipe.
This fixes an inconsistency, it shouldn't be a bug here, but could result in bugs when this script is adapted in product layers, etc.
--- recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +1 -1
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do "format") log_begin_msg "Encryption of ${part_device}" /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode \ - --type luks2 "$partition" < "$tmp_key" + --type luks2 "$part_device" < "$tmp_key" enroll_tpm2_token "$part_device" "$tmp_key" "$tpm_device" "$tpm_key_algorithm" "$pcr_bank_hash_type" open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Re: [PATCH 3/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: use real device path in luksFormat case
Quoted 21 lines · Claudius Heine
In the 'format' case the
$partitionvariable is used instead of$part_device, which is likely an error, because all other cases use$part_device.
$part_deviceis the real path to the block device, while$partitionis the 'name' of the partition in the$PARITIONSvariable, as defined in the recipe.This fixes an inconsistency, it shouldn't be a bug here, but could result in bugs when this script is adapted in product layers, etc.
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 260
Quoted 8 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +1
-1@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do "format") log_begin_msg "Encryption of ${part_device}" /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode \ - --type luks2 "$partition" < "$tmp_key" + --type luks2 "$part_device" < "$tmp_key" enroll_tpm2_token "$part_device" "$tmp_key" "$tpm_device" "$tpm_key_algorithm" "$pcr_bank_hash_type" open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}"
This goes back to commit 98974a68ab9b, and there it is stated:
+ # clevis does not work with links in /dev/disk*
+ part_device=$(readlink -f "$partition")
So this really looks like a pure consistency cleanup (but a valid one). Right, Quirin?
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
Re: [PATCH 3/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: use real device path in luksFormat case
Quoted 36 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 21 lines · Claudius Heine
In the 'format' case the
$partitionvariable is used instead of$part_device, which is likely an error, because all other cases use$part_device.
$part_deviceis the real path to the block device, while$partitionis the 'name' of the partition in the$PARITIONSvariable, as defined in the recipe.This fixes an inconsistency, it shouldn't be a bug here, but could result in bugs when this script is adapted in product layers, etc.
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 260
Quoted 8 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +1
-1@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do "format") log_begin_msg "Encryption of ${part_device}" /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode \ - --type luks2 "$partition" < "$tmp_key" + --type luks2 "$part_device" < "$tmp_key" enroll_tpm2_token "$part_device" "$tmp_key" "$tpm_device" "$tpm_key_algorithm" "$pcr_bank_hash_type" open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}"This goes back to commit
98974a68ab9b, and there it is stated:(quoted diff) +2
-0+ # clevis does not work with links in /dev/disk* + part_device=$(readlink -f "$partition")
Quoted 2 lines
So this really looks like a pure consistency cleanup (but a valid one). Right, Quirin?
Yes.
Quirin
Quoted 3 lines
Jan
Jan Kiszka
AppliedRe: [PATCH 3/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: use real device path in luksFormat case
In reply to Claudius HeineQuoted 21 lines · Claudius Heine
In the 'format' case the
$partitionvariable is used instead of$part_device, which is likely an error, because all other cases use$part_device.
$part_deviceis the real path to the block device, while$partitionis the 'name' of the partition in the$PARITIONSvariable, as defined in the recipe.This fixes an inconsistency, it shouldn't be a bug here, but could result in bugs when this script is adapted in product layers, etc.
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 260
Quoted 8 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +1
-1@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do "format") log_begin_msg "Encryption of ${part_device}" /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode \ - --type luks2 "$partition" < "$tmp_key" + --type luks2 "$part_device" < "$tmp_key" enroll_tpm2_token "$part_device" "$tmp_key" "$tpm_device" "$tpm_key_algorithm" "$pcr_bank_hash_type" open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}"
Thanks, applied.
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
PATCH 4/5 initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
In reply to Claudius HeineIn case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the noencrypt hook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of the local-top-complete script.
--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 +- .../files/local-top-complete | 29 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2 -1
@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, it it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. This makes it possible for an image to support encrypted systems, while not encrypting anything on their own. Useful when updating from a system that is unencrypted to one that is, while supporting a fallback system. #### Encrypted root file system
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +24 -5
@@ -216,22 +216,41 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" - # check if we are trying to mount root - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf - fi if [ "$partition_expand" = "expand" ]; then expand_partition $part_device fi + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ | grep -q "luks2"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + continue fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] + then + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to plain partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$part_device" >/conf/param.conf + fi + + continue + fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Re: [PATCH 4/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Quoted 19 lines · Claudius Heine
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 +- .../files/local-top-complete | 29 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri · line 50
Quoted 10 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-1@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, it it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is.
"it it" -> "if it"
Quoted 2 lines
This makes it possible for an image to support encrypted systems, while not encrypting anything on their own. Useful when updating from a system that is unencrypted to one that is, while supporting a fallback system.
Please elaborate a bit more on how things are supposed to work this way, which scenarios should be addressed - and which not because they are inherently insecure.
Quoted 28 lines
#### Encrypted root file system
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +5
-5@@ -216,22 +216,41 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" - # check if we are trying to mount root - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf - fi if [ "$partition_expand" = "expand" ]; then expand_partition $part_device fi + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ | grep -q "luks2"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 241
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +7
-0+ echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + continue fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] + then + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to plain partition:
And this is exactly where all alarms go off: We should not promote the inherently insecure scenario of trying to post-mortem secure the rootfs via an in-field update to encryption unless it is backed by some integrity protection mechanism already (dm-verity in our case).
We may encrypt certain data partitions post deployment if data on it is not sensitive or is integrity-protected at application level. I don't see other scenarios here, in the official isar-cip-core layer because they are simply bad practice.
Quoted 5 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +5
-0+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$part_device" >/conf/param.conf + fi + + continue
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 256
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +7
-0+ fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
Re: [PATCH 4/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Hi Jan,
Quoted 33 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 19 lines · Claudius Heine
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 +- .../files/local-top-complete | 29 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri · line 50
Quoted 10 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-1@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, it it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is."it it" -> "if it"
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This makes it possible for an image to support encrypted systems, while not encrypting anything on their own. Useful when updating from a system that is unencrypted to one that is, while supporting a fallback system.
Please elaborate a bit more on how things are supposed to work this way, which scenarios should be addressed - and which not because they are inherently insecure.
Well. Switching in-field from an unencrypted system into an encrypted one is inherently insecure. I agree.
It seems security requirements have changed in an existing project and now they wanted to add encryption via an update afterwards.
If your decision is to NAK this feature, since it promotes insecure approaches, then I can understand.
The reason I submitted it here, is because it might be useful for others as well. Eventually encrypting systems is still better than leaving them unencrypted.
Quoted 45 lines
Quoted 29 lines
#### Encrypted root file system
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +5
-5@@ -216,22 +216,41 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" - # check if we are trying to mount root - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf - fi if [ "$partition_expand" = "expand" ]; then expand_partition $part_device fi + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ | grep -q "luks2"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; thenrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 241
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +7
-0+ echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + continue fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] + then + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to plain partition:And this is exactly where all alarms go off: We should not promote the inherently insecure scenario of trying to post-mortem secure the rootfs via an in-field update to encryption unless it is backed by some integrity protection mechanism already (dm-verity in our case).
Quoted 4 lines
We may encrypt certain data partitions post deployment if data on it is not sensitive or is integrity-protected at application level. I don't see other scenarios here, in the official isar-cip-core layer because they are simply bad practice.
I agree. Security requirements shouldn't just change after a product was released. But apparently that happened in the project where this feature was required.
Question here is about if cip-core is trying to deal with it pragmatically and support it, or if cip-core rather wants to demonstrate the best-practice security implementation.
I am fine with both options.
Thank you and kind regards,
Claudius
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 6 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +5
-0+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$part_device" >/conf/param.conf + fi + + continuerecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 256
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +7
-0+ fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &Jan
Signature · 3 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Erika Unter HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-54 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: [email protected]
Re: [PATCH 4/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Quoted 128 lines · Claudius Heine
Hi Jan,
Quoted 50 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 32 lines · Claudius Heine
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>---
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 +- .../files/local-top-complete | 29 +++++++++++++++----2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/ renamed from doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0README.tpm2.encryption.md
index 3f7e89f..515348a 100644doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the followingvariables which can be overwri
###CRYPT_PARTITIONS
The variableCRYPT_PARTITIONScontains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it.
-Each entry uses the schema<partition- identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>.
+Each entry uses the schema<partition- identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>.
- Thepartition-idenitiferis used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g./dev/sda.
- Themountpointis used mount the decrypted partition in theQuoted 8 lines
root file system
-reencryptusescryptsetup reencryptto encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount
-formatcreates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given inCRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD+-noencryptwill not try to encrypt the partition, it it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is."it it" -> "if it"
Quoted 5 lines
This makes it possible for an image to support encrypted systems, while not encrypting anything on their own. Useful when updating from a system that is unencrypted to one that is, while supporting a fallback system.
Quoted 3 lines
Please elaborate a bit more on how things are supposed to work this way, which scenarios should be addressed - and which not because they are inherently insecure.
Well. Switching in-field from an unencrypted system into an encrypted one is inherently insecure. I agree.
It seems security requirements have changed in an existing project and now they wanted to add encryption via an update afterwards.
If your decision is to NAK this feature, since it promotes insecure approaches, then I can understand.
The reason I submitted it here, is because it might be useful for others as well. Eventually encrypting systems is still better than leaving them unencrypted.
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 35 lines
#### Encrypted root file system
diff --git a/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local- top-complete b/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local- top-complete
index b907ea7..1214a63 100644recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -216,22 +216,41 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; doif [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then
panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!"
fi
- decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
- # check if we are trying to mount root
- if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
- echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
- fi
if [ "$partition_expand" = "expand" ]; thenexpand_partition$part_device
fi
+ # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition:
+ decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \
| grep -q "luks2"; then
open_tpm2_partition"$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device"
+
+ # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:
+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
+ echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi
+Quoted 8 lines
continue
fi
+ # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition:
+ if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ]
+ then
+ # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to plain partition:And this is exactly where all alarms go off: We should not promote the inherently insecure scenario of trying to post-mortem secure the rootfs via an in-field update to encryption unless it is backed by some integrity protection mechanism already (dm-verity in our case).
Quoted 4 lines
We may encrypt certain data partitions post deployment if data on it is not sensitive or is integrity-protected at application level. I don't see other scenarios here, in the official isar-cip-core layer because they are simply bad practice.
I agree. Security requirements shouldn't just change after a product was released. But apparently that happened in the project where this feature was required.
Quoted 6 lines
Question here is about if cip-core is trying to deal with it pragmatically and support it, or if cip-core rather wants to demonstrate the best-practice security implementation.
I am fine with both options.
Well, as I said, there can be scenarios where encryption could securely work. If we clearly describe them, I'm fine with adding features that are needed to support them - and by chance also scenarios that no one should use for security reasons.
But Quirin and I discussed further, and we have more questions regarding your approach and its robustness: Right now, it looks like that isar-cip-core cannot recover from a powercut in the middle of an unfinished encryption. We believe that your approach is equally affected. At the same time, the crypttools should be able to handle that. Maybe we should address that first before adding something that suggest it could provide a recoverable in-field encryption.
And please describe HOW all those features should be used. We might have guessed that wrongly why thinking about their shortcomings.
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
Re: [cip-dev] [PATCH 4/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
In reply to Claudius HeineQuoted 61 lines · Claudius Heine via lists.cip-project.org
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 +- .../files/local-top-complete | 29 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-1@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, it it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. This makes it possible for an image to support encrypted systems, while not encrypting anything on their own. Useful when updating from a system that is unencrypted to one that is, while supporting a fallback system. #### Encrypted root file systemrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +8
-5@@ -216,22 +216,41 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" - # check if we are trying to mount root - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf - fi if [ "$partition_expand" = "expand" ]; then expand_partition $part_device fi + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ | grep -q "luks2"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi +
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 244
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +7
-0continue fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] + then + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to plain partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$part_device" >/conf/param.conf + fi
Is this check really necessary? In case root is not encrypted the Root partition should be given by abrootfs/verity/cmdline ?
Quirin
Quoted 23 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +9
-1+ + continue + fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog & -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-Links: You receive all messages sent to this group.
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Re: [cip-dev] [PATCH 4/5] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Hi Quirin,
Quoted 69 lines · Quirin Gylstorff
Quoted 66 lines · Claudius Heine via lists.cip-project.org
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>---
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 +- .../files/local-top-complete | 29 +++++++++++++++----2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the followingvariables which can be overwri
###CRYPT_PARTITIONS
The variableCRYPT_PARTITIONScontains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it.
-Each entry uses the schema `<partition-
identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`.
+Each entry uses the schema `<partition-
identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`.
- Thepartition-idenitiferis used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g./dev/sda.
- Themountpointis used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system
-reencryptusescryptsetup reencryptto encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount
-formatcreates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given inCRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD
+-noencryptwill not try to encrypt the partition, it it isn't
encrypted already, but will open it if it is. This makes it possible for an image to support encrypted systems, while not encrypting anything on their own. Useful when updating from a system that is unencrypted to one that is, while supporting a fallback system. #### Encrypted root file systemrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -216,22 +216,41 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; doif [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then
panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi
- decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
- # check if we are trying to mount root
- if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
- echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
- fi
if [ "$partition_expand" = "expand" ]; then
expand_partition$part_device
fi
+ # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition:
+ decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \
| grep -q "luks2"; then
open_tpm2_partition"$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" +
+ # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:
+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
+ echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
+ fi
+
continue
fi
+ # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
+ if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ]
+ then
+ # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to plain partition:
+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
+ echo "ROOT=$part_device" >/conf/param.conf + fiIs this check really necessary? In case root is not encrypted the Root partition should be given by abrootfs/verity/cmdline ?
Good point.
Quoted 27 lines
Quirin
Quoted 24 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +5
-0+ + continue + fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decryptedpartition:
+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi
+# service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Erika Unter HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-54 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: [email protected]
PATCH 5/5 initramfs-crypt-hook: add 'format-if-empty' feature
In reply to Claudius HeineWhen encryption is enabled from one update to the next there is a difference between flashing a fresh factory image to a empty storage device, which contains an empty fallback partition set and updating it, where the fallback partition contains the actual fallback partitions.
In the update case, the update case, the fallback system should be left alone and unencrypted.
When doing a factory flash, the fallback partitions can be encrypted.
The best marker on in which case the system is booted is, if the partition is empty or not. The 'format-if-empty' option will format the partition with a luks format in case the first 10MiB are empty.
--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 ++- .../files/local-top-complete | 16 ++++++++++++++++ .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 2 +- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2 -1
@@ -42,12 +42,13 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt | format-if-empty>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` - `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, it it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. This makes it possible for an image to support encrypted systems, while not encrypting anything on their own. Useful when updating from a system that is unencrypted to one that is, while supporting a fallback system. +- `format-if-empty` will create a empty LUKS partition and formats it, like the `format` option, but only if the first 10MiB are empty (contain only 0x00). This makes it possible to differenciate if a partition is empty and can be encrypted, because it was freshly flashed via a factory image, or if it might contain an unencrypted fallback system and should be left alone. #### Encrypted root file system
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +16 -0
@@ -279,6 +279,22 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}" log_end_msg ;; + "format-if-empty") + # Check if first 10MiB contain only zeros + if cmp -s -n "$(( 10 * 1024 * 1024 ))" "${part_device}" /dev/zero + then + log_begin_msg "Encryption of ${part_device}" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode \ + --type luks2 "$part_device" < "$tmp_key" + enroll_tpm2_token "$part_device" "$tmp_key" "$tpm_device" "$tpm_key_algorithm" "$pcr_bank_hash_type" + open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}" + log_end_msg + else + # If not empty, leave it alone. + continue + fi + ;; *) panic "Unknown value ${partition_format}. Cannot create a encrypted partition !" ;;
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +1 -1
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ HOOK_COPY_EXECS = " \ openssl mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ - e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup \ + e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp \ tpm2_pcrread tpm2_testparms tpm2_flushcontext \ /usr/lib/*/libgcc_s.so.1"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5