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mei: vsc: Fix kernel-crash when build with gcc 15

PATCH In review Hans de Goede 4 participants 9 messages Mar 18, 2025 – May 4, 2025

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#0 lore raw

cover mei: vsc: Fix kernel-crash when build with gcc 15

Hi All,

Here are 2 fixes for the vsc-tp mei code. The first patch fixes a kernel crash when the kernel is build with gcc 15 and it would be get to get this upstream ASAP.

The second patch is just a small cleanup of something which I noticed when working on the fix.

Regards,

Hans

Hans de Goede (2):
mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use
mei: vsc: Use struct vsc_tp_packet as vsc-tp tx_buf and rx_buf type

 drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[   80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
[   80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50
...
[   80.843175]  __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb
[   80.843186]  vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw]
[   80.843210]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[   80.843229]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   80.843250]  mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc]
[   80.843270]  mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.

Fixes 566f5ca97680 ("mei: Add transport driver for IVSC device")
---
 drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +15 -11
index 7be1649b1972..fa553d4914b6 100644
@@ -36,20 +36,24 @@
 #define VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES		700
 #define VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE		1
 #define VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) \
-	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->hdr.len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
 #define VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
-	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
 #define VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE \
 	(VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES)
 #define VSC_TP_NEXT_XFER_LEN(len, offset) \
-	(len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
+	(len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
 
-struct vsc_tp_packet {
+struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr {
 	__u8 sync;
 	__u8 cmd;
 	__le16 len;
 	__le32 seq;
-	__u8 buf[] __counted_by(len);
+};
+
+struct vsc_tp_packet {
+	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr hdr;
+	__u8 buf[VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE - sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr)];
 };
 
 struct vsc_tp {
@@ -158,12 +162,12 @@ static int vsc_tp_dev_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, void *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len
 static int vsc_tp_xfer_helper(struct vsc_tp *tp, struct vsc_tp_packet *pkt,
 			      void *ibuf, u16 ilen)
 {
-	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet);
+	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr);
 	int next_xfer_len = VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES;
 	u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = tp->rx_buf;
 	int count_down = VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_COUNT;
 	u32 recv_crc = 0, crc = ~0;
-	struct vsc_tp_packet ack;
+	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr ack;
 	u8 *dst = (u8 *)&ack;
 	bool synced = false;
 
@@ -280,10 +284,10 @@ int vsc_tp_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, u8 cmd, const void *obuf, size_t olen,
 
 	guard(mutex)(&tp->mutex);
 
-	pkt->sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
-	pkt->cmd = cmd;
-	pkt->len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
-	pkt->seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
+	pkt->hdr.sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
+	pkt->hdr.cmd = cmd;
+	pkt->hdr.len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
+	pkt->hdr.seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
 	memcpy(pkt->buf, obuf, olen);
 
 	crc = ~crc32(~0, (u8 *)pkt, sizeof(pkt) + olen);
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/2
#2 lore raw

RE: [PATCH 1/2] mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

Quoted 25 lines

Subject: [PATCH 1/2] mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[   80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
[   80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032
__fortify_report+0x45/0x50
...
[   80.843175]  __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb
[   80.843186]  vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw]
[   80.843210]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[   80.843229]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   80.843250]  mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc]
[   80.843270]  mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Quoted 8 lines

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.

Fixes 566f5ca97680 ("mei: Add transport driver for IVSC device")
Quoted 82 lines
---
 drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +9 -5
index 7be1649b1972..fa553d4914b6 100644
@@ -36,20 +36,24 @@
 #define VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES		700
 #define VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE		1
 #define VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) \
-	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->len) +
 VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->hdr.len) +
 VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
 #define VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
-	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE +
 VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE +
 VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
 #define VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE \
 	(VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES)
 #define VSC_TP_NEXT_XFER_LEN(len, offset) \
-	(len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset +
 VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
+	(len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset +
 VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
 
-struct vsc_tp_packet {
+struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr {
 	__u8 sync;
 	__u8 cmd;
 	__le16 len;
 	__le32 seq;
-	__u8 buf[] __counted_by(len);
+};
+
+struct vsc_tp_packet {
+	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr hdr;
+	__u8 buf[VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE - sizeof(struct

vsc_tp_packet_hdr)];
};

struct vsc_tp {

drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +6 -6
@@ -158,12 +162,12 @@ static int vsc_tp_dev_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, void
 *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len
 static int vsc_tp_xfer_helper(struct vsc_tp *tp, struct vsc_tp_packet *pkt,
 			      void *ibuf, u16 ilen)
 {
-	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct
 vsc_tp_packet);
+	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct
 vsc_tp_packet_hdr);
 	int next_xfer_len = VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) +
 VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES;
 	u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = tp->rx_buf;
 	int count_down = VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_COUNT;
 	u32 recv_crc = 0, crc = ~0;
-	struct vsc_tp_packet ack;
+	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr ack;
 	u8 *dst = (u8 *)&ack;
 	bool synced = false;
@@ -280,10 +284,10 @@ int vsc_tp_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, u8 cmd, const
 void *obuf, size_t olen,
 
 	guard(mutex)(&tp->mutex);
 
-	pkt->sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
-	pkt->cmd = cmd;
-	pkt->len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
-	pkt->seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
+	pkt->hdr.sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
+	pkt->hdr.cmd = cmd;
+	pkt->hdr.len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
+	pkt->hdr.seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
 	memcpy(pkt->buf, obuf, olen);
 

crc = ~crc32(~0, (u8 *)pkt, sizeof(pkt) + olen);
--
2.48.1

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

In reply to Hans de Goede

Hi,

found this patch while searching for a I think a similar bug on 6.14.4 compiled with gcc 15:

[  121.966267] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 3 byte read of buffer size 18446744073709551615
[  121.966273] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 3709 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x49/0x50
[  121.966277] Modules linked in: xt_addrtype ip_set_hash_net ip_set xt_connmark xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_conntrack iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_mangle nf_tables iptable_filter wireguard curve25519_x86_64 libchacha20poly1305 chacha_x86_64 poly1305_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic libchacha ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer rfcomm snd_seq qrtr ccm algif_aead crypto_null des3_ede_x86_64 cbc des_generic libdes uhid cmac md4 algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep sch_cake zram 842_decompress 842_compress pkcs8_key_parser bcachefs lz4hc_compress nls_iso8859_1 lz4_compress vfat fat snd_usb_audio snd_usbmidi_lib snd_ump snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device mc amd_atl intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common iwlmvm snd_hda_codec_realtek kvm_amd snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_scodec_component mac80211 kvm snd_hda_intel nvidia_drm(OE) libarc4 snd_intel_dspcfg irqbypass ptp snd_intel_sdw_acpi polyval_clmulni pps_core btusb snd_hda_codec polyval_generic btrtl ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_core [  121.966340]  nvidia_modeset(OE) sha512_ssse3 btintel snd_hwdep sha256_ssse3 iwlwifi spd5118 btbcm sha1_ssse3 snd_pcm r8169 btmtk aesni_intel sp5100_tco snd_timer crypto_simd drm_ttm_helper realtek bluetooth mousedev joydev ttm snd cryptd mdio_devres i2c_piix4 cfg80211 wmi_bmof rapl ccp soundcore libphy pcspkr i2c_smbus mac_hid nvidia_uvm(OE) nvidia(OE) it87(OE) hwmon_vid i2c_dev sg crypto_user k10temp acpi_call(OE) dm_mod loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables hid_generic nvme nvme_core nvme_auth hid_asus usbhid asus_wmi video wmi sparse_keymap i8042 platform_profile rfkill atkbd libps2 serio vivaldi_fmap
[  121.966389] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 3709 Comm: Wonderlands.exe Tainted: G           OE      6.14.4-arch1-1.2-g14 #1 57caf87d4589a112ce1dd9d12091033e815c0f73
[  121.966392] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  121.966393] Hardware name: Micro Computer (HK) Tech Limited MotherBoard Series/DRFXL, BIOS 1.09 09/29/2024
[  121.966394] RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x49/0x50
[  121.966396] Code: d0 48 0f 47 c2 83 e7 01 4c 89 ca 48 8b 34 c5 e0 ef 6f 9b 48 c7 c0 b0 15 e2 9b 48 c7 c7 f0 15 d5 9b 48 0f 44 c8 e8 27 98 80 ff <0f> 0b e9 0b 6b 5b ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
[  121.966398] RSP: 0018:ffffb73e0663f880 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  121.966399] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb73e0663f8f0 RCX: 0000000000000027
[  121.966401] RDX: ffff96c6bd3a1908 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff96c6bd3a1900
[  121.966401] RBP: ffffb73e0663f988 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff
[  121.966402] R10: ffffffff9d240820 R11: ffffb73e0663f718 R12: ffff96b9ceb4c000
[  121.966403] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffff96b8fc79e290 R15: ffff96bad2e81b40
[  121.966404] FS:  00007860a69c0f80(0000) GS:ffff96c6bd380000(0000) knlGS:000000007ffc0000
[  121.966406] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  121.966407] CR2: 0000000081f2d31c CR3: 000000030f1ae000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
[  121.966408] PKRU: 55555554
[  121.966409] Call Trace:
[  121.966411]  <TASK>
[  121.966412]  __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
[  121.966416]  bch2_xattr_get_trans.cold+0xe/0xe [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966446]  ? __bch2_time_stats_update+0xfc/0x340 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966471]  bch2_xattr_get_handler+0x85/0x150 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966488]  __vfs_getxattr+0x91/0xd0
[  121.966492]  do_getxattr+0xb5/0x190
[  121.966494]  path_getxattrat+0x12f/0x190
[  121.966500]  do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x190
[  121.966505]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966507]  ? switch_fpu_return+0x5d/0xe0
[  121.966510]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966511]  ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare.isra.0+0x7c/0xa0
[  121.966514]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966515]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x45/0x1d0
[  121.966517]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966519]  ? __bch2_fs_usage_read_short+0x1cb/0x200 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966538]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966540]  ? bch2_fs_usage_read_short+0x56/0xe0 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966553]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966555]  ? do_statfs_native+0x38/0x70
[  121.966558]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966560]  ? __do_sys_fstatfs+0x5e/0x70
[  121.966561]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966562]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966564]  ? cp_new_stat+0x131/0x170
[  121.966568]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966569]  ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x6a/0x80
[  121.966572]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966573]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x45/0x1d0
[  121.966575]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966576]  ? do_syscall_64+0x8b/0x190
[  121.966578]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966579]  ? do_syscall_64+0x8b/0x190
[  121.966581]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966582]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x3a/0x1d0
[  121.966584]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  121.966586] RIP: 0033:0x7860a6e8df9e
[  121.966608] Code: 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08 6a 4b e8 8e 30 f8 ff c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 c1 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 6d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  121.966610] RSP: 002b:00000001000ff318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c1
[  121.966611] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000001000ff434 RCX: 00007860a6e8df9e
[  121.966612] RDX: 00000001000ff330 RSI: 00007860a5439317 RDI: 00000000000003e6
[  121.966613] RBP: 00000001000ff3f0 R08: 0000000000001460 R09: 00007860a548f5c0
[  121.966614] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[  121.966615] R13: 00000001000ff330 R14: 00000001000ff440 R15: 00000000000003e6
[  121.966618]  </TASK>
[  121.966619] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  121.966623] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  121.966623] kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1040!
[  121.966629] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  121.966631] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 3709 Comm: Wonderlands.exe Tainted: G        W  OE      6.14.4-arch1-1.2-g14 #1 57caf87d4589a112ce1dd9d12091033e815c0f73
[  121.966634] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  121.966635] Hardware name: Micro Computer (HK) Tech Limited MotherBoard Series/DRFXL, BIOS 1.09 09/29/2024
[  121.966636] RIP: 0010:__fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
[  121.966638] Code: e9 bc 22 90 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 40 0f b6 ff e8 43 50 90 00 <0f> 0b 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 4d 89 d0 4c 89 e1 48 c7 c7 cc
[  121.966640] RSP: 0018:ffffb73e0663f888 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  121.966641] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb73e0663f8f0 RCX: 0000000000000027
[  121.966642] RDX: ffff96c6bd3a1908 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff96c6bd3a1900
[  121.966644] RBP: ffffb73e0663f988 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff
[  121.966645] R10: ffffffff9d240820 R11: ffffb73e0663f718 R12: ffff96b9ceb4c000
[  121.966646] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffff96b8fc79e290 R15: ffff96bad2e81b40
[  121.966647] FS:  00007860a69c0f80(0000) GS:ffff96c6bd380000(0000) knlGS:000000007ffc0000
[  121.966648] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  121.966649] CR2: 0000000081f2d31c CR3: 000000030f1ae000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
[  121.966651] PKRU: 55555554
[  121.966652] Call Trace:
[  121.966653]  <TASK>
[  121.966654]  bch2_xattr_get_trans.cold+0xe/0xe [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966673]  ? __bch2_time_stats_update+0xfc/0x340 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966693]  bch2_xattr_get_handler+0x85/0x150 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966710]  __vfs_getxattr+0x91/0xd0
[  121.966712]  do_getxattr+0xb5/0x190
[  121.966715]  path_getxattrat+0x12f/0x190
[  121.966721]  do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x190
[  121.966724]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966725]  ? switch_fpu_return+0x5d/0xe0
[  121.966727]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966728]  ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare.isra.0+0x7c/0xa0
[  121.966730]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966731]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x45/0x1d0
[  121.966733]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966735]  ? __bch2_fs_usage_read_short+0x1cb/0x200 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966755]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966756]  ? bch2_fs_usage_read_short+0x56/0xe0 [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]
[  121.966770]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966772]  ? do_statfs_native+0x38/0x70
[  121.966775]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966776]  ? __do_sys_fstatfs+0x5e/0x70
[  121.966778]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966779]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966781]  ? cp_new_stat+0x131/0x170
[  121.966784]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966786]  ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x6a/0x80
[  121.966789]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966791]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x45/0x1d0
[  121.966792]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966794]  ? do_syscall_64+0x8b/0x190
[  121.966796]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966797]  ? do_syscall_64+0x8b/0x190
[  121.966799]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  121.966801]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x3a/0x1d0
[  121.966803]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  121.966805] RIP: 0033:0x7860a6e8df9e
[  121.966807] Code: 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08 6a 4b e8 8e 30 f8 ff c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 c1 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 6d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  121.966808] RSP: 002b:00000001000ff318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c1
[  121.966810] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000001000ff434 RCX: 00007860a6e8df9e
[  121.966811] RDX: 00000001000ff330 RSI: 00007860a5439317 RDI: 00000000000003e6
[  121.966812] RBP: 00000001000ff3f0 R08: 0000000000001460 R09: 00007860a548f5c0
[  121.966814] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[  121.966815] R13: 00000001000ff330 R14: 00000001000ff440 R15: 00000000000003e6
[  121.966818]  </TASK>
[  121.966819] Modules linked in: xt_addrtype ip_set_hash_net ip_set xt_connmark xt_MASQUERADE xt_mark xt_conntrack iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_mangle nf_tables iptable_filter wireguard curve25519_x86_64 libchacha20poly1305 chacha_x86_64 poly1305_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic libchacha ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer rfcomm snd_seq qrtr ccm algif_aead crypto_null des3_ede_x86_64 cbc des_generic libdes uhid cmac md4 algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep sch_cake zram 842_decompress 842_compress pkcs8_key_parser bcachefs lz4hc_compress nls_iso8859_1 lz4_compress vfat fat snd_usb_audio snd_usbmidi_lib snd_ump snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device mc amd_atl intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common iwlmvm snd_hda_codec_realtek kvm_amd snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_scodec_component mac80211 kvm snd_hda_intel nvidia_drm(OE) libarc4 snd_intel_dspcfg irqbypass ptp snd_intel_sdw_acpi polyval_clmulni pps_core btusb snd_hda_codec polyval_generic btrtl ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_core [  121.966863]  nvidia_modeset(OE) sha512_ssse3 btintel snd_hwdep sha256_ssse3 iwlwifi spd5118 btbcm sha1_ssse3 snd_pcm r8169 btmtk aesni_intel sp5100_tco snd_timer crypto_simd drm_ttm_helper realtek bluetooth mousedev joydev ttm snd cryptd mdio_devres i2c_piix4 cfg80211 wmi_bmof rapl ccp soundcore libphy pcspkr i2c_smbus mac_hid nvidia_uvm(OE) nvidia(OE) it87(OE) hwmon_vid i2c_dev sg crypto_user k10temp acpi_call(OE) dm_mod loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables hid_generic nvme nvme_core nvme_auth hid_asus usbhid asus_wmi video wmi sparse_keymap i8042 platform_profile rfkill atkbd libps2 serio vivaldi_fmap
[  121.966899] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  121.966900] RIP: 0010:__fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
[  121.966902] Code: e9 bc 22 90 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 40 0f b6 ff e8 43 50 90 00 <0f> 0b 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 4d 89 d0 4c 89 e1 48 c7 c7 cc
[  121.966903] RSP: 0018:ffffb73e0663f888 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  121.966905] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb73e0663f8f0 RCX: 0000000000000027
[  121.966906] RDX: ffff96c6bd3a1908 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff96c6bd3a1900
[  121.966907] RBP: ffffb73e0663f988 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff
[  121.966908] R10: ffffffff9d240820 R11: ffffb73e0663f718 R12: ffff96b9ceb4c000
[  121.966909] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffff96b8fc79e290 R15: ffff96bad2e81b40
[  121.966910] FS:  00007860a69c0f80(0000) GS:ffff96c6bd380000(0000) knlGS:000000007ffc0000
[  121.966912] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  121.966913] CR2: 0000000081f2d31c CR3: 000000030f1ae000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
[  121.966914] PKRU: 55555554

Unfortunately even with this patch the bug still shows up, so I am not 100% sure this is exactly the same , the call trace is diffirent so maybe a similar bug but in a diffirent subsystem?

The behavior from user space is that I am trying to launch Tiny Tina's Wonderlands and that pops up after the optimizing shaders finishes and the game never launches, it gets stuck after that.

W dniu 18.03.2025 o 15:12, Hans de Goede pisze:

Quoted 97 lines

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[   80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
[   80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50
...
[   80.843175]  __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb
[   80.843186]  vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw]
[   80.843210]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[   80.843229]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   80.843250]  mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc]
[   80.843270]  mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.

Fixes 566f5ca97680 ("mei: Add transport driver for IVSC device")
---
  drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +15 -11
index 7be1649b1972..fa553d4914b6 100644
@@ -36,20 +36,24 @@
  #define VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES		700
  #define VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE		1
  #define VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) \
-	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->hdr.len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
  #define VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
-	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+	(sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
  #define VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE \
  	(VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES)
  #define VSC_TP_NEXT_XFER_LEN(len, offset) \
-	(len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
+	(len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
 
-struct vsc_tp_packet {
+struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr {
  	__u8 sync;
  	__u8 cmd;
  	__le16 len;
  	__le32 seq;
-	__u8 buf[] __counted_by(len);
+};
+
+struct vsc_tp_packet {
+	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr hdr;
+	__u8 buf[VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE - sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr)];
  };
 
  struct vsc_tp {
@@ -158,12 +162,12 @@ static int vsc_tp_dev_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, void *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len
  static int vsc_tp_xfer_helper(struct vsc_tp *tp, struct vsc_tp_packet *pkt,
  			      void *ibuf, u16 ilen)
  {
-	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet);
+	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr);
  	int next_xfer_len = VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES;
  	u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = tp->rx_buf;
  	int count_down = VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_COUNT;
  	u32 recv_crc = 0, crc = ~0;
-	struct vsc_tp_packet ack;
+	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr ack;
  	u8 *dst = (u8 *)&ack;
  	bool synced = false;
 
@@ -280,10 +284,10 @@ int vsc_tp_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, u8 cmd, const void *obuf, size_t olen,
 
  	guard(mutex)(&tp->mutex);
 
-	pkt->sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
-	pkt->cmd = cmd;
-	pkt->len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
-	pkt->seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
+	pkt->hdr.sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
+	pkt->hdr.cmd = cmd;
+	pkt->hdr.len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
+	pkt->hdr.seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
  	memcpy(pkt->buf, obuf, olen);
 
  	crc = ~crc32(~0, (u8 *)pkt, sizeof(pkt) + olen);
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

Hi Mateusz,

Quoted 5 lines · Mateusz Schyboll

Hi,

found this patch while searching for a I think a similar bug on 6.14.4 compiled with gcc 15:

[  121.966267] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 3 byte read of buffer size 18446744073709551615

<snip.

Quoted 4 lines

[  121.966409] Call Trace:
[  121.966411]  <TASK>
[  121.966412]  __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
[  121.966416]  bch2_xattr_get_trans.cold+0xe/0xe [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]

<snip>

Quoted 1 line

Unfortunately even with this patch the bug still shows up, so I am not 100% sure this is exactly the same , the call trace is diffirent so maybe a similar bug but in a diffirent subsystem?

That is not surprising, this really is a totally different bug, which happens to also trigger a fortify panic and that you're seeing this bug now that arch has switched to gcc15 indicates that it indeed is triggered by gcc15 now supporting counted_by().

This could either be a real bug in the kernel which now gets caught or another invalid counted_by() use.

Either way looking at the back trace it seems that you are using bcachefs and this is a bcache fs issue (bch2_xattr_get_trans() is defined in fs/bcachefs/xattr.c).

Please report this to the bcachefs developer. Note it would be good to note in your report to Kent that this is triggered by gcc15.

Regards,

Hans

Quoted 95 lines

The behavior from user space is that I am trying to launch Tiny Tina's Wonderlands and that pops up after the optimizing shaders finishes and the game never launches, it gets stuck after that.

W dniu 18.03.2025 o 15:12, Hans de Goede pisze:

Quoted 91 lines

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[   80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
[   80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50
...
[   80.843175]  __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb
[   80.843186]  vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw]
[   80.843210]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[   80.843229]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   80.843250]  mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc]
[   80.843270]  mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.

Fixes 566f5ca97680 ("mei: Add transport driver for IVSC device")

---
  drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------

  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +11 -6
index 7be1649b1972..fa553d4914b6 100644
@@ -36,20 +36,24 @@
   #define VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES        700
   #define VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE        1
   #define VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) \
-    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->hdr.len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
   #define VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
-    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
   #define VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE \
       (VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES)
   #define VSC_TP_NEXT_XFER_LEN(len, offset) \
-    (len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
+    (len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
   -struct vsc_tp_packet {
+struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr {
       __u8 sync;
       __u8 cmd;
       __le16 len;
       __le32 seq;
-    __u8 buf[] __counted_by(len);
+};
+
+struct vsc_tp_packet {
+    struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr hdr;
+    __u8 buf[VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE - sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr)];
   };
     struct vsc_tp {
@@ -158,12 +162,12 @@ static int vsc_tp_dev_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, void *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len
   static int vsc_tp_xfer_helper(struct vsc_tp *tp, struct vsc_tp_packet *pkt,
                     void *ibuf, u16 ilen)
   {
-    int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet);
+    int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr);
       int next_xfer_len = VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES;
       u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = tp->rx_buf;
       int count_down = VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_COUNT;
       u32 recv_crc = 0, crc = ~0;
-    struct vsc_tp_packet ack;
+    struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr ack;
       u8 *dst = (u8 *)&ack;
       bool synced = false;
   @@ -280,10 +284,10 @@ int vsc_tp_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, u8 cmd, const void *obuf, size_t olen,

        guard(mutex)(&tp->mutex);
  -    pkt->sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
-    pkt->cmd = cmd;
-    pkt->len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
-    pkt->seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
+    pkt->hdr.sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
+    pkt->hdr.cmd = cmd;
+    pkt->hdr.len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
+    pkt->hdr.seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq); memcpy(pkt->buf, obuf, olen);
        crc = ~crc32(~0, (u8 *)pkt, sizeof(pkt) + olen);

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

Quoted 6 lines

Either way looking at the back trace it seems that you are using bcachefs and this is a bcache fs issue (bch2_xattr_get_trans() is defined in fs/bcachefs/xattr.c).

Please report this to the bcachefs developer. Note it would be good to note in your report to Kent that this is triggered by gcc15.

Right, that game I am trying to run is stored on bcachefs (where the rest of my system is ext4, with explains why only this has issues). Thanks for the hint, reported on github https://github.com/koverstreet/bcachefs/issues/874

W dniu 4.05.2025 o 10:56, Hans de Goede pisze:

Quoted 134 lines

Hi Mateusz,

Quoted 5 lines · Mateusz Schyboll

Hi,

found this patch while searching for a I think a similar bug on 6.14.4 compiled with gcc 15:

[  121.966267] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 3 byte read of buffer size 18446744073709551615

<snip.

Quoted 4 lines

[  121.966409] Call Trace:
[  121.966411]  <TASK>
[  121.966412]  __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
[  121.966416]  bch2_xattr_get_trans.cold+0xe/0xe [bcachefs b5391e24358551d6754989dda9ec90add2ece543]

<snip>

Quoted 1 line

Unfortunately even with this patch the bug still shows up, so I am not 100% sure this is exactly the same , the call trace is diffirent so maybe a similar bug but in a diffirent subsystem?

That is not surprising, this really is a totally different bug, which happens to also trigger a fortify panic and that you're seeing this bug now that arch has switched to gcc15 indicates that it indeed is triggered by gcc15 now supporting counted_by().

This could either be a real bug in the kernel which now gets caught or another invalid counted_by() use.

Either way looking at the back trace it seems that you are using bcachefs and this is a bcache fs issue (bch2_xattr_get_trans() is defined in fs/bcachefs/xattr.c).

Please report this to the bcachefs developer. Note it would be good to note in your report to Kent that this is triggered by gcc15.

Regards,

Hans

Quoted 94 lines

The behavior from user space is that I am trying to launch Tiny Tina's Wonderlands and that pops up after the optimizing shaders finishes and the game never launches, it gets stuck after that.

W dniu 18.03.2025 o 15:12, Hans de Goede pisze:

Quoted 91 lines

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[   80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
[   80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50
...
[   80.843175]  __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb
[   80.843186]  vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw]
[   80.843210]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[   80.843229]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   80.843250]  mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc]
[   80.843270]  mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.

Fixes 566f5ca97680 ("mei: Add transport driver for IVSC device")
---
   drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
   1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +11 -6
index 7be1649b1972..fa553d4914b6 100644
@@ -36,20 +36,24 @@
   #define VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES        700
   #define VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE        1
   #define VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) \
-    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + le16_to_cpu((pkt)->hdr.len) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
   #define VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
-    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
+    (sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_MAX_MSG_SIZE + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE)
   #define VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE \
       (VSC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES)
   #define VSC_TP_NEXT_XFER_LEN(len, offset) \
-    (len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
+    (len + sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr) + VSC_TP_CRC_SIZE - offset + VSC_TP_PACKET_PADDING_SIZE)
   -struct vsc_tp_packet {
+struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr {
       __u8 sync;
       __u8 cmd;
       __le16 len;
       __le32 seq;
-    __u8 buf[] __counted_by(len);
+};
+
+struct vsc_tp_packet {
+    struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr hdr;
+    __u8 buf[VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE - sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr)];
   };
     struct vsc_tp {
@@ -158,12 +162,12 @@ static int vsc_tp_dev_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, void *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len
   static int vsc_tp_xfer_helper(struct vsc_tp *tp, struct vsc_tp_packet *pkt,
                     void *ibuf, u16 ilen)
   {
-    int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet);
+    int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr);
       int next_xfer_len = VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES;
       u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = tp->rx_buf;
       int count_down = VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_COUNT;
       u32 recv_crc = 0, crc = ~0;
-    struct vsc_tp_packet ack;
+    struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr ack;
       u8 *dst = (u8 *)&ack;
       bool synced = false;
   @@ -280,10 +284,10 @@ int vsc_tp_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, u8 cmd, const void *obuf, size_t olen,

        guard(mutex)(&tp->mutex);
  -    pkt->sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
-    pkt->cmd = cmd;
-    pkt->len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
-    pkt->seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
+    pkt->hdr.sync = VSC_TP_PACKET_SYNC;
+    pkt->hdr.cmd = cmd;
+    pkt->hdr.len = cpu_to_le16(olen);
+    pkt->hdr.seq = cpu_to_le32(++tp->seq);
      memcpy(pkt->buf, obuf, olen);
        crc = ~crc32(~0, (u8 *)pkt, sizeof(pkt) + olen);

#6 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 mei: vsc: Use struct vsc_tp_packet as vsc-tp tx_buf and rx_buf type

In reply to Hans de Goede

vsc_tp.tx_buf and vsc_tp.rx_buf point to a struct vsc_tp_packet, use the correct type instead of "void *" and use sizeof(*ptr) when allocating memory for these buffers.

---
 drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +7 -7
index fa553d4914b6..da26a080916c 100644
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ struct vsc_tp {
 	u32 seq;
 
 	/* command buffer */
-	void *tx_buf;
-	void *rx_buf;
+	struct vsc_tp_packet *tx_buf;
+	struct vsc_tp_packet *rx_buf;
 
 	atomic_t assert_cnt;
 	wait_queue_head_t xfer_wait;
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int vsc_tp_xfer_helper(struct vsc_tp *tp, struct vsc_tp_packet *pkt,
 {
 	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr);
 	int next_xfer_len = VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) + VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES;
-	u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = tp->rx_buf;
+	u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = (u8 *)tp->rx_buf;
 	int count_down = VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_COUNT;
 	u32 recv_crc = 0, crc = ~0;
 	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr ack;
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ int vsc_tp_rom_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, const void *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len)
 	guard(mutex)(&tp->mutex);
 
 	/* rom xfer is big endian */
-	cpu_to_be32_array(tp->tx_buf, obuf, words);
+	cpu_to_be32_array((u32 *)tp->tx_buf, obuf, words);
 
 	ret = read_poll_timeout(gpiod_get_value_cansleep, ret,
 				!ret, VSC_TP_ROM_XFER_POLL_DELAY_US,
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ int vsc_tp_rom_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, const void *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (ibuf)
-		be32_to_cpu_array(ibuf, tp->rx_buf, words);
+		be32_to_cpu_array(ibuf, (u32 *)tp->rx_buf, words);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -494,11 +494,11 @@ static int vsc_tp_probe(struct spi_device *spi)
 	if (!tp)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	tp->tx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tp->tx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*tp->tx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tp->tx_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	tp->rx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tp->rx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*tp->rx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tp->rx_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 2/2
#7 lore raw

RE: [PATCH 2/2] mei: vsc: Use struct vsc_tp_packet as vsc-tp tx_buf and rx_buf type

Quoted 12 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 18, 2025 4:12 PM
To: Wentong Wu <[email protected]>; Usyskin, Alexander <[email protected]>; Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>; Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>; Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>; Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mei: vsc: Use struct vsc_tp_packet as vsc-tp tx_buf and rx_buf type

Quoted 5 lines

vsc_tp.tx_buf and vsc_tp.rx_buf point to a struct vsc_tp_packet, use the correct type instead of "void *" and use sizeof(*ptr) when allocating memory for these buffers.

Quoted 69 lines
---
 drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +3 -3
index fa553d4914b6..da26a080916c 100644
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ struct vsc_tp {
 	u32 seq;
 
 	/* command buffer */
-	void *tx_buf;
-	void *rx_buf;
+	struct vsc_tp_packet *tx_buf;
+	struct vsc_tp_packet *rx_buf;
 
 	atomic_t assert_cnt;
 	wait_queue_head_t xfer_wait;
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int vsc_tp_xfer_helper(struct vsc_tp *tp, struct
 vsc_tp_packet *pkt,
 {
 	int ret, offset = 0, cpy_len, src_len, dst_len = sizeof(struct
 vsc_tp_packet_hdr);
 	int next_xfer_len = VSC_TP_PACKET_SIZE(pkt) +
 VSC_TP_XFER_TIMEOUT_BYTES;
-	u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = tp->rx_buf;
+	u8 *src, *crc_src, *rx_buf = (u8 *)tp->rx_buf;
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +1 -1
 	int count_down = VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_COUNT;
 	u32 recv_crc = 0, crc = ~0;
 	struct vsc_tp_packet_hdr ack;
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ int vsc_tp_rom_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, const void
 *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len)
 	guard(mutex)(&tp->mutex);
 
 	/* rom xfer is big endian */
-	cpu_to_be32_array(tp->tx_buf, obuf, words);
+	cpu_to_be32_array((u32 *)tp->tx_buf, obuf, words);
 
 	ret = read_poll_timeout(gpiod_get_value_cansleep, ret,
drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +1 -1
 				!ret, VSC_TP_ROM_XFER_POLL_DELAY_US,
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ int vsc_tp_rom_xfer(struct vsc_tp *tp, const void
 *obuf, void *ibuf, size_t len)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (ibuf)
-		be32_to_cpu_array(ibuf, tp->rx_buf, words);
+		be32_to_cpu_array(ibuf, (u32 *)tp->rx_buf, words);
 
 	return ret;

}

drivers/misc/mei/vsc-tp.c +2 -2
@@ -494,11 +494,11 @@ static int vsc_tp_probe(struct spi_device *spi)
 	if (!tp)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	tp->tx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE,
 GFP_KERNEL);
+	tp->tx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*tp->tx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tp->tx_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	tp->rx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE,
 GFP_KERNEL);
+	tp->rx_buf = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*tp->rx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tp->rx_buf)

return -ENOMEM;

--
2.48.1

Reviewed-by on the v1 series
#8 lore raw
In reply to Hans de Goede

Hi Hans,

Quoted 8 lines · Hans de Goede

Hi All,

Here are 2 fixes for the vsc-tp mei code. The first patch fixes a kernel crash when the kernel is build with gcc 15 and it would be get to get this upstream ASAP.

The second patch is just a small cleanup of something which I noticed when working on the fix.

Thanks for the patches.

Signature · 1 line
Sakari Ailus