KVM: SEV: Add support for the ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES feature
v5 cover KVM: SEV: Add support for the ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES feature
AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the SEV_FEATURES that are set for, or by, a guest [1]. ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES can be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled.
Patch 1/2 adds support to detect the feature.
Patch 2/2 configures the ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB according to the features the hypervisor supports.
Tested SNP by setting random feature bits to the sev_features assignment in wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit() (but not its ghcb_set_rax).
Tested SEV-ES by manipulating the save->sev_features assignment in sev_es_sync_vmsa(). Note that SEV-ES "allows" operation only works on features available in SEV-ES, i.e., it ignores SNP-only features. Zen5 SEV-ES features are DEBUG_SWAP, PREVENT_HOST_IBS, VMGEXIT_PARAMETER, PMC_VIRTUALIZATION, and IBS_VIRTUALIZATION.
Based on x86-kvm/next.
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250v5:
- Add reviews-by
- Add the two new vmcb fields to dump_vmcb() output (Pankaj)
- Address comment by Tom and put single assignment in sev_es_init_vmcb
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
- Revert the user-opt in (Sean, sorry for the misunderstanding)
- this basically undoes v3 uAPI changes and makes the feature always-on, if available
- rebased on top of x86-kvm/next
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
- Assign allowed_sev_features based on user-provided vmsa_features mask (Sean)
- Users now have to explicitly opt-in with a qemu "allowed-sev-features=on" switch.
- Rebased on top of 6.14-rc1 and reworked authorship chain (tglx)
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Added some SEV_FEATURES require to be explicitly allowed by ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES wording (Sean).
- Added Nikunj's Reviewed-by.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Kim Phillips (1):
KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
Kishon Vijay Abraham I (1):
x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 7 ++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
base-commit: c9ea48bb6ee6b28bbc956c1e8af98044618fed5e
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v5 1/2 x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature
From: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>
Add CPU feature detection for "Allowed SEV Features" to allow the Hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guest VMs cannot enable features (via SEV_FEATURES) that the Hypervisor does not support or wish to be enabled.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP (19*32+14)/* "debug_swap" SEV-ES full debug state swap support */ #define X86_FEATURE_RMPREAD (19*32+21)/* RMPREAD instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP (19*32+23)/* Segmented RMP support */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27)/* Allowed SEV Features */ #define X86_FEATURE_SVSM (19*32+28)/* "svsm" SVSM present */ #define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED (19*32+30)/* Allow Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v5 2/2 KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
In reply to Kim PhillipsAMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the SEV_FEATURES that are set for, or by, a guest [1]. ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES can be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled.
Always enable ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES. A VMRUN will fail if any non-reserved bits are 1 in SEV_FEATURES but are 0 in ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.
Some SEV_FEATURES - currently PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic (see Appendix B, Table B-4) - require an opt-in via ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES, i.e. are off-by-default, whereas all other features are effectively on-by-default, but still honor ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 7 ++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +6 -1
@@ -159,7 +159,10 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {u64 avic_physical_id;/* Offset 0xf8 */ u8 reserved_7[8 ];u64 vmsa_pa;/* Used for an SEV-ES guest */ -u8 reserved_8[720 ]; +u8 reserved_8[40 ]; +u64 allowed_sev_features;/* Offset 0x138 */ +u64 guest_sev_features;/* Offset 0x140 */ +u8 reserved_9[664 ];/* * Offset 0x3e0, 32 bytes reserved * for use by hypervisor/software.
@@ -291,6 +294,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) +#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63) +struct vmcb_seg {u16 selector;u16 attrib;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +5 -0
@@ -4449,6 +4449,7 @@ void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)static void sev_es_init_vmcb (struct vcpu_svm *svm) { +struct kvm_sev_info *sev =to_kvm_sev_info (svm->vcpu.kvm);struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
@@ -4464,6 +4465,10 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)if (svm->sev_es.vmsa && !svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa) svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa =__pa (svm->sev_es.vmsa); +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES )) + svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features = sev->vmsa_features | +VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID ; +/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */ svm_clr_intercept (svm,INTERCEPT_CR0_READ );svm_clr_intercept (svm,INTERCEPT_CR4_READ );
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2 -0
@@ -3435,6 +3435,8 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"avic_logical_id:" , control->avic_logical_id);pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"avic_physical_id:" , control->avic_physical_id);pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"vmsa_pa:" , control->vmsa_pa); +pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"allowed_sev_features:" , control->allowed_sev_features); +pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"guest_sev_features:" , control->guest_sev_features);pr_err ("VMCB State Save Area:\n" ); pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n", "es:",
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
Quoted 15 lines · Kim Phillips
AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the
SEV_FEATURESthat are set for, or by, a guest [1].ALLOWED_SEV_FEATUREScan be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled.Always enable
ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES. A VMRUN will fail if any non-reserved bits are 1 inSEV_FEATURESbut are 0 inALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.Some
SEV_FEATURES- currently PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic (see Appendix B, Table B-4) - require an opt-in viaALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES, i.e. are off-by-default, whereas all other features are effectively on-by-default, but still honorALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.
Quoted 8 lines
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250Co-developed-by Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
Quoted 67 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 7 ++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +6
-1@@ -159,7 +159,10 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {u64 avic_physical_id;/* Offset 0xf8 */ u8 reserved_7[8 ];u64 vmsa_pa;/* Used for an SEV-ES guest */ -u8 reserved_8[720 ]; +u8 reserved_8[40 ]; +u64 allowed_sev_features;/* Offset 0x138 */ +u64 guest_sev_features;/* Offset 0x140 */ +u8 reserved_9[664 ];/* * Offset 0x3e0, 32 bytes reserved * for use by hypervisor/software. @@ -291,6 +294,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) +#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63) +struct vmcb_seg {u16 selector;u16 attrib;arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +5
-0@@ -4449,6 +4449,7 @@ void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)static void sev_es_init_vmcb (struct vcpu_svm *svm) { +struct kvm_sev_info *sev =to_kvm_sev_info (svm->vcpu.kvm);struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;@@ -4464,6 +4465,10 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)if (svm->sev_es.vmsa && !svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa) svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa =__pa (svm->sev_es.vmsa); +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES )) + svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features = sev->vmsa_features | +VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID ; +/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */ svm_clr_intercept (svm,INTERCEPT_CR0_READ );svm_clr_intercept (svm,INTERCEPT_CR4_READ );arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2
-0@@ -3435,6 +3435,8 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"avic_logical_id:" , control->avic_logical_id);pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"avic_physical_id:" , control->avic_physical_id);pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"vmsa_pa:" , control->vmsa_pa); +pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"allowed_sev_features:" , control->allowed_sev_features); +pr_err ("%-20s%016llx\n" ,"guest_sev_features:" , control->guest_sev_features);pr_err ("VMCB State Save Area:\n" ); pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n", "es:",
Quoted 9 lines · Kim Phillips
AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the
SEV_FEATURESthat are set for, or by, a guest [1].ALLOWED_SEV_FEATUREScan be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled.Patch 1/2 adds support to detect the feature.
[...]
Applied to kvm-x86 svm, thanks!
[1/2] x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/67e672eb2e89 [2/2] KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/51c4b387555d