5.15.179-rc1 review
Subsystems (7)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 423/620 selftests: rtnetlink: update netdevsim ipsec output format
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
commit 3ec920bb978ccdc68a7dfb304d303d598d038cb1 upstream.
After the netdevsim update to use human-readable IP address formats for IPsec, we can now use the source and destination IPs directly in testing. Here is the result:
# ./rtnetlink.sh -t kci_test_ipsec_offload PASS: ipsec_offload
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/rtnetlink.sh | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/rtnetlink.sh +2 -2
@@ -813,10 +813,10 @@ kci_test_ipsec_offload() # does driver have correct offload info diff $sysfsf - << EOF SA count=2 tx=3 -sa[0] tx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 +sa[0] tx ipaddr=$dstip sa[0] spi=0x00000009 proto=0x32 salt=0x61626364 crypt=1 sa[0] key=0x34333231 38373635 32313039 36353433 -sa[1] rx ipaddr=0x00000000 00000000 00000000 037ba8c0 +sa[1] rx ipaddr=$srcip sa[1] spi=0x00000009 proto=0x32 salt=0x61626364 crypt=1 sa[1] key=0x34333231 38373635 32313039 36353433 EOF
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 424/620 ARM: dts: dra7: Add bus_dma_limit for l4 cfg bus
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Romain Naour <[email protected]>
commit c1472ec1dc4419d0bae663c1a1e6cb98dc7881ad upstream.
A bus_dma_limit was added for l3 bus by commit cfb5d65f2595 ("ARM: dts: dra7: Add bus_dma_limit for L3 bus") to fix an issue observed only with SATA on DRA7-EVM with 4GB RAM and CONFIG_ARM_LPAE enabled.
Since kernel 5.13, the SATA issue can be reproduced again following the SATA node move from L3 bus to L4_cfg in commit 8af15365a368 ("ARM: dts: Configure interconnect target module for dra7 sata").
Fix it by adding an empty dma-ranges property to l4_cfg and segment@100000 nodes (parent device tree node of SATA controller) to inherit the 2GB dma ranges limit from l3 bus node.
Note: A similar fix was applied for PCIe controller by commit 90d4d3f4ea45 ("ARM: dts: dra7: Fix bus_dma_limit for PCIe").
--- arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7-l4.dtsi | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7-l4.dtsi +2 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ ranges = <0x00000000 0x4a000000 0x100000>, /* segment 0 */ <0x00100000 0x4a100000 0x100000>, /* segment 1 */ <0x00200000 0x4a200000 0x100000>; /* segment 2 */ + dma-ranges; segment@0 { /* 0x4a000000 */ compatible = "simple-pm-bus";
@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ <0x0007e000 0x0017e000 0x001000>, /* ap 124 */ <0x00059000 0x00159000 0x001000>, /* ap 125 */ <0x0005a000 0x0015a000 0x001000>; /* ap 126 */ + dma-ranges; target-module@2000 { /* 0x4a102000, ap 27 3c.0 */ compatible = "ti,sysc";
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 425/620 f2fs: fix to wait dio completion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 96cfeb0389530ae32ade8a48ae3ae1ac3b6c009d upstream.
It should wait all existing dio write IOs before block removal, otherwise, previous direct write IO may overwrite data in the block which may be reused by other inode.
--- fs/f2fs/file.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/file.c +13 -0
@@ -965,6 +965,13 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct user_namespace *return err; } +/* +* wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after +* IO completion. +*/ +if (attr->ia_size < old_size) +inode_dio_wait (inode); +down_write (&F2FS_I (inode)->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE ]);filemap_invalidate_lock (inode->i_mapping);
@@ -1790,6 +1797,12 @@ static long f2fs_fallocate(struct file *if (ret) goto out; +/* +* wait for inflight dio, blocks should be removed after IO +* completion. +*/ +inode_dio_wait (inode); +if (mode &FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE ) {if (offset >= inode->i_size) goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 426/620 x86/i8253: Disable PIT timer 0 when not in use
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
commit 70e6b7d9ae3c63df90a7bba7700e8d5c300c3c60 upstream.
Leaving the PIT interrupt running can cause noticeable steal time for virtual guests. The VMM generally has a timer which toggles the IRQ input to the PIC and I/O APIC, which takes CPU time away from the guest. Even on real hardware, running the counter may use power needlessly (albeit not much).
Make sure it's turned off if it isn't going to be used.
--- arch/x86/kernel/i8253.c | 11 +++++++++-- drivers/clocksource/i8253.c | 13 +++++++++---- include/linux/i8253.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/i8253.c +9 -2
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <linux/timex.h> #include <linux/i8253.h> +#include <asm/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/hpet.h> #include <asm/time.h>
@@ -39,9 +40,15 @@ static bool __init use_pit(void)bool __init pit_timer_init (void ) { -if (!use_pit ()) +if (!use_pit ()) { +/* +* Don't just ignore the PIT. Ensure it's stopped, because +* VMMs otherwise steal CPU time just to pointlessly waggle +* the (masked) IRQ. +*/ +clockevent_i8253_disable ();return false; - + }clockevent_i8253_init (true); global_clock_event = &i8253_clockevent;return true;
drivers/clocksource/i8253.c +9 -4
@@ -108,11 +108,8 @@ int __init clocksource_i8253_init(void)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CLKEVT_I8253 -static int pit_shutdown (struct clock_event_device *evt) +void clockevent_i8253_disable (void ) { -if (!clockevent_state_oneshot (evt) && !clockevent_state_periodic (evt)) -return 0 ; -raw_spin_lock (&i8253_lock);outb_p (0x30 ,PIT_MODE );
@@ -123,6 +120,14 @@ static int pit_shutdown(struct clock_eve }raw_spin_unlock (&i8253_lock); +} + +static int pit_shutdown (struct clock_event_device *evt) +{ +if (!clockevent_state_oneshot (evt) && !clockevent_state_periodic (evt)) +return 0 ; + +clockevent_i8253_disable ();return 0 ; }
include/linux/i8253.h +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ extern raw_spinlock_t i8253_lock;extern bool i8253_clear_counter_on_shutdown;extern struct clock_event_device i8253_clockevent;extern void clockevent_i8253_init (bool oneshot); +extern void clockevent_i8253_disable (void );extern void setup_pit_timer (void );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 427/620 Revert "btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Koichiro Den <[email protected]>
This reverts commit 214d92f0a465f93eea15e702e743f2c63823b1fd.
The backport for linux-5.15.y, commit 214d92f0a465 ("btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file"), inserted cond_resched() in the wrong location.
Revert it now; a subsequent commit will re-backport the original patch.
--- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +0 -2
@@ -7698,8 +7698,6 @@ noinline int can_nocow_extent(struct ino ret = -EAGAIN ; goto out; } - -cond_resched (); }btrfs_release_path (path);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 428/620 btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
commit 2c8507c63f5498d4ee4af404a8e44ceae4345056 upstream.
This commit re-attempts the backport of the change to the linux-5.15.y branch. Commit 214d92f0a465 ("btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file") on this branch was reverted.
During swap activation we iterate over the extents of a file and we can have many thousands of them, so we can end up in a busy loop monopolizing a core. Avoid this by doing a voluntary reschedule after processing each extent.
--- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +2 -0
@@ -11031,6 +11031,8 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct sw } start += len; + +cond_resched (); }if (bsi.block_len)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 429/620 pps: Fix a use-after-free
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Calvin Owens <[email protected]>
commit c79a39dc8d060b9e64e8b0fa9d245d44befeefbe upstream.
On a board running ntpd and gpsd, I'm seeing a consistent use-after-free in sys_exit() from gpsd when rebooting:
pps pps1: removed
------------[ cut here ]------------
kobject: '(null)' (00000000db4bec24): is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 440 at lib/kobject.c:734 kobject_put+0x120/0x150
CPU: 2 UID: 299 PID: 440 Comm: gpsd Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-00308-gb31c44928842 #1
Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.1 (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : kobject_put+0x120/0x150
lr : kobject_put+0x120/0x150
sp : ffffffc0803d3ae0
x29: ffffffc0803d3ae0 x28: ffffff8042dc9738 x27: 0000000000000001
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff8042dc9040 x24: ffffff8042dc9440
x23: ffffff80402a4620 x22: ffffff8042ef4bd0 x21: ffffff80405cb600
x20: 000000000008001b x19: ffffff8040b3b6e0 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 696e6920746f6e20
x14: 7369203a29343263 x13: 205d303434542020 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
kobject_put+0x120/0x150
cdev_put+0x20/0x3c
__fput+0x2c4/0x2d8
____fput+0x1c/0x38
task_work_run+0x70/0xfc
do_exit+0x2a0/0x924
do_group_exit+0x34/0x90
get_signal+0x7fc/0x8c0
do_signal+0x128/0x13b4
do_notify_resume+0xdc/0x160
el0_svc+0xd4/0xf8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x140/0x14c
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---...followed by more symptoms of corruption, with similar stacks:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
This happens because pps_device_destruct() frees the pps_device with the embedded cdev immediately after calling cdev_del(), but, as the comment above cdev_del() notes, fops for previously opened cdevs are still callable even after cdev_del() returns. I think this bug has always been there: I can't explain why it suddenly started happening every time I reboot this particular board.
In commit d953e0e837e6 ("pps: Fix a use-after free bug when unregistering a source."), George Spelvin suggested removing the embedded cdev. That seems like the simplest way to fix this, so I've implemented his suggestion, using __register_chrdev() with pps_idr becoming the source of truth for which minor corresponds to which device.
But now that pps_idr defines userspace visibility instead of cdev_add(), we need to be sure the pps->dev refcount can't reach zero while userspace can still find it again. So, the idr_remove() call moves to pps_unregister_cdev(), and pps_idr now holds a reference to pps->dev.
pps_core: source serial1 got cdev (251:1)
<...>
pps pps1: removed
pps_core: unregistering pps1
pps_core: deallocating pps1
--- drivers/pps/clients/pps-gpio.c | 4 - drivers/pps/clients/pps-ktimer.c | 4 - drivers/pps/clients/pps-ldisc.c | 6 - drivers/pps/clients/pps_parport.c | 4 - drivers/pps/kapi.c | 10 +- drivers/pps/kc.c | 10 +- drivers/pps/pps.c | 127 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- drivers/ptp/ptp_ocp.c | 2 include/linux/pps_kernel.h | 3 9 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
drivers/pps/clients/pps-gpio.c +2 -2
@@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ static int pps_gpio_probe(struct platforreturn -EINVAL ; } -dev_info (data->pps->dev,"Registered IRQ %d as PPS source\n" , - data->irq); +dev_dbg (&data->pps->dev,"Registered IRQ %d as PPS source\n" , + data->irq);return 0 ; }
drivers/pps/clients/pps-ktimer.c +2 -2
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static struct pps_source_info pps_ktimer static void __exit pps_ktimer_exit(void) { -dev_info (pps->dev,"ktimer PPS source unregistered\n" ); +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"ktimer PPS source unregistered\n" );del_timer_sync (&ktimer);pps_unregister_source (pps);
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int __init pps_ktimer_init(void)timer_setup (&ktimer, pps_ktimer_event,0 );mod_timer (&ktimer, jiffies +HZ ); -dev_info (pps->dev,"ktimer PPS source registered\n" ); +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"ktimer PPS source registered\n" );return 0 ; }
drivers/pps/clients/pps-ldisc.c +3 -3
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static void pps_tty_dcd_change(struct ttpps_event (pps, &ts, status ?PPS_CAPTUREASSERT :PPS_CAPTURECLEAR ,NULL ); -dev_dbg (pps->dev,"PPS %s at %lu\n" , +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"PPS %s at %lu\n" , status ?"assert" :"clear" , jiffies); }
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int pps_tty_open(struct tty_struc goto err_unregister; } -dev_info (pps->dev,"source \"%s\" added\n" , info.path); +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"source \"%s\" added\n" , info.path);return 0 ;
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static void pps_tty_close(struct tty_strif (WARN_ON (!pps))return ; -dev_info (pps->dev,"removed\n" ); +dev_info (&pps->dev,"removed\n" );pps_unregister_source (pps); }
drivers/pps/clients/pps_parport.c +2 -2
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static void parport_irq(void *handle)/* check the signal (no signal means the pulse is lost this time) */ if (!signal_is_set (port)) {local_irq_restore (flags); -dev_err (dev->pps->dev,"lost the signal\n" ); +dev_err (&dev->pps->dev,"lost the signal\n" ); goto out_assert; }
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static void parport_irq(void *handle)/* timeout */ dev->cw_err++;if (dev->cw_err >=CLEAR_WAIT_MAX_ERRORS ) { -dev_err (dev->pps->dev,"disabled clear edge capture after %d" +dev_err (&dev->pps->dev,"disabled clear edge capture after %d" " timeouts\n" , dev->cw_err); dev->cw =0 ; dev->cw_err =0 ;
drivers/pps/kapi.c +5 -5
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static void pps_add_offset(struct pps_ktstatic void pps_echo_client_default (struct pps_device *pps,int event,void *data) { -dev_info (pps->dev,"echo %s %s\n" , +dev_info (&pps->dev,"echo %s %s\n" , event &PPS_CAPTUREASSERT ?"assert" :"" , event &PPS_CAPTURECLEAR ?"clear" :"" ); }
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct pps_device *pps_register_source(s goto kfree_pps; } -dev_info (pps->dev,"new PPS source %s\n" , info->name); +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"new PPS source %s\n" , info->name);return pps;
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void pps_event(struct pps_device *pps, s/* check event type */ BUG_ON ((event & (PPS_CAPTUREASSERT |PPS_CAPTURECLEAR )) ==0 ); -dev_dbg (pps->dev,"PPS event at %lld.%09ld\n" , +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"PPS event at %lld.%09ld\n" , (s64 )ts->ts_real.tv_sec, ts->ts_real.tv_nsec);timespec_to_pps_ktime (&ts_real, ts->ts_real);
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ void pps_event(struct pps_device *pps, s/* Save the time stamp */ pps->assert_tu = ts_real; pps->assert_sequence++; -dev_dbg (pps->dev,"capture assert seq #%u\n" , +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"capture assert seq #%u\n" , pps->assert_sequence); captured = ~0 ;
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ void pps_event(struct pps_device *pps, s/* Save the time stamp */ pps->clear_tu = ts_real; pps->clear_sequence++; -dev_dbg (pps->dev,"capture clear seq #%u\n" , +dev_dbg (&pps->dev,"capture clear seq #%u\n" , pps->clear_sequence); captured = ~0 ;
drivers/pps/kc.c +5 -5
@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ int pps_kc_bind(struct pps_device *pps, pps_kc_hardpps_mode =0 ; pps_kc_hardpps_dev =NULL ;spin_unlock_irq (&pps_kc_hardpps_lock); -dev_info (pps->dev,"unbound kernel" +dev_info (&pps->dev,"unbound kernel" " consumer\n" ); }else {spin_unlock_irq (&pps_kc_hardpps_lock); -dev_err (pps->dev,"selected kernel consumer" +dev_err (&pps->dev,"selected kernel consumer" " is not bound\n" );return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ int pps_kc_bind(struct pps_device *pps, pps_kc_hardpps_mode = bind_args->edge; pps_kc_hardpps_dev = pps;spin_unlock_irq (&pps_kc_hardpps_lock); -dev_info (pps->dev,"bound kernel consumer: " +dev_info (&pps->dev,"bound kernel consumer: " "edge=0x%x\n" , bind_args->edge); }else {spin_unlock_irq (&pps_kc_hardpps_lock); -dev_err (pps->dev,"another kernel consumer" +dev_err (&pps->dev,"another kernel consumer" " is already bound\n" );return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void pps_kc_remove(struct pps_device *pp pps_kc_hardpps_mode =0 ; pps_kc_hardpps_dev =NULL ;spin_unlock_irq (&pps_kc_hardpps_lock); -dev_info (pps->dev,"unbound kernel consumer" +dev_info (&pps->dev,"unbound kernel consumer" " on device removal\n" ); }else spin_unlock_irq (&pps_kc_hardpps_lock);
drivers/pps/pps.c +66 -61
288 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/ptp/ptp_ocp.c +1 -1
@@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@ ptp_ocp_complete(struct ptp_ocp *bp) pps =pps_lookup_dev (bp->ptp);if (pps) -ptp_ocp_symlink (bp, pps->dev,"pps" ); +ptp_ocp_symlink (bp, &pps->dev,"pps" );if (device_add_groups (&bp->dev, timecard_groups))pr_err ("device add groups failed\n" );
include/linux/pps_kernel.h +1 -2
@@ -56,8 +56,7 @@ struct pps_device {unsigned int id;/* PPS source unique ID */ void const *lookup_cookie;/* For pps_lookup_dev() only */ -struct cdev cdev; -struct device *dev; +struct device dev;struct fasync_struct *async_queue;/* fasync method */ spinlock_t lock; };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 430/620 arm64: mte: Do not allow PROT_MTE on MAP_HUGETLB user mappings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
PROT_MTE (memory tagging extensions) is not supported on all user mmap() types for various reasons (memory attributes, backing storage, CoW handling). The arm64 arch_validate_flags() function checks whether the VM_MTE_ALLOWED flag has been set for a vma during mmap(), usually by arch_calc_vm_flag_bits().
Linux prior to 6.13 does not support PROT_MTE hugetlb mappings. This was added by commit 25c17c4b55de ("hugetlb: arm64: add mte support"). However, earlier kernels inadvertently set VM_MTE_ALLOWED on (MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB) mappings by only checking for MAP_ANONYMOUS.
Explicitly check MAP_HUGETLB in arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() and avoid setting VM_MTE_ALLOWED for such mappings.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h +6 -3
@@ -31,9 +31,12 @@ static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm* backed by tags-capable memory. The vm_flags may be overridden by a * filesystem supporting MTE (RAM-based). */ -if (system_supports_mte () && - ((flags &MAP_ANONYMOUS ) ||shmem_file (file))) -return VM_MTE_ALLOWED ; +if (system_supports_mte ()) { +if ((flags &MAP_ANONYMOUS ) && !(flags &MAP_HUGETLB )) +return VM_MTE_ALLOWED ; +if (shmem_file (file)) +return VM_MTE_ALLOWED ; + }return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 431/620 crypto: testmgr - fix wrong key length for pkcs1pad
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lei He <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 39ef08517082a424b5b65c3dbaa6c0fa9d3303b9 ]
Fix wrong test data at testmgr.h, it seems to be caused by ignoring the last '\0' when calling sizeof.
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/testmgr.h +1 -1
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = {"\xd1\x86\x48\x55\xce\x83\xee\x8e\x51\xc7\xde\x32\x12\x47\x7d\x46" "\xb8\x35\xdf\x41\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00" "\x02\x01\x00", - .key_len = 804, + .key_len = 803,/* * m is SHA256 hash of following message: * "\x49\x41\xbe\x0a\x0c\xc9\xf6\x35\x51\xe4\x27\x56\x13\x71\x4b\xd0"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 432/620 crypto: testmgr - Fix wrong test case of RSA
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lei He <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a9887010ed2da3fddaff83ceec80e2b71be8a966 ]
According to the BER encoding rules, integer value should be encoded as two's complement, and if the highest bit of a positive integer is 1, should add a leading zero-octet.
The kernel's built-in RSA algorithm cannot recognize negative numbers when parsing keys, so it can pass this test case.
Export the key to file and run the following command to verify the fix result:
openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in /path/to/key/file
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
crypto/testmgr.h +3 -3
@@ -257,9 +257,9 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = { }, {#endif .key = -"\x30\x82\x02\x1F" /* sequence of 543 bytes */ +"\x30\x82\x02\x20" /* sequence of 544 bytes */ "\x02\x01\x01" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x82\x01\x00" /* modulus - integer of 256 bytes */ +"\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00" /* modulus - integer of 256 bytes */ "\xDB\x10\x1A\xC2\xA3\xF1\xDC\xFF\x13\x6B\xED\x44\xDF\xF0\x02\x6D" "\x13\xC7\x88\xDA\x70\x6B\x54\xF1\xE8\x27\xDC\xC3\x0F\x99\x6A\xFA" "\xC6\x67\xFF\x1D\x1E\x3C\x1D\xC1\xB5\x5F\x6C\xC0\xB2\x07\x3A\x6D"
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {"\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent1 - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent2 - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x01\x00", /* coefficient - integer of 1 byte */ - .key_len = 547, + .key_len = 548, .m ="\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a" , .c ="\xb2\x97\x76\xb4\xae\x3e\x38\x3c\x7e\x64\x1f\xcc\xa2\x7f\xf6\xbe"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 433/620 crypto: testmgr - fix version number of RSA tests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: lei he <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0bb8f125253843c445b70fc6ef4fb21aa7b25625 ]
According to PKCS#1 standard, the 'otherPrimeInfos' field contains the information for the additional primes r_3, ..., r_u, in order. It shall be omitted if the version is 0 and shall contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if the version is 1, see:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3447#page-44
Replace the version number '1' with 0, otherwise, some drivers may not pass the run-time tests.
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
crypto/testmgr.h +3 -3
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS .key ="\x30\x81\x9A" /* sequence of 154 bytes */ -"\x02\x01\x01" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ +"\x02\x01\x00" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x41" /* modulus - integer of 65 bytes */ "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F" "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = { }, { .key ="\x30\x82\x01\x1D" /* sequence of 285 bytes */ -"\x02\x01\x01" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ +"\x02\x01\x00" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x81\x81" /* modulus - integer of 129 bytes */ "\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71" "\xF7\x36\x8D\x07\xEE\xD4\x10\x43\xA4\x40\xD6\xB6\xF0\x74\x54\xF5"
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {#endif .key ="\x30\x82\x02\x20" /* sequence of 544 bytes */ -"\x02\x01\x01" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ +"\x02\x01\x00" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00" /* modulus - integer of 256 bytes */ "\xDB\x10\x1A\xC2\xA3\xF1\xDC\xFF\x13\x6B\xED\x44\xDF\xF0\x02\x6D" "\x13\xC7\x88\xDA\x70\x6B\x54\xF1\xE8\x27\xDC\xC3\x0F\x99\x6A\xFA"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 434/620 crypto: testmgr - populate RSA CRT parameters in RSA test vectors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 79e6e2f3f3ff345947075341781e900e4f70db81 ]
Changes from v1:
* replace some accidental spaces with tabs
In commit f145d411a67e ("crypto: rsa - implement Chinese Remainder Theorem for faster private key operations") we have started to use the additional primes and coefficients for RSA private key operations. However, these additional parameters are not present (defined as 0 integers) in the RSA test vectors.
Some parameters were borrowed from OpenSSL, so I was able to find the source. I could not find the public source for 1 vector though, so had to recover the parameters by implementing Appendix C from [1].
[1]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br1.pdf
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
crypto/testmgr.h +100 -21
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = { {#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS .key = -"\x30\x81\x9A" /* sequence of 154 bytes */ +"\x30\x82\x01\x38" /* sequence of 312 bytes */ "\x02\x01\x00" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x41" /* modulus - integer of 65 bytes */ "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
@@ -197,23 +197,36 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {"\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64" "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9" "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51" -"\x02\x01\x00" /* prime1 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* prime2 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent1 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent2 - integer of 1 byte */ - "\x02\x01\x00", /* coefficient - integer of 1 byte */ +"\x02\x21" /* prime1 - integer of 33 bytes */ +"\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5" +"\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12" +"\x0D" +"\x02\x21" /* prime2 - integer of 33 bytes */ +"\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9" +"\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D" +"\x89" +"\x02\x20" /* exponent1 - integer of 32 bytes */ +"\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF" +"\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05" +"\x02\x21" /* exponent2 - integer of 33 bytes */ +"\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99" +"\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D" +"\x51" +"\x02\x20" /* coefficient - integer of 32 bytes */ +"\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8" + "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26", .m = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a", .c ="\x63\x1c\xcd\x7b\xe1\x7e\xe4\xde\xc9\xa8\x89\xa1\x74\xcb\x3c\x63" "\x7d\x24\xec\x83\xc3\x15\xe4\x7f\x73\x05\x34\xd1\xec\x22\xbb\x8a" "\x5e\x32\x39\x6d\xc1\x1d\x7d\x50\x3b\x9f\x7a\xad\xf0\x2e\x25\x53" "\x9f\x6e\xbd\x4c\x55\x84\x0c\x9b\xcf\x1a\x4b\x51\x1e\x9e\x0c\x06", - .key_len = 157, + .key_len = 316, .m_size = 8, .c_size =64 , }, { .key = -"\x30\x82\x01\x1D" /* sequence of 285 bytes */ +"\x30\x82\x02\x5B" /* sequence of 603 bytes */ "\x02\x01\x00" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x81\x81" /* modulus - integer of 129 bytes */ "\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71"
@@ -236,12 +249,35 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {"\x93\x99\x26\xED\x4F\x74\xA1\x3E\xDD\xFB\xE1\xA1\xCE\xCC\x48\x94" "\xAF\x94\x28\xC2\xB7\xB8\x88\x3F\xE4\x46\x3A\x4B\xC8\x5B\x1C\xB3" "\xC1" -"\x02\x01\x00" /* prime1 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* prime2 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent1 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent2 - integer of 1 byte */ - "\x02\x01\x00", /* coefficient - integer of 1 byte */ - .key_len = 289, +"\x02\x41" /* prime1 - integer of 65 bytes */ +"\x00\xEE\xCF\xAE\x81\xB1\xB9\xB3\xC9\x08\x81\x0B\x10\xA1\xB5\x60" +"\x01\x99\xEB\x9F\x44\xAE\xF4\xFD\xA4\x93\xB8\x1A\x9E\x3D\x84\xF6" +"\x32\x12\x4E\xF0\x23\x6E\x5D\x1E\x3B\x7E\x28\xFA\xE7\xAA\x04\x0A" +"\x2D\x5B\x25\x21\x76\x45\x9D\x1F\x39\x75\x41\xBA\x2A\x58\xFB\x65" +"\x99" +"\x02\x41" /* prime2 - integer of 65 bytes */ +"\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9" +"\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D" +"\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5" +"\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x15" +"\x03" +"\x02\x40" /* exponent1 - integer of 64 bytes */ +"\x54\x49\x4C\xA6\x3E\xBA\x03\x37\xE4\xE2\x40\x23\xFC\xD6\x9A\x5A" +"\xEB\x07\xDD\xDC\x01\x83\xA4\xD0\xAC\x9B\x54\xB0\x51\xF2\xB1\x3E" +"\xD9\x49\x09\x75\xEA\xB7\x74\x14\xFF\x59\xC1\xF7\x69\x2E\x9A\x2E" +"\x20\x2B\x38\xFC\x91\x0A\x47\x41\x74\xAD\xC9\x3C\x1F\x67\xC9\x81" +"\x02\x40" /* exponent2 - integer of 64 bytes */ +"\x47\x1E\x02\x90\xFF\x0A\xF0\x75\x03\x51\xB7\xF8\x78\x86\x4C\xA9" +"\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7" +"\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D" +"\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D" +"\x02\x41" ,/* coefficient - integer of 65 bytes */ +"\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23" +"\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11" +"\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E" +"\x9E\x2E\x0F\x96\x56\xE6\x98\xEA\x36\x66\xED\xFB\x25\x79\x80\x39" +"\xF7" , + .key_len = 607, .m = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a", .c ="\x74\x1b\x55\xac\x47\xb5\x08\x0a\x6e\x2b\x2d\xf7\x94\xb8\x8a\x95"
@@ -257,7 +293,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = { }, {#endif .key = -"\x30\x82\x02\x20" /* sequence of 544 bytes */ +"\x30\x82\x04\xA3" /* sequence of 1187 bytes */ "\x02\x01\x00" /* version - integer of 1 byte */ "\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00" /* modulus - integer of 256 bytes */ "\xDB\x10\x1A\xC2\xA3\xF1\xDC\xFF\x13\x6B\xED\x44\xDF\xF0\x02\x6D"
@@ -294,12 +330,55 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {"\x62\xFF\xE9\x46\xB8\xD8\x44\xDB\xA5\xCC\x31\x54\x34\xCE\x3E\x82" "\xD6\xBF\x7A\x0B\x64\x21\x6D\x88\x7E\x5B\x45\x12\x1E\x63\x8D\x49" "\xA7\x1D\xD9\x1E\x06\xCD\xE8\xBA\x2C\x8C\x69\x32\xEA\xBE\x60\x71" -"\x02\x01\x00" /* prime1 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* prime2 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent1 - integer of 1 byte */ -"\x02\x01\x00" /* exponent2 - integer of 1 byte */ - "\x02\x01\x00", /* coefficient - integer of 1 byte */ - .key_len = 548, +"\x02\x81\x81" /* prime1 - integer of 129 bytes */ +"\x00\xFA\xAC\xE1\x37\x5E\x32\x11\x34\xC6\x72\x58\x2D\x91\x06\x3E" +"\x77\xE7\x11\x21\xCD\x4A\xF8\xA4\x3F\x0F\xEF\x31\xE3\xF3\x55\xA0" +"\xB9\xAC\xB6\xCB\xBB\x41\xD0\x32\x81\x9A\x8F\x7A\x99\x30\x77\x6C" +"\x68\x27\xE2\x96\xB5\x72\xC9\xC3\xD4\x42\xAA\xAA\xCA\x95\x8F\xFF" +"\xC9\x9B\x52\x34\x30\x1D\xCF\xFE\xCF\x3C\x56\x68\x6E\xEF\xE7\x6C" +"\xD7\xFB\x99\xF5\x4A\xA5\x21\x1F\x2B\xEA\x93\xE8\x98\x26\xC4\x6E" +"\x42\x21\x5E\xA0\xA1\x2A\x58\x35\xBB\x10\xE7\xBA\x27\x0A\x3B\xB3" +"\xAF\xE2\x75\x36\x04\xAC\x56\xA0\xAB\x52\xDE\xCE\xDD\x2C\x28\x77" +"\x03" +"\x02\x81\x81" /* prime2 - integer of 129 bytes */ +"\x00\xDF\xB7\x52\xB6\xD7\xC0\xE2\x96\xE7\xC9\xFE\x5D\x71\x5A\xC4" +"\x40\x96\x2F\xE5\x87\xEA\xF3\xA5\x77\x11\x67\x3C\x8D\x56\x08\xA7" +"\xB5\x67\xFA\x37\xA8\xB8\xCF\x61\xE8\x63\xD8\x38\x06\x21\x2B\x92" +"\x09\xA6\x39\x3A\xEA\xA8\xB4\x45\x4B\x36\x10\x4C\xE4\x00\x66\x71" +"\x65\xF8\x0B\x94\x59\x4F\x8C\xFD\xD5\x34\xA2\xE7\x62\x84\x0A\xA7" +"\xBB\xDB\xD9\x8A\xCD\x05\xE1\xCC\x57\x7B\xF1\xF1\x1F\x11\x9D\xBA" +"\x3E\x45\x18\x99\x1B\x41\x64\x43\xEE\x97\x5D\x77\x13\x5B\x74\x69" +"\x73\x87\x95\x05\x07\xBE\x45\x07\x17\x7E\x4A\x69\x22\xF3\xDB\x05" +"\x39" +"\x02\x81\x80" /* exponent1 - integer of 128 bytes */ +"\x5E\xD8\xDC\xDA\x53\x44\xC4\x67\xE0\x92\x51\x34\xE4\x83\xA5\x4D" +"\x3E\xDB\xA7\x9B\x82\xBB\x73\x81\xFC\xE8\x77\x4B\x15\xBE\x17\x73" +"\x49\x9B\x5C\x98\xBC\xBD\x26\xEF\x0C\xE9\x2E\xED\x19\x7E\x86\x41" +"\x1E\x9E\x48\x81\xDD\x2D\xE4\x6F\xC2\xCD\xCA\x93\x9E\x65\x7E\xD5" +"\xEC\x73\xFD\x15\x1B\xA2\xA0\x7A\x0F\x0D\x6E\xB4\x53\x07\x90\x92" +"\x64\x3B\x8B\xA9\x33\xB3\xC5\x94\x9B\x4C\x5D\x9C\x7C\x46\xA4\xA5" +"\x56\xF4\xF3\xF8\x27\x0A\x7B\x42\x0D\x92\x70\x47\xE7\x42\x51\xA9" +"\xC2\x18\xB1\x58\xB1\x50\x91\xB8\x61\x41\xB6\xA9\xCE\xD4\x7C\xBB" +"\x02\x81\x80" /* exponent2 - integer of 128 bytes */ +"\x54\x09\x1F\x0F\x03\xD8\xB6\xC5\x0C\xE8\xB9\x9E\x0C\x38\x96\x43" +"\xD4\xA6\xC5\x47\xDB\x20\x0E\xE5\xBD\x29\xD4\x7B\x1A\xF8\x41\x57" +"\x49\x69\x9A\x82\xCC\x79\x4A\x43\xEB\x4D\x8B\x2D\xF2\x43\xD5\xA5" +"\xBE\x44\xFD\x36\xAC\x8C\x9B\x02\xF7\x9A\x03\xE8\x19\xA6\x61\xAE" +"\x76\x10\x93\x77\x41\x04\xAB\x4C\xED\x6A\xCC\x14\x1B\x99\x8D\x0C" +"\x6A\x37\x3B\x86\x6C\x51\x37\x5B\x1D\x79\xF2\xA3\x43\x10\xC6\xA7" +"\x21\x79\x6D\xF9\xE9\x04\x6A\xE8\x32\xFF\xAE\xFD\x1C\x7B\x8C\x29" +"\x13\xA3\x0C\xB2\xAD\xEC\x6C\x0F\x8D\x27\x12\x7B\x48\xB2\xDB\x31" +"\x02\x81\x81" ,/* coefficient - integer of 129 bytes */ +"\x00\x8D\x1B\x05\xCA\x24\x1F\x0C\x53\x19\x52\x74\x63\x21\xFA\x78" +"\x46\x79\xAF\x5C\xDE\x30\xA4\x6C\x20\x38\xE6\x97\x39\xB8\x7A\x70" +"\x0D\x8B\x6C\x6D\x13\x74\xD5\x1C\xDE\xA9\xF4\x60\x37\xFE\x68\x77" +"\x5E\x0B\x4E\x5E\x03\x31\x30\xDF\xD6\xAE\x85\xD0\x81\xBB\x61\xC7" +"\xB1\x04\x5A\xC4\x6D\x56\x1C\xD9\x64\xE7\x85\x7F\x88\x91\xC9\x60" +"\x28\x05\xE2\xC6\x24\x8F\xDD\x61\x64\xD8\x09\xDE\x7E\xD3\x4A\x61" +"\x1A\xD3\x73\x58\x4B\xD8\xA0\x54\x25\x48\x83\x6F\x82\x6C\xAF\x36" +"\x51\x2A\x5D\x14\x2F\x41\x25\x00\xDD\xF8\xF3\x95\xFE\x31\x25\x50" +"\x12" , + .key_len = 1191, .m = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a", .c ="\xb2\x97\x76\xb4\xae\x3e\x38\x3c\x7e\x64\x1f\xcc\xa2\x7f\xf6\xbe"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 435/620 crypto: testmgr - some more fixes to RSA test vectors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9d2bb9a74b2877f100637d6ab5685bcd33c69d44 ]
Two more fixes:
* some test vectors in commit 79e6e2f3f3ff ("crypto: testmgr - populate RSA CRT parameters in RSA test vectors") had misplaced commas, which break the test and trigger KASAN warnings at least on x86-64
* pkcs1pad test vector did not have its CRT parameters
--- crypto/testmgr.h | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
crypto/testmgr.h +63 -39
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {"\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7" "\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D" "\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D" -"\x02\x41" ,/* coefficient - integer of 65 bytes */ +"\x02\x41" /* coefficient - integer of 65 bytes */ "\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23" "\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11" "\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E"
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {"\x6A\x37\x3B\x86\x6C\x51\x37\x5B\x1D\x79\xF2\xA3\x43\x10\xC6\xA7" "\x21\x79\x6D\xF9\xE9\x04\x6A\xE8\x32\xFF\xAE\xFD\x1C\x7B\x8C\x29" "\x13\xA3\x0C\xB2\xAD\xEC\x6C\x0F\x8D\x27\x12\x7B\x48\xB2\xDB\x31" -"\x02\x81\x81" ,/* coefficient - integer of 129 bytes */ +"\x02\x81\x81" /* coefficient - integer of 129 bytes */ "\x00\x8D\x1B\x05\xCA\x24\x1F\x0C\x53\x19\x52\x74\x63\x21\xFA\x78" "\x46\x79\xAF\x5C\xDE\x30\xA4\x6C\x20\x38\xE6\x97\x39\xB8\x7A\x70" "\x0D\x8B\x6C\x6D\x13\x74\xD5\x1C\xDE\xA9\xF4\x60\x37\xFE\x68\x77"
@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecrdsa_tv_template[] = {static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = { { .key = -"\x30\x82\x03\x1f\x02\x01\x00\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xd7\x1e\x77\x82" +"\x30\x82\x04\xa5\x02\x01\x00\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xd7\x1e\x77\x82" "\x8c\x92\x31\xe7\x69\x02\xa2\xd5\x5c\x78\xde\xa2\x0c\x8f\xfe\x28" "\x59\x31\xdf\x40\x9c\x60\x61\x06\xb9\x2f\x62\x40\x80\x76\xcb\x67" "\x4a\xb5\x59\x56\x69\x17\x07\xfa\xf9\x4c\xbd\x6c\x37\x7a\x46\x7d"
@@ -1245,42 +1245,66 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = {"\x9e\x49\x63\x6e\x02\xc1\xc9\x3a\x9b\xa5\x22\x1b\x07\x95\xd6\x10" "\x02\x50\xfd\xfd\xd1\x9b\xbe\xab\xc2\xc0\x74\xd7\xec\x00\xfb\x11" "\x71\xcb\x7a\xdc\x81\x79\x9f\x86\x68\x46\x63\x82\x4d\xb7\xf1\xe6" -"\x16\x6f\x42\x63\xf4\x94\xa0\xca\x33\xcc\x75\x13\x02\x82\x01\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" -"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01" -"\x02\x82\x01\x00\x62\xb5\x60\x31\x4f\x3f\x66\x16\xc1\x60\xac\x47" -"\x2a\xff\x6b\x69\x00\x4a\xb2\x5c\xe1\x50\xb9\x18\x74\xa8\xe4\xdc" -"\xa8\xec\xcd\x30\xbb\xc1\xc6\xe3\xc6\xac\x20\x2a\x3e\x5e\x8b\x12" -"\xe6\x82\x08\x09\x38\x0b\xab\x7c\xb3\xcc\x9c\xce\x97\x67\xdd\xef" -"\x95\x40\x4e\x92\xe2\x44\xe9\x1d\xc1\x14\xfd\xa9\xb1\xdc\x71\x9c" -"\x46\x21\xbd\x58\x88\x6e\x22\x15\x56\xc1\xef\xe0\xc9\x8d\xe5\x80" -"\x3e\xda\x7e\x93\x0f\x52\xf6\xf5\xc1\x91\x90\x9e\x42\x49\x4f\x8d" -"\x9c\xba\x38\x83\xe9\x33\xc2\x50\x4f\xec\xc2\xf0\xa8\xb7\x6e\x28" -"\x25\x56\x6b\x62\x67\xfe\x08\xf1\x56\xe5\x6f\x0e\x99\xf1\xe5\x95" -"\x7b\xef\xeb\x0a\x2c\x92\x97\x57\x23\x33\x36\x07\xdd\xfb\xae\xf1" -"\xb1\xd8\x33\xb7\x96\x71\x42\x36\xc5\xa4\xa9\x19\x4b\x1b\x52\x4c" -"\x50\x69\x91\xf0\x0e\xfa\x80\x37\x4b\xb5\xd0\x2f\xb7\x44\x0d\xd4" -"\xf8\x39\x8d\xab\x71\x67\x59\x05\x88\x3d\xeb\x48\x48\x33\x88\x4e" -"\xfe\xf8\x27\x1b\xd6\x55\x60\x5e\x48\xb7\x6d\x9a\xa8\x37\xf9\x7a" -"\xde\x1b\xcd\x5d\x1a\x30\xd4\xe9\x9e\x5b\x3c\x15\xf8\x9c\x1f\xda" -"\xd1\x86\x48\x55\xce\x83\xee\x8e\x51\xc7\xde\x32\x12\x47\x7d\x46" -"\xb8\x35\xdf\x41\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00\x02\x01\x00" - "\x02\x01\x00", - .key_len = 803, +"\x16\x6f\x42\x63\xf4\x94\xa0\xca\x33\xcc\x75\x13\x02\x03\x01\x00" +"\x01\x02\x82\x01\x00\x62\xb5\x60\x31\x4f\x3f\x66\x16\xc1\x60\xac" +"\x47\x2a\xff\x6b\x69\x00\x4a\xb2\x5c\xe1\x50\xb9\x18\x74\xa8\xe4" +"\xdc\xa8\xec\xcd\x30\xbb\xc1\xc6\xe3\xc6\xac\x20\x2a\x3e\x5e\x8b" +"\x12\xe6\x82\x08\x09\x38\x0b\xab\x7c\xb3\xcc\x9c\xce\x97\x67\xdd" +"\xef\x95\x40\x4e\x92\xe2\x44\xe9\x1d\xc1\x14\xfd\xa9\xb1\xdc\x71" +"\x9c\x46\x21\xbd\x58\x88\x6e\x22\x15\x56\xc1\xef\xe0\xc9\x8d\xe5" +"\x80\x3e\xda\x7e\x93\x0f\x52\xf6\xf5\xc1\x91\x90\x9e\x42\x49\x4f" +"\x8d\x9c\xba\x38\x83\xe9\x33\xc2\x50\x4f\xec\xc2\xf0\xa8\xb7\x6e" +"\x28\x25\x56\x6b\x62\x67\xfe\x08\xf1\x56\xe5\x6f\x0e\x99\xf1\xe5" +"\x95\x7b\xef\xeb\x0a\x2c\x92\x97\x57\x23\x33\x36\x07\xdd\xfb\xae" +"\xf1\xb1\xd8\x33\xb7\x96\x71\x42\x36\xc5\xa4\xa9\x19\x4b\x1b\x52" +"\x4c\x50\x69\x91\xf0\x0e\xfa\x80\x37\x4b\xb5\xd0\x2f\xb7\x44\x0d" +"\xd4\xf8\x39\x8d\xab\x71\x67\x59\x05\x88\x3d\xeb\x48\x48\x33\x88" +"\x4e\xfe\xf8\x27\x1b\xd6\x55\x60\x5e\x48\xb7\x6d\x9a\xa8\x37\xf9" +"\x7a\xde\x1b\xcd\x5d\x1a\x30\xd4\xe9\x9e\x5b\x3c\x15\xf8\x9c\x1f" +"\xda\xd1\x86\x48\x55\xce\x83\xee\x8e\x51\xc7\xde\x32\x12\x47\x7d" +"\x46\xb8\x35\xdf\x41\x02\x81\x81\x00\xe4\x4c\xae\xde\x16\xfd\x9f" +"\x83\x55\x5b\x84\x4a\xcf\x1c\xf1\x37\x95\xad\xca\x29\x7f\x2d\x6e" +"\x32\x81\xa4\x2b\x26\x14\x96\x1d\x40\x05\xec\x0c\xaf\x3f\x2c\x6f" +"\x2c\xe8\xbf\x1d\xee\xd0\xb3\xef\x7c\x5b\x9e\x88\x4f\x2a\x8b\x0e" +"\x4a\xbd\xb7\x8c\xfa\x10\x0e\x3b\xda\x68\xad\x41\x2b\xe4\x96\xfa" +"\x7f\x80\x52\x5f\x07\x9f\x0e\x3b\x5e\x96\x45\x1a\x13\x2b\x94\xce" +"\x1f\x07\x69\x85\x35\xfc\x69\x63\x5b\xf8\xf8\x3f\xce\x9d\x40\x1e" +"\x7c\xad\xfb\x9e\xce\xe0\x01\xf8\xef\x59\x5d\xdc\x00\x79\xab\x8a" +"\x3f\x80\xa2\x76\x32\x94\xa9\xea\x65\x02\x81\x81\x00\xf1\x38\x60" +"\x90\x0d\x0c\x2e\x3d\x34\xe5\x90\xea\x21\x43\x1f\x68\x63\x16\x7b" +"\x25\x8d\xde\x82\x2b\x52\xf8\xa3\xfd\x0f\x39\xe7\xe9\x5e\x32\x75" +"\x15\x7d\xd0\xc9\xce\x06\xe5\xfb\xa9\xcb\x22\xe5\xdb\x49\x09\xf2" +"\xe6\xb7\xa5\xa7\x75\x2e\x91\x2d\x2b\x5d\xf1\x48\x61\x45\x43\xd7" +"\xbd\xfc\x11\x73\xb5\x11\x9f\xb2\x18\x3a\x6f\x36\xa7\xc2\xd3\x18" +"\x4d\xf0\xc5\x1f\x70\x8c\x9b\xc5\x1d\x95\xa8\x5a\x9e\x8c\xb1\x4b" +"\x6a\x2a\x84\x76\x2c\xd8\x4f\x47\xb0\x81\x84\x02\x45\xf0\x85\xf8" +"\x0c\x6d\xa7\x0c\x4d\x2c\xb2\x5b\x81\x70\xfd\x6e\x17\x02\x81\x81" +"\x00\x8d\x07\xc5\xfa\x92\x4f\x48\xcb\xd3\xdd\xfe\x02\x4c\xa1\x7f" +"\x6d\xab\xfc\x38\xe7\x9b\x95\xcf\xfe\x49\x51\xc6\x09\xf7\x2b\xa8" +"\x94\x15\x54\x75\x9d\x88\xb4\x05\x55\xc3\xcd\xd4\x4a\xe4\x08\x53" +"\xc8\x09\xbd\x0c\x4d\x83\x65\x75\x85\xbc\x5e\xf8\x2a\xbd\xe2\x5d" +"\x1d\x16\x0e\xf9\x34\x89\x38\xaf\x34\x36\x6c\x2c\x22\x44\x22\x81" +"\x90\x73\xd9\xea\x3a\xaf\x70\x74\x48\x7c\xc6\xb5\xb0\xdc\xe5\xa9" +"\xa8\x76\x4b\xbc\xf7\x00\xf3\x4c\x22\x0f\x44\x62\x1d\x40\x0a\x57" +"\xe2\x5b\xdd\x7c\x7b\x9a\xad\xda\x70\x52\x21\x8a\x4c\xc2\xc3\x98" +"\x75\x02\x81\x81\x00\xed\x24\x5c\xa2\x21\x81\xa1\x0f\xa1\x2a\x33" +"\x0e\x49\xc7\x00\x60\x92\x51\x6e\x9d\x9b\xdc\x6d\x22\x04\x7e\xd6" +"\x51\x19\x9f\xf6\xe3\x91\x2c\x8f\xb8\xa2\x29\x19\xcc\x47\x31\xdf" +"\xf8\xab\xf0\xd2\x02\x83\xca\x99\x16\xc2\xe2\xc3\x3f\x4b\x99\x83" +"\xcb\x87\x9e\x86\x66\xc2\x3e\x91\x21\x80\x66\xf3\xd6\xc5\xcd\xb6" +"\xbb\x64\xef\x22\xcf\x48\x94\x58\xe7\x7e\xd5\x7c\x34\x1c\xb7\xa2" +"\xd0\x93\xe9\x9f\xb5\x11\x61\xd7\x5f\x37\x0f\x64\x52\x70\x11\x78" +"\xcc\x08\x77\xeb\xf8\x30\x1e\xb4\x9e\x1b\x4a\xc7\xa8\x33\x51\xe0" +"\xed\xdf\x53\xf6\xdf\x02\x81\x81\x00\x86\xd9\x4c\xee\x65\x61\xc1" +"\x19\xa9\xd5\x74\x9b\xd5\xca\xf6\x83\x2b\x06\xb4\x20\xfe\x45\x29" +"\xe8\xe3\xfa\xe1\x4f\x28\x8e\x63\x2f\x74\xc3\x3a\x5c\x9a\xf5\x9e" +"\x0e\x0d\xc5\xfe\xa0\x4c\x00\xce\x7b\xa4\x19\x17\x59\xaf\x13\x3a" +"\x03\x8f\x54\xf5\x60\x39\x2e\xd9\x06\xb3\x7c\xd6\x90\x06\x41\x77" +"\xf3\x93\xe1\x7a\x01\x41\xc1\x8f\xfe\x4c\x88\x39\xdb\xde\x71\x9e" +"\x58\xd1\x49\x50\x80\xb2\x5a\x4f\x69\x8b\xb8\xfe\x63\xd4\x42\x3d" +"\x37\x61\xa8\x4c\xff\xb6\x99\x4c\xf4\x51\xe0\x44\xaa\x69\x79\x3f" + "\x81\xa4\x61\x3d\x26\xe9\x04\x52\x64", + .key_len = 1193,/* * m is SHA256 hash of following message: * "\x49\x41\xbe\x0a\x0c\xc9\xf6\x35\x51\xe4\x27\x56\x13\x71\x4b\xd0"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 436/620 media: imx-jpeg: Fix potential error pointer dereference in detach_pm()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1378ffec30367233152b7dbf4fa6a25ee98585d1 ]
The proble is on the first line:
if (jpeg->pd_dev[i] && !pm_runtime_suspended(jpeg->pd_dev[i]))
If jpeg->pd_dev[i] is an error pointer, then passing it to pm_runtime_suspended() will lead to an Oops. The other conditions check for both error pointers and NULL, but it would be more clear to use the IS_ERR_OR_NULL() check for that.
--- drivers/media/platform/imx-jpeg/mxc-jpeg.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/imx-jpeg/mxc-jpeg.c +4 -3
@@ -1997,11 +1997,12 @@ static void mxc_jpeg_detach_pm_domains(struct mxc_jpeg_dev *jpeg)int i;for (i =0 ; i < jpeg->num_domains; i++) { -if (jpeg->pd_dev[i] && !pm_runtime_suspended (jpeg->pd_dev[i])) +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (jpeg->pd_dev[i]) && + !pm_runtime_suspended (jpeg->pd_dev[i]))pm_runtime_force_suspend (jpeg->pd_dev[i]); -if (jpeg->pd_link[i] && !IS_ERR (jpeg->pd_link[i])) +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (jpeg->pd_link[i]))device_link_del (jpeg->pd_link[i]); -if (jpeg->pd_dev[i] && !IS_ERR (jpeg->pd_dev[i])) +if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (jpeg->pd_dev[i]))dev_pm_domain_detach (jpeg->pd_dev[i], true); jpeg->pd_dev[i] =NULL ; jpeg->pd_link[i] =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 437/620 mm: update mark_victim tracepoints fields
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Carlos Galo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 72ba14deb40a9e9668ec5e66a341ed657e5215c2 ]
The current implementation of the mark_victim tracepoint provides only the process ID (pid) of the victim process. This limitation poses challenges for userspace tools requiring real-time OOM analysis and intervention. Although this information is available from the kernel logs, it’s not the appropriate format to provide OOM notifications. In Android, BPF programs are used with the mark_victim trace events to notify userspace of an OOM kill. For consistency, update the trace event to include the same information about the OOMed victim as the kernel logs.
- UID
In Android each installed application has a unique UID. Including the uid assists in correlating OOM events with specific apps.
- Process Name (comm)
Enables identification of the affected process.
- OOM Score
Will allow userspace to get additional insight of the relative kill priority of the OOM victim. In Android, the oom_score_adj is used to categorize app state (foreground, background, etc.), which aids in analyzing user-perceptible impacts of OOM events [1].
- Total VM, RSS Stats, and pgtables
Amount of memory used by the victim that will, potentially, be freed up by killing it.
Stable-dep-of: ade81479c7dd ("memcg: fix soft lockup in the OOM process")
--- include/trace/events/oom.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- mm/oom_kill.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/oom.h +32 -4
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@#include <linux/tracepoint.h> #include <trace/events/mmflags.h> +#define PG_COUNT_TO_KB (x) ((x) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10)) + TRACE_EVENT(oom_score_adj_update, TP_PROTO(struct task_struct *task),
@@ -72,19 +74,45 @@ TRACE_EVENT(reclaim_retry_zone, );TRACE_EVENT (mark_victim, - TP_PROTO(int pid), + TP_PROTO(struct task_struct *task, uid_t uid), -TP_ARGS (pid), +TP_ARGS (task, uid),TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field(int, pid) + __string(comm, task->comm) + __field(unsigned long, total_vm) + __field(unsigned long, anon_rss) + __field(unsigned long, file_rss) + __field(unsigned long, shmem_rss) + __field(uid_t, uid) + __field(unsigned long, pgtables) +__field (short, oom_score_adj) ),TP_fast_assign ( - __entry->pid = pid; + __entry->pid = task->pid; + __assign_str(comm, task->comm); + __entry->total_vm = PG_COUNT_TO_KB(task->mm->total_vm); + __entry->anon_rss = PG_COUNT_TO_KB(get_mm_counter(task->mm, MM_ANONPAGES)); + __entry->file_rss = PG_COUNT_TO_KB(get_mm_counter(task->mm, MM_FILEPAGES)); + __entry->shmem_rss = PG_COUNT_TO_KB(get_mm_counter(task->mm, MM_SHMEMPAGES)); + __entry->uid = uid; + __entry->pgtables = mm_pgtables_bytes(task->mm) >> 10; + __entry->oom_score_adj = task->signal->oom_score_adj; ), -TP_printk ("pid=%d" , __entry->pid) +TP_printk ("pid=%d comm=%s total-vm=%lukB anon-rss=%lukB file-rss:%lukB shmem-rss:%lukB uid=%u pgtables=%lukB oom_score_adj=%hd" , + __entry->pid, +__get_str (comm), + __entry->total_vm, + __entry->anon_rss, + __entry->file_rss, + __entry->shmem_rss, + __entry->uid, + __entry->pgtables, + __entry->oom_score_adj + ) ); TRACE_EVENT(wake_reaper,
mm/oom_kill.c +5 -1
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/mmu_notifier.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -725,6 +726,7 @@ static inline void queue_oom_reaper(struct task_struct *tsk)*/ static void mark_oom_victim (struct task_struct *tsk) { +const struct cred *cred;struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;WARN_ON (oom_killer_disabled);
@@ -746,7 +748,9 @@ static void mark_oom_victim(struct task_struct *tsk)*/ __thaw_task (tsk);atomic_inc (&oom_victims); -trace_mark_victim (tsk->pid); + cred =get_task_cred (tsk); +trace_mark_victim (tsk, cred->uid.val); +put_cred (cred); }/**
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 438/620 memcg: fix soft lockup in the OOM process
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Ridong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ade81479c7dda1ce3eedb215c78bc615bbd04f06 ]
A soft lockup issue was found in the product with about 56,000 tasks were in the OOM cgroup, it was traversing them when the soft lockup was triggered.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [VM Thread:1503066] CPU: 2 PID: 1503066 Comm: VM Thread Kdump: loaded Tainted: G Hardware name: Huawei Cloud OpenStack Nova, BIOS RIP: 0010:console_unlock+0x343/0x540 RSP: 0000:ffffb751447db9a0 EFLAGS: 00000247 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000247 RBP: ffffffffafc71f90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000040 R10: 0000000000000080 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffafc74bd0 R13: ffffffffaf60a220 R14: 0000000000000247 R15: 0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2fe6ad91f0 CR3: 00000004b2076003 CR4: 0000000000360ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: vprintk_emit+0x193/0x280 printk+0x52/0x6e dump_task+0x114/0x130 mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x76/0x100 dump_header+0x1fe/0x210 oom_kill_process+0xd1/0x100 out_of_memory+0x125/0x570 mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0xb5/0xd0 try_charge+0x720/0x770 mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x86/0x180 mem_cgroup_try_charge_delay+0x1c/0x40 do_anonymous_page+0xb5/0x390 handle_mm_fault+0xc4/0x1f0
This is because thousands of processes are in the OOM cgroup, it takes a long time to traverse all of them. As a result, this lead to soft lockup in the OOM process.
To fix this issue, call 'cond_resched' in the 'mem_cgroup_scan_tasks' function per 1000 iterations. For global OOM, call 'touch_softlockup_watchdog' per 1000 iterations to avoid this issue.
--- mm/memcontrol.c | 7 ++++++- mm/oom_kill.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/memcontrol.c +6 -1
@@ -1194,6 +1194,7 @@ int mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, {struct mem_cgroup *iter;int ret =0 ; +int i =0 ;BUG_ON (memcg == root_mem_cgroup);
@@ -1202,8 +1203,12 @@ int mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,struct task_struct *task;css_task_iter_start (&iter->css,CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS , &it); -while (!ret && (task =css_task_iter_next (&it))) +while (!ret && (task =css_task_iter_next (&it))) { +/* Avoid potential softlockup warning */ +if ((++i &1023 ) ==0 ) +cond_resched (); ret =fn (task, arg); + }css_task_iter_end (&it);if (ret) {mem_cgroup_iter_break (memcg, iter);
mm/oom_kill.c +7 -1
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/mmu_notifier.h> #include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/nmi.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -433,10 +434,15 @@ static void dump_tasks(struct oom_control *oc)mem_cgroup_scan_tasks (oc->memcg, dump_task, oc); else {struct task_struct *p; +int i =0 ;rcu_read_lock (); -for_each_process (p) +for_each_process (p) { +/* Avoid potential softlockup warning */ +if ((++i &1023 ) ==0 ) +touch_softlockup_watchdog ();dump_task (p, oc); + }rcu_read_unlock (); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 439/620 ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aab98e2dbd648510f8f51b83fbf4721206ccae45 ]
On 32bit systems the addition operations in ipc_msg_alloc() can potentially overflow leading to memory corruption.
Add bounds checking using KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD to avoid overflow.
--- fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c +9 -0
@@ -566,6 +566,9 @@ ksmbd_ipc_spnego_authen_request(const char *spnego_blob, int blob_len)struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request *req;struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp; +if (blob_len >KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD ) +return NULL ; + msg =ipc_msg_alloc (sizeof (struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request ) + blob_len +1 );if (!msg)
@@ -745,6 +748,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_write(struct ksmbd_session *sess, int handlestruct ksmbd_rpc_command *req;struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp; +if (payload_sz >KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD ) +return NULL ; + msg =ipc_msg_alloc (sizeof (struct ksmbd_rpc_command ) + payload_sz +1 );if (!msg)return NULL ;
@@ -793,6 +799,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_ioctl(struct ksmbd_session *sess, int handlestruct ksmbd_rpc_command *req;struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp; +if (payload_sz >KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD ) +return NULL ; + msg =ipc_msg_alloc (sizeof (struct ksmbd_rpc_command ) + payload_sz +1 );if (!msg)return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 440/620 drm/probe-helper: Create a HPD IRQ event helper for a single connector
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0464ed1a79b818d5e3eda1ac3c23a057ac0cc7c3 ]
The drm_helper_hpd_irq_event() function is iterating over all the connectors when an hotplug event is detected.
During that iteration, it will call each connector detect function and figure out if its status changed.
Finally, if any connector changed, it will notify the user-space and the clients that something changed on the DRM device.
This is supposed to be used for drivers that don't have a hotplug interrupt for individual connectors. However, drivers that can use an interrupt for a single connector are left in the dust and can either reimplement the logic used during the iteration for each connector or use that helper and iterate over all connectors all the time.
Since both are suboptimal, let's create a helper that will only perform the status detection on a single connector.
Stable-dep-of: 666e19604641 ("drm/rockchip: cdn-dp: Use drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event()")
--- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_probe_helper.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++-------- include/drm/drm_probe_helper.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_probe_helper.c +85 -31
@@ -805,6 +805,86 @@ void drm_kms_helper_poll_fini(struct drm_device *dev) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (drm_kms_helper_poll_fini); +static bool check_connector_changed (struct drm_connector *connector) +{ +struct drm_device *dev = connector->dev; +enum drm_connector_status old_status; +u64 old_epoch_counter; + +/* Only handle HPD capable connectors. */ +drm_WARN_ON (dev, !(connector->polled &DRM_CONNECTOR_POLL_HPD )); + +drm_WARN_ON (dev, !mutex_is_locked (&dev->mode_config.mutex)); + + old_status = connector->status; + old_epoch_counter = connector->epoch_counter; + connector->status =drm_helper_probe_detect (connector,NULL , false); + +if (old_epoch_counter == connector->epoch_counter) { +drm_dbg_kms (dev,"[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] Same epoch counter %llu\n" , + connector->base.id, + connector->name, + connector->epoch_counter); + +return false; + } + +drm_dbg_kms (dev,"[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] status updated from %s to %s\n" , + connector->base.id, + connector->name, +drm_get_connector_status_name (old_status), +drm_get_connector_status_name (connector->status)); + +drm_dbg_kms (dev,"[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] Changed epoch counter %llu => %llu\n" , + connector->base.id, + connector->name, + old_epoch_counter, + connector->epoch_counter); + +return true; +} + +/** +* drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event - hotplug processing +* @connector: drm_connector +* +* Drivers can use this helper function to run a detect cycle on a connector +* which has the DRM_CONNECTOR_POLL_HPD flag set in its &polled member. +* +* This helper function is useful for drivers which can track hotplug +* interrupts for a single connector. Drivers that want to send a +* hotplug event for all connectors or can't track hotplug interrupts +* per connector need to use drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(). +* +* This function must be called from process context with no mode +* setting locks held. +* +* Note that a connector can be both polled and probed from the hotplug +* handler, in case the hotplug interrupt is known to be unreliable. +* +* Returns: +* A boolean indicating whether the connector status changed or not +*/ +bool drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event (struct drm_connector *connector) +{ +struct drm_device *dev = connector->dev; +bool changed; + +mutex_lock (&dev->mode_config.mutex); + changed =check_connector_changed (connector); +mutex_unlock (&dev->mode_config.mutex); + +if (changed) { +drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event (dev); +drm_dbg_kms (dev,"[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] Sent hotplug event\n" , + connector->base.id, + connector->name); + } + +return changed; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event); +/** * drm_helper_hpd_irq_event - hotplug processing * @dev: drm_device
@@ -818,9 +898,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_kms_helper_poll_fini);* interrupts for each connector. * * Drivers which support hotplug interrupts for each connector individually and -* which have a more fine-grained detect logic should bypass this code and -* directly call drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event() in case the connector state -* changed. +* which have a more fine-grained detect logic can use +* drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event(). Alternatively, they should bypass this +* code and directly call drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event() in case the connector +* state changed. * * This function must be called from process context with no mode * setting locks held.
@@ -832,9 +913,7 @@ bool drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(struct drm_device *dev) {struct drm_connector *connector;struct drm_connector_list_iter conn_iter; -enum drm_connector_status old_status;bool changed = false; -u64 old_epoch_counter;if (!dev->mode_config.poll_enabled)return false;
@@ -846,33 +925,8 @@ bool drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(struct drm_device *dev)if (!(connector->polled &DRM_CONNECTOR_POLL_HPD ))continue ; - old_status = connector->status; - - old_epoch_counter = connector->epoch_counter; - -DRM_DEBUG_KMS ("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] Old epoch counter %llu\n" , connector->base.id, - connector->name, - old_epoch_counter); - - connector->status =drm_helper_probe_detect (connector,NULL , false); -DRM_DEBUG_KMS ("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] status updated from %s to %s\n" , - connector->base.id, - connector->name, -drm_get_connector_status_name (old_status), -drm_get_connector_status_name (connector->status)); - -DRM_DEBUG_KMS ("[CONNECTOR:%d:%s] New epoch counter %llu\n" , - connector->base.id, - connector->name, - connector->epoch_counter); - -/* -* Check if epoch counter had changed, meaning that we need -* to send a uevent. -*/ -if (old_epoch_counter != connector->epoch_counter) +if (check_connector_changed (connector)) changed = true; - }drm_connector_list_iter_end (&conn_iter);mutex_unlock (&dev->mode_config.mutex);
include/drm/drm_probe_helper.h +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ int drm_helper_probe_detect(struct drm_connector *connector,void drm_kms_helper_poll_init (struct drm_device *dev);void drm_kms_helper_poll_fini (struct drm_device *dev);bool drm_helper_hpd_irq_event (struct drm_device *dev); +bool drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event (struct drm_connector *connector);void drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event (struct drm_device *dev);void drm_kms_helper_poll_disable (struct drm_device *dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 441/620 drm/rockchip: cdn-dp: Use drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 666e1960464140cc4bc9203c203097e70b54c95a ]
The code for detecting and updating the connector status in cdn_dp_pd_event_work() has a number of problems.
- It does not aquire the locks to call the detect helper and update the connector status. These are struct drm_mode_config.connection_mutex and struct drm_mode_config.mutex.
- It does not use drm_helper_probe_detect(), which helps with the details of locking and detection.
- It uses the connector's status field to determine a change to the connector status. The epoch_counter field is the correct one. The field signals a change even if the connector status' value did not change.
Replace the code with a call to drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event(), which fixes all these problems.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/cdn-dp-core.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/cdn-dp-core.c +1 -8
@@ -916,9 +916,6 @@ static void cdn_dp_pd_event_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct cdn_dp_device *dp = container_of(work, struct cdn_dp_device, event_work); -struct drm_connector *connector = &dp->connector; -enum drm_connector_status old_status; -int ret;mutex_lock (&dp->lock);
@@ -980,11 +977,7 @@ static void cdn_dp_pd_event_work(struct work_struct *work) out:mutex_unlock (&dp->lock); - - old_status = connector->status; - connector->status = connector->funcs->detect (connector, false); -if (old_status != connector->status) -drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event (dp->drm_dev); +drm_connector_helper_hpd_irq_event (&dp->connector); } static int cdn_dp_pd_event(struct notifier_block *nb,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 442/620 ASoC: renesas: rz-ssi: Add a check for negative sample_space
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 82a0a3e6f8c02b3236b55e784a083fa4ee07c321 ]
My static checker rule complains about this code. The concern is that if "sample_space" is negative then the "sample_space >= runtime->channels" condition will not work as intended because it will be type promoted to a high unsigned int value.
strm->fifo_sample_size is SSI_FIFO_DEPTH (32). The SSIFSR_TDC_MASK is 0x3f. Without any further context it does seem like a reasonable warning and it can't hurt to add a check for negatives.
--- sound/soc/sh/rz-ssi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/soc/sh/rz-ssi.c +2 -0
@@ -487,6 +487,8 @@ static int rz_ssi_pio_send(struct rz_ssi_priv *ssi, struct rz_ssi_stream *strm) sample_space = strm->fifo_sample_size; ssifsr =rz_ssi_reg_readl (ssi,SSIFSR ); sample_space -= (ssifsr >>SSIFSR_TDC_SHIFT ) &SSIFSR_TDC_MASK ; +if (sample_space <0 ) +return -EINVAL ;/* Only add full frames at a time */ while (frames_left && (sample_space >= runtime->channels)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 443/620 arm64: dts: mediatek: mt8183: Disable DSI display output by default
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 26f6e91fa29a58fdc76b47f94f8f6027944a490c ]
Most SoC dtsi files have the display output interfaces disabled by default, and only enabled on boards that utilize them. The MT8183 has it backwards: the display outputs are left enabled by default, and only disabled at the board level.
Reverse the situation for the DSI output so that it follows the normal scheme. For ease of backporting the DPI output is handled in a separate patch.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt8183.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/mediatek/mt8183.dtsi +1 -0
@@ -1236,6 +1236,7 @@ dsi0: dsi@14014000 { clock-names = "engine", "digital", "hs"; phys = <&mipi_tx0>; phy-names = "dphy"; + status = "disabled"; }; mutex: mutex@14016000 {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 444/620 tpm: Use managed allocation for bios event log
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eddie James <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 441b7152729f4a2bdb100135a58625fa0aeb69e4 ]
Since the bios event log is freed in the device release function, let devres handle the deallocation. This will allow other memory allocation/mapping functions to be used for the bios event log.
Stable-dep-of: a3a860bc0fd6 ("tpm: Change to kvalloc() in eventlog/acpi.c")
--- drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c | 5 +++-- drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/efi.c | 13 +++++++------ drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/of.c | 3 ++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 - 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c +3 -2
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@* Access to the event log extended by the TCG BIOS of PC platform */ +#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/security.h>
@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) }/* malloc EventLog space */ - log->bios_event_log =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL ); + log->bios_event_log =devm_kmalloc (&chip->dev, len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!log->bios_event_log)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip)return format; err: -kfree (log->bios_event_log); +devm_kfree (&chip->dev, log->bios_event_log); log->bios_event_log =NULL ;return ret; }
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/efi.c +7 -6
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@* Thiebaud Weksteen <[email protected]> */ +#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip) }/* malloc EventLog space */ - log->bios_event_log =kmemdup (log_tbl->log, log_size,GFP_KERNEL ); + log->bios_event_log =devm_kmemdup (&chip->dev, log_tbl->log, log_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!log->bios_event_log) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out;
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip) MEMREMAP_WB);if (!final_tbl) {pr_err ("Could not map UEFI TPM final log\n" ); -kfree (log->bios_event_log); +devm_kfree (&chip->dev, log->bios_event_log); ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out; }
@@ -91,11 +92,11 @@ int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip)* Allocate memory for the 'combined log' where we will append the * 'final events log' to. */ - tmp =krealloc (log->bios_event_log, - log_size + final_events_log_size, -GFP_KERNEL ); + tmp =devm_krealloc (&chip->dev, log->bios_event_log, + log_size + final_events_log_size, +GFP_KERNEL );if (!tmp) { -kfree (log->bios_event_log); +devm_kfree (&chip->dev, log->bios_event_log); ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out; }
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/of.c +2 -1
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@* Read the event log created by the firmware on PPC64 */ +#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip)return -EIO ; } - log->bios_event_log =kmemdup (__va (base), size,GFP_KERNEL ); + log->bios_event_log =devm_kmemdup (&chip->dev,__va (base), size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!log->bios_event_log)return -ENOMEM ;
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +0 -1
@@ -267,7 +267,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)idr_remove (&dev_nums_idr, chip->dev_num);mutex_unlock (&idr_lock); -kfree (chip->log.bios_event_log);kfree (chip->work_space.context_buf);kfree (chip->work_space.session_buf);kfree (chip->allocated_banks);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 445/620 tpm: Change to kvalloc() in eventlog/acpi.c
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a3a860bc0fd6c07332e4911cf9a238d20de90173 ]
The following failure was reported on HPE ProLiant D320:
[ 10.693310][ T1] tpm_tis STM0925:00: 2.0 TPM (device-id 0x3, rev-id 0) [ 10.848132][ T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 10.853559][ T1] WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 1 at mm/page_alloc.c:4727 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330 [ 10.862827][ T1] Modules linked in: [ 10.866671][ T1] CPU: 59 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-lp155.2.g52785e2-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 588cd98293a7c9eba9013378d807364c088c9375 [ 10.882741][ T1] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL320 Gen12/ProLiant DL320 Gen12, BIOS 1.20 10/28/2024 [ 10.892170][ T1] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_noprof+0x2ca/0x330 [ 10.898103][ T1] Code: 24 08 e9 4a fe ff ff e8 34 36 fa ff e9 88 fe ff ff 83 fe 0a 0f 86 b3 fd ff ff 80 3d 01 e7 ce 01 00 75 09 c6 05 f8 e6 ce 01 01 <0f> 0b 45 31 ff e9 e5 fe ff ff f7 c2 00 00 08 00 75 42 89 d9 80 e1 [ 10.917750][ T1] RSP: 0000:ffffb7cf40077980 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 10.923777][ T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000040cc0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 10.931727][ T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000040cc0
The above transcript shows that ACPI pointed a 16 MiB buffer for the log events because RSI maps to the 'order' parameter of __alloc_pages_noprof(). Address the bug by moving from devm_kmalloc() to devm_add_action() and kvmalloc() and devm_add_action().
--- drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c +13 -2
@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ static bool tpm_is_tpm2_log(void *bios_event_log, u64 len)return n ==0 ; } +static void tpm_bios_log_free (void *data) +{ +kvfree (data); +} +/* read binary bios log */ int tpm_read_log_acpi (struct tpm_chip *chip) {
@@ -136,7 +141,7 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) }/* malloc EventLog space */ - log->bios_event_log =devm_kmalloc (&chip->dev, len,GFP_KERNEL ); + log->bios_event_log =kvmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!log->bios_event_log)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -162,10 +167,16 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) goto err; } + ret =devm_add_action (&chip->dev, tpm_bios_log_free, log->bios_event_log); +if (ret) { + log->bios_event_log =NULL ; + goto err; + } +return format; err: -devm_kfree (&chip->dev, log->bios_event_log); +tpm_bios_log_free (log->bios_event_log); log->bios_event_log =NULL ;return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 446/620 kfence: allow use of a deferrable timer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marco Elver <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 737b6a10ac19e41877aa1911bf6b361a72a88ad9 ]
Allow the use of a deferrable timer, which does not force CPU wake-ups when the system is idle. A consequence is that the sample interval becomes very unpredictable, to the point that it is not guaranteed that the KFENCE KUnit test still passes.
Nevertheless, on power-constrained systems this may be preferable, so let's give the user the option should they accept the above trade-off.
Stable-dep-of: e64f81946adf ("kfence: skip __GFP_THISNODE allocations on NUMA systems")
--- Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 12 ++++++++++++ lib/Kconfig.kfence | 12 ++++++++++++ mm/kfence/core.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst +12 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,18 @@ guarded by KFENCE. The default is configurable via the Kconfig option ``CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL``. Setting ``kfence.sample_interval=0`` disables KFENCE. +The sample interval controls a timer that sets up KFENCE allocations. By +default, to keep the real sample interval predictable, the normal timer also +causes CPU wake-ups when the system is completely idle. This may be undesirable +on power-constrained systems. The boot parameter ``kfence.deferrable=1`` +instead switches to a "deferrable" timer which does not force CPU wake-ups on +idle systems, at the risk of unpredictable sample intervals. The default is +configurable via the Kconfig option ``CONFIG_KFENCE_DEFERRABLE``. + +.. warning:: + The KUnit test suite is very likely to fail when using a deferrable timer + since it currently causes very unpredictable sample intervals. + The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted, no further KFENCE allocations occur. With ``CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS`` (default 255), the number of available guarded objects can be controlled. Each object
lib/Kconfig.kfence +12 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent ones used as guard pages. +config KFENCE_DEFERRABLE + bool "Use a deferrable timer to trigger allocations" + help + Use a deferrable timer to trigger allocations. This avoids forcing + CPU wake-ups if the system is idle, at the risk of a less predictable + sample interval. + + Warning: The KUnit test suite fails with this option enabled - due to + the unpredictability of the sample interval! + + Say N if you are unsure. + config KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS bool "Use static keys to set up allocations" if EXPERT depends on JUMP_LABEL
mm/kfence/core.c +13 -2
@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ module_param_cb(sample_interval, &sample_interval_param_ops, &kfence_sample_intestatic unsigned long kfence_skip_covered_thresh__read_mostly =75 ;module_param_named (skip_covered_thresh, kfence_skip_covered_thresh, ulong,0644 ); +/* If true, use a deferrable timer. */ +static bool kfence_deferrable__read_mostly =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KFENCE_DEFERRABLE ); +module_param_named (deferrable, kfence_deferrable, bool,0444 ); +/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */ char *__kfence_pool__ro_after_init ;EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kfence_pool);/* Export for test modules. */
@@ -695,6 +699,8 @@ late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init);/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */ +static struct delayed_work kfence_timer; +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS /* Wait queue to wake up allocation-gate timer task. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (allocation_wait);
@@ -717,7 +723,6 @@ static DEFINE_IRQ_WORK(wake_up_kfence_timer_work, wake_up_kfence_timer);* avoids IPIs, at the cost of not immediately capturing allocations if the * instructions remain cached. */ -static struct delayed_work kfence_timer;static void toggle_allocation_gate (struct work_struct *work) {if (!READ_ONCE (kfence_enabled))
@@ -745,7 +750,6 @@ static void toggle_allocation_gate(struct work_struct *work)queue_delayed_work (system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer,msecs_to_jiffies (kfence_sample_interval)); } -static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate);/* === Public interface ===================================================== */
@@ -774,8 +778,15 @@ void __init kfence_init(void)if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS ))static_branch_enable (&kfence_allocation_key); + +if (kfence_deferrable) +INIT_DEFERRABLE_WORK (&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); +else +INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); +WRITE_ONCE (kfence_enabled, true);queue_delayed_work (system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer,0 ); +pr_info ("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n" ,KFENCE_POOL_SIZE ,CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS , (void *)__kfence_pool, (void *)(__kfence_pool +KFENCE_POOL_SIZE ));
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 447/620 kfence: enable check kfence canary on panic via boot param
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: huangshaobo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3c81b3bb0a33e2b555edb8d7eb99a7ae4f17d8bb ]
Out-of-bounds accesses that aren't caught by a guard page will result in corruption of canary memory. In pathological cases, where an object has certain alignment requirements, an out-of-bounds access might never be caught by the guard page. Such corruptions, however, are only detected on kfree() normally. If the bug causes the kernel to panic before kfree(), KFENCE has no opportunity to report the issue. Such corruptions may also indicate failing memory or other faults.
To provide some more information in such cases, add the option to check canary bytes on panic. This might help narrow the search for the panic cause; but, due to only having the allocation stack trace, such reports are difficult to use to diagnose an issue alone. In most cases, such reports are inactionable, and is therefore an opt-in feature (disabled by default).
Stable-dep-of: e64f81946adf ("kfence: skip __GFP_THISNODE allocations on NUMA systems")
--- mm/kfence/core.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
mm/kfence/core.c +34 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@#include <linux/log2.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/notifier.h> +#include <linux/panic_notifier.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
@@ -93,6 +95,10 @@ module_param_named(skip_covered_thresh, kfence_skip_covered_thresh, ulong, 0644)static bool kfence_deferrable__read_mostly =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KFENCE_DEFERRABLE );module_param_named (deferrable, kfence_deferrable, bool,0444 ); +/* If true, check all canary bytes on panic. */ +static bool kfence_check_on_panic__read_mostly ; +module_param_named (check_on_panic, kfence_check_on_panic, bool,0444 ); +/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */ char *__kfence_pool__ro_after_init ;EXPORT_SYMBOL (__kfence_pool);/* Export for test modules. */
@@ -697,6 +703,31 @@ static int kfence_debugfs_init(void)late_initcall (kfence_debugfs_init); +/* === Panic Notifier ====================================================== */ + +static void kfence_check_all_canary (void ) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS ; i++) { +struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + +if (meta->state ==KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED ) +for_each_canary (meta, check_canary_byte); + } +} + +static int kfence_check_canary_callback (struct notifier_block *nb, +unsigned long reason,void *arg) +{ +kfence_check_all_canary (); +return NOTIFY_OK ; +} + +static struct notifier_block kfence_check_canary_notifier = { + .notifier_call = kfence_check_canary_callback, +}; +/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */ static struct delayed_work kfence_timer;
@@ -784,6 +815,9 @@ void __init kfence_init(void)else INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); +if (kfence_check_on_panic) +atomic_notifier_chain_register (&panic_notifier_list, &kfence_check_canary_notifier); +WRITE_ONCE (kfence_enabled, true);queue_delayed_work (system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 448/620 kfence: skip __GFP_THISNODE allocations on NUMA systems
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marco Elver <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e64f81946adf68cd75e2207dd9a51668348a4af8 ]
On NUMA systems, __GFP_THISNODE indicates that an allocation _must_ be on a particular node, and failure to allocate on the desired node will result in a failed allocation.
Skip __GFP_THISNODE allocations if we are running on a NUMA system, since KFENCE can't guarantee which node its pool pages are allocated on.
--- mm/kfence/core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
mm/kfence/core.c +2 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <linux/log2.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/nodemask.h> #include <linux/notifier.h> #include <linux/panic_notifier.h> #include <linux/random.h>
@@ -906,6 +907,7 @@ void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags)* properties (e.g. reside in DMAable memory). */ if ((flags &GFP_ZONEMASK ) || + ((flags & __GFP_THISNODE) &&num_online_nodes () >1 ) || (s->flags & (SLAB_CACHE_DMA |SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 ))) {atomic_long_inc (&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT ]);return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 449/620 soc: mediatek: mtk-devapc: Switch to devm_clk_get_enabled()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 916120df5aa926d65f4666c075ed8d4955ef7bab ]
This driver does exactly devm_clk_get() and clk_prepare_enable() right after, which is exactly what devm_clk_get_enabled() does: clean that up by switching to the latter.
This commit brings no functional changes.
Stable-dep-of: c0eb059a4575 ("soc: mediatek: mtk-devapc: Fix leaking IO map on error paths")
--- drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c | 11 ++--------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c +2 -9
@@ -261,19 +261,14 @@ static int mtk_devapc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)if (!devapc_irq)return -EINVAL ; - ctx->infra_clk =devm_clk_get (&pdev->dev,"devapc-infra-clock" ); + ctx->infra_clk =devm_clk_get_enabled (&pdev->dev,"devapc-infra-clock" );if (IS_ERR (ctx->infra_clk))return -EINVAL ; -if (clk_prepare_enable (ctx->infra_clk)) -return -EINVAL ; - ret =devm_request_irq (&pdev->dev, devapc_irq, devapc_violation_irq,IRQF_TRIGGER_NONE ,"devapc" , ctx); -if (ret) { -clk_disable_unprepare (ctx->infra_clk); +if (ret)return ret; - }platform_set_drvdata (pdev, ctx);
@@ -288,8 +283,6 @@ static int mtk_devapc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)stop_devapc (ctx); -clk_disable_unprepare (ctx->infra_clk); -return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 450/620 soc: mediatek: mtk-devapc: Fix leaking IO map on error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c0eb059a4575ed57f265d9883a5203799c19982c ]
Error paths of mtk_devapc_probe() should unmap the memory. Reported by Smatch:
drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c:292 mtk_devapc_probe() warn: 'ctx->infra_base' from of_iomap() not released on lines: 277,281,286.
--- drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c +13 -5
@@ -258,23 +258,31 @@ static int mtk_devapc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)return -EINVAL ; devapc_irq =irq_of_parse_and_map (node,0 ); -if (!devapc_irq) -return -EINVAL ; +if (!devapc_irq) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto err; + } ctx->infra_clk =devm_clk_get_enabled (&pdev->dev,"devapc-infra-clock" ); -if (IS_ERR (ctx->infra_clk)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (IS_ERR (ctx->infra_clk)) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto err; + } ret =devm_request_irq (&pdev->dev, devapc_irq, devapc_violation_irq,IRQF_TRIGGER_NONE ,"devapc" , ctx);if (ret) -return ret; + goto err;platform_set_drvdata (pdev, ctx);start_devapc (ctx);return 0 ; + +err: +iounmap (ctx->infra_base); +return ret; }static int mtk_devapc_remove (struct platform_device *pdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 451/620 soc/mediatek: mtk-devapc: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a129ac3555c0dca6f04ae404dc0f0790656587fb ]
The .remove() callback for a platform driver returns an int which makes many driver authors wrongly assume it's possible to do error handling by returning an error code. However the value returned is ignored (apart from emitting a warning) and this typically results in resource leaks. To improve here there is a quest to make the remove callback return void. In the first step of this quest all drivers are converted to .remove_new() which already returns void. Eventually after all drivers are converted, .remove_new() will be renamed to .remove().
Trivially convert this driver from always returning zero in the remove callback to the void returning variant.
Stable-dep-of: c9c0036c1990 ("soc: mediatek: mtk-devapc: Fix leaking IO map on driver remove")
--- drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c +2 -4
@@ -285,18 +285,16 @@ static int mtk_devapc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)return ret; } -static int mtk_devapc_remove (struct platform_device *pdev) +static void mtk_devapc_remove (struct platform_device *pdev) {struct mtk_devapc_context *ctx =platform_get_drvdata (pdev);stop_devapc (ctx); - -return 0 ; }static struct platform_driver mtk_devapc_driver = { .probe = mtk_devapc_probe, - .remove = mtk_devapc_remove, + .remove_new = mtk_devapc_remove, .driver = { .name ="mtk-devapc" , .of_match_table = mtk_devapc_dt_match,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 452/620 soc: mediatek: mtk-devapc: Fix leaking IO map on driver remove
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c9c0036c1990da8d2dd33563e327e05a775fcf10 ]
Driver removal should fully clean up - unmap the memory.
--- drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/soc/mediatek/mtk-devapc.c +1 -0
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static void mtk_devapc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)struct mtk_devapc_context *ctx =platform_get_drvdata (pdev);stop_devapc (ctx); +iounmap (ctx->infra_base); }static struct platform_driver mtk_devapc_driver = {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 453/620 media: uvcvideo: Set error_idx during ctrl_commit errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6350d6a4ed487d16a3a021f76a7edcb9cb60fdbf ]
If we have an error setting a control, return the affected control in the error_idx field.
Stable-dep-of: d9fecd096f67 ("media: uvcvideo: Only save async fh if success")
--- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c | 2 +- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h | 10 +++----- 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c +35 -7
@@ -1645,7 +1645,7 @@ int uvc_ctrl_begin(struct uvc_video_chain *chain) }static int uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (struct uvc_device *dev, -struct uvc_entity *entity,int rollback) +struct uvc_entity *entity,int rollback,struct uvc_control **err_ctrl) {struct uvc_control *ctrl;unsigned int i;
@@ -1687,31 +1687,59 @@ static int uvc_ctrl_commit_entity(struct uvc_device *dev, ctrl->dirty =0 ; -if (ret <0 ) +if (ret <0 ) { +if (err_ctrl) + *err_ctrl = ctrl;return ret; + } }return 0 ; } +static int uvc_ctrl_find_ctrl_idx (struct uvc_entity *entity, +struct v4l2_ext_controls *ctrls, +struct uvc_control *uvc_control) +{ +struct uvc_control_mapping *mapping; +struct uvc_control *ctrl_found; +unsigned int i; + +if (!entity) +return ctrls->count; + +for (i =0 ; i < ctrls->count; i++) { +__uvc_find_control (entity, ctrls->controls[i].id, &mapping, + &ctrl_found,0 ); +if (uvc_control == ctrl_found) +return i; + } + +return ctrls->count; +} +int __uvc_ctrl_commit (struct uvc_fh *handle,int rollback, -const struct v4l2_ext_control *xctrls, -unsigned int xctrls_count) +struct v4l2_ext_controls *ctrls) {struct uvc_video_chain *chain = handle->chain; +struct uvc_control *err_ctrl;struct uvc_entity *entity;int ret =0 ;/* Find the control. */ list_for_each_entry (entity, &chain->entities, chain) { - ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (chain->dev, entity, rollback); + ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (chain->dev, entity, rollback, + &err_ctrl);if (ret <0 ) goto done; }if (!rollback) -uvc_ctrl_send_events (handle, xctrls, xctrls_count); +uvc_ctrl_send_events (handle, ctrls->controls, ctrls->count); done: +if (ret <0 && ctrls) + ctrls->error_idx =uvc_ctrl_find_ctrl_idx (entity, ctrls, + err_ctrl);mutex_unlock (&chain->ctrl_mutex);return ret; }
@@ -2165,7 +2193,7 @@ int uvc_ctrl_restore_values(struct uvc_device *dev) ctrl->dirty =1 ; } - ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (dev, entity,0 ); + ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (dev, entity,0 ,NULL );if (ret <0 )return ret; }
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c +1 -1
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_s_try_ext_ctrls(struct uvc_fh *handle, ctrls->error_idx =0 ;if (ioctl ==VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS ) -return uvc_ctrl_commit (handle, ctrls->controls, ctrls->count); +return uvc_ctrl_commit (handle, ctrls);else return uvc_ctrl_rollback (handle); }
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h +4 -6
@@ -886,17 +886,15 @@ void uvc_ctrl_status_event(struct uvc_video_chain *chain,int uvc_ctrl_begin (struct uvc_video_chain *chain);int __uvc_ctrl_commit (struct uvc_fh *handle,int rollback, -const struct v4l2_ext_control *xctrls, -unsigned int xctrls_count); +struct v4l2_ext_controls *ctrls);static inline int uvc_ctrl_commit (struct uvc_fh *handle, -const struct v4l2_ext_control *xctrls, -unsigned int xctrls_count) +struct v4l2_ext_controls *ctrls) { -return __uvc_ctrl_commit (handle,0 , xctrls, xctrls_count); +return __uvc_ctrl_commit (handle,0 , ctrls); }static inline int uvc_ctrl_rollback (struct uvc_fh *handle) { -return __uvc_ctrl_commit (handle,1 ,NULL ,0 ); +return __uvc_ctrl_commit (handle,1 ,NULL ); }int uvc_ctrl_get (struct uvc_video_chain *chain,struct v4l2_ext_control *xctrl);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 454/620 media: uvcvideo: Refactor iterators
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 64627daf0c5f7838111f52bbbd1a597cb5d6871a ]
Avoid using the iterators after the list_for_each() constructs. This patch should be a NOP, but makes cocci, happier:
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c:1861:44-50: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 1850 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c:2195:17-23: ERROR: invalid reference to the index variable of the iterator on line 2179
Stable-dep-of: d9fecd096f67 ("media: uvcvideo: Only save async fh if success")
--- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c +13 -11
@@ -1730,16 +1730,18 @@ int __uvc_ctrl_commit(struct uvc_fh *handle, int rollback,list_for_each_entry (entity, &chain->entities, chain) { ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (chain->dev, entity, rollback, &err_ctrl); -if (ret <0 ) +if (ret <0 ) { +if (ctrls) + ctrls->error_idx = +uvc_ctrl_find_ctrl_idx (entity, ctrls, + err_ctrl); goto done; + } }if (!rollback)uvc_ctrl_send_events (handle, ctrls->controls, ctrls->count); done: -if (ret <0 && ctrls) - ctrls->error_idx =uvc_ctrl_find_ctrl_idx (entity, ctrls, - err_ctrl);mutex_unlock (&chain->ctrl_mutex);return ret; }
@@ -2037,7 +2039,7 @@ static int uvc_ctrl_init_xu_ctrl(struct uvc_device *dev,int uvc_xu_ctrl_query (struct uvc_video_chain *chain,struct uvc_xu_control_query *xqry) { -struct uvc_entity *entity; +struct uvc_entity *entity, *iter;struct uvc_control *ctrl;unsigned int i;bool found;
@@ -2047,16 +2049,16 @@ int uvc_xu_ctrl_query(struct uvc_video_chain *chain,int ret;/* Find the extension unit. */ - found = false; -list_for_each_entry (entity, &chain->entities, chain) { -if (UVC_ENTITY_TYPE (entity) ==UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT && - entity->id == xqry->unit) { - found = true; + entity =NULL ; +list_for_each_entry (iter, &chain->entities, chain) { +if (UVC_ENTITY_TYPE (iter) ==UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT && + iter->id == xqry->unit) { + entity = iter;break ; } } -if (!found) { +if (!entity) {uvc_dbg (chain->dev,CONTROL ,"Extension unit %u not found\n" , xqry->unit);return -ENOENT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 455/620 media: uvcvideo: Only save async fh if success
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d9fecd096f67a4469536e040a8a10bbfb665918b ]
Now we keep a reference to the active fh for any call to uvc_ctrl_set, regardless if it is an actual set or if it is a just a try or if the device refused the operation.
We should only keep the file handle if the device actually accepted applying the operation.
--- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c +11 -7
@@ -1645,7 +1645,10 @@ int uvc_ctrl_begin(struct uvc_video_chain *chain) }static int uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (struct uvc_device *dev, -struct uvc_entity *entity,int rollback,struct uvc_control **err_ctrl) +struct uvc_fh *handle, +struct uvc_entity *entity, +int rollback, +struct uvc_control **err_ctrl) {struct uvc_control *ctrl;unsigned int i;
@@ -1692,6 +1695,10 @@ static int uvc_ctrl_commit_entity(struct uvc_device *dev, *err_ctrl = ctrl;return ret; } + +if (!rollback && handle && + ctrl->info.flags &UVC_CTRL_FLAG_ASYNCHRONOUS ) + ctrl->handle = handle; }return 0 ;
@@ -1728,8 +1735,8 @@ int __uvc_ctrl_commit(struct uvc_fh *handle, int rollback,/* Find the control. */ list_for_each_entry (entity, &chain->entities, chain) { - ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (chain->dev, entity, rollback, - &err_ctrl); + ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (chain->dev, handle, entity, + rollback, &err_ctrl);if (ret <0 ) {if (ctrls) ctrls->error_idx =
@@ -1864,9 +1871,6 @@ int uvc_ctrl_set(struct uvc_fh *handle, mapping->set (mapping, value,uvc_ctrl_data (ctrl,UVC_CTRL_DATA_CURRENT )); -if (ctrl->info.flags &UVC_CTRL_FLAG_ASYNCHRONOUS ) - ctrl->handle = handle; - ctrl->dirty =1 ; ctrl->modified =1 ;return 0 ;
@@ -2195,7 +2199,7 @@ int uvc_ctrl_restore_values(struct uvc_device *dev) ctrl->dirty =1 ; } - ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (dev, entity,0 ,NULL ); + ret =uvc_ctrl_commit_entity (dev,NULL , entity,0 ,NULL );if (ret <0 )return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 456/620 batman-adv: Drop initialization of flexible ethtool_link_ksettings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 813e62a6fe7539fdf0d8e018d4f157b57bdaeedd ]
The commit 94dfc73e7cf4 ("treewide: uapi: Replace zero-length arrays with flexible-array members") changed various structures from using 0-length arrays to flexible arrays
net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c: note: in included file:
./include/linux/ethtool.h:148:38: warning: nested flexible array net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c:128:9: warning: using sizeof on a flexible structure
In theory, this could be worked around by using {} as initializer for the variable on the stack. But this variable doesn't has to be initialized at all by the caller of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings - everything will be initialized by the callee when no error occurs.
Stable-dep-of: 8c8ecc98f5c6 ("batman-adv: Drop unmanaged ELP metric worker")
--- net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c +0 -1
@@ -141,7 +141,6 @@ static bool batadv_v_elp_get_throughput(struct batadv_hardif_neigh_node *neigh,/* if not a wifi interface, check if this device provides data via * ethtool (e.g. an Ethernet adapter) */ -memset (&link_settings,0 ,sizeof (link_settings));rtnl_lock (); ret =__ethtool_get_link_ksettings (hard_iface->net_dev, &link_settings);rtnl_unlock ();
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 457/620 batman-adv: Drop unmanaged ELP metric worker
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8c8ecc98f5c65947b0070a24bac11e12e47cc65d ]
The ELP worker needs to calculate new metric values for all neighbors "reachable" over an interface. Some of the used metric sources require locks which might need to sleep. This sleep is incompatible with the RCU list iterator used for the recorded neighbors. The initial approach to work around of this problem was to queue another work item per neighbor and then run this in a new context.
Even when this solved the RCU vs might_sleep() conflict, it has a major
problems: Nothing was stopping the work item in case it is not needed anymore - for example because one of the related interfaces was removed or the batman-adv module was unloaded - resulting in potential invalid memory accesses.
Directly canceling the metric worker also has various problems:
* cancel_work_sync for a to-be-deactivated interface is called with rtnl_lock held. But the code in the ELP metric worker also tries to use rtnl_lock() - which will never return in this case. This also means that cancel_work_sync would never return because it is waiting for the worker to finish.
* iterating over the neighbor list for the to-be-deactivated interface is currently done using the RCU specific methods. Which means that it is possible to miss items when iterating over it without the associated spinlock - a behaviour which is acceptable for a periodic metric check but not for a cleanup routine (which must "stop" all still running workers)
The better approch is to get rid of the per interface neighbor metric worker and handle everything in the interface worker. The original problems are solved by:
* creating a list of neighbors which require new metric information inside the RCU protected context, gathering the metric according to the new list outside the RCU protected context
* only use rcu_trylock inside metric gathering code to avoid a deadlock when the cancel_delayed_work_sync is called in the interface removal code (which is called with the rtnl_lock held)
--- net/batman-adv/bat_v.c | 2 -- net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.h | 2 -- net/batman-adv/types.h | 3 -- 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/bat_v.c +0 -2
@@ -113,8 +113,6 @@ static void batadv_v_hardif_neigh_init(struct batadv_hardif_neigh_node *hardif_neigh) {ewma_throughput_init (&hardif_neigh->bat_v.throughput); -INIT_WORK (&hardif_neigh->bat_v.metric_work, - batadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update); }/**
net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.c +48 -23
143 lines not on this page · raw message
net/batman-adv/bat_v_elp.h +0 -2
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@#include "main.h" #include <linux/skbuff.h> -#include <linux/workqueue.h> int batadv_v_elp_iface_enable (struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface);void batadv_v_elp_iface_disable (struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface);
@@ -19,6 +18,5 @@ void batadv_v_elp_iface_activate(struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_iface,void batadv_v_elp_primary_iface_set (struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_iface);int batadv_v_elp_packet_recv (struct sk_buff *skb,struct batadv_hard_iface *if_incoming); -void batadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update (struct work_struct *work);#endif /* _NET_BATMAN_ADV_BAT_V_ELP_H_ */
net/batman-adv/types.h +0 -3
@@ -596,9 +596,6 @@ struct batadv_hardif_neigh_node_bat_v {* neighbor */ unsigned long last_unicast_tx; - -/** @metric_work: work queue callback item for metric update */ -struct work_struct metric_work; };/**
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 458/620 usb: dwc3: Increase DWC3 controller halt timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wesley Cheng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 461ee467507cb98a348fa91ff8460908bb0ea423 ]
Since EP0 transactions need to be completed before the controller halt sequence is finished, this may take some time depending on the host and the enabled functions. Increase the controller halt timeout, so that we give the controller sufficient time to handle EP0 transfers.
Stable-dep-of: d3a8c28426fc ("usb: dwc3: Fix timeout issue during controller enter/exit from halt state")
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +2 -1
@@ -2457,7 +2457,7 @@ static void __dwc3_gadget_set_speed(struct dwc3 *dwc)static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop (struct dwc3 *dwc,int is_on) {u32 reg; -u32 timeout =500 ; +u32 timeout =2000 ;if (pm_runtime_suspended (dwc->dev))return 0 ;
@@ -2484,6 +2484,7 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop(struct dwc3 *dwc, int is_on)dwc3_gadget_dctl_write_safe (dwc, reg);do { +usleep_range (1000 ,2000 ); reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_DSTS ); reg &=DWC3_DSTS_DEVCTRLHLT ; }while (--timeout && !(!is_on ^ !reg));
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 459/620 usb: dwc3: Fix timeout issue during controller enter/exit from halt state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Selvarasu Ganesan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d3a8c28426fc1fb3252753a9f1db0d691ffc21b0 ]
There is a frequent timeout during controller enter/exit from halt state after toggling the run_stop bit by SW. This timeout occurs when performing frequent role switches between host and device, causing device enumeration issues due to the timeout. This issue was not present when USB2 suspend PHY was disabled by passing the SNPS quirks (snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk and snps,dis_enblslpm_quirk) from the DTS. However, there is a requirement to enable USB2 suspend PHY by setting of GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY bits when controller starts in gadget or host mode results in the timeout issue.
This commit addresses this timeout issue by ensuring that the bits GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY are cleared before starting the dwc3_gadget_run_stop sequence and restoring them after the dwc3_gadget_run_stop sequence is completed.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +34 -0
@@ -2458,10 +2458,38 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop(struct dwc3 *dwc, int is_on) {u32 reg;u32 timeout =2000 ; +u32 saved_config =0 ;if (pm_runtime_suspended (dwc->dev))return 0 ; +/* +* When operating in USB 2.0 speeds (HS/FS), ensure that +* GUSB2PHYCFG.ENBLSLPM and GUSB2PHYCFG.SUSPHY are cleared before starting +* or stopping the controller. This resolves timeout issues that occur +* during frequent role switches between host and device modes. +* +* Save and clear these settings, then restore them after completing the +* controller start or stop sequence. +* +* This solution was discovered through experimentation as it is not +* mentioned in the dwc3 programming guide. It has been tested on an +* Exynos platforms. +*/ + reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG (0 )); +if (reg &DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY ) { + saved_config |=DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY ; + reg &= ~DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_SUSPHY ; + } + +if (reg &DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM ) { + saved_config |=DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM ; + reg &= ~DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG_ENBLSLPM ; + } + +if (saved_config) +dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG (0 ), reg); + reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_DCTL );if (is_on) { if (DWC3_VER_IS_WITHIN(DWC3, ANY, 187A)) {
@@ -2489,6 +2517,12 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_run_stop(struct dwc3 *dwc, int is_on) reg &=DWC3_DSTS_DEVCTRLHLT ; }while (--timeout && !(!is_on ^ !reg)); +if (saved_config) { + reg =dwc3_readl (dwc->regs,DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG (0 )); + reg |= saved_config; +dwc3_writel (dwc->regs,DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG (0 ), reg); + } +if (!timeout)return -ETIMEDOUT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 460/620 USB: gadget: f_midi: f_midi_complete to call queue_work
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jill Donahue <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4ab37fcb42832cdd3e9d5e50653285ca84d6686f ]
When using USB MIDI, a lock is attempted to be acquired twice through a re-entrant call to f_midi_transmit, causing a deadlock.
Fix it by using queue_work() to schedule the inner f_midi_transmit() via a high priority work queue from the completion handler.
--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c +1 -1
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ f_midi_complete(struct usb_ep *ep, struct usb_request *req)/* Our transmit completed. See if there's more to go. * f_midi_transmit eats req, don't queue it again. */ req->length =0 ; -f_midi_transmit (midi); +queue_work (system_highpri_wq, &midi->work);return ; }break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 461/620 powerpc/64s/mm: Move __real_pte stubs into hash-4k.h
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8ae4f16f7d7b59cca55aeca6db7c9636ffe7fbaa ]
The stub versions of __real_pte() etc are only used with HPT & 4K pages, so move them into the hash-4k.h header.
Stable-dep-of: 61bcc752d1b8 ("powerpc/64s: Rewrite __real_pte() and __rpte_to_hidx() as static inline")
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h | 20 +++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 26 -------------------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h +20 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,26 @@ static inline int hash__hugepd_ok(hugepd_t hpd) }#endif +/* +* With 4K page size the real_pte machinery is all nops. +*/ +#define __real_pte (e, p, o) ((real_pte_t){(e)}) +#define __rpte_to_pte (r) ((r).pte) +#define __rpte_to_hidx (r,index) (pte_val(__rpte_to_pte(r)) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) + +#define pte_iterate_hashed_subpages (rpte, psize, va, index, shift) \ + do { \ + index = 0; \ + shift = mmu_psize_defs[psize].shift; \ + +#define pte_iterate_hashed_end () } while(0) + +/* +* We expect this to be called only for user addresses or kernel virtual +* addresses other than the linear mapping. +*/ +#define pte_pagesize_index (mm, addr, pte) MMU_PAGE_4K +/* * 4K PTE format is different from 64K PTE format. Saving the hash_slot is just * a matter of returning the PTE bits that need to be modified. On 64K PTE,
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h +0 -26
@@ -336,32 +336,6 @@ extern unsigned long pci_io_base;#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ -/* -* This is the default implementation of various PTE accessors, it's -* used in all cases except Book3S with 64K pages where we have a -* concept of sub-pages -*/ -#ifndef __real_pte - -#define __real_pte (e, p, o) ((real_pte_t){(e)}) -#define __rpte_to_pte (r) ((r).pte) -#define __rpte_to_hidx (r,index) (pte_val(__rpte_to_pte(r)) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) - -#define pte_iterate_hashed_subpages (rpte, psize, va, index, shift) \ - do { \ - index = 0; \ - shift = mmu_psize_defs[psize].shift; \ - -#define pte_iterate_hashed_end () } while(0) - -/* -* We expect this to be called only for user addresses or kernel virtual -* addresses other than the linear mapping. -*/ -#define pte_pagesize_index (mm, addr, pte) MMU_PAGE_4K - -#endif /* __real_pte */ -static inline unsigned long pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pte_t *ptep,unsigned long clr,unsigned long set,int huge)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 462/620 powerpc/64s: Rewrite __real_pte() and __rpte_to_hidx() as static inline
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 61bcc752d1b81fde3cae454ff20c1d3c359df500 ]
Rewrite __real_pte() and __rpte_to_hidx() as static inline in order to avoid following warnings/errors when building with 4k page size:
CC arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_tlb.o
arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_tlb.c: In function 'hpte_need_flush':
arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_tlb.c:49:16: error: variable 'offset' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
49 | int i, offset;
| ^~~~~~
CC arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_native.o
arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_native.c: In function 'native_flush_hash_range':
arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_native.c:782:29: error: variable 'index' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
782 | unsigned long hash, index, hidx, shift, slot;
| ^~~~~
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash-4k.h +10 -2
@@ -92,9 +92,17 @@ static inline int hash__hugepd_ok(hugepd_t hpd)/* * With 4K page size the real_pte machinery is all nops. */ -#define __real_pte (e, p, o) ((real_pte_t){(e)}) +static inline real_pte_t __real_pte (pte_t pte,pte_t *ptep,int offset) +{ +return (real_pte_t ){pte}; +} +#define __rpte_to_pte (r) ((r).pte) -#define __rpte_to_hidx (r,index) (pte_val(__rpte_to_pte(r)) >> H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT) + +static inline unsigned long __rpte_to_hidx (real_pte_t rpte,unsigned long index) +{ +return pte_val (__rpte_to_pte (rpte)) >>H_PAGE_F_GIX_SHIFT ; +}#define pte_iterate_hashed_subpages (rpte, psize, va, index, shift) \ do { \
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 463/620 ALSA: hda/realtek: Fixup ALC225 depop procedure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 174448badb4409491bfba2e6b46f7aa078741c5e ]
Headset MIC will no function when power_save=0.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +1 -0
@@ -3770,6 +3770,7 @@ static void alc225_init(struct hda_codec *codec) AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_UNMUTE);msleep (75 ); +alc_update_coef_idx (codec,0x4a ,3 <<10 ,0 );alc_update_coefex_idx (codec,0x57 ,0x04 ,0x0007 ,0x4 );/* Hight power */ } }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 464/620 powerpc/code-patching: Fix KASAN hit by not flagging text patching area as VM_ALLOC
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d262a192d38e527faa5984629aabda2e0d1c4f54 ]
Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4 with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8 Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293 CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac Call Trace: [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable) [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504 [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108 [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8 [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478 [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14 [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4 [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890 [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420 [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274 NIP: 005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8 REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4) MSR: 0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24004422 XER: 00000000
GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001 NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
--- interrupt: c00
The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[f1000000, f1002000) created by:
text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
raw: 00000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
^
f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
==================================================================f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.
Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is never called for that area.
That went undetected until commit e4137f08816b ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")
The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.
--- arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c +1 -1
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int text_area_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu) {struct vm_struct *area; - area =get_vm_area (PAGE_SIZE ,VM_ALLOC ); + area =get_vm_area (PAGE_SIZE ,0 );if (!area) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Failed to create text area for cpu %d\n" , cpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 465/620 geneve: Fix use-after-free in geneve_find_dev().
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9593172d93b9f91c362baec4643003dc29802929 ]
syzkaller reported a use-after-free in geneve_find_dev() [0] without repro.
geneve_configure() links struct geneve_dev.next to net_generic(net, geneve_net_id)->geneve_list.
The net here could differ from dev_net(dev) if IFLA_NET_NS_PID, IFLA_NET_NS_FD, or IFLA_TARGET_NETNSID is set.
When dev_net(dev) is dismantled, geneve_exit_batch_rtnl() finally calls unregister_netdevice_queue() for each dev in the netns, and later the dev is freed.
However, its geneve_dev.next is still linked to the backend UDP socket netns.
Then, use-after-free will occur when another geneve dev is created in the netns.
Let's call geneve_dellink() instead in geneve_destroy_tunnels().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343 Read of size 2 at addr ffff000054d6ee24 by task syz.1.4029/13441 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13441 Comm: syz.1.4029 Not tainted 6.13.0-g0ad9617c78ac #24 dc35ca22c79fb82e8e7bc5c9c9adafea898b1e3d Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x38/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C) __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x108 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x16c/0x6f0 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0xc0/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:602 __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379 geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline] geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343 geneve_newlink+0xb8/0x128 drivers/net/geneve.c:1634 rtnl_newlink_create+0x23c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3795 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x618/0x838 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348 netlink_sendmsg+0x5fc/0x8b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:713 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x410/0x6f8 net/socket.c:2568 ___sys_sendmsg+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:2622 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2654 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2659 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2657 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x90/0x278 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x13c/0x250 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x54/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x4c/0xa8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 Allocated by task 13247: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58 mm/kasan/generic.c:568 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4298 [inline] __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2a0/0x560 mm/slub.c:4304 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x9c/0x230 mm/util.c:645 alloc_netdev_mqs+0xb8/0x11a0 net/core/dev.c:11470 rtnl_create_link+0x2b8/0xb50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3604 rtnl_newlink_create+0x19c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3780 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x618/0x838 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348 netlink_sendmsg+0x5fc/0x8b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:713 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x410/0x6f8 net/socket.c:2568 ___sys_sendmsg+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:2622 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2654 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2659 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2657 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x90/0x278 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x13c/0x250 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x54/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x4c/0xa8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 Freed by task 45: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x30/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:582 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2353 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4613 [inline] kfree+0x140/0x420 mm/slub.c:4761 kvfree+0x4c/0x68 mm/util.c:688 netdev_release+0x94/0xc8 net/core/net-sysfs.c:2065 device_release+0x98/0x1c0 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x2b0/0x438 lib/kobject.c:737 netdev_run_todo+0xe5c/0xfc8 net/core/dev.c:11185 rtnl_unlock+0x20/0x38 net/core/rtnetlink.c:151 cleanup_net+0x4fc/0x8c0 net/core/net_namespace.c:648 process_one_work+0x700/0x1398 kernel/workqueue.c:3236 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3317 [inline] worker_thread+0x8c4/0xe10 kernel/workqueue.c:3398 kthread+0x4bc/0x608 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:862 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000054d6e000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-4k of size 4096
The buggy address is located 3620 bytes inside of
freed 4096-byte region [ffff000054d6e000, ffff000054d6f000)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x94d68
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 memcg:ffff000016276181
flags: 0x3fffe0000000040(head|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 03fffe0000000040 ffff0000c000f500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001f5000000 ffff000016276181
head: 03fffe0000000040 ffff0000c000f500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001f5000000 ffff000016276181
head: 03fffe0000000003 fffffdffc1535a01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff000054d6ed00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff000054d6ed80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff000054d6ee00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff000054d6ee80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff000054d6ef00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb--- drivers/net/geneve.c | 11 +++-------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/net/geneve.c +3 -8
@@ -1965,16 +1965,11 @@ static void geneve_destroy_tunnels(struct net *net, struct list_head *head)/* gather any geneve devices that were moved into this ns */ for_each_netdev_safe (net, dev, aux)if (dev->rtnl_link_ops == &geneve_link_ops) -unregister_netdevice_queue (dev, head); +geneve_dellink (dev, head);/* now gather any other geneve devices that were created in this ns */ -list_for_each_entry_safe (geneve, next, &gn->geneve_list, next) { -/* If geneve->dev is in the same netns, it was already added -* to the list by the previous loop. -*/ -if (!net_eq (dev_net (geneve->dev), net)) -unregister_netdevice_queue (geneve->dev, head); - } +list_for_each_entry_safe (geneve, next, &gn->geneve_list, next) +geneve_dellink (geneve->dev, head); } static void __net_exit geneve_exit_batch_net(struct list_head *net_list)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 466/620 gtp: Suppress list corruption splat in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl().
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4ccacf86491d33d2486b62d4d44864d7101b299d ]
Brad Spengler reported the list_del() corruption splat in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl(). [0]
Commit eb28fd76c0a0 ("gtp: Destroy device along with udp socket's netns dismantle.") added the for_each_netdev() loop in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() to destroy devices in each netns as done in geneve and ip tunnels.
However, this could trigger ->dellink() twice for the same device during ->exit_batch_rtnl().
Say we have two netns A & B and gtp device B that resides in netns B but whose UDP socket is in netns A.
1. cleanup_net() processes netns A and then B.
2. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating
netns A's gn->gtp_dev_list and calls ->dellink().
[ device B is not yet unlinked from netns B
as unregister_netdevice_many() has not been called. ]
3. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating
netns B's for_each_netdev() and calls ->dellink().
gtp_dellink() cleans up the device's hash table, unlinks the dev from gn->gtp_dev_list, and calls unregister_netdevice_queue().
Basically, calling gtp_dellink() multiple times is fine unless CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST is enabled.
Let's remove for_each_netdev() in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() and delegate the destruction to default_device_exit_batch() as done in bareudp.
[0]:list_del corruption, ffff8880aaa62c00->next (autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object]) is LIST_POISON1 (ffffffffffffff02) (prev is 0xffffffffffffff04) kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1804 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G T 6.12.13-grsec-full-20250211091339 #1 Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84947381>] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58 Code: c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 9f b1 f7 fc 0f 0b 4d 89 f0 48 c7 c1 02 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 e0 c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 7f b1 f7 fc <0f> 0b 4d 89 e8 48 c7 c1 04 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 60 RSP: 0018:fffffe8040b4fbd0 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff818c4054 RDX: ffffffff84947381 RSI: ffffffff818d1512 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8880aaa62c00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbd008169f32 R10: fffffe8040b4f997 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: a1988d84f24943e4 R13: ffffffffffffff02 R14: ffffffffffffff04 R15: ffff8880aaa62c08 RBX: kasan shadow of 0x0 RCX: __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x74/0xe0 kernel/printk/printk.c:4554 RDX: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58 RSI: vprintk+0x72/0x100 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:71 RBP: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object] RSP: process kstack fffffe8040b4fbd0+0x7bd0/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ] R09: kasan shadow of process kstack fffffe8040b4f990+0x7990/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ] R10: process kstack fffffe8040b4f997+0x7997/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ] R15: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc08/0x1000 [slab object] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888116000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000748f5372c000 CR3: 0000000015408000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 shadow CR4: 00000000003406f0 Stack: 0000000000000000 ffffffff8a0c35e7 ffffffff8a0c3603 ffff8880aaa62c00 ffff8880aaa62c00 0000000000000004 ffff88811145311c 0000000000000005 0000000000000001 ffff8880aaa62000 fffffe8040b4fd40 ffffffff8a0c360d Call Trace: <TASK> [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:131 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:248 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] list_del include/linux/list.h:262 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] gtp_dellink+0x16d/0x360 drivers/net/gtp.c:1557 fffffe8040b4fc28 [<ffffffff8a0d0404>] gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl+0x124/0x2c0 drivers/net/gtp.c:2495 fffffe8040b4fc88 [<ffffffff8e705b24>] cleanup_net+0x5a4/0xbe0 net/core/net_namespace.c:635 fffffe8040b4fcd0 [<ffffffff81754c97>] process_one_work+0xbd7/0x2160 kernel/workqueue.c:3326 fffffe8040b4fd88 [<ffffffff81757195>] process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3407 [inline] fffffe8040b4fec0 [<ffffffff81757195>] worker_thread+0x6b5/0xfa0 kernel/workqueue.c:3488 fffffe8040b4fec0 [<ffffffff817782a0>] kthread+0x360/0x4c0 kernel/kthread.c:397 fffffe8040b4ff78 [<ffffffff814d8594>] ret_from_fork+0x74/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:172 fffffe8040b4ffb8 [<ffffffff8110f509>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x29/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:399 fffffe8040b4ffe8 </TASK> Modules linked in:
--- drivers/net/gtp.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/gtp.c +0 -5
@@ -1414,11 +1414,6 @@ static void __net_exit gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl(struct list_head *net_list,list_for_each_entry (net, net_list, exit_list) {struct gtp_net *gn =net_generic (net, gtp_net_id);struct gtp_dev *gtp, *gtp_next; -struct net_device *dev; - -for_each_netdev (net, dev) -if (dev->rtnl_link_ops == >p_link_ops) -gtp_dellink (dev, dev_to_kill);list_for_each_entry_safe (gtp, gtp_next, &gn->gtp_dev_list, list)gtp_dellink (gtp->dev, dev_to_kill);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 467/620 geneve: Suppress list corruption splat in geneve_destroy_tunnels().
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 62fab6eef61f245dc8797e3a6a5b890ef40e8628 ]
As explained in the previous patch, iterating for_each_netdev() and gn->geneve_list during ->exit_batch_rtnl() could trigger ->dellink() twice for the same device.
If CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST is enabled, we will see a list_del() corruption splat in the 2nd call of geneve_dellink().
Let's remove for_each_netdev() in geneve_destroy_tunnels() and delegate that part to default_device_exit_batch().
--- drivers/net/geneve.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/geneve.c +0 -7
@@ -1960,14 +1960,7 @@ static void geneve_destroy_tunnels(struct net *net, struct list_head *head) {struct geneve_net *gn =net_generic (net, geneve_net_id);struct geneve_dev *geneve, *next; -struct net_device *dev, *aux; -/* gather any geneve devices that were moved into this ns */ -for_each_netdev_safe (net, dev, aux) -if (dev->rtnl_link_ops == &geneve_link_ops) -geneve_dellink (dev, head); - -/* now gather any other geneve devices that were created in this ns */ list_for_each_entry_safe (geneve, next, &gn->geneve_list, next)geneve_dellink (geneve->dev, head); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 468/620 net: extract port range fields from fl_flow_key
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maksym Glubokiy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 83d85bb069152b790caad905fa53e6d50cd3734d ]
So it can be used for port range filter offloading.
Stable-dep-of: 3e5796862c69 ("flow_dissector: Fix handling of mixed port and port-range keys")
--- include/net/flow_dissector.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ include/net/flow_offload.h | 6 ++++++ net/core/flow_offload.c | 7 +++++++ net/sched/cls_flower.c | 8 +------- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/net/flow_dissector.h +16 -0
@@ -178,6 +178,22 @@ struct flow_dissector_key_ports { }; }; +/** +* struct flow_dissector_key_ports_range +* @tp: port number from packet +* @tp_min: min port number in range +* @tp_max: max port number in range +*/ +struct flow_dissector_key_ports_range { +union { +struct flow_dissector_key_ports tp; +struct { +struct flow_dissector_key_ports tp_min; +struct flow_dissector_key_ports tp_max; + }; + }; +}; +/** * flow_dissector_key_icmp: * type: ICMP type
include/net/flow_offload.h +6 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ struct flow_match_ports {struct flow_dissector_key_ports *key, *mask; }; +struct flow_match_ports_range { +struct flow_dissector_key_ports_range *key, *mask; +}; +struct flow_match_icmp {struct flow_dissector_key_icmp *key, *mask; };
@@ -94,6 +98,8 @@ void flow_rule_match_ip(const struct flow_rule *rule, struct flow_match_ip *out);void flow_rule_match_ports (const struct flow_rule *rule,struct flow_match_ports *out); +void flow_rule_match_ports_range (const struct flow_rule *rule, +struct flow_match_ports_range *out);void flow_rule_match_tcp (const struct flow_rule *rule,struct flow_match_tcp *out); void flow_rule_match_icmp(const struct flow_rule *rule,
net/core/flow_offload.c +7 -0
@@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ void flow_rule_match_ports(const struct flow_rule *rule, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (flow_rule_match_ports); +void flow_rule_match_ports_range (const struct flow_rule *rule, +struct flow_match_ports_range *out) +{ +FLOW_DISSECTOR_MATCH (rule,FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE , out); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (flow_rule_match_ports_range); +void flow_rule_match_tcp (const struct flow_rule *rule,struct flow_match_tcp *out) {
net/sched/cls_flower.c +1 -7
@@ -62,13 +62,7 @@ struct fl_flow_key {struct flow_dissector_key_ip ip;struct flow_dissector_key_ip enc_ip;struct flow_dissector_key_enc_opts enc_opts; -union { -struct flow_dissector_key_ports tp; -struct { -struct flow_dissector_key_ports tp_min; -struct flow_dissector_key_ports tp_max; - }; - } tp_range; +struct flow_dissector_key_ports_range tp_range;struct flow_dissector_key_ct ct;struct flow_dissector_key_hash hash; }__aligned(BITS_PER_LONG / 8) ;/* Ensure that we can do comparisons as longs. */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 469/620 flow_dissector: Fix handling of mixed port and port-range keys
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e5796862c692ea608d96f0a1437f9290f44953a ]
This patch fixes a bug in TC flower filter where rules combining a specific destination port with a source port range weren't working correctly.
The specific case was when users tried to configure rules like:
tc filter add dev ens38 ingress protocol ip flower ip_proto udp \dst_port 5000 src_port 2000-3000 action drop
The root cause was in the flow dissector code. While both FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS and FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE flags were being set correctly in the classifier, the __skb_flow_dissect_ports() function was only populating one of them: whichever came first in the enum check. This meant that when the code needed both a specific port and a port range, one of them would be left as 0, causing the filter to not match packets as expected.
Fix it by removing the either/or logic and instead checking and populating both key types independently when they're in use.
--- net/core/flow_dissector.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/core/flow_dissector.c +19 -12
@@ -725,23 +725,30 @@ __skb_flow_dissect_ports(const struct sk_buff *skb, void *target_container, const void *data, int nhoff, u8 ip_proto, int hlen) { - enum flow_dissector_key_id dissector_ports = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_MAX; -struct flow_dissector_key_ports *key_ports; + struct flow_dissector_key_ports_range *key_ports_range = NULL; +struct flow_dissector_key_ports *key_ports =NULL ; +__be32 ports;if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector,FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS )) - dissector_ports =FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS ; -else if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector, -FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE )) - dissector_ports =FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE ; + key_ports =skb_flow_dissector_target (flow_dissector, +FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS , + target_container); + +if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector,FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE )) + key_ports_range =skb_flow_dissector_target (flow_dissector, +FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE , + target_container); -if (dissector_ports ==FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_MAX ) +if (!key_ports && !key_ports_range)return ; - key_ports =skb_flow_dissector_target (flow_dissector, - dissector_ports, - target_container); - key_ports->ports =__skb_flow_get_ports (skb, nhoff, ip_proto, - data, hlen); + ports =__skb_flow_get_ports (skb, nhoff, ip_proto, data, hlen); + +if (key_ports) + key_ports->ports = ports; + +if (key_ports_range) + key_ports_range->tp.ports = ports; } static void
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 470/620 flow_dissector: Fix port range key handling in BPF conversion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 69ab34f705fbfabcace64b5d53bb7a4450fac875 ]
Fix how port range keys are handled in __skb_flow_bpf_to_target() by:
- Separating PORTS and PORTS_RANGE key handling
- Using correct key_ports_range structure for range keys
- Properly initializing both key types independently
This ensures port range information is correctly stored in its dedicated structure rather than incorrectly using the regular ports key structure.
--- net/core/flow_dissector.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/core/flow_dissector.c +10 -8
@@ -803,6 +803,7 @@ static void __skb_flow_bpf_to_target(const struct bpf_flow_keys *flow_keys,struct flow_dissector *flow_dissector, void *target_container) { + struct flow_dissector_key_ports_range *key_ports_range = NULL;struct flow_dissector_key_ports *key_ports =NULL ;struct flow_dissector_key_control *key_control;struct flow_dissector_key_basic *key_basic;
@@ -847,20 +848,21 @@ static void __skb_flow_bpf_to_target(const struct bpf_flow_keys *flow_keys, key_control->addr_type =FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS ; } -if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector,FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS )) +if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector,FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS )) { key_ports =skb_flow_dissector_target (flow_dissector,FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS , target_container); -else if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector, -FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE )) - key_ports =skb_flow_dissector_target (flow_dissector, -FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE , - target_container); - -if (key_ports) { key_ports->src = flow_keys->sport; key_ports->dst = flow_keys->dport; } +if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector, +FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE )) { + key_ports_range =skb_flow_dissector_target (flow_dissector, +FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_PORTS_RANGE , + target_container); + key_ports_range->tp.src = flow_keys->sport; + key_ports_range->tp.dst = flow_keys->dport; + }if (dissector_uses_key (flow_dissector,FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_FLOW_LABEL )) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 471/620 net: Add non-RCU dev_getbyhwaddr() helper
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4b5a28b38c4a0106c64416a1b2042405166b26ce ]
Add dedicated helper for finding devices by hardware address when holding rtnl_lock, similar to existing dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu(). This prevents PROVE_LOCKING warnings when rtnl_lock is held but RCU read lock is not.
Extract common address comparison logic into dev_addr_cmp().
The context about this change could be found in the following discussion:
Stable-dep-of: 4eae0ee0f1e6 ("arp: switch to dev_getbyhwaddr() in arp_req_set_public()")
--- include/linux/netdevice.h | 2 ++ net/core/dev.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/netdevice.h +2 -0
@@ -2966,6 +2966,8 @@ static inline struct net_device *first_net_device_rcu(struct net *net) }int netdev_boot_setup_check (struct net_device *dev); +struct net_device *dev_getbyhwaddr (struct net *net,unsigned short type, +const char *hwaddr);struct net_device *dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu (struct net *net,unsigned short type,const char *hwaddr);struct net_device *dev_getfirstbyhwtype (struct net *net,unsigned short type);
net/core/dev.c +34 -3
@@ -972,6 +972,12 @@ int netdev_get_name(struct net *net, char *name, int ifindex)return ret; } +static bool dev_addr_cmp (struct net_device *dev,unsigned short type, +const char *ha) +{ +return dev->type == type && !memcmp (dev->dev_addr, ha, dev->addr_len); +} +/** * dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu - find a device by its hardware address * @net: the applicable net namespace
@@ -980,7 +986,7 @@ int netdev_get_name(struct net *net, char *name, int ifindex)* * Search for an interface by MAC address. Returns NULL if the device * is not found or a pointer to the device. -* The caller must hold RCU or RTNL. +* The caller must hold RCU. * The returned device has not had its ref count increased * and the caller must therefore be careful about locking *
@@ -992,14 +998,39 @@ struct net_device *dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu(struct net *net, unsigned short type,struct net_device *dev;for_each_netdev_rcu (net, dev) -if (dev->type == type && - !memcmp (dev->dev_addr, ha, dev->addr_len)) +if (dev_addr_cmp (dev, type, ha))return dev;return NULL ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu); +/** +* dev_getbyhwaddr() - find a device by its hardware address +* @net: the applicable net namespace +* @type: media type of device +* @ha: hardware address +* +* Similar to dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu(), but the owner needs to hold +* rtnl_lock. +* +* Context: rtnl_lock() must be held. +* Return: pointer to the net_device, or NULL if not found +*/ +struct net_device *dev_getbyhwaddr (struct net *net,unsigned short type, +const char *ha) +{ +struct net_device *dev; + +ASSERT_RTNL (); +for_each_netdev (net, dev) +if (dev_addr_cmp (dev, type, ha)) +return dev; + +return NULL ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (dev_getbyhwaddr); +struct net_device *dev_getfirstbyhwtype (struct net *net,unsigned short type) {struct net_device *dev, *ret =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 472/620 arp: switch to dev_getbyhwaddr() in arp_req_set_public()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4eae0ee0f1e6256d0b0b9dd6e72f1d9cf8f72e08 ]
The arp_req_set_public() function is called with the rtnl lock held, which provides enough synchronization protection. This makes the RCU variant of dev_getbyhwaddr() unnecessary. Switch to using the simpler dev_getbyhwaddr() function since we already have the required rtnl locking.
This change helps maintain consistency in the networking code by using the appropriate helper function for the existing locking context. Since we're not holding the RCU read lock in arp_req_set_public() existing code could trigger false positive locking warnings.
--- net/ipv4/arp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/arp.c +1 -1
@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ static int arp_req_set_public(struct net *net, struct arpreq *r,if (mask && mask !=htonl (0xFFFFFFFF ))return -EINVAL ;if (!dev && (r->arp_flags &ATF_COM )) { - dev =dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu (net, r->arp_ha.sa_family, + dev =dev_getbyhwaddr (net, r->arp_ha.sa_family, r->arp_ha.sa_data);if (!dev)return -ENODEV ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 473/620 power: supply: da9150-fg: fix potential overflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrey Vatoropin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3fb3cb4350befc4f901c54e0cb4a2a47b1302e08 ]
Size of variable sd_gain equals four bytes - DA9150_QIF_SD_GAIN_SIZE. Size of variable shunt_val equals two bytes - DA9150_QIF_SHUNT_VAL_SIZE.
The expression sd_gain * shunt_val is currently being evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic. So during the multiplication an overflow may occur.
As the value of type 'u64' is used as storage for the eventual result, put ULL variable at the first position of each expression in order to give the compiler complete information about the proper arithmetic to use. According to C99 the guaranteed width for a variable of type 'unsigned long long' >= 64 bits.
Remove the explicit cast to u64 as it is meaningless.
Just for the sake of consistency, perform the similar trick with another expression concerning 'iavg'.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
--- drivers/power/supply/da9150-fg.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/power/supply/da9150-fg.c +2 -2
@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ static int da9150_fg_current_avg(struct da9150_fg *fg, DA9150_QIF_SD_GAIN_SIZE);da9150_fg_read_sync_end (fg); - div = (u64) (sd_gain * shunt_val *65536ULL ); + div =65536ULL * sd_gain * shunt_val;do_div (div,1000000 ); - res = (u64) (iavg *1000000ULL ); + res =1000000ULL * iavg;do_div (res, div); val->intval = (int ) res;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 474/620 nvme/ioctl: add missing space in err message
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Caleb Sander Mateos <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 487a3ea7b1b8ba2ca7d2c2bb3c3594dc360d6261 ]
nvme_validate_passthru_nsid() logs an err message whose format string is split over 2 lines. There is a missing space between the two pieces, resulting in log lines like "... does not match nsid (1)of namespace". Add the missing space between ")" and "of". Also combine the format string pieces onto a single line to make the err message easier to grep.
--- drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/ioctl.c +1 -2
@@ -183,8 +183,7 @@ static bool nvme_validate_passthru_nsid(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, {if (ns && nsid != ns->head->ns_id) {dev_err (ctrl->device, -"%s: nsid (%u) in cmd does not match nsid (%u)" -"of namespace\n" , +"%s: nsid (%u) in cmd does not match nsid (%u) of namespace\n" , current->comm, nsid, ns->head->ns_id);return false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 475/620 bpf: skip non exist keys in generic_map_lookup_batch
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yan Zhai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5644c6b50ffee0a56c1e01430a8c88e34decb120 ]
The generic_map_lookup_batch currently returns EINTR if it fails with ENOENT and retries several times on bpf_map_copy_value. The next batch would start from the same location, presuming it's a transient issue. This is incorrect if a map can actually have "holes", i.e. "get_next_key" can return a key that does not point to a valid value. At least the array of maps type may contain such holes legitly. Right now these holes show up, generic batch lookup cannot proceed any more. It will always fail with EINTR errors.
Rather, do not retry in generic_map_lookup_batch. If it finds a non existing element, skip to the next key. This simple solution comes with a price that transient errors may not be recovered, and the iteration might cycle back to the first key under parallel deletion. For example, Hou Tao <[email protected]> pointed out a following scenario:
For LPM trie map:
(1) ->map_get_next_key(map, prev_key, key) returns a valid key
(2) bpf_map_copy_value() return -ENOMENT
It means the key must be deleted concurrently.
(3) goto next_key
It swaps the prev_key and key
(4) ->map_get_next_key(map, prev_key, key) againprev_key points to a non-existing key, for LPM trie it will treat just like prev_key=NULL case, the returned key will be duplicated.
With the retry logic, the iteration can continue to the key next to the deleted one. But if we directly skip to the next key, the iteration loop would restart from the first key for the lpm_trie type.
However, not all races may be recovered. For example, if current key is deleted after instead of before bpf_map_copy_value, or if the prev_key also gets deleted, then the loop will still restart from the first key for lpm_tire anyway. For generic lookup it might be better to stay simple, i.e. just skip to the next key. To guarantee that the output keys are not duplicated, it is better to implement map type specific batch operations, which can properly lock the trie and synchronize with concurrent mutators.
--- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 18 +++++------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +5 -13
@@ -1435,8 +1435,6 @@ int generic_map_update_batch(struct bpf_map *map,return err; } -#define MAP_LOOKUP_RETRIES 3 -int generic_map_lookup_batch (struct bpf_map *map,const union bpf_attr *attr,union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
@@ -1446,8 +1444,8 @@ int generic_map_lookup_batch(struct bpf_map *map,void __user *values =u64_to_user_ptr (attr->batch.values);void __user *keys =u64_to_user_ptr (attr->batch.keys);void *buf, *buf_prevkey, *prev_key, *key, *value; -int err, retry =MAP_LOOKUP_RETRIES ;u32 value_size, cp, max_count; +int err;if (attr->batch.elem_flags & ~BPF_F_LOCK )return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1493,14 +1491,8 @@ int generic_map_lookup_batch(struct bpf_map *map, err =bpf_map_copy_value (map, key, value, attr->batch.elem_flags); -if (err == -ENOENT ) { -if (retry) { - retry--; -continue ; - } - err = -EINTR ; -break ; - } +if (err == -ENOENT ) + goto next_key;if (err) goto free_buf;
@@ -1515,12 +1507,12 @@ int generic_map_lookup_batch(struct bpf_map *map, goto free_buf; } + cp++; +next_key:if (!prev_key) prev_key = buf_prevkey;swap (prev_key, key); - retry =MAP_LOOKUP_RETRIES ; - cp++;cond_resched (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 476/620 tee: optee: Fix supplicant wait loop
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
commit 70b0d6b0a199c5a3ee6c72f5e61681ed6f759612 upstream.
OP-TEE supplicant is a user-space daemon and it's possible for it be hung or crashed or killed in the middle of processing an OP-TEE RPC call. It becomes more complicated when there is incorrect shutdown ordering of the supplicant process vs the OP-TEE client application which can eventually lead to system hang-up waiting for the closure of the client application.
Allow the client process waiting in kernel for supplicant response to be killed rather than indefinitely waiting in an unkillable state. Also, a normal uninterruptible wait should not have resulted in the hung-task watchdog getting triggered, but the endless loop would.
This fixes issues observed during system reboot/shutdown when supplicant got hung for some reason or gets crashed/killed which lead to client getting hung in an unkillable state. It in turn lead to system being in hung up state requiring hard power off/on to recover.
--- drivers/tee/optee/supp.c | 35 ++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
drivers/tee/optee/supp.c +8 -27
@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ u32 optee_supp_thrd_req(struct tee_contestruct optee *optee =tee_get_drvdata (ctx->teedev);struct optee_supp *supp = &optee->supp;struct optee_supp_req *req; -bool interruptable;u32 ret;/*
@@ -111,36 +110,18 @@ u32 optee_supp_thrd_req(struct tee_conte/* * Wait for supplicant to process and return result, once we've * returned from wait_for_completion(&req->c) successfully we have -* exclusive access again. +* exclusive access again. Allow the wait to be killable such that +* the wait doesn't turn into an indefinite state if the supplicant +* gets hung for some reason. */ -while (wait_for_completion_interruptible (&req->c)) { +if (wait_for_completion_killable (&req->c)) {mutex_lock (&supp->mutex); - interruptable = !supp->ctx; -if (interruptable) { -/* -* There's no supplicant available and since the -* supp->mutex currently is held none can -* become available until the mutex released -* again. -* -* Interrupting an RPC to supplicant is only -* allowed as a way of slightly improving the user -* experience in case the supplicant hasn't been -* started yet. During normal operation the supplicant -* will serve all requests in a timely manner and -* interrupting then wouldn't make sense. -*/ -if (req->in_queue) { -list_del (&req->link); - req->in_queue = false; - } +if (req->in_queue) { +list_del (&req->link); + req->in_queue = false; }mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); - -if (interruptable) { - req->ret =TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION ; -break ; - } + req->ret =TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION ; } ret = req->ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 477/620 drop_monitor: fix incorrect initialization order
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gavrilov Ilia <[email protected]>
commit 07b598c0e6f06a0f254c88dafb4ad50f8a8c6eea upstream.
Syzkaller reports the following bug:
BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#1, syz-executor.0/7995 lock: 0xffff88805303f3e0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0 CPU: 1 PID: 7995 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G E 5.10.209+ #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x119/0x179 lib/dump_stack.c:118 debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:83 [inline] do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f6/0x270 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:112 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:117 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 reset_per_cpu_data+0xe6/0x240 [drop_monitor] net_dm_cmd_trace+0x43d/0x17a0 [drop_monitor] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22f/0x330 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x341/0x5a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2497 genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348 netlink_sendmsg+0x914/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1916 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x157/0x190 net/socket.c:663 ____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x870 net/socket.c:2378 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2432 __sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2461 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xc7 RIP: 0033:0x7f3f9815aee9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f3f972bf0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3f9826d050 RCX: 00007f3f9815aee9 RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020001300 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007f3f981b63bd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f3f9826d050 R15: 00007ffe01ee6768
If drop_monitor is built as a kernel module, syzkaller may have time to send a netlink NET_DM_CMD_START message during the module loading. This will call the net_dm_monitor_start() function that uses a spinlock that has not yet been initialized.
To fix this, let's place resource initialization above the registration of a generic netlink family.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
--- net/core/drop_monitor.c | 29 ++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
net/core/drop_monitor.c +14 -15
@@ -1729,30 +1729,30 @@ static int __init init_net_drop_monitor(return -ENOSPC ; } - rc =genl_register_family (&net_drop_monitor_family); -if (rc) { -pr_err ("Could not create drop monitor netlink family\n" ); -return rc; +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { +net_dm_cpu_data_init (cpu); +net_dm_hw_cpu_data_init (cpu); } -WARN_ON (net_drop_monitor_family.mcgrp_offset !=NET_DM_GRP_ALERT ); rc =register_netdevice_notifier (&dropmon_net_notifier);if (rc <0 ) {pr_crit ("Failed to register netdevice notifier\n" ); +return rc; + } + + rc =genl_register_family (&net_drop_monitor_family); +if (rc) { +pr_err ("Could not create drop monitor netlink family\n" ); goto out_unreg; } +WARN_ON (net_drop_monitor_family.mcgrp_offset !=NET_DM_GRP_ALERT ); rc =0 ; -for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { -net_dm_cpu_data_init (cpu); -net_dm_hw_cpu_data_init (cpu); - } - goto out; out_unreg: -genl_unregister_family (&net_drop_monitor_family); +WARN_ON (unregister_netdevice_notifier (&dropmon_net_notifier)); out:return rc; }
@@ -1761,19 +1761,18 @@ static void exit_net_drop_monitor(void) {int cpu; -BUG_ON (unregister_netdevice_notifier (&dropmon_net_notifier)); -/* * Because of the module_get/put we do in the trace state change path * we are guaranteed not to have any current users when we get here */ +BUG_ON (genl_unregister_family (&net_drop_monitor_family)); + +BUG_ON (unregister_netdevice_notifier (&dropmon_net_notifier));for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {net_dm_hw_cpu_data_fini (cpu);net_dm_cpu_data_fini (cpu); } - -BUG_ON (genl_unregister_family (&net_drop_monitor_family)); }module_init (init_net_drop_monitor);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 478/620 nfp: bpf: Add check for nfp_app_ctrl_msg_alloc()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
commit 878e7b11736e062514e58f3b445ff343e6705537 upstream.
Add check for the return value of nfp_app_ctrl_msg_alloc() in nfp_bpf_cmsg_alloc() to prevent null pointer dereference.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/cmsg.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/cmsg.c +2 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ nfp_bpf_cmsg_alloc(struct nfp_app_bpf *bstruct sk_buff *skb; skb =nfp_app_ctrl_msg_alloc (bpf->app, size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!skb) +return NULL ;skb_put (skb, size);return skb;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 479/620 ALSA: hda/conexant: Add quirk for HP ProBook 450 G4 mute LED
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Veness <[email protected]>
commit 6d1f86610f23b0bc334d6506a186f21a98f51392 upstream.
Allows the LED on the dedicated mute button on the HP ProBook 450 G4 laptop to change colour correctly.
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +1 -0
@@ -1098,6 +1098,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk cxt506SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x814f ,"HP ZBook 15u G3" ,CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8174 ,"HP Spectre x360" ,CXT_FIXUP_HP_SPECTRE ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x822e ,"HP ProBook 440 G4" ,CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO ), +SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8231 ,"HP ProBook 450 G4" ,CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_GPIO ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x828c ,"HP EliteBook 840 G4" ,CXT_FIXUP_HP_DOCK ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8299 ,"HP 800 G3 SFF" ,CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE ), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x829a, "HP 800 G3 DM", CXT_FIXUP_HP_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 480/620 acct: perform last write from workqueue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
commit 56d5f3eba3f5de0efdd556de4ef381e109b973a9 upstream.
In [1] it was reported that the acct(2) system call can be used to trigger NULL deref in cases where it is set to write to a file that triggers an internal lookup. This can e.g., happen when pointing acc(2) to /sys/power/resume. At the point the where the write to this file happens the calling task has already exited and called exit_fs(). A lookup will thus trigger a NULL-deref when accessing current->fs.
Reorganize the code so that the the final write happens from the workqueue but with the caller's credentials. This preserves the (strange) permission model and has almost no regression risk.
This api should stop to exist though.
--- kernel/acct.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
kernel/acct.c +70 -50
@@ -85,48 +85,50 @@ struct bsd_acct_struct {atomic_long_t count;struct rcu_head rcu;struct mutex lock; -int active; +bool active; +bool check_space;unsigned long needcheck;struct file *file;struct pid_namespace *ns;struct work_struct work;struct completion done; +acct_t ac; }; -static void do_acct_process (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct); +static void fill_ac (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct); +static void acct_write_process (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct);/* * Check the amount of free space and suspend/resume accordingly. */ -static int check_free_space (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct) +static bool check_free_space (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct) {struct kstatfs sbuf; -if (time_is_after_jiffies (acct->needcheck)) - goto out; +if (!acct->check_space) +return acct->active;/* May block */ if (vfs_statfs (&acct->file->f_path, &sbuf)) - goto out; +return acct->active;if (acct->active) {u64 suspend = sbuf.f_blocks *SUSPEND ;do_div (suspend,100 );if (sbuf.f_bavail <= suspend) { - acct->active =0 ; + acct->active = false;pr_info ("Process accounting paused\n" ); } }else {u64 resume = sbuf.f_blocks *RESUME ;do_div (resume,100 );if (sbuf.f_bavail >= resume) { - acct->active =1 ; + acct->active = true;pr_info ("Process accounting resumed\n" ); } } acct->needcheck = jiffies +ACCT_TIMEOUT *HZ ; -out:return acct->active; }
@@ -171,7 +173,11 @@ static void acct_pin_kill(struct fs_pin {struct bsd_acct_struct *acct =to_acct (pin);mutex_lock (&acct->lock); -do_acct_process (acct); +/* +* Fill the accounting struct with the exiting task's info +* before punting to the workqueue. +*/ +fill_ac (acct);schedule_work (&acct->work);wait_for_completion (&acct->done);cmpxchg (&acct->ns->bacct, pin,NULL );
@@ -184,6 +190,9 @@ static void close_work(struct work_struc { struct bsd_acct_struct *acct = container_of(work, struct bsd_acct_struct, work);struct file *file = acct->file; + +/* We were fired by acct_pin_kill() which holds acct->lock. */ +acct_write_process (acct);if (file->f_op->flush) file->f_op->flush (file,NULL );__fput_sync (file);
@@ -412,13 +421,27 @@ static u32 encode_float(u64 value)* do_exit() or when switching to a different output file. */ -static void fill_ac (acct_t *ac) +static void fill_ac (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct) {struct pacct_struct *pacct = ¤t->signal->pacct; +struct file *file = acct->file; +acct_t *ac = &acct->ac;u64 elapsed, run_time;time64_t btime;struct tty_struct *tty; +lockdep_assert_held (&acct->lock); + +if (time_is_after_jiffies (acct->needcheck)) { + acct->check_space = false; + +/* Don't fill in @ac if nothing will be written. */ +if (!acct->active) +return ; + }else { + acct->check_space = true; + } +/* * Fill the accounting struct with the needed info as recorded * by the different kernel functions.
@@ -466,64 +489,61 @@ static void fill_ac(acct_t *ac) ac->ac_majflt =encode_comp_t (pacct->ac_majflt); ac->ac_exitcode = pacct->ac_exitcode;spin_unlock_irq (¤t->sighand->siglock); -} -/* -* do_acct_process does all actual work. Caller holds the reference to file. -*/ -static void do_acct_process (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct) -{ -acct_t ac; -unsigned long flim; -const struct cred *orig_cred; -struct file *file = acct->file; - -/* -* Accounting records are not subject to resource limits. -*/ - flim =rlimit (RLIMIT_FSIZE ); - current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE ].rlim_cur =RLIM_INFINITY ; -/* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled accounting */ - orig_cred =override_creds (file->f_cred); -/* -* First check to see if there is enough free_space to continue -* the process accounting system. -*/ -if (!check_free_space (acct)) - goto out; - -fill_ac (&ac);/* we really need to bite the bullet and change layout */ - ac.ac_uid =from_kuid_munged (file->f_cred->user_ns, orig_cred->uid); - ac.ac_gid =from_kgid_munged (file->f_cred->user_ns, orig_cred->gid); + ac->ac_uid =from_kuid_munged (file->f_cred->user_ns,current_uid ()); + ac->ac_gid =from_kgid_munged (file->f_cred->user_ns,current_gid ());#if ACCT_VERSION ==1 ||ACCT_VERSION ==2 /* backward-compatible 16 bit fields */ - ac.ac_uid16 = ac.ac_uid; - ac.ac_gid16 = ac.ac_gid; + ac->ac_uid16 = ac->ac_uid; + ac->ac_gid16 = ac->ac_gid;#elif ACCT_VERSION ==3 {struct pid_namespace *ns = acct->ns; - ac.ac_pid =task_tgid_nr_ns (current, ns); + ac->ac_pid =task_tgid_nr_ns (current, ns);rcu_read_lock (); - ac.ac_ppid =task_tgid_nr_ns (rcu_dereference (current->real_parent), - ns); + ac->ac_ppid =task_tgid_nr_ns (rcu_dereference (current->real_parent), ns);rcu_read_unlock (); }#endif +} + +static void acct_write_process (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct) +{ +struct file *file = acct->file; +const struct cred *cred; +acct_t *ac = &acct->ac; + +/* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled accounting */ + cred =override_creds (file->f_cred); +/* -* Get freeze protection. If the fs is frozen, just skip the write -* as we could deadlock the system otherwise. +* First check to see if there is enough free_space to continue +* the process accounting system. Then get freeze protection. If +* the fs is frozen, just skip the write as we could deadlock +* the system otherwise. */ -if (file_start_write_trylock (file)) { +if (check_free_space (acct) &&file_start_write_trylock (file)) {/* it's been opened O_APPEND, so position is irrelevant */ loff_t pos =0 ; -__kernel_write (file, &ac,sizeof (acct_t), &pos); +__kernel_write (file, ac,sizeof (acct_t), &pos);file_end_write (file); } -out: + +revert_creds (cred); +} + +static void do_acct_process (struct bsd_acct_struct *acct) +{ +unsigned long flim; + +/* Accounting records are not subject to resource limits. */ + flim =rlimit (RLIMIT_FSIZE ); + current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE ].rlim_cur =RLIM_INFINITY ; +fill_ac (acct); +acct_write_process (acct); current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE ].rlim_cur = flim; -revert_creds (orig_cred); }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 481/620 acct: block access to kernel internal filesystems
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
commit 890ed45bde808c422c3c27d3285fc45affa0f930 upstream.
There's no point in allowing anything kernel internal nor procfs or sysfs.
--- kernel/acct.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
kernel/acct.c +14 -0
@@ -225,6 +225,20 @@ static int acct_on(struct filename *pathreturn -EACCES ; } +/* Exclude kernel kernel internal filesystems. */ +if (file_inode (file)->i_sb->s_flags & (SB_NOUSER |SB_KERNMOUNT )) { +kfree (acct); +filp_close (file,NULL ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +/* Exclude procfs and sysfs. */ +if (file_inode (file)->i_sb->s_iflags &SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE ) { +kfree (acct); +filp_close (file,NULL ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (!(file->f_mode &FMODE_CAN_WRITE )) {kfree (acct);filp_close (file,NULL );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 482/620 mtd: rawnand: cadence: fix error code in cadence_nand_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Niravkumar L Rabara <[email protected]>
commit 2b9df00cded911e2ca2cfae5c45082166b24f8aa upstream.
Replace dma_request_channel() with dma_request_chan_by_mask() and use helper functions to return proper error code instead of fixed -EBUSY.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c +4 -5
@@ -2866,11 +2866,10 @@ static int cadence_nand_init(struct cdnsdma_cap_set (DMA_MEMCPY , mask);if (cdns_ctrl->caps1->has_dma) { - cdns_ctrl->dmac =dma_request_channel (mask,NULL ,NULL ); -if (!cdns_ctrl->dmac) { -dev_err (cdns_ctrl->dev, -"Unable to get a DMA channel\n" ); - ret = -EBUSY ; + cdns_ctrl->dmac =dma_request_chan_by_mask (&mask); +if (IS_ERR (cdns_ctrl->dmac)) { + ret =dev_err_probe (cdns_ctrl->dev,PTR_ERR (cdns_ctrl->dmac), +"%d: Failed to get a DMA channel\n" , ret); goto disable_irq; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 483/620 mtd: rawnand: cadence: use dma_map_resource for sdma address
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Niravkumar L Rabara <[email protected]>
commit d76d22b5096c5b05208fd982b153b3f182350b19 upstream.
Remap the slave DMA I/O resources to enhance driver portability. Using a physical address causes DMA translation failure when the ARM SMMU is enabled.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c +25 -4
@@ -469,6 +469,8 @@ struct cdns_nand_ctrl {struct {void __iomem *virt;dma_addr_t dma; +dma_addr_t iova_dma; +u32 size; } io;int irq;
@@ -1830,11 +1832,11 @@ static int cadence_nand_slave_dma_transf }if (dir ==DMA_FROM_DEVICE ) { - src_dma = cdns_ctrl->io.dma; + src_dma = cdns_ctrl->io.iova_dma; dst_dma = buf_dma; }else { src_dma = buf_dma; - dst_dma = cdns_ctrl->io.dma; + dst_dma = cdns_ctrl->io.iova_dma; } tx = dmaengine_prep_dma_memcpy(cdns_ctrl->dmac, dst_dma, src_dma, len,
@@ -2831,6 +2833,7 @@ cadence_nand_irq_cleanup(int irqnum, strstatic int cadence_nand_init (struct cdns_nand_ctrl *cdns_ctrl) {dma_cap_mask_t mask; +struct dma_device *dma_dev = cdns_ctrl->dmac->device;int ret; cdns_ctrl->cdma_desc = dma_alloc_coherent(cdns_ctrl->dev,
@@ -2874,6 +2877,16 @@ static int cadence_nand_init(struct cdns } } + cdns_ctrl->io.iova_dma =dma_map_resource (dma_dev->dev, cdns_ctrl->io.dma, + cdns_ctrl->io.size, +DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ,0 ); + + ret =dma_mapping_error (dma_dev->dev, cdns_ctrl->io.iova_dma); +if (ret) { +dev_err (cdns_ctrl->dev,"Failed to map I/O resource to DMA\n" ); + goto dma_release_chnl; + } +nand_controller_init (&cdns_ctrl->controller);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cdns_ctrl->chips);
@@ -2884,18 +2897,22 @@ static int cadence_nand_init(struct cdnsif (ret) {dev_err (cdns_ctrl->dev,"Failed to register MTD: %d\n" , ret); - goto dma_release_chnl; + goto unmap_dma_resource; }kfree (cdns_ctrl->buf); cdns_ctrl->buf =kzalloc (cdns_ctrl->buf_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!cdns_ctrl->buf) { ret = -ENOMEM ; - goto dma_release_chnl; + goto unmap_dma_resource; }return 0 ; +unmap_dma_resource: +dma_unmap_resource (dma_dev->dev, cdns_ctrl->io.iova_dma, + cdns_ctrl->io.size,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ,0 ); + dma_release_chnl:if (cdns_ctrl->dmac)dma_release_channel (cdns_ctrl->dmac);
@@ -2917,6 +2934,8 @@ free_buf_desc:static void cadence_nand_remove (struct cdns_nand_ctrl *cdns_ctrl) {cadence_nand_chips_cleanup (cdns_ctrl); +dma_unmap_resource (cdns_ctrl->dmac->device->dev, cdns_ctrl->io.iova_dma, + cdns_ctrl->io.size,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ,0 );cadence_nand_irq_cleanup (cdns_ctrl->irq, cdns_ctrl);kfree (cdns_ctrl->buf); dma_free_coherent(cdns_ctrl->dev, sizeof(struct cadence_nand_cdma_desc),
@@ -2985,7 +3004,9 @@ static int cadence_nand_dt_probe(struct cdns_ctrl->io.virt =devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource (ofdev,1 , &res);if (IS_ERR (cdns_ctrl->io.virt))return PTR_ERR (cdns_ctrl->io.virt); + cdns_ctrl->io.dma = res->start; + cdns_ctrl->io.size =resource_size (res); dt->clk =devm_clk_get (cdns_ctrl->dev,"nf_clk" );if (IS_ERR (dt->clk))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 484/620 mtd: rawnand: cadence: fix incorrect device in dma_unmap_single
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Niravkumar L Rabara <[email protected]>
commit f37d135b42cb484bdecee93f56b9f483214ede78 upstream.
dma_map_single is using physical/bus device (DMA) but dma_unmap_single is using framework device(NAND controller), which is incorrect. Fixed dma_unmap_single to use correct physical/bus device.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c +2 -2
@@ -1858,12 +1858,12 @@ static int cadence_nand_slave_dma_transfdma_async_issue_pending (cdns_ctrl->dmac);wait_for_completion (&finished); -dma_unmap_single (cdns_ctrl->dev, buf_dma, len, dir); +dma_unmap_single (dma_dev->dev, buf_dma, len, dir);return 0 ; err_unmap: -dma_unmap_single (cdns_ctrl->dev, buf_dma, len, dir); +dma_unmap_single (dma_dev->dev, buf_dma, len, dir); err:dev_dbg (cdns_ctrl->dev,"Fall back to CPU I/O\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 485/620 x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Patrick Bellasi <[email protected]>
commit 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e upstream.
In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a better separation of concerns:
- ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only
- IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new semantics.
Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.
Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence, an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is not.
- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is already set.
That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g. a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected mitigation config.
- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.
For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard, since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration. Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.
Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +2 -1
@@ -2449,7 +2449,8 @@ config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 default y help - Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation. + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and + spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations. config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +14 -6
@@ -1092,6 +1092,8 @@ do_cmd_auto:case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB :setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT ); + mitigate_smt = true;/* * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
@@ -1101,8 +1103,6 @@ do_cmd_auto:setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_UNRET );setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); - mitigate_smt = true; -/* * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
@@ -2607,6 +2607,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatioif (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY )) {if (has_microcode) {setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT ); srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB ;/*
@@ -2616,6 +2617,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio*/ setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_UNRET );setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); + +/* +* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures +* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, +* regardless of IBPB implementation. +*/ +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ); } }else {pr_err ("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n" );
@@ -2624,8 +2632,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatiobreak ;case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT : -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CPU_SRSO )) { -if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB ) && has_microcode) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY )) { +if (has_microcode) {setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT ); srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT ;
@@ -2637,9 +2645,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatiosetup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ); } }else { -pr_err ("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n" ); +pr_err ("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n" ); goto pred_cmd; - } + }break ;default :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 486/620 IB/mlx5: Set and get correct qp_num for a DCT QP
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 12d044770e12c4205fa69535b4fa8a9981fea98f ]
When a DCT QP is created on an active lag, it's dctc.port is assigned in a round-robin way, which is from 1 to dev->lag_port. In this case when querying this QP, we may get qp_attr.port_num > 2.
Fix this by setting qp->port when modifying a DCT QP, and read port_num from qp->port instead of dctc.port when querying it.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c +3 -1
@@ -4461,6 +4461,8 @@ static int mlx5_ib_modify_dct(struct ib_qp *ibqp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, set_id =mlx5_ib_get_counters_id (dev, attr->port_num -1 );MLX5_SET (dctc, dctc, counter_set_id, set_id); + + qp->port = attr->port_num; }else if (cur_state ==IB_QPS_INIT && new_state ==IB_QPS_RTR ) {struct mlx5_ib_modify_qp_resp resp = {};u32 out[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW (create_dct_out)] = {};
@@ -4949,7 +4951,7 @@ static int mlx5_ib_dct_query_qp(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_qp *mqp, }if (qp_attr_mask &IB_QP_PORT ) - qp_attr->port_num =MLX5_GET (dctc, dctc, port); + qp_attr->port_num = mqp->port;if (qp_attr_mask &IB_QP_MIN_RNR_TIMER ) qp_attr->min_rnr_timer =MLX5_GET (dctc, dctc, min_rnr_nak);if (qp_attr_mask &IB_QP_AV ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 487/620 ovl: use wrappers to all vfs_*xattr() calls
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c914c0e27eb0843b7cf3bec71d6f34d53a3a671e ]
Use helpers ovl_*xattr() to access user/trusted.overlay.* xattrs and use helpers ovl_do_*xattr() to access generic xattrs. This is a preparatory patch for using idmapped base layers with overlay.
Note that a few of those places called vfs_*xattr() calls directly to reduce the amount of debug output. But as Miklos pointed out since overlayfs has been stable for quite some time the debug output isn't all that relevant anymore and the additional debug in all locations was actually quite helpful when developing this patch series.
Stable-dep-of: c84e125fff26 ("ovl: fix UAF in ovl_dentry_update_reval by moving dput() in ovl_link_up")
--- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 15 ++++++++------- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 17 +++++++++-------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 4 ++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 12 ++++++------ fs/overlayfs/util.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 8 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +11 -10
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *old, goto retry; } - error =vfs_setxattr (&init_user_ns, new, name, value, size,0 ); + error =ovl_do_setxattr (OVL_FS (sb), new, name, value, size,0 );if (error) {if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP ||ovl_must_copy_xattr (name))break ;
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int ovl_set_upper_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upper,if (IS_ERR (fh))return PTR_ERR (fh); - err =ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, index,OVL_XATTR_UPPER , fh->buf, fh->fb.len); + err =ovl_setxattr (ofs, index,OVL_XATTR_UPPER , fh->buf, fh->fb.len);kfree (fh);return err;
@@ -868,12 +868,13 @@ static bool ovl_need_meta_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,return true; } -static ssize_t ovl_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name,char **value) +static ssize_t ovl_getxattr_value (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *dentry, +char *name,char **value) {ssize_t res;char *buf; - res =vfs_getxattr (&init_user_ns, dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry, name,NULL ,0 );if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP ) res =0 ;
@@ -882,7 +883,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value)if (!buf)return -ENOMEM ; - res =vfs_getxattr (&init_user_ns, dentry, name, buf, res); + res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry, name, buf, res);if (res <0 )kfree (buf);else
@@ -909,8 +910,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)return -EIO ;if (c->stat.size) { - err = cap_size =ovl_getxattr (upperpath.dentry,XATTR_NAME_CAPS , - &capability); + err = cap_size =ovl_getxattr_value (ofs, upperpath.dentry, +XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &capability);if (cap_size <0 ) goto out; }
@@ -924,14 +925,14 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)* don't want that to happen for normal copy-up operation. */ if (capability) { - err =vfs_setxattr (&init_user_ns, upperpath.dentry, -XATTR_NAME_CAPS , capability, cap_size,0 ); + err =ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, upperpath.dentry,XATTR_NAME_CAPS , + capability, cap_size,0 );if (err) goto out_free; } - err =ovl_do_removexattr (ofs, upperpath.dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY ); + err =ovl_removexattr (ofs, upperpath.dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY );if (err) goto out_free;
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +8 -7
@@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_clear_empty(struct dentry *dentry,return ERR_PTR (err); } -static int ovl_set_upper_acl (struct dentry *upperdentry,const char *name, -const struct posix_acl *acl) +static int ovl_set_upper_acl (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *upperdentry, +const char *name,const struct posix_acl *acl) {void *buffer;size_t size;
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int ovl_set_upper_acl(struct dentry *upperdentry, const char *name,if (err <0 ) goto out_free; - err =vfs_setxattr (&init_user_ns, upperdentry, name, buffer, size,XATTR_CREATE ); + err =ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, upperdentry, name, buffer, size,XATTR_CREATE ); out_free:kfree (buffer);return err;
@@ -459,6 +459,7 @@ static int ovl_set_upper_acl(struct dentry *upperdentry, const char *name,static int ovl_create_over_whiteout (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,struct ovl_cattr *cattr) { +struct ovl_fs *ofs =OVL_FS (dentry->d_sb);struct dentry *workdir =ovl_workdir (dentry);struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;struct dentry *upperdir =ovl_dentry_upper (dentry->d_parent);
@@ -515,13 +516,13 @@ static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, goto out_cleanup; }if (!hardlink) { - err =ovl_set_upper_acl (newdentry,XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS , - acl); + err =ovl_set_upper_acl (ofs, newdentry, +XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS , acl);if (err) goto out_cleanup; - err =ovl_set_upper_acl (newdentry,XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT , - default_acl); + err =ovl_set_upper_acl (ofs, newdentry, +XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT , default_acl);if (err) goto out_cleanup; }
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +9 -8
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { int err; +struct ovl_fs *ofs =OVL_FS (dentry->d_sb);struct dentry *upperdentry =ovl_i_dentry_upper (inode);struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?:ovl_dentry_lower (dentry);const struct cred *old_cred;
@@ -367,12 +368,12 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, } old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); -if (value) - err =vfs_setxattr (&init_user_ns, realdentry, name, value, size, - flags); -else { +if (value) { + err =ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, realdentry, name, value, size, + flags); + }else {WARN_ON (flags !=XATTR_REPLACE ); - err =vfs_removexattr (&init_user_ns, realdentry, name); + err =ovl_do_removexattr (ofs, realdentry, name); }revert_creds (old_cred);
@@ -887,8 +888,8 @@ static int ovl_set_nlink_common(struct dentry *dentry,if (WARN_ON (len >=sizeof (buf)))return -EIO ; -return ovl_do_setxattr (OVL_FS (inode->i_sb),ovl_dentry_upper (dentry), -OVL_XATTR_NLINK , buf, len); +return ovl_setxattr (OVL_FS (inode->i_sb),ovl_dentry_upper (dentry), +OVL_XATTR_NLINK , buf, len); }int ovl_set_nlink_upper (struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -913,7 +914,7 @@ unsigned int ovl_get_nlink(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *lowerdentry,if (!lowerdentry || !upperdentry ||d_inode (lowerdentry)->i_nlink ==1 )return fallback; - err =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, upperdentry,OVL_XATTR_NLINK , + err =ovl_getxattr (ofs, upperdentry,OVL_XATTR_NLINK , &buf,sizeof (buf) -1 );if (err <0 ) goto fail;
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +3 -3
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,int res, err;struct ovl_fh *fh =NULL ; - res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry, ox,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_getxattr (ofs, dentry, ox,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return NULL ;
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,if (!fh)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry, ox, fh->buf, res); + res =ovl_getxattr (ofs, dentry, ox, fh->buf, res);if (res <0 ) goto fail;
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ int ovl_verify_set_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry, err =ovl_verify_fh (ofs, dentry, ox, fh);if (set && err == -ENODATA ) - err =ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, dentry, ox, fh->buf, fh->fb.len); + err =ovl_setxattr (ofs, dentry, ox, fh->buf, fh->fb.len);if (err) goto fail;
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +28 -10
@@ -183,10 +183,9 @@ static inline int ovl_do_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, }static inline ssize_t ovl_do_getxattr (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *dentry, -enum ovl_xattr ox,void *value, +const char *name,void *value,size_t size) { -const char *name =ovl_xattr (ofs, ox);int err =vfs_getxattr (&init_user_ns, dentry, name, value, size);int len = (value && err >0 ) ? err :0 ;
@@ -195,26 +194,45 @@ static inline ssize_t ovl_do_getxattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,return err; } +static inline ssize_t ovl_getxattr (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *dentry, +enum ovl_xattr ox,void *value, +size_t size) +{ +return ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry,ovl_xattr (ofs, ox), value, size); +} +static inline int ovl_do_setxattr (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *dentry, -enum ovl_xattr ox,const void *value, -size_t size) +const char *name,const void *value, +size_t size,int flags) { -const char *name =ovl_xattr (ofs, ox); -int err =vfs_setxattr (&init_user_ns, dentry, name, value, size,0 ); -pr_debug ("setxattr(%pd2, \"%s\", \"%*pE\", %zu, 0) = %i\n" , - dentry, name,min ((int )size,48 ), value, size, err); +int err =vfs_setxattr (&init_user_ns, dentry, name, value, size, flags); + +pr_debug ("setxattr(%pd2, \"%s\", \"%*pE\", %zu, %d) = %i\n" , + dentry, name,min ((int )size,48 ), value, size, flags, err);return err; } +static inline int ovl_setxattr (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *dentry, +enum ovl_xattr ox,const void *value, +size_t size) +{ +return ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, dentry,ovl_xattr (ofs, ox), value, size,0 ); +} +static inline int ovl_do_removexattr (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *dentry, -enum ovl_xattr ox) +const char *name) { -const char *name =ovl_xattr (ofs, ox);int err =vfs_removexattr (&init_user_ns, dentry, name);pr_debug ("removexattr(%pd2, \"%s\") = %i\n" , dentry, name, err);return err; } +static inline int ovl_removexattr (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *dentry, +enum ovl_xattr ox) +{ +return ovl_do_removexattr (ofs, dentry,ovl_xattr (ofs, ox)); +} +static inline int ovl_do_rename (struct inode *olddir,struct dentry *olddentry,struct inode *newdir,struct dentry *newdentry,unsigned int flags)
fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +2 -2
@@ -623,8 +623,8 @@ static struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_cache_get_impure(struct path *path)* Removing the "impure" xattr is best effort. */ if (!ovl_want_write (dentry)) { -ovl_do_removexattr (ofs,ovl_dentry_upper (dentry), -OVL_XATTR_IMPURE ); +ovl_removexattr (ofs,ovl_dentry_upper (dentry), +OVL_XATTR_IMPURE );ovl_drop_write (dentry); }ovl_clear_flag (OVL_IMPURE ,d_inode (dentry));
fs/overlayfs/super.c +6 -6
@@ -815,13 +815,13 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct ovl_fs *ofs,* allowed as upper are limited to "normal" ones, where checking * for the above two errors is sufficient. */ - err =vfs_removexattr (&init_user_ns, work, -XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT ); + err =ovl_do_removexattr (ofs, work, +XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT );if (err && err != -ENODATA && err != -EOPNOTSUPP ) goto out_dput; - err =vfs_removexattr (&init_user_ns, work, -XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS ); + err =ovl_do_removexattr (ofs, work, +XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS );if (err && err != -ENODATA && err != -EOPNOTSUPP ) goto out_dput;
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,/* * Check if upper/work fs supports (trusted|user).overlay.* xattr */ - err =ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, ofs->workdir,OVL_XATTR_OPAQUE ,"0" ,1 ); + err =ovl_setxattr (ofs, ofs->workdir,OVL_XATTR_OPAQUE ,"0" ,1 );if (err) {pr_warn ("failed to set xattr on upper\n" ); ofs->noxattr = true;
@@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,pr_info ("try mounting with 'userxattr' option\n" ); err =0 ; }else { -ovl_do_removexattr (ofs, ofs->workdir,OVL_XATTR_OPAQUE ); +ovl_removexattr (ofs, ofs->workdir,OVL_XATTR_OPAQUE ); }/*
fs/overlayfs/util.c +8 -8
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ bool ovl_check_origin_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry) {int res; - res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN ,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN ,NULL ,0 );/* Zero size value means "copied up but origin unknown" */ if (res >=0 )
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ bool ovl_check_dir_xattr(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dentry,if (!d_is_dir (dentry))return false; - res =ovl_do_getxattr (OVL_FS (sb), dentry, ox, &val,1 ); + res =ovl_getxattr (OVL_FS (sb), dentry, ox, &val,1 );if (res ==1 && val =='y' )return true;
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ int ovl_check_setxattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upperdentry,if (ofs->noxattr)return xerr; - err =ovl_do_setxattr (ofs, upperdentry, ox, value, size); + err =ovl_setxattr (ofs, upperdentry, ox, value, size);if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP ) {pr_warn ("cannot set %s xattr on upper\n" ,ovl_xattr (ofs, ox));
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void ovl_check_protattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *upper)char buf[OVL_PROTATTR_MAX +1 ];int res, n; - res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, upper,OVL_XATTR_PROTATTR , buf, + res =ovl_getxattr (ofs, upper,OVL_XATTR_PROTATTR , buf,OVL_PROTATTR_MAX );if (res <0 )return ;
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ int ovl_set_protattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *upper, err =ovl_check_setxattr (ofs, upper,OVL_XATTR_PROTATTR , buf, len, -EPERM ); }else if (inode->i_flags &OVL_PROT_I_FLAGS_MASK ) { - err =ovl_do_removexattr (ofs, upper,OVL_XATTR_PROTATTR ); + err =ovl_removexattr (ofs, upper,OVL_XATTR_PROTATTR );if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP || err == -ENODATA ) err =0 ; }
@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry)if (!S_ISREG (d_inode (dentry)->i_mode))return 0 ; - res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY ,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY ,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;
@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,int res;char *s, *next, *buf =NULL ; - res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT ,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT ,NULL ,0 );if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return NULL ;if (res <0 )
@@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,if (!buf)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - res =ovl_do_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT , buf, res); + res =ovl_getxattr (ofs, dentry,OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT , buf, res);if (res <0 ) goto fail;if (res ==0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 488/620 ovl: pass ofs to creation operations
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 576bb263450bbba6601a9f528d0cf601d97a13e6 ]
Pass down struct ovl_fs to all creation helpers so we can ultimately retrieve the relevant upper mount and take the mount's idmapping into account when creating new filesystem objects. This is needed to support idmapped base layers with overlay.
Stable-dep-of: c84e125fff26 ("ovl: fix UAF in ovl_dentry_update_reval by moving dput() in ovl_link_up")
--- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 21 +++++----- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 54 +++++++++++++++---------- fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 28 +++++++------ fs/overlayfs/super.c | 28 +++++++------ fs/overlayfs/util.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +12 -9
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ static int ovl_create_index(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *origin,if (err)return err; - temp =ovl_create_temp (indexdir,OVL_CATTR (S_IFDIR |0 )); + temp =ovl_create_temp (ofs, indexdir,OVL_CATTR (S_IFDIR |0 )); err =PTR_ERR (temp);if (IS_ERR (temp)) goto free_name;
@@ -487,12 +487,12 @@ static int ovl_create_index(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *origin,if (IS_ERR (index)) { err =PTR_ERR (index); }else { - err =ovl_do_rename (dir, temp, dir, index,0 ); + err =ovl_do_rename (ofs, dir, temp, dir, index,0 );dput (index); } out:if (err) -ovl_cleanup (dir, temp); +ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, temp);dput (temp); free_name:kfree (name.name);
@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)int err;struct dentry *upper;struct dentry *upperdir =ovl_dentry_upper (c->parent); +struct ovl_fs *ofs =OVL_FS (c->dentry->d_sb);struct inode *udir =d_inode (upperdir);/* Mark parent "impure" because it may now contain non-pure upper */
@@ -535,7 +536,7 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) c->dentry->d_name.len); err =PTR_ERR (upper);if (!IS_ERR (upper)) { - err =ovl_do_link (ovl_dentry_upper (c->dentry), udir, upper); + err =ovl_do_link (ofs,ovl_dentry_upper (c->dentry), udir, upper);dput (upper);if (!err) {
@@ -658,6 +659,7 @@ static void ovl_revert_cu_creds(struct ovl_cu_creds *cc)*/ static int ovl_copy_up_workdir (struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) { +struct ovl_fs *ofs =OVL_FS (c->dentry->d_sb);struct inode *inode;struct inode *udir =d_inode (c->destdir), *wdir =d_inode (c->workdir);struct dentry *temp, *upper;
@@ -679,7 +681,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_workdir(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)if (err) goto unlock; - temp =ovl_create_temp (c->workdir, &cattr); + temp =ovl_create_temp (ofs, c->workdir, &cattr);ovl_revert_cu_creds (&cc); err =PTR_ERR (temp);
@@ -701,7 +703,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_workdir(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)if (IS_ERR (upper)) goto cleanup; - err =ovl_do_rename (wdir, temp, udir, upper,0 ); + err =ovl_do_rename (ofs, wdir, temp, udir, upper,0 );dput (upper);if (err) goto cleanup;
@@ -718,7 +720,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_workdir(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)return err; cleanup: -ovl_cleanup (wdir, temp); +ovl_cleanup (ofs, wdir, temp);dput (temp); goto unlock; }
@@ -726,6 +728,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_workdir(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)/* Copyup using O_TMPFILE which does not require cross dir locking */ static int ovl_copy_up_tmpfile (struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) { +struct ovl_fs *ofs =OVL_FS (c->dentry->d_sb);struct inode *udir =d_inode (c->destdir);struct dentry *temp, *upper;struct ovl_cu_creds cc;
@@ -735,7 +738,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_tmpfile(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)if (err)return err; - temp =ovl_do_tmpfile (c->workdir, c->stat.mode); + temp =ovl_do_tmpfile (ofs, c->workdir, c->stat.mode);ovl_revert_cu_creds (&cc);if (IS_ERR (temp))
@@ -750,7 +753,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_tmpfile(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) upper =lookup_one_len (c->destname.name, c->destdir, c->destname.len); err =PTR_ERR (upper);if (!IS_ERR (upper)) { - err =ovl_do_link (temp, udir, upper); + err =ovl_do_link (ofs, temp, udir, upper);dput (upper); }inode_unlock (udir);
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +45 -40
276 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +33 -21
130 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +15 -13
@@ -1001,7 +1001,8 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)return err; } -void ovl_cleanup_whiteouts (struct dentry *upper,struct list_head *list) +void ovl_cleanup_whiteouts (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct dentry *upper, +struct list_head *list) {struct ovl_cache_entry *p;
@@ -1020,7 +1021,7 @@ void ovl_cleanup_whiteouts(struct dentry *upper, struct list_head *list)continue ; }if (dentry->d_inode) -ovl_cleanup (upper->d_inode, dentry); +ovl_cleanup (ofs, upper->d_inode, dentry);dput (dentry); }inode_unlock (upper->d_inode);
@@ -1064,7 +1065,8 @@ int ovl_check_d_type_supported(struct path *realpath)#define OVL_INCOMPATDIR_NAME "incompat" -static int ovl_workdir_cleanup_recurse (struct path *path,int level) +static int ovl_workdir_cleanup_recurse (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct path *path, +int level) {int err;struct inode *dir = path->dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1115,7 +1117,7 @@ static int ovl_workdir_cleanup_recurse(struct path *path, int level)if (IS_ERR (dentry))continue ;if (dentry->d_inode) - err =ovl_workdir_cleanup (dir, path->mnt, dentry, level); + err =ovl_workdir_cleanup (ofs, dir, path->mnt, dentry, level);dput (dentry);if (err)break ;
@@ -1126,24 +1128,24 @@ static int ovl_workdir_cleanup_recurse(struct path *path, int level)return err; } -int ovl_workdir_cleanup (struct inode *dir,struct vfsmount *mnt, -struct dentry *dentry,int level) +int ovl_workdir_cleanup (struct ovl_fs *ofs,struct inode *dir, +struct vfsmount *mnt,struct dentry *dentry,int level) {int err;if (!d_is_dir (dentry) || level >1 ) { -return ovl_cleanup (dir, dentry); +return ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, dentry); } - err =ovl_do_rmdir (dir, dentry); + err =ovl_do_rmdir (ofs, dir, dentry);if (err) {struct path path = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = dentry };inode_unlock (dir); - err =ovl_workdir_cleanup_recurse (&path, level +1 ); + err =ovl_workdir_cleanup_recurse (ofs, &path, level +1 );inode_lock_nested (dir,I_MUTEX_PARENT );if (!err) - err =ovl_cleanup (dir, dentry); + err =ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, dentry); }return err;
@@ -1187,7 +1189,7 @@ int ovl_indexdir_cleanup(struct ovl_fs *ofs) }/* Cleanup leftover from index create/cleanup attempt */ if (index->d_name.name[0 ] =='#' ) { - err =ovl_workdir_cleanup (dir, path.mnt, index,1 ); + err =ovl_workdir_cleanup (ofs, dir, path.mnt, index,1 );if (err)break ; goto next;
@@ -1197,7 +1199,7 @@ int ovl_indexdir_cleanup(struct ovl_fs *ofs) goto next; }else if (err == -ESTALE ) {/* Cleanup stale index entries */ - err =ovl_cleanup (dir, index); + err =ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, index); }else if (err != -ENOENT ) {/* * Abort mount to avoid corrupting the index if
@@ -1213,7 +1215,7 @@ int ovl_indexdir_cleanup(struct ovl_fs *ofs) err =ovl_cleanup_and_whiteout (ofs, dir, index); }else {/* Cleanup orphan index entries */ - err =ovl_cleanup (dir, index); + err =ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, index); }if (err)
fs/overlayfs/super.c +15 -13
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct ovl_fs *ofs, goto out_unlock; retried = true; - err =ovl_workdir_cleanup (dir, mnt, work,0 ); + err =ovl_workdir_cleanup (ofs, dir, mnt, work,0 );dput (work);if (err == -EINVAL ) { work =ERR_PTR (err);
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct ovl_fs *ofs, goto retry; } - err =ovl_mkdir_real (dir, &work, attr.ia_mode); + err =ovl_mkdir_real (ofs, dir, &work, attr.ia_mode);if (err) goto out_dput;
@@ -1262,8 +1262,9 @@ static int ovl_get_upper(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,* Returns 1 if RENAME_WHITEOUT is supported, 0 if not supported and * negative values if error is encountered. */ -static int ovl_check_rename_whiteout (struct dentry *workdir) +static int ovl_check_rename_whiteout (struct ovl_fs *ofs) { +struct dentry *workdir = ofs->workdir;struct inode *dir =d_inode (workdir);struct dentry *temp;struct dentry *dest;
@@ -1273,12 +1274,12 @@ static int ovl_check_rename_whiteout(struct dentry *workdir)inode_lock_nested (dir,I_MUTEX_PARENT ); - temp =ovl_create_temp (workdir,OVL_CATTR (S_IFREG |0 )); + temp =ovl_create_temp (ofs, workdir,OVL_CATTR (S_IFREG |0 )); err =PTR_ERR (temp);if (IS_ERR (temp)) goto out_unlock; - dest =ovl_lookup_temp (workdir); + dest =ovl_lookup_temp (ofs, workdir); err =PTR_ERR (dest);if (IS_ERR (dest)) {dput (temp);
@@ -1287,7 +1288,7 @@ static int ovl_check_rename_whiteout(struct dentry *workdir)/* Name is inline and stable - using snapshot as a copy helper */ take_dentry_name_snapshot (&name, temp); - err =ovl_do_rename (dir, temp, dir, dest,RENAME_WHITEOUT ); + err =ovl_do_rename (ofs, dir, temp, dir, dest,RENAME_WHITEOUT );if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) err =0 ;
@@ -1303,11 +1304,11 @@ static int ovl_check_rename_whiteout(struct dentry *workdir)/* Best effort cleanup of whiteout and temp file */ if (err) -ovl_cleanup (dir, whiteout); +ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, whiteout);dput (whiteout); cleanup_temp: -ovl_cleanup (dir, temp); +ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, temp);release_dentry_name_snapshot (&name);dput (temp);dput (dest);
@@ -1318,7 +1319,8 @@ static int ovl_check_rename_whiteout(struct dentry *workdir)return err; } -static struct dentry *ovl_lookup_or_create (struct dentry *parent, +static struct dentry *ovl_lookup_or_create (struct ovl_fs *ofs, +struct dentry *parent,const char *name,umode_t mode) {size_t len =strlen (name);
@@ -1327,7 +1329,7 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_lookup_or_create(struct dentry *parent,inode_lock_nested (parent->d_inode,I_MUTEX_PARENT ); child =lookup_one_len (name, parent, len);if (!IS_ERR (child) && !child->d_inode) - child =ovl_create_real (parent->d_inode, child, + child =ovl_create_real (ofs, parent->d_inode, child,OVL_CATTR (mode));inode_unlock (parent->d_inode);dput (parent);
@@ -1349,7 +1351,7 @@ static int ovl_create_volatile_dirty(struct ovl_fs *ofs)const char *const *name = volatile_path;for (ctr =ARRAY_SIZE (volatile_path); ctr; ctr--, name++) { - d =ovl_lookup_or_create (d, *name, ctr >1 ?S_IFDIR :S_IFREG ); + d =ovl_lookup_or_create (ofs, d, *name, ctr >1 ?S_IFDIR :S_IFREG );if (IS_ERR (d))return PTR_ERR (d); }
@@ -1397,7 +1399,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,pr_warn ("upper fs needs to support d_type.\n" );/* Check if upper/work fs supports O_TMPFILE */ - temp =ovl_do_tmpfile (ofs->workdir,S_IFREG |0 ); + temp =ovl_do_tmpfile (ofs, ofs->workdir,S_IFREG |0 ); ofs->tmpfile = !IS_ERR (temp);if (ofs->tmpfile)dput (temp);
@@ -1406,7 +1408,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,/* Check if upper/work fs supports RENAME_WHITEOUT */ - err =ovl_check_rename_whiteout (ofs->workdir); + err =ovl_check_rename_whiteout (ofs);if (err <0 ) goto out;
fs/overlayfs/util.c +1 -1
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static void ovl_cleanup_index(struct dentry *dentry) dir, index); }else {/* Cleanup orphan index entries */ - err =ovl_cleanup (dir, index); + err =ovl_cleanup (ofs, dir, index); }inode_unlock (dir);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 489/620 ovl: fix UAF in ovl_dentry_update_reval by moving dput() in ovl_link_up
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c84e125fff2615b4d9c259e762596134eddd2f27 ]
The issue was caused by dput(upper) being called before ovl_dentry_update_reval(), while upper->d_flags was still accessed in ovl_dentry_remote().
Move dput(upper) after its last use to prevent use-after-free.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline] ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167 ovl_link_up fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:610 [inline] ovl_copy_up_one+0x2105/0x3490 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1170 ovl_copy_up_flags+0x18d/0x200 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1223 ovl_rename+0x39e/0x18c0 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:1136 vfs_rename+0xf84/0x20a0 fs/namei.c:4893 ... </TASK>
--- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +1 -1
@@ -537,7 +537,6 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) err =PTR_ERR (upper);if (!IS_ERR (upper)) { err =ovl_do_link (ofs,ovl_dentry_upper (c->dentry), udir, upper); -dput (upper);if (!err) {/* Restore timestamps on parent (best effort) */
@@ -545,6 +544,7 @@ static int ovl_link_up(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)ovl_dentry_set_upper_alias (c->dentry);ovl_dentry_update_reval (c->dentry, upper); } +dput (upper); }inode_unlock (udir);if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 490/620 scsi: core: Dont memset() the entire scsi_cmnd in scsi_init_command()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 71bada345b33b9297e7cc9415db6328c99b554f9 ]
Replace the big fat memset that requires saving and restoring various fields with just initializing those fields that need initialization.
All the clearing to 0 is moved to scsi_prepare_cmd() as scsi_ioctl_reset() alreadly uses kzalloc() to allocate a pre-zeroed command.
This is still conservative and can probably be optimized further.
Stable-dep-of: dce5c4afd035 ("scsi: core: Clear driver private data when retrying request")
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +28 -32
@@ -1114,45 +1114,16 @@ static void scsi_cleanup_rq(struct request *rq)/* Called before a request is prepared. See also scsi_mq_prep_fn(). */ void scsi_init_command (struct scsi_device *dev,struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) { -void *buf = cmd->sense_buffer; -void *prot = cmd->prot_sdb;struct request *rq =scsi_cmd_to_rq (cmd); -unsigned int flags = cmd->flags &SCMD_PRESERVED_FLAGS ; -unsigned long jiffies_at_alloc; -int retries, to_clear; -bool in_flight; -int budget_token = cmd->budget_token; - -if (!blk_rq_is_passthrough (rq) && !(flags &SCMD_INITIALIZED )) { - flags |=SCMD_INITIALIZED ; + +if (!blk_rq_is_passthrough (rq) && !(cmd->flags &SCMD_INITIALIZED )) { + cmd->flags |=SCMD_INITIALIZED ;scsi_initialize_rq (rq); } - jiffies_at_alloc = cmd->jiffies_at_alloc; - retries = cmd->retries; - in_flight =test_bit (SCMD_STATE_INFLIGHT , &cmd->state); -/* -* Zero out the cmd, except for the embedded scsi_request. Only clear -* the driver-private command data if the LLD does not supply a -* function to initialize that data. -*/ - to_clear =sizeof (*cmd) -sizeof (cmd->req); -if (!dev->host->hostt->init_cmd_priv) - to_clear += dev->host->hostt->cmd_size; -memset ((char *)cmd +sizeof (cmd->req),0 , to_clear); - cmd->device = dev; - cmd->sense_buffer = buf; - cmd->prot_sdb = prot; - cmd->flags = flags;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cmd->eh_entry);INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&cmd->abort_work, scmd_eh_abort_handler); - cmd->jiffies_at_alloc = jiffies_at_alloc; - cmd->retries = retries; -if (in_flight) -__set_bit (SCMD_STATE_INFLIGHT , &cmd->state); - cmd->budget_token = budget_token; - } static blk_status_t scsi_setup_scsi_cmnd(struct scsi_device *sdev,
@@ -1539,10 +1510,35 @@ static blk_status_t scsi_prepare_cmd(struct request *req)struct scsi_cmnd *cmd =blk_mq_rq_to_pdu (req);struct scsi_device *sdev = req->q->queuedata;struct Scsi_Host *shost = sdev->host; +bool in_flight =test_bit (SCMD_STATE_INFLIGHT , &cmd->state);struct scatterlist *sg;scsi_init_command (sdev, cmd); + cmd->eh_eflags =0 ; + cmd->allowed =0 ; + cmd->prot_type =0 ; + cmd->prot_flags =0 ; + cmd->submitter =0 ; + cmd->cmd_len =0 ; + cmd->cmnd =NULL ; +memset (&cmd->sdb,0 ,sizeof (cmd->sdb)); + cmd->underflow =0 ; + cmd->transfersize =0 ; + cmd->host_scribble =NULL ; + cmd->result =0 ; + cmd->extra_len =0 ; + cmd->state =0 ; +if (in_flight) +__set_bit (SCMD_STATE_INFLIGHT , &cmd->state); + +/* +* Only clear the driver-private command data if the LLD does not supply +* a function to initialize that data. +*/ +if (!shost->hostt->init_cmd_priv) +memset (cmd +1 ,0 , shost->hostt->cmd_size); + cmd->prot_op =SCSI_PROT_NORMAL ;if (blk_rq_bytes (req)) cmd->sc_data_direction =rq_dma_dir (req);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 491/620 scsi: core: Clear driver private data when retrying request
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dce5c4afd035e8090a26e5d776b1682c0e649683 ]
After commit 1bad6c4a57ef ("scsi: zero per-cmd private driver data for each MQ I/O"), the xen-scsifront/virtio_scsi/snic drivers all removed code that explicitly zeroed driver-private command data.
In combination with commit 464a00c9e0ad ("scsi: core: Kill DRIVER_SENSE"), after virtio_scsi performs a capacity expansion, the first request will return a unit attention to indicate that the capacity has changed. And then the original command is retried. As driver-private command data was not cleared, the request would return UA again and eventually time out and fail.
Zero driver-private command data when a request is retried.
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +7 -7
@@ -1532,13 +1532,6 @@ static blk_status_t scsi_prepare_cmd(struct request *req)if (in_flight)__set_bit (SCMD_STATE_INFLIGHT , &cmd->state); -/* -* Only clear the driver-private command data if the LLD does not supply -* a function to initialize that data. -*/ -if (!shost->hostt->init_cmd_priv) -memset (cmd +1 ,0 , shost->hostt->cmd_size); - cmd->prot_op =SCSI_PROT_NORMAL ;if (blk_rq_bytes (req)) cmd->sc_data_direction =rq_dma_dir (req);
@@ -1675,6 +1668,13 @@ static blk_status_t scsi_queue_rq(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,if (!scsi_host_queue_ready (q, shost, sdev, cmd)) goto out_dec_target_busy; +/* +* Only clear the driver-private command data if the LLD does not supply +* a function to initialize that data. +*/ +if (shost->hostt->cmd_size && !shost->hostt->init_cmd_priv) +memset (cmd +1 ,0 , shost->hostt->cmd_size); +if (!(req->rq_flags &RQF_DONTPREP )) { ret =scsi_prepare_cmd (req);if (ret !=BLK_STS_OK )
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 492/620 RDMA/mlx5: Fix bind QP error cleanup flow
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1a0bdbdfdf08428f0ede5ae49c7f4139ac73ef5 ]
When there is a failure during bind QP, the cleanup flow destroys the counter regardless if it is the one that created it or not, which is problematic since if it isn't the one that created it, that counter could still be in use.
Fix that by destroying the counter only if it was created during this call.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/counters.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/counters.c +6 -2
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ static int mlx5_ib_counter_bind_qp(struct rdma_counter *counter, struct ib_qp *qp) {struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev =to_mdev (qp->device); +bool new = false;int err;if (!counter->id) {
@@ -351,6 +352,7 @@ static int mlx5_ib_counter_bind_qp(struct rdma_counter *counter,return err; counter->id =MLX5_GET (alloc_q_counter_out, out, counter_set_id); + new = true; } err =mlx5_ib_qp_set_counter (qp, counter);
@@ -360,8 +362,10 @@ static int mlx5_ib_counter_bind_qp(struct rdma_counter *counter,return 0 ; fail_set_counter: -mlx5_ib_counter_dealloc (counter); - counter->id =0 ; +if (new) { +mlx5_ib_counter_dealloc (counter); + counter->id =0 ; + }return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 493/620 sunrpc: suppress warnings for unused procfs functions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1f7a4f98c11fbeb18ed21f3b3a497e90a50ad2e0 ]
There is a warning about unused variables when building with W=1 and no procfs:
net/sunrpc/cache.c:1660:30: error: 'cache_flush_proc_ops' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
1660 | static const struct proc_ops cache_flush_proc_ops = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/sunrpc/cache.c:1622:30: error: 'content_proc_ops' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
1622 | static const struct proc_ops content_proc_ops = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/sunrpc/cache.c:1598:30: error: 'cache_channel_proc_ops' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
1598 | static const struct proc_ops cache_channel_proc_ops = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~These are used inside of an #ifdef, so replacing that with an IS_ENABLED() check lets the compiler see how they are used while still dropping them during dead code elimination.
--- net/sunrpc/cache.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/cache.c +3 -7
@@ -1659,12 +1659,14 @@ static void remove_cache_proc_entries(struct cache_detail *cd) } } -#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS static int create_cache_proc_entries (struct cache_detail *cd,struct net *net) {struct proc_dir_entry *p;struct sunrpc_net *sn; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PROC_FS )) +return 0 ; + sn =net_generic (net, sunrpc_net_id); cd->procfs =proc_mkdir (cd->name, sn->proc_net_rpc);if (cd->procfs ==NULL )
@@ -1692,12 +1694,6 @@ static int create_cache_proc_entries(struct cache_detail *cd, struct net *net)remove_cache_proc_entries (cd);return -ENOMEM ; } -#else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ -static int create_cache_proc_entries (struct cache_detail *cd,struct net *net) -{ -return 0 ; -} -#endif void __init cache_initialize (void ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 494/620 ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid dropping MIDI events at closing multiple ports
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a3bdd8f5c2217e1cb35db02c2eed36ea20fb50f5 ]
We fixed the UAF issue in USB MIDI code by canceling the pending work at closing each MIDI output device in the commit below. However, this assumed that it's the only one that is tied with the endpoint, and it resulted in unexpected data truncations when multiple devices are assigned to a single endpoint and opened simultaneously.
For addressing the unexpected MIDI message drops, simply replace cancel_work_sync() with flush_work(). The drain callback should have been already invoked before the close callback, hence the port->active flag must be already cleared. So this just assures that the pending work is finished before freeing the resources.
--- sound/usb/midi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/midi.c +1 -1
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ static int snd_usbmidi_output_close(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream) {struct usbmidi_out_port *port = substream->runtime->private_data; -cancel_work_sync (&port->ep->work); +flush_work (&port->ep->work);return substream_open (substream,0 ,0 ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 495/620 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_RSP response
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b25120e1d5f2ebb3db00af557709041f47f7f3d0 ]
L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_RSP needs to respond DCID in the same order received as SCID but the order is reversed due to use of list_add which actually prepend channels to the list so the response is reversed:
Quoted 1 line
ACL Data RX: Handle 16 flags
0x02dlen 26
LE L2CAP: Enhanced Credit Connection Request (0x17) ident 2 len 18
PSM: 39 (0x0027)
MTU: 256
MPS: 251
Credits: 65535
Source CID: 116
Source CID: 117
Source CID: 118
Source CID: 119
Source CID: 120< ACL Data TX: Handle 16 flags 0x00 dlen 26
LE L2CAP: Enhanced Credit Connection Response (0x18) ident 2 len 18
MTU: 517
MPS: 247
Credits: 3
Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
Destination CID: 68
Destination CID: 67
Destination CID: 66
Destination CID: 65
Destination CID: 64
Also make sure the response don't include channels that are not on BT_CONNECT2 since the chan->ident can be set to the same value as in the following trace:
< ACL Data TX: Handle 16 flags 0x00 dlen 12
LE L2CAP: LE Flow Control Credit (0x16) ident 6 len 4
Source CID: 64
Credits: 1
...
Quoted 1 line
ACL Data RX: Handle 16 flags
0x02dlen 18
LE L2CAP: Enhanced Credit Connection Request (0x17) ident 6 len 10
PSM: 39 (0x0027)
MTU: 517
MPS: 251
Credits: 255
Source CID: 70
< ACL Data TX: Handle 16 flags 0x00 dlen 20
LE L2CAP: Enhanced Credit Connection Response (0x18) ident 6 len 12
MTU: 517
MPS: 247
Credits: 3
Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
Destination CID: 64
Destination CID: 68--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +7 -2
@@ -632,7 +632,8 @@ void __l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan) test_bit(FLAG_HOLD_HCI_CONN, &chan->flags))hci_conn_hold (conn->hcon); -list_add (&chan->list, &conn->chan_l); +/* Append to the list since the order matters for ECRED */ +list_add_tail (&chan->list, &conn->chan_l); }void l2cap_chan_add (struct l2cap_conn *conn,struct l2cap_chan *chan)
@@ -3971,7 +3972,11 @@ static void l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data) {struct l2cap_ecred_rsp_data *rsp = data; -if (test_bit (FLAG_ECRED_CONN_REQ_SENT , &chan->flags)) +/* Check if channel for outgoing connection or if it wasn't deferred +* since in those cases it must be skipped. +*/ +if (test_bit (FLAG_ECRED_CONN_REQ_SENT , &chan->flags) || + !test_and_clear_bit (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP , &chan->flags))return ;/* Reset ident so only one response is sent */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 496/620 afs: remove variable nr_servers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 318b83b71242998814a570c3420c042ee6165fca ]
Variable nr_servers is no longer being used, the last reference to it was removed in commit 45df8462730d ("afs: Fix server list handling") so clean up the code by removing it.
Stable-dep-of: add117e48df4 ("afs: Fix the server_list to unuse a displaced server rather than putting it")
--- fs/afs/volume.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/afs/volume.c +1 -5
@@ -77,11 +77,7 @@ static struct afs_volume *afs_alloc_volume(struct afs_fs_context *params, {struct afs_server_list *slist;struct afs_volume *volume; -int ret = -ENOMEM , nr_servers =0 , i; - -for (i =0 ; i < vldb->nr_servers; i++) -if (vldb->fs_mask[i] & type_mask) - nr_servers++; +int ret = -ENOMEM ; volume =kzalloc (sizeof (struct afs_volume ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!volume)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 497/620 afs: Make it possible to find the volumes that are using a server
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ca0e79a46097d54e4af46c67c852479d97af35bb ]
Make it possible to find the afs_volume structs that are using an afs_server struct to aid in breaking volume callbacks.
The way this is done is that each afs_volume already has an array of afs_server_entry records that point to the servers where that volume might be found. An afs_volume backpointer and a list node is added to each entry and each entry is then added to an RCU-traversable list on the afs_server to which it points.
Stable-dep-of: add117e48df4 ("afs: Fix the server_list to unuse a displaced server rather than putting it")
--- fs/afs/cell.c | 1 + fs/afs/internal.h | 23 +++++---- fs/afs/server.c | 1 + fs/afs/server_list.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/afs/vl_alias.c | 2 +- fs/afs/volume.c | 36 ++++++++------ 6 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
fs/afs/cell.c +1 -0
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ static struct afs_cell *afs_alloc_cell(struct afs_net *net,refcount_set (&cell->ref,1 );atomic_set (&cell->active,0 );INIT_WORK (&cell->manager, afs_manage_cell_work); +spin_lock_init (&cell->vs_lock); cell->volumes =RB_ROOT ;INIT_HLIST_HEAD (&cell->proc_volumes);seqlock_init (&cell->volume_lock);
fs/afs/internal.h +15 -8
@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ struct afs_cell {unsigned int debug_id;/* The volumes belonging to this cell */ +spinlock_t vs_lock;/* Lock for server->volumes */ struct rb_root volumes;/* Tree of volumes on this server */ struct hlist_head proc_volumes;/* procfs volume list */ seqlock_t volume_lock;/* For volumes */
@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ struct afs_server {struct hlist_node addr4_link;/* Link in net->fs_addresses4 */ struct hlist_node addr6_link;/* Link in net->fs_addresses6 */ struct hlist_node proc_link;/* Link in net->fs_proc */ +struct list_head volumes;/* RCU list of afs_server_entry objects */ struct work_struct initcb_work;/* Work for CB.InitCallBackState* */ struct afs_server *gc_next;/* Next server in manager's list */ time64_t unuse_time;/* Time at which last unused */
@@ -553,12 +555,14 @@ struct afs_server {*/ struct afs_server_entry {struct afs_server *server; +struct afs_volume *volume; +struct list_head slink;/* Link in server->volumes */ };struct afs_server_list {struct rcu_head rcu; -afs_volid_t vids[AFS_MAXTYPES ];/* Volume IDs */ refcount_t usage; +bool attached;/* T if attached to servers */ unsigned char nr_servers;unsigned char preferred;/* Preferred server */ unsigned short vnovol_mask;/* Servers to be skipped due to VNOVOL */
@@ -571,10 +575,9 @@ struct afs_server_list {* Live AFS volume management. */ struct afs_volume { -union { -struct rcu_head rcu; -afs_volid_t vid;/* volume ID */ - }; +struct rcu_head rcu; +afs_volid_t vid;/* The volume ID of this volume */ +afs_volid_t vids[AFS_MAXTYPES ];/* All associated volume IDs */ refcount_t ref;time64_t update_at;/* Time at which to next update */ struct afs_cell *cell;/* Cell to which belongs (pins ref) */
@@ -1436,10 +1439,14 @@ static inline struct afs_server_list *afs_get_serverlist(struct afs_server_list }extern void afs_put_serverlist (struct afs_net *,struct afs_server_list *); -extern struct afs_server_list *afs_alloc_server_list (struct afs_cell *,struct key *, -struct afs_vldb_entry *, -u8 ); +struct afs_server_list *afs_alloc_server_list (struct afs_volume *volume, +struct key *key, +struct afs_vldb_entry *vldb);extern bool afs_annotate_server_list (struct afs_server_list *,struct afs_server_list *); +void afs_attach_volume_to_servers (struct afs_volume *volume,struct afs_server_list *slist); +void afs_reattach_volume_to_servers (struct afs_volume *volume,struct afs_server_list *slist, +struct afs_server_list *old); +void afs_detach_volume_from_servers (struct afs_volume *volume,struct afs_server_list *slist);/* * super.c
fs/afs/server.c +1 -0
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ static struct afs_server *afs_alloc_server(struct afs_cell *cell, server->addr_version = alist->version; server->uuid = *uuid;rwlock_init (&server->fs_lock); +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&server->volumes);INIT_WORK (&server->initcb_work, afs_server_init_callback_work);init_waitqueue_head (&server->probe_wq);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&server->probe_link);
fs/afs/server_list.c +103 -9
154 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/afs/vl_alias.c +1 -1
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int afs_compare_volume_slists(const struct afs_volume *vol_a, lb =rcu_dereference (vol_b->servers);for (i =0 ; i <AFS_MAXTYPES ; i++) -if (la->vids[i] != lb->vids[i]) +if (vol_a->vids[i] != vol_b->vids[i])return 0 ;while (a < la->nr_servers && b < lb->nr_servers) {
fs/afs/volume.c +22 -14
@@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ static void afs_remove_volume_from_cell(struct afs_volume *volume)*/ static struct afs_volume *afs_alloc_volume (struct afs_fs_context *params,struct afs_vldb_entry *vldb, -unsigned long type_mask) +struct afs_server_list **_slist) {struct afs_server_list *slist;struct afs_volume *volume; -int ret = -ENOMEM ; +int ret = -ENOMEM , i; volume =kzalloc (sizeof (struct afs_volume ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!volume)
@@ -96,13 +96,16 @@ static struct afs_volume *afs_alloc_volume(struct afs_fs_context *params,rwlock_init (&volume->cb_v_break_lock);memcpy (volume->name, vldb->name, vldb->name_len +1 ); - slist =afs_alloc_server_list (params->cell, params->key, vldb, type_mask); +for (i =0 ; i <AFS_MAXTYPES ; i++) + volume->vids[i] = vldb->vid[i]; + + slist =afs_alloc_server_list (volume, params->key, vldb);if (IS_ERR (slist)) { ret =PTR_ERR (slist); goto error_1; } -refcount_set (&slist->usage,1 ); + *_slist = slist;rcu_assign_pointer (volume->servers, slist);trace_afs_volume (volume->vid,1 , afs_volume_trace_alloc);return volume;
@@ -118,17 +121,19 @@ static struct afs_volume *afs_alloc_volume(struct afs_fs_context *params,* Look up or allocate a volume record. */ static struct afs_volume *afs_lookup_volume (struct afs_fs_context *params, -struct afs_vldb_entry *vldb, -unsigned long type_mask) +struct afs_vldb_entry *vldb) { +struct afs_server_list *slist;struct afs_volume *candidate, *volume; - candidate =afs_alloc_volume (params, vldb, type_mask); + candidate =afs_alloc_volume (params, vldb, &slist);if (IS_ERR (candidate))return candidate; volume =afs_insert_volume_into_cell (params->cell, candidate); -if (volume != candidate) +if (volume == candidate) +afs_attach_volume_to_servers (volume, slist); +else afs_put_volume (params->net, candidate, afs_volume_trace_put_cell_dup);return volume; }
@@ -209,8 +214,7 @@ struct afs_volume *afs_create_volume(struct afs_fs_context *params) goto error; } - type_mask =1UL << params->type; - volume =afs_lookup_volume (params, vldb, type_mask); + volume =afs_lookup_volume (params, vldb); error:kfree (vldb);
@@ -222,14 +226,17 @@ struct afs_volume *afs_create_volume(struct afs_fs_context *params)*/ static void afs_destroy_volume (struct afs_net *net,struct afs_volume *volume) { +struct afs_server_list *slist =rcu_access_pointer (volume->servers); +_enter ("%p" , volume);#ifdef CONFIG_AFS_FSCACHE ASSERTCMP(volume->cache, ==, NULL);#endif +afs_detach_volume_from_servers (volume, slist);afs_remove_volume_from_cell (volume); -afs_put_serverlist (net,rcu_access_pointer (volume->servers)); +afs_put_serverlist (net, slist);afs_put_cell (volume->cell, afs_cell_trace_put_vol);trace_afs_volume (volume->vid,refcount_read (&volume->ref), afs_volume_trace_free);
@@ -348,8 +355,7 @@ static int afs_update_volume_status(struct afs_volume *volume, struct key *key) }/* See if the volume's server list got updated. */ - new =afs_alloc_server_list (volume->cell, key, - vldb, (1 << volume->type)); + new =afs_alloc_server_list (volume, key, vldb);if (IS_ERR (new)) { ret =PTR_ERR (new); goto error_vldb;
@@ -370,9 +376,11 @@ static int afs_update_volume_status(struct afs_volume *volume, struct key *key) volume->update_at =ktime_get_real_seconds () + afs_volume_record_life;write_unlock (&volume->servers_lock); - ret =0 ; +if (discard == old) +afs_reattach_volume_to_servers (volume, new, old);afs_put_serverlist (volume->cell->net, discard); + ret =0 ; error_vldb:kfree (vldb); error:
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 498/620 afs: Fix the server_list to unuse a displaced server rather than putting it
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit add117e48df4788a86a21bd0515833c0a6db1ad1 ]
When allocating and building an afs_server_list struct object from a VLDB record, we look up each server address to get the server record for it - but a server may have more than one entry in the record and we discard the duplicate pointers. Currently, however, when we discard, we only put a server record, not unuse it - but the lookup got as an active-user count.
The active-user count on an afs_server_list object determines its lifetime whereas the refcount keeps the memory backing it around. Failing to reduce the active-user counter prevents the record from being cleaned up and can lead to multiple copied being seen - and pointing to deleted afs_cell objects and other such things.
Fix this by switching the incorrect 'put' to an 'unuse' instead.
Without this, occasionally, a dead server record can be seen in /proc/net/afs/servers and list corruption may be observed:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff888102423e40, but was 0000000000000000. (prev=ffff88810140cd38)
--- fs/afs/server_list.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/afs/server_list.c +2 -2
@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ struct afs_server_list *afs_alloc_server_list(struct afs_volume *volume,break ;if (j < slist->nr_servers) {if (slist->servers[j].server == server) { -afs_put_server (volume->cell->net, server, - afs_server_trace_put_slist_isort); +afs_unuse_server (volume->cell->net, server, + afs_server_trace_put_slist_isort);continue ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 499/620 net: loopback: Avoid sending IP packets without an Ethernet header
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0e4427f8f587c4b603475468bb3aee9418574893 ]
After commit 22600596b675 ("ipv4: give an IPv4 dev to blackhole_netdev") IPv4 neighbors can be constructed on the blackhole net device, but they are constructed with an output function (neigh_direct_output()) that simply calls dev_queue_xmit(). The latter will transmit packets via 'skb->dev' which might not be the blackhole net device if dst_dev_put() switched 'dst->dev' to the blackhole net device while another CPU was using the dst entry in ip_output(), but after it already initialized 'skb->dev' from 'dst->dev'.
Specifically, the following can happen:
CPU1 CPU2
udp_sendmsg(sk1) udp_sendmsg(sk2)udp_send_skb() [...]ip_output()
skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev
dst_dev_put()
dst->dev = blackhole_netdev
ip_finish_output2()
resolves neigh on dst->devneigh_output()neigh_direct_output()dev_queue_xmit()
This will result in IPv4 packets being sent without an Ethernet header via a valid net device:
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode listening on enp9s0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 262144 bytes 22:07:02.329668 20:00:40:11:18:fb > 45:00:00:44:f4:94, ethertype Unknown (0x58c6), length 68:
0x0000: 8dda 74ca f1ae ca6c ca6c 0098 969c 0400 ..t....l.l......
0x0010: 0000 4730 3f18 6800 0000 0000 0000 9971 ..G0?.h........q
0x0020: c4c9 9055 a157 0a70 9ead bf83 38ca ab38 ...U.W.p....8..8
0x0030: 8add ab96 e052 .....RFix by making sure that neighbors are constructed on top of the blackhole net device with an output function that simply consumes the packets, in a similar fashion to dst_discard_out() and blackhole_netdev_xmit().
--- drivers/net/loopback.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/net/loopback.c +14 -0
@@ -243,8 +243,22 @@ static netdev_tx_t blackhole_netdev_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,return NETDEV_TX_OK ; } +static int blackhole_neigh_output (struct neighbour *n,struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +kfree_skb (skb); +return 0 ; +} + +static int blackhole_neigh_construct (struct net_device *dev, +struct neighbour *n) +{ + n->output = blackhole_neigh_output; +return 0 ; +} +static const struct net_device_ops blackhole_netdev_ops = { .ndo_start_xmit = blackhole_netdev_xmit, + .ndo_neigh_construct = blackhole_neigh_construct, };/* This is a dst-dummy device used specifically for invalidated
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 500/620 net: cadence: macb: Synchronize stats calculations
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Anderson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fa52f15c745ce55261b92873676f64f7348cfe82 ]
Stats calculations involve a RMW to add the stat update to the existing value. This is currently not protected by any synchronization mechanism, so data races are possible. Add a spinlock to protect the update. The reader side could be protected using u64_stats, but we would still need a spinlock for the update side anyway. And we always do an update immediately before reading the stats anyway.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.h | 2 ++ drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb.h +2 -0
@@ -1258,6 +1258,8 @@ struct macb {struct clk *rx_clk;struct clk *tsu_clk;struct net_device *dev; +/* Protects hw_stats and ethtool_stats */ +spinlock_t stats_lock;union {struct macb_stats macb;struct gem_stats gem;
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c +10 -2
@@ -1892,10 +1892,12 @@ static irqreturn_t macb_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)if (status &MACB_BIT (ISR_ROVR )) {/* We missed at least one packet */ +spin_lock (&bp->stats_lock);if (macb_is_gem (bp)) bp->hw_stats.gem.rx_overruns++;else bp->hw_stats.macb.rx_overruns++; +spin_unlock (&bp->stats_lock);if (bp->caps &MACB_CAPS_ISR_CLEAR_ON_WRITE )queue_writel (queue,ISR ,MACB_BIT (ISR_ROVR ));
@@ -2939,6 +2941,7 @@ static struct net_device_stats *gem_get_stats(struct macb *bp)if (!netif_running (bp->dev))return nstat; +spin_lock_irq (&bp->stats_lock);gem_update_stats (bp); nstat->rx_errors = (hwstat->rx_frame_check_sequence_errors +
@@ -2968,6 +2971,7 @@ static struct net_device_stats *gem_get_stats(struct macb *bp) nstat->tx_aborted_errors = hwstat->tx_excessive_collisions; nstat->tx_carrier_errors = hwstat->tx_carrier_sense_errors; nstat->tx_fifo_errors = hwstat->tx_underrun; +spin_unlock_irq (&bp->stats_lock);return nstat; }
@@ -2975,12 +2979,13 @@ static struct net_device_stats *gem_get_stats(struct macb *bp)static void gem_get_ethtool_stats (struct net_device *dev,struct ethtool_stats *stats,u64 *data) { -struct macb *bp; +struct macb *bp =netdev_priv (dev); - bp =netdev_priv (dev); +spin_lock_irq (&bp->stats_lock);gem_update_stats (bp);memcpy (data, &bp->ethtool_stats,sizeof (u64) * (GEM_STATS_LEN +QUEUE_STATS_LEN *MACB_MAX_QUEUES )); +spin_unlock_irq (&bp->stats_lock); }static int gem_get_sset_count (struct net_device *dev,int sset)
@@ -3030,6 +3035,7 @@ static struct net_device_stats *macb_get_stats(struct net_device *dev)return gem_get_stats (bp);/* read stats from hardware */ +spin_lock_irq (&bp->stats_lock);macb_update_stats (bp);/* Convert HW stats into netdevice stats */
@@ -3063,6 +3069,7 @@ static struct net_device_stats *macb_get_stats(struct net_device *dev) nstat->tx_carrier_errors = hwstat->tx_carrier_errors; nstat->tx_fifo_errors = hwstat->tx_underruns;/* Don't know about heartbeat or window errors... */ +spin_unlock_irq (&bp->stats_lock);return nstat; }
@@ -4802,6 +4809,7 @@ static int macb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) bp->usrio = macb_config->usrio;spin_lock_init (&bp->lock); +spin_lock_init (&bp->stats_lock);/* setup capabilities */ macb_configure_caps (bp, macb_config);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 501/620 ASoC: es8328: fix route from DAC to output
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nicolas Frattaroli <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5b0c02f9b8acf2a791e531bbc09acae2d51f4f9b ]
The ES8328 codec driver, which is also used for the ES8388 chip that appears to have an identical register map, claims that the output can either take the route from DAC->Mixer->Output or through DAC->Output directly. To the best of what I could find, this is not true, and creates problems.
Without DACCONTROL17 bit index 7 set for the left channel, as well as DACCONTROL20 bit index 7 set for the right channel, I cannot get any analog audio out on Left Out 2 and Right Out 2 respectively, despite the DAPM routes claiming that this should be possible. Furthermore, the same is the case for Left Out 1 and Right Out 1, showing that those two don't have a direct route from DAC to output bypassing the mixer either.
Those control bits toggle whether the DACs are fed (stale bread?) into their respective mixers. If one "unmutes" the mixer controls in alsamixer, then sure, the audio output works, but if it doesn't work without the mixer being fed the DAC input then evidently it's not a direct output from the DAC.
ES8328/ES8388 are seemingly not alone in this. ES8323, which uses a separate driver for what appears to be a very similar register map, simply flips those two bits on in its probe function, and then pretends there is no power management whatsoever for the individual controls. Fair enough.
My theory as to why nobody has noticed this up to this point is that everyone just assumes it's their fault when they had to unmute an additional control in ALSA.
Fix this in the es8328 driver by removing the erroneous direct route, then get rid of the playback switch controls and have those bits tied to the mixer's widget instead, which until now had no register to play with.
--- sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c | 15 ++++----------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c +4 -11
@@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new es8328_right_line_controls =/* Left Mixer */ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new es8328_left_mixer_controls[] = { -SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Playback Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL17 ,7 ,1 ,0 ),SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Left Bypass Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL17 ,6 ,1 ,0 ),SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Right Playback Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL18 ,7 ,1 ,0 ),SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Right Bypass Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL18 ,6 ,1 ,0 ),
@@ -244,7 +243,6 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new es8328_left_mixer_controls[] = {static const struct snd_kcontrol_new es8328_right_mixer_controls[] = {SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Left Playback Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL19 ,7 ,1 ,0 ),SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Left Bypass Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL19 ,6 ,1 ,0 ), -SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Playback Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL20 ,7 ,1 ,0 ),SOC_DAPM_SINGLE ("Right Bypass Switch" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL20 ,6 ,1 ,0 ), };
@@ -337,10 +335,10 @@ static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget es8328_dapm_widgets[] = {SND_SOC_DAPM_DAC ("Left DAC" ,"Left Playback" ,ES8328_DACPOWER ,ES8328_DACPOWER_LDAC_OFF ,1 ), -SND_SOC_DAPM_MIXER ("Left Mixer" ,SND_SOC_NOPM ,0 ,0 , +SND_SOC_DAPM_MIXER ("Left Mixer" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL17 ,7 ,0 , &es8328_left_mixer_controls[0 ],ARRAY_SIZE (es8328_left_mixer_controls)), -SND_SOC_DAPM_MIXER ("Right Mixer" ,SND_SOC_NOPM ,0 ,0 , +SND_SOC_DAPM_MIXER ("Right Mixer" ,ES8328_DACCONTROL20 ,7 ,0 , &es8328_right_mixer_controls[0 ], ARRAY_SIZE(es8328_right_mixer_controls)),
@@ -419,19 +417,14 @@ static const struct snd_soc_dapm_route es8328_dapm_routes[] = { { "Right Line Mux", "PGA", "Right PGA Mux" }, { "Right Line Mux", "Differential", "Differential Mux" }, - { "Left Out 1", NULL, "Left DAC" }, - { "Right Out 1", NULL, "Right DAC" }, - { "Left Out 2", NULL, "Left DAC" }, - { "Right Out 2", NULL, "Right DAC" }, - - { "Left Mixer", "Playback Switch", "Left DAC" }, + { "Left Mixer", NULL, "Left DAC" }, { "Left Mixer", "Left Bypass Switch", "Left Line Mux" }, { "Left Mixer", "Right Playback Switch", "Right DAC" }, { "Left Mixer", "Right Bypass Switch", "Right Line Mux" }, { "Right Mixer", "Left Playback Switch", "Left DAC" }, { "Right Mixer", "Left Bypass Switch", "Left Line Mux" }, - { "Right Mixer", "Playback Switch", "Right DAC" }, + { "Right Mixer", NULL, "Right DAC" }, { "Right Mixer", "Right Bypass Switch", "Right Line Mux" }, { "DAC DIG", NULL, "DAC STM" },
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 502/620 ipvs: Always clear ipvs_property flag in skb_scrub_packet()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Philo Lu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit de2c211868b9424f9aa9b3432c4430825bafb41b ]
We found an issue when using bpf_redirect with ipvs NAT mode after commit ff70202b2d1a ("dev_forward_skb: do not scrub skb mark within the same name space"). Particularly, we use bpf_redirect to return the skb directly back to the netif it comes from, i.e., xnet is false in skb_scrub_packet(), and then ipvs_property is preserved and SNAT is skipped in the rx path.
ipvs_property has been already cleared when netns is changed in commit 2b5ec1a5f973 ("netfilter/ipvs: clear ipvs_property flag when SKB net namespace changed"). This patch just clears it in spite of netns.
--- net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/skbuff.c +1 -1
@@ -5558,11 +5558,11 @@ void skb_scrub_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bool xnet) skb->offload_fwd_mark =0 ; skb->offload_l3_fwd_mark =0 ;#endif +ipvs_reset (skb);if (!xnet)return ; -ipvs_reset (skb); skb->mark =0 ; skb->tstamp =0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 503/620 tcp: Defer ts_recent changes until req is owned
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Hai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8d52da23b6c68a0f6bad83959ebb61a2cf623c4e ]
Recently a bug was discovered where the server had entered TCP_ESTABLISHED state, but the upper layers were not notified.
The same 5-tuple packet may be processed by different CPUSs, so two CPUs may receive different ack packets at the same time when the state is TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV.
In that case, req->ts_recent in tcp_check_req may be changed concurrently, which will probably cause the newsk's ts_recent to be incorrectly large. So that tcp_validate_incoming will fail. At this point, newsk will not be able to enter the TCP_ESTABLISHED.
cpu1 cpu2tcp_check_req
tcp_check_req
req->ts_recent = rcv_tsval = t1
req->ts_recent = rcv_tsval = t2
syn_recv_sock
tcp_sk(child)->rx_opt.ts_recent = req->ts_recent = t2 // t1 < t2tcp_child_process
tcp_rcv_state_process
tcp_validate_incoming
tcp_paws_check
if ((s32)(rx_opt->ts_recent - rx_opt->rcv_tsval) <= paws_win)
// t2 - t1 > paws_win, failed
tcp_v4_do_rcv
tcp_rcv_state_process
// TCP_ESTABLISHEDThe cpu2's skb or a newly received skb will call tcp_v4_do_rcv to get the newsk into the TCP_ESTABLISHED state, but at this point it is no longer possible to notify the upper layer application. A notification mechanism could be added here, but the fix is more complex, so the current fix is used.
In tcp_check_req, req->ts_recent is used to assign a value to tcp_sk(child)->rx_opt.ts_recent, so removing the change in req->ts_recent and changing tcp_sk(child)->rx_opt.ts_recent directly after owning the req fixes this bug.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +4 -6
@@ -725,12 +725,6 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,/* In sequence, PAWS is OK. */ -/* TODO: We probably should defer ts_recent change once -* we take ownership of @req. -*/ -if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp && !after (TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->seq,tcp_rsk (req)->rcv_nxt)) -WRITE_ONCE (req->ts_recent, tmp_opt.rcv_tsval); -if (TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->seq ==tcp_rsk (req)->rcv_isn) {/* Truncate SYN, it is out of window starting at tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1. */
@@ -779,6 +773,10 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,if (!child) goto listen_overflow; +if (own_req && tmp_opt.saw_tstamp && + !after (TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->seq,tcp_rsk (req)->rcv_nxt)) +tcp_sk (child)->rx_opt.ts_recent = tmp_opt.rcv_tsval; +if (own_req &&rsk_drop_req (req)) {reqsk_queue_removed (&inet_csk (req->rsk_listener)->icsk_accept_queue, req);inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put (req->rsk_listener, req);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 504/620 net: mvpp2: cls: Fixed Non IP flow, with vlan tag flow defination.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harshal Chaudhari <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2d253726ff7106b39a44483b6864398bba8a2f74 ]
Non IP flow, with vlan tag not working as expected while running below command for vlan-priority. fixed that.
ethtool -N eth1 flow-type ether vlan 0x8000 vlan-mask 0x1fff action 0 loc 0
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_cls.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_cls.c +1 -1
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static const struct mvpp2_cls_flow cls_flows[MVPP2_N_PRS_FLOWS] = { MVPP2_PRS_RI_VLAN_MASK),/* Non IP flow, with vlan tag */ MVPP2_DEF_FLOW (MVPP22_FLOW_ETHERNET ,MVPP2_FL_NON_IP_TAG , -MVPP22_CLS_HEK_OPT_VLAN , +MVPP22_CLS_HEK_TAGGED , 0, 0), };
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 505/620 net/mlx5: IRQ, Fix null string in debug print
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shay Drory <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2f5a6014eb168a97b24153adccfa663d3b282767 ]
irq_pool_alloc() debug print can print a null string. Fix it by providing a default string to print.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/pci_irq.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/pci_irq.c +1 -1
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ irq_pool_alloc(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int start, int size, char *name, pool->min_threshold = min_threshold *MLX5_EQ_REFS_PER_IRQ ; pool->max_threshold = max_threshold *MLX5_EQ_REFS_PER_IRQ ;mlx5_core_dbg (dev,"pool->name = %s, pool->size = %d, pool->start = %d" , - name, size, start); + name ? name :"mlx5_pcif_pool" , size, start);return pool; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 506/620 seg6: add support for SRv6 H.Encaps.Red behavior
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b07c8cdbe918aa17da864da9a89b22afaed0393e ]
The SRv6 H.Encaps.Red behavior described in [1] is an optimization of the SRv6 H.Encaps behavior [2].
H.Encaps.Red reduces the length of the SRH by excluding the first segment (SID) in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 header. The first SID is only placed in the IPv6 Destination Address field of the pushed IPv6 header.
When the SRv6 Policy only contains one SID the SRH is omitted, unless there is an HMAC TLV to be carried.
[1] - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8986#section-5.2
[2] - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8986#section-5.1
Stable-dep-of: c64a0727f9b1 ("net: ipv6: fix dst ref loop on input in seg6 lwt")
--- include/uapi/linux/seg6_iptunnel.h | 1 + net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/seg6_iptunnel.h +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ enum {SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_INLINE ,SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP ,SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP , + SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP_RED, };#endif
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +127 -1
158 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 507/620 seg6: add support for SRv6 H.L2Encaps.Red behavior
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 13f0296be8ece1189cbc4383a45ba97cafaecc09 ]
The SRv6 H.L2Encaps.Red behavior described in [1] is an optimization of the SRv6 H.L2Encaps behavior [2].
H.L2Encaps.Red reduces the length of the SRH by excluding the first segment (SID) in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 header. The first SID is only placed in the IPv6 Destination Address field of the pushed IPv6 header.
When the SRv6 Policy only contains one SID the SRH is omitted, unless there is an HMAC TLV to be carried.
[1] - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8986#section-5.4
[2] - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8986#section-5.3
Stable-dep-of: c64a0727f9b1 ("net: ipv6: fix dst ref loop on input in seg6 lwt")
--- include/uapi/linux/seg6_iptunnel.h | 1 + net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 12 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/seg6_iptunnel.h +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ enum {SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP ,SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP ,SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP_RED , + SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP_RED, };#endif
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +11 -1
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static size_t seg6_lwt_headroom(struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *tuninfo) head =sizeof (struct ipv6hdr );break ;case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP : +case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP_RED :return 0 ; }
@@ -413,6 +414,7 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb) skb->protocol =htons (ETH_P_IPV6 );break ;case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP : +case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP_RED :if (!skb_mac_header_was_set (skb))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -422,7 +424,13 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb)skb_mac_header_rebuild (skb);skb_push (skb, skb->mac_len); - err =seg6_do_srh_encap (skb, tinfo->srh,IPPROTO_ETHERNET ); +if (tinfo->mode ==SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP ) + err =seg6_do_srh_encap (skb, tinfo->srh, +IPPROTO_ETHERNET ); +else + err =seg6_do_srh_encap_red (skb, tinfo->srh, +IPPROTO_ETHERNET ); +if (err)return err;
@@ -642,6 +650,8 @@ static int seg6_build_state(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,break ;case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP_RED :break ; +case SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP_RED : +break ;default :return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 508/620 include: net: add static inline dst_dev_overhead() to dst.h
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Justin Iurman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0600cf40e9b36fe17f9c9f04d4f9cef249eaa5e7 ]
Add static inline dst_dev_overhead() function to include/net/dst.h. This helper function is used by ioam6_iptunnel, rpl_iptunnel and seg6_iptunnel to get the dev's overhead based on a cache entry (dst_entry). If the cache is empty, the default and generic value skb->mac_len is returned. Otherwise, LL_RESERVED_SPACE() over dst's dev is returned.
Stable-dep-of: c64a0727f9b1 ("net: ipv6: fix dst ref loop on input in seg6 lwt")
--- include/net/dst.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
include/net/dst.h +9 -0
@@ -433,6 +433,15 @@ static inline void dst_set_expires(struct dst_entry *dst, int timeout) dst->expires = expires; } +static inline unsigned int dst_dev_overhead (struct dst_entry *dst, +struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +if (likely (dst)) +return LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev); + +return skb->mac_len; +} + INDIRECT_CALLABLE_DECLARE(int ip6_output(struct net *, struct sock *,struct sk_buff *)); INDIRECT_CALLABLE_DECLARE(int ip_output(struct net *, struct sock *,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 509/620 net: ipv6: seg6_iptunnel: mitigate 2-realloc issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Justin Iurman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 40475b63761abb6f8fdef960d03228a08662c9c4 ]
This patch mitigates the two-reallocations issue with seg6_iptunnel by providing the dst_entry (in the cache) to the first call to skb_cow_head(). As a result, the very first iteration would still trigger two reallocations (i.e., empty cache), while next iterations would only trigger a single reallocation.
Performance tests before/after applying this patch, which clearly shows the improvement:
- before: https://ibb.co/3Cg4sNH
- after: https://ibb.co/8rQ350r
Stable-dep-of: c64a0727f9b1 ("net: ipv6: fix dst ref loop on input in seg6 lwt")
--- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +52 -33
@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ static __be32 seg6_make_flowlabel(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,return flowlabel; } -/* encapsulate an IPv6 packet within an outer IPv6 header with a given SRH */ -int seg6_do_srh_encap (struct sk_buff *skb,struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh,int proto) +static int __seg6_do_srh_encap (struct sk_buff *skb,struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, +int proto,struct dst_entry *cache_dst) {struct dst_entry *dst =skb_dst (skb);struct net *net =dev_net (dst->dev);
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int seg6_do_srh_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, int proto) hdrlen = (osrh->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ; tot_len = hdrlen +sizeof (*hdr); - err =skb_cow_head (skb, tot_len + skb->mac_len); + err =skb_cow_head (skb, tot_len +dst_dev_overhead (cache_dst, skb));if (unlikely (err))return err;
@@ -197,11 +197,18 @@ int seg6_do_srh_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, int proto)return 0 ; } + +/* encapsulate an IPv6 packet within an outer IPv6 header with a given SRH */ +int seg6_do_srh_encap (struct sk_buff *skb,struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh,int proto) +{ +return __seg6_do_srh_encap (skb, osrh, proto,NULL ); +}EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (seg6_do_srh_encap);/* encapsulate an IPv6 packet within an outer IPv6 header with reduced SRH */ static int seg6_do_srh_encap_red (struct sk_buff *skb, -struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh,int proto) +struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh,int proto, +struct dst_entry *cache_dst) {__u8 first_seg = osrh->first_segment;struct dst_entry *dst =skb_dst (skb);
@@ -230,7 +237,7 @@ static int seg6_do_srh_encap_red(struct sk_buff *skb, tot_len = red_hdrlen +sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ); - err =skb_cow_head (skb, tot_len + skb->mac_len); + err =skb_cow_head (skb, tot_len +dst_dev_overhead (cache_dst, skb));if (unlikely (err))return err;
@@ -317,8 +324,8 @@ static int seg6_do_srh_encap_red(struct sk_buff *skb,return 0 ; } -/* insert an SRH within an IPv6 packet, just after the IPv6 header */ -int seg6_do_srh_inline (struct sk_buff *skb,struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh) +static int __seg6_do_srh_inline (struct sk_buff *skb,struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh, +struct dst_entry *cache_dst) {struct ipv6hdr *hdr, *oldhdr;struct ipv6_sr_hdr *isrh;
@@ -326,7 +333,7 @@ int seg6_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh) hdrlen = (osrh->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ; - err =skb_cow_head (skb, hdrlen + skb->mac_len); + err =skb_cow_head (skb, hdrlen +dst_dev_overhead (cache_dst, skb));if (unlikely (err))return err;
@@ -369,9 +376,8 @@ int seg6_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh)return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (seg6_do_srh_inline); -static int seg6_do_srh (struct sk_buff *skb) +static int seg6_do_srh (struct sk_buff *skb,struct dst_entry *cache_dst) {struct dst_entry *dst =skb_dst (skb);struct seg6_iptunnel_encap *tinfo;
@@ -384,7 +390,7 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb)if (skb->protocol !=htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ))return -EINVAL ; - err =seg6_do_srh_inline (skb, tinfo->srh); + err =__seg6_do_srh_inline (skb, tinfo->srh, cache_dst);if (err)return err;break ;
@@ -402,9 +408,11 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb)return -EINVAL ;if (tinfo->mode ==SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_ENCAP ) - err =seg6_do_srh_encap (skb, tinfo->srh, proto); + err =__seg6_do_srh_encap (skb, tinfo->srh, + proto, cache_dst);else - err =seg6_do_srh_encap_red (skb, tinfo->srh, proto); + err =seg6_do_srh_encap_red (skb, tinfo->srh, + proto, cache_dst);if (err)return err;
@@ -425,11 +433,13 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb)skb_push (skb, skb->mac_len);if (tinfo->mode ==SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP ) - err =seg6_do_srh_encap (skb, tinfo->srh, -IPPROTO_ETHERNET ); + err =__seg6_do_srh_encap (skb, tinfo->srh, +IPPROTO_ETHERNET , + cache_dst);else err =seg6_do_srh_encap_red (skb, tinfo->srh, -IPPROTO_ETHERNET ); +IPPROTO_ETHERNET , + cache_dst);if (err)return err;
@@ -444,6 +454,13 @@ static int seg6_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb)return 0 ; } +/* insert an SRH within an IPv6 packet, just after the IPv6 header */ +int seg6_do_srh_inline (struct sk_buff *skb,struct ipv6_sr_hdr *osrh) +{ +return __seg6_do_srh_inline (skb, osrh,NULL ); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (seg6_do_srh_inline); +static int seg6_input_finish (struct net *net,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) {
@@ -458,14 +475,15 @@ static int seg6_input_core(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,struct seg6_lwt *slwt;int err; - err =seg6_do_srh (skb); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop; - slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (orig_dst->lwtstate);local_bh_disable (); dst =dst_cache_get (&slwt->cache); +local_bh_enable (); + + err =seg6_do_srh (skb, dst); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop;skb_dst_drop (skb);
@@ -473,17 +491,18 @@ static int seg6_input_core(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,ip6_route_input (skb); dst =skb_dst (skb);if (!dst->error) { +local_bh_disable ();dst_cache_set_ip6 (&slwt->cache, dst, &ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr); +local_bh_enable (); } + + err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop; }else {skb_dst_set (skb, dst); } -local_bh_enable (); - - err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop;if (static_branch_unlikely (&nf_hooks_lwtunnel_enabled)) return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
@@ -529,16 +548,16 @@ static int seg6_output_core(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,struct seg6_lwt *slwt;int err; - err =seg6_do_srh (skb); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop; - slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (orig_dst->lwtstate);local_bh_disable (); dst =dst_cache_get (&slwt->cache);local_bh_enable (); + err =seg6_do_srh (skb, dst); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop; +if (unlikely (!dst)) {struct ipv6hdr *hdr =ipv6_hdr (skb);struct flowi6 fl6;
@@ -560,15 +579,15 @@ static int seg6_output_core(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,local_bh_disable ();dst_cache_set_ip6 (&slwt->cache, dst, &fl6.saddr);local_bh_enable (); + + err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop; }skb_dst_drop (skb);skb_dst_set (skb, dst); - err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop; -if (static_branch_unlikely (&nf_hooks_lwtunnel_enabled))return NF_HOOK (NFPROTO_IPV6 ,NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT , net, sk, skb,NULL ,skb_dst (skb)->dev, dst_output);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 510/620 net: ipv6: fix dst ref loop on input in seg6 lwt
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Justin Iurman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c64a0727f9b1cbc63a5538c8c0014e9a175ad864 ]
Prevent a dst ref loop on input in seg6_iptunnel.
--- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +12 -2
@@ -472,10 +472,18 @@ static int seg6_input_core(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, {struct dst_entry *orig_dst =skb_dst (skb);struct dst_entry *dst =NULL ; +struct lwtunnel_state *lwtst;struct seg6_lwt *slwt;int err; - slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (orig_dst->lwtstate); +/* We cannot dereference "orig_dst" once ip6_route_input() or +* skb_dst_drop() is called. However, in order to detect a dst loop, we +* need the address of its lwtstate. So, save the address of lwtstate +* now and use it later as a comparison. +*/ + lwtst = orig_dst->lwtstate; + + slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (lwtst);local_bh_disable (); dst =dst_cache_get (&slwt->cache);
@@ -490,7 +498,9 @@ static int seg6_input_core(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,if (!dst) {ip6_route_input (skb); dst =skb_dst (skb); -if (!dst->error) { + +/* cache only if we don't create a dst reference loop */ +if (!dst->error && lwtst != dst->lwtstate) {local_bh_disable ();dst_cache_set_ip6 (&slwt->cache, dst, &ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 511/620 net: ipv6: rpl_iptunnel: mitigate 2-realloc issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Justin Iurman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 985ec6f5e6235242191370628acb73d7a9f0c0ea ]
This patch mitigates the two-reallocations issue with rpl_iptunnel by providing the dst_entry (in the cache) to the first call to skb_cow_head(). As a result, the very first iteration would still trigger two reallocations (i.e., empty cache), while next iterations would only trigger a single reallocation.
Performance tests before/after applying this patch, which clearly shows there is no impact (it even shows improvement):
- before: https://ibb.co/nQJhqwc
- after: https://ibb.co/4ZvW6wV
Stable-dep-of: 13e55fbaec17 ("net: ipv6: fix dst ref loop on input in rpl lwt")
--- net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c +25 -21
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ static void rpl_destroy_state(struct lwtunnel_state *lwt) }static int rpl_do_srh_inline (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct rpl_lwt *rlwt, -const struct ipv6_rpl_sr_hdr *srh) +const struct ipv6_rpl_sr_hdr *srh, +struct dst_entry *cache_dst) {struct ipv6_rpl_sr_hdr *isrh, *csrh;const struct ipv6hdr *oldhdr;
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ static int rpl_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct rpl_lwt *rlwt, hdrlen = ((csrh->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ); - err =skb_cow_head (skb, hdrlen + skb->mac_len); + err =skb_cow_head (skb, hdrlen +dst_dev_overhead (cache_dst, skb));if (unlikely (err)) {kfree (buf);return err;
@@ -186,7 +187,8 @@ static int rpl_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct rpl_lwt *rlwt,return 0 ; } -static int rpl_do_srh (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct rpl_lwt *rlwt) +static int rpl_do_srh (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct rpl_lwt *rlwt, +struct dst_entry *cache_dst) {struct dst_entry *dst =skb_dst (skb);struct rpl_iptunnel_encap *tinfo;
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ static int rpl_do_srh(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct rpl_lwt *rlwt) tinfo =rpl_encap_lwtunnel (dst->lwtstate); -return rpl_do_srh_inline (skb, rlwt, tinfo->srh); +return rpl_do_srh_inline (skb, rlwt, tinfo->srh, cache_dst); }static int rpl_output (struct net *net,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -208,14 +210,14 @@ static int rpl_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) rlwt =rpl_lwt_lwtunnel (orig_dst->lwtstate); - err =rpl_do_srh (skb, rlwt); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop; -local_bh_disable (); dst =dst_cache_get (&rlwt->cache);local_bh_enable (); + err =rpl_do_srh (skb, rlwt, dst); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop; +if (unlikely (!dst)) {struct ipv6hdr *hdr =ipv6_hdr (skb);struct flowi6 fl6;
@@ -237,15 +239,15 @@ static int rpl_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)local_bh_disable ();dst_cache_set_ip6 (&rlwt->cache, dst, &fl6.saddr);local_bh_enable (); + + err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop; }skb_dst_drop (skb);skb_dst_set (skb, dst); - err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop; -return dst_output (net, sk, skb); drop:
@@ -262,12 +264,13 @@ static int rpl_input(struct sk_buff *skb) rlwt =rpl_lwt_lwtunnel (orig_dst->lwtstate); - err =rpl_do_srh (skb, rlwt); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop; -local_bh_disable (); dst =dst_cache_get (&rlwt->cache); +local_bh_enable (); + + err =rpl_do_srh (skb, rlwt, dst); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop;skb_dst_drop (skb);
@@ -275,17 +278,18 @@ static int rpl_input(struct sk_buff *skb)ip6_route_input (skb); dst =skb_dst (skb);if (!dst->error) { +local_bh_disable ();dst_cache_set_ip6 (&rlwt->cache, dst, &ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr); +local_bh_enable (); } + + err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); +if (unlikely (err)) + goto drop; }else {skb_dst_set (skb, dst); } -local_bh_enable (); - - err =skb_cow_head (skb,LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dst->dev)); -if (unlikely (err)) - goto drop;return dst_input (skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 512/620 net: ipv6: fix dst ref loop on input in rpl lwt
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Justin Iurman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 13e55fbaec176119cff68a7e1693b251c8883c5f ]
Prevent a dst ref loop on input in rpl_iptunnel.
--- net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c +12 -2
@@ -259,10 +259,18 @@ static int rpl_input(struct sk_buff *skb) {struct dst_entry *orig_dst =skb_dst (skb);struct dst_entry *dst =NULL ; +struct lwtunnel_state *lwtst;struct rpl_lwt *rlwt;int err; - rlwt =rpl_lwt_lwtunnel (orig_dst->lwtstate); +/* We cannot dereference "orig_dst" once ip6_route_input() or +* skb_dst_drop() is called. However, in order to detect a dst loop, we +* need the address of its lwtstate. So, save the address of lwtstate +* now and use it later as a comparison. +*/ + lwtst = orig_dst->lwtstate; + + rlwt =rpl_lwt_lwtunnel (lwtst);local_bh_disable (); dst =dst_cache_get (&rlwt->cache);
@@ -277,7 +285,9 @@ static int rpl_input(struct sk_buff *skb)if (!dst) {ip6_route_input (skb); dst =skb_dst (skb); -if (!dst->error) { + +/* cache only if we don't create a dst reference loop */ +if (!dst->error && lwtst != dst->lwtstate) {local_bh_disable ();dst_cache_set_ip6 (&rlwt->cache, dst, &ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 513/620 x86/CPU: Fix warm boot hang regression on AMD SC1100 SoC systems
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell Senior <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bebe35bb738b573c32a5033499cd59f20293f2a3 ]
I still have some Soekris net4826 in a Community Wireless Network I volunteer with. These devices use an AMD SC1100 SoC. I am running OpenWrt on them, which uses a patched kernel, that naturally has evolved over time. I haven't updated the ones in the field in a number of years (circa 2017), but have one in a test bed, where I have intermittently tried out test builds.
A few years ago, I noticed some trouble, particularly when "warm booting", that is, doing a reboot without removing power, and noticed the device was hanging after the kernel message:
[ 0.081615] Working around Cyrix MediaGX virtual DMA bugs.
If I removed power and then restarted, it would boot fine, continuing through the message above, thusly:
[ 0.081615] Working around Cyrix MediaGX virtual DMA bugs. [ 0.090076] Enable Memory-Write-back mode on Cyrix/NSC processor. [ 0.100000] Enable Memory access reorder on Cyrix/NSC processor. [ 0.100070] Last level iTLB entries: 4KB 0, 2MB 0, 4MB 0 [ 0.110058] Last level dTLB entries: 4KB 0, 2MB 0, 4MB 0, 1GB 0 [ 0.120037] CPU: NSC Geode(TM) Integrated Processor by National Semi (family: 0x5, model: 0x9, stepping: 0x1) [...]
In order to continue using modern tools, like ssh, to interact with the software on these old devices, I need modern builds of the OpenWrt firmware on the devices. I confirmed that the warm boot hang was still an issue in modern OpenWrt builds (currently using a patched linux v6.6.65).
Last night, I decided it was time to get to the bottom of the warm boot hang, and began bisecting. From preserved builds, I narrowed down the bisection window from late February to late May 2019. During this period, the OpenWrt builds were using 4.14.x. I was able to build using period-correct Ubuntu 18.04.6. After a number of bisection iterations, I identified a kernel bump from 4.14.112 to 4.14.113 as the commit that introduced the warm boot hang.
https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/07aaa7e3d62ad32767d7067107db64b6ade81537
Looking at the upstream changes in the stable kernel between 4.14.112 and 4.14.113 (tig v4.14.112..v4.14.113), I spotted a likely suspect:
So, I tried reverting just that kernel change on top of the breaking OpenWrt commit, and my warm boot hang went away.
Presumably, the warm boot hang is due to some register not getting cleared in the same way that a loss of power does. That is approximately as much as I understand about the problem.
More poking/prodding and coaching from Jonas Gorski, it looks like this test patch fixes the problem on my board: Tested against v6.6.67 and v4.14.113.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c +2 -2
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static void geode_configure(void)u8 ccr3;local_irq_save (flags); -/* Suspend on halt power saving and enable #SUSP pin */ -setCx86 (CX86_CCR2 ,getCx86 (CX86_CCR2 ) |0x88 ); +/* Suspend on halt power saving */ +setCx86 (CX86_CCR2 ,getCx86 (CX86_CCR2 ) |0x08 ); ccr3 =getCx86 (CX86_CCR3 );setCx86 (CX86_CCR3 , (ccr3 &0x0f ) |0x10 );/* enable MAPEN */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 514/620 ftrace: Avoid potential division by zero in function_stat_show()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikolay Kuratov <[email protected]>
commit a1a7eb89ca0b89dc1c326eeee2596f263291aca3 upstream.
Check whether denominator expression x * (x - 1) * 1000 mod {2^32, 2^64} produce zero and skip stddev computation in that case.
For now don't care about rec->counter * rec->counter overflow because rec->time * rec->time overflow will likely happen earlier.
--- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/ftrace.c +12 -15
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ static int function_stat_show(struct seqstatic struct trace_seq s;unsigned long long avg;unsigned long long stddev; +unsigned long long stddev_denom;#endif mutex_lock (&ftrace_profile_lock);
@@ -531,23 +532,19 @@ static int function_stat_show(struct seq#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER seq_puts (m," " ); -/* Sample standard deviation (s^2) */ -if (rec->counter <=1 ) - stddev =0 ; -else { -/* -* Apply Welford's method: -* s^2 = 1 / (n * (n-1)) * (n * \Sum (x_i)^2 - (\Sum x_i)^2) -*/ +/* +* Variance formula: +* s^2 = 1 / (n * (n-1)) * (n * \Sum (x_i)^2 - (\Sum x_i)^2) +* Maybe Welford's method is better here? +* Divide only by 1000 for ns^2 -> us^2 conversion. +* trace_print_graph_duration will divide by 1000 again. +*/ + stddev =0 ; + stddev_denom = rec->counter * (rec->counter -1 ) *1000 ; +if (stddev_denom) { stddev = rec->counter * rec->time_squared - rec->time * rec->time; - -/* -* Divide only 1000 for ns^2 -> us^2 conversion. -* trace_print_graph_duration will divide 1000 again. -*/ - stddev =div64_ul (stddev, - rec->counter * (rec->counter -1 ) *1000 ); + stddev =div64_ul (stddev, stddev_denom); }trace_seq_init (&s);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 515/620 ALSA: usb-audio: Re-add sample rate quirk for Pioneer DJM-900NXS2
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Panchenko <[email protected]>
commit 9af3b4f2d879da01192d6168e6c651e7fb5b652d upstream.
Re-add the sample-rate quirk for the Pioneer DJM-900NXS2. This device does not work without setting sample-rate.
--- sound/usb/quirks.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/usb/quirks.c +1 -0
@@ -1502,6 +1502,7 @@ void snd_usb_set_format_quirk(struct sndcase USB_ID (0x534d ,0x2109 ):/* MacroSilicon MS2109 */ subs->stream_offset_adj =2 ;break ; +case USB_ID (0x2b73 ,0x000a ):/* Pioneer DJM-900NXS2 */ case USB_ID (0x2b73 ,0x0013 ):/* Pioneer DJM-450 */ pioneer_djm_set_format_quirk (subs,0x0082 );break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 516/620 perf/core: Fix low freq setting via IOC_PERIOD
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
commit 0d39844150546fa1415127c5fbae26db64070dd3 upstream.
A low attr::freq value cannot be set via IOC_PERIOD on some platforms.
The perf_event_check_period() introduced in:
81ec3f3c4c4d ("perf/x86: Add check_period PMU callback")
was intended to check the period, rather than the frequency. A low frequency may be mistakenly rejected by limit_period().
Fix it.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +9 -8
@@ -5773,14 +5773,15 @@ static int _perf_event_period(struct perif (!value)return -EINVAL ; -if (event->attr.freq && value > sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate) -return -EINVAL ; - -if (perf_event_check_period (event, value)) -return -EINVAL ; - -if (!event->attr.freq && (value & (1ULL <<63 ))) -return -EINVAL ; +if (event->attr.freq) { +if (value > sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate) +return -EINVAL ; + }else { +if (perf_event_check_period (event, value)) +return -EINVAL ; +if (value & (1ULL <<63 )) +return -EINVAL ; + }event_function_call (event, __perf_event_period, &value);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 517/620 drm/amd/display: Fix HPD after gpu reset
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Roman Li <[email protected]>
commit 4de141b8b1b7991b607f77e5f4580e1c67c24717 upstream.
[Why]
DC is not using amdgpu_irq_get/put to manage the HPD interrupt refcounts. So when amdgpu_irq_gpu_reset_resume_helper() reprograms all of the IRQs, HPD gets disabled.
[How]
Use amdgpu_irq_get/put() for HPD init/fini in DM in order to sync refcounts
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_irq.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_irq.c +14 -0
@@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ void amdgpu_dm_hpd_init(struct amdgpu_destruct drm_device *dev =adev_to_drm (adev);struct drm_connector *connector;struct drm_connector_list_iter iter; +int i;drm_connector_list_iter_begin (dev, &iter);drm_for_each_connector_iter (connector, &iter) {
@@ -906,6 +907,12 @@ void amdgpu_dm_hpd_init(struct amdgpu_de } }drm_connector_list_iter_end (&iter); + +/* Update reference counts for HPDs */ +for (i =DC_IRQ_SOURCE_HPD1 ; i <= adev->mode_info.num_hpd; i++) { +if (amdgpu_irq_get (adev, &adev->hpd_irq, i -DC_IRQ_SOURCE_HPD1 )) +drm_err (dev,"DM_IRQ: Failed get HPD for source=%d)!\n" , i); + } }/**
@@ -921,6 +928,7 @@ void amdgpu_dm_hpd_fini(struct amdgpu_destruct drm_device *dev =adev_to_drm (adev);struct drm_connector *connector;struct drm_connector_list_iter iter; +int i;drm_connector_list_iter_begin (dev, &iter);drm_for_each_connector_iter (connector, &iter) {
@@ -937,4 +945,10 @@ void amdgpu_dm_hpd_fini(struct amdgpu_de } }drm_connector_list_iter_end (&iter); + +/* Update reference counts for HPDs */ +for (i =DC_IRQ_SOURCE_HPD1 ; i <= adev->mode_info.num_hpd; i++) { +if (amdgpu_irq_put (adev, &adev->hpd_irq, i -DC_IRQ_SOURCE_HPD1 )) +drm_err (dev,"DM_IRQ: Failed put HPD for source=%d!\n" , i); + } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 518/620 i2c: npcm: disable interrupt enable bit before devm_request_irq
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tyrone Ting <[email protected]>
commit dd1998e243f5fa25d348a384ba0b6c84d980f2b2 upstream.
The customer reports that there is a soft lockup issue related to the i2c driver. After checking, the i2c module was doing a tx transfer and the bmc machine reboots in the middle of the i2c transaction, the i2c module keeps the status without being reset.
Due to such an i2c module status, the i2c irq handler keeps getting triggered since the i2c irq handler is registered in the kernel booting process after the bmc machine is doing a warm rebooting.
The continuous triggering is stopped by the soft lockup watchdog timer.
Disable the interrupt enable bit in the i2c module before calling devm_request_irq to fix this issue since the i2c relative status bit is read-only.
Here is the soft lockup log.
[ 28.176395] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [swapper/0:1] [ 28.183351] Modules linked in: [ 28.186407] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.120-yocto-s-dirty-bbebc78 #1 [ 28.201174] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 28.208128] pc : __do_softirq+0xb0/0x368 [ 28.212055] lr : __do_softirq+0x70/0x368 [ 28.215972] sp : ffffff8035ebca00 [ 28.219278] x29: ffffff8035ebca00 x28: 0000000000000002 x27: ffffff80071a3780 [ 28.226412] x26: ffffffc008bdc000 x25: ffffffc008bcc640 x24: ffffffc008be50c0 [ 28.233546] x23: ffffffc00800200c x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 000000000000001b [ 28.240679] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff80001c3200 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 28.247812] x17: ffffffc02d2e0000 x16: ffffff8035eb8b40 x15: 00001e8480000000 [ 28.254945] x14: 02c3647e37dbfcb6 x13: 02c364f2ab14200c x12: 0000000002c364f2 [ 28.262078] x11: 00000000fa83b2da x10: 000000000000b67e x9 : ffffffc008010250 [ 28.269211] x8 : 000000009d983d00 x7 : 7fffffffffffffff x6 : 0000036d74732434 [ 28.276344] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 0000000000000015 x3 : 0000000000000198 [ 28.283476] x2 : ffffffc02d2e0000 x1 : 00000000000000e0 x0 : ffffffc008bdcb40 [ 28.290611] Call trace: [ 28.293052] __do_softirq+0xb0/0x368 [ 28.296625] __irq_exit_rcu+0xe0/0x100 [ 28.300374] irq_exit+0x14/0x20 [ 28.303513] handle_domain_irq+0x68/0x90 [ 28.307440] gic_handle_irq+0x78/0xb0 [ 28.311098] call_on_irq_stack+0x20/0x38 [ 28.315019] do_interrupt_handler+0x54/0x5c [ 28.319199] el1_interrupt+0x2c/0x4c [ 28.322777] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x20 [ 28.326872] el1h_64_irq+0x74/0x78 [ 28.330269] __setup_irq+0x454/0x780 [ 28.333841] request_threaded_irq+0xd0/0x1b4 [ 28.338107] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x84/0x100 [ 28.342809] npcm_i2c_probe_bus+0x188/0x3d0 [ 28.346990] platform_probe+0x6c/0xc4 [ 28.350653] really_probe+0xcc/0x45c [ 28.354227] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x160 [ 28.358578] driver_probe_device+0x44/0xe0 [ 28.362670] __driver_attach+0x124/0x1d0 [ 28.366589] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0 [ 28.370426] driver_attach+0x28/0x30 [ 28.373997] bus_add_driver+0x124/0x240 [ 28.377830] driver_register+0x7c/0x124 [ 28.381662] __platform_driver_register+0x2c/0x34 [ 28.386362] npcm_i2c_init+0x3c/0x5c [ 28.389937] do_one_initcall+0x74/0x230 [ 28.393768] kernel_init_freeable+0x24c/0x2b4 [ 28.398126] kernel_init+0x28/0x130 [ 28.401614] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 28.405189] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks [ 28.411011] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 28.414933] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 28.418412] CPU features: 0x00000000,00000802 [ 28.427644] Rebooting in 20 seconds..
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-npcm7xx.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-npcm7xx.c +7 -0
@@ -2305,6 +2305,13 @@ static int npcm_i2c_probe_bus(struct plaif (irq <0 )return irq; +/* +* Disable the interrupt to avoid the interrupt handler being triggered +* incorrectly by the asynchronous interrupt status since the machine +* might do a warm reset during the last smbus/i2c transfer session. +*/ +npcm_i2c_int_enable (bus, false); + ret =devm_request_irq (bus->dev, irq, npcm_i2c_bus_irq,0 ,dev_name (bus->dev), bus);if (ret)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 519/620 usbnet: gl620a: fix endpoint checking in genelink_bind()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikita Zhandarovich <[email protected]>
commit 1cf9631d836b289bd5490776551961c883ae8a4f upstream.
Syzbot reports [1] a warning in usb_submit_urb() triggered by inconsistencies between expected and actually present endpoints in gl620a driver. Since genelink_bind() does not properly verify whether specified eps are in fact provided by the device, in this case, an artificially manufactured one, one may get a mismatch.
Fix the issue by resorting to a usbnet utility function usbnet_get_endpoints(), usually reserved for this very problem. Check for endpoints and return early before proceeding further if any are missing.
[1] Syzbot report:
usb 5-1: Manufacturer: syz
usb 5-1: SerialNumber: syz
usb 5-1: config 0 descriptor??
gl620a 5-1:0.23 usb0: register 'gl620a' at usb-dummy_hcd.0-1, ...
------------[ cut here ]------------ usb 5-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1841 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1841 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-07834-g06afb0f36106 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xe4b/0x1730 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 ... Call Trace: <TASK> usbnet_start_xmit+0x6be/0x2780 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1467 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9a/0x7b0 net/core/dev.c:3606 sch_direct_xmit+0x1ae/0xc30 net/sched/sch_generic.c:343 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3827 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13d4/0x43e0 net/core/dev.c:4400 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline] neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1514 [inline] neigh_resolve_output+0x5bc/0x950 net/core/neighbour.c:1494 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:539 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0xb1b/0x2070 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline] ip6_finish_output+0x3f9/0x1360 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x1f8/0x540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247 dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline] mld_sendpack+0x9f0/0x11d0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1819 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2120 [inline] mld_ifc_work+0x740/0xca0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651 process_one_work+0x9c5/0x1ba0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3310 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf00 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK>
--- drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c +1 -3
@@ -179,9 +179,7 @@ static int genelink_bind(struct usbnet * { dev->hard_mtu =GL_RCV_BUF_SIZE ; dev->net->hard_header_len +=4 ; - dev->in =usb_rcvbulkpipe (dev->udev, dev->driver_info->in); - dev->out =usb_sndbulkpipe (dev->udev, dev->driver_info->out); -return 0 ; +return usbnet_get_endpoints (dev, intf); }static const struct driver_info genelink_info = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 520/620 net: enetc: fix the off-by-one issue in enetc_map_tx_buffs()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei Fang <[email protected]>
commit 39ab773e4c120f7f98d759415ccc2aca706bbc10 upstream.
When a DMA mapping error occurs while processing skb frags, it will free one more tx_swbd than expected, so fix this off-by-one issue.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c +19 -7
@@ -121,6 +121,24 @@ static int enetc_ptp_parse(struct sk_bufreturn 0 ; } +/** +* enetc_unwind_tx_frame() - Unwind the DMA mappings of a multi-buffer Tx frame +* @tx_ring: Pointer to the Tx ring on which the buffer descriptors are located +* @count: Number of Tx buffer descriptors which need to be unmapped +* @i: Index of the last successfully mapped Tx buffer descriptor +*/ +static void enetc_unwind_tx_frame (struct enetc_bdr *tx_ring,int count,int i) +{ +while (count--) { +struct enetc_tx_swbd *tx_swbd = &tx_ring->tx_swbd[i]; + +enetc_free_tx_frame (tx_ring, tx_swbd); +if (i ==0 ) + i = tx_ring->bd_count; + i--; + } +} +static int enetc_map_tx_buffs (struct enetc_bdr *tx_ring,struct sk_buff *skb) {bool do_vlan, do_onestep_tstamp = false, do_twostep_tstamp = false;
@@ -303,13 +321,7 @@ static int enetc_map_tx_buffs(struct ene dma_err:dev_err (tx_ring->dev,"DMA map error" ); -do { - tx_swbd = &tx_ring->tx_swbd[i]; -enetc_free_tx_frame (tx_ring, tx_swbd); -if (i ==0 ) - i = tx_ring->bd_count; - i--; - }while (count--); +enetc_unwind_tx_frame (tx_ring, count, i);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 521/620 net: enetc: update UDP checksum when updating originTimestamp field
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei Fang <[email protected]>
commit bbcbc906ab7b5834c1219cd17a38d78dba904aa0 upstream.
There is an issue with one-step timestamp based on UDP/IP. The peer will discard the sync packet because of the wrong UDP checksum. For ENETC v1, the software needs to update the UDP checksum when updating the originTimestamp field, so that the hardware can correctly update the UDP checksum when updating the correction field. Otherwise, the UDP checksum in the sync packet will be wrong.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c +34 -7
@@ -228,9 +228,11 @@ static int enetc_map_tx_buffs(struct ene }if (do_onestep_tstamp) { -u32 lo, hi, val; -u64 sec, nsec; +__be32 new_sec_l, new_nsec; +u32 lo, hi, nsec, val; +__be16 new_sec_h;u8 *data; +u64 sec; lo =enetc_rd_hot (hw,ENETC_SICTR0 ); hi =enetc_rd_hot (hw,ENETC_SICTR1 );
@@ -244,13 +246,38 @@ static int enetc_map_tx_buffs(struct ene/* Update originTimestamp field of Sync packet * - 48 bits seconds field * - 32 bits nanseconds field +* +* In addition, the UDP checksum needs to be updated +* by software after updating originTimestamp field, +* otherwise the hardware will calculate the wrong +* checksum when updating the correction field and +* update it to the packet. */ data =skb_mac_header (skb); - *(__be16 *)(data + offset2) = -htons ((sec >>32 ) &0xffff ); - *(__be32 *)(data + offset2 +2 ) = -htonl (sec &0xffffffff ); - *(__be32 *)(data + offset2 +6 ) =htonl (nsec); + new_sec_h =htons ((sec >>32 ) &0xffff ); + new_sec_l =htonl (sec &0xffffffff ); + new_nsec =htonl (nsec); +if (udp) { +struct udphdr *uh =udp_hdr (skb); +__be32 old_sec_l, old_nsec; +__be16 old_sec_h; + + old_sec_h = *(__be16 *)(data + offset2); +inet_proto_csum_replace2 (&uh->check, skb, old_sec_h, + new_sec_h, false); + + old_sec_l = *(__be32 *)(data + offset2 +2 ); +inet_proto_csum_replace4 (&uh->check, skb, old_sec_l, + new_sec_l, false); + + old_nsec = *(__be32 *)(data + offset2 +6 ); +inet_proto_csum_replace4 (&uh->check, skb, old_nsec, + new_nsec, false); + } + + *(__be16 *)(data + offset2) = new_sec_h; + *(__be32 *)(data + offset2 +2 ) = new_sec_l; + *(__be32 *)(data + offset2 +6 ) = new_nsec;/* Configure single-step register */ val =ENETC_PM0_SINGLE_STEP_EN ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 522/620 net: enetc: correct the xdp_tx statistics
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei Fang <[email protected]>
commit 432a2cb3ee97a7c6ea578888fe81baad035b9307 upstream.
The 'xdp_tx' is used to count the number of XDP_TX frames sent, not the number of Tx BDs.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c +1 -1
@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ static int enetc_clean_rx_ring_xdp(strucenetc_xdp_drop (rx_ring, orig_i, i); tx_ring->stats.xdp_tx_drops++; }else { - tx_ring->stats.xdp_tx += xdp_tx_bd_cnt; + tx_ring->stats.xdp_tx++; rx_ring->xdp.xdp_tx_in_flight += xdp_tx_bd_cnt; xdp_tx_frm_cnt++;/* The XDP_TX enqueue was successful, so we
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 523/620 phy: tegra: xusb: reset VBUS & ID OVERRIDE
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: BH Hsieh <[email protected]>
commit 55f1a5f7c97c3c92ba469e16991a09274410ceb7 upstream.
Observed VBUS_OVERRIDE & ID_OVERRIDE might be programmed with unexpected value prior to XUSB PADCTL driver, this could also occur in virtualization scenario.
For example, UEFI firmware programs ID_OVERRIDE=GROUNDED to set a type-c port to host mode and keeps the value to kernel. If the type-c port is connected a usb host, below errors can be observed right after usb host mode driver gets probed. The errors would keep until usb role class driver detects the type-c port as device mode and notifies usb device mode driver to set both ID_OVERRIDE and VBUS_OVERRIDE to correct value by XUSB PADCTL driver.
[ 173.765814] usb usb3-port2: Cannot enable. Maybe the USB cable is bad? [ 173.765837] usb usb3-port2: config error
Taking virtualization into account, asserting XUSB PADCTL reset would break XUSB functions used by other guest OS, hence only reset VBUS & ID OVERRIDE of the port in utmi_phy_init.
--- drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c +11 -0
@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ static int tegra186_utmi_phy_exit(structunsigned int index = lane->index;struct device *dev = padctl->dev;int err; +u32 reg; port =tegra_xusb_find_usb2_port (padctl, index);if (!port) {
@@ -904,6 +905,16 @@ static int tegra186_utmi_phy_exit(structreturn -ENODEV ; } +if (port->mode ==USB_DR_MODE_OTG || + port->mode ==USB_DR_MODE_PERIPHERAL ) { +/* reset VBUS&ID OVERRIDE */ + reg =padctl_readl (padctl,USB2_VBUS_ID ); + reg &= ~VBUS_OVERRIDE ; + reg &= ~ID_OVERRIDE (~0 ); + reg |=ID_OVERRIDE_FLOATING ; +padctl_writel (padctl, reg,USB2_VBUS_ID ); + } +if (port->supply && port->mode ==USB_DR_MODE_HOST ) { err =regulator_disable (port->supply);if (err) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 524/620 phy: exynos5-usbdrd: fix MPLL_MULTIPLIER and SSC_REFCLKSEL masks in refclk
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kaustabh Chakraborty <[email protected]>
commit e2158c953c973adb49383ddea2504faf08d375b7 upstream.
In exynos5_usbdrd_{pipe3,utmi}_set_refclk(), the masks PHYCLKRST_MPLL_MULTIPLIER_MASK and PHYCLKRST_SSC_REFCLKSEL_MASK are not inverted when applied to the register values. Fix it.
--- drivers/phy/samsung/phy-exynos5-usbdrd.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/phy/samsung/phy-exynos5-usbdrd.c +6 -6
@@ -288,9 +288,9 @@ exynos5_usbdrd_pipe3_set_refclk(struct p reg |=PHYCLKRST_REFCLKSEL_EXT_REFCLK ;/* FSEL settings corresponding to reference clock */ - reg &= ~PHYCLKRST_FSEL_PIPE_MASK | -PHYCLKRST_MPLL_MULTIPLIER_MASK | -PHYCLKRST_SSC_REFCLKSEL_MASK ; + reg &= ~(PHYCLKRST_FSEL_PIPE_MASK | +PHYCLKRST_MPLL_MULTIPLIER_MASK | +PHYCLKRST_SSC_REFCLKSEL_MASK );switch (phy_drd->extrefclk) {case EXYNOS5_FSEL_50MHZ : reg |= (PHYCLKRST_MPLL_MULTIPLIER_50M_REF |
@@ -332,9 +332,9 @@ exynos5_usbdrd_utmi_set_refclk(struct ph reg &= ~PHYCLKRST_REFCLKSEL_MASK ; reg |=PHYCLKRST_REFCLKSEL_EXT_REFCLK ; - reg &= ~PHYCLKRST_FSEL_UTMI_MASK | -PHYCLKRST_MPLL_MULTIPLIER_MASK | -PHYCLKRST_SSC_REFCLKSEL_MASK ; + reg &= ~(PHYCLKRST_FSEL_UTMI_MASK | +PHYCLKRST_MPLL_MULTIPLIER_MASK | +PHYCLKRST_SSC_REFCLKSEL_MASK ); reg |=PHYCLKRST_FSEL (phy_drd->extrefclk);return reg;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 525/620 mptcp: always handle address removal under msk socket lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit f865c24bc55158313d5779fc81116023a6940ca3 upstream.
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat in the PM control path:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 sock_owned_by_me include/net/sock.h:1711 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 msk_owned_by_me net/mptcp/protocol.h:363 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6693 at ./include/net/sock.h:1711 mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack+0x57c/0x610 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:788 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6693 Comm: syz.0.205 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-syzkaller-00303-gad1b832bf1cf #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/27/2024 RIP: 0010:sock_owned_by_me include/net/sock.h:1711 [inline] RIP: 0010:msk_owned_by_me net/mptcp/protocol.h:363 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_addr_send_ack+0x57c/0x610 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:788 Code: 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 ca 7b d3 f5 eb b9 e8 c3 7b d3 f5 90 0f 0b 90 e9 dd fb ff ff e8 b5 7b d3 f5 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3e fb ff ff 44 89 f1 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c eb fb ff ff RSP: 0000:ffffc900034f6f60 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: ffffffff8bee3c2b RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000 RDX: ffffc90004d42000 RSI: 000000000000a407 RDI: 000000000000a408 RBP: ffffc900034f7030 R08: ffffffff8bee37f6 R09: 0100000000000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100bcc62e4 R12: ffff88805e6316e0 R13: ffff88805e630c00 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88805e630c00 FS: 00007f7e9a7e96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2fd18ff8 CR3: 0000000032c24000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> mptcp_pm_remove_addr+0x103/0x1d0 net/mptcp/pm.c:59 mptcp_pm_remove_anno_addr+0x1f4/0x2f0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1486 mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1518 [inline] mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x118d/0x1af0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1629 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0xb1f/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x206/0x480 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348 netlink_sendmsg+0x8de/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:733 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53a/0x860 net/socket.c:2573 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2627 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2659 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f7e9998cde9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f7e9a7e9038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7e99ba5fa0 RCX: 00007f7e9998cde9 RDX: 000000002000c094 RSI: 0000400000000000 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007f7e99a0e2a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f7e99ba5fa0 R15: 00007fff49231088
Indeed the PM can try to send a RM_ADDR over a msk without acquiring first the msk socket lock.
The bugged code-path comes from an early optimization: when there are no subflows, the PM should (usually) not send RM_ADDR notifications.
The above statement is incorrect, as without locks another process could concurrent create a new subflow and cause the RM_ADDR generation.
Additionally the supposed optimization is not very effective even performance-wise, as most mptcp sockets should have at least one
subflow: the MPC one.
Address the issue removing the buggy code path, the existing "slow-path" will handle correctly even the edge case.
--- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +0 -6
@@ -1406,11 +1406,6 @@ static int mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_sstruct sock *sk = (struct sock *)msk;bool remove_subflow; -if (list_empty (&msk->conn_list)) { -mptcp_pm_remove_anno_addr (msk, addr, false); - goto next; - } -lock_sock (sk); remove_subflow =lookup_subflow_by_saddr (&msk->conn_list, addr);mptcp_pm_remove_anno_addr (msk, addr, remove_subflow);
@@ -1418,7 +1413,6 @@ static int mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_smptcp_pm_remove_subflow (msk, &list);release_sock (sk); -next:sock_put (sk);cond_resched (); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 526/620 vmlinux.lds: Ensure that const vars with relocations are mapped R/O
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
commit 68f3ea7ee199ef77551e090dfef5a49046ea8443 upstream.
In the kernel, there are architectures (x86, arm64) that perform boot-time relocation (for KASLR) without relying on PIE codegen. In this case, all const global objects are emitted into .rodata, including const objects with fields that will be fixed up by the boot-time relocation code. This implies that .rodata (and .text in some cases) need to be writable at boot, but they will usually be mapped read-only as soon as the boot completes.
When using PIE codegen, the compiler will emit const global objects into .data.rel.ro rather than .rodata if the object contains fields that need such fixups at boot-time. This permits the linker to annotate such regions as requiring read-write access only at load time, but not at execution time (in user space), while keeping .rodata truly const (in user space, this is important for reducing the CoW footprint of dynamic executables).
This distinction does not matter for the kernel, but it does imply that const data will end up in writable memory if the .data.rel.ro sections are not treated in a special way, as they will end up in the writable .data segment by default.
So emit .data.rel.ro into the .rodata segment.
--- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h +1 -1
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ . = ALIGN((align)); \ .rodata : AT(ADDR(.rodata) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \ __start_rodata = .; \ - *(.rodata) *(.rodata.*) \ + *(.rodata) *(.rodata.*) *(.data.rel.ro*) \ SCHED_DATA \RO_AFTER_INIT_DATA /* Read only after init */ \ . = ALIGN(8); \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 527/620 sched/core: Prevent rescheduling when interrupts are disabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit 82c387ef7568c0d96a918a5a78d9cad6256cfa15 upstream.
David reported a warning observed while loop testing kexec jump:
Interrupts enabled after irqrouter_resume+0x0/0x50
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 560 at drivers/base/syscore.c:103 syscore_resume+0x18a/0x220 kernel_kexec+0xf6/0x180 __do_sys_reboot+0x206/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
The corresponding interrupt flag trace:
hardirqs last enabled at (15573): [<ffffffffa8281b8e>] __up_console_sem+0x7e/0x90 hardirqs last disabled at (15580): [<ffffffffa8281b73>] __up_console_sem+0x63/0x90
That means __up_console_sem() was invoked with interrupts enabled. Further instrumentation revealed that in the interrupt disabled section of kexec jump one of the syscore_suspend() callbacks woke up a task, which set the NEED_RESCHED flag. A later callback in the resume path invoked cond_resched() which in turn led to the invocation of the scheduler:
__cond_resched+0x21/0x60 down_timeout+0x18/0x60 acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x4c/0x80 acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x3d/0x100 acpi_ns_get_node+0x27/0x60 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1cb/0x2d0 acpi_rs_set_srs_method_data+0x156/0x190 acpi_pci_link_set+0x11c/0x290 irqrouter_resume+0x54/0x60 syscore_resume+0x6a/0x200 kernel_kexec+0x145/0x1c0 __do_sys_reboot+0xeb/0x240 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
This is a long standing problem, which probably got more visible with the recent printk changes. Something does a task wakeup and the scheduler sets the NEED_RESCHED flag. cond_resched() sees it set and invokes schedule() from a completely bogus context. The scheduler enables interrupts after context switching, which causes the above warning at the end.
Quite some of the code paths in syscore_suspend()/resume() can result in triggering a wakeup with the exactly same consequences. They might not have done so yet, but as they share a lot of code with normal operations it's just a question of time.
The problem only affects the PREEMPT_NONE and PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY scheduling models. Full preemption is not affected as cond_resched() is disabled and the preemption check preemptible() takes the interrupt disabled flag into account.
Cure the problem by adding a corresponding check into cond_resched().
--- kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +1 -1
@@ -8247,7 +8247,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sched_yield)#if !defined(CONFIG_PREEMPTION ) || defined(CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC ) int __sched __cond_resched(void) { -if (should_resched (0 )) { +if (should_resched (0 ) && !irqs_disabled ()) {preempt_schedule_common ();return 1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 528/620 intel_idle: Handle older CPUs, which stop the TSC in deeper C states, correctly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
commit c157d351460bcf202970e97e611cb6b54a3dd4a4 upstream.
The Intel idle driver is preferred over the ACPI processor idle driver, but fails to implement the work around for Core2 generation CPUs, where the TSC stops in C2 and deeper C-states. This causes stalls and boot delays, when the clocksource watchdog does not catch the unstable TSC before the CPU goes deep idle for the first time.
The ACPI driver marks the TSC unstable when it detects that the CPU supports C2 or deeper and the CPU does not have a non-stop TSC.
Add the equivivalent work around to the Intel idle driver to cure that.
--- drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/idle/intel_idle.c +4 -0
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/mwait.h> #include <asm/msr.h> +#include <asm/tsc.h> #define INTEL_IDLE_VERSION "0.5.1"
@@ -1335,6 +1336,9 @@ static void __init intel_idle_init_cstatif (intel_idle_state_needs_timer_stop (state)) state->flags |=CPUIDLE_FLAG_TIMER_STOP ; +if (cx->type >ACPI_STATE_C1 && !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC )) +mark_tsc_unstable ("TSC halts in idle" ); + state->enter = intel_idle; state->enter_s2idle = intel_idle_s2idle; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 529/620 pfifo_tail_enqueue: Drop new packet when sch->limit == 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Quang Le <[email protected]>
commit 647cef20e649c576dff271e018d5d15d998b629d upstream.
Expected behaviour:
In case we reach scheduler's limit, pfifo_tail_enqueue() will drop a packet in scheduler's queue and decrease scheduler's qlen by one. Then, pfifo_tail_enqueue() enqueue new packet and increase scheduler's qlen by one. Finally, pfifo_tail_enqueue() return NET_XMIT_CN status code.
Weird behaviour:
In case we set sch->limit == 0 and trigger pfifo_tail_enqueue() on a scheduler that has no packet, the 'drop a packet' step will do nothing. This means the scheduler's qlen still has value equal 0. Then, we continue to enqueue new packet and increase scheduler's qlen by one. In summary, we can leverage pfifo_tail_enqueue() to increase qlen by one and return NET_XMIT_CN status code.
The problem is:
Let's say we have two qdiscs: Qdisc_A and Qdisc_B.
- Qdisc_A's type must have '->graft()' function to create parent/child relationship. Let's say Qdisc_A's type is hfsc. Enqueue packet to this qdisc will trigger hfsc_enqueue.
- Qdisc_B's type is pfifo_head_drop. Enqueue packet to this qdisc will trigger pfifo_tail_enqueue.
- Qdisc_B is configured to have sch->limit == 0.
- Qdisc_A is configured to route the enqueued's packet to Qdisc_B.
Enqueue packet through Qdisc_A will lead to:
- hfsc_enqueue(Qdisc_A) -> pfifo_tail_enqueue(Qdisc_B)
- Qdisc_B->q.qlen += 1
- pfifo_tail_enqueue() return NET_XMIT_CN
- hfsc_enqueue() check for NET_XMIT_SUCCESS and see NET_XMIT_CN => hfsc_enqueue() don't increase qlen of Qdisc_A.
The whole process lead to a situation where Qdisc_A->q.qlen == 0 and Qdisc_B->q.qlen == 1. Replace 'hfsc' with other type (for example: 'drr') still lead to the same problem. This violate the design where parent's qlen should equal to the sum of its childrens'qlen.
Bug impact: This issue can be used for user->kernel privilege escalation when it is reachable.
--- net/sched/sch_fifo.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/sched/sch_fifo.c +3 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ static int pfifo_tail_enqueue(struct sk_ {unsigned int prev_backlog; +if (unlikely (READ_ONCE (sch->limit) ==0 )) +return qdisc_drop (skb, sch, to_free); +if (likely (sch->q.qlen < sch->limit))return qdisc_enqueue_tail (skb, sch);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 530/620 smb: client: Add check for next_buffer in receive_encrypted_standard()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 860ca5e50f73c2a1cef7eefc9d39d04e275417f7 ]
Add check for the return value of cifs_buf_get() and cifs_small_buf_get() in receive_encrypted_standard() to prevent null pointer dereference.
--- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +4 -0
@@ -5198,6 +5198,10 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, next_buffer = (char *)cifs_buf_get (); else next_buffer = (char *)cifs_small_buf_get (); +if (!next_buffer) { +cifs_server_dbg (VFS ,"No memory for (large) SMB response\n" ); +return -1 ; + }memcpy (next_buffer, buf + next_cmd, pdu_length - next_cmd); }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 531/620 drm/amdgpu: Check extended configuration space register when system uses large bar
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ma Jun <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e372baeb3d336b20fd9463784c577fd8824497cd ]
Some customer platforms do not enable mmconfig for various reasons, such as bios bug, and therefore cannot access the GPU extend configuration space through mmio.
When the system enters the d3cold state and resumes, the amdgpu driver fails to resume because the extend configuration space registers of GPU can't be restored. At this point, Usually we only see some failure dmesg log printed by amdgpu driver, it is difficult to find the root cause.
Therefor print a warnning message if the system can't access the extended configuration space register when using large bar.
Stable-dep-of: 099bffc7cadf ("drm/amdgpu: disable BAR resize on Dell G5 SE")
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +4 -0
@@ -1202,6 +1202,10 @@ int amdgpu_device_resize_fb_bar(struct amdgpu_device *adev)if (amdgpu_sriov_vf (adev))return 0 ; +/* PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_VNDR extended capability is located at 0x100 */ +if (!pci_find_ext_capability (adev->pdev,PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_VNDR )) +DRM_WARN ("System can't access extended configuration space,please check!!\n" ); +/* skip if the bios has already enabled large BAR */ if (adev->gmc.real_vram_size && (pci_resource_len (adev->pdev,0 ) >= adev->gmc.real_vram_size))
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 532/620 drm/amdgpu: disable BAR resize on Dell G5 SE
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 099bffc7cadff40bfab1517c3461c53a7a38a0d7 ]
There was a quirk added to add a workaround for a Sapphire RX 5600 XT Pulse that didn't allow BAR resizing. However, the quirk caused a regression with runtime pm on Dell laptops using those chips, rather than narrowing the scope of the resizing quirk, add a quirk to prevent amdgpu from resizing the BAR on those Dell platforms unless runtime pm is disabled.
v2: update commit message, add runpm check
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c +7 -0
@@ -1202,6 +1202,13 @@ int amdgpu_device_resize_fb_bar(struct amdgpu_device *adev)if (amdgpu_sriov_vf (adev))return 0 ; +/* resizing on Dell G5 SE platforms causes problems with runtime pm */ +if ((amdgpu_runtime_pm !=0 ) && + adev->pdev->vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI && + adev->pdev->device ==0x731f && + adev->pdev->subsystem_vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_DELL ) +return 0 ; +/* PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_VNDR extended capability is located at 0x100 */ if (!pci_find_ext_capability (adev->pdev,PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_VNDR ))DRM_WARN ("System can't access extended configuration space,please check!!\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 533/620 Revert "of: reserved-memory: Fix using wrong number of cells to get property alignment"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]>
commit 75f1f311d883dfaffb98be3c1da208d6ed5d4df9 upstream.
This reverts commit 267b21d0bef8e67dbe6c591c9991444e58237ec9.
Turns out some DTs do depend on this behavior. Specifically, a downstream Pixel 6 DT. Revert the change at least until we can decide if the DT spec can be changed instead.
--- drivers/of/of_reserved_mem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/of/of_reserved_mem.c +2 -2
@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ static int __init __reserved_mem_alloc_s prop =of_get_flat_dt_prop (node,"alignment" , &len);if (prop) { -if (len != dt_root_size_cells *sizeof (__be32)) { +if (len != dt_root_addr_cells *sizeof (__be32)) {pr_err ("invalid alignment property in '%s' node.\n" , uname);return -EINVAL ; } - align =dt_mem_next_cell (dt_root_size_cells, &prop); + align =dt_mem_next_cell (dt_root_addr_cells, &prop); } nomap =of_get_flat_dt_prop (node,"no-map" ,NULL ) !=NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 534/620 HID: appleir: Fix potential NULL dereference at raw event handle
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniil Dulov <[email protected]>
commit 2ff5baa9b5275e3acafdf7f2089f74cccb2f38d1 upstream.
Syzkaller reports a NULL pointer dereference issue in input_event().
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in is_event_supported drivers/input/input.c:67 [inline] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in input_event+0x42/0xa0 drivers/input/input.c:395 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000028 by task syz-executor199/2949 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2949 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00076-gf097a36ef88d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] kasan_check_range+0xef/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline] _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline] is_event_supported drivers/input/input.c:67 [inline] input_event+0x42/0xa0 drivers/input/input.c:395 input_report_key include/linux/input.h:439 [inline] key_down drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:159 [inline] appleir_raw_event+0x3e5/0x5e0 drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c:232 __hid_input_report.constprop.0+0x312/0x440 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2111 hid_ctrl+0x49f/0x550 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:484 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x389/0x6e0 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1650 usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x396/0x450 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1734 dummy_timer+0x17f7/0x3960 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1993 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1739 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x20a/0xae0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1803 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x17d/0x350 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1820 handle_softirqs+0x206/0x8d0 kernel/softirq.c:561 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xfa/0x160 kernel/softirq.c:662 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x90/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702 __mod_timer+0x8f6/0xdc0 kernel/time/timer.c:1185 add_timer+0x62/0x90 kernel/time/timer.c:1295 schedule_timeout+0x11f/0x280 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:98 usbhid_wait_io+0x1c7/0x380 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:645 usbhid_init_reports+0x19f/0x390 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:784 hiddev_ioctl+0x1133/0x15b0 drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c:794 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x190/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK>
This happens due to the malformed report items sent by the emulated device which results in a report, that has no fields, being added to the report list. Due to this appleir_input_configured() is never called, hidinput_connect() fails which results in the HID_CLAIMED_INPUT flag is not being set. However, it does not make appleir_probe() fail and lets the event callback to be called without the associated input device.
Thus, add a check for the HID_CLAIMED_INPUT flag and leave the event hook early if the driver didn't claim any input_dev for some reason. Moreover, some other hid drivers accessing input_dev in their event callbacks do have similar checks, too.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
--- drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c +1 -1
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int appleir_raw_event(struct hid_static const u8 flatbattery[] = {0x25 ,0x87 ,0xe0 };unsigned long flags; -if (len !=5 ) +if (len !=5 || !(hid->claimed &HID_CLAIMED_INPUT )) goto out;if (!memcmp (data, keydown,sizeof (keydown))) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 535/620 gpio: rcar: Use raw_spinlock to protect register access
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]>
commit f02c41f87cfe61440c18bf77d1ef0a884b9ee2b5 upstream.
Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access.
[ 4.239592] =============================
[ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 Not tainted
[ 4.239603] -----------------------------
[ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock:
[ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164
[ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 4.239643] context-{5:5}
[ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76:
[ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c
[ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value.
[ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c
[ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8
[ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value.
[ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc
[ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690
[ 4.264840] #4:
[ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value.
[ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690
[ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee100000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz
[ 4.304082] stack backtrace:
[ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35
[ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT)
[ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
[ 4.304106] Call trace:
[ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C)
[ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90
[ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c
[ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584
[ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c
[ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
[ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164
[ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8
[ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178
[ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690
[ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190
[ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4
[ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries
[ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0
[ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac
[ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4
[ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440
[ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4
[ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78
[ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8
[ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8
[ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118
[ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154
[ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160
[ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0
[ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc
[ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8
[ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c
[ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340
[ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110
[ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20--- drivers/gpio/gpio-rcar.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-rcar.c +12 -12
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ struct gpio_rcar_info {struct gpio_rcar_priv {void __iomem *base; -spinlock_t lock; +raw_spinlock_t lock;struct device *dev;struct gpio_chip gpio_chip;struct irq_chip irq_chip;
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static void gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_i* "Setting Level-Sensitive Interrupt Input Mode" */ -spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags);/* Configure positive or negative logic in POSNEG */ gpio_rcar_modify_bit (p,POSNEG , hwirq, !active_high_rising_edge);
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_iif (!level_trigger)gpio_rcar_write (p,INTCLR ,BIT (hwirq)); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); }static int gpio_rcar_irq_set_type (struct irq_data *d,unsigned int type)
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static void gpio_rcar_config_general_inp* "Setting General Input Mode" */ -spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags);/* Configure positive logic in POSNEG */ gpio_rcar_modify_bit (p,POSNEG , gpio, false);
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static void gpio_rcar_config_general_inpif (p->info.has_outdtsel && output)gpio_rcar_modify_bit (p,OUTDTSEL , gpio, false); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); }static int gpio_rcar_request (struct gpio_chip *chip,unsigned offset)
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int gpio_rcar_get_multiple(structreturn 0 ; } -spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags); outputs =gpio_rcar_read (p,INOUTSEL ); m = outputs & bankmask;if (m)
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int gpio_rcar_get_multiple(struct m = ~outputs & bankmask;if (m) val |=gpio_rcar_read (p,INDT ) & m; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); bits[0 ] = val;return 0 ;
@@ -354,9 +354,9 @@ static void gpio_rcar_set(struct gpio_chstruct gpio_rcar_priv *p =gpiochip_get_data (chip);unsigned long flags; -spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags);gpio_rcar_modify_bit (p,OUTDT , offset, value); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); } static void gpio_rcar_set_multiple(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned long *mask,
@@ -373,12 +373,12 @@ static void gpio_rcar_set_multiple(strucif (!bankmask)return ; -spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&p->lock, flags); val =gpio_rcar_read (p,OUTDT ); val &= ~bankmask; val |= (bankmask & bits[0 ]);gpio_rcar_write (p,OUTDT , val); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); +raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&p->lock, flags); } static int gpio_rcar_direction_output(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned offset,
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int gpio_rcar_probe(struct platforeturn -ENOMEM ; p->dev = dev; -spin_lock_init (&p->lock); +raw_spin_lock_init (&p->lock);/* Get device configuration from DT node */ ret =gpio_rcar_parse_dt (p, &npins);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 536/620 gpio: aggregator: protect driver attr handlers against module unload
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Koichiro Den <[email protected]>
commit 12f65d1203507f7db3ba59930fe29a3b8eee9945 upstream.
Both new_device_store and delete_device_store touch module global resources (e.g. gpio_aggregator_lock). To prevent race conditions with module unload, a reference needs to be held.
Add try_module_get() in these handlers.
For new_device_store, this eliminates what appears to be the most dangerous
scenario: if an id is allocated from gpio_aggregator_idr but platform_device_register has not yet been called or completed, a concurrent module unload could fail to unregister/delete the device, leaving behind a dangling platform device/GPIO forwarder. This can result in various issues. The following simple reproducer demonstrates these problems:
#!/bin/bash
while :; do
# note: whether 'gpiochip0 0' exists or not does not matter. echo 'gpiochip0 0' > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/gpio-aggregator/new_device
done &
while :; do
modprobe gpio-aggregator
modprobe -r gpio-aggregator
done &
wait
Starting with the following warning, several kinds of warnings will appear and the system may become unstable:
------------[ cut here ]------------ list_del corruption, ffff888103e2e980->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1327 at lib/list_debug.c:56 __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 [...] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xf2 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 ? report_bug+0xe6/0x170 ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x39/0xe0 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa3/0x120 gpiod_remove_lookup_table+0x22/0x60 new_device_store+0x315/0x350 [gpio_aggregator] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x137/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x262/0x430 ksys_write+0x60/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [...] </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
--- drivers/gpio/gpio-aggregator.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-aggregator.c +17 -3
@@ -116,10 +116,15 @@ static ssize_t new_device_store(struct dstruct platform_device *pdev;int res, id; +if (!try_module_get (THIS_MODULE )) +return -ENOENT ; +/* kernfs guarantees string termination, so count + 1 is safe */ aggr =kzalloc (sizeof (*aggr) + count +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!aggr) -return -ENOMEM ; +if (!aggr) { + res = -ENOMEM ; + goto put_module; + }memcpy (aggr->args, buf, count +1 );
@@ -158,6 +163,7 @@ static ssize_t new_device_store(struct d } aggr->pdev = pdev; +module_put (THIS_MODULE );return count; remove_table:
@@ -172,6 +178,8 @@ free_table:kfree (aggr->lookups); free_ga:kfree (aggr); +put_module: +module_put (THIS_MODULE );return res; }
@@ -200,13 +208,19 @@ static ssize_t delete_device_store(strucif (error)return error; +if (!try_module_get (THIS_MODULE )) +return -ENOENT ; +mutex_lock (&gpio_aggregator_lock); aggr =idr_remove (&gpio_aggregator_idr, id);mutex_unlock (&gpio_aggregator_lock); -if (!aggr) +if (!aggr) { +module_put (THIS_MODULE );return -ENOENT ; + }gpio_aggregator_free (aggr); +module_put (THIS_MODULE );return count; }static DRIVER_ATTR_WO (delete_device);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 537/620 ALSA: hda: intel: Add Dell ALC3271 to power_save denylist
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hoku Ishibe <[email protected]>
commit 1ee5aa765c22a0577ec552d460bf2035300b4b51 upstream.
Dell XPS 13 7390 with the Realtek ALC3271 codec experiences persistent humming noise when the power_save mode is enabled. This issue occurs when the codec enters power saving mode, leading to unwanted noise from the speakers.
This patch adds the affected model (PCI ID 0x1028:0x0962) to the power_save denylist to ensure power_save is disabled by default, preventing power-off related noise issues.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Boot the system with snd_hda_intel loaded.
2. Verify that power_save mode is enabled:
```sh cat /sys/module/snd_hda_intel/parameters/power_save ````
output: 10 (default power save timeout)
3. Wait for the power save timeout
4. Observe a persistent humming noise from the speakers
5. Disable power_save manually:
```sh echo 0 | sudo tee /sys/module/snd_hda_intel/parameters/power_save ````
6. Confirm that the noise disappears immediately.
This issue has been observed on my system, and this patch successfully eliminates the unwanted noise. If other users experience similar issues, additional reports would be helpful.
--- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +2 -0
@@ -2212,6 +2212,8 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk power_SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1631 ,0xe017 ,"Packard Bell NEC IMEDIA 5204" ,0 ),/* KONTRON SinglePC may cause a stall at runtime resume */ SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1734 ,0x1232 ,"KONTRON SinglePC" ,0 ), +/* Dell ALC3271 */ + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1028, 0x0962, "Dell ALC3271", 0), {} };#endif /* CONFIG_PM */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 538/620 ALSA: hda/realtek: update ALC222 depop optimize
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
commit ca0dedaff92307591f66c9206933fbdfe87add10 upstream.
Add ALC222 its own depop functions for alc_init and alc_shutup.
[note: this fixes pop noise issues on the models with two headphone
jacks -- tiwai ]
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +76 -0
@@ -3825,6 +3825,79 @@ static void alc225_shutup(struct hda_cod } } +static void alc222_init (struct hda_codec *codec) +{ +struct alc_spec *spec = codec->spec; +hda_nid_t hp_pin =alc_get_hp_pin (spec); +bool hp1_pin_sense, hp2_pin_sense; + +if (!hp_pin) +return ; + +msleep (30 ); + + hp1_pin_sense =snd_hda_jack_detect (codec, hp_pin); + hp2_pin_sense =snd_hda_jack_detect (codec,0x14 ); + +if (hp1_pin_sense || hp2_pin_sense) { +msleep (2 ); + +if (hp1_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec, hp_pin,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL ,PIN_OUT ); +if (hp2_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec,0x14 ,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL ,PIN_OUT ); +msleep (75 ); + +if (hp1_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec, hp_pin,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE ,AMP_OUT_UNMUTE ); +if (hp2_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec,0x14 ,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE ,AMP_OUT_UNMUTE ); + +msleep (75 ); + } +} + +static void alc222_shutup (struct hda_codec *codec) +{ +struct alc_spec *spec = codec->spec; +hda_nid_t hp_pin =alc_get_hp_pin (spec); +bool hp1_pin_sense, hp2_pin_sense; + +if (!hp_pin) + hp_pin =0x21 ; + + hp1_pin_sense =snd_hda_jack_detect (codec, hp_pin); + hp2_pin_sense =snd_hda_jack_detect (codec,0x14 ); + +if (hp1_pin_sense || hp2_pin_sense) { +msleep (2 ); + +if (hp1_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec, hp_pin,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE ,AMP_OUT_MUTE ); +if (hp2_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec,0x14 ,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE ,AMP_OUT_MUTE ); + +msleep (75 ); + +if (hp1_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec, hp_pin,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL ,0x0 ); +if (hp2_pin_sense) +snd_hda_codec_write (codec,0x14 ,0 , +AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL ,0x0 ); + +msleep (75 ); + } +alc_auto_setup_eapd (codec, false); +alc_shutup_pins (codec); +} +static void alc_default_init (struct hda_codec *codec) {struct alc_spec *spec = codec->spec;
@@ -10374,8 +10447,11 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec spec->codec_variant =ALC269_TYPE_ALC300 ; spec->gen.mixer_nid =0 ;/* no loopback on ALC300 */ break ; +case 0x10ec0222 :case 0x10ec0623 : spec->codec_variant =ALC269_TYPE_ALC623 ; + spec->shutup = alc222_shutup; + spec->init_hook = alc222_init;break ;case 0x10ec0700 :case 0x10ec0701 :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 539/620 drm/radeon: Fix rs400_gpu_init for ATI mobility radeon Xpress 200M
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Thier <[email protected]>
commit 29ffeb73b216ce3eff10229eb077cf9b7812119d upstream.
num_gb_pipes was set to a wrong value using r420_pipe_config
This have lead to HyperZ glitches on fast Z clearing.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r300.c | 3 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_asic.h | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/rs400.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r300.c +2 -1
@@ -359,7 +359,8 @@ int r300_mc_wait_for_idle(struct radeon_return -1 ; } -static void r300_gpu_init (struct radeon_device *rdev) +/* rs400_gpu_init also calls this! */ +void r300_gpu_init (struct radeon_device *rdev) {uint32_t gb_tile_config, tmp;
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_asic.h +1 -0
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ void r200_set_safe_registers(struct rade*/ extern int r300_init (struct radeon_device *rdev);extern void r300_fini (struct radeon_device *rdev); +extern void r300_gpu_init (struct radeon_device *rdev);extern int r300_suspend (struct radeon_device *rdev);extern int r300_resume (struct radeon_device *rdev);extern int r300_asic_reset (struct radeon_device *rdev,bool hard);
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/rs400.c +16 -2
@@ -255,8 +255,22 @@ int rs400_mc_wait_for_idle(struct radeonstatic void rs400_gpu_init (struct radeon_device *rdev) { -/* FIXME: is this correct ? */ -r420_pipes_init (rdev); +/* Earlier code was calling r420_pipes_init and then +* rs400_mc_wait_for_idle(rdev). The problem is that +* at least on my Mobility Radeon Xpress 200M RC410 card +* that ends up in this code path ends up num_gb_pipes == 3 +* while the card seems to have only one pipe. With the +* r420 pipe initialization method. +* +* Problems shown up as HyperZ glitches, see: +* https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110897 +* +* Delegating initialization to r300 code seems to work +* and results in proper pipe numbers. The rs400 cards +* are said to be not r400, but r300 kind of cards. +*/ +r300_gpu_init (rdev); +if (rs400_mc_wait_for_idle (rdev)) {pr_warn ("rs400: Failed to wait MC idle while programming pipes. Bad things might happen. %08x\n" ,RREG32 (RADEON_MC_STATUS ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 540/620 platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Add battery quirk for ThinkPad X131e
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mingcong Bai <[email protected]>
commit d0d10eaedcb53740883d7e5d53c5e15c879b48fb upstream.
Based on the dmesg messages from the original reporter:
[ 4.964073] ACPI: \_SB_.PCI0.LPCB.EC__.HKEY: BCTG evaluated but flagged as error [ 4.964083] thinkpad_acpi: Error probing battery 2
Lenovo ThinkPad X131e also needs this battery quirk.
--- drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c +1 -0
@@ -9766,6 +9766,7 @@ static const struct tpacpi_quirk battery* Individual addressing is broken on models that expose the * primary battery as BAT1. */ +TPACPI_Q_LNV ('G' ,'8' , true),/* ThinkPad X131e */ TPACPI_Q_LNV ('8' ,'F' , true),/* Thinkpad X120e */ TPACPI_Q_LNV ('J' ,'7' , true),/* B5400 */ TPACPI_Q_LNV('J', 'I', true), /* Thinkpad 11e */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 541/620 x86/cacheinfo: Validate CPUID leaf 0x2 EDX output
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ahmed S. Darwish <[email protected]>
commit 8177c6bedb7013cf736137da586cf783922309dd upstream.
CPUID leaf 0x2 emits one-byte descriptors in its four output registers EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX. For these descriptors to be valid, the most significant bit (MSB) of each register must be clear.
The historical Git commit:
019361a20f016 ("- pre6: Intel: start to add Pentium IV specific stuff (128-byte cacheline etc)...")
introduced leaf 0x2 output parsing. It only validated the MSBs of EAX, EBX, and ECX, but left EDX unchecked.
Validate EDX's most-significant bit.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c +1 -1
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ void init_intel_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfocpuid (2 , ®s[0 ], ®s[1 ], ®s[2 ], ®s[3 ]);/* If bit 31 is set, this is an unknown format */ -for (j =0 ; j <3 ; j++) +for (j =0 ; j <4 ; j++)if (regs[j] & (1 <<31 )) regs[j] =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 542/620 x86/cpu: Validate CPUID leaf 0x2 EDX output
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ahmed S. Darwish <[email protected]>
commit 1881148215c67151b146450fb89ec22fd92337a7 upstream.
CPUID leaf 0x2 emits one-byte descriptors in its four output registers EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX. For these descriptors to be valid, the most significant bit (MSB) of each register must be clear.
Leaf 0x2 parsing at intel.c only validated the MSBs of EAX, EBX, and ECX, but left EDX unchecked.
Validate EDX's most-significant bit as well.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +1 -1
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static void intel_detect_tlb(struct cpuicpuid (2 , ®s[0 ], ®s[1 ], ®s[2 ], ®s[3 ]);/* If bit 31 is set, this is an unknown format */ -for (j =0 ; j <3 ; j++) +for (j =0 ; j <4 ; j++)if (regs[j] & (1 <<31 )) regs[j] =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 543/620 x86/cpu: Properly parse CPUID leaf 0x2 TLB descriptor 0x63
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ahmed S. Darwish <[email protected]>
commit f6bdaab79ee4228a143ee1b4cb80416d6ffc0c63 upstream.
CPUID leaf 0x2's one-byte TLB descriptors report the number of entries for specific TLB types, among other properties.
Typically, each emitted descriptor implies the same number of entries for its respective TLB type(s). An emitted 0x63 descriptor is an
exception: it implies 4 data TLB entries for 1GB pages and 32 data TLB entries for 2MB or 4MB pages.
For the TLB descriptors parsing code, the entry count for 1GB pages is encoded at the intel_tlb_table[] mapping, but the 2MB/4MB entry count is totally ignored.
Update leaf 0x2's parsing logic 0x2 to account for 32 data TLB entries for 2MB/4MB pages implied by the 0x63 descriptor.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +39 -21
@@ -749,26 +749,37 @@ static unsigned int intel_size_cache(str }#endif -#define TLB_INST_4K 0x01 -#define TLB_INST_4M 0x02 -#define TLB_INST_2M_4M 0x03 - -#define TLB_INST_ALL 0x05 -#define TLB_INST_1G 0x06 - -#define TLB_DATA_4K 0x11 -#define TLB_DATA_4M 0x12 -#define TLB_DATA_2M_4M 0x13 -#define TLB_DATA_4K_4M 0x14 - -#define TLB_DATA_1G 0x16 - -#define TLB_DATA0_4K 0x21 -#define TLB_DATA0_4M 0x22 -#define TLB_DATA0_2M_4M 0x23 - -#define STLB_4K 0x41 -#define STLB_4K_2M 0x42 +#define TLB_INST_4K 0x01 +#define TLB_INST_4M 0x02 +#define TLB_INST_2M_4M 0x03 + +#define TLB_INST_ALL 0x05 +#define TLB_INST_1G 0x06 + +#define TLB_DATA_4K 0x11 +#define TLB_DATA_4M 0x12 +#define TLB_DATA_2M_4M 0x13 +#define TLB_DATA_4K_4M 0x14 + +#define TLB_DATA_1G 0x16 +#define TLB_DATA_1G_2M_4M 0x17 + +#define TLB_DATA0_4K 0x21 +#define TLB_DATA0_4M 0x22 +#define TLB_DATA0_2M_4M 0x23 + +#define STLB_4K 0x41 +#define STLB_4K_2M 0x42 + +/* +* All of leaf 0x2's one-byte TLB descriptors implies the same number of +* entries for their respective TLB types. The 0x63 descriptor is an +* exception: it implies 4 dTLB entries for 1GB pages 32 dTLB entries +* for 2MB or 4MB pages. Encode descriptor 0x63 dTLB entry count for +* 2MB/4MB pages here, as its count for dTLB 1GB pages is already at the +* intel_tlb_table[] mapping. +*/ +#define TLB_0x63_2M_4M_ENTRIES 32static const struct _tlb_table intel_tlb_table[] = { {0x01 ,TLB_INST_4K ,32 ," TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
@@ -790,7 +801,8 @@ static const struct _tlb_table intel_tlb { 0x5c, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 128, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" }, { 0x5d, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" }, { 0x61, TLB_INST_4K, 48, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, full associative" }, - { 0x63, TLB_DATA_1G, 4, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, 4-way set associative" }, + { 0x63, TLB_DATA_1G_2M_4M, 4, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, 4-way set associative" + " (plus 32 entries TLB_DATA 2 MByte or 4 MByte pages, not encoded here)" }, { 0x6b, TLB_DATA_4K, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 8-way associative" }, { 0x6c, TLB_DATA_2M_4M, 128, " TLB_DATA 2 MByte or 4 MByte pages, 8-way associative" }, { 0x6d, TLB_DATA_1G, 16, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, fully associative" },
@@ -890,6 +902,12 @@ static void intel_tlb_lookup(const unsigif (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES ] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries) tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES ] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;break ; +case TLB_DATA_1G_2M_4M : +if (tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES ] < TLB_0x63_2M_4M_ENTRIES) + tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES ] = TLB_0x63_2M_4M_ENTRIES; +if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES ] < TLB_0x63_2M_4M_ENTRIES) + tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES ] = TLB_0x63_2M_4M_ENTRIES; + fallthrough;case TLB_DATA_1G :if (tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES ] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries) tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES ] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 544/620 wifi: cfg80211: regulatory: improve invalid hints checking
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikita Zhandarovich <[email protected]>
commit 59b348be7597c4a9903cb003c69e37df20c04a30 upstream.
Syzbot keeps reporting an issue [1] that occurs when erroneous symbols sent from userspace get through into user_alpha2[] via regulatory_hint_user() call. Such invalid regulatory hints should be rejected.
While a sanity check from commit 47caf685a685 ("cfg80211: regulatory:
reject invalid hints") looks to be enough to deter these very cases, there is a way to get around it due to 2 reasons.
1) The way isalpha() works, symbols other than latin lower and upper letters may be used to determine a country/domain. For instance, greek letters will also be considered upper/lower letters and for such characters isalpha() will return true as well. However, ISO-3166-1 alpha2 codes should only hold latin characters.
2) While processing a user regulatory request, between reg_process_hint_user() and regulatory_hint_user() there happens to be a call to queue_regulatory_request() which modifies letters in request->alpha2[] with toupper(). This works fine for latin symbols, less so for weird letter characters from the second part of _ctype[].
Syzbot triggers a warning in is_user_regdom_saved() by first sending over an unexpected non-latin letter that gets malformed by toupper() into a character that ends up failing isalpha() check.
Prevent this by enhancing is_an_alpha2() to ensure that incoming symbols are latin letters and nothing else.
[1] Syzbot report:
------------[ cut here ]------------ Unexpected user alpha2: A� WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 964 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00044-gc1e939a21eb1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: events_power_efficient crda_timeout_work RIP: 0010:is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline] RIP: 0010:restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline] RIP: 0010:restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516 ... Call Trace: <TASK> crda_timeout_work+0x27/0x50 net/wireless/reg.c:542 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK>
--- net/wireless/reg.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/wireless/reg.c +2 -1
@@ -404,7 +404,8 @@ static bool is_an_alpha2(const char *alp {if (!alpha2)return false; -return isalpha (alpha2[0 ]) &&isalpha (alpha2[1 ]); +return isascii (alpha2[0 ]) &&isalpha (alpha2[0 ]) && +isascii (alpha2[1 ]) &&isalpha (alpha2[1 ]); }static bool alpha2_equal (const char *alpha2_x,const char *alpha2_y)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 545/620 wifi: nl80211: reject cooked mode if it is set along with other flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vitaliy Shevtsov <[email protected]>
commit 49f27f29446a5bfe633dd2cc0cfebd48a1a5e77f upstream.
It is possible to set both MONITOR_FLAG_COOK_FRAMES and MONITOR_FLAG_ACTIVE flags simultaneously on the same monitor interface from the userspace. This causes a sub-interface to be created with no IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER bit set because the monitor interface is in the cooked state and it takes precedence over all other states. When the interface is then being deleted the kernel calls WARN_ONCE() from check_sdata_in_driver() because of missing that bit.
Fix this by rejecting MONITOR_FLAG_COOK_FRAMES if it is set along with other flags.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
--- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/wireless/nl80211.c +5 -0
@@ -3800,6 +3800,11 @@ static int parse_monitor_flags(struct nlif (flags[flag]) *mntrflags |= (1 <<flag); +/* cooked monitor mode is incompatible with other modes */ +if (*mntrflags &MONITOR_FLAG_COOK_FRAMES && + *mntrflags !=MONITOR_FLAG_COOK_FRAMES ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + *mntrflags |=MONITOR_FLAG_CHANGED ;return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 546/620 rapidio: add check for rio_add_net() in rio_scan_alloc_net()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
commit e842f9a1edf306bf36fe2a4d847a0b0d458770de upstream.
The return value of rio_add_net() should be checked. If it fails, put_device() should be called to free the memory and give up the reference initialized in rio_add_net().
--- drivers/rapidio/rio-scan.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rapidio/rio-scan.c +4 -1
@@ -871,7 +871,10 @@ static struct rio_net *rio_scan_alloc_nedev_set_name (&net->dev,"rnet_%d" , net->id); net->dev.parent = &mport->dev; net->dev.release = rio_scan_release_dev; -rio_add_net (net); +if (rio_add_net (net)) { +put_device (&net->dev); + net =NULL ; + } }return net;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 547/620 rapidio: fix an API misues when rio_add_net() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
commit b2ef51c74b0171fde7eb69b6152d3d2f743ef269 upstream.
rio_add_net() calls device_register() and fails when device_register() fails. Thus, put_device() should be used rather than kfree(). Add "mport->net = NULL;" to avoid a use after free issue.
--- drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c +2 -1
@@ -1739,7 +1739,8 @@ static int rio_mport_add_riodev(struct m err =rio_add_net (net);if (err) {rmcd_debug (RDEV ,"failed to register net, err=%d" , err); -kfree (net); +put_device (&net->dev); + mport->net =NULL ; goto cleanup; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 548/620 s390/traps: Fix test_monitor_call() inline assembly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
commit 5623bc23a1cb9f9a9470fa73b3a20321dc4c4870 upstream.
The test_monitor_call() inline assembly uses the xgr instruction, which also modifies the condition code, to clear a register. However the clobber list of the inline assembly does not specify that the condition code is modified, which may lead to incorrect code generation.
Use the lhi instruction instead to clear the register without that the condition code is modified. Furthermore this limits clearing to the lower 32 bits of val, since its type is int.
--- arch/s390/kernel/traps.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/traps.c +3 -3
@@ -281,10 +281,10 @@ static void __init test_monitor_call(voireturn ; asmvolatile (" mc 0,0\n" -"0: xgr %0,%0\n" +"0: lhi %[val],0\n" "1:\n" - EX_TABLE(0b,1b) - : "+d" (val)); + EX_TABLE(0b, 1b) + : [val] "+d" (val)); if (!val)panic ("Monitor call doesn't work!\n" ); }