two nits for path lookup
cover two nits for path lookup
since path looku is being looked at, two extra nits from me:
1. some trivial jump avoidance in inode_permission()
2. but more importantly avoiding a memory access which is most likely a cache miss when descending into devcgroup_inode_permission()
the file seems to have no maintainer fwiw
anyhow I'm confident the way forward is to add IOP_FAST_MAY_EXEC (or similar) to elide inode_permission() in the common case to begin with. There are quite a few branches which straight up don't need execute. On top of that btrfs has a permission hook only to check for MAY_WRITE, which in case of path lookup is not set. With the above flag the call will be avoided.
Mateusz Guzik (2):
fs: touch up predicts in inode_permission()
device_cgroup: avoid access to ->i_rdev in the common case in
devcgroup_inode_permission()
fs/namei.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
PATCH 1/2 fs: touch up predicts in inode_permission()
The routine only encounters errors when people try to access things they can't, which is a negligible amount of calls.
The only questionable bit might be the pre-existing predict around MAY_WRITE. Currently the routine is predominantly used for MAY_EXEC, so this makes some sense.
I verified this straightens out the asm.
--- fs/namei.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +5 -5
@@ -571,14 +571,14 @@ int inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,int retval; retval =sb_permission (inode->i_sb, inode, mask); -if (retval) +if (unlikely (retval))return retval;if (unlikely (mask &MAY_WRITE )) {/* * Nobody gets write access to an immutable file. */ -if (IS_IMMUTABLE (inode)) +if (unlikely (IS_IMMUTABLE (inode)))return -EPERM ;/*
@@ -586,16 +586,16 @@ int inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,* written back improperly if their true value is unknown * to the vfs. */ -if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID (idmap, inode)) +if (unlikely (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID (idmap, inode)))return -EACCES ; } retval =do_inode_permission (idmap, inode, mask); -if (retval) +if (unlikely (retval))return retval; retval =devcgroup_inode_permission (inode, mask); -if (retval) +if (unlikely (retval))return retval;return security_inode_permission (inode, mask);
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
PATCH 2/2 device_cgroup: avoid access to ->i_rdev in the common case in devcgroup_inode_permission()
In reply to Mateusz GuzikThe routine gets called for every path component during lookup. ->i_mode is going to be cached on account of permission checks, while ->i_rdev is an area which is most likely cache-cold.
gcc 14.2 is kind enough to emit one branch:
movzwl (%rbx),%eax mov %eax,%edx and $0xb000,%dx cmp $0x2000,%dx je 11bc <inode_permission+0xec>
This patch is lazy in that I don't know if the ->i_rdev branch makes any sense with the newly added mode check upfront. I am not changing any semantics here though.
--- include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/device_cgroup.h +4 -3
@@ -18,15 +18,16 @@ static inline int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) {short type, access =0 ; +if (likely (!S_ISBLK (inode->i_mode) && !S_ISCHR (inode->i_mode))) +return 0 ; +if (likely (!inode->i_rdev))return 0 ;if (S_ISBLK (inode->i_mode)) type =DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK ; -else if (S_ISCHR (inode->i_mode)) +else /* S_ISCHR by the test above */ type =DEVCG_DEV_CHAR ; -else -return 0 ;if (mask &MAY_WRITE ) access |=DEVCG_ACC_WRITE ;
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Quoted 5 lines · Mateusz Guzik
since path looku is being looked at, two extra nits from me:
1. some trivial jump avoidance in
inode_permission()
Quoted 8 lines
2. but more importantly avoiding a memory access which is most likely a cache miss when descending into
devcgroup_inode_permission()the file seems to have no maintainer fwiw
anyhow I'm confident the way forward is to add
IOP_FAST_MAY_EXEC(or similar) to elideinode_permission()in the common case to begin with. There are quite a few branches which straight up don't need execute.
.. the bit would be set if everyone has the x perm on the inode, there are no acls and the thing is a directory
The perm to check being MAY_EXEC elides the MAY_WRITE check in sb_permission(). The bit only showing up on directories means this is not a device, eliding devcgroup_inode_permission()
The bit being set means there is no need to separately check for the mode and acls.
I have hooks in the same spot as security_* callbacks for setattr and setacl + a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS-guarded runtime check that the bit is only set if there are indeed no acls and the mode grants x for everyone. It also handles races against setattr/getacl. I just need to clean this up + do more testing.
Quoted 16 lines
On top of that btrfs has a permission hook only to check for
MAY_WRITE, which in case of path lookup is not set. With the above flag the call will be avoided.Mateusz Guzik (2):
fs: touch up predicts ininode_permission()
device_cgroup: avoid access to ->i_rdev in the common case in
devcgroup_inode_permission()fs/namei.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)--
2.48.1
Signature · 1 line
Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik gmail.com>
Quoted 2 lines · Mateusz Guzik
since path looku is being looked at, two extra nits from me:
Ack, both look sane to me.
Linus
Christian Brauner
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Mateusz Guzik
since path looku is being looked at, two extra nits from me:
1. some trivial jump avoidance in
inode_permission()2. but more importantly avoiding a memory access which is most likely a cache miss when descending into
devcgroup_inode_permission()
Serge did maintain this for a while. But honestly it is an absolute legacy eyesore from the cgroup v1 days. Somehow it was decided that device permission management is a good fit for cgroups. Idk, I have ranted about this in other places at length. No use warming that back up.
They later decided to reimplement device access management as a dedicated bpf program type. That imho is another bad design decision.
What should've happend is that device access management should've just been implemented through the bpf-LSM infrastructure. That way all this stuff would've gone through security_inode_permission() instead of us having to have two separate calls in inode_permission().
I would love to kill this call. And cgroup v1 is deprecated and systemd has dropped any support for it last year as well.
Quoted 6 lines
the file seems to have no maintainer fwiw
anyhow I'm confident the way forward is to add
IOP_FAST_MAY_EXEC(or similar) to elideinode_permission()in the common case to begin with. There are quite a few branches which straight up don't need execute.
Yes.
Quoted 16 lines
On top of that btrfs has a permission hook only to check for
MAY_WRITE, which in case of path lookup is not set. With the above flag the call will be avoided.Mateusz Guzik (2):
fs: touch up predicts ininode_permission()
device_cgroup: avoid access to ->i_rdev in the common case in
devcgroup_inode_permission()fs/namei.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Quoted 8 lines · Mateusz Guzik
since path looku is being looked at, two extra nits from me:
1. some trivial jump avoidance in
inode_permission()2. but more importantly avoiding a memory access which is most likely a cache miss when descending into
devcgroup_inode_permission()[...]
Applied to the vfs-6.16.misc branch of the vfs/vfs.git tree. Patches in the vfs-6.16.misc branch should appear in linux-next soon.
Please report any outstanding bugs that were missed during review in a new review to the original patch series allowing us to drop it.
It's encouraged to provide Acked-bys and Reviewed-bys even though the patch has now been applied. If possible patch trailers will be updated.
Note that commit hashes shown below are subject to change due to rebase, trailer updates or similar. If in doubt, please check the listed branch.
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git branch: vfs-6.16.misc
[1/2] fs: touch up predicts in inode_permission()
https://git.kernel.org/vfs/vfs/c/305a4329d07c [2/2] device_cgroup: avoid access to ->i_rdev in the common case in devcgroup_inode_permission() https://git.kernel.org/vfs/vfs/c/328ba0291442