screen: fix CVE-2025-46802
PATCH 1/2 screen: fix CVE-2025-46802
From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
For a short time they PTY is set to mode 666, allowing any user on the system to connect to the screen session.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-46802
Upstream-patch:
https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?id=049b26b22e197ba3be9c46e5c193032e01a4724a
--- .../screen/screen/CVE-2025-46802.patch | 146 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.9.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 147 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2025-46802.patch
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2025-46802.patch new file +146 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +From 049b26b22e197ba3be9c46e5c193032e01a4724a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthias Gerstner <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 15:15:38 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2025-46802: attacher.c - prevent temporary 0666 mode + on PTYs + +This temporary chmod of the PTY to mode 0666 is most likely a remnant of +past times, before the PTY file descriptor was passed to the target +session via the UNIX domain socket. + +This chmod() causes a race condition during which any other user in the +system can open the PTY for reading and writing, and thus allows PTY +hijacking. + +Simply remove this logic completely. + +CVE: CVE-2025-46802 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?id=049b26b22e197ba3be9c46e5c193032e01a4724a] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + attacher.c | 27 --------------------------- + screen.c | 19 ------------------- + 2 files changed, 46 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/attacher.c b/attacher.c +index c35ae7a..16b151e 100644 +--- a/attacher.c ++++ b/attacher.c +@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ extern int MasterPid, attach_fd; + #ifdef MULTIUSER + extern char *multi; + extern int multiattach, multi_uid, own_uid; +-extern int tty_mode, tty_oldmode; + # ifndef USE_SETEUID + static int multipipe[2]; + # endif +@@ -160,9 +159,6 @@ int how; + + if (pipe(multipipe)) + Panic(errno, "pipe"); +- if (chmod(attach_tty, 0666)) +- Panic(errno, "chmod %s", attach_tty); +- tty_oldmode = tty_mode; + eff_uid = -1; /* make UserContext fork */ + real_uid = multi_uid; + if ((ret = UserContext()) <= 0) +@@ -174,11 +170,6 @@ int how; + Panic(errno, "UserContext"); + close(multipipe[1]); + read(multipipe[0], &dummy, 1); +- if (tty_oldmode >= 0) +- { +- chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode); +- tty_oldmode = -1; +- } + ret = UserStatus(); + #ifdef LOCK + if (ret == SIG_LOCK) +@@ -224,9 +215,6 @@ int how; + xseteuid(multi_uid); + xseteuid(own_uid); + #endif +- if (chmod(attach_tty, 0666)) +- Panic(errno, "chmod %s", attach_tty); +- tty_oldmode = tty_mode; + } + # endif /* USE_SETEUID */ + #endif /* MULTIUSER */ +@@ -423,13 +411,6 @@ int how; + ContinuePlease = 0; + # ifndef USE_SETEUID + close(multipipe[1]); +-# else +- xseteuid(own_uid); +- if (tty_oldmode >= 0) +- if (chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode)) +- Panic(errno, "chmod %s", attach_tty); +- tty_oldmode = -1; +- xseteuid(real_uid); + # endif + } + #endif +@@ -505,14 +486,6 @@ AttacherFinit SIGDEFARG + close(s); + } + } +-#ifdef MULTIUSER +- if (tty_oldmode >= 0) +- { +- if (setuid(own_uid)) +- Panic(errno, "setuid"); +- chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode); +- } +-#endif + exit(0); + SIGRETURN; + } +diff --git a/screen.c b/screen.c +index 7653cd1..1a23e1a 100644 +--- a/screen.c ++++ b/screen.c +@@ -230,8 +230,6 @@ char *multi_home; + int multi_uid; + int own_uid; + int multiattach; +-int tty_mode; +-int tty_oldmode = -1; + #endif + + char HostName[MAXSTR]; +@@ -1009,9 +1007,6 @@ int main(int ac, char** av) + + /* ttyname implies isatty */ + SetTtyname(true, &st); +-#ifdef MULTIUSER +- tty_mode = (int)st.st_mode & 0777; +-#endif + + fl = fcntl(0, F_GETFL, 0); + if (fl != -1 && (fl & (O_RDWR|O_RDONLY|O_WRONLY)) == O_RDWR) +@@ -2170,20 +2165,6 @@ DEFINE_VARARGS_FN(Panic) + if (D_userpid) + Kill(D_userpid, SIG_BYE); + } +-#ifdef MULTIUSER +- if (tty_oldmode >= 0) { +- +-# ifdef USE_SETEUID +- if (setuid(own_uid)) +- xseteuid(own_uid); /* may be a loop. sigh. */ +-# else +- setuid(own_uid); +-# endif +- +- debug1("Panic: changing back modes from %s\n", attach_tty); +- chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode); +- } +-#endif + eexit(1); + } + +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.9.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/screen/screen-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0002-comm.h-now-depends-on-term.h.patch \ file://0001-fix-for-multijob-build.patch \ file://0001-Remove-more-compatibility-stuff.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-46802.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "26cef3e3c42571c0d484ad6faf110c5c15091fbf872b06fa7aa4766c7405ac69"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
PATCH 2/2 screen: fix CVE-2025-46804
From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A minor information leak when running Screen with setuid-root privileges allosw unprivileged users to deduce information about a path that would otherwise not be available.
Affected are older Screen versions, as well as version 5.0.0.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-46804
Upstream-patch:
https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?id=e0eef5aac453fa98a2664416a56c50ad1d00cb30
--- .../screen/screen/CVE-2025-46804.patch | 131 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.9.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2025-46804.patch
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen/CVE-2025-46804.patch new file +131 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From e0eef5aac453fa98a2664416a56c50ad1d00cb30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthias Gerstner <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 15:26:11 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2025-46804: avoid file existence test information + leaks + +In setuid-root context the current error messages give away whether +certain paths not accessible by the real user exist and what type they +have. To prevent this only output generic error messages in setuid-root +context. + +In some situations, when an error is pertaining a directory and the +directory is owner by the real user then we can still output more +detailed diagnostics. + +This change can lead to less helpful error messages when Screen is +install setuid-root. More complex changes would be needed to avoid this +(e.g. only open the `SocketPath` with raised privileges when +multi-attach is requested). + +There might still be lingering some code paths that allow such +information leaks, since `SocketPath` is a global variable that is used +across the code base. The majority of issues should be caught with this +fix, however. + +CVE: CVE-2025-46804 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/screen.git/commit/?id=e0eef5aac453fa98a2664416a56c50ad1d00cb30] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + screen.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + socket.c | 9 +++++++-- + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/screen.c b/screen.c +index 1a23e1a..6eec151 100644 +--- a/screen.c ++++ b/screen.c +@@ -1122,15 +1122,28 @@ int main(int ac, char** av) + #endif + } + +- if (stat(SockPath, &st) == -1) +- Panic(errno, "Cannot access %s", SockPath); +- else +- if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) ++ if (stat(SockPath, &st) == -1) { ++ if (eff_uid == real_uid) { ++ Panic(errno, "Cannot access %s", SockPath); ++ } else { ++ Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath); ++ } ++ } else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { ++ if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) { + Panic(0, "%s is not a directory.", SockPath); ++ } else { ++ Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath); ++ } ++ } + #ifdef MULTIUSER + if (multi) { +- if ((int)st.st_uid != multi_uid) +- Panic(0, "%s is not the owner of %s.", multi, SockPath); ++ if ((int)st.st_uid != multi_uid) { ++ if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) { ++ Panic(0, "%s is not the owner of %s.", multi, SockPath); ++ } else { ++ Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath); ++ } ++ } + } + else + #endif +@@ -1144,9 +1157,13 @@ int main(int ac, char** av) + Panic(0, "You are not the owner of %s.", SockPath); + #endif + } +- +- if ((st.st_mode & 0777) != 0700) +- Panic(0, "Directory %s must have mode 700.", SockPath); ++ if ((st.st_mode & 0777) != 0700) { ++ if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) { ++ Panic(0, "Directory %s must have mode 700.", SockPath); ++ } else { ++ Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath); ++ } ++ } + if (SockMatch && index(SockMatch, '/')) + Panic(0, "Bad session name '%s'", SockMatch); + SockName = SockPath + strlen(SockPath) + 1; +@@ -1184,8 +1201,14 @@ int main(int ac, char** av) + else + exit(9 + (fo || oth ? 1 : 0) + fo); + } +- if (fo == 0) +- Panic(0, "No Sockets found in %s.\n", SockPath); ++ if (fo == 0) { ++ if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) { ++ Panic(0, "No Sockets found in %s.\n", SockPath); ++ } else { ++ Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath); ++ } ++ } ++ + Msg(0, "%d Socket%s in %s.", fo, fo > 1 ? "s" : "", SockPath); + eexit(0); + } +diff --git a/socket.c b/socket.c +index 54d8cb8..6c3502f 100644 +--- a/socket.c ++++ b/socket.c +@@ -169,8 +169,13 @@ bool *is_sock; + xsetegid(real_gid); + #endif + +- if ((dirp = opendir(SockPath)) == 0) +- Panic(errno, "Cannot opendir %s", SockPath); ++ if ((dirp = opendir(SockPath)) == 0) { ++ if (eff_uid == real_uid) { ++ Panic(errno, "Cannot opendir %s", SockPath); ++ } else { ++ Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath); ++ } ++ } + + slist = 0; + slisttail = &slist; +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/screen/screen_4.9.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/screen/screen-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-fix-for-multijob-build.patch \ file://0001-Remove-more-compatibility-stuff.patch \ file://CVE-2025-46802.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-46804.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "26cef3e3c42571c0d484ad6faf110c5c15091fbf872b06fa7aa4766c7405ac69"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0