Skip to contentSkip to conversation

TLB flush fixes

PATCH Superseded Rik van Riel 2 participants 9 messages Jun 2, 2025 – Jun 3, 2025

Subsystems (2)

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

cover TLB flush fixes

Some TLB flush fixes extracted from, or encountered while developing the Intel RAR functionality.

1) Fix a potential overflow in user_pcid_flush_mask. I do not think anybody is hitting this in practice, but they could if they wanted to.

2) Change the early boot initialized value of invlpgb_count_max to 1, to avoid an infinite loop when...

3) Having cpa_flush() call flush_kernel_range(), which results in the INVPLGB code being called very early at boot time.

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 x86/mm: Fix potential overflow in user_pcid_flush_mask

From: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>

Currently no system with AMD INVLPGB support requires the page table isolation mitigation. However, people could still enable PTI manually, or a vulnerability could be found in the future that makes PTI useful on certain AMD CPUs.

Additionally, there are systems that support Intel RAR TLB invalidation, where PTI is a useful mitigation.

The combination of PTI and broadcast TLB flush has a problem:
- invalidate_user_asid() sets a bit corresponding to the process PCID in user_pcid_flush_mask
- SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 tests and clears a bit corresponding to the process PCID in user_pcid_flush_mask

Enlarge user_pcid_flush_mask to fit the PCID numbers that can be present when using broadcast TLB flushing. This takes up 256 or 512 bytes per CPU, depending on whether or not page table isolation is built into the kernel.

Fixes c3ed3f5b2550 x86/mm: userspace & pageout flushing using Intel RAR
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c   |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c               | 28 +++-------------------
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +34 -8
index e9b81876ebe4..cc9935bbbd45 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,31 @@ void __flush_tlb_all(void);
 #define TLB_FLUSH_ALL	-1UL
 #define TLB_GENERATION_INVALID	0
 
+/*
+ * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
+ * user/kernel switches
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	1
+#else
+# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	0
+#endif
+
+#define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS (X86_CR3_PCID_BITS - PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS)
+
+/*
+ * ASIDs are zero-based: 0->MAX_AVAIL_ASID are valid.  -1 below to account
+ * for them being zero-based.  Another -1 is because PCID 0 is reserved for
+ * use by non-PCID-aware users.
+ */
+#define MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS) - 2)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BROADCAST_TLB_FLUSH
+# define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_LONGS ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS) / BITS_PER_LONG)
+#else
+# define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_LONGS 1
+#endif
+
 void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear);
 unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void);
 
@@ -115,14 +140,6 @@ struct tlb_state {
 	 */
 	u8 lam;
 #endif
-
-	/*
-	 * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
-	 * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
-	 * switch to it; see SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
-	 */
-	unsigned short user_pcid_flush_mask;
-
 	/*
 	 * Access to this CR4 shadow and to H/W CR4 is protected by
 	 * disabling interrupts when modifying either one.
@@ -149,6 +166,15 @@ struct tlb_state {
 	 * context 0.
 	 */
 	struct tlb_context ctxs[TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS];
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+	/*
+	 * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
+	 * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
+	 * switch to it; see SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
+	 */
+	unsigned long user_pcid_flush_mask[CR3_AVAIL_PCID_LONGS];
+#endif
 };
 DECLARE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate);
 
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
index 6259b474073b..8c41a2e5a53e 100644
@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	BLANK();
 	DEFINE(PTREGS_SIZE, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/* TLB state for the entry code */
 	OFFSET(TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask, tlb_state, user_pcid_flush_mask);
+#endif
 
 	/* Layout info for cpu_entry_area */
 	OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack, cpu_entry_area, entry_stack_page);
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +3 -25
index 39f80111e6f1..f5761e8be77f 100644
@@ -90,25 +90,6 @@
  *
  */
 
-/*
- * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
- * user/kernel switches
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
-# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	1
-#else
-# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	0
-#endif
-
-#define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS (X86_CR3_PCID_BITS - PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS)
-
-/*
- * ASIDs are zero-based: 0->MAX_AVAIL_ASID are valid.  -1 below to account
- * for them being zero-based.  Another -1 is because PCID 0 is reserved for
- * use by non-PCID-aware users.
- */
-#define MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS) - 2)
-
 /*
  * Given @asid, compute kPCID
  */
@@ -543,10 +524,7 @@ static void broadcast_tlb_flush(struct flush_tlb_info *info)
  */
 static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
 {
-	/* There is no user ASID if address space separation is off */
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
-		return;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/*
 	 * We only have a single ASID if PCID is off and the CR3
 	 * write will have flushed it.
@@ -557,8 +535,8 @@ static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		return;
 
-	__set_bit(kern_pcid(asid),
-		  (unsigned long *)this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tlbstate.user_pcid_flush_mask));
+	__set_bit(kern_pcid(asid), this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tlbstate.user_pcid_flush_mask[0]));
+#endif
 }
 
 static void load_new_mm_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir, u16 new_asid, unsigned long lam,
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/mm: Fix potential overflow in user_pcid_flush_mask

Quoted 7 lines · Rik van Riel

Currently no system with AMD INVLPGB support requires the page table isolation mitigation. However, people could still enable PTI manually, or a vulnerability could be found in the future that makes PTI useful on certain AMD CPUs.

Additionally, there are systems that support Intel RAR TLB invalidation, where PTI is a useful mitigation.

Let's just leave this mention of RAR out for now.

Quoted 3 lines

The combination of PTI and broadcast TLB flush has a problem:
- invalidate_user_asid() sets a bit corresponding to the process PCID in user_pcid_flush_mask
- SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 tests and clears a bit corresponding to the process PCID in user_pcid_flush_mask

The other bit of background here is that there are currently only 6 PCIDs that might need to be flushed in this way (TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS). There are obviously more than 6 bits in an unsigned long, so this is all fine.

But the INVLPGB support vastly expanded the number of ASIDs that might be used.

Quoted 22 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +14 -0
index e9b81876ebe4..cc9935bbbd45 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,31 @@ void __flush_tlb_all(void);
 #define TLB_FLUSH_ALL	-1UL
 #define TLB_GENERATION_INVALID	0
 
+/*
+ * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
+ * user/kernel switches
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	1
+#else
+# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	0
+#endif
+
+#define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS (X86_CR3_PCID_BITS - PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS)
+
+/*
+ * ASIDs are zero-based: 0->MAX_AVAIL_ASID are valid.  -1 below to account

arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h void __flush_tlb_all(void); · line 49

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +10 -0
+ * for them being zero-based.  Another -1 is because PCID 0 is reserved for
+ * use by non-PCID-aware users.
+ */
+#define MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS) - 2)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BROADCAST_TLB_FLUSH
+# define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_LONGS ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS) / BITS_PER_LONG)
+#else
+# define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_LONGS 1
+#endif

I wonder if we can make this easier to understand. Is there something preventing us from using good old DECLARE_BITMAP()?

	DECLARE_BITMAP(user_pcid_flush_mask, MAX_KERN_ASID);

#ifdef CONFIG_BROADCAST_TLB_FLUSH

# define MAX_KERN_PCID (1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS - 1)
#else
  /* PCID 0 is reserved. Dynamic asids 0->5 map to PCIDs 1->6 */
# define MAX_KERN_PCID (TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS + 1)
#endif

The TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS portion of this could even be a preparatory patch before the CONFIG_BROADCAST_TLB_FLUSH gets added. That might also make the whole thing more clear.

Quoted 23 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +1 -8
 void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear);
 unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void);
 
@@ -115,14 +140,6 @@ struct tlb_state {
 	 */
 	u8 lam;
 #endif
-
-	/*
-	 * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
-	 * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
-	 * switch to it; see SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
-	 */
-	unsigned short user_pcid_flush_mask;
-
 	/*
 	 * Access to this CR4 shadow and to H/W CR4 is protected by
 	 * disabling interrupts when modifying either one.
@@ -149,6 +166,15 @@ struct tlb_state {
 	 * context 0.
 	 */
 	struct tlb_context ctxs[TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS];
+

arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h struct tlb_state { · line 179

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +8 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+	/*
+	 * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
+	 * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
+	 * switch to it; see SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
+	 */
+	unsigned long user_pcid_flush_mask[CR3_AVAIL_PCID_LONGS];
+#endif
 };
 DECLARE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate);

This adds an #ifdef. I guess it makes sense to do it for the now larger user_pcid_flush_mask[] while it didn't for a single long. But that's another logically separate bit that adds complexity to reading this whole mess.

Honestly, I'd just leave this out for the bug fix. If someone really cares, we can come back and fix it up in mainline.

arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c static void __used common(void) · line 109

Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
index 6259b474073b..8c41a2e5a53e 100644
@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	BLANK();
 	DEFINE(PTREGS_SIZE, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/* TLB state for the entry code */
 	OFFSET(TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask, tlb_state, user_pcid_flush_mask);
+#endif

Because it necessitates this hunk too...

Quoted 45 lines
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +0 -0
 	/* Layout info for cpu_entry_area */
 	OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack, cpu_entry_area, entry_stack_page);
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +1 -23
index 39f80111e6f1..f5761e8be77f 100644
@@ -90,25 +90,6 @@
  *
  */
 
-/*
- * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
- * user/kernel switches
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
-# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	1
-#else
-# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS	0
-#endif
-
-#define CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS (X86_CR3_PCID_BITS - PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS)
-
-/*
- * ASIDs are zero-based: 0->MAX_AVAIL_ASID are valid.  -1 below to account
- * for them being zero-based.  Another -1 is because PCID 0 is reserved for
- * use by non-PCID-aware users.
- */
-#define MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE ((1 << CR3_AVAIL_PCID_BITS) - 2)
-
 /*
  * Given @asid, compute kPCID
  */
@@ -543,10 +524,7 @@ static void broadcast_tlb_flush(struct flush_tlb_info *info)
  */
 static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
 {
-	/* There is no user ASID if address space separation is off */
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
-		return;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	/*
 	 * We only have a single ASID if PCID is off and the CR3
 	 * write will have flushed it.

arch/x86/mm/tlb.c static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid) · line 540

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +2 -2
@@ -557,8 +535,8 @@ static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
 		return;
 
-	__set_bit(kern_pcid(asid),
-		  (unsigned long *)this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tlbstate.user_pcid_flush_mask));
+	__set_bit(kern_pcid(asid), this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tlbstate.user_pcid_flush_mask[0]));
+#endif
 }

... and this one.

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/mm: Fix potential overflow in user_pcid_flush_mask

Quoted 24 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Rik van Riel
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +1 -0
@@ -149,6 +166,15 @@ struct tlb_state {
  	 * context 0.
  	 */
  	struct tlb_context ctxs[TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS];
+

arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h struct tlb_state { · line 179

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +8 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+	/*
+	 * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
+	 * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
+	 * switch to it; see SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
+	 */
+	unsigned long user_pcid_flush_mask[CR3_AVAIL_PCID_LONGS];
+#endif
  };
  DECLARE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate);

This adds an #ifdef. I guess it makes sense to do it for the now larger
user_pcid_flush_mask[] while it didn't for a single long. But that's another logically separate bit that adds complexity to reading this whole mess.

Quoted 2 lines

Honestly, I'd just leave this out for the bug fix. If someone really cares, we can come back and fix it up in mainline.

I added the #ifdef at Ingo's request.

I am happy to do the code in any way you two can agree on, but we should probably avoid the back and forth over many versions thing :)

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/asm- renamed from arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +0 -0

offsets.c
index 6259b474073b..8c41a2e5a53e 100644

arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +0 -0
@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ static void __used common(void)
  	BLANK();
  	DEFINE(PTREGS_SIZE, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
Quoted 6 lines


+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION /* TLB state for the entry code */ OFFSET(TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask, tlb_state, user_pcid_flush_mask);
+#endif

Because it necessitates this hunk too...

I agree this isn't the prettiest, but then again asm-offsets.c isn't code people will be reading a lot?

Signature · 1 line
All Rights Reversed.
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/mm: Fix potential overflow in user_pcid_flush_mask

Quoted 7 lines · Rik van Riel
Quoted 2 lines

Honestly, I'd just leave this out for the bug fix. If someone really cares, we can come back and fix it up in mainline.

I added the #ifdef at Ingo's request.

I am happy to do the code in any way you two can
agree on, but we should probably avoid the back
and forth over many versions thing 🙂

Ingo, I don't think the #ifdef is worth it, especially for what needs to go to stable@. The PTI config option is enabled quite widely, so it's not doing much practically. If you feel strongly that it's required for this series, then it needs to be broken out as a prerequisite and not intermingled with the actual bug fix.

#5 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 x86/mm: Fix early boot use of INVPLGB

In reply to Rik van Riel

Use of the INVLPGB instruction is done based off the X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB CPU feature, which is provided directly by the hardware.

If invlpgb_kernel_range_flush is called before the kernel has read the value of invlpgb_count_max from the hardware, the normally bounded loop can become an infinite loop if invlpgb_count_max is initialized to zero.

Fix that issue by initializing invlpgb_count_max to 1.

This way INVPLGB at early boot time will be a little bit slower than normal (with initialized invplgb_count_max), and not an instant hang at bootup time.

Fixes b7aa05cbdc52 ("x86/mm: Add INVLPGB support code")
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +1 -1
index 93da466dfe2c..b2ad8d13211a 100644
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 
 #include "cpu.h"
 
-u16 invlpgb_count_max __ro_after_init;
+u16 invlpgb_count_max __ro_after_init = 1;
 
 static inline int rdmsrq_amd_safe(unsigned msr, u64 *p)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Acked-by on v1 2/3
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86/mm: Fix early boot use of INVPLGB

Quoted 8 lines · Rik van Riel

Use of the INVLPGB instruction is done based off the X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB CPU feature, which is provided directly by the hardware.

If invlpgb_kernel_range_flush is called before the kernel has read the value of invlpgb_count_max from the hardware, the normally bounded loop can become an infinite loop if invlpgb_count_max is initialized to zero.

Quoted 5 lines

Fix that issue by initializing invlpgb_count_max to 1.

This way INVPLGB at early boot time will be a little bit slower than normal (with initialized invplgb_count_max), and not an instant hang at bootup time.

The INVLPGB instruction has limits on how many invalidations it can perform at once. That limit is enumerated in CPUID, read by the kernel, and stored in 'invlpgb_count_max'. Ranged invalidation (like invlpgb_kernel_range_flush()) break up their invalidations so that they do not exceed the limit.

However, early boot code currently attempts to do ranged invalidations before populating 'invlpgb_count_max'. There's a for() loop which is basically:

	for (...; addr < end; addr += invlpgb_count_max*PAGE_SIZE)

It doesn't make much progress when invlpgb_count_max==0.

... then the rest

---

BTW, how was this code even _working_ without this patch? Are the early boot ranged invalidations infrequent or something?

#7 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 x86/mm: Change cpa_flush() to call flush_kernel_range() directly

In reply to Rik van Riel

From: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>

The function cpa_flush() calls __flush_tlb_one_kernel() and flush_tlb_all().

Replacing that with a call to flush_tlb_kernel_range() allows cpa_flush() to make use of INVLPGB or RAR without any additional changes.

Initialize invlpgb_count_max to 1, since flush_tlb_kernel_range() can now be called before invlpgb_count_max has been initialized to the value read from CPUID.

[riel: remove now unused __cpa_flush_tlb]

---
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 20 +++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +7 -13
index 30ab4aced761..2454f5249329 100644
@@ -399,15 +399,6 @@ static void cpa_flush_all(unsigned long cache)
 	on_each_cpu(__cpa_flush_all, (void *) cache, 1);
 }
 
-static void __cpa_flush_tlb(void *data)
-{
-	struct cpa_data *cpa = data;
-	unsigned int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < cpa->numpages; i++)
-		flush_tlb_one_kernel(fix_addr(__cpa_addr(cpa, i)));
-}
-
 static int collapse_large_pages(unsigned long addr, struct list_head *pgtables);
 
 static void cpa_collapse_large_pages(struct cpa_data *cpa)
@@ -444,6 +435,7 @@ static void cpa_collapse_large_pages(struct cpa_data *cpa)
 
 static void cpa_flush(struct cpa_data *cpa, int cache)
 {
+	unsigned long start, end;
 	unsigned int i;
 
 	BUG_ON(irqs_disabled() && !early_boot_irqs_disabled);
@@ -453,10 +445,12 @@ static void cpa_flush(struct cpa_data *cpa, int cache)
 		goto collapse_large_pages;
 	}
 
-	if (cpa->force_flush_all || cpa->numpages > tlb_single_page_flush_ceiling)
-		flush_tlb_all();
-	else
-		on_each_cpu(__cpa_flush_tlb, cpa, 1);
+	start = fix_addr(__cpa_addr(cpa, 0));
+	end = fix_addr(__cpa_addr(cpa, cpa->numpages));
+	if (cpa->force_flush_all)
+		end = TLB_FLUSH_ALL;
+
+	flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end);
 
 	if (!cache)
 		goto collapse_large_pages;
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Acked-by on v1 3/3
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/mm: Change cpa_flush() to call flush_kernel_range() directly

Quoted 5 lines · Rik van Riel

From: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>

The function cpa_flush() calls __flush_tlb_one_kernel() and flush_tlb_all().

Quoted 7 lines

Replacing that with a call to flush_tlb_kernel_range() allows cpa_flush() to make use of INVLPGB or RAR without any additional changes.

Initialize invlpgb_count_max to 1, since flush_tlb_kernel_range() can now be called before invlpgb_count_max has been initialized to the value read from CPUID.

Looks good, thanks for picking this out of the RAR series: