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efi: Add a mechanism for embedding SBAT section

PATCH In review Vitaly Kuznetsov 2 participants 4 messages May 13, 2025 – May 21, 2025

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#0 lore raw

v3 cover efi: Add a mechanism for embedding SBAT section

Changes since v2 (Ard):
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-efi/[email protected]/)
- Use 'textsize' intermediary in arch/x86/boot/header.S to avoid additional '#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SBAT'.
- Fix indentation.
- Added R-b tags.

Original description:

SBAT is a mechanism which improves SecureBoot revocations of UEFI binaries by introducing a generation-based technique. Compromised or vulnerable UEFI binaries can be prevented from booting by bumping the minimal required generation for the specific component in the bootloader. More information on the SBAT can be obtained here:

https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md

Currently, shim checks .sbat data for itself in self-test and for second stage bootloaders (grub, sd-boot, UKIs with sd-stub, ...) but kernel revocations require cycling signing keys or adding kernel hashes to shim's internal dbx. Adding .sbat to kernel and enforcing it on kernel loading will allow to do the same tracking and revocation distros are already doing with a simplified mechanism, and without having to keep lists of kernels outside of the git repos.

Previously, an attempt was made to add ".sbat" section to the linux kernel:

https://lwn.net/Articles/938422/

The approach was rejected mainly because currently there's no policy on how to update SBAT generation number when a new vulnerability is discovered. In particular, it is unclear what to do with stable kernels which may or may not backport certain patches making it impossible to describe the current state with a simple number.

This series suggests a different approach: instead of defining SBAT information, provide a mechanism for downstream kernel builders (distros) to include their own SBAT data. This leaves the decision on the policy to the distro vendors. Basically, each distro implementing SecureBoot today, will have an option to inject their own SBAT data during kernel build and before it gets signed by their SecureBoot CA. Different distro do not need to agree on the common SBAT component names or generation numbers as each distro ships its own 'shim' with their own 'vendor_cert'/'vendor_db'. Linux upstream will never, ever need to care about the data unless they choose in the future to participate in that way.

Vitaly Kuznetsov (2):
efi: zboot specific mechanism for embedding SBAT section x86/efi: Implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86

 arch/x86/boot/Makefile                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile           |  5 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S             |  7 +++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S      |  8 ++++++
 arch/x86/boot/header.S                      | 31 +++++++++++++++------
 drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig                | 24 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile.zboot |  4 +++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot-header.S | 22 +++++++++++++--
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot.lds      | 11 ++++++++
 9 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 efi: zboot specific mechanism for embedding SBAT section

SBAT is a mechanism which improves SecureBoot revocations of UEFI binaries by introducing a generation-based technique. Compromised or vulnerable UEFI binaries can be prevented from booting by bumping the minimal required generation for the specific component in the bootloader. More information on the SBAT can be obtained here:

https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md

Upstream Linux kernel does not currently participate in any way in SBAT as there's no existing policy in how SBAT generation number should be defined. Keep the status quo and provide a mechanism for distro vendors and anyone else who signs their kernel for SecureBoot to include their own SBAT data. This leaves the decision on the policy to the vendor. Basically, each distro implementing SecureBoot today, will have an option to inject their own SBAT data during kernel build and before it gets signed by their SecureBoot CA. Different distro do not need to agree on the common SBAT component names or generation numbers as each distro ships its own 'shim' with their own 'vendor_cert'/'vendor_db'

Implement support for embedding SBAT data for architectures using zboot (arm64, loongarch, riscv). Put '.sbat' section in between '.data' and '.text' as the former also covers '.bss' and thus must be the last one.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig                | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile.zboot |  4 ++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot-header.S | 22 +++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot.lds      | 11 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +24 -0
index 5fe61b9ab5f9..db8c5c03d3a2 100644
@@ -281,6 +281,30 @@ config EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE
 	bool
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
 
+config EFI_SBAT
+       def_bool y if EFI_SBAT_FILE!=""
+
+config EFI_SBAT_FILE
+	string "Embedded SBAT section file path"
+	depends on EFI_ZBOOT
+	help
+	  SBAT section provides a way to improve SecureBoot revocations of UEFI
+	  binaries by introducing a generation-based mechanism. With SBAT, older
+	  UEFI binaries can be prevented from booting by bumping the minimal
+	  required generation for the specific component in the bootloader.
+
+	  Note: SBAT information is distribution specific, i.e. the owner of the
+	  signing SecureBoot certificate must define the SBAT policy. Linux
+	  kernel upstream does not define SBAT components and their generations.
+
+	  See https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md for the additional
+	  details.
+
+	  Specify a file with SBAT data which is going to be embedded as '.sbat'
+	  section into the kernel.
+
+	  If unsure, leave blank.
+
 endmenu
 
 config UEFI_CPER
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile.zboot +4 -0
index 48842b5c106b..92e3c73502ba 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ AFLAGS_zboot-header.o += -DMACHINE_TYPE=IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_$(EFI_ZBOOT_MACH_TYPE
 $(obj)/zboot-header.o: $(srctree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot-header.S FORCE
 	$(call if_changed_rule,as_o_S)
 
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE),)
+$(obj)/zboot-header.o: $(CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE)
+endif
+
 ZBOOT_DEPS := $(obj)/zboot-header.o $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
 
 LDFLAGS_vmlinuz.efi.elf := -T $(srctree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot.lds
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot-header.S +20 -2
index fb676ded47fa..e02247458b65 100644
@@ -123,11 +123,29 @@ __efistub_efi_zboot_header:
 			IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ | \
 			IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SBAT
+	.ascii		".sbat\0\0\0"
+	.long		__sbat_size
+	.long		_sbat - .Ldoshdr
+	.long		__sbat_size
+	.long		_sbat - .Ldoshdr
+
+	.long		0, 0
+	.short		0, 0
+	.long		IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA | \
+			IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ | \
+			IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE
+
+	.pushsection ".sbat", "a", @progbits
+	.incbin CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE
+	.popsection
+#endif
+
 	.ascii		".data\0\0\0"
 	.long		__data_size
-	.long		_etext - .Ldoshdr
+	.long		_data - .Ldoshdr
 	.long		__data_rawsize
-	.long		_etext - .Ldoshdr
+	.long		_data - .Ldoshdr
 
 	.long		0, 0
 	.short		0, 0
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot.lds +11 -0
index 9ecc57ff5b45..c3a166675450 100644
@@ -29,7 +29,17 @@ SECTIONS
 		. = _etext;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SBAT
+        .sbat : ALIGN(4096) {
+		_sbat = .;
+		*(.sbat)
+		_esbat = ALIGN(4096);
+		. = _esbat;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	.data : ALIGN(4096) {
+		_data = .;
 		*(.data* .init.data*)
 		_edata = ALIGN(512);
 		. = _edata;
@@ -52,3 +62,4 @@ PROVIDE(__efistub__gzdata_size =
 
 PROVIDE(__data_rawsize = ABSOLUTE(_edata - _etext));
 PROVIDE(__data_size = ABSOLUTE(_end - _etext));
+PROVIDE(__sbat_size = ABSOLUTE(_esbat - _sbat));
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 x86/efi: Implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86

In reply to Vitaly Kuznetsov

Similar to zboot architectures, implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86. Put '.sbat' section in between '.data' and '.text' as the former also covers '.bss' and '.pgtable' and thus must be the last one in the file.

---
 arch/x86/boot/Makefile                 |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile      |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S        |  7 ++++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S |  8 +++++++
 arch/x86/boot/header.S                 | 31 ++++++++++++++++++--------
 drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig           |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S
arch/x86/boot/Makefile +1 -1
index 81f55da81967..5f7b52f0e7f5 100644
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ $(obj)/vmlinux.bin: $(obj)/compressed/vmlinux FORCE
 
 SETUP_OBJS = $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(setup-y))
 
-sed-zoffset := -e 's/^\([0-9a-fA-F]*\) [a-zA-Z] \(startup_32\|efi.._stub_entry\|efi\(32\)\?_pe_entry\|input_data\|kernel_info\|_end\|_ehead\|_text\|_e\?data\|z_.*\)$$/\#define ZO_\2 0x\1/p'
+sed-zoffset := -e 's/^\([0-9a-fA-F]*\) [a-zA-Z] \(startup_32\|efi.._stub_entry\|efi\(32\)\?_pe_entry\|input_data\|kernel_info\|_end\|_ehead\|_text\|_e\?data\|_e\?sbat\|z_.*\)$$/\#define ZO_\2 0x\1/p'
 
 quiet_cmd_zoffset = ZOFFSET $@
       cmd_zoffset = $(NM) $< | sed -n $(sed-zoffset) > $@
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +5 -0
index fdbce022db55..1441435869cc 100644
@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY) += $(obj)/mem.o
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI) += $(obj)/efi.o
 vmlinux-libs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_SBAT) += $(obj)/sbat.o
+
+ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SBAT
+$(obj)/sbat.o: $(CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE)
+endif
 
 $(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) $(vmlinux-libs-y) FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,ld)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S new file +7 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..838f70a997dd
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Embed SBAT data in the kernel.
+ */
+	.pushsection ".sbat", "a", @progbits
+	.incbin CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE
+	.popsection
arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S +8 -0
index 3b2bc61c9408..587ce3e7c504 100644
@@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ SECTIONS
 		*(.rodata.*)
 		_erodata = . ;
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SBAT
+	.sbat : ALIGN(0x1000) {
+		_sbat = . ;
+		*(.sbat)
+		_esbat = ALIGN(0x1000);
+		. = _esbat;
+	}
+#endif
 	.data :	ALIGN(0x1000) {
 		_data = . ;
 		*(.data)
arch/x86/boot/header.S +22 -9
index b5c79f43359b..a1568a33561a 100644
@@ -179,15 +179,11 @@ pecompat_fstart:
 #else
 	.set	pecompat_fstart, setup_size
 #endif
-	.ascii	".text"
-	.byte	0
-	.byte	0
-	.byte	0
-	.long	ZO__data
-	.long	setup_size
-	.long	ZO__data			# Size of initialized data
-						# on disk
-	.long	setup_size
+	.ascii	".text\0\0\0"
+	.long	textsize            		# VirtualSize
+	.long	setup_size			# VirtualAddress
+	.long	textsize			# SizeOfRawData
+	.long	setup_size			# PointerToRawData
 	.long	0				# PointerToRelocations
 	.long	0				# PointerToLineNumbers
 	.word	0				# NumberOfRelocations
@@ -196,6 +192,23 @@ pecompat_fstart:
 		IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ		| \
 		IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE		# Characteristics
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SBAT
+	.ascii	".sbat\0\0\0"
+	.long	ZO__esbat - ZO__sbat            # VirtualSize
+	.long	setup_size + ZO__sbat           # VirtualAddress
+	.long	ZO__esbat - ZO__sbat            # SizeOfRawData
+	.long	setup_size + ZO__sbat           # PointerToRawData
+
+	.long	0, 0, 0
+	.long	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA	| \
+		IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ		| \
+		IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE	# Characteristics
+
+	.set	textsize, ZO__sbat
+#else
+	.set	textsize, ZO__data
+#endif
+
 	.ascii	".data\0\0\0"
 	.long	ZO__end - ZO__data		# VirtualSize
 	.long	setup_size + ZO__data		# VirtualAddress
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +1 -1
index db8c5c03d3a2..16baa038d412 100644
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ config EFI_SBAT
 
 config EFI_SBAT_FILE
 	string "Embedded SBAT section file path"
-	depends on EFI_ZBOOT
+	depends on EFI_ZBOOT || (EFI_STUB && X86)
 	help
 	  SBAT section provides a way to improve SecureBoot revocations of UEFI
 	  binaries by introducing a generation-based mechanism. With SBAT, older
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to Vitaly Kuznetsov
Quoted 47 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov

Changes since v2 (Ard):
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-efi/[email protected]/)
- Use 'textsize' intermediary in arch/x86/boot/header.S to avoid additional '#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SBAT'.
- Fix indentation.
- Added R-b tags.

Original description:

SBAT is a mechanism which improves SecureBoot revocations of UEFI binaries by introducing a generation-based technique. Compromised or vulnerable UEFI binaries can be prevented from booting by bumping the minimal required generation for the specific component in the bootloader. More information on the SBAT can be obtained here:

https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md

Currently, shim checks .sbat data for itself in self-test and for second stage bootloaders (grub, sd-boot, UKIs with sd-stub, ...) but kernel revocations require cycling signing keys or adding kernel hashes to shim's internal dbx. Adding .sbat to kernel and enforcing it on kernel loading will allow to do the same tracking and revocation distros are already doing with a simplified mechanism, and without having to keep lists of kernels outside of the git repos.

Previously, an attempt was made to add ".sbat" section to the linux kernel:

https://lwn.net/Articles/938422/

The approach was rejected mainly because currently there's no policy on how to update SBAT generation number when a new vulnerability is discovered. In particular, it is unclear what to do with stable kernels which may or may not backport certain patches making it impossible to describe the current state with a simple number.

This series suggests a different approach: instead of defining SBAT information, provide a mechanism for downstream kernel builders (distros) to include their own SBAT data. This leaves the decision on the policy to the distro vendors. Basically, each distro implementing SecureBoot today, will have an option to inject their own SBAT data during kernel build and before it gets signed by their SecureBoot CA. Different distro do not need to agree on the common SBAT component names or generation numbers as each distro ships its own 'shim' with their own 'vendor_cert'/'vendor_db'. Linux upstream will never, ever need to care about the data unless they choose in the future to participate in that way.

Quoted 2 lines

Vitaly Kuznetsov (2):
efi: zboot specific mechanism for embedding SBAT section

I've picked up the first patch for the next cycle. The second one can then go via the -tip tree for v6.17

Or if team-tip is happy to pick it up now, I've created a separate efi-sbat branch with only the first patch, so it can be merged into -tip and the second patch applied on top.

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git efi-sbat

Quoted 17 lines

x86/efi: Implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86

 arch/x86/boot/Makefile                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile           |  5 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S             |  7 +++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S      |  8 ++++++
 arch/x86/boot/header.S                      | 31 +++++++++++++++------
 drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig                | 24 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile.zboot |  4 +++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot-header.S | 22 +++++++++++++--
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/zboot.lds      | 11 ++++++++
 9 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S

--
2.49.0