tty: replace capable() with file_ns_capable()
PATCH 1/1 tty: replace capable() with file_ns_capable()
The TIOCCONS ioctl currently uses capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to check for privileges, which validates the current task's credentials. Since this ioctl acts on an open file descriptor, the check should instead use the file opener's credentials.
Replace capable() with file_ns_capable() to ensure the capability is checked against file->f_cred in the correct user namespace. This prevents unintended privilege escalation and aligns with best practices for secure ioctl implementations.
--- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/tty_io.c +4 -1
@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/termios_internal.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/kbd_kern.h> #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
@@ -2379,7 +2382,7 @@ static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg)*/ static int tioccons (struct file *file) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!file_ns_capable (file, file->f_cred->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (file->f_op->write_iter == redirected_tty_write) {struct file *f;
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 31 lines · Pranav Tyagi
The TIOCCONS ioctl currently uses
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)to check for privileges, which validates the current task's credentials. Since this ioctl acts on an open file descriptor, the check should instead use the file opener's credentials.Replace
capable()withfile_ns_capable()to ensure the capability is checked againstfile->f_credin the correct user namespace. This prevents unintended privilege escalation and aligns with best practices for secure ioctl implementations.Signed-off-by Pranav Tyagi <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/tty/tty_io.c +3
-0@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/termios_internal.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/kbd_kern.h> #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
drivers/tty/tty_io.c static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg) · line 2385
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/tty/tty_io.c +1
-1@@ -2379,7 +2382,7 @@ static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg)*/ static int tioccons (struct file *file) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!file_ns_capable (file, file->f_cred->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))
As you now are affecting the user/kernel api here, how was this tested and are you _SURE_ this is the correct thing to be doing? Did you audit all userspace users of this ioctl that you can find (i.e. a Debian code search) to verify that they can handle this change in behaviour?
I need a lot of assurances before being able to take a change like this, for obvious reasons.
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 44 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 31 lines · Pranav Tyagi
The TIOCCONS ioctl currently uses
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)to check for privileges, which validates the current task's credentials. Since this ioctl acts on an open file descriptor, the check should instead use the file opener's credentials.Replace
capable()withfile_ns_capable()to ensure the capability is checked againstfile->f_credin the correct user namespace. This prevents unintended privilege escalation and aligns with best practices for secure ioctl implementations.Signed-off-by Pranav Tyagi <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/tty/tty_io.c +3
-0@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/termios_internal.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/kbd_kern.h> #include <linux/vt_kern.h> drivers/tty/tty_io.c static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg) · line 2385
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/tty/tty_io.c +1
-1@@ -2379,7 +2382,7 @@ static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg)*/ static int tioccons (struct file *file) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!file_ns_capable (file, file->f_cred->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))As you now are affecting the user/kernel api here, how was this tested and are you _SURE_ this is the correct thing to be doing? Did you audit all userspace users of this ioctl that you can find (i.e. a Debian code search) to verify that they can handle this change in behaviour?
Quoted 6 lines
I need a lot of assurances before being able to take a change like this, for obvious reasons.
thanks,
greg k-h
Hi,
Thank you for the feedback.
I could not find any existing selftests specifically targeting TIOCCONS. If there are any related ones, I’d appreciate it if you could point me in the right direction.
Given that, I had to write a standalone functional test to exercise this ioctl and validate the permission behavior with the proposed change. I’ll share the test code and output shortly.
I'm also in the process of auditing userspace tools that use TIOCCONS, using Debian Code Search as suggested. That is taking a bit of time, but I’ll include the findings in my next update.
In addition, I plan to run integration tests with a few known tools that rely on TIOCCONS and will report those results as well.
I’d appreciate a bit more time to complete this work and ensure all bases are covered before resubmitting.
Regards
Pranav Tyagi
Quoted 4 lines · On Sat, 7 Jun 2025 19:11:14 +0530 Pranav Tyagi <[email protected]>…
The TIOCCONS ioctl currently uses
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)to check for privileges, which validates the current task's credentials. Since this ioctl acts on an open file descriptor, the check should instead use the file opener's credentials.
Is that right?
A terminal will have been opened before the login sequence changed the user id.
The 'best practise' might be to check both!
David
Quoted 35 lines
Replace
capable()withfile_ns_capable()to ensure the capability is checked againstfile->f_credin the correct user namespace. This prevents unintended privilege escalation and aligns with best practices for secure ioctl implementations.Signed-off-by Pranav Tyagi <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/tty/tty_io.c +4
-1@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/termios_internal.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/kbd_kern.h> #include <linux/vt_kern.h> @@ -2379,7 +2382,7 @@ static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg)*/ static int tioccons (struct file *file) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!file_ns_capable (file, file->f_cred->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (file->f_op->write_iter == redirected_tty_write) {struct file *f;
Quoted 9 lines · David Laight
Quoted 4 lines · On Sat, 7 Jun 2025 19:11:14 +0530 Pranav Tyagi <[email protected]>…
The TIOCCONS ioctl currently uses
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)to check for privileges, which validates the current task's credentials. Since this ioctl acts on an open file descriptor, the check should instead use the file opener's credentials.
Quoted 6 lines
Is that right?
A terminal will have been opened before the login sequence changed the user id.The 'best practise' might be to check both!
David
Hi,
You're right — I hadn’t fully considered that the terminal is typically opened before the user ID changes during login. Checking only the file opener's credentials may miss important security context.
Best practice would indeed be to validate both: ensure that the current task has sufficient privileges and that the file was opened by an authorized user.
Thanks for pointing this out — I’ll revise the patch accordingly.
Regards
Pranav Tyagi
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 36 lines
Replace
capable()withfile_ns_capable()to ensure the capability is checked againstfile->f_credin the correct user namespace. This prevents unintended privilege escalation and aligns with best practices for secure ioctl implementations.Signed-off-by Pranav Tyagi <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/tty/tty_io.c +4
-1@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/termios_internal.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/kbd_kern.h> #include <linux/vt_kern.h> @@ -2379,7 +2382,7 @@ static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg)*/ static int tioccons (struct file *file) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!file_ns_capable (file, file->f_cred->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (file->f_op->write_iter == redirected_tty_write) {struct file *f;