u-boot: ensure keys are generated before assembling U-Boot FIT image
PATCH 1/1 u-boot: ensure keys are generated before assembling U-Boot FIT image
From: Rogerio Guerra Borin <[email protected]>
Add the task dependency:
do_uboot_assemble_fitimage -> virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys
to ensure the kernel FIT image signing keys are available when creating the U-Boot DTB. This is done only if the signing of the kernel FIT image is enabled (UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE="1").
The lack of the dependency causes build errors when executing a build with no kernel FIT keys initially present in the keys directory. In such cases one would see an output like this in the Bitbake logs:
Log data follows:
| DEBUG: Executing shell function do_uboot_assemble_fitimage | Couldn't open RSA private key: '/workdir/build/keys/fit/dev.key': No such file or directory | Failed to sign 'signature' signature node in 'conf-1' conf node | FIT description: Kernel Image image with one or more FDT blobs | ...
This issue was introduced by commit 259bfa86f384 where the dependency between U-Boot and the kernel was removed (for good reasons). Before that commit the dependency was set via DEPENDS so that, in terms of tasks, one had:
u-boot:do_configure -> virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot
and the chain leading to the key generation was:
virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot -> virtual/kernel:do_install virtual/kernel:do_install -> virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage -> virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys
With the removal of the first dependency, no more guarantees exist that the keys would be present when assembling the U-Boot FIT image. That's the situation we are solving with the present commit.
--- meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +2 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ python() { sign = d.getVar('UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE') == '1' if d.getVar('UBOOT_FITIMAGE_ENABLE') == '1' or sign: d.appendVar('DEPENDS', " u-boot-tools-native dtc-native") + if sign: + d.appendVarFlag('do_uboot_assemble_fitimage', 'depends', ' virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys') } concat_dtb() {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 62 lines · Rogerio Guerra Borin
From: Rogerio Guerra Borin <[email protected]>
Add the task dependency:
do_uboot_assemble_fitimage->
virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keysto ensure the kernel FIT image signing keys are available when creating
the U-Boot DTB. This is done only if the signing of the kernel FIT image
is enabled (UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE="1").The lack of the dependency causes build errors when executing a build with no kernel FIT keys initially present in the keys directory. In such
cases one would see an output like this in the Bitbake logs:Log data follows:
Quoted 6 lines
DEBUG: Executing shell function
do_uboot_assemble_fitimageCouldn't open RSA private key: '/workdir/build/keys/fit/dev.key':
No such file or directory
Failed to sign 'signature' signature node in 'conf-1' conf node FIT description: Kernel Image image with one or more FDT blobs
...This issue was introduced by commit
259bfa86f384where the dependency between U-Boot and the kernel was removed (for good reasons). Before that commit the dependency was set via DEPENDS so that, in terms of tasks, one had:u-boot:do_configure -> virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot
and the chain leading to the key generation was:
virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot -> virtual/kernel:do_install virtual/kernel:do_install -> virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage -> virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys
With the removal of the first dependency, no more guarantees exist that
the keys would be present when assembling the U-Boot FIT image. That's
the situation we are solving with the present commit.Fixes 259bfa86f384 ("u-boot: kernel-fitimage: Fix dependency loop if
UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLEandUBOOT_ENVenabled")Signed-off-by Rogerio Guerra Borin <[email protected]>Cc Marek Vasut <[email protected]>Cc Sean Anderson <[email protected]>Cc Adrian Freihofer <[email protected]>---
meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass | 2 ++1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/classes- renamed from meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +0
-0recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass
index76a81546e34..7744e0c5ab5100644meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +0
-0@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ python() {
Quoted 6 lines
sign =
d.getVar('UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE')== '1'
ifd.getVar('UBOOT_FITIMAGE_ENABLE')== '1' or sign:
d.appendVar('DEPENDS', " u-boot-tools-native dtc-native")+ if sign:
+d.appendVarFlag('do_uboot_assemble_fitimage', 'depends', ' virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys')
Short answer: Thank you for fixing this regression. I basically agree with the fix.
However, could you please also check if FIT_GENERATE_KEYS is enabled? Would a v2 like this be fine?
+ if sign and d.getVar('FIT_GENERATE_KEYS') == '1':
+ d.appendVarFlag('do_uboot_assemble_fitimage', 'depends', '
Longer answer: The way the keys are (and always have been) generated presents two major issues from my point of view:
1. It creates a dependency from U-Boot on the kernel, which should generally be avoided.
2. More problematically, the current implementation leads to random key generation in many use cases:
- When building from an existing TMPDIR, the existing key is reused
- When building from an empty TMPDIR, a new key is generated, and signing works automatically with this fresh key
- This also occurs when building with an SDK that uses the sstate- cache to create the TMPDIR. Since the key is not sstate-cached, each SDK will likely create its own key
While FIT_GENERATE_KEYS might be a convenient feature for quick experiments, it becomes problematic when maintaining real products where using random keys is typically not acceptable. Until now, my assumption has been that FIT_GENERATE_KEYS is primarily used for testing purposes rather than in actual product deployments. So offering the possibility to switch it properly off without pulling in some potentially problematic task dependencies is important.
We likely need a more sophisticated implementation for the future - one that is reproducible, secure, and doesn't create a task dependency from U-Boot to the kernel.
The key management should probably be moved to a separate (native?) recipe that provides the key via (native-)sysroots to other recipes. Yocto could provide a reasonably secure default implementation for such a key provider recipe, which could be easily overridden in a downstream layer.
I will consider this after the major refactoring of the FIT image is merged. Basically, I'm thinking about a recipe that:
* Takes an optionally encrypted key via SRC_URI (note that using the fetcher is important for handling key changes reliably)
* Provides the decrypted key to other recipes via sysroots
* Stores the encrypted key in sstate-cache
* Uses a password provided by a non sstate-cached file for decrypting the symmetrically encrypted key
This would provide a semi-secure, reproducible implementation.
For enhanced security, I see two possible implementations:
* Replacing the semi-secure signature created by the default implementation later on, independently from the build process (e.g. with a hardware token offering a PKCS#11 interface.
* Passing a PKCS#11 interface to Bitbake. However, this appears extremely complicated and raises the question of how to pass the PKCS#11 secret to BitBake. It also raises the question if a PKCS#11 interface is available on a build machine.
Regards,
Adrian
Quoted 3 lines
}
concat_dtb() {
Quoted 77 lines · Adrian
This message originated from outside your organization
Quoted 62 lines · Rogerio Guerra Borin
From: Rogerio Guerra Borin <[email protected]>
Add the task dependency:
do_uboot_assemble_fitimage->
virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keysto ensure the kernel FIT image signing keys are available when creating
the U-Boot DTB. This is done only if the signing of the kernel FIT image
is enabled (UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE="1").The lack of the dependency causes build errors when executing a build with no kernel FIT keys initially present in the keys directory. In such
cases one would see an output like this in the Bitbake logs:Log data follows:
Quoted 6 lines
DEBUG: Executing shell function
do_uboot_assemble_fitimageCouldn't open RSA private key: '/workdir/build/keys/fit/dev.key':
No such file or directory
Failed to sign 'signature' signature node in 'conf-1' conf node FIT description: Kernel Image image with one or more FDT blobs
...This issue was introduced by commit
259bfa86f384where the dependency between U-Boot and the kernel was removed (for good reasons). Before that commit the dependency was set via DEPENDS so that, in terms of tasks, one had:u-boot:do_configure -> virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot
and the chain leading to the key generation was:
virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot -> virtual/kernel:do_install virtual/kernel:do_install -> virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage -> virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys
With the removal of the first dependency, no more guarantees exist that
the keys would be present when assembling the U-Boot FIT image. That's
the situation we are solving with the present commit.Fixes 259bfa86f384 ("u-boot: kernel-fitimage: Fix dependency loop if
UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLEandUBOOT_ENVenabled")Signed-off-by Rogerio Guerra Borin <[email protected]>Cc Marek Vasut <[email protected]>Cc Sean Anderson <[email protected]>Cc Adrian Freihofer <[email protected]>--- meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/classes- renamed from meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +0
-0recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass
index76a81546e34..7744e0c5ab5100644meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass python() { · line 118
Quoted 6 lines
meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +2
-0@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ python() { sign = d.getVar('UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE') == '1' if d.getVar('UBOOT_FITIMAGE_ENABLE') == '1' or sign: d.appendVar('DEPENDS', " u-boot-tools-native dtc-native") + if sign: + d.appendVarFlag('do_uboot_assemble_fitimage', 'depends', ' virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys')Short answer: Thank you for fixing this regression. I basically agree with the fix.
However, could you please also check ifFIT_GENERATE_KEYSis enabled? Would a v2 like this be fine?
Quoted 3 lines
+ if sign and
d.getVar('FIT_GENERATE_KEYS')== '1':
+ d.appendVarFlag('do_uboot_assemble_fitimage', 'depends', '
Absolutely. I'll do it on v2.
Quoted 50 lines
Longer answer: The way the keys are (and always have been) generated presents two major issues from my point of view:
1. It creates a dependency from U-Boot on the kernel, which should generally be avoided.
2. More problematically, the current implementation leads to random key generation in many use cases:
- When building from an existing TMPDIR, the existing key is reused
- When building from an empty TMPDIR, a new key is generated, and signing works automatically with this fresh key
- This also occurs when building with an SDK that uses the sstate- cache to create the TMPDIR. Since the key is not sstate-cached, each SDK will likely create its own keyWhile
FIT_GENERATE_KEYSmight be a convenient feature for quick experiments, it becomes problematic when maintaining real products where using random keys is typically not acceptable. Until now, my assumption has been thatFIT_GENERATE_KEYSis primarily used for testing purposes rather than in actual product deployments. So offering the possibility to switch it properly off without pulling in some potentially problematic task dependencies is important.We likely need a more sophisticated implementation for the future - one that is reproducible, secure, and doesn't create a task dependency from U-Boot to the kernel.
The key management should probably be moved to a separate (native?) recipe that provides the key via (native-)sysroots to other recipes. Yocto could provide a reasonably secure default implementation for such a key provider recipe, which could be easily overridden in a downstream layer.I will consider this after the major refactoring of the FIT image is merged. Basically, I'm thinking about a recipe that:
* Takes an optionally encrypted key viaSRC_URI(note that using the fetcher is important for handling key changes reliably)
* Provides the decrypted key to other recipes via sysroots
* Stores the encrypted key in sstate-cache
* Uses a password provided by a non sstate-cached file for decrypting the symmetrically encrypted key
This would provide a semi-secure, reproducible implementation.For enhanced security, I see two possible implementations:
* Replacing the semi-secure signature created by the default implementation later on, independently from the build process (e.g. with a hardware token offering a PKCS#11 interface.
* Passing a PKCS#11 interface to Bitbake. However, this appears extremely complicated and raises the question of how to pass the PKCS#11 secret to BitBake. It also raises the question if a PKCS#11 interface is available on a build machine.
Quoted 8 lines
Regards,
AdrianQuoted 3 lines
meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +0
-0}concat_dtb() {
Thanks for the detailed answer. Yeah, that looks like a promising path to follow for improving the signing infrastructure.
Cheers,
Rogerio
Quoted 52 lines · Rogerio Guerra Borin
From: Rogerio Guerra Borin <[email protected]>
Add the task dependency:
do_uboot_assemble_fitimage-> virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keysto ensure the kernel FIT image signing keys are available when creating the U-Boot DTB. This is done only if the signing of the kernel FIT image is enabled (UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE="1").
The lack of the dependency causes build errors when executing a build with no kernel FIT keys initially present in the keys directory. In such cases one would see an output like this in the Bitbake logs:
Log data follows:
| DEBUG: Executing shell function do_uboot_assemble_fitimage | Couldn't open RSA private key: '/workdir/build/keys/fit/dev.key': No such file or directory | Failed to sign 'signature' signature node in 'conf-1' conf node | FIT description: Kernel Image image with one or more FDT blobs | ...This issue was introduced by commit
259bfa86f384where the dependency between U-Boot and the kernel was removed (for good reasons). Before that commit the dependency was set via DEPENDS so that, in terms of tasks, one had:u-boot:do_configure -> virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot
and the chain leading to the key generation was:
virtual/kernel:do_populate_sysroot -> virtual/kernel:do_install virtual/kernel:do_install -> virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage virtual/kernel:do_assemble_fitimage -> virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys
With the removal of the first dependency, no more guarantees exist that the keys would be present when assembling the U-Boot FIT image. That's the situation we are solving with the present commit.
Fixes 259bfa86f384 ("u-boot: kernel-fitimage: Fix dependency loop if UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE and UBOOT_ENV enabled")Signed-off-by Rogerio Guerra Borin <[email protected]>Cc Marek Vasut <[email protected]>Cc Sean Anderson <[email protected]>Cc Adrian Freihofer <[email protected]>--- meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +0
-0
meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass python() { · line 117
Quoted 5 lines
meta/classes-recipe/uboot-sign.bbclass +2
-0@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ python() { sign = d.getVar('UBOOT_SIGN_ENABLE') == '1' if d.getVar('UBOOT_FITIMAGE_ENABLE') == '1' or sign: d.appendVar('DEPENDS', " u-boot-tools-native dtc-native") + if sign: + d.appendVarFlag('do_uboot_assemble_fitimage', 'depends', ' virtual/kernel:do_kernel_generate_rsa_keys')
This should also check for FIT_GENERATE_KEYS=1 before adding the dependency, right ?