Skip to contentSkip to conversation

5.4.294-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 9 participants 237 messages Jun 2, 2025 – Aug 10, 2025 Page 2 of 2

Subsystems (6)
lore
Share & tools
lore
author maintainer
#173 lore raw

PATCH 146/204 smack: recognize ipv4 CIPSO w/o categories

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konstantin Andreev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a158a937d864d0034fea14913c1f09c6d5f574b8 ]

If SMACK label has CIPSO representation w/o categories, e.g.:

| # cat /smack/cipso2
| foo  10
| @ 250/2
| ...

then SMACK does not recognize such CIPSO in input ipv4 packets and substitues '*' label instead. Audit records may look like

| lsm=SMACK fn=smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb action=denied
| subject="*" object="_" requested=w pid=0 comm="swapper/1" ...

This happens in two steps:

1) security/smack/smackfs.c`smk_set_cipso does not clear NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT
from (struct smack_known *)skp->smk_netlabel.flags on assigning CIPSO w/o categories:

| rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat); | skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;

2) security/smack/smack_lsm.c`smack_from_secattr
can not match skp->smk_netlabel with input packet's struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap
because sap->flags have not NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT (what is correct) but skp->smk_netlabel.flags have (what is incorrect):

| if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
| 	if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
| 		 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
| 		found = 1;
| 	break;
| }

This commit sets/clears NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT in skp->smk_netlabel.flags according to the presense of CIPSO categories. The update of smk_netlabel is not atomic, so input packets processing still may be incorrect during short time while update proceeds.

---
 security/smack/smackfs.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
security/smack/smackfs.c +4 -0
index ddb0a292802ef..526598b40b13c 100644
@@ -921,6 +921,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (rc >= 0) {
 		old_cat = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
 		rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat);
+		if (ncats.attr.mls.cat)
+			skp->smk_netlabel.flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+		else
+			skp->smk_netlabel.flags &= ~(u32)NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
 		skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
 		synchronize_rcu();
 		netlbl_catmap_free(old_cat);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#174 lore raw

PATCH 147/204 net/mlx4_core: Avoid impossible mlx4_db_alloc() order value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4a6f18f28627e121bd1f74b5fcc9f945d6dbeb1e ]

GCC can see that the value range for "order" is capped, but this leads it to consider that it might be negative, leading to a false positive warning (with GCC 15 with -Warray-bounds -fdiagnostics-details):

../drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/alloc.c:691:47: error: array subscript -1 is below array bounds of 'long unsigned int *[2]' [-Werror=array-bounds=]

  691 |                 i = find_first_bit(pgdir->bits[o], MLX4_DB_PER_PAGE >> o);
      |                                    ~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
  'mlx4_alloc_db_from_pgdir': events 1-2
  691 |                 i = find_first_bit(pgdir->bits[o], MLX4_DB_PER_PAGE >> o);                        |                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      |                     |                         |                                                   |                     |                         (2) out of array bounds here
      |                     (1) when the condition is evaluated to true                             In file included from ../drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4.h:53,
                 from ../drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/alloc.c:42:

../include/linux/mlx4/device.h:664:33: note: while referencing 'bits'
664 | unsigned long *bits[2];
| ^~~~

Switch the argument to unsigned int, which removes the compiler needing to consider negative values.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/alloc.c | 6 +++---
 include/linux/mlx4/device.h                | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/alloc.c +3 -3
index b330020dc0d67..f2bded847e61d 100644
@@ -682,9 +682,9 @@ static struct mlx4_db_pgdir *mlx4_alloc_db_pgdir(struct device *dma_device)
 }
 
 static int mlx4_alloc_db_from_pgdir(struct mlx4_db_pgdir *pgdir,
-				    struct mlx4_db *db, int order)
+				    struct mlx4_db *db, unsigned int order)
 {
-	int o;
+	unsigned int o;
 	int i;
 
 	for (o = order; o <= 1; ++o) {
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ static int mlx4_alloc_db_from_pgdir(struct mlx4_db_pgdir *pgdir,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int mlx4_db_alloc(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_db *db, int order)
+int mlx4_db_alloc(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_db *db, unsigned int order)
 {
 	struct mlx4_priv *priv = mlx4_priv(dev);
 	struct mlx4_db_pgdir *pgdir;
include/linux/mlx4/device.h +1 -1
index 35b4e324e17f2..7c399831540d7 100644
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ int mlx4_write_mtt(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_mtt *mtt,
 int mlx4_buf_write_mtt(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_mtt *mtt,
 		       struct mlx4_buf *buf);
 
-int mlx4_db_alloc(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_db *db, int order);
+int mlx4_db_alloc(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_db *db, unsigned int order);
 void mlx4_db_free(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_db *db);
 
 int mlx4_alloc_hwq_res(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_hwq_resources *wqres,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 148/204 phy: core: dont require set_mode() callback for phy_get_mode() to work

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d58c04e305afbaa9dda7969151f06c4efe2c98b0 ]

As reported by Damon Ding, the phy_get_mode() call doesn't work as expected unless the PHY driver has a .set_mode() call. This prompts PHY drivers to have empty stubs for .set_mode() for the sake of being able to get the mode.

Make .set_mode() callback truly optional and update PHY's mode even if it there is none.

---
 drivers/phy/phy-core.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/phy/phy-core.c +4 -3
index c94a0d2c45161..917e01af4769f 100644
@@ -360,13 +360,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(phy_power_off);
 
 int phy_set_mode_ext(struct phy *phy, enum phy_mode mode, int submode)
 {
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (!phy || !phy->ops->set_mode)
+	if (!phy)
 		return 0;
 
 	mutex_lock(&phy->mutex);
-	ret = phy->ops->set_mode(phy, mode, submode);
+	if (phy->ops->set_mode)
+		ret = phy->ops->set_mode(phy, mode, submode);
 	if (!ret)
 		phy->attrs.mode = mode;
 	mutex_unlock(&phy->mutex);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 149/204 net/mlx5: Extend Ethtool loopback selftest to support non-linear SKB

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexei Lazar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 95b9606b15bb3ce1198d28d2393dd0e1f0a5f3e9 ]

Current loopback test validation ignores non-linear SKB case in the SKB access, which can lead to failures in scenarios such as when HW GRO is enabled.
Linearize the SKB so both cases will be handled.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_selftest.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_selftest.c +3 -0
index bbff8d8ded767..abb88a61e4d98 100644
@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ mlx5e_test_loopback_validate(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct udphdr *udph;
 	struct iphdr *iph;
 
+	if (skb_linearize(skb))
+		goto out;
+
 	/* We are only going to peek, no need to clone the SKB */
 	if (MLX5E_TEST_PKT_SIZE - ETH_HLEN > skb_headlen(skb))
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 150/204 net/mlx5e: set the tx_queue_len for pfifo_fast

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: William Tu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a38cc5706fb9f7dc4ee3a443f61de13ce1e410ed ]

By default, the mq netdev creates a pfifo_fast qdisc. On a system with 16 core, the pfifo_fast with 3 bands consumes 16 * 3 * 8 (size of pointer) * 1024 (default tx queue len) = 393KB. The patch sets the tx qlen to representor default value, 128 (1<<MLX5E_REP_PARAMS_DEF_LOG_SQ_SIZE), which consumes 16 * 3 * 8 * 128 = 49KB, saving 344KB for each representor at ECPF.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c +2 -0
index a40fecfdb10ca..26a9d38d1e2a7 100644
@@ -1470,6 +1470,8 @@ static void mlx5e_build_rep_netdev(struct net_device *netdev)
 	}
 
 	netdev->watchdog_timeo    = 15 * HZ;
+	if (mlx5_core_is_ecpf(mdev))
+		netdev->tx_queue_len = 1 << MLX5E_REP_PARAMS_DEF_LOG_SQ_SIZE;
 
 	netdev->features       |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 151/204 net/mlx5e: reduce rep rxq depth to 256 for ECPF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: William Tu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b9cc8f9d700867aaa77aedddfea85e53d5e5d584 ]

By experiments, a single queue representor netdev consumes kernel memory around 2.8MB, and 1.8MB out of the 2.8MB is due to page pool for the RXQ. Scaling to a thousand representors consumes 2.8GB, which becomes a memory pressure issue for embedded devices such as BlueField-2 16GB / BlueField-3 32GB memory.

Since representor netdevs mostly handles miss traffic, and ideally, most of the traffic will be offloaded, reduce the default non-uplink rep netdev's RXQ default depth from 1024 to 256 if mdev is ecpf eswitch manager. This saves around 1MB of memory per regular RQ, (1024 - 256) * 2KB, allocated from page pool.

With rxq depth of 256, the netlink page pool tool reports $./tools/net/ynl/cli.py --spec Documentation/netlink/specs/netdev.yaml \
--dump page-pool-get
{'id': 277,
'ifindex': 9,
'inflight': 128,
'inflight-mem': 786432,
'napi-id': 775}]

This is due to mtu 1500 + headroom consumes half pages, so 256 rxq entries consumes around 128 pages (thus create a page pool with size 128), shown above at inflight.

Note that each netdev has multiple types of RQs, including Regular RQ, XSK, PTP, Drop, Trap RQ. Since non-uplink representor only supports regular rq, this patch only changes the regular RQ's default depth.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c +3 -0
index 26a9d38d1e2a7..479304afdada2 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #define MLX5E_REP_PARAMS_DEF_LOG_SQ_SIZE \
         max(0x7, MLX5E_PARAMS_MINIMUM_LOG_SQ_SIZE)
 #define MLX5E_REP_PARAMS_DEF_NUM_CHANNELS 1
+#define MLX5E_REP_PARAMS_DEF_LOG_RQ_SIZE 0x8
 
 static const char mlx5e_rep_driver_name[] = "mlx5e_rep";
 
@@ -1430,6 +1431,8 @@ static void mlx5e_build_rep_params(struct net_device *netdev)
 
 	/* RQ */
 	mlx5e_build_rq_params(mdev, params);
+	if (!mlx5e_is_uplink_rep(priv) && mlx5_core_is_ecpf(mdev))
+		params->log_rq_mtu_frames = MLX5E_REP_PARAMS_DEF_LOG_RQ_SIZE;
 
 	/* CQ moderation params */
 	params->rx_dim_enabled = MLX5_CAP_GEN(mdev, cq_moderation);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 152/204 ip: fib_rules: Fetch net from fib_rule in fib[46]_rule_configure().

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5a1ccffd30a08f5a2428cd5fbb3ab03e8eb6c66d ]

The following patch will not set skb->sk from VRF path.

Let's fetch net from fib_rule->fr_net instead of sock_net(skb->sk) in fib[46]_rule_configure().

---
 net/ipv4/fib_rules.c  | 4 ++--
 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/fib_rules.c +2 -2
index e9a3cc9e98dfa..1617ea18fae3a 100644
@@ -220,9 +220,9 @@ static int fib4_rule_configure(struct fib_rule *rule, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			       struct nlattr **tb,
 			       struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
-	struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
+	struct fib4_rule *rule4 = (struct fib4_rule *)rule;
+	struct net *net = rule->fr_net;
 	int err = -EINVAL;
-	struct fib4_rule *rule4 = (struct fib4_rule *) rule;
 
 	if (frh->tos & ~IPTOS_TOS_MASK) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid tos");
net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c +2 -2
index 3cf9dc2231036..acb8610c9a9df 100644
@@ -344,9 +344,9 @@ static int fib6_rule_configure(struct fib_rule *rule, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			       struct nlattr **tb,
 			       struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
+	struct fib6_rule *rule6 = (struct fib6_rule *)rule;
+	struct net *net = rule->fr_net;
 	int err = -EINVAL;
-	struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
-	struct fib6_rule *rule6 = (struct fib6_rule *) rule;
 
 	if (rule->action == FR_ACT_TO_TBL && !rule->l3mdev) {
 		if (rule->table == RT6_TABLE_UNSPEC) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 153/204 hwmon: (xgene-hwmon) use appropriate type for the latency value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Vatoropin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8df0f002827e18632dcd986f7546c1abf1953a6f ]

The expression PCC_NUM_RETRIES * pcc_chan->latency is currently being evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic.

Since a value of type 'u64' is used to store the eventual result, and this result is later sent to the function usecs_to_jiffies with input parameter unsigned int, the current data type is too wide to store the value of ctx->usecs_lat.

Change the data type of "usecs_lat" to a more suitable (narrower) type.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c +1 -1
index 559a73bab51e8..15889bcc85875 100644
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ struct xgene_hwmon_dev {
 
 	phys_addr_t		comm_base_addr;
 	void			*pcc_comm_addr;
-	u64			usecs_lat;
+	unsigned int		usecs_lat;
 };
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 154/204 vxlan: Annotate FDB data races

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f6205f8215f12a96518ac9469ff76294ae7bd612 ]

The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2].

Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE().

[1]

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit

write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0:

 vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650
 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150
 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0
 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90
 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2:

 vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650
 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150
 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0
 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90
 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:

CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014

[2]
#!/bin/bash

set +H
echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan
echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan

ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q &

---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vxlan.c +9 -9
index ce11fb2b05561..7105ac37f341e 100644
@@ -302,9 +302,9 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
 	    nla_put_u32(skb, NDA_IFINDEX, rdst->remote_ifindex))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 
-	ci.ndm_used	 = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - fdb->used);
+	ci.ndm_used	 = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - READ_ONCE(fdb->used));
 	ci.ndm_confirmed = 0;
-	ci.ndm_updated	 = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - fdb->updated);
+	ci.ndm_updated	 = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - READ_ONCE(fdb->updated));
 	ci.ndm_refcnt	 = 0;
 
 	if (nla_put(skb, NDA_CACHEINFO, sizeof(ci), &ci))
@@ -510,8 +510,8 @@ static struct vxlan_fdb *vxlan_find_mac(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
 	struct vxlan_fdb *f;
 
 	f = __vxlan_find_mac(vxlan, mac, vni);
-	if (f && f->used != jiffies)
-		f->used = jiffies;
+	if (f && READ_ONCE(f->used) != jiffies)
+		WRITE_ONCE(f->used, jiffies);
 
 	return f;
 }
@@ -942,12 +942,12 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_update_existing(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
 	    !(f->flags & NTF_VXLAN_ADDED_BY_USER)) {
 		if (f->state != state) {
 			f->state = state;
-			f->updated = jiffies;
+			WRITE_ONCE(f->updated, jiffies);
 			notify = 1;
 		}
 		if (f->flags != fdb_flags) {
 			f->flags = fdb_flags;
-			f->updated = jiffies;
+			WRITE_ONCE(f->updated, jiffies);
 			notify = 1;
 		}
 	}
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_update_existing(struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
 	}
 
 	if (ndm_flags & NTF_USE)
-		f->used = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(f->used, jiffies);
 
 	if (notify) {
 		if (rd == NULL)
@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ static bool vxlan_snoop(struct net_device *dev,
 				    src_mac, &rdst->remote_ip.sa, &src_ip->sa);
 
 		rdst->remote_ip = *src_ip;
-		f->updated = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(f->updated, jiffies);
 		vxlan_fdb_notify(vxlan, f, rdst, RTM_NEWNEIGH, true, NULL);
 	} else {
 		u32 hash_index = fdb_head_index(vxlan, src_mac, vni);
@@ -2748,7 +2748,7 @@ static void vxlan_cleanup(struct timer_list *t)
 			if (f->flags & NTF_EXT_LEARNED)
 				continue;
 
-			timeout = f->used + vxlan->cfg.age_interval * HZ;
+			timeout = READ_ONCE(f->used) + vxlan->cfg.age_interval * HZ;
 			if (time_before_eq(timeout, jiffies)) {
 				netdev_dbg(vxlan->dev,
 					   "garbage collect %pM\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 155/204 rcu: handle quiescent states for PREEMPT_RCU=n, PREEMPT_COUNT=y

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ankur Arora <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 83b28cfe796464ebbde1cf7916c126da6d572685 ]

With PREEMPT_RCU=n, cond_resched() provides urgently needed quiescent states for read-side critical sections via rcu_all_qs(). One reason why this was needed: lacking preempt-count, the tick handler has no way of knowing whether it is executing in a read-side critical section or not.

With (PREEMPT_LAZY=y, PREEMPT_DYNAMIC=n), we get (PREEMPT_COUNT=y, PREEMPT_RCU=n). In this configuration cond_resched() is a stub and does not provide quiescent states via rcu_all_qs(). (PREEMPT_RCU=y provides this information via rcu_read_unlock() and its nesting counter.)

So, use the availability of preempt_count() to report quiescent states in rcu_flavor_sched_clock_irq().

---
 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h +7 -4
index 2c127d438fe0a..1d9f2831b54ea 100644
@@ -902,13 +902,16 @@ static void rcu_preempt_check_blocked_tasks(struct rcu_node *rnp)
  */
 static void rcu_flavor_sched_clock_irq(int user)
 {
-	if (user || rcu_is_cpu_rrupt_from_idle()) {
+	if (user || rcu_is_cpu_rrupt_from_idle() ||
+	     (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT) &&
+	      (preempt_count() == HARDIRQ_OFFSET))) {
 
 		/*
 		 * Get here if this CPU took its interrupt from user
-		 * mode or from the idle loop, and if this is not a
-		 * nested interrupt.  In this case, the CPU is in
-		 * a quiescent state, so note it.
+		 * mode, from the idle loop without this being a nested
+		 * interrupt, or while not holding the task preempt count
+		 * (with PREEMPT_COUNT=y). In this case, the CPU is in a
+		 * quiescent state, so note it.
 		 *
 		 * No memory barrier is required here because rcu_qs()
 		 * references only CPU-local variables that other CPUs
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 156/204 rcu: fix header guard for rcu_all_qs()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ankur Arora <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ad6b5b73ff565e88aca7a7d1286788d80c97ba71 ]

rcu_all_qs() is defined for !CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU but the declaration is conditioned on CONFIG_PREEMPTION.

With CONFIG_PREEMPT_LAZY, CONFIG_PREEMPTION=y does not imply CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU=y.

Decouple the two.

---
 include/linux/rcutree.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/rcutree.h +1 -1
index 18b1ed9864b02..5d39875c6594e 100644
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ void rcu_scheduler_starting(void);
 extern int rcu_scheduler_active __read_mostly;
 void rcu_end_inkernel_boot(void);
 bool rcu_is_watching(void);
-#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
+#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU
 void rcu_all_qs(void);
 #endif
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#184 lore raw

PATCH 157/204 scsi: lpfc: Handle duplicate D_IDs in ndlp search-by D_ID routine

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Justin Tee <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 56c3d809b7b450379162d0b8a70bbe71ab8db706 ]

After a port swap between separate fabrics, there may be multiple nodes in the vport's fc_nodes list with the same fabric well known address. Duplication is temporary and eventually resolves itself after dev_loss_tmo expires, but nameserver queries may still occur before dev_loss_tmo. This possibly results in returning stale fabric ndlp objects. Fix by adding an nlp_state check to ensure the ndlp search routine returns the correct newer allocated ndlp fabric object.

---
 drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c +12 -5
index 0abce779fbb13..3238222b89fa8 100644
@@ -5357,6 +5357,7 @@ static struct lpfc_nodelist *
 __lpfc_findnode_did(struct lpfc_vport *vport, uint32_t did)
 {
 	struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp;
+	struct lpfc_nodelist *np = NULL;
 	uint32_t data1;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(ndlp, &vport->fc_nodes, nlp_listp) {
@@ -5371,14 +5372,20 @@ __lpfc_findnode_did(struct lpfc_vport *vport, uint32_t did)
 					 ndlp, ndlp->nlp_DID,
 					 ndlp->nlp_flag, data1, ndlp->nlp_rpi,
 					 ndlp->active_rrqs_xri_bitmap);
-			return ndlp;
+
+			/* Check for new or potentially stale node */
+			if (ndlp->nlp_state != NLP_STE_UNUSED_NODE)
+				return ndlp;
+			np = ndlp;
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* FIND node did <did> NOT FOUND */
-	lpfc_printf_vlog(vport, KERN_INFO, LOG_NODE,
-			 "0932 FIND node did x%x NOT FOUND.\n", did);
-	return NULL;
+	if (!np)
+		/* FIND node did <did> NOT FOUND */
+		lpfc_printf_vlog(vport, KERN_INFO, LOG_NODE,
+				 "0932 FIND node did x%x NOT FOUND.\n", did);
+
+	return np;
 }
 
 struct lpfc_nodelist *
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#185 lore raw

PATCH 158/204 scsi: st: Restore some drive settings after reset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kai Mäkisara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7081dc75df79696d8322d01821c28e53416c932c ]

Some of the allowed operations put the tape into a known position to continue operation assuming only the tape position has changed. But reset sets partition, density and block size to drive default values. These should be restored to the values before reset.

Normally the current block size and density are stored by the drive. If the settings have been changed, the changed values have to be saved by the driver across reset.

---
 drivers/scsi/st.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
 drivers/scsi/st.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/st.c +21 -3
index 3f798f87e8d98..d4aef346bfee3 100644
@@ -949,7 +949,6 @@ static void reset_state(struct scsi_tape *STp)
 		STp->partition = find_partition(STp);
 		if (STp->partition < 0)
 			STp->partition = 0;
-		STp->new_partition = STp->partition;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -2921,14 +2920,17 @@ static int st_int_ioctl(struct scsi_tape *STp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned lon
 		if (cmd_in == MTSETDENSITY) {
 			(STp->buffer)->b_data[4] = arg;
 			STp->density_changed = 1;	/* At least we tried ;-) */
+			STp->changed_density = arg;
 		} else if (cmd_in == SET_DENS_AND_BLK)
 			(STp->buffer)->b_data[4] = arg >> 24;
 		else
 			(STp->buffer)->b_data[4] = STp->density;
 		if (cmd_in == MTSETBLK || cmd_in == SET_DENS_AND_BLK) {
 			ltmp = arg & MT_ST_BLKSIZE_MASK;
-			if (cmd_in == MTSETBLK)
+			if (cmd_in == MTSETBLK) {
 				STp->blksize_changed = 1; /* At least we tried ;-) */
+				STp->changed_blksize = arg;
+			}
 		} else
 			ltmp = STp->block_size;
 		(STp->buffer)->b_data[9] = (ltmp >> 16);
@@ -3629,9 +3631,25 @@ static long st_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
 				retval = (-EIO);
 				goto out;
 			}
-			reset_state(STp);
+			reset_state(STp); /* Clears pos_unknown */
 			/* remove this when the midlevel properly clears was_reset */
 			STp->device->was_reset = 0;
+
+			/* Fix the device settings after reset, ignore errors */
+			if (mtc.mt_op == MTREW || mtc.mt_op == MTSEEK ||
+				mtc.mt_op == MTEOM) {
+				if (STp->can_partitions) {
+					/* STp->new_partition contains the
+					 *  latest partition set
+					 */
+					STp->partition = 0;
+					switch_partition(STp);
+				}
+				if (STp->density_changed)
+					st_int_ioctl(STp, MTSETDENSITY, STp->changed_density);
+				if (STp->blksize_changed)
+					st_int_ioctl(STp, MTSETBLK, STp->changed_blksize);
+			}
 		}
 
 		if (mtc.mt_op != MTNOP && mtc.mt_op != MTSETBLK &&
drivers/scsi/st.h +2 -0
index 95d2e7a7988de..c9947abb0a451 100644
@@ -168,12 +168,14 @@ struct scsi_tape {
 	unsigned char compression_changed;
 	unsigned char drv_buffer;
 	unsigned char density;
+	unsigned char changed_density;
 	unsigned char door_locked;
 	unsigned char autorew_dev;   /* auto-rewind device */
 	unsigned char rew_at_close;  /* rewind necessary at close */
 	unsigned char inited;
 	unsigned char cleaning_req;  /* cleaning requested? */
 	int block_size;
+	int changed_blksize;
 	int min_block;
 	int max_block;
 	int recover_count;     /* From tape opening */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 159/204 HID: usbkbd: Fix the bit shift number for LED_KANA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: junan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d73a4bfa2881a6859b384b75a414c33d4898b055 ]

Since "LED_KANA" was defined as "0x04", the shift number should be "4".

---
 drivers/hid/usbhid/usbkbd.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hid/usbhid/usbkbd.c +1 -1
index d5b7a696a68c5..50c5b204bf04c 100644
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int usb_kbd_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type,
 		return -1;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&kbd->leds_lock, flags);
-	kbd->newleds = (!!test_bit(LED_KANA,    dev->led) << 3) | (!!test_bit(LED_COMPOSE, dev->led) << 3) |
+	kbd->newleds = (!!test_bit(LED_KANA,    dev->led) << 4) | (!!test_bit(LED_COMPOSE, dev->led) << 3) |
 		       (!!test_bit(LED_SCROLLL, dev->led) << 2) | (!!test_bit(LED_CAPSL,   dev->led) << 1) |
 		       (!!test_bit(LED_NUML,    dev->led));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 160/204 bpftool: Fix readlink usage in get_fd_type

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0053f7d39d491b6138d7c526876d13885cbb65f1 ]

The readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf)) call reads at most sizeof(buf) bytes and *does not* append null-terminator to buf. With respect to that, fix two pieces in get_fd_type:

1. Change the truncation check to contain sizeof(buf) rather than sizeof(path).
2. Append null-terminator to buf.

Reported by Coverity.

---
 tools/bpf/bpftool/common.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/bpf/bpftool/common.c +2 -1
index a209f53901b8c..91bf7575493b5 100644
@@ -283,10 +283,11 @@ int get_fd_type(int fd)
 		p_err("can't read link type: %s", strerror(errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if (n == sizeof(path)) {
+	if (n == sizeof(buf)) {
 		p_err("can't read link type: path too long!");
 		return -1;
 	}
+	buf[n] = '\0';
 
 	if (strstr(buf, "bpf-map"))
 		return BPF_OBJ_MAP;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 161/204 wifi: rtw88: Dont use static local variable in rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bitterblue Smith <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 00451eb3bec763f708e7e58326468c1e575e5a66 ]

Some users want to plug two identical USB devices at the same time. This static variable could theoretically cause them to use incorrect TX power values.

Move the variable to the caller and pass a pointer to it to rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate().

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw8822b.c | 14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/rtw8822b.c +8 -6
index 63abda3b0ebfc..004a85448ce99 100644
@@ -864,11 +864,11 @@ static void rtw8822b_query_rx_desc(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 *rx_desc,
 }
 
 static void
-rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 path, u8 rs)
+rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 path,
+				    u8 rs, u32 *phy_pwr_idx)
 {
 	struct rtw_hal *hal = &rtwdev->hal;
 	static const u32 offset_txagc[2] = {0x1d00, 0x1d80};
-	static u32 phy_pwr_idx;
 	u8 rate, rate_idx, pwr_index, shift;
 	int j;
 
@@ -876,12 +876,12 @@ rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 path, u8 rs)
 		rate = rtw_rate_section[rs][j];
 		pwr_index = hal->tx_pwr_tbl[path][rate];
 		shift = rate & 0x3;
-		phy_pwr_idx |= ((u32)pwr_index << (shift * 8));
+		*phy_pwr_idx |= ((u32)pwr_index << (shift * 8));
 		if (shift == 0x3) {
 			rate_idx = rate & 0xfc;
 			rtw_write32(rtwdev, offset_txagc[path] + rate_idx,
-				    phy_pwr_idx);
-			phy_pwr_idx = 0;
+				    *phy_pwr_idx);
+			*phy_pwr_idx = 0;
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -889,11 +889,13 @@ rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, u8 path, u8 rs)
 static void rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev)
 {
 	struct rtw_hal *hal = &rtwdev->hal;
+	u32 phy_pwr_idx = 0;
 	int rs, path;
 
 	for (path = 0; path < hal->rf_path_num; path++) {
 		for (rs = 0; rs < RTW_RATE_SECTION_MAX; rs++)
-			rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate(rtwdev, path, rs);
+			rtw8822b_set_tx_power_index_by_rate(rtwdev, path, rs,
+							    &phy_pwr_idx);
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 162/204 regulator: ad5398: Add device tree support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Isaac Scott <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5a6a461079decea452fdcae955bccecf92e07e97 ]

Previously, the ad5398 driver used only platform_data, which is deprecated in favour of device tree. This caused the AD5398 to fail to probe as it could not load its init_data. If the AD5398 has a device tree node, pull the init_data from there using of_get_regulator_init_data.

---
 drivers/regulator/ad5398.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/regulator/ad5398.c +9 -3
index 75f432f61e919..f4d6e62bd963e 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/regulator/driver.h>
 #include <linux/regulator/machine.h>
+#include <linux/regulator/of_regulator.h>
 
 #define AD5398_CURRENT_EN_MASK	0x8000
 
@@ -221,15 +222,20 @@ static int ad5398_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
 	const struct ad5398_current_data_format *df =
 			(struct ad5398_current_data_format *)id->driver_data;
 
-	if (!init_data)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	chip = devm_kzalloc(&client->dev, sizeof(*chip), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!chip)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	config.dev = &client->dev;
+	if (client->dev.of_node)
+		init_data = of_get_regulator_init_data(&client->dev,
+						       client->dev.of_node,
+						       &ad5398_reg);
+	if (!init_data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	config.init_data = init_data;
+	config.of_node = client->dev.of_node;
 	config.driver_data = chip;
 
 	chip->client = client;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 163/204 drm/atomic: clarify the rules around drm_atomic_state->allow_modeset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Simona Vetter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5e3306a424b52e38ad2c28c7f3399fcd03e383d ]

msm is automagically upgrading normal commits to full modesets, and that's a big no-no:

- for one this results in full on->off->on transitions on all these crtc, at least if you're using the usual helpers. Which seems to be the case, and is breaking uapi

- further even if the ctm change itself would not result in flicker, this can hide modesets for other reasons. Which again breaks the uapi

v2: I forgot the case of adding unrelated crtc state. Add that case and link to the existing kerneldoc explainers. This has come up in an irc discussion with Manasi and Ville about intel's bigjoiner mode. Also cc everyone involved in the msm irc discussion, more people joined after I sent out v1.

v3: Wording polish from Pekka and Thomas

---
 include/drm/drm_atomic.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/drm/drm_atomic.h +21 -2
index 927e1205d7aa4..202975db784c6 100644
@@ -323,8 +323,27 @@ struct drm_atomic_state {
 	 *
 	 * Allow full modeset. This is used by the ATOMIC IOCTL handler to
 	 * implement the DRM_MODE_ATOMIC_ALLOW_MODESET flag. Drivers should
-	 * never consult this flag, instead looking at the output of
-	 * drm_atomic_crtc_needs_modeset().
+	 * generally not consult this flag, but instead look at the output of
+	 * drm_atomic_crtc_needs_modeset(). The detailed rules are:
+	 *
+	 * - Drivers must not consult @allow_modeset in the atomic commit path.
+	 *   Use drm_atomic_crtc_needs_modeset() instead.
+	 *
+	 * - Drivers must consult @allow_modeset before adding unrelated struct
+	 *   drm_crtc_state to this commit by calling
+	 *   drm_atomic_get_crtc_state(). See also the warning in the
+	 *   documentation for that function.
+	 *
+	 * - Drivers must never change this flag, it is under the exclusive
+	 *   control of userspace.
+	 *
+	 * - Drivers may consult @allow_modeset in the atomic check path, if
+	 *   they have the choice between an optimal hardware configuration
+	 *   which requires a modeset, and a less optimal configuration which
+	 *   can be committed without a modeset. An example would be suboptimal
+	 *   scanout FIFO allocation resulting in increased idle power
+	 *   consumption. This allows userspace to avoid flickering and delays
+	 *   for the normal composition loop at reasonable cost.
 	 */
 	bool allow_modeset : 1;
 	bool legacy_cursor_update : 1;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 164/204 drm: Add valid clones check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jessica Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 41b4b11da02157c7474caf41d56baae0e941d01a ]

Check that all encoders attached to a given CRTC are valid possible_clones of each other.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c +28 -0
index 70d97a7fc6864..678dba387d838 100644
@@ -561,6 +561,30 @@ mode_valid(struct drm_atomic_state *state)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int drm_atomic_check_valid_clones(struct drm_atomic_state *state,
+					 struct drm_crtc *crtc)
+{
+	struct drm_encoder *drm_enc;
+	struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state = drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state(state,
+									  crtc);
+
+	drm_for_each_encoder_mask(drm_enc, crtc->dev, crtc_state->encoder_mask) {
+		if (!drm_enc->possible_clones) {
+			DRM_DEBUG("enc%d possible_clones is 0\n", drm_enc->base.id);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if ((crtc_state->encoder_mask & drm_enc->possible_clones) !=
+		    crtc_state->encoder_mask) {
+			DRM_DEBUG("crtc%d failed valid clone check for mask 0x%x\n",
+				  crtc->base.id, crtc_state->encoder_mask);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset - validate state object for modeset changes
  * @dev: DRM device
@@ -724,6 +748,10 @@ drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset(struct drm_device *dev,
 		ret = drm_atomic_add_affected_planes(state, crtc);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			return ret;
+
+		ret = drm_atomic_check_valid_clones(state, crtc);
+		if (ret != 0)
+			return ret;
 	}
 
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 165/204 pinctrl: meson: define the pull up/down resistor value as 60 kOhm

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martin Blumenstingl <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e56088a13708757da68ad035269d69b93ac8c389 ]

The public datasheets of the following Amlogic SoCs describe a typical resistor value for the built-in pull up/down resistor:
- Meson8/8b/8m2: not documented
- GXBB (S905): 60 kOhm
- GXL (S905X): 60 kOhm
- GXM (S912): 60 kOhm
- G12B (S922X): 60 kOhm
- SM1 (S905D3): 60 kOhm

The public G12B and SM1 datasheets additionally state min and max values:
- min value: 50 kOhm for both, pull-up and pull-down
- max value for the pull-up: 70 kOhm
- max value for the pull-down: 130 kOhm

Use 60 kOhm in the pinctrl-meson driver as well so it's shown in the debugfs output. It may not be accurate for Meson8/8b/8m2 but in reality 60 kOhm is closer to the actual value than 1 Ohm.

---
 drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson.c +1 -1
index aba479a1150c8..f3b381370e5ed 100644
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static int meson_pinconf_get(struct pinctrl_dev *pcdev, unsigned int pin,
 	case PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_PULL_DOWN:
 	case PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_PULL_UP:
 		if (meson_pinconf_get_pull(pc, pin) == param)
-			arg = 1;
+			arg = 60000;
 		else
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 166/204 ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Add DMI quirk for Acer Aspire SW3-013

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a549b927ea3f5e50b1394209b64e6e17e31d4db8 ]

Acer Aspire SW3-013 requires the very same quirk as other Acer Aspire model for making it working.

---
 sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c +13 -0
index 104cfb56d225f..5a8e86ba29004 100644
@@ -428,6 +428,19 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id byt_rt5640_quirk_table[] = {
 					BYT_RT5640_SSP0_AIF2 |
 					BYT_RT5640_MCLK_EN),
 	},
+	{       /* Acer Aspire SW3-013 */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Acer"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Aspire SW3-013"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = (void *)(BYT_RT5640_DMIC1_MAP |
+					BYT_RT5640_JD_SRC_JD2_IN4N |
+					BYT_RT5640_OVCD_TH_2000UA |
+					BYT_RT5640_OVCD_SF_0P75 |
+					BYT_RT5640_DIFF_MIC |
+					BYT_RT5640_SSP0_AIF1 |
+					BYT_RT5640_MCLK_EN),
+	},
 	{
 		.matches = {
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Acer"),
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 167/204 nvmet-tcp: dont restore null sk_state_change

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alistair Francis <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 46d22b47df2741996af277a2838b95f130436c13 ]

queue->state_change is set as part of nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock(), but if the TCP connection isn't established when nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock() is called then queue->state_change isn't set and sock->sk->sk_state_change isn't replaced.

As such we don't need to restore sock->sk->sk_state_change if queue->state_change is NULL.

This avoids NULL pointer dereferences such as this:

[  286.462026][    C0] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[  286.462814][    C0] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[  286.463796][    C0] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[  286.464392][    C0] PGD 8000000140620067 P4D 8000000140620067 PUD 114201067 PMD 0
[  286.465086][    C0] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  286.465559][    C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1628 Comm: nvme Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2+ #11 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  286.466393][    C0] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
[  286.467147][    C0] RIP: 0010:0x0
[  286.467420][    C0] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[  286.467977][    C0] RSP: 0018:ffff8883ae008580 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  286.468425][    C0] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88813fd34100 RCX: ffffffffa386cc43
[  286.469019][    C0] RDX: 1ffff11027fa68b6 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88813fd34100
[  286.469545][    C0] RBP: ffff88813fd34160 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1027fa682c
[  286.470072][    C0] R10: ffff88813fd34167 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813fd344c3
[  286.470585][    C0] R13: ffff88813fd34112 R14: ffff88813fd34aec R15: ffff888132cdd268
[  286.471070][    C0] FS:  00007fe3c04c7d80(0000) GS:ffff88840743f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  286.471644][    C0] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  286.472543][    C0] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000012daca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  286.473500][    C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  286.474467][    C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  286.475453][    C0] Call Trace:
[  286.476102][    C0]  <IRQ>
[  286.476719][    C0]  tcp_fin+0x2bb/0x440
[  286.477429][    C0]  tcp_data_queue+0x190f/0x4e60
[  286.478174][    C0]  ? __build_skb_around+0x234/0x330
[  286.478940][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.479659][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_data_queue+0x10/0x10
[  286.480431][    C0]  ? tcp_try_undo_loss+0x640/0x6c0
[  286.481196][    C0]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[  286.482046][    C0]  ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30
[  286.482769][    C0]  ? ktime_get+0x66/0x150
[  286.483433][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.484146][    C0]  tcp_rcv_established+0x6e4/0x2050
[  286.484857][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.485523][    C0]  ? ipv4_dst_check+0x160/0x2b0
[  286.486203][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_rcv_established+0x10/0x10
[  286.486917][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.487595][    C0]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x4d6/0x9b0
[  286.488279][    C0]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x2af8/0x3e30
[  286.488904][    C0]  ? raw_local_deliver+0x51b/0xad0
[  286.489551][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.490198][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_v4_rcv+0x10/0x10
[  286.490813][    C0]  ? __pfx_raw_local_deliver+0x10/0x10
[  286.491487][    C0]  ? __pfx_nf_confirm+0x10/0x10 [nf_conntrack]
[  286.492275][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.492900][    C0]  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x8f/0x370
[  286.493579][    C0]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x297/0x420
[  286.494268][    C0]  ip_local_deliver+0x168/0x430
[  286.494867][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver+0x10/0x10
[  286.495498][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[  286.496204][    C0]  ? ip_rcv_finish_core+0x19a/0x1f20
[  286.496806][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.497414][    C0]  ip_rcv+0x455/0x6e0
[  286.497945][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[  286.498550][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.499137][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10
[  286.499763][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.500327][    C0]  ? dl_scaled_delta_exec+0xd1/0x2c0
[  286.500922][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[  286.501480][    C0]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0
[  286.502173][    C0]  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
[  286.502903][    C0]  ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310
[  286.503487][    C0]  ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350
[  286.504087][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.504642][    C0]  process_backlog+0x3b9/0x1350
[  286.505214][    C0]  ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350
[  286.505779][    C0]  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa6/0x490
[  286.506363][    C0]  net_rx_action+0x92e/0xe10
[  286.506889][    C0]  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
[  286.507437][    C0]  ? timerqueue_add+0x1f0/0x320
[  286.507977][    C0]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x68/0x540
[  286.508492][    C0]  ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310
[  286.509043][    C0]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
[  286.509607][    C0]  ? handle_softirqs+0x1aa/0x7d0
[  286.510187][    C0]  handle_softirqs+0x1f2/0x7d0
[  286.510754][    C0]  ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10
[  286.511348][    C0]  ? irqtime_account_irq+0x181/0x290
[  286.511937][    C0]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450
[  286.512510][    C0]  do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0
[  286.513100][    C0]  </IRQ>
[  286.513548][    C0]  <TASK>
[  286.513953][    C0]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x112/0x140
[  286.514522][    C0]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450
[  286.515072][    C0]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x872/0x3450
[  286.515619][    C0]  ? nft_do_chain+0xe16/0x15b0 [nf_tables]
[  286.516252][    C0]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
[  286.516817][    C0]  ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x43c/0xc50
[  286.517433][    C0]  ? __pfx_selinux_ip_postroute+0x10/0x10
[  286.518061][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.518606][    C0]  ? ip_output+0x164/0x4a0
[  286.519149][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.519671][    C0]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x17d5/0x1fb0
[  286.520258][    C0]  ip_finish_output2+0xb4b/0x1fb0
[  286.520787][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
[  286.521355][    C0]  ? __ip_finish_output+0x15d/0x750
[  286.521890][    C0]  ip_output+0x164/0x4a0
[  286.522372][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10
[  286.522872][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.523402][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60
[  286.524031][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10
[  286.524605][    C0]  ? __ip_queue_xmit+0x999/0x2260
[  286.525200][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.525744][    C0]  ? ipv4_dst_check+0x16a/0x2b0
[  286.526279][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.526793][    C0]  __ip_queue_xmit+0x1883/0x2260
[  286.527324][    C0]  ? __skb_clone+0x54c/0x730
[  286.527827][    C0]  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x209b/0x37a0
[  286.528374][    C0]  ? __pfx___tcp_transmit_skb+0x10/0x10
[  286.528952][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.529472][    C0]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[  286.530152][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120
[  286.530691][    C0]  tcp_write_xmit+0xb81/0x88b0
[  286.531224][    C0]  ? mod_memcg_state+0x4d/0x60
[  286.531736][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.532253][    C0]  __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x90/0x320
[  286.532826][    C0]  tcp_send_fin+0x141/0xb50
[  286.533352][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_send_fin+0x10/0x10
[  286.533908][    C0]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xab/0x140
[  286.534495][    C0]  inet_shutdown+0x243/0x320
[  286.535077][    C0]  nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0xb3b/0x2590 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.535709][    C0]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260
[  286.536314][    C0]  ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.536996][    C0]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x1e0
[  286.537550][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
[  286.538127][    C0]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260
[  286.538664][    C0]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  286.539249][    C0]  ? nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.539892][    C0]  ? __wake_up+0x40/0x60
[  286.540392][    C0]  nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.541047][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.541589][    C0]  nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x8b/0x7a0 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.542254][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60
[  286.542887][    C0]  ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.543568][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120
[  286.544166][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60
[  286.544792][    C0]  ? nvme_change_ctrl_state+0x196/0x2e0 [nvme_core]
[  286.545477][    C0]  nvme_tcp_create_ctrl+0x839/0xb90 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.546126][    C0]  nvmf_dev_write+0x3db/0x7e0 [nvme_fabrics]
[  286.546775][    C0]  ? rw_verify_area+0x69/0x520
[  286.547334][    C0]  vfs_write+0x218/0xe90
[  286.547854][    C0]  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190
[  286.548408][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.549037][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280
[  286.549659][    C0]  ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
[  286.550259][    C0]  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190
[  286.550840][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x8e/0x280
[  286.551516][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.552180][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280
[  286.552834][    C0]  ? ksys_read+0xf5/0x1c0
[  286.553386][    C0]  ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[  286.553964][    C0]  ksys_write+0xf5/0x1c0
[  286.554499][    C0]  ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
[  286.555072][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.555698][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280
[  286.556319][    C0]  ? do_syscall_64+0x54/0x190
[  286.556866][    C0]  do_syscall_64+0x93/0x190
[  286.557420][    C0]  ? rcu_read_unlock+0x17/0x60
[  286.557986][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.558526][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.559087][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.559659][    C0]  ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x4a/0x60
[  286.560476][    C0]  ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110
[  286.561064][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.561647][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.562257][    C0]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x171/0xa00
[  286.562839][    C0]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a2/0xa00
[  286.563453][    C0]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270
[  286.564112][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.564677][    C0]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270
[  286.565317][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.565922][    C0]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  286.566542][    C0] RIP: 0033:0x7fe3c05e6504
[  286.567102][    C0] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 8b 10 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
[  286.568931][    C0] RSP: 002b:00007fff76444f58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  286.569807][    C0] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b40d930 RCX: 00007fe3c05e6504
[  286.570621][    C0] RDX: 00000000000000cf RSI: 000000003b40d930 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  286.571443][    C0] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00000000000000cf R09: 000000003b40d930
[  286.572246][    C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000003b40cd60
[  286.573069][    C0] R13: 00000000000000cf R14: 00007fe3c07417f8 R15: 00007fe3c073502e
[  286.573886][    C0]  </TASK>
---
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c +3 -0
index 11c8506e04ca3..bac81baa49c13 100644
@@ -1338,6 +1338,9 @@ static void nvmet_tcp_restore_socket_callbacks(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
 {
 	struct socket *sock = queue->sock;
 
+	if (!queue->state_change)
+		return;
+
 	write_lock_bh(&sock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
 	sock->sk->sk_data_ready =  queue->data_ready;
 	sock->sk->sk_state_change = queue->state_change;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 168/204 btrfs: correct the order of prelim_ref arguments in btrfs__prelim_ref

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Goldwyn Rodrigues <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc7e0975093567f51be8e1bdf4aa5900a3cf0b1e ]

btrfs_prelim_ref() calls the old and new reference variables in the incorrect order. This causes a NULL pointer dereference because oldref is passed as NULL to trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert().

Note, trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert() is being called with newref as oldref (and oldref as NULL) on purpose in order to print out the values of newref.

To reproduce:
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/btrfs/btrfs_prelim_ref_insert/enable

Perform some writeback operations.

Backtrace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 115949067 P4D 115949067 PUD 11594a067 PMD 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1188 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-tester+ #47 PREEMPT(voluntary)  7ca2cef72d5e9c600f0c7718adb6462de8149622
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-2-gc13ff2cd-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_btrfs__prelim_ref+0x72/0x130
 Code: e8 43 81 9f ff 48 85 c0 74 78 4d 85 e4 0f 84 8f 00 00 00 49 8b 94 24 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 0a 48 89 48 08 48 8b 52 08 48 89 50 10 <49> 8b 55 18 48 89 50 18 49 8b 55 20 48 89 50 20 41 0f b6 55 28 88
 RSP: 0018:ffffce44820077a0 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: ffff8c6b403f9014 RBX: ffff8c6b55825730 RCX: 304994edf9cf506b
 RDX: d8b11eb7f0fdb699 RSI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RDI: ffff8c6b403f9010
 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8c6b4e8fb000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffce44820077a8 R15: ffff8c6b4abd1540
 FS:  00007f4dc6813740(0000) GS:ffff8c6c1d378000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000010eb42000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  prelim_ref_insert+0x1c1/0x270
  find_parent_nodes+0x12a6/0x1ee0
  ? __entry_text_end+0x101f06/0x101f09
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  btrfs_is_data_extent_shared+0x167/0x640
  ? fiemap_process_hole+0xd0/0x2c0
  extent_fiemap+0xa5c/0xbc0
  ? __entry_text_end+0x101f05/0x101f09
  btrfs_fiemap+0x7e/0xd0
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x425/0x9d0
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x75/0xc0
---
 include/trace/events/btrfs.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/trace/events/btrfs.h +1 -1
index 94a3adb65b8af..fe4d7e165050b 100644
@@ -1773,7 +1773,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(btrfs__prelim_ref,
 	TP_PROTO(const struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 		 const struct prelim_ref *oldref,
 		 const struct prelim_ref *newref, u64 tree_size),
-	TP_ARGS(fs_info, newref, oldref, tree_size),
+	TP_ARGS(fs_info, oldref, newref, tree_size),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry_btrfs(
 		__field(	u64,  root_id		)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 169/204 xenbus: Allow PVH dom0 a non-local xenstore

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 90989869baae47ee2aa3bcb6f6eb9fbbe4287958 ]

Make xenbus_init() allow a non-local xenstore for a PVH dom0 - it is currently forced to XS_LOCAL. With Hyperlaunch booting dom0 and a xenstore stubdom, dom0 can be handled as a regular XS_HVM following the late init path.

Ideally we'd drop the use of xen_initial_domain() and just check for the event channel instead. However, ARM has a xen,enhanced no-xenstore mode, where the event channel and PFN would both be 0. Retain the xen_initial_domain() check, and use that for an additional check when the event channel is 0.

Check the full 64bit HVM_PARAM_STORE_EVTCHN value to catch the off chance that high bits are set for the 32bit event channel.

Change-Id I5506da42e4c6b8e85079fefb2f193c8de17c7437

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c | 14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c +8 -6
index fd686b962727a..17705f82f85fd 100644
@@ -881,9 +881,15 @@ static int __init xenbus_init(void)
 	if (xen_pv_domain())
 		xen_store_domain_type = XS_PV;
 	if (xen_hvm_domain())
+	{
 		xen_store_domain_type = XS_HVM;
-	if (xen_hvm_domain() && xen_initial_domain())
-		xen_store_domain_type = XS_LOCAL;
+		err = hvm_get_parameter(HVM_PARAM_STORE_EVTCHN, &v);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_error;
+		xen_store_evtchn = (int)v;
+		if (!v && xen_initial_domain())
+			xen_store_domain_type = XS_LOCAL;
+	}
 	if (xen_pv_domain() && !xen_start_info->store_evtchn)
 		xen_store_domain_type = XS_LOCAL;
 	if (xen_pv_domain() && xen_start_info->store_evtchn)
@@ -902,10 +908,6 @@ static int __init xenbus_init(void)
 		xen_store_interface = gfn_to_virt(xen_store_gfn);
 		break;
 	case XS_HVM:
-		err = hvm_get_parameter(HVM_PARAM_STORE_EVTCHN, &v);
-		if (err)
-			goto out_error;
-		xen_store_evtchn = (int)v;
 		err = hvm_get_parameter(HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN, &v);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_error;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 170/204 __legitimize_mnt(): check for MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT should be under mount_lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 250cf3693060a5f803c5f1ddc082bb06b16112a9 ]

... or we risk stealing final mntput from sync umount - raising mnt_count after umount(2) has verified that victim is not busy, but before it has set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT; in that case __legitimize_mnt() doesn't see that it's safe to quietly undo mnt_count increment and leaves dropping the reference to caller, where it'll be a full-blown mntput().

Check under mount_lock is needed; leaving the current one done before taking that makes no sense - it's nowhere near common enough to bother with.

---
 fs/namespace.c | 6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +1 -5
index 809ec3acb147c..a5cb608778b1e 100644
@@ -572,12 +572,8 @@ int __legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *bastard, unsigned seq)
 	smp_mb();		// see mntput_no_expire() and do_umount()
 	if (likely(!read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq)))
 		return 0;
-	if (bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT) {
-		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
-		return 1;
-	}
 	lock_mount_hash();
-	if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_DOOMED)) {
+	if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & (MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT | MNT_DOOMED))) {
 		mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
 		unlock_mount_hash();
 		return 1;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 171/204 xfrm: Sanitize marks before insert

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Chaignon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0b91fda3a1f044141e1e615456ff62508c32b202 ]

Prior to this patch, the mark is sanitized (applying the state's mask to the state's value) only on inserts when checking if a conflicting XFRM state or policy exists.

We discovered in Cilium that this same sanitization does not occur in the hot-path __xfrm_state_lookup. In the hot-path, the sk_buff's mark is simply compared to the state's value:

    if ((mark & x->mark.m) != x->mark.v)
        continue;

Therefore, users can define unsanitized marks (ex. 0xf42/0xf00) which will never match any packet.

This commit updates __xfrm_state_insert and xfrm_policy_insert to store the sanitized marks, thus removing this footgun.

This has the side effect of changing the ip output, as the returned mark will have the mask applied to it when printed.

Fixes 3d6acfa7641f ("xfrm: SA lookups with mark")
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 3 +++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +3 -0
index bffac2f4b581d..78f69ee65d0ea 100644
@@ -1571,6 +1571,9 @@ int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl)
 	struct xfrm_policy *delpol;
 	struct hlist_head *chain;
 
+	/* Sanitize mark before store */
+	policy->mark.v &= policy->mark.m;
+
 	spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
 	chain = policy_hash_bysel(net, &policy->selector, policy->family, dir);
 	if (chain)
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +3 -0
index e8be18bff0960..7380aa3a5f0fe 100644
@@ -1244,6 +1244,9 @@ static void __xfrm_state_insert(struct xfrm_state *x)
 
 	list_add(&x->km.all, &net->xfrm.state_all);
 
+	/* Sanitize mark before store */
+	x->mark.v &= x->mark.m;
+
 	h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, &x->props.saddr,
 			  x->props.reqid, x->props.family);
 	hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->bydst, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 172/204 bridge: netfilter: Fix forwarding of fragmented packets

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 91b6dbced0ef1d680afdd69b14fc83d50ebafaf3 ]

When netfilter defrag hooks are loaded (due to the presence of conntrack rules, for example), fragmented packets entering the bridge will be defragged by the bridge's pre-routing hook (br_nf_pre_routing() -> ipv4_conntrack_defrag()).

Later on, in the bridge's post-routing hook, the defragged packet will be fragmented again. If the size of the largest fragment is larger than what the kernel has determined as the destination MTU (using ip_skb_dst_mtu()), the defragged packet will be dropped.

Before commit ac6627a28dbf ("net: ipv4: Consolidate ipv4_mtu and ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), ip_skb_dst_mtu() would return dst_mtu() as the destination MTU. Assuming the dst entry attached to the packet is the bridge's fake rtable one, this would simply be the bridge's MTU (see fake_mtu()).

However, after above mentioned commit, ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up returning the route's MTU stored in the dst entry's metrics. Ideally, in case the dst entry is the bridge's fake rtable one, this should be the bridge's MTU as the bridge takes care of updating this metric when its MTU changes (see br_change_mtu()).

Unfortunately, the last operation is a no-op given the metrics attached to the fake rtable entry are marked as read-only. Therefore, ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up returning 1500 (the initial MTU value) and defragged packets are dropped during fragmentation when dealing with large fragments and high MTU (e.g., 9k).

Fix by moving the fake rtable entry's metrics to be per-bridge (in a similar fashion to the fake rtable entry itself) and marking them as writable, thereby allowing MTU changes to be reflected.

---
 net/bridge/br_nf_core.c | 7 ++-----
 net/bridge/br_private.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_nf_core.c +2 -5
index 8c69f0c95a8ed..b8c8deb87407d 100644
@@ -65,17 +65,14 @@ static struct dst_ops fake_dst_ops = {
  * ipt_REJECT needs it.  Future netfilter modules might
  * require us to fill additional fields.
  */
-static const u32 br_dst_default_metrics[RTAX_MAX] = {
-	[RTAX_MTU - 1] = 1500,
-};
-
 void br_netfilter_rtable_init(struct net_bridge *br)
 {
 	struct rtable *rt = &br->fake_rtable;
 
 	atomic_set(&rt->dst.__refcnt, 1);
 	rt->dst.dev = br->dev;
-	dst_init_metrics(&rt->dst, br_dst_default_metrics, true);
+	dst_init_metrics(&rt->dst, br->metrics, false);
+	dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_MTU, br->dev->mtu);
 	rt->dst.flags	= DST_NOXFRM | DST_FAKE_RTABLE;
 	rt->dst.ops = &fake_dst_ops;
 }
net/bridge/br_private.h +1 -0
index 5ba4620727a7e..eb0b1b513feb3 100644
@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ struct net_bridge {
 		struct rtable		fake_rtable;
 		struct rt6_info		fake_rt6_info;
 	};
+	u32				metrics[RTAX_MAX];
 #endif
 	u16				group_fwd_mask;
 	u16				group_fwd_mask_required;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 173/204 net: dwmac-sun8i: Use parsed internal PHY address instead of 1

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Kocialkowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 47653e4243f2b0a26372e481ca098936b51ec3a8 ]

While the MDIO address of the internal PHY on Allwinner sun8i chips is generally 1, of_mdio_parse_addr is used to cleanly parse the address from the device-tree instead of hardcoding it.

A commit reworking the code ditched the parsed value and hardcoded the value 1 instead, which didn't really break anything but is more fragile and not future-proof.

Restore the initial behavior using the parsed address returned from the helper.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-sun8i.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-sun8i.c +1 -1
index 497ce6e6b16ff..99387e39c04ea 100644
@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ static int sun8i_dwmac_set_syscon(struct stmmac_priv *priv)
 		/* of_mdio_parse_addr returns a valid (0 ~ 31) PHY
 		 * address. No need to mask it again.
 		 */
-		reg |= 1 << H3_EPHY_ADDR_SHIFT;
+		reg |= ret << H3_EPHY_ADDR_SHIFT;
 	} else {
 		/* For SoCs without internal PHY the PHY selection bit should be
 		 * set to 0 (external PHY).
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#201 lore raw

PATCH 174/204 sch_hfsc: Fix qlen accounting bug when using peek in hfsc_enqueue()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3f981138109f63232a5fb7165938d4c945cc1b9d ]

When enqueuing the first packet to an HFSC class, hfsc_enqueue() calls the child qdisc's peek() operation before incrementing sch->q.qlen and sch->qstats.backlog. If the child qdisc uses qdisc_peek_dequeued(), this may trigger an immediate dequeue and potential packet drop. In such cases, qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is called, but the HFSC qdisc's qlen and backlog have not yet been updated, leading to inconsistent queue accounting. This can leave an empty HFSC class in the active list, causing further consequences like use-after-free.

This patch fixes the bug by moving the increment of sch->q.qlen and sch->qstats.backlog before the call to the child qdisc's peek() operation. This ensures that queue length and backlog are always accurate when packet drops or dequeues are triggered during the peek.

Fixes 12d0ad3be9c3 ("net/sched/sch_hfsc.c: handle corner cases where head may change invalidating calculated deadline")
---
 net/sched/sch_hfsc.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_hfsc.c +3 -3
index 5d73d02b8dce7..66c33d7e243d5 100644
@@ -1573,6 +1573,9 @@ hfsc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff **to_free)
 		return err;
 	}
 
+	sch->qstats.backlog += len;
+	sch->q.qlen++;
+
 	if (first && !cl->cl_nactive) {
 		if (cl->cl_flags & HFSC_RSC)
 			init_ed(cl, len);
@@ -1588,9 +1591,6 @@ hfsc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff **to_free)
 
 	}
 
-	sch->qstats.backlog += len;
-	sch->q.qlen++;
-
 	return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#202 lore raw

PATCH 175/204 crypto: algif_hash - fix double free in hash_accept

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ivan Pravdin <[email protected]>

commit b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6 upstream.

If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails, sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release, leading to slab-use-after-free error.

Fixes fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations")
---
 crypto/algif_hash.c |    4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
crypto/algif_hash.c +0 -4
@@ -262,10 +262,6 @@ static int hash_accept(struct socket *so
 		return err;
 
 	err = crypto_ahash_import(&ctx2->req, state);
-	if (err) {
-		sock_orphan(sk2);
-		sock_put(sk2);
-	}
 
 	return err;
 }
author maintainer
#203 lore raw

PATCH 176/204 can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>

commit c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 upstream.

The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero.

Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe' can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx(). Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh.

At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts too.

---
 net/can/bcm.c |   66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
net/can/bcm.c +45 -21
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <linux/can/skb.h>
 #include <linux/can/bcm.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 
@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ struct bcm_op {
 	struct canfd_frame last_sframe;
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct net_device *rx_reg_dev;
+	spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */
 };
 
 struct bcm_sock {
@@ -275,13 +277,18 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct net_device *dev;
-	struct canfd_frame *cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe;
+	struct canfd_frame *cf;
 	int err;
 
 	/* no target device? => exit */
 	if (!op->ifindex)
 		return;
 
+	/* read currframe under lock protection */
+	spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+	cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+
 	dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk), op->ifindex);
 	if (!dev) {
 		/* RFC: should this bcm_op remove itself here? */
@@ -302,6 +309,10 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op
 	skb->dev = dev;
 	can_skb_set_owner(skb, op->sk);
 	err = can_send(skb, 1);
+
+	/* update currframe and count under lock protection */
+	spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+
 	if (!err)
 		op->frames_abs++;
 
@@ -310,6 +321,11 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op
 	/* reached last frame? */
 	if (op->currframe >= op->nframes)
 		op->currframe = 0;
+
+	if (op->count > 0)
+		op->count--;
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
 out:
 	dev_put(dev);
 }
@@ -406,7 +422,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeo
 	struct bcm_msg_head msg_head;
 
 	if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) {
-		op->count--;
+		bcm_can_tx(op);
 		if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) {
 
 			/* create notification to user */
@@ -421,7 +437,6 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeo
 
 			bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0);
 		}
-		bcm_can_tx(op);
 
 	} else if (op->kt_ival2) {
 		bcm_can_tx(op);
@@ -911,6 +926,27 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 		}
 		op->flags = msg_head->flags;
 
+		/* only lock for unlikely count/nframes/currframe changes */
+		if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
+		    op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX ||
+		    op->flags & SETTIMER) {
+
+			spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+
+			if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
+			    op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
+				/* potentially update changed nframes */
+				op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
+				/* restart multiple frame transmission */
+				op->currframe = 0;
+			}
+
+			if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
+				op->count = msg_head->count;
+
+			spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+		}
+
 	} else {
 		/* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */
 
@@ -918,9 +954,14 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 		if (!op)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
+		spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
 		op->can_id = msg_head->can_id;
 		op->cfsiz = CFSIZ(msg_head->flags);
 		op->flags = msg_head->flags;
+		op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
+
+		if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
+			op->count = msg_head->count;
 
 		/* create array for CAN frames and copy the data */
 		if (msg_head->nframes > 1) {
@@ -979,22 +1020,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 
 	} /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */
 
-	if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes) {
-		op->nframes   = msg_head->nframes;
-		/* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */
-		op->currframe = 0;
-	}
-
-	/* check flags */
-
-	if (op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
-		/* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */
-		op->currframe = 0;
-	}
-
 	if (op->flags & SETTIMER) {
 		/* set timer values */
-		op->count = msg_head->count;
 		op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1;
 		op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2;
 		op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1);
@@ -1011,11 +1038,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 		op->flags |= TX_ANNOUNCE;
 	}
 
-	if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) {
+	if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE)
 		bcm_can_tx(op);
-		if (op->count)
-			op->count--;
-	}
 
 	if (op->flags & STARTTIMER)
 		bcm_tx_start_timer(op);
author maintainer
#204 lore raw

PATCH 177/204 can: bcm: add missing rcu read protection for procfs content

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>

commit dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb upstream.

When the procfs content is generated for a bcm_op which is in the process to be removed the procfs output might show unreliable data (UAF).

As the removal of bcm_op's is already implemented with rcu handling this patch adds the missing rcu_read_lock() and makes sure the list entries are properly removed under rcu protection.

---
 net/can/bcm.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/can/bcm.c +9 -4
@@ -209,7 +209,9 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file
 	seq_printf(m, " / bound %s", bcm_proc_getifname(net, ifname, bo->ifindex));
 	seq_printf(m, " <<<\n");
 
-	list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
 
 		unsigned long reduction;
 
@@ -265,6 +267,9 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file
 		seq_printf(m, "# sent %ld\n", op->frames_abs);
 	}
 	seq_putc(m, '\n');
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
@@ -813,7 +818,7 @@ static int bcm_delete_rx_op(struct list_
 						  REGMASK(op->can_id),
 						  bcm_rx_handler, op);
 
-			list_del(&op->list);
+			list_del_rcu(&op->list);
 			bcm_remove_op(op);
 			return 1; /* done */
 		}
@@ -833,7 +838,7 @@ static int bcm_delete_tx_op(struct list_
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(op, n, ops, list) {
 		if ((op->can_id == mh->can_id) && (op->ifindex == ifindex) &&
 		    (op->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) == (mh->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME)) {
-			list_del(&op->list);
+			list_del_rcu(&op->list);
 			bcm_remove_op(op);
 			return 1; /* done */
 		}
@@ -1255,7 +1260,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 					      bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk);
 		if (err) {
 			/* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
-			list_del(&op->list);
+			list_del_rcu(&op->list);
 			bcm_remove_op(op);
 			return err;
 		}
author maintainer
#205 lore raw

PATCH 178/204 ALSA: pcm: Fix race of buffer access at PCM OSS layer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 93a81ca0657758b607c3f4ba889ae806be9beb73 upstream.

The PCM OSS layer tries to clear the buffer with the silence data at initialization (or reconfiguration) of a stream with the explicit call of snd_pcm_format_set_silence() with runtime->dma_area. But this may lead to a UAF because the accessed runtime->dma_area might be freed concurrently, as it's performed outside the PCM ops.

For avoiding it, move the code into the PCM core and perform it inside the buffer access lock, so that it won't be changed during the operation.

---
 include/sound/pcm.h      |    2 ++
 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c |    3 +--
 sound/core/pcm_native.c  |   11 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/sound/pcm.h +2 -0
@@ -1319,6 +1319,8 @@ int snd_pcm_lib_mmap_iomem(struct snd_pc
 #define snd_pcm_lib_mmap_iomem	NULL
 #endif
 
+void snd_pcm_runtime_buffer_set_silence(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime);
+
 /**
  * snd_pcm_limit_isa_dma_size - Get the max size fitting with ISA DMA transfer
  * @dma: DMA number
sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c +1 -2
@@ -1081,8 +1081,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params_loc
 	runtime->oss.params = 0;
 	runtime->oss.prepare = 1;
 	runtime->oss.buffer_used = 0;
-	if (runtime->dma_area)
-		snd_pcm_format_set_silence(runtime->format, runtime->dma_area, bytes_to_samples(runtime, runtime->dma_bytes));
+	snd_pcm_runtime_buffer_set_silence(runtime);
 
 	runtime->oss.period_frames = snd_pcm_alsa_frames(substream, oss_period_size);
 
sound/core/pcm_native.c +11 -0
@@ -648,6 +648,17 @@ static void snd_pcm_buffer_access_unlock
 	atomic_inc(&runtime->buffer_accessing);
 }
 
+/* fill the PCM buffer with the current silence format; called from pcm_oss.c */
+void snd_pcm_runtime_buffer_set_silence(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime)
+{
+	snd_pcm_buffer_access_lock(runtime);
+	if (runtime->dma_area)
+		snd_pcm_format_set_silence(runtime->format, runtime->dma_area,
+					   bytes_to_samples(runtime, runtime->dma_bytes));
+	snd_pcm_buffer_access_unlock(runtime);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_pcm_runtime_buffer_set_silence);
+
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS)
 #define is_oss_stream(substream)	((substream)->oss.oss)
 #else
author maintainer
#206 lore raw

PATCH 179/204 llc: fix data loss when reading from a socket in llc_ui_recvmsg()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilia Gavrilov <[email protected]>

commit 239af1970bcb039a1551d2c438d113df0010c149 upstream.

For SOCK_STREAM sockets, if user buffer size (len) is less than skb size (skb->len), the remaining data from skb will be lost after calling kfree_skb().

To fix this, move the statement for partial reading above skb deletion.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org)

Fixes 30a584d944fb ("[LLX]: SOCK_DGRAM interface fixes")
---
 net/llc/af_llc.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/llc/af_llc.c +4 -4
@@ -885,15 +885,15 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket
 		if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
 			goto copy_uaddr;
 
+		/* Partial read */
+		if (used + offset < skb_len)
+			continue;
+
 		if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
 			skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 			*seq = 0;
 		}
-
-		/* Partial read */
-		if (used + offset < skb_len)
-			continue;
 	} while (len > 0);
 
 out:
author maintainer
#207 lore raw

PATCH 180/204 drm/edid: fixed the bug that hdr metadata was not reset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: feijuan.li <[email protected]>

commit 6692dbc15e5ed40a3aa037aced65d7b8826c58cd upstream.

When DP connected to a device with HDR capability, the hdr structure was filled.Then connected to another sink device without hdr capability, but the hdr info still exist.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c +1 -0
@@ -4629,6 +4629,7 @@ drm_reset_display_info(struct drm_connec
 	info->has_hdmi_infoframe = false;
 	info->rgb_quant_range_selectable = false;
 	memset(&info->hdmi, 0, sizeof(info->hdmi));
+	memset(&connector->hdr_sink_metadata, 0, sizeof(connector->hdr_sink_metadata));
 
 	info->non_desktop = 0;
 }
author maintainer
#208 lore raw

PATCH 181/204 memcg: always call cond_resched() after fn()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

commit 06717a7b6c86514dbd6ab322e8083ffaa4db5712 upstream.

I am seeing soft lockup on certain machine types when a cgroup OOMs. This is happening because killing the process in certain machine might be very slow, which causes the soft lockup and RCU stalls. This happens usually when the cgroup has MANY processes and memory.oom.group is set.

Example I am seeing in real production:

       [462012.244552] Memory cgroup out of memory: Killed process 3370438 (crosvm) ....
       ....
       [462037.318059] Memory cgroup out of memory: Killed process 4171372 (adb) ....
       [462037.348314] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#64 stuck for 26s! [stat_manager-ag:1618982]
       ....

Quick look at why this is so slow, it seems to be related to serial flush for certain machine types. For all the crashes I saw, the target CPU was at console_flush_all().

In the case above, there are thousands of processes in the cgroup, and it is soft locking up before it reaches the 1024 limit in the code (which would call the cond_resched()). So, cond_resched() in 1024 blocks is not sufficient.

Remove the counter-based conditional rescheduling logic and call cond_resched() unconditionally after each task iteration, after fn() is called. This avoids the lockup independently of how slow fn() is.

Fixes ade81479c7dd ("memcg: fix soft lockup in the OOM process")
Cc Michael van der Westhuizen <[email protected]>
Cc Usama Arif <[email protected]>
Cc Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Cc Chen Ridong <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
---
 mm/memcontrol.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/memcontrol.c +2 -4
@@ -1221,7 +1221,6 @@ int mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(struct mem_cgr
 {
 	struct mem_cgroup *iter;
 	int ret = 0;
-	int i = 0;
 
 	BUG_ON(memcg == root_mem_cgroup);
 
@@ -1231,10 +1230,9 @@ int mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(struct mem_cgr
 
 		css_task_iter_start(&iter->css, CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS, &it);
 		while (!ret && (task = css_task_iter_next(&it))) {
-			/* Avoid potential softlockup warning */
-			if ((++i & 1023) == 0)
-				cond_resched();
 			ret = fn(task, arg);
+			/* Avoid potential softlockup warning */
+			cond_resched();
 		}
 		css_task_iter_end(&it);
 		if (ret) {
author maintainer
#209 lore raw

PATCH 182/204 mm/page_alloc.c: avoid infinite retries caused by cpuset race

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tianyang Zhang <[email protected]>

commit e05741fb10c38d70bbd7ec12b23c197b6355d519 upstream.

__alloc_pages_slowpath has no change detection for ac->nodemask in the part of retry path, while cpuset can modify it in parallel. For some processes that set mempolicy as MPOL_BIND, this results ac->nodemask changes, and then the should_reclaim_retry will judge based on the latest nodemask and jump to retry, while the get_page_from_freelist only traverses the zonelist from ac->preferred_zoneref, which selected by a expired nodemask and may cause infinite retries in some cases

cpu 64:

__alloc_pages_slowpath {
        /* ..... */
retry:
        /* ac->nodemask = 0x1, ac->preferred->zone->nid = 1 */
        if (alloc_flags & ALLOC_KSWAPD)
                wake_all_kswapds(order, gfp_mask, ac);
        /* cpu 1:
        cpuset_write_resmask
            update_nodemask
                update_nodemasks_hier
                    update_tasks_nodemask
                        mpol_rebind_task
                         mpol_rebind_policy
                          mpol_rebind_nodemask
		// mempolicy->nodes has been modified,
		// which ac->nodemask point to

        */
        /* ac->nodemask = 0x3, ac->preferred->zone->nid = 1 */
        if (should_reclaim_retry(gfp_mask, order, ac, alloc_flags,
                                 did_some_progress > 0, &no_progress_loops))
                goto retry;
}

Simultaneously starting multiple cpuset01 from LTP can quickly reproduce this issue on a multi node server when the maximum memory pressure is reached and the swap is enabled

Fixes c33d6c06f60f ("mm, page_alloc: avoid looking up the first zone in a zonelist twice")
Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc Brendan Jackman <[email protected]>
Cc Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc Zi Yan <[email protected]>
---
 mm/page_alloc.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
mm/page_alloc.c +8 -0
@@ -4573,6 +4573,14 @@ restart:
 	}
 
 retry:
+	/*
+	 * Deal with possible cpuset update races or zonelist updates to avoid
+	 * infinite retries.
+	 */
+	if (check_retry_cpuset(cpuset_mems_cookie, ac) ||
+	    check_retry_zonelist(zonelist_iter_cookie))
+		goto restart;
+
 	/* Ensure kswapd doesn't accidentally go to sleep as long as we loop */
 	if (alloc_flags & ALLOC_KSWAPD)
 		wake_all_kswapds(order, gfp_mask, ac);
author maintainer
#210 lore raw

PATCH 183/204 spi: spi-fsl-dspi: restrict register range for regmap access

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Larisa Grigore <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 283ae0c65e9c592f4a1ba4f31917f5e766da7f31 ]

DSPI registers are NOT continuous, some registers are reserved and accessing them from userspace will trigger external abort, add regmap register access table to avoid below abort.

For example on S32G:

  # cat /sys/kernel/debug/regmap/401d8000.spi/registers
  Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000210 1 PREEMPT SMP
  ...
  Call trace:
  regmap_mmio_read32le+0x24/0x48
  regmap_mmio_read+0x48/0x70
  _regmap_bus_reg_read+0x38/0x48
  _regmap_read+0x68/0x1b0
  regmap_read+0x50/0x78
  regmap_read_debugfs+0x120/0x338
Fixes 1acbdeb92c87 ("spi/fsl-dspi: Convert to use regmap and add big-endian support")
---
 drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c +19 -1
index 351b2989db071..1d94fc89602f2 100644
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
 //
 // Copyright 2013 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
-// Copyright 2020 NXP
+// Copyright 2020-2025 NXP
 //
 // Freescale DSPI driver
 // This file contains a driver for the Freescale DSPI
@@ -946,6 +946,20 @@ static int dspi_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(dspi_pm, dspi_suspend, dspi_resume);
 
+static const struct regmap_range dspi_yes_ranges[] = {
+	regmap_reg_range(SPI_MCR, SPI_MCR),
+	regmap_reg_range(SPI_TCR, SPI_CTAR(3)),
+	regmap_reg_range(SPI_SR, SPI_TXFR3),
+	regmap_reg_range(SPI_RXFR0, SPI_RXFR3),
+	regmap_reg_range(SPI_CTARE(0), SPI_CTARE(3)),
+	regmap_reg_range(SPI_SREX, SPI_SREX),
+};
+
+static const struct regmap_access_table dspi_access_table = {
+	.yes_ranges	= dspi_yes_ranges,
+	.n_yes_ranges	= ARRAY_SIZE(dspi_yes_ranges),
+};
+
 static const struct regmap_range dspi_volatile_ranges[] = {
 	regmap_reg_range(SPI_MCR, SPI_TCR),
 	regmap_reg_range(SPI_SR, SPI_SR),
@@ -963,6 +977,8 @@ static const struct regmap_config dspi_regmap_config = {
 	.reg_stride	= 4,
 	.max_register	= 0x88,
 	.volatile_table	= &dspi_volatile_table,
+	.rd_table	= &dspi_access_table,
+	.wr_table	= &dspi_access_table,
 };
 
 static const struct regmap_range dspi_xspi_volatile_ranges[] = {
@@ -984,6 +1000,8 @@ static const struct regmap_config dspi_xspi_regmap_config[] = {
 		.reg_stride	= 4,
 		.max_register	= 0x13c,
 		.volatile_table	= &dspi_xspi_volatile_table,
+		.rd_table	= &dspi_access_table,
+		.wr_table	= &dspi_access_table,
 	},
 	{
 		.name		= "pushr",
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#211 lore raw

PATCH 184/204 kbuild: Disable -Wdefault-const-init-unsafe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

commit d0afcfeb9e3810ec89d1ffde1a0e36621bb75dca upstream.

A new on by default warning in clang [1] aims to flags instances where const variables without static or thread local storage or const members in aggregate types are not initialized because it can lead to an indeterminate value. This is quite noisy for the kernel due to instances originating from header files such as:

drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_ring.h:62:2: error: default initialization of an object of type 'typeof (ring->size)' (aka 'const unsigned int') leaves the object uninitialized [-Werror,-Wdefault-const-init-var-unsafe]

     62 |         typecheck(typeof(ring->size), next);
        |         ^
  include/linux/typecheck.h:10:9: note: expanded from macro 'typecheck'
     10 | ({      type __dummy; \
        |              ^
  include/net/ip.h:478:14: error: default initialization of an object of type 'typeof (rt->dst.expires)' (aka 'const unsigned long') leaves the object uninitialized [-Werror,-Wdefault-const-init-var-unsafe]
    478 |                 if (mtu && time_before(jiffies, rt->dst.expires))
        |                            ^
  include/linux/jiffies.h:138:26: note: expanded from macro 'time_before'
    138 | #define time_before(a,b)        time_after(b,a)
        |                                 ^
  include/linux/jiffies.h:128:3: note: expanded from macro 'time_after'
    128 |         (typecheck(unsigned long, a) && \
        |          ^
  include/linux/typecheck.h:11:12: note: expanded from macro 'typecheck'
     11 |         typeof(x) __dummy2; \
        |                   ^

include/linux/list.h:409:27: warning: default initialization of an object of type 'union (unnamed union at include/linux/list.h:409:27)' with const member leaves the object uninitialized [-Wdefault-const-init-field-unsafe]

    409 |         struct list_head *next = smp_load_acquire(&head->next);
        |                                  ^
  include/asm-generic/barrier.h:176:29: note: expanded from macro 'smp_load_acquire'
    176 | #define smp_load_acquire(p) __smp_load_acquire(p)
        |                             ^
  arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h:164:59: note: expanded from macro '__smp_load_acquire'
    164 |         union { __unqual_scalar_typeof(*p) __val; char __c[1]; } __u;   \
        |                                                                  ^

include/linux/list.h:409:27: note: member '__val' declared 'const' here

crypto/scatterwalk.c:66:22: error: default initialization of an object of type 'struct scatter_walk' with const member leaves the object uninitialized [-Werror,-Wdefault-const-init-field-unsafe]

     66 |         struct scatter_walk walk;
        |                             ^
  include/crypto/algapi.h:112:15: note: member 'addr' declared 'const' here
    112 |                 void *const addr;
        |                             ^

fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:733:24: error: default initialization of an object of type 'struct vm_area_struct' with const member leaves the object uninitialized [-Werror,-Wdefault-const-init-field-unsafe]

    733 |         struct vm_area_struct pseudo_vma;
        |                               ^
  include/linux/mm_types.h:803:20: note: member 'vm_flags' declared 'const' here
    803 |                 const vm_flags_t vm_flags;
        |                                  ^

Silencing the instances from typecheck.h is difficult because '= {}' is not available in older but supported compilers and '= {0}' would cause warnings about a literal 0 being treated as NULL. While it might be possible to come up with a local hack to silence the warning for clang-21+, it may not be worth it since -Wuninitialized will still trigger if an uninitialized const variable is actually used.

In all audited cases of the "field" variant of the warning, the members are either not used in the particular call path, modified through other means such as memset() / memcpy() because the containing object is not const, or are within a union with other non-const members.

Since this warning does not appear to have a high signal to noise ratio, just disable it.

[nathan: Apply change to Makefile instead of scripts/Makefile.extrawarn
due to lack of e88ca24319e4 in older stable branches]

---
 Makefile |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
Makefile +12 -0
@@ -770,6 +770,18 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-tautological-compa
 # source of a reference will be _MergedGlobals and not on of the whitelisted names.
 # See modpost pattern 2
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-global-merge
+
+# Clang may emit a warning when a const variable, such as the dummy variables
+# in typecheck(), or const member of an aggregate type are not initialized,
+# which can result in unexpected behavior. However, in many audited cases of
+# the "field" variant of the warning, this is intentional because the field is
+# never used within a particular call path, the field is within a union with
+# other non-const members, or the containing object is not const so the field
+# can be modified via memcpy() / memset(). While the variable warning also gets
+# disabled with this same switch, there should not be too much coverage lost
+# because -Wuninitialized will still flag when an uninitialized const variable
+# is used.
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, default-const-init-unsafe)
 else
 
 # Warn about unmarked fall-throughs in switch statement.
author maintainer
#212 lore raw

PATCH 185/204 netfilter: nf_tables: pass nft_chain to destroy function, not nft_ctx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

commit 8965d42bcf54d42cbc72fe34a9d0ec3f8527debd upstream.

It would be better to not store nft_ctx inside nft_trans object, the netlink ctx strucutre is huge and most of its information is never needed in places that use trans->ctx.

Avoid/reduce its usage if possible, no runtime behaviour change intended.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c |   15 ++++++---------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +6 -9
@@ -1675,10 +1675,8 @@ static void nf_tables_chain_free_chain_r
 	kvfree(chain->rules_next);
 }
 
-static void nf_tables_chain_destroy(struct nft_ctx *ctx)
+void nf_tables_chain_destroy(struct nft_chain *chain)
 {
-	struct nft_chain *chain = ctx->chain;
-
 	if (WARN_ON(chain->use > 0))
 		return;
 
@@ -1929,7 +1927,7 @@ err2:
 err_use:
 	nf_tables_unregister_hook(net, table, chain);
 err1:
-	nf_tables_chain_destroy(ctx);
+	nf_tables_chain_destroy(chain);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -6905,7 +6903,7 @@ static void nft_commit_release(struct nf
 		kfree(nft_trans_chain_name(trans));
 		break;
 	case NFT_MSG_DELCHAIN:
-		nf_tables_chain_destroy(&trans->ctx);
+		nf_tables_chain_destroy(trans->ctx.chain);
 		break;
 	case NFT_MSG_DELRULE:
 		nf_tables_rule_destroy(&trans->ctx, nft_trans_rule(trans));
@@ -7582,7 +7580,7 @@ static void nf_tables_abort_release(stru
 		nf_tables_table_destroy(&trans->ctx);
 		break;
 	case NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN:
-		nf_tables_chain_destroy(&trans->ctx);
+		nf_tables_chain_destroy(trans->ctx.chain);
 		break;
 	case NFT_MSG_NEWRULE:
 		nf_tables_rule_destroy(&trans->ctx, nft_trans_rule(trans));
@@ -8233,7 +8231,7 @@ int __nft_release_basechain(struct nft_c
 	}
 	nft_chain_del(ctx->chain);
 	nft_use_dec(&ctx->table->use);
-	nf_tables_chain_destroy(ctx);
+	nf_tables_chain_destroy(ctx->chain);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -8300,10 +8298,9 @@ static void __nft_release_table(struct n
 		nft_obj_destroy(&ctx, obj);
 	}
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, nc, &table->chains, list) {
-		ctx.chain = chain;
 		nft_chain_del(chain);
 		nft_use_dec(&table->use);
-		nf_tables_chain_destroy(&ctx);
+		nf_tables_chain_destroy(chain);
 	}
 	list_del(&table->list);
 	nf_tables_table_destroy(&ctx);
author maintainer
#213 lore raw

PATCH 186/204 netfilter: nf_tables: wait for rcu grace period on net_device removal

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

commit c03d278fdf35e73dd0ec543b9b556876b9d9a8dc upstream.

8c873e219970 ("netfilter: core: free hooks with call_rcu") removed synchronize_net() call when unregistering basechain hook, however, net_device removal event handler for the NFPROTO_NETDEV was not updated to wait for RCU grace period.

Note that 835b803377f5 ("netfilter: nf_tables_netdev: unregister hooks on net_device removal") does not remove basechain rules on device removal, I was hinted to remove rules on net_device removal later, see 5ebe0b0eec9d ("netfilter: nf_tables: destroy basechain and rules on netdevice removal").

Although NETDEV_UNREGISTER event is guaranteed to be handled after synchronize_net() call, this path needs to wait for rcu grace period via rcu callback to release basechain hooks if netns is alive because an ongoing netlink dump could be in progress (sockets hold a reference on the netns).

Note that nf_tables_pre_exit_net() unregisters and releases basechain hooks but it is possible to see NETDEV_UNREGISTER at a later stage in the netns exit path, eg. veth peer device in another netns:

cleanup_net()
default_device_exit_batch()
unregister_netdevice_many_notify()
notifier_call_chain()
nf_tables_netdev_event()
__nft_release_basechain()

In this particular case, same rule of thumb applies: if netns is alive, then wait for rcu grace period because netlink dump in the other netns could be in progress. Otherwise, if the other netns is going away then no netlink dump can be in progress and basechain hooks can be released inmediately.

While at it, turn WARN_ON() into WARN_ON_ONCE() for the basechain validation, which should not ever happen.

Fixes 835b803377f5 ("netfilter: nf_tables_netdev: unregister hooks on net_device removal")
---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h |    3 ++
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c     |   41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +3 -0
@@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ struct nft_chain {
 	u8				flags:6,
 					genmask:2;
 	char				*name;
+	struct rcu_head			rcu_head;
 
 	/* Only used during control plane commit phase: */
 	struct nft_rule			**rules_next;
@@ -1015,6 +1016,7 @@ static inline void nft_use_inc_restore(u
  *	@sets: sets in the table
  *	@objects: stateful objects in the table
  *	@flowtables: flow tables in the table
+ *	@net: netnamespace this table belongs to
  *	@hgenerator: handle generator state
  *	@handle: table handle
  *	@use: number of chain references to this table
@@ -1030,6 +1032,7 @@ struct nft_table {
 	struct list_head		sets;
 	struct list_head		objects;
 	struct list_head		flowtables;
+	possible_net_t			net;
 	u64				hgenerator;
 	u64				handle;
 	u32				use;
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +34 -7

62 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#214 lore raw

PATCH 187/204 netfilter: nf_tables: do not defer rule destruction via call_rcu

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

commit b04df3da1b5c6f6dc7cdccc37941740c078c4043 upstream.

nf_tables_chain_destroy can sleep, it can't be used from call_rcu callbacks.

Moreover, nf_tables_rule_release() is only safe for error unwinding, while transaction mutex is held and the to-be-desroyed rule was not exposed to either dataplane or dumps, as it deactives+frees without the required synchronize_rcu() in-between.

nft_rule_expr_deactivate() callbacks will change ->use counters of other chains/sets, see e.g. nft_lookup .deactivate callback, these must be serialized via transaction mutex.

Also add a few lockdep asserts to make this more explicit.

Calling synchronize_rcu() isn't ideal, but fixing this without is hard and way more intrusive. As-is, we can get:

WARNING: .. net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5515 nft_set_destroy+0x..

Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
RIP: 0010:nft_set_destroy+0x3fe/0x5c0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x6b7/0xad0
 process_one_work+0x64a/0xce0
 worker_thread+0x613/0x10d0

In case the synchronize_rcu becomes an issue, we can explore alternatives.

One way would be to allocate nft_trans_rule objects + one nft_trans_chain object, deactivate the rules + the chain and then defer the freeing to the nft destroy workqueue. We'd still need to keep the synchronize_rcu path as a fallback to handle -ENOMEM corner cases though.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes c03d278fdf35 ("netfilter: nf_tables: wait for rcu grace period on net_device removal")
---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h |    3 ---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c     |   31 ++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +0 -3
@@ -899,7 +899,6 @@ struct nft_chain {
 	u8				flags:6,
 					genmask:2;
 	char				*name;
-	struct rcu_head			rcu_head;
 
 	/* Only used during control plane commit phase: */
 	struct nft_rule			**rules_next;
@@ -1016,7 +1015,6 @@ static inline void nft_use_inc_restore(u
  *	@sets: sets in the table
  *	@objects: stateful objects in the table
  *	@flowtables: flow tables in the table
- *	@net: netnamespace this table belongs to
  *	@hgenerator: handle generator state
  *	@handle: table handle
  *	@use: number of chain references to this table
@@ -1032,7 +1030,6 @@ struct nft_table {
 	struct list_head		sets;
 	struct list_head		objects;
 	struct list_head		flowtables;
-	possible_net_t			net;
 	u64				hgenerator;
 	u64				handle;
 	u32				use;
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +14 -17
@@ -1109,7 +1109,6 @@ static int nf_tables_newtable(struct net
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&table->sets);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&table->objects);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&table->flowtables);
-	write_pnet(&table->net, net);
 	table->family = family;
 	table->flags = flags;
 	table->handle = ++table_handle;
@@ -2824,6 +2823,8 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_destroy(const
 static void nf_tables_rule_release(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 				   struct nft_rule *rule)
 {
+	lockdep_commit_lock_is_held(ctx->net);
+
 	nft_rule_expr_deactivate(ctx, rule, NFT_TRANS_RELEASE);
 	nf_tables_rule_destroy(ctx, rule);
 }
@@ -4172,6 +4173,8 @@ void nf_tables_deactivate_set(const stru
 			      struct nft_set_binding *binding,
 			      enum nft_trans_phase phase)
 {
+	lockdep_commit_lock_is_held(ctx->net);
+
 	switch (phase) {
 	case NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR:
 		nft_set_trans_unbind(ctx, set);
@@ -8228,19 +8231,6 @@ static void __nft_release_basechain_now(
 	nf_tables_chain_destroy(ctx->chain);
 }
 
-static void nft_release_basechain_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
-	struct nft_chain *chain = container_of(head, struct nft_chain, rcu_head);
-	struct nft_ctx ctx = {
-		.family	= chain->table->family,
-		.chain	= chain,
-		.net	= read_pnet(&chain->table->net),
-	};
-
-	__nft_release_basechain_now(&ctx);
-	put_net(ctx.net);
-}
-
 int __nft_release_basechain(struct nft_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct nft_rule *rule;
@@ -8255,11 +8245,18 @@ int __nft_release_basechain(struct nft_c
 	nft_chain_del(ctx->chain);
 	nft_use_dec(&ctx->table->use);
 
-	if (maybe_get_net(ctx->net))
-		call_rcu(&ctx->chain->rcu_head, nft_release_basechain_rcu);
-	else
+	if (!maybe_get_net(ctx->net)) {
 		__nft_release_basechain_now(ctx);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* wait for ruleset dumps to complete.  Owning chain is no longer in
+	 * lists, so new dumps can't find any of these rules anymore.
+	 */
+	synchronize_rcu();
 
+	__nft_release_basechain_now(ctx);
+	put_net(ctx->net);
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__nft_release_basechain);
author maintainer
#215 lore raw

PATCH 188/204 drm/i915/gvt: fix unterminated-string-initialization warning

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>

commit 2e43ae7dd71cd9bb0d1bce1d3306bf77523feb81 upstream.

Initializing const char opregion_signature[16] = OPREGION_SIGNATURE (which is "IntelGraphicsMem") drops the NUL termination of the string. This is intentional, but the compiler doesn't know this.

Switch to initializing header->signature directly from the string litaral, with sizeof destination rather than source. We don't treat the signature as a string other than for initialization; it's really just a blob of binary data.

Add a static assert for good measure to cross-check the sizes.

[nathan: Move static_assert() to top of function to avoid instance of
-Wdeclaration-after-statement due to lack of b5ec6fd286df]

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/opregion.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/opregion.c +5 -3
@@ -223,7 +223,8 @@ int intel_vgpu_init_opregion(struct inte
 	u8 *buf;
 	struct opregion_header *header;
 	struct vbt v;
-	const char opregion_signature[16] = OPREGION_SIGNATURE;
+
+	static_assert(sizeof(header->signature) == sizeof(OPREGION_SIGNATURE) - 1);
 
 	gvt_dbg_core("init vgpu%d opregion\n", vgpu->id);
 	vgpu_opregion(vgpu)->va = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL |
@@ -237,8 +238,9 @@ int intel_vgpu_init_opregion(struct inte
 	/* emulated opregion with VBT mailbox only */
 	buf = (u8 *)vgpu_opregion(vgpu)->va;
 	header = (struct opregion_header *)buf;
-	memcpy(header->signature, opregion_signature,
-	       sizeof(opregion_signature));
+
+	memcpy(header->signature, OPREGION_SIGNATURE, sizeof(header->signature));
+
 	header->size = 0x8;
 	header->opregion_ver = 0x02000000;
 	header->mboxes = MBOX_VBT;
author maintainer
#216 lore raw

PATCH 189/204 smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wang Zhaolong <[email protected]>

commit a7a8fe56e932a36f43e031b398aef92341bf5ea0 upstream.

There is a race condition in the readdir concurrency process, which may access the rsp buffer after it has been released, triggering the following KASAN warning.

==================================================================

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880099b819c by task a.out/342975

 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 342975 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ #240 PREEMPT(full)
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
  print_report+0xce/0x640
  kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
  cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]
  cifs_readdir+0x12cb/0x3190 [cifs]
  iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
  __x64_sys_getdents+0x134/0x220
  do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f996f64b9f9
 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
 f0 ff ff  0d f7 c3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 8
 RSP: 002b:00007f996f53de78 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996f53ecdc RCX: 00007f996f64b9f9
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00007f996f53dea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: ffffffffffffff88
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8cd9a500 R15: 00007f996f51e000
  </TASK>

 Allocated by task 408:
  kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70
  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x117/0x3d0
  mempool_alloc_noprof+0xf2/0x2c0
  cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x80 [cifs]
  allocate_buffers+0x1d2/0x330 [cifs]
  cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x22b/0x2690 [cifs]
  kthread+0x394/0x720
  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 Freed by task 342979:
  kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50
  kmem_cache_free+0x2b8/0x500
  cifs_buf_release+0x3c/0x70 [cifs]
  cifs_readdir+0x1c97/0x3190 [cifs]
  iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
  __x64_sys_getdents64+0x134/0x220
  do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880099b8000
  which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588
 The buggy address is located 412 bytes inside of
  freed 16588-byte region [ffff8880099b8000, ffff8880099bc0cc)

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x99b8
 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
 anon flags: 0x80000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)
 page_type: f5(slab)
 raw: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
 head: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
 head: 0080000000000003 ffffea0000266e01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
 head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff8880099b8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff8880099b8100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 >ffff8880099b8180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                             ^
  ffff8880099b8200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff8880099b8280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ==================================================================

POC is available in the link [1].

The problem triggering process is as follows:

Process 1 Process 2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
cifs_readdir
/* file->private_data == NULL */
initiate_cifs_search

    cifsFile = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cifsFileInfo), GFP_KERNEL);
    smb2_query_dir_first ->query_dir_first()
      SMB2_query_directory
        SMB2_query_directory_init
        cifs_send_recv
        smb2_parse_query_directory
          srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start = (char *)rsp;
          srch_inf->srch_entries_start = (char *)rsp + ...
          srch_inf->last_entry = (char *)rsp + ...
          srch_inf->smallBuf = true;
  find_cifs_entry
    /* if (cfile->srch_inf.ntwrk_buf_start) */
    cifs_small_buf_release(cfile->srch_inf // free

                        cifs_readdir  ->iterate_shared()
                          /* file->private_data != NULL */
                          find_cifs_entry
                            /* in while (...) loop */
                            smb2_query_dir_next  ->query_dir_next()
                              SMB2_query_directory
                                SMB2_query_directory_init
                                cifs_send_recv
                                  compound_send_recv
                                    smb_send_rqst
                                    __smb_send_rqst
                                      rc = -ERESTARTSYS;
                                      /* if (fatal_signal_pending()) */
                                      goto out;
                                      return rc
                            /* if (cfile->srch_inf.last_entry) */
                            cifs_save_resume_key()
                              cifs_fill_dirent // UAF
                            /* if (rc) */
                            return -ENOENT;

Fix this by ensuring the return code is checked before using pointers from the srch_inf.

---
 fs/cifs/readdir.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/readdir.c +2 -2
@@ -644,11 +644,11 @@ find_cifs_entry(const unsigned int xid,
 		rc = server->ops->query_dir_next(xid, tcon, &cfile->fid,
 						 search_flags,
 						 &cfile->srch_inf);
+		if (rc)
+			return -ENOENT;
 		/* FindFirst/Next set last_entry to NULL on malformed reply */
 		if (cfile->srch_inf.last_entry)
 			cifs_save_resume_key(cfile->srch_inf.last_entry, cfile);
-		if (rc)
-			return -ENOENT;
 	}
 	if (index_to_find < cfile->srch_inf.index_of_last_entry) {
 		/* we found the buffer that contains the entry */
author maintainer
#217 lore raw

PATCH 190/204 smb: client: Reset all search buffer pointers when releasing buffer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wang Zhaolong <[email protected]>

commit e48f9d849bfdec276eebf782a84fd4dfbe1c14c0 upstream.

Multiple pointers in struct cifs_search_info (ntwrk_buf_start, srch_entries_start, and last_entry) point to the same allocated buffer. However, when freeing this buffer, only ntwrk_buf_start was set to NULL, while the other pointers remained pointing to freed memory.

This is defensive programming to prevent potential issues with stale pointers. While the active UAF vulnerability is fixed by the previous patch, this change ensures consistent pointer state and more robust error handling.

---
 fs/cifs/readdir.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/cifs/readdir.c +3 -0
@@ -621,7 +621,10 @@ find_cifs_entry(const unsigned int xid,
 			else
 				cifs_buf_release(cfile->srch_inf.
 						ntwrk_buf_start);
+			/* Reset all pointers to the network buffer to prevent stale references */
 			cfile->srch_inf.ntwrk_buf_start = NULL;
+			cfile->srch_inf.srch_entries_start = NULL;
+			cfile->srch_inf.last_entry = NULL;
 		}
 		rc = initiate_cifs_search(xid, file);
 		if (rc) {
author maintainer
#218 lore raw

PATCH 191/204 net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <[email protected]>

commit ac9fe7dd8e730a103ae4481147395cc73492d786 upstream.

Savino says:
"We are writing to report that this recent patch (141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with NETEM.

The patch only checks the cl->cl_nactive field to determine whether it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only incremented by init_vf [3].

By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].

However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a very low rate,
it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued. This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."

To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child, check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.

[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u

---
 net/sched/sch_hfsc.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sched/sch_hfsc.c +8 -1
@@ -176,6 +176,11 @@ struct hfsc_sched {
 
 #define	HT_INFINITY	0xffffffffffffffffULL	/* infinite time value */
 
+static bool cl_in_el_or_vttree(struct hfsc_class *cl)
+{
+	return ((cl->cl_flags & HFSC_FSC) && cl->cl_nactive) ||
+		((cl->cl_flags & HFSC_RSC) && !RB_EMPTY_NODE(&cl->el_node));
+}
 
 /*
  * eligible tree holds backlogged classes being sorted by their eligible times.
@@ -1038,6 +1043,8 @@ hfsc_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32
 	if (cl == NULL)
 		return -ENOBUFS;
 
+	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&cl->el_node);
+
 	err = tcf_block_get(&cl->block, &cl->filter_list, sch, extack);
 	if (err) {
 		kfree(cl);
@@ -1576,7 +1583,7 @@ hfsc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
 	sch->qstats.backlog += len;
 	sch->q.qlen++;
 
-	if (first && !cl->cl_nactive) {
+	if (first && !cl_in_el_or_vttree(cl)) {
 		if (cl->cl_flags & HFSC_RSC)
 			init_ed(cl, len);
 		if (cl->cl_flags & HFSC_FSC)
author maintainer
#219 lore raw

PATCH 192/204 coredump: fix error handling for replace_fd()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 95c5f43181fe9c1b5e5a4bd3281c857a5259991f upstream.

The replace_fd() helper returns the file descriptor number on success and a negative error code on failure. The current error handling in umh_pipe_setup() only works because the file descriptor that is replaced is zero but that's pretty volatile. Explicitly check for a negative error code.

---
 fs/coredump.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/coredump.c +7 -2
@@ -551,7 +551,9 @@ static int umh_pipe_setup(struct subproc
 {
 	struct file *files[2];
 	struct coredump_params *cp = (struct coredump_params *)info->data;
-	int err = create_pipe_files(files, 0);
+	int err;
+
+	err = create_pipe_files(files, 0);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -559,10 +561,13 @@ static int umh_pipe_setup(struct subproc
 
 	err = replace_fd(0, files[0], 0);
 	fput(files[0]);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
 	/* and disallow core files too */
 	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE] = (struct rlimit){1, 1};
 
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
author maintainer
#220 lore raw

PATCH 193/204 pidfd: check pid has attached task in fdinfo

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 3d6d8da48d0b214d65ea0227d47228abc75d7c88 upstream.

Currently, when a task is dead we still print the pid it used to use in the fdinfo files of its pidfds. This doesn't make much sense since the pid may have already been reused. So verify that the task is still alive by introducing the pid_has_task() helper which will be used by other callers in follow-up patches.
If the task is not alive anymore, we will print -1. This allows us to differentiate between a task not being present in a given pid namespace
- in which case we already print 0 - and a task having been reaped.

Note that this uses PIDTYPE_PID for the check. Technically, we could've checked PIDTYPE_TGID since pidfds currently only refer to thread-group leaders but if they won't anymore in the future then this check becomes problematic without it being immediately obvious to non-experts imho. If a thread is created via clone(CLONE_THREAD) than struct pid has a single non-empty list pid->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID] and this pid can't be used as a PIDTYPE_TGID meaning pid->tasks[PIDTYPE_TGID] will return NULL even though the thread-group leader might still be very much alive. So checking PIDTYPE_PID is fine and is easier to maintain should we ever allow pidfds to refer to threads.

---
 include/linux/pid.h |    4 ++++
 kernel/fork.c       |   10 ++++++++--
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/pid.h +4 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ static inline struct pid *get_pid(struct
 
 extern void put_pid(struct pid *pid);
 extern struct task_struct *pid_task(struct pid *pid, enum pid_type);
+static inline bool pid_has_task(struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type)
+{
+	return !hlist_empty(&pid->tasks[type]);
+}
 extern struct task_struct *get_pid_task(struct pid *pid, enum pid_type);
 
 extern struct pid *get_task_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type);
kernel/fork.c +8 -2
@@ -1703,10 +1703,16 @@ static int pidfd_release(struct inode *i
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 static void pidfd_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f)
 {
-	struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(m->file));
 	struct pid *pid = f->private_data;
+	struct pid_namespace *ns;
+	pid_t nr = -1;
 
-	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Pid:\t", pid_nr_ns(pid, ns));
+	if (likely(pid_has_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID))) {
+		ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(m->file));
+		nr = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns);
+	}
+
+	seq_put_decimal_ll(m, "Pid:\t", nr);
 	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 }
 #endif
author maintainer
#221 lore raw

PATCH 194/204 pid: add pidfd_prepare()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 6ae930d9dbf2d093157be33428538c91966d8a9f upstream.

Add a new helper that allows to reserve a pidfd and allocates a new pidfd file that stashes the provided struct pid. This will allow us to remove places that either open code this function or that call pidfd_create() but then have to call close_fd() because there are still failure points after pidfd_create() has been called.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 include/linux/pid.h |    1 
 kernel/fork.c       |   85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+)
include/linux/pid.h +1 -0
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations pidf
 struct file;
 
 extern struct pid *pidfd_pid(const struct file *file);
+int pidfd_prepare(struct pid *pid, unsigned int flags, struct file **ret);
 
 static inline struct pid *get_pid(struct pid *pid)
 {
kernel/fork.c +85 -0

91 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#222 lore raw

PATCH 195/204 fork: use pidfd_prepare()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit ca7707f5430ad6b1c9cb7cee0a7f67d69328bb2d upstream.

Stop open-coding get_unused_fd_flags() and anon_inode_getfile(). That's brittle just for keeping the flags between both calls in sync. Use the dedicated helper.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 kernel/fork.c |   13 ++-----------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/fork.c +2 -11
@@ -2155,21 +2155,12 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_stru
 	 * if the fd table isn't shared).
 	 */
 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_PIDFD) {
-		retval = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+		/* Note that no task has been attached to @pid yet. */
+		retval = __pidfd_prepare(pid, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, &pidfile);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			goto bad_fork_free_pid;
-
 		pidfd = retval;
 
-		pidfile = anon_inode_getfile("[pidfd]", &pidfd_fops, pid,
-					      O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
-		if (IS_ERR(pidfile)) {
-			put_unused_fd(pidfd);
-			retval = PTR_ERR(pidfile);
-			goto bad_fork_free_pid;
-		}
-		get_pid(pid);	/* held by pidfile now */
-
 		retval = put_user(pidfd, args->pidfd);
 		if (retval)
 			goto bad_fork_put_pidfd;
author maintainer
#223 lore raw

PATCH 196/204 coredump: hand a pidfd to the usermode coredump helper

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit b5325b2a270fcaf7b2a9a0f23d422ca8a5a8bdea upstream.

Give userspace a way to instruct the kernel to install a pidfd into the usermode helper process. This makes coredump handling a lot more reliable for userspace. In parallel with this commit we already have systemd adding support for this in [1].

We create a pidfs file for the coredumping process when we process the corename pattern. When the usermode helper process is forked we then install the pidfs file as file descriptor three into the usermode helpers file descriptor table so it's available to the exec'd program.

Since usermode helpers are either children of the system_unbound_wq workqueue or kthreadd we know that the file descriptor table is empty and can thus always use three as the file descriptor number.

Note, that we'll install a pidfd for the thread-group leader even if a subthread is calling do_coredump(). We know that task linkage hasn't been removed due to delay_group_leader() and even if this @current isn't the actual thread-group leader we know that the thread-group leader cannot be reaped until @current has exited.

[brauner: This is a backport for the v5.4 series. Upstream has significantly changed and backporting all that infra is a non-starter. So simply backport the pidfd_prepare() helper and waste the file descriptor we allocated. Then we minimally massage the umh coredump setup code.]

---
 fs/coredump.c           |   77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/binfmts.h |    1 
 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/coredump.c +70 -7
@@ -52,6 +52,13 @@
 
 #include <trace/events/sched.h>
 
+/*
+ * File descriptor number for the pidfd for the thread-group leader of
+ * the coredumping task installed into the usermode helper's file
+ * descriptor table.
+ */
+#define COREDUMP_PIDFD_NUMBER 3
+
 int core_uses_pid;
 unsigned int core_pipe_limit;
 char core_pattern[CORENAME_MAX_SIZE] = "core";
@@ -314,6 +321,27 @@ static int format_corename(struct core_n
 				err = cn_printf(cn, "%lu",
 					      rlimit(RLIMIT_CORE));
 				break;
+			/* pidfd number */
+			case 'F': {
+				/*
+				 * Installing a pidfd only makes sense if
+				 * we actually spawn a usermode helper.
+				 */
+				if (!ispipe)
+					break;
+
+				/*
+				 * Note that we'll install a pidfd for the
+				 * thread-group leader. We know that task
+				 * linkage hasn't been removed yet and even if
+				 * this @current isn't the actual thread-group
+				 * leader we know that the thread-group leader
+				 * cannot be reaped until @current has exited.
+				 */
+				cprm->pid = task_tgid(current);
+				err = cn_printf(cn, "%d", COREDUMP_PIDFD_NUMBER);
+				break;
+			}
 			default:
 				break;
 			}
@@ -537,7 +565,7 @@ static void wait_for_dump_helpers(struct
 }
 
 /*
- * umh_pipe_setup
+ * umh_coredump_setup
  * helper function to customize the process used
  * to collect the core in userspace.  Specifically
  * it sets up a pipe and installs it as fd 0 (stdin)
@@ -547,27 +575,62 @@ static void wait_for_dump_helpers(struct
  * is a special value that we use to trap recursive
  * core dumps
  */
-static int umh_pipe_setup(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new)
+static int umh_coredump_setup(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *new)
 {
 	struct file *files[2];
+	struct file *pidfs_file = NULL;
 	struct coredump_params *cp = (struct coredump_params *)info->data;
 	int err;
 
+	if (cp->pid) {
+		int fd;
+
+		fd = pidfd_prepare(cp->pid, 0, &pidfs_file);
+		if (fd < 0)
+			return fd;
+
+		/*
+		 * We don't care about the fd. We also cannot simply
+		 * replace it below because dup2() will refuse to close
+		 * this file descriptor if its in a larval state. So
+		 * close it!
+		 */
+		put_unused_fd(fd);
+
+		/*
+		 * Usermode helpers are childen of either
+		 * system_unbound_wq or of kthreadd. So we know that
+		 * we're starting off with a clean file descriptor
+		 * table. So we should always be able to use
+		 * COREDUMP_PIDFD_NUMBER as our file descriptor value.
+		 */
+		err = replace_fd(COREDUMP_PIDFD_NUMBER, pidfs_file, 0);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto out_fail;
+
+		pidfs_file = NULL;
+	}
+
 	err = create_pipe_files(files, 0);
 	if (err)
-		return err;
+		goto out_fail;
 
 	cp->file = files[1];
 
 	err = replace_fd(0, files[0], 0);
 	fput(files[0]);
 	if (err < 0)
-		return err;
+		goto out_fail;
 
 	/* and disallow core files too */
 	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE] = (struct rlimit){1, 1};
 
-	return 0;
+	err = 0;
+
+out_fail:
+	if (pidfs_file)
+		fput(pidfs_file);
+	return err;
 }
 
 void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
@@ -643,7 +706,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t
 		}
 
 		if (cprm.limit == 1) {
-			/* See umh_pipe_setup() which sets RLIMIT_CORE = 1.
+			/* See umh_coredump_setup() which sets RLIMIT_CORE = 1.
 			 *
 			 * Normally core limits are irrelevant to pipes, since
 			 * we're not writing to the file system, but we use
@@ -688,7 +751,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t
 		retval = -ENOMEM;
 		sub_info = call_usermodehelper_setup(helper_argv[0],
 						helper_argv, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
-						umh_pipe_setup, NULL, &cprm);
+						umh_coredump_setup, NULL, &cprm);
 		if (sub_info)
 			retval = call_usermodehelper_exec(sub_info,
 							  UMH_WAIT_EXEC);
include/linux/binfmts.h +1 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ struct coredump_params {
 	unsigned long mm_flags;
 	loff_t written;
 	loff_t pos;
+	struct pid *pid;
 };
 
 /*
author maintainer
#224 lore raw

PATCH 197/204 HID: quirks: Add ADATA XPG alpha wireless mouse support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Milton Barrera <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa9fdeea1b7d6440c22efa6d59a769eae8bc89f1 ]

This patch adds HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL for the ADATA XPG wireless gaming mouse (USB ID 125f:7505) and its USB dongle (USB ID 125f:7506). Without this quirk, the device does not generate input events properly.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h    | 4 ++++
 drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +4 -0
index d5369577b4755..356916608cc49 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_ACTIONSTAR	0x2101
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_ACTIONSTAR_1011	0x1011
 
+#define USB_VENDOR_ID_ADATA_XPG 0x125f
+#define USB_VENDOR_ID_ADATA_XPG_WL_GAMING_MOUSE 0x7505
+#define USB_VENDOR_ID_ADATA_XPG_WL_GAMING_MOUSE_DONGLE 0x7506
+
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_ADS_TECH		0x06e1
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_ADS_TECH_RADIO_SI470X	0xa155
 
drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c +2 -0
index 9b375ca53946e..ff1a9d142cddf 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
 static const struct hid_device_id hid_quirks[] = {
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_AASHIMA, USB_DEVICE_ID_AASHIMA_GAMEPAD), HID_QUIRK_BADPAD },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_AASHIMA, USB_DEVICE_ID_AASHIMA_PREDATOR), HID_QUIRK_BADPAD },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ADATA_XPG, USB_VENDOR_ID_ADATA_XPG_WL_GAMING_MOUSE), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ADATA_XPG, USB_VENDOR_ID_ADATA_XPG_WL_GAMING_MOUSE_DONGLE), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_AFATECH, USB_DEVICE_ID_AFATECH_AF9016), HID_QUIRK_FULLSPEED_INTERVAL },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_AIREN, USB_DEVICE_ID_AIREN_SLIMPLUS), HID_QUIRK_NOGET },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_AKAI_09E8, USB_DEVICE_ID_AKAI_09E8_MIDIMIX), HID_QUIRK_NO_INIT_REPORTS },
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#225 lore raw

PATCH 198/204 nfs: dont share pNFS DS connections between net namespaces

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6b9785dc8b13d9fb75ceec8cf4ea7ec3f3b1edbc ]

Currently, different NFS clients can share the same DS connections, even when they are in different net namespaces. If a containerized client creates a DS connection, another container can find and use it. When the first client exits, the connection will close which can lead to stalls in other clients.

Add a net namespace pointer to struct nfs4_pnfs_ds, and compare those value to the caller's netns in _data_server_lookup_locked() when searching for a nfs4_pnfs_ds to match.

---
 fs/nfs/filelayout/filelayoutdev.c         | 6 +++---
 fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c | 6 +++---
 fs/nfs/pnfs.h                             | 4 +++-
 fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c                         | 9 +++++----
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/filelayout/filelayoutdev.c +3 -3
index d913e818858f3..82bba1ede717c 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ nfs4_fl_alloc_deviceid_node(struct nfs_server *server, struct pnfs_device *pdev,
 	struct page *scratch;
 	struct list_head dsaddrs;
 	struct nfs4_pnfs_ds_addr *da;
+	struct net *net = server->nfs_client->cl_net;
 
 	/* set up xdr stream */
 	scratch = alloc_page(gfp_flags);
@@ -160,8 +161,7 @@ nfs4_fl_alloc_deviceid_node(struct nfs_server *server, struct pnfs_device *pdev,
 
 		mp_count = be32_to_cpup(p); /* multipath count */
 		for (j = 0; j < mp_count; j++) {
-			da = nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr(server->nfs_client->cl_net,
-						    &stream, gfp_flags);
+			da = nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr(net, &stream, gfp_flags);
 			if (da)
 				list_add_tail(&da->da_node, &dsaddrs);
 		}
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ nfs4_fl_alloc_deviceid_node(struct nfs_server *server, struct pnfs_device *pdev,
 			goto out_err_free_deviceid;
 		}
 
-		dsaddr->ds_list[i] = nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(&dsaddrs, gfp_flags);
+		dsaddr->ds_list[i] = nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(net, &dsaddrs, gfp_flags);
 		if (!dsaddr->ds_list[i])
 			goto out_err_drain_dsaddrs;
 
fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c +3 -3
index 1f12297109b41..e6d7473e1a32a 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ nfs4_ff_alloc_deviceid_node(struct nfs_server *server, struct pnfs_device *pdev,
 	struct nfs4_pnfs_ds_addr *da;
 	struct nfs4_ff_layout_ds *new_ds = NULL;
 	struct nfs4_ff_ds_version *ds_versions = NULL;
+	struct net *net = server->nfs_client->cl_net;
 	u32 mp_count;
 	u32 version_count;
 	__be32 *p;
@@ -80,8 +81,7 @@ nfs4_ff_alloc_deviceid_node(struct nfs_server *server, struct pnfs_device *pdev,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < mp_count; i++) {
 		/* multipath ds */
-		da = nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr(server->nfs_client->cl_net,
-					    &stream, gfp_flags);
+		da = nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr(net, &stream, gfp_flags);
 		if (da)
 			list_add_tail(&da->da_node, &dsaddrs);
 	}
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ nfs4_ff_alloc_deviceid_node(struct nfs_server *server, struct pnfs_device *pdev,
 	new_ds->ds_versions = ds_versions;
 	new_ds->ds_versions_cnt = version_count;
 
-	new_ds->ds = nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(&dsaddrs, gfp_flags);
+	new_ds->ds = nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(net, &dsaddrs, gfp_flags);
 	if (!new_ds->ds)
 		goto out_err_drain_dsaddrs;
 
fs/nfs/pnfs.h +3 -1
index b0f91a4592cb5..7976886a47db9 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct nfs4_pnfs_ds {
 	struct list_head	ds_node;  /* nfs4_pnfs_dev_hlist dev_dslist */
 	char			*ds_remotestr;	/* comma sep list of addrs */
 	struct list_head	ds_addrs;
+	const struct net	*ds_net;
 	struct nfs_client	*ds_clp;
 	refcount_t		ds_count;
 	unsigned long		ds_state;
@@ -378,7 +379,8 @@ int pnfs_generic_commit_pagelist(struct inode *inode,
 int pnfs_generic_scan_commit_lists(struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo, int max);
 void pnfs_generic_write_commit_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data);
 void nfs4_pnfs_ds_put(struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds);
-struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(struct list_head *dsaddrs,
+struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(const struct net *net,
+				      struct list_head *dsaddrs,
 				      gfp_t gfp_flags);
 void nfs4_pnfs_v3_ds_connect_unload(void);
 int nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect(struct nfs_server *mds_srv, struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds,
fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c +5 -4
index aff44a7b98f86..e2d90239d042d 100644
@@ -414,12 +414,12 @@ _same_data_server_addrs_locked(const struct list_head *dsaddrs1,
  * Lookup DS by addresses.  nfs4_ds_cache_lock is held
  */
 static struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *
-_data_server_lookup_locked(const struct list_head *dsaddrs)
+_data_server_lookup_locked(const struct net *net, const struct list_head *dsaddrs)
 {
 	struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *ds;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(ds, &nfs4_data_server_cache, ds_node)
-		if (_same_data_server_addrs_locked(&ds->ds_addrs, dsaddrs))
+		if (ds->ds_net == net && _same_data_server_addrs_locked(&ds->ds_addrs, dsaddrs))
 			return ds;
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ nfs4_pnfs_remotestr(struct list_head *dsaddrs, gfp_t gfp_flags)
  * uncached and return cached struct nfs4_pnfs_ds.
  */
 struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *
-nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(struct list_head *dsaddrs, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(const struct net *net, struct list_head *dsaddrs, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
 	struct nfs4_pnfs_ds *tmp_ds, *ds = NULL;
 	char *remotestr;
@@ -530,13 +530,14 @@ nfs4_pnfs_ds_add(struct list_head *dsaddrs, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 	remotestr = nfs4_pnfs_remotestr(dsaddrs, gfp_flags);
 
 	spin_lock(&nfs4_ds_cache_lock);
-	tmp_ds = _data_server_lookup_locked(dsaddrs);
+	tmp_ds = _data_server_lookup_locked(net, dsaddrs);
 	if (tmp_ds == NULL) {
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ds->ds_addrs);
 		list_splice_init(dsaddrs, &ds->ds_addrs);
 		ds->ds_remotestr = remotestr;
 		refcount_set(&ds->ds_count, 1);
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ds->ds_node);
+		ds->ds_net = net;
 		ds->ds_clp = NULL;
 		list_add(&ds->ds_node, &nfs4_data_server_cache);
 		dprintk("%s add new data server %s\n", __func__,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#226 lore raw

PATCH 199/204 platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Support also NEC Lavie X1475JAS

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: John Chau <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a032f29a15412fab9f4352e0032836d51420a338 ]

Change get_thinkpad_model_data() to check for additional vendor name "NEC" in order to support NEC Lavie X1475JAS notebook (and perhaps more).

The reason of this works with minimal changes is because NEC Lavie X1475JAS is a Thinkpad inside. ACPI dumps reveals its OEM ID to be "LENOVO", BIOS version "R2PET30W" matches typical Lenovo BIOS version, the existence of HKEY of LEN0268, with DMI fw string is "R2PHT24W".

I compiled and tested with my own machine, attached the dmesg below as proof of work:

[    6.288932] thinkpad_acpi: ThinkPad ACPI Extras v0.26
[    6.288937] thinkpad_acpi: http://ibm-acpi.sf.net/
[    6.288938] thinkpad_acpi: ThinkPad BIOS R2PET30W (1.11 ), EC R2PHT24W
[    6.307000] thinkpad_acpi: radio switch found; radios are enabled
[    6.307030] thinkpad_acpi: This ThinkPad has standard ACPI backlight brightness control, supported by the ACPI video driver
[    6.307033] thinkpad_acpi: Disabling thinkpad-acpi brightness events by default...
[    6.320322] thinkpad_acpi: rfkill switch tpacpi_bluetooth_sw: radio is unblocked
[    6.371963] thinkpad_acpi: secondary fan control detected & enabled
[    6.391922] thinkpad_acpi: battery 1 registered (start 0, stop 85, behaviours: 0x7)
[    6.398375] input: ThinkPad Extra Buttons as /devices/platform/thinkpad_acpi/input/input13
---
 drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c +2 -0
index fbb9a5c7f8b82..441b7fb6b37af 100644
@@ -10112,6 +10112,8 @@ static int __must_check __init get_thinkpad_model_data(
 		tp->vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_IBM;
 	else if (dmi_name_in_vendors("LENOVO"))
 		tp->vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO;
+	else if (dmi_name_in_vendors("NEC"))
+		tp->vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO;
 	else
 		return 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#227 lore raw

PATCH 200/204 um: let make clean properly clean underlying SUBARCH as well

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ab09da75700e9d25c7dfbc7f7934920beb5e39b9 ]

Building the kernel with O= is affected by stale in-tree build artifacts.

So, if the source tree is not clean, Kbuild displays the following:

  $ make ARCH=um O=build defconfig
  make[1]: Entering directory '/.../linux/build'
  ***
  *** The source tree is not clean, please run 'make ARCH=um mrproper'
  *** in /.../linux
  ***
  make[2]: *** [/.../linux/Makefile:673: outputmakefile] Error 1
  make[1]: *** [/.../linux/Makefile:248: __sub-make] Error 2
  make[1]: Leaving directory '/.../linux/build'
  make: *** [Makefile:248: __sub-make] Error 2

Usually, running 'make mrproper' is sufficient for cleaning the source tree for out-of-tree builds.

However, building UML generates build artifacts not only in arch/um/, but also in the SUBARCH directory (i.e., arch/x86/). If in-tree stale files remain under arch/x86/, Kbuild will reuse them instead of creating new ones under the specified build directory.

This commit makes 'make ARCH=um clean' recurse into the SUBARCH directory.

---
 arch/um/Makefile | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/um/Makefile +1 -0
index 94cea8d46b222..daec900ed4631 100644
@@ -154,5 +154,6 @@ MRPROPER_DIRS += arch/$(SUBARCH)/include/generated
 archclean:
 	@find . \( -name '*.bb' -o -name '*.bbg' -o -name '*.da' \
 		-o -name '*.gcov' \) -type f -print | xargs rm -f
+	$(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile ARCH=$(HEADER_ARCH) clean
 
 export HEADER_ARCH SUBARCH USER_CFLAGS CFLAGS_NO_HARDENING OS DEV_NULL_PATH
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#228 lore raw

PATCH 201/204 spi: spi-sun4i: fix early activation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alessandro Grassi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fb98bd0a13de2c9d96cb5c00c81b5ca118ac9d71 ]

The SPI interface is activated before the CPOL setting is applied. In that moment, the clock idles high and CS goes low. After a short delay, CPOL and other settings are applied, which may cause the clock to change state and idle low. This transition is not part of a clock cycle, and it can confuse the receiving device.

To prevent this unexpected transition, activate the interface while CPOL and the other settings are being applied.

---
 drivers/spi/spi-sun4i.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/spi/spi-sun4i.c +4 -1
index cbfac6596fad5..2bdac65789b62 100644
@@ -263,6 +263,9 @@ static int sun4i_spi_transfer_one(struct spi_master *master,
 	else
 		reg |= SUN4I_CTL_DHB;
 
+	/* Now that the settings are correct, enable the interface */
+	reg |= SUN4I_CTL_ENABLE;
+
 	sun4i_spi_write(sspi, SUN4I_CTL_REG, reg);
 
 	/* Ensure that we have a parent clock fast enough */
@@ -403,7 +406,7 @@ static int sun4i_spi_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 	}
 
 	sun4i_spi_write(sspi, SUN4I_CTL_REG,
-			SUN4I_CTL_ENABLE | SUN4I_CTL_MASTER | SUN4I_CTL_TP);
+			SUN4I_CTL_MASTER | SUN4I_CTL_TP);
 
 	return 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#229 lore raw

PATCH 202/204 platform/x86: fujitsu-laptop: Support Lifebook S2110 hotkeys

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Valtteri Koskivuori <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a7e255ff9fe4d9b8b902023aaf5b7a673786bb50 ]

The S2110 has an additional set of media playback control keys enabled by a hardware toggle button that switches the keys between "Application" and "Player" modes. Toggling "Player" mode just shifts the scancode of each hotkey up by 4.

Add defines for new scancodes, and a keymap and dmi id for the S2110.

Tested on a Fujitsu Lifebook S2110.

---
 drivers/platform/x86/fujitsu-laptop.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/x86/fujitsu-laptop.c +29 -4
index 80929380ec7e3..04ccfdd99e277 100644
@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@
 /*
  * fujitsu-laptop.c - Fujitsu laptop support, providing access to additional
  * features made available on a range of Fujitsu laptops including the
- * P2xxx/P5xxx/S6xxx/S7xxx series.
+ * P2xxx/P5xxx/S2xxx/S6xxx/S7xxx series.
  *
  * This driver implements a vendor-specific backlight control interface for
  * Fujitsu laptops and provides support for hotkeys present on certain Fujitsu
  * laptops.
  *
- * This driver has been tested on a Fujitsu Lifebook S6410, S7020 and
+ * This driver has been tested on a Fujitsu Lifebook S2110, S6410, S7020 and
  * P8010.  It should work on most P-series and S-series Lifebooks, but
  * YMMV.
  *
@@ -102,7 +102,11 @@
 #define KEY2_CODE			0x411
 #define KEY3_CODE			0x412
 #define KEY4_CODE			0x413
-#define KEY5_CODE			0x420
+#define KEY5_CODE			0x414
+#define KEY6_CODE			0x415
+#define KEY7_CODE			0x416
+#define KEY8_CODE			0x417
+#define KEY9_CODE			0x420
 
 /* Hotkey ringbuffer limits */
 #define MAX_HOTKEY_RINGBUFFER_SIZE	100
@@ -450,7 +454,7 @@ static const struct key_entry keymap_default[] = {
 	{ KE_KEY, KEY2_CODE,            { KEY_PROG2 } },
 	{ KE_KEY, KEY3_CODE,            { KEY_PROG3 } },
 	{ KE_KEY, KEY4_CODE,            { KEY_PROG4 } },
-	{ KE_KEY, KEY5_CODE,            { KEY_RFKILL } },
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY9_CODE,            { KEY_RFKILL } },
 	/* Soft keys read from status flags */
 	{ KE_KEY, FLAG_RFKILL,          { KEY_RFKILL } },
 	{ KE_KEY, FLAG_TOUCHPAD_TOGGLE, { KEY_TOUCHPAD_TOGGLE } },
@@ -474,6 +478,18 @@ static const struct key_entry keymap_p8010[] = {
 	{ KE_END, 0 }
 };
 
+static const struct key_entry keymap_s2110[] = {
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY1_CODE, { KEY_PROG1 } }, /* "A" */
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY2_CODE, { KEY_PROG2 } }, /* "B" */
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY3_CODE, { KEY_WWW } },   /* "Internet" */
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY4_CODE, { KEY_EMAIL } }, /* "E-mail" */
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY5_CODE, { KEY_STOPCD } },
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY6_CODE, { KEY_PLAYPAUSE } },
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY7_CODE, { KEY_PREVIOUSSONG } },
+	{ KE_KEY, KEY8_CODE, { KEY_NEXTSONG } },
+	{ KE_END, 0 }
+};
+
 static const struct key_entry *keymap = keymap_default;
 
 static int fujitsu_laptop_dmi_keymap_override(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
@@ -511,6 +527,15 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id fujitsu_laptop_dmi_table[] = {
 		},
 		.driver_data = (void *)keymap_p8010
 	},
+	{
+		.callback = fujitsu_laptop_dmi_keymap_override,
+		.ident = "Fujitsu LifeBook S2110",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "FUJITSU SIEMENS"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "LIFEBOOK S2110"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = (void *)keymap_s2110
+	},
 	{}
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#230 lore raw

PATCH 203/204 platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Ignore battery threshold change event notification

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Pearson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 29e4e6b4235fefa5930affb531fe449cac330a72 ]

If user modifies the battery charge threshold an ACPI event is generated. Confirmed with Lenovo FW team this is only generated on user event. As no action is needed, ignore the event and prevent spurious kernel logs.

---
 drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c +5 -0
index 441b7fb6b37af..9eb74d9e1519c 100644
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ enum tpacpi_hkey_event_t {
 	/* Thermal events */
 	TP_HKEY_EV_ALARM_BAT_HOT	= 0x6011, /* battery too hot */
 	TP_HKEY_EV_ALARM_BAT_XHOT	= 0x6012, /* battery critically hot */
+	TP_HKEY_EV_ALARM_BAT_LIM_CHANGE	= 0x6013, /* battery charge limit changed*/
 	TP_HKEY_EV_ALARM_SENSOR_HOT	= 0x6021, /* sensor too hot */
 	TP_HKEY_EV_ALARM_SENSOR_XHOT	= 0x6022, /* sensor critically hot */
 	TP_HKEY_EV_THM_TABLE_CHANGED	= 0x6030, /* windows; thermal table changed */
@@ -4059,6 +4060,10 @@ static bool hotkey_notify_6xxx(const u32 hkey,
 		pr_alert("THERMAL EMERGENCY: battery is extremely hot!\n");
 		/* recommended action: immediate sleep/hibernate */
 		break;
+	case TP_HKEY_EV_ALARM_BAT_LIM_CHANGE:
+		pr_debug("Battery Info: battery charge threshold changed\n");
+		/* User changed charging threshold. No action needed */
+		return true;
 	case TP_HKEY_EV_ALARM_SENSOR_HOT:
 		pr_crit("THERMAL ALARM: a sensor reports something is too hot!\n");
 		/* recommended action: warn user through gui, that */
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author maintainer
#231 lore raw

PATCH 204/204 xen/swiotlb: relax alignment requirements

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>

commit 85fcb57c983f423180ba6ec5d0034242da05cc54 upstream.

When mapping a buffer for DMA via .map_page or .map_sg DMA operations, there is no need to check the machine frames to be aligned according to the mapped areas size. All what is needed in these cases is that the buffer is contiguous at machine level.

So carve out the alignment check from range_straddles_page_boundary() and move it to a helper called by xen_swiotlb_alloc_coherent() and xen_swiotlb_free_coherent() directly.

---
 drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c |   18 +++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c +11 -7
@@ -85,19 +85,21 @@ static inline dma_addr_t xen_virt_to_bus
 	return xen_phys_to_bus(virt_to_phys(address));
 }
 
+static inline bool range_requires_alignment(phys_addr_t p, size_t size)
+{
+	phys_addr_t algn = 1ULL << (get_order(size) + PAGE_SHIFT);
+	phys_addr_t bus_addr = pfn_to_bfn(XEN_PFN_DOWN(p)) << XEN_PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	return IS_ALIGNED(p, algn) && !IS_ALIGNED(bus_addr, algn);
+}
+
 static inline int range_straddles_page_boundary(phys_addr_t p, size_t size)
 {
 	unsigned long next_bfn, xen_pfn = XEN_PFN_DOWN(p);
 	unsigned int i, nr_pages = XEN_PFN_UP(xen_offset_in_page(p) + size);
-	phys_addr_t algn = 1ULL << (get_order(size) + PAGE_SHIFT);
 
 	next_bfn = pfn_to_bfn(xen_pfn);
 
-	/* If buffer is physically aligned, ensure DMA alignment. */
-	if (IS_ALIGNED(p, algn) &&
-	    !IS_ALIGNED((phys_addr_t)next_bfn << XEN_PAGE_SHIFT, algn))
-		return 1;
-
 	for (i = 1; i < nr_pages; i++)
 		if (pfn_to_bfn(++xen_pfn) != ++next_bfn)
 			return 1;
@@ -320,7 +322,8 @@ xen_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device
 	phys = *dma_handle;
 	dev_addr = xen_phys_to_bus(phys);
 	if (((dev_addr + size - 1 <= dma_mask)) &&
-	    !range_straddles_page_boundary(phys, size))
+	    !range_straddles_page_boundary(phys, size) &&
+	    !range_requires_alignment(phys, size))
 		*dma_handle = dev_addr;
 	else {
 		if (xen_create_contiguous_region(phys, order,
@@ -360,6 +363,7 @@ xen_swiotlb_free_coherent(struct device
 
 	if (!WARN_ON((dev_addr + size - 1 > dma_mask) ||
 		     range_straddles_page_boundary(phys, size)) &&
+	    !range_requires_alignment(phys, size) &&
 	    TestClearPageXenRemapped(page))
 		xen_destroy_contiguous_region(phys, order);
 
Tested-by on the v1 series
#232 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.294 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jun 2025 13:42:20 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.294-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:

There is a new warning showing up due to:

commit d2dd45288b46f39ee8ee8756d14dadd63b64b14a

Author: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Apr 22 20:30:25 2025 +0900

tracing: Fix oob write in trace_seq_to_buffer()

as seen below:

In file included from ./include/asm-generic/bug.h:19,

                 from ./arch/arm/include/asm/bug.h:60,
                 from ./include/linux/bug.h:5,
                 from ./include/linux/mmdebug.h:5,
                 from ./include/linux/mm.h:9,
                 from ./include/linux/ring_buffer.h:5,
                 from kernel/trace/trace.c:15:

kernel/trace/trace.c: In function 'tracing_splice_read_pipe':
./include/linux/kernel.h:843:43: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast
843 | (!!(sizeof((typeof(x) *)1 == (typeof(y) *)1)))
| ^~
./include/linux/kernel.h:857:18: note: in expansion of macro '__typecheck'
857 | (__typecheck(x, y) && __no_side_effects(x, y))

      |                  ^~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/kernel.h:867:31: note: in expansion of macro '__safe_cmp'
  867 |         __builtin_choose_expr(__safe_cmp(x, y), \
      |                               ^~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/kernel.h:876:25: note: in expansion of macro '__careful_cmp'
  876 | #define min(x, y)       __careful_cmp(x, y, <)
      |                         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~

kernel/trace/trace.c:6334:43: note: in expansion of macro 'min'
6334 |
min((size_t)trace_seq_used(&iter->seq),
| ^~~

Signature · 1 line
Florian
Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#233 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.294 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jun 2025 13:42:20 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.294-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

NOTE:
As other reported,
Here is the build warning on arm with clang-20 and gcc-12

kernel/trace/trace.c:6334:8: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types ('typeof ((size_t)trace_seq_used(&iter->seq)) *' (aka 'unsigned int *') and 'typeof (((1UL) << 12)) *' (aka 'unsigned long *')) [-Wcompare-distinct-pointer-types]
6334 |
min((size_t)trace_seq_used(&iter->seq),

      |
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 6335 |                                                   PAGE_SIZE));
      |                                                   ~~~~~~~~~~

This build warning is due to,
tracing: Fix oob write in trace_seq_to_buffer() commit f5178c41bb43444a6008150fe6094497135d07cb upstream.

## Build arm log
Build link: https://storage.tuxsuite.com/public/linaro/lkft/builds/2xxMDrYnM37m3B0qZbAdLmnoeQ6/
Build config: https://storage.tuxsuite.com/public/linaro/lkft/builds/2xxMDrYnM37m3B0qZbAdLmnoeQ6/config

## steps to reproduce
- tuxmake --runtime podman --target-arch arm --toolchain clang-20
--kconfig vexpress_defconfig LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=0

## Build
* kernel: 5.4.294-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git commit: dbf9e583326d679bc41fbbee9302d2f0ec8e01b2
* git describe: v5.4.293-205-gdbf9e583326d
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.4.y/build/v5.4.293-205-gdbf9e583326d

## Test Regressions (compared to v5.4.292-180-gd5e62da0f6d5)

## Metric Regressions (compared to v5.4.292-180-gd5e62da0f6d5)

## Test Fixes (compared to v5.4.292-180-gd5e62da0f6d5)

## Metric Fixes (compared to v5.4.292-180-gd5e62da0f6d5)

## Test result summary
total: 45395, pass: 32893, fail: 2231, skip: 10140, xfail: 131

## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 131 total, 131 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 31 total, 29 passed, 2 failed
* i386: 18 total, 13 passed, 5 failed
* mips: 25 total, 25 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 3 total, 0 passed, 3 failed
* powerpc: 26 total, 26 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 9 total, 3 passed, 6 failed
* s390: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 27 total, 27 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-x86
* kunit
* lava
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-build-clang
* log-parser-build-gcc
* log-parser-test
* ltp-capability
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Tested-by on the v1 series
#234 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.294 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jun 2025 13:42:20 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.294-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Tested-by on the v1 series
#235 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jun 2025 13:42:20 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/ 

v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.294-rc1.gz__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ! J6pJroisoISUtldxNLLNVGnkvgEjGsbCZoajtOyvledDnWtv3FKmjfXeyFoe0fxRN5q4r2IeQ3Tq045ESnyZuZ_RPw$ or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

No problems seen on x86_64 and aarch64 with our testing.

Thanks,
Alok

maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#236 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.294 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Jun 2025 13:42:20 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.294-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.4:

    10 builds:	10 pass, 0 fail
    24 boots:	24 pass, 0 fail
    54 tests:	54 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.4.294-rc1-gdbf9e583326d
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon