initramfs-crypt-hook patch
v3 cover initramfs-crypt-hook patch
Hi,
here is v3 of my patchset, I rebased this on the current next branch and fixed the review issues.
regards,
Claudius
Changes from v2:
- Rebase on current next
- Extended noencrypt documentation
- support clevis tokens for re-encryption recovery
Changes from v1:
- Added more descriptive commit message
- Added more descriptive documentation about noencrypt option
- Fixed typos in documentation
- removed unecessary setting of /conf/param.conf in initramfs-crypt-hook
- added re-encryption recovery patch
Claudius Heine (4):
initramfs-crypt-hook: make sure that mount path exists
initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
initramfs-crypt-hook: add 'format-if-empty' feature
initramfs-crypt-hook: add re-encryption recovery
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 23 +++++- .../files/local-bottom-complete | 1 + .../files/local-top-complete | 73 ++++++++++++++++--- .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 5 +- 4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.47.2
PATCH v3 1/4 initramfs-crypt-hook: make sure that mount path exists
Wherever or not the mount directory (and their parents) gets created seem to be inconsistent; mentioning a missing mount point in the /etc/fstab might cause the boot to fail, while using systemd .mount units will just create the mount point.
Wic creates missing mount points that where mentioned in the .wks file; so moving from such a setup to letting initramfs-crypt-hook mount the file system at boot inside the ramdisk, the mount would suddenly fail.
Therefore creating the mount point for your, if it doesn't exists seem to provide a smoother transition.
--- .../initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-bottom-complete | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-bottom-complete +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ mount_partition() { partition_mountpoint=$2 [ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "mount device: '$partition_dev_path' to '$partition_mountpoint'" if ! mountpoint -q "${partition_mountpoint}"; then + mkdir -p "${partition_mountpoint}" if ! mount -t "$(get_fstype "${partition_dev_path}")" "${partition_dev_path}" \ "${partition_mountpoint}"; then panic "Can't mount partition '${partition_dev_path}'!"
Signature · 1 line
2.47.2
PATCH v3 2/4 initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
In reply to Claudius HeineIn case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the noencrypt hook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of the local-top-complete script.
--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 22 ++++++++++++++++- .../files/local-top-complete | 24 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +21 -1
@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, if it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. See the section [Encrypting the shared partition via an update](#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update) for more information #### Encrypted root file system
@@ -58,6 +59,25 @@ The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf Both partitions are encrypted during first boot. The initramfs hook opens `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_A}` and `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_B}` during boot. +#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update + +With the following requirements, special handling is necessary: + +- A/B update scheme is used +- Both slots have a shared volume, that needs to be encrypted as well +- The system in field is currently unencrypted and encryption should be added via an update +- When the update failed, the fallback system needs to deal with an encrypted data partition + +If this case the fallback system needs to support an encrypted shared data partition, but would not encrypt it themselves. For this the `noencrypt` flag can be used. + +The data partition in the fallback system will have the `noencrypt` flag set, while the update system will set the flag to `reencrypt`, this will handle the following case, for example + +- Un-encrypted system on slot A is running, shared data partition has set `noencrypt` flag and is not encrypted +- Update for enabling encryption is applied to slot B, where the shared data partition has the `reencrypt` flag +- System reboots to slot B, encrypting the shared data partition +- Update fails at a later point and is not blessed, system reboots into the fallback system on slot A +- Fallback system now needs to be able to use the shared data partition + ### CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD The variable `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` contains the command to create a new file system on a newly
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +19 -5
@@ -240,18 +240,32 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" - # check if we are trying to mount root - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf - fi + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ | grep -q "luks2"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + continue fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] + then + continue + fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &
Signature · 1 line
2.47.2
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Quoted 19 lines · Claudius Heine
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 22 ++++++++++++++++- .../files/local-top-complete | 24 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri · line 50
Quoted 10 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-1@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, if it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. See the section [Encrypting the shared partition via an update](#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update) for more information
"...encrypt the partition if it isn't..." (not sure about the second comma as non-native speaker, though)
Quoted 7 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0#### Encrypted root file system@@ -58,6 +59,25 @@ The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf Both partitions are encrypted during first boot. The initramfs hook opens `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_A}` and `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_B}` during boot.
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf · line 71
Quoted 10 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +10
-0+#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update + +With the following requirements, special handling is necessary: + +- A/B update scheme is used +- Both slots have a shared volume, that needs to be encrypted as well +- The system in field is currently unencrypted and encryption should be added via an update +- When the update failed, the fallback system needs to deal with an encrypted data partition + +If this case the fallback system needs to support an encrypted shared data partition, but would not encrypt it themselves. For this the `noencrypt` flag can be used.
"In this case"? Sounds strange.
"themselves" - where is the plural coming from?
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf · line 79
Quoted 8 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +8
-0+ +The data partition in the fallback system will have the `noencrypt` flag set, while the update system will set the flag to `reencrypt`, this will handle the following case, for example + +- Un-encrypted system on slot A is running, shared data partition has set `noencrypt` flag and is not encrypted +- Update for enabling encryption is applied to slot B, where the shared data partition has the `reencrypt` flag +- System reboots to slot B, encrypting the shared data partition +- Update fails at a later point and is not blessed, system reboots into the fallback system on slot A +- Fallback system now needs to be able to use the shared data partition
Where do you describe the "format-if-empty" usage of patch 3? Seems that is an important element as well.
Quoted 36 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +1
-0+ ### CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD The variable `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` contains the command to create a new file system on a newlyrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +12
-5@@ -240,18 +240,32 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" - # check if we are trying to mount root - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf - fi + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ | grep -q "luks2"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + continue fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] + then + continue
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 271
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +7
-0+ fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Hi Jan,
Quoted 22 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 21 lines · Claudius Heine
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 22 ++++++++++++++++- .../files/local-top-complete | 24 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS
Quoted 11 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri · line 50
Quoted 8 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-1The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` +- `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, if it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. See the section [Encrypting the shared partition via an update](#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update) for more information"...encrypt the partition if it isn't..." (not sure about the second comma as non-native speaker, though)
fixed, thx.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0#### Encrypted root file system@@ -58,6 +59,25 @@ The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf Both partitions are encrypted during first boot. The initramfs hook opens `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_A}` and `${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_B}` during boot.
Quoted 12 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf · line 71
Quoted 10 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +10
-0+#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update + +With the following requirements, special handling is necessary: + +- A/B update scheme is used +- Both slots have a shared volume, that needs to be encrypted as well +- The system in field is currently unencrypted and encryption should be added via an update +- When the update failed, the fallback system needs to deal with an encrypted data partition + +If this case the fallback system needs to support an encrypted shared data partition, but would not encrypt it themselves. For this the `noencrypt` flag can be used."In this case"? Sounds strange.
fixed, thx.
Quoted 2 lines
"themselves" - where is the plural coming from?
There is the rule: "He, she, it; das S muss mit"
I went ahead and let languagetool decide, and it also wants there to be "themselves" instead of "themself", but just to be sure, I rewrote 'themselves' to 'on its own' there. (notice the s there as well :)
Quoted 12 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf · line 79
Quoted 9 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +8
-0+ +The data partition in the fallback system will have the `noencrypt` flag set, while the update system will set the flag to `reencrypt`, this will handle the following case, for example + +- Un-encrypted system on slot A is running, shared data partition has set `noencrypt` flag and is not encrypted +- Update for enabling encryption is applied to slot B, where the shared data partition has the `reencrypt` flag +- System reboots to slot B, encrypting the shared data partition +- Update fails at a later point and is not blessed, system reboots into the fallback system on slot A +- Fallback system now needs to be able to use the shared data partitionWhere do you describe the "format-if-empty" usage of patch 3? Seems that is an important element as well.
I will add a note there in the format-if-empty patch.
regards,
Claudius
Quoted 50 lines
Quoted 37 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +1
-0+ ### CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD The variable `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` contains the command to create a new file system on a newlyrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +12
-5@@ -240,18 +240,32 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do if [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!" fi - decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" - # check if we are trying to mount root - if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then - echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf - fi + # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: + decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ | grep -q "luks2"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + continue fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: + if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] + then + continuerecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 271
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +7
-0+ fi + + # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition: + if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then + echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi + # service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &Jan
Signature · 3 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Erika Unter HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-54 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: [email protected]
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Quoted 76 lines · Claudius Heine
Hi Jan,
Quoted 38 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 37 lines · Claudius Heine
In case encryption needs to be enabled via an update, while still allowing the update fall back to work. One update step where encryption is supported, but no reencryption is taking place if the device is not encrypted.
For this the
noencrypthook is implemented, which requires some restructure/reordering of thelocal-top-completescript.Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>---
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 22 ++++++++++++++++- .../files/local-top-complete | 24 +++++++++++++++----2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)doc/ renamed from doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0README.tpm2.encryption.md
index 3f7e89f..a97425c 100644doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +0
-0@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the followingvariables which can be overwri
###CRYPT_PARTITIONS
The variableCRYPT_PARTITIONScontains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it.
-Each entry uses the schema<partition- identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt or format>.
+Each entry uses the schema<partition- identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>.
- Thepartition-idenitiferis used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g./dev/sda.
- Themountpointis used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system
-reencryptusescryptsetup reencryptto encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount
-formatcreates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file systemQuoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
defined with the shell command given in
CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD+-noencryptwill not try to encrypt the partition, if it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. See the section [Encrypting the shared partition via an update](#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update) for more information"...encrypt the partition if it isn't..." (not sure about the second comma as non-native speaker, though)
fixed, thx.
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
#### Encrypted root file system
@@ -58,6 +59,25 @@ The mountpoint is empty as the root partition is mounted by a seperate initramf
Both partitions are encrypted during first boot. The initramfs hook opens${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_A}and${ABROOTFS_PART_UUID_B}during boot.
+#### Encrypting the shared partition via an updatedoc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +6
-0+ +With the following requirements, special handling is necessary: + +- A/B update scheme is used +- Both slots have a shared volume, that needs to be encrypted as well +- The system in field is currently unencrypted and encryption shouldbe added via an update
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
+- When the update failed, the fallback system needs to deal with an encrypted data partition
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-0+ +If this case the fallback system needs to support an encryptedshared data partition, but would not encrypt it themselves. For this the
noencryptflag can be used."In this case"? Sounds strange.
Quoted 7 lines
fixed, thx.
Quoted 2 lines
"themselves" - where is the plural coming from?
There is the rule: "He, she, it; das S muss mit"
"the fallback system... would not encrypt it itself" - it's only one fallback system from my reading of the sentence.
Jan
Quoted 84 lines
I went ahead and let languagetool decide, and it also wants there to be "themselves" instead of "themself", but just to be sure, I rewrote 'themselves' to 'on its own' there. (notice the s there as well :)
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 10 lines
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-0+ +The data partition in the fallback system will have the `noencrypt`flag set, while the update system will set the flag to
reencrypt, this will handle the following case, for example
+
+- Un-encrypted system on slot A is running, shared data partition has setnoencryptflag and is not encrypted
+- Update for enabling encryption is applied to slot B, where the shared data partition has thereencryptflagQuoted 4 lines
+- System reboots to slot B, encrypting the shared data partition +- Update fails at a later point and is not blessed, system rebootsinto the fallback system on slot A
+- Fallback system now needs to be able to use the shared data partitionWhere do you describe the "format-if-empty" usage of patch 3? Seems that is an important element as well.
I will add a note there in the format-if-empty patch.
regards,
ClaudiusQuoted 56 lines
Quoted 50 lines
+
###CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD
The variableCRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMDcontains the command to create a new file system on a newly(quoted diff) +0
-0complete b/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top- complete
index cf49e63..1ef784d 100644recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -240,18 +240,32 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; doif [ ! -e "$part_device" ]; then
panic "Could not find device mapped to '$partition' cannot be encrypted!"
fi
- decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
- # check if we are trying to mount root
- if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
- echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
- fi
+ # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition:
+ decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \
| grep -q "luks2"; then
open_tpm2_partition"$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device"
+
+ # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:
+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
+ echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf + fi
+
continue
fi
+ # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition:
+ if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ]
+ then
+ continue
+ fi
+
+ # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:
+ if [ "$partition_mountpoint" = "/" ]; then
+ echo "ROOT=$decrypted_part" >/conf/param.conf
+ fi
+Quoted 3 lines
# service watchdog in the background during lengthy re-encryption if [ -z "$watchdog_pid" ]; then service_watchdog &Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: implement 'noencrypt' option
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
"themselves" - where is the plural coming from?
There is the rule: "He, she, it; das S muss mit"
"the fallback system... would not encrypt it itself" - it's only one fallback system from my reading of the sentence.
They/them is not necessarily plural, but as I said, I changed it to on its own, for the next version.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singular_they
Signature · 3 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Erika Unter HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-54 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: [email protected]
PATCH v3 3/4 initramfs-crypt-hook: add 'format-if-empty' feature
In reply to Claudius HeineWhen encryption is enabled from one update to the next there is a difference between flashing a fresh factory image to a empty storage device, which contains an empty fallback partition set and updating it, where the fallback partition contains the actual fallback partitions.
In the update case, the update case, the fallback system should be left alone and unencrypted.
When doing a factory flash, the fallback partitions can be encrypted.
The best marker on in which case the system is booted is, if the partition is empty or not. The 'format-if-empty' option will format the partition with a luks format in case the first 10MiB are empty.
--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 ++- .../files/local-top-complete | 16 ++++++++++++++++ .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 2 +- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2 -1
@@ -42,12 +42,13 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt | format-if-empty>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` - `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, if it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. See the section [Encrypting the shared partition via an update](#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update) for more information +- `format-if-empty` will create a empty LUKS partition and formats it, like the `format` option, but only if the first 10MiB are empty (contain only 0x00). This makes it possible to differentiate if a partition is empty and can be encrypted, because it was freshly flashed via a factory image, or if it might contain an unencrypted fallback system and should be left alone. #### Encrypted root file system
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +16 -0
@@ -294,6 +294,22 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}" log_end_msg ;; + "format-if-empty") + # Check if first 10MiB contain only zeros + if cmp -s -n "$(( 10 * 1024 * 1024 ))" "${part_device}" /dev/zero + then + log_begin_msg "Encryption of ${part_device}" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode \ + --type luks2 "$part_device" < "$tmp_key" + enroll_tpm2_token "$part_device" "$tmp_key" "$tpm_device" "$tpm_key_algorithm" "$pcr_bank_hash_type" + open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}" + log_end_msg + else + # If not empty, leave it alone. + continue + fi + ;; *) panic "Unknown value ${partition_format}. Cannot create a encrypted partition !" ;;
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +1 -1
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ HOOK_COPY_EXECS = " \ openssl mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ - e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup \ + e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp \ tpm2_pcrread tpm2_testparms tpm2_flushcontext \ /usr/lib/*/libgcc_s.so.1"
Signature · 1 line
2.47.2
Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: add 'format-if-empty' feature
Quoted 7 lines · Claudius Heine
When encryption is enabled from one update to the next there is a difference between flashing a fresh factory image to a empty storage device, which contains an empty fallback partition set and updating it, where the fallback partition contains the actual fallback partitions.
In the update case, the update case, the fallback system should be left alone and unencrypted.
Please re-read the sentence and fix it.
So, we are talking about encrypting the a/b rootfs partitions here, right? Then please also explain WHY we should not start encrypting both partitions. What is the difference to having to continue with encrypting the single data partition after a rollback?
I guess encrypting both would be against our principle to not touch the working partition set on an a/b update. Please make that clear. If there is more, please write it up.
Quoted 4 lines
When doing a factory flash, the fallback partitions can be encrypted.
The best marker on in which case the system is booted is, if the
Please re-read the sentence and fix it.
Quoted 34 lines
partition is empty or not. The 'format-if-empty' option will format the partition with a luks format in case the first 10MiB are empty.
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md | 3 ++- .../files/local-top-complete | 16 ++++++++++++++++ .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 2 +- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)doc/README.tpm2.encryption.md +2
-1@@ -42,12 +42,13 @@ The initramfs-crypt-hook recipe has the following variables which can be overwri ### CRYPT_PARTITIONS The variable `CRYPT_PARTITIONS` contains the information which partition shall be encrypted where to mount it. -Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt>`. +Each entry uses the schema `<partition-identifier>:<mountpoint>:<reencrypt | format | noencrypt | format-if-empty>`. - The `partition-idenitifer` is used to identify the partition on the disk, it can contain a partition label, partition UUID or absolute path to the partition device, e.g. `/dev/sda`. - The `mountpoint` is used mount the decrypted partition in the root file system - `reencrypt` uses `cryptsetup reencrypt` to encrypt the exiting content of the partition. This reduces the partition by 32MB and the file system by a similar amount - `format` creates a empty LUKS partition and creates a file system defined with the shell command given in `CRYPT_CREATE_FILE_SYSTEM_CMD` - `noencrypt` will not try to encrypt the partition, if it isn't encrypted already, but will open it if it is. See the section [Encrypting the shared partition via an update](#### Encrypting the shared partition via an update) for more information +- `format-if-empty` will create a empty LUKS partition and formats it, like the `format` option, but only if the first 10MiB are empty (contain only 0x00). This makes it possible to differentiate if a partition is empty and can be encrypted, because it was freshly flashed via a factory image, or if it might contain an unencrypted fallback system and should be left alone. #### Encrypted root file systemrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 300
Quoted 7 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +4
-0@@ -294,6 +294,22 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}" log_end_msg ;; + "format-if-empty") + # Check if first 10MiB contain only zeros + if cmp -s -n "$(( 10 * 1024 * 1024 ))" "${part_device}" /dev/zero + then
if ...; then
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 304
Quoted 4 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +4
-0+ log_begin_msg "Encryption of ${part_device}" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksFormat --batch-mode \ + --type luks2 "$part_device" < "$tmp_key" + enroll_tpm2_token "$part_device" "$tmp_key" "$tpm_device" "$tpm_key_algorithm" "$pcr_bank_hash_type"
Please re-wrap that line into two, it's getting too long.
Quoted 16 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +8
-0+ open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" + eval "${create_file_system_cmd} ${decrypted_part}" + log_end_msg + else + # If not empty, leave it alone. + continue + fi + ;; *) panic "Unknown value ${partition_format}. Cannot create a encrypted partition !" ;;recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +0
-0
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ · line 47
Quoted 8 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +1
-1@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ HOOK_COPY_EXECS = " \ openssl mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ - e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup \ + e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp \ tpm2_pcrread tpm2_testparms tpm2_flushcontext \ /usr/lib/*/libgcc_s.so.1"
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
PATCH v3 4/4 initramfs-crypt-hook: add re-encryption recovery
In reply to Claudius HeineIntegrate detection and recovery of power failures while a partition is being encrypted.
There are possible scenarios:
1. Power-fail happens while the partition is reencrypted:
- The LUKS header contains online-reencrypt-v2 and needs to be repaired with cryptsetup repair before it can continue.
- Also no resizing of the file system is necessary
2. Power-fail happens before the systemd-tpm2/clevis token can be installed
- The LUKS header does not contain 'systemd-tpm2'/'clevis', thus it needs to be registered and the temporary encryption key needs to be removed
In both scenarios the system after the reboot needs to have access to the temporary encryption key that was initially used. So using a random one, generated via openssl rand is not possible. Since it is only a temporary key and gets removed after the systemd-tpm2/clevis token was installed, a known password can be used.
The list of these scenarios is not complete, there might be other instances where a sudden power-fail could be fatal to the system, but these where the most obvious and risky ones.
--- .../files/local-top-complete | 33 +++++++++++++++---- .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 5 ++- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +27 -6
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { reduced_size="$(expr "$part_size_blocks" - 65536 )" reduced_size_in_byte="$(expr "$reduced_size" \* 512)" reduced_size_in_kb="$(expr "$reduced_size_in_byte" / 1024)K" + + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="--reduce-device-size ${reduce_device_size}k" + case $partition_fstype in ext*) # reduce the filesystem and partition by 32M to fit the LUKS header
@@ -90,14 +93,25 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { squashfs|swap|erofs|"") [ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "skip disk resize as it is not supported or unnecessary for fstype: '$partition_fstype'" ;; + luks) + # Check if reencrypt was aborted + if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$1" \ + | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup repair --batch-mode "$1" < "$2" || \ + panic "cryptsetup repair was not successful" + fi + + # already luks partition, don't resize + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="" + ;; *) panic "cannot resize partition, unsupported fstype: '$partition_fstype'" ;; esac if [ -x /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt ]; then - /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt --new --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt --new ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2" else - /usr/sbin/cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2" fi }
@@ -244,7 +258,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ - | grep -q "luks2"; then + | grep -q "systemd-tpm2\|clevis"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:
@@ -255,6 +269,12 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do continue fi + # If partition contains an aborted reencrypt luks header, switch to reencrypt mode: + if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "${part_device}" \ + | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then + partition_format="reencrypt" + fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] then
@@ -272,10 +292,11 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do watchdog_pid=$! fi - # create random password for initial encryption - # this will be dropped after reboot + # use partuuid of the partition for initial encryption password, this key + # will be removed after the reencryption has finished and the TPM2 token is + # registered: tmp_key=/tmp/"$(basename "$part_device")-lukskey" - openssl rand -base64 32 > "$tmp_key" + lsblk -no partuuid "$part_device" > "$tmp_key" case "${partition_format}" in "reencrypt")
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +2 -3
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ require recipes-initramfs/initramfs-hook/hook.inc DEBIAN_DEPENDS .= ", \ cryptsetup, \ awk, \ - openssl, \ e2fsprogs, \ tpm2-tools, \ coreutils, \
@@ -40,8 +39,8 @@ HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ ecb aes_generic xts" HOOK_COPY_EXECS = " \ - openssl mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ - e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp \ + mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ + e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp lsblk \ tpm2_pcrread tpm2_testparms tpm2_flushcontext \ /usr/lib/*/libgcc_s.so.1"
Signature · 1 line
2.47.2
Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: add re-encryption recovery
Quoted 3 lines · Claudius Heine
Integrate detection and recovery of power failures while a partition is being encrypted.
Why is this at the end of the series? It can already help the existing implementation during encrypt-on-first-boot.
Quoted 16 lines
There are possible scenarios:
1. Power-fail happens while the partition is reencrypted:
- The LUKS header containsonline-reencrypt-v2and needs to be repaired withcryptsetup repairbefore it can continue.
- Also no resizing of the file system is necessary
2. Power-fail happens before the systemd-tpm2/clevis token can be installed
- The LUKS header does not contain 'systemd-tpm2'/'clevis', thus it needs to be registered and the temporary encryption key needs to be removedIn both scenarios the system after the reboot needs to have access to the temporary encryption key that was initially used. So using a random one, generated via
openssl randis not possible. Since it is only a temporary key and gets removed after the systemd-tpm2/clevis token was installed, a known password can be used.
Quoted 3 lines
The list of these scenarios is not complete, there might be other instances where a sudden power-fail could be fatal to the system, but these where the most obvious and risky ones.
For recovery of the first boot, this might be enough. But when proposing this for in-field recovery, we should be stricter with thinking the details through. If we fix them, immediately or later (or never if unfixable) is on a different page.
Quoted 73 lines
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- .../files/local-top-complete | 33 +++++++++++++++---- .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 5 ++- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +23
-3@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { reduced_size="$(expr "$part_size_blocks" - 65536 )" reduced_size_in_byte="$(expr "$reduced_size" \* 512)" reduced_size_in_kb="$(expr "$reduced_size_in_byte" / 1024)K" + + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="--reduce-device-size ${reduce_device_size}k" + case $partition_fstype in ext*) # reduce the filesystem and partition by 32M to fit the LUKS header@@ -90,14 +93,25 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { squashfs|swap|erofs|"") [ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "skip disk resize as it is not supported or unnecessary for fstype: '$partition_fstype'" ;; + luks) + # Check if reencrypt was aborted + if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$1" \ + | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup repair --batch-mode "$1" < "$2" || \ + panic "cryptsetup repair was not successful" + fi + + # already luks partition, don't resize + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="" + ;; *) panic "cannot resize partition, unsupported fstype: '$partition_fstype'" ;; esac if [ -x /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt ]; then - /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt --new --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt --new ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2" else - /usr/sbin/cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2" fi }@@ -244,7 +258,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ - | grep -q "luks2"; then + | grep -q "systemd-tpm2\|clevis"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:@@ -255,6 +269,12 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do continue fi + # If partition contains an aborted reencrypt luks header, switch to reencrypt mode: + if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "${part_device}" \ + | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then + partition_format="reencrypt" + fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] then@@ -272,10 +292,11 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do watchdog_pid=$!
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 299
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +4
-3fi - # create random password for initial encryption - # this will be dropped after reboot + # use partuuid of the partition for initial encryption password, this key + # will be removed after the reencryption has finished and the TPM2 token is + # registered: tmp_key=/tmp/"$(basename "$part_device")-lukskey" - openssl rand -base64 32 > "$tmp_key" + lsblk -no partuuid "$part_device" > "$tmp_key"
This should be factored out into a separate commit. I don't disagree about it, it just deserves an own, clear reasoning. Without recovery, it looks to me like a nice size optimization for the initramfs by dropping the openssl dependency.
Quoted 16 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0case "${partition_format}" in "reencrypt")recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +0
-1@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ require recipes-initramfs/initramfs-hook/hook.inc DEBIAN_DEPENDS .= ", \ cryptsetup, \ awk, \ - openssl, \ e2fsprogs, \ tpm2-tools, \ coreutils, \
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ · line 46
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +2
-2@@ -40,8 +39,8 @@ HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ ecb aes_generic xts" HOOK_COPY_EXECS = " \ - openssl mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ - e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp \ + mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ + e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp lsblk \ tpm2_pcrread tpm2_testparms tpm2_flushcontext \ /usr/lib/*/libgcc_s.so.1"
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: add re-encryption recovery
Quoted 108 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 3 lines · Claudius Heine
Integrate detection and recovery of power failures while a partition is being encrypted.
Why is this at the end of the series? It can already help the existing implementation during encrypt-on-first-boot.
Quoted 16 lines
There are possible scenarios:
1. Power-fail happens while the partition is reencrypted:
- The LUKS header containsonline-reencrypt-v2and needs to be repaired withcryptsetup repairbefore it can continue.
- Also no resizing of the file system is necessary
2. Power-fail happens before the systemd-tpm2/clevis token can be installed
- The LUKS header does not contain 'systemd-tpm2'/'clevis', thus it needs to be registered and the temporary encryption key needs to be removedIn both scenarios the system after the reboot needs to have access to the temporary encryption key that was initially used. So using a random one, generated via
openssl randis not possible. Since it is only a temporary key and gets removed after the systemd-tpm2/clevis token was installed, a known password can be used.Quoted 3 lines
The list of these scenarios is not complete, there might be other instances where a sudden power-fail could be fatal to the system, but these where the most obvious and risky ones.
For recovery of the first boot, this might be enough. But when proposing this for in-field recovery, we should be stricter with thinking the details through. If we fix them, immediately or later (or never if unfixable) is on a different page.
Quoted 75 lines
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- .../files/local-top-complete | 33 +++++++++++++++---- .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 5 ++- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +23
-3@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { reduced_size="$(expr "$part_size_blocks" - 65536 )" reduced_size_in_byte="$(expr "$reduced_size" \* 512)" reduced_size_in_kb="$(expr "$reduced_size_in_byte" / 1024)K" + + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="--reduce-device-size ${reduce_device_size}k" + case $partition_fstype in ext*) # reduce the filesystem and partition by 32M to fit the LUKS header@@ -90,14 +93,25 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { squashfs|swap|erofs|"") [ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "skip disk resize as it is not supported or unnecessary for fstype: '$partition_fstype'" ;; + luks) + # Check if reencrypt was aborted + if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$1" \ + | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup repair --batch-mode "$1" < "$2" || \ + panic "cryptsetup repair was not successful" + fi + + # already luks partition, don't resize + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="" + ;; *) panic "cannot resize partition, unsupported fstype: '$partition_fstype'" ;; esac if [ -x /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt ]; then - /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt --new --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt --new ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2" else - /usr/sbin/cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2" + /usr/sbin/cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2" fi }@@ -244,7 +258,7 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition: decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name" if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \ - | grep -q "luks2"; then + | grep -q "systemd-tpm2\|clevis"; then open_tpm2_partition "$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device" # check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:@@ -255,6 +269,12 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do continue fi + # If partition contains an aborted reencrypt luks header, switch to reencrypt mode: + if /usr/sbin/cryptsetup luksDump --batch-mode "${part_device}" \ + | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then + partition_format="reencrypt" + fi + # If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition: if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ] then@@ -272,10 +292,11 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do watchdog_pid=$! fi
Quoted 13 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete for partition_set in $partition_sets; do · line 299
Quoted 8 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +4
-3- # create random password for initial encryption - # this will be dropped after reboot + # use partuuid of the partition for initial encryption password, this key + # will be removed after the reencryption has finished and the TPM2 token is + # registered: tmp_key=/tmp/"$(basename "$part_device")-lukskey" - openssl rand -base64 32 > "$tmp_key" + lsblk -no partuuid "$part_device" > "$tmp_key"This should be factored out into a separate commit. I don't disagree about it, it just deserves an own, clear reasoning. Without recovery, it looks to me like a nice size optimization for the initramfs by dropping the openssl dependency.
Why lsblk instead of blkid -s PARTUUID -o value, as blkid is already used in initramfs-verity-hook and initramfs-abrootfs-hook this would save more space.
Quirin
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 17 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0case "${partition_format}" in "reencrypt")recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +0
-1@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ require recipes-initramfs/initramfs-hook/hook.inc DEBIAN_DEPENDS .= ", \ cryptsetup, \ awk, \ - openssl, \ e2fsprogs, \ tpm2-tools, \ coreutils, \recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ · line 46
Quoted 10 lines
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb +2
-2@@ -40,8 +39,8 @@ HOOK_ADD_MODULES = " \ ecb aes_generic xts" HOOK_COPY_EXECS = " \ - openssl mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ - e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp \ + mke2fs grep awk expr seq sleep basename uuidparse mountpoint \ + e2fsck resize2fs cryptsetup cmp lsblk \ tpm2_pcrread tpm2_testparms tpm2_flushcontext \ /usr/lib/*/libgcc_s.so.1"Jan
Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: add re-encryption recovery
Quoted 138 lines · Quirin Gylstorff
Quoted 126 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 3 lines · Claudius Heine
Integrate detection and recovery of power failures while a partition is being encrypted.
Why is this at the end of the series? It can already help the existing implementation during encrypt-on-first-boot.
Quoted 17 lines
There are possible scenarios:
1. Power-fail happens while the partition is reencrypted:
- The LUKS header containsonline-reencrypt-v2and needs to be repaired withcryptsetup repairbefore it can continue.
- Also no resizing of the file system is necessary
2. Power-fail happens before the systemd-tpm2/clevis token can be installed
- The LUKS header does not contain 'systemd-tpm2'/'clevis', thus it needs to be registered and the temporary encryption key needs to be removedIn both scenarios the system after the reboot needs to have access to the temporary encryption key that was initially used. So using a random one, generated via
openssl randis not possible. Since it is only a temporary key and gets removed after the systemd-tpm2/clevis token was installed, a known password can be used.Quoted 3 lines
The list of these scenarios is not complete, there might be other instances where a sudden power-fail could be fatal to the system, but these where the most obvious and risky ones.
For recovery of the first boot, this might be enough. But when proposing this for in-field recovery, we should be stricter with thinking the details through. If we fix them, immediately or later (or never if unfixable) is on a different page.
Quoted 92 lines
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>---
.../files/local-top-complete | 33 +++++++++++++++---- .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 5 ++-2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)(quoted diff) +0
-0complete b/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top- complete
index 47533b5..e67f26f 100644recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() {reduced_size="$(expr "$part_size_blocks" - 65536 )" reduced_size_in_byte="$(expr "$reduced_size" \* 512)" reduced_size_in_kb="$(expr "$reduced_size_in_byte" / 1024)K"
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +3
-0+ + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="--reduce-device-size ${reduce_device_size}k" +case $partition_fstype in
ext*)# reduce the filesystem and partition by 32M to fit the LUKS headerrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -90,14 +93,25 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { squashfs|swap|erofs|"")[ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "skip disk resize as it is not supported or unnecessary for fstype: '$partition_fstype'" ;;
+ luks)
+ # Check if reencrypt was aborted
+ if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "$1" \
+ | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then
+/usr/sbin/cryptsetuprepair --batch-mode "$1" < "$2" || \
+ panic "cryptsetup repair was not successful" + fi
+
+ # already luks partition, don't resize
+ CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS=""
+ ;;
*)
panic "cannot resize partition, unsupported fstype:
'$partition_fstype'"
;;
esac
if [ -x/usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt]; then
-/usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt--new --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2"
+/usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt--new ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2"
else
-/usr/sbin/cryptsetupreencrypt --encrypt --reduce-device- size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2"
+/usr/sbin/cryptsetupreencrypt --encrypt ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2"
fi
}
@@ -244,7 +258,7 @@ forpartition_setin $partition_sets; do # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with next partition:
decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \
- | grep -q "luks2"; then
+ | grep -q "systemd-tpm2\|clevis"; thenopen_tpm2_partition"$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name" "$tpm_device"# check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -255,6 +269,12 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; docontinue
fi
+ # If partition contains an aborted reencrypt luks header, switch to reencrypt mode:
+ if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "${part_device}" \
+ | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then
+ partition_format="reencrypt"
+ fi
+
# If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next partition:
if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ]
thenrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -272,10 +292,11 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; dowatchdog_pid=$!
fi
- # create random password for initial encryption
- # this will be dropped after reboot
+ # use partuuid of the partition for initial encryption password, this key
+ # will be removed after the reencryption has finished and the TPM2 token is
+ # registered:Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
tmp_key=/tmp/"$(basename "$part_device")-lukskey" - openssl rand -base64 32 > "$tmp_key"
+ lsblk -no partuuid "$part_device" > "$tmp_key"This should be factored out into a separate commit. I don't disagree about it, it just deserves an own, clear reasoning. Without recovery, it looks to me like a nice size optimization for the initramfs by dropping the openssl dependency.
Quoted 3 lines
Why
lsblkinstead ofblkid -s PARTUUID -o value, as blkid is already used in initramfs-verity-hook and initramfs-abrootfs-hook this would save more space.
Or just use "some-long-hardcoded-temporary-password". From a security perspective, there should be no difference.
Jan
Signature · 2 lines
Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center
Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] initramfs-crypt-hook: add re-encryption recovery
Hi Jan,
Quoted 11 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 10 lines · Quirin Gylstorff
Quoted 7 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 3 lines · Claudius Heine
Integrate detection and recovery of power failures while a partition is being encrypted.
Why is this at the end of the series? It can already help the existing implementation during encrypt-on-first-boot.
Because that was the order this feature was implemented, to us the support for 'noencrypt' was more important than the re-encryption recovery.
I can look into reordering it.
Quoted 128 lines
Quoted 128 lines
Quoted 127 lines
Quoted 18 lines
There are possible scenarios:
1. Power-fail happens while the partition is reencrypted:
- The LUKS header containsonline-reencrypt-v2and needs to be repaired withcryptsetup repairbefore it can continue.
- Also no resizing of the file system is necessary
2. Power-fail happens before the systemd-tpm2/clevis token can be installed
- The LUKS header does not contain 'systemd-tpm2'/'clevis', thus it needs to be registered and the temporary encryption key needs to be removedIn both scenarios the system after the reboot needs to have access to the temporary encryption key that was initially used. So using a random one, generated via
openssl randis not possible. Since it is only a temporary key and gets removed after the systemd-tpm2/clevis token was installed, a known password can be used.Quoted 3 lines
The list of these scenarios is not complete, there might be other instances where a sudden power-fail could be fatal to the system, but these where the most obvious and risky ones.
For recovery of the first boot, this might be enough. But when proposing this for in-field recovery, we should be stricter with thinking the details through. If we fix them, immediately or later (or never if unfixable) is on a different page.
Quoted 88 lines
Signed-off-by Claudius Heine <[email protected]>--- .../files/local-top-complete | 33 +++++++++++++++---- .../initramfs-crypt-hook_0.6.bb | 5 ++- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)(quoted diff) +0
-0complete b/recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top- complete
index 47533b5..e67f26f 100644recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +3
-0@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { reduced_size="$(expr "$part_size_blocks" - 65536 )" reduced_size_in_byte="$(expr "$reduced_size" \* 512)" reduced_size_in_kb="$(expr "$reduced_size_in_byte" / 1024)K" + + CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS="--reduce-device-size ${reduce_device_size}k" + case $partition_fstype in ext*) # reduce the filesystem and partition by 32M to fit theLUKS header
recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -90,14 +93,25 @@ reencrypt_existing_partition() { squashfs|swap|erofs|"") [ "$debug" = "y" ] && echo "skip disk resize as it is notsupported or unnecessary for fstype: '$partition_fstype'"
;;
+ luks)
+ # Check if reencrypt was aborted
+ if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "$1" \
+ | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then
+/usr/sbin/cryptsetuprepair --batch-mode "$1" < "$2" || \
+ panic "cryptsetup repair was not successful" + fi
+
+ # already luks partition, don't resize
+ CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS=""
+ ;;
*)
panic "cannot resize partition, unsupported fstype:
'$partition_fstype'"
;;
esac
if [ -x/usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt]; then
-/usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt--new --reduce-device-size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2"
+/usr/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt--new ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2"
else
-/usr/sbin/cryptsetupreencrypt --encrypt --reduce-device- size "$reduce_device_size"k "$1" < "$2"
+/usr/sbin/cryptsetupreencrypt --encrypt ${CRYPTSETUP_PARAMS} "$1" < "$2"
fi
}
@@ -244,7 +258,7 @@ forpartition_setin $partition_sets; do # If partition is already encrypted, decrypt and continue with
next partition:
decrypted_part=/dev/mapper/"$crypt_mount_name"
if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "$part_device" \
- | grep -q "luks2"; then
+ | grep -q "systemd-tpm2\|clevis"; then
open_tpm2_partition"$part_device" "$crypt_mount_name"
"$tpm_device"# check if we are trying to mount root, set ROOT to decrypted partition:recipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +0
-0@@ -255,6 +269,12 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do continue fi + # If partition contains an aborted reencrypt luks header,switch to reencrypt mode:
+ if/usr/sbin/cryptsetupluksDump --batch-mode "${part_device}" \
+ | grep -q "online-reencrypt-v2"; then
+ partition_format="reencrypt"
+ fi
+
# If partition should not be encrypted, continue with next
partition:
if [ "$partition_format" = "noencrypt" ]
thenrecipes-initramfs/initramfs-crypt-hook/files/local-top-complete +1
-1@@ -272,10 +292,11 @@ for partition_set in $partition_sets; do watchdog_pid=$! fi - # create random password for initial encryption - # this will be dropped after reboot + # use partuuid of the partition for initial encryption password,Quoted 7 lines
this key
+ # will be removed after the reencryption has finished and the TPM2 token is
+ # registered:
tmp_key=/tmp/"$(basename "$part_device")-lukskey"
- openssl rand -base64 32 > "$tmp_key"
+ lsblk -no partuuid "$part_device" > "$tmp_key"This should be factored out into a separate commit. I don't disagree about it, it just deserves an own, clear reasoning. Without recovery, it looks to me like a nice size optimization for the initramfs by dropping the openssl dependency.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Why
lsblkinstead ofblkid -s PARTUUID -o value, as blkid is already used in initramfs-verity-hook and initramfs-abrootfs-hook this would save more space.
Good idea.
Quoted 3 lines
Or just use "some-long-hardcoded-temporary-password". From a security perspective, there should be no difference.
That is was we did initially downstream, but I thought that just inserting some fixed hard-coded password string might have even more issues being accepted here upstream than using some device parameter.
We could also use dmidecode -s system-uuid, that at least would require to readout the uuid of the system. Having the storage medium alone would not be enough.
regards,
Claudius
Quoted 3 lines
Jan
Signature · 3 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Erika Unter HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-54 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: [email protected]