KVM: VMX: Clean up EPT_VIOLATIONS_xxx #defines
Sean Christopherson
maintainerv2 cover KVM: VMX: Clean up EPT_VIOLATIONS_xxx #defines
Nikolay's patch[v1] to drop the ACC_*_BIT defines, plus another patch to add proper defines for the protection bits instead of piggybacking the RWX EPT entry defines.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Nikolay Borisov (1):
KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines
Sean Christopherson (1):
KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 +-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
base-commit: fed48e2967f402f561d80075a20c5c9e16866e53
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1.711.g2feabab25a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 1/2 KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines
From: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Those defines are only used in the definition of the various EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_* macros which are then used to extract respective bits from vmexit error qualifications. Remove the _BIT defines and redefine the _ACC ones via BIT() macro. No functional changes.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 15 +++++---------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +5 -10
@@ -580,18 +580,13 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {/* * Exit Qualifications for EPT Violations */ -#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ_BIT 0 -#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE_BIT 1 -#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR_BIT 2#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT 3 -#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID_BIT 7 -#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED_BIT 8 -#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ_BIT) -#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE_BIT) -#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR_BIT) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ BIT(0) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE BIT(1) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR BIT(2)#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK << EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT) -#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID_BIT) -#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED_BIT) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID BIT(7) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED BIT(8)/* * Exit Qualifications for NOTIFY VM EXIT
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1.711.g2feabab25a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH v2 2/2 KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDefine independent macros for the RWX protection bits that are enumerated via EXIT_QUALIFICATION for EPT Violations, and tie them to the RWX bits in EPT entries via compile-time asserts. Piggybacking the EPTE defines works for now, but it creates holes in the EPT_VIOLATION_xxx macros and will cause headaches if/when KVM emulates Mode-Based Execution (MBEC), or any other features that introduces additional protection information.
Opportunistically rename EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK to EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK so that it doesn't become stale if/when MBEC support is added.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 13 +++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 3 +-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +11 -2
@@ -580,14 +580,23 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {/* * Exit Qualifications for EPT Violations */ -#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT 3#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ BIT(0)#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE BIT(1)#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR BIT(2) -#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK << EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ BIT(3) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE BIT(4) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC BIT(5) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | \ + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \ + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC)#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID BIT(7)#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED BIT(8) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT (__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) << 3) + +static_assert (EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT (VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ) == + (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ |EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE |EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC )); +/* * Exit Qualifications for NOTIFY VM EXIT */
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +1 -2
@@ -510,8 +510,7 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,* Note, pte_access holds the raw RWX bits from the EPTE, not * ACC_*_MASK flags! */ - walker->fault.exit_qualification |= (pte_access &VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK ) << - EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT; + walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT(pte_access); }#endif walker->fault.address = addr;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
@@ -5821,7 +5821,7 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR ) ?PFERR_FETCH_MASK :0 ;/* ept page table entry is present? */ - error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK ) + error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK ) ?PFERR_PRESENT_MASK :0 ;if (error_code &EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID )
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1.711.g2feabab25a-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Define independent macros for the RWX protection bits that are enumerated via
EXIT_QUALIFICATIONfor EPT Violations, and tie them to the RWX bits in EPT entries via compile-time asserts. Piggybacking the EPTE defines works for now, but it creates holes in theEPT_VIOLATION_xxxmacros and will cause headaches if/when KVM emulates Mode-Based Execution (MBEC), or any other features that introduces additional protection information.
Quoted 8 lines
Opportunistically rename
EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASKtoEPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASKso that it doesn't become stale if/when MBEC support is added.No functional change intended.
Cc Jon Kohler <[email protected]>Cc Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits
Quoted 25 lines · Nikolay Borisov
!-------------------------------------------------------------------|
CAUTION: External Email|-------------------------------------------------------------------!
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Define independent macros for the RWX protection bits that are enumerated via
EXIT_QUALIFICATIONfor EPT Violations, and tie them to the RWX bits in EPT entries via compile-time asserts. Piggybacking the EPTE defines works for now, but it creates holes in theEPT_VIOLATION_xxxmacros and will cause headaches if/when KVM emulates Mode-Based Execution (MBEC), or any other features that introduces additional protection information. Opportunistically renameEPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASKtoEPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASKso that it doesn't become stale if/when MBEC support is added. No functional change intended.Quoted 3 lines
Cc Jon Kohler <[email protected]>Cc Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
LGTM, but any chance we could hold this until I get the MBEC RFC out? My apologies on the delay, I caught a terrible chest cold after we met about it, followed by a secondary case of strep! Just getting back into the grind now, so I need to rebase and send those out.
For anyone curious, the drafts are here:
https://github.com/JonKohler/linux/tree/mbec-rfc-v1-6.12
https://github.com/JonKohler/qemu/tree/mbec-rfc-v1
I need to incorporate some early off-list review comments and send it out properly, but in reference to this specific change, you can see how I approached it here:
https://github.com/JonKohler/linux/commit/0d2e82704ed3eb28c105967c8acd7907523ded5b
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits
Quoted 4 lines · Jon Kohler
Quoted 4 lines · Nikolay Borisov
!-------------------------------------------------------------------|
CAUTION: External Email
Noted. :-D
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
|-------------------------------------------------------------------!
Quoted 12 lines · Sean Christopherson
Define independent macros for the RWX protection bits that are enumerated via
EXIT_QUALIFICATIONfor EPT Violations, and tie them to the RWX bits in EPT entries via compile-time asserts. Piggybacking the EPTE defines works for now, but it creates holes in theEPT_VIOLATION_xxxmacros and will cause headaches if/when KVM emulates Mode-Based Execution (MBEC), or any other features that introduces additional protection information. Opportunistically renameEPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASKtoEPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASKso that it doesn't become stale if/when MBEC support is added. No functional change intended.Cc Jon Kohler <[email protected]>Cc Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>LGTM, but any chance we could hold this until I get the MBEC RFC out?
No? It's definitely landing before the MBEC support, and IOM it works quite nicely with the MBEC support (my diff at the bottom). I don't see any reason to delay or change this cleanup.
Quoted 2 lines
My apologies on the delay, I caught a terrible chest cold after we met about it, followed by a secondary case of strep!
Ow. Don't rush on behalf of upstream, KVM has lived without MBEC for a long time, it's not going anywhere.o
--- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 4 +++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +3 -1
@@ -587,9 +587,11 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ BIT(3)#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE BIT(4)#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC BIT(5) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC BIT(6)#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | \ EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \ - EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC) + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC | \ + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC)#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID BIT(7)#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED BIT(8)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +7 -2
@@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_access)(u64 gpte)unsigned access;#if PTTYPE ==PTTYPE_EPT access = ((gpte &VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK ) ?ACC_WRITE_MASK :0 ) | - ((gpte &VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK ) ?ACC_EXEC_MASK :0 ) | - ((gpte &VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK ) ?ACC_USER_MASK :0 ); + ((gpte &VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK ) ?ACC_EXEC_MASK :0 ) | + ((gpte &VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK ) ?ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK :0 ) | + ((gpte &VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK ) ?ACC_USER_MASK :0 );#else BUILD_BUG_ON (ACC_EXEC_MASK !=PT_PRESENT_MASK );BUILD_BUG_ON (ACC_EXEC_MASK !=1 );
@@ -511,6 +512,10 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,* ACC_*_MASK flags! */ walker->fault.exit_qualification |=EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT (pte_access); +/* This is also wrong.*/ +if (vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control && + (pte_access &VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK )) + walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC; }#endif walker->fault.address = addr;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7 -0
@@ -5806,6 +5806,13 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) exit_qualification =vmx_get_exit_qual (vcpu); +/* +* The USER_EXEC flag is undefined if MBEC is disabled. +* Note, this is wrong, MBEC should be a property of the MMU. +*/ +if (!vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control) + exit_qualification &= ~EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC ; +/* * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI, * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
base-commit: 67983df09fc3f96d0d6107fe1a99d29460bab481
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 4 lines · Jon Kohler
Quoted 4 lines · Nikolay Borisov
!-------------------------------------------------------------------|
CAUTION: External EmailNoted. :-D
Silly IT !
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
|-------------------------------------------------------------------!
Quoted 12 lines · Sean Christopherson
Define independent macros for the RWX protection bits that are enumerated via
EXIT_QUALIFICATIONfor EPT Violations, and tie them to the RWX bits in EPT entries via compile-time asserts. Piggybacking the EPTE defines works for now, but it creates holes in theEPT_VIOLATION_xxxmacros and will cause headaches if/when KVM emulates Mode-Based Execution (MBEC), or any other features that introduces additional protection information. Opportunistically renameEPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASKtoEPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASKso that it doesn't become stale if/when MBEC support is added. No functional change intended.Cc Jon Kohler <[email protected]>Cc Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>LGTM, but any chance we could hold this until I get the MBEC RFC out?
No? It's definitely landing before the MBEC support, and IOM it works quite nicely with the MBEC support (my diff at the bottom). I don't see any reason to delay or change this cleanup.
Ok no problem at all, happy to rebase on top of this when it lands.
Thanks for the suggestions on the diff, will give it a poke
Quoted 79 lines
Quoted 3 lines
My apologies on the delay, I caught a terrible chest cold after we met about it, followed by a secondary case of strep!
Ow. Don't rush on behalf of upstream, KVM has lived without MBEC for a long time, it's not going anywhere.o
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 4 +++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +3
-1@@ -587,9 +587,11 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ BIT(3)#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE BIT(4)#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC BIT(5) +#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC BIT(6)#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | \ EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \ - EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC) + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC | \ + EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC)#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID BIT(7)#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED BIT(8)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +0
-0@@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_access)(u64 gpte)unsigned access;#if PTTYPE ==PTTYPE_EPT access = ((gpte &
VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ?ACC_WRITE_MASK: 0) |
- ((gpte &VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ?ACC_EXEC_MASK: 0) |
- ((gpte &VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ?ACC_USER_MASK: 0);
+ ((gpte &VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ?ACC_EXEC_MASK: 0) |
+ ((gpte &VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ?ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK: 0) |
+ ((gpte &VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ?ACC_USER_MASK: 0); #elseBUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != PT_PRESENT_MASK);BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != 1);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +4
-0@@ -511,6 +512,10 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,* ACC_*_MASK flags! */ walker->fault.exit_qualification |=EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT (pte_access); +/* This is also wrong.*/ +if (vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control && + (pte_access &VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK )) + walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC; }#endif walker->fault.address = addr;arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0@@ -5806,6 +5806,13 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) exit_qualification =vmx_get_exit_qual (vcpu); +/* +* The USER_EXEC flag is undefined if MBEC is disabled. +* Note, this is wrong, MBEC should be a property of the MMU. +*/ +if (!vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control) + exit_qualification &= ~EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC ; +/* * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI, * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry. base-commit:
67983df09fc3f96d0d6107fe1a99d29460bab481
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits
Quoted 8 lines · Jon Kohler
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line
LGTM, but any chance we could hold this until I get the MBEC RFC out?
No? It's definitely landing before the MBEC support, and IOM it works quite nicely with the MBEC support (my diff at the bottom). I don't see any reason to delay or change this cleanup.
Ok no problem at all, happy to rebase on top of this when it lands.
FWIW, you don't have to wait for this to land to send your RFC. You could send your RFC as-is; obviously I'd point out the conflict, but (a) it's an RFC and
(b) generally it's not your responsibility to anticipate conflicts.
Alternatively, and probably better in this case, would be include these patches in your RFC, with a short message in the cover letter explaining their existence.
That said, I'm guessing I'll beat you to the punch and get this landed in kvm-x86 next before you send the RFC :-)
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Nikolay's patch[v1] to drop the ACC_*_BIT defines, plus another patch to add proper defines for the protection bits instead of piggybacking the RWX EPT entry defines.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Nikolay Borisov (1):
KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines[...]
Applied to kvm-x86 vmx, thanks!
[1/2] KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/fa6c8fc2d267 [2/2] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/61146f67e4cb