Retbleed fixes
Subsystems (2)
Pawan Gupta
reviewerv4 cover Retbleed fixes
v4:
- Replace the warning message in set_return_thunk() with an info. (Borislav)
- Collected tags.
- Rebased to v6.16-rc1.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
- Get rid of AUTO check in retbleed mitigation. (Borislav)
- Update commit message to mention the preparatory patch. (Nikolay)
- Collected tags.
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
- Split the ITS stuffing patch into smaller patches. (Borislav)
- Zap spectre_v2_in_retpoline_mode() helper. (Borislav)
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
This series untangles retbleed and ITS mitigation.
---
Pawan Gupta (7):
x86/retbleed: Avoid AUTO after the select step x86/retbleed: Simplify the =stuff checks x86/bugs: Avoid warning when overriding return thunk x86/its: Use switch/case to apply mitigation x86/retbleed: Introduce cdt_possible() x86/its: Remove =stuff dependency on retbleed x86/its: Allow stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 19272b37aa4f83ca52bdf9c16d5d81bdd1354494
change-id: 20250520-eibrs-fix-6c452b697dbf
Best regards,
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Pawan
Pawan Gupta
reviewerPATCH v4 1/7 x86/retbleed: Avoid AUTO after the select step
Retbleed select function leaves the mitigation to AUTO in some cases. Moreover, the update function can also set the mitigation to AUTO. This is inconsistent with other mitigations and requires explicit handling of AUTO at the end of update step.
Make sure a mitigation gets selected in the select step, and do not change it to AUTO in the update step. When no mitigation can be selected leave it to NONE, which is what AUTO was getting changed to in the end.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +10 -9
@@ -1247,6 +1247,14 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ; else retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; + }else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor ==X86_VENDOR_INTEL ) { +/* Final mitigation depends on spectre-v2 selection */ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED )) + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS ; +else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBRS )) + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS ; +else + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; } }
@@ -1255,9 +1263,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_RETBLEED ) ||cpu_mitigations_off ())return ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ) - goto out; -/* * retbleed=stuff is only allowed on Intel. If stuffing can't be used * then a different mitigation will be selected below.
@@ -1268,7 +1273,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void) its_mitigation == ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF) {if (spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) {pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_AUTO ; + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; }else {if (retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF )pr_info ("Retbleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n" );
@@ -1294,15 +1299,11 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF )pr_err (RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG ); } -/* If nothing has set the mitigation yet, default to NONE. */ -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_AUTO ) - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; } -out: +pr_info ("%s\n" , retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } -static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation (void ) {bool mitigate_smt = false;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Avoid AUTO after the select step in the retbleed mitigation
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 98ff5c071d1cde9426b0bfa449c43d49ec58f1c4 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/98ff5c071d1cde9426b0bfa449c43d49ec58f1c4 Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:29:00 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:16:23 +02:00
x86/bugs: Avoid AUTO after the select step in the retbleed mitigation
The retbleed select function leaves the mitigation to AUTO in some cases. Moreover, the update function can also set the mitigation to AUTO. This is inconsistent with other mitigations and requires explicit handling of AUTO at the end of update step.
Make sure a mitigation gets selected in the select step, and do not change it to AUTO in the update step. When no mitigation can be selected leave it to NONE, which is what AUTO was getting changed to in the end.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +10 -9
@@ -1247,6 +1247,14 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ; else retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; + }else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor ==X86_VENDOR_INTEL ) { +/* Final mitigation depends on spectre-v2 selection */ +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED )) + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS ; +else if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBRS )) + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS ; +else + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; } }
@@ -1255,9 +1263,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_RETBLEED ) ||cpu_mitigations_off ())return ; -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ) - goto out; -/* * retbleed=stuff is only allowed on Intel. If stuffing can't be used * then a different mitigation will be selected below.
@@ -1268,7 +1273,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void) its_mitigation == ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF) {if (spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) {pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_AUTO ; + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; }else {if (retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF )pr_info ("Retbleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n" );
@@ -1294,15 +1299,11 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF )pr_err (RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG ); } -/* If nothing has set the mitigation yet, default to NONE. */ -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_AUTO ) - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; } -out: +pr_info ("%s\n" , retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } -static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation (void ) {bool mitigate_smt = false;
Pawan Gupta
reviewerPATCH v4 2/7 x86/retbleed: Simplify the =stuff checks
In reply to Pawan GuptaSimplify the nested checks, remove redundant print and comment.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +8 -16
@@ -1263,24 +1263,16 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_RETBLEED ) ||cpu_mitigations_off ())return ; -/* -* retbleed=stuff is only allowed on Intel. If stuffing can't be used -* then a different mitigation will be selected below. -* -* its=stuff will also attempt to enable stuffing. -*/ -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF || - its_mitigation ==ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF ) { -if (spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) { -pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; - }else { -if (retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ) -pr_info ("Retbleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n" ); +/* ITS can also enable stuffing */ +if (its_mitigation ==ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF ) + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ; - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ; - } +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF && + spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) { +pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; } +/* * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the * retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Simplify the retbleed=stuff checks
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 530e80648bff083e1d19ad7248c0540812a9a35f Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/530e80648bff083e1d19ad7248c0540812a9a35f Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:29:15 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:16:30 +02:00
x86/bugs: Simplify the retbleed=stuff checks
Simplify the nested checks, remove redundant print and comment.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +8 -16
@@ -1263,24 +1263,16 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_RETBLEED ) ||cpu_mitigations_off ())return ; -/* -* retbleed=stuff is only allowed on Intel. If stuffing can't be used -* then a different mitigation will be selected below. -* -* its=stuff will also attempt to enable stuffing. -*/ -if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF || - its_mitigation ==ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF ) { -if (spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) { -pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; - }else { -if (retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ) -pr_info ("Retbleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n" ); +/* ITS can also enable stuffing */ +if (its_mitigation ==ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF ) + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ; - retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ; - } +if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF && + spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) { +pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); + retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; } +/* * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the * retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing
Pawan Gupta
reviewerPATCH v4 3/7 x86/bugs: Avoid warning when overriding return thunk
In reply to Pawan GuptaThe purpose of the warning is to prevent an unexpected change to the return thunk mitigation. However, there are legitimate cases where the return thunk is intentionally set more than once. For example, ITS and SRSO both can set the return thunk after retbleed has set it. In both the cases retbleed is still mitigated.
Replace the warning with an info about the active return thunk.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -3
@@ -113,10 +113,9 @@ void (*x86_return_thunk)(void) __ro_after_init = __x86_return_thunk;static void __init set_return_thunk (void *thunk) { -if (x86_return_thunk != __x86_return_thunk) -pr_warn ("x86/bugs: return thunk changed\n" ); - x86_return_thunk = thunk; + +pr_info ("active return thunk: %ps\n" , thunk); }/* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Avoid warning when overriding return thunk
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 9f85fdb9fc5a1bd308a10a0a7d7e34f2712ba58b Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/9f85fdb9fc5a1bd308a10a0a7d7e34f2712ba58b Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:29:31 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:21:30 +02:00
x86/bugs: Avoid warning when overriding return thunk
The purpose of the warning is to prevent an unexpected change to the return thunk mitigation. However, there are legitimate cases where the return thunk is intentionally set more than once. For example, ITS and SRSO both can set the return thunk after retbleed has set it. In both the cases retbleed is still mitigated.
Replace the warning with an info about the active return thunk.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -3
@@ -113,10 +113,9 @@ void (*x86_return_thunk)(void) __ro_after_init = __x86_return_thunk;static void __init set_return_thunk (void *thunk) { -if (x86_return_thunk != __x86_return_thunk) -pr_warn ("x86/bugs: return thunk changed\n" ); - x86_return_thunk = thunk; + +pr_info ("active return thunk: %ps\n" , thunk); }/* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
Pawan Gupta
reviewerPATCH v4 4/7 x86/its: Use switch/case to apply mitigation
In reply to Pawan GuptaPrepare to apply stuffing mitigation in its_apply_mitigation(). This is currently only done via retbleed mitigation. Also using switch/case makes it evident that mitigation mode like VMEXIT_ONLY doesn't need any special handling.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +13 -7
@@ -1468,15 +1468,21 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void)static void __init its_apply_mitigation (void ) { +switch (its_mitigation) { +case ITS_MITIGATION_OFF : +case ITS_MITIGATION_AUTO : +case ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY :/* its=stuff forces retbleed stuffing and is enabled there. */ -if (its_mitigation !=ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS ) -return ; - -if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE )) -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS ); +case ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF : +break ; +case ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS : +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE )) +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS ); -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); -set_return_thunk (its_return_thunk); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); +set_return_thunk (its_return_thunk); +break ; + } }#undef pr_fmt
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Use switch/case in its_apply_mitigation()
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 7e44909e0ea8346ba08b244ecc275fc3394e2b8e Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/7e44909e0ea8346ba08b244ecc275fc3394e2b8e Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:29:47 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:22:44 +02:00
x86/bugs: Use switch/case in its_apply_mitigation()
Prepare to apply stuffing mitigation in its_apply_mitigation(). This is currently only done via retbleed mitigation. Also using switch/case makes it evident that mitigation mode like VMEXIT_ONLY doesn't need any special handling.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +13 -7
@@ -1468,15 +1468,21 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void)static void __init its_apply_mitigation (void ) { +switch (its_mitigation) { +case ITS_MITIGATION_OFF : +case ITS_MITIGATION_AUTO : +case ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY :/* its=stuff forces retbleed stuffing and is enabled there. */ -if (its_mitigation !=ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS ) -return ; - -if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE )) -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS ); +case ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF : +break ; +case ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS : +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE )) +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS ); -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); -set_return_thunk (its_return_thunk); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); +set_return_thunk (its_return_thunk); +break ; + } }#undef pr_fmt
Pawan Gupta
reviewerPATCH v4 5/7 x86/retbleed: Introduce cdt_possible()
In reply to Pawan GuptaIn preparation to allow ITS to also enable stuffing a.k.a. Call Depth Tracking(CDT) independently of retbleed, introduce a helper cdt_possible().
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +14 -1
@@ -1119,6 +1119,19 @@ early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init =SPECTRE_V2_NONE ; +/* Depends on spectre_v2 mitigation selected already */ +static inline bool cdt_possible (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING ) || + !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE )) +return false; + +if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) +return true; + +return false; +} +#undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
@@ -1267,7 +1280,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void) retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ;if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF && - spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) { + !cdt_possible (spectre_v2_enabled)) {pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Introduce cdt_possible()
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 8374a2719df2a00781e6821e373d7de71390d1b4 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8374a2719df2a00781e6821e373d7de71390d1b4 Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:30:03 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:26:57 +02:00
x86/bugs: Introduce cdt_possible()
In preparation to allow ITS to also enable stuffing aka Call Depth Tracking (CDT) independently of retbleed, introduce a helper cdt_possible().
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +14 -1
@@ -1119,6 +1119,19 @@ early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init =SPECTRE_V2_NONE ; +/* Depends on spectre_v2 mitigation selected already */ +static inline bool cdt_possible (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING ) || + !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE )) +return false; + +if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) +return true; + +return false; +} +#undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
@@ -1267,7 +1280,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void) retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ;if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF && - spectre_v2_enabled !=SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) { + !cdt_possible (spectre_v2_enabled)) {pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; }
Pawan Gupta
reviewerPATCH v4 6/7 x86/its: Remove =stuff dependency on retbleed
In reply to Pawan GuptaAllow ITS to enable stuffing independent of retbleed. The dependency is only on retpoline. It is a valid case for retbleed to be mitigated by eIBRS while ITS deploys stuffing at the same time.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6 -8
@@ -1467,13 +1467,8 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void)break ; } -/* -* retbleed_update_mitigation() will try to do stuffing if its=stuff. -* If it can't, such as if spectre_v2!=retpoline, then fall back to -* aligned thunks. -*/ if (its_mitigation ==ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF && - retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ) + !cdt_possible (spectre_v2_enabled)) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS ;pr_info ("%s\n" , its_strings[its_mitigation]);
@@ -1485,8 +1480,6 @@ static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void)case ITS_MITIGATION_OFF :case ITS_MITIGATION_AUTO :case ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY : -/* its=stuff forces retbleed stuffing and is enabled there. */ -case ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF :break ;case ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS :if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ))
@@ -1495,6 +1488,11 @@ static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void)setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK );set_return_thunk (its_return_thunk);break ; +case ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF : +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH ); +set_return_thunk (call_depth_return_thunk); +break ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Remove its=stuff dependency on retbleed
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: e2a9c03192f54bb53a5422bf5106bdc4d04a7426 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/e2a9c03192f54bb53a5422bf5106bdc4d04a7426 Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:30:18 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:29:04 +02:00
x86/bugs: Remove its=stuff dependency on retbleed
Allow ITS to enable stuffing independent of retbleed. The dependency is only on retpoline. It is a valid case for retbleed to be mitigated by eIBRS while ITS deploys stuffing at the same time.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6 -8
@@ -1467,13 +1467,8 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void)break ; } -/* -* retbleed_update_mitigation() will try to do stuffing if its=stuff. -* If it can't, such as if spectre_v2!=retpoline, then fall back to -* aligned thunks. -*/ if (its_mitigation ==ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF && - retbleed_mitigation !=RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ) + !cdt_possible (spectre_v2_enabled)) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS ;pr_info ("%s\n" , its_strings[its_mitigation]);
@@ -1485,8 +1480,6 @@ static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void)case ITS_MITIGATION_OFF :case ITS_MITIGATION_AUTO :case ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY : -/* its=stuff forces retbleed stuffing and is enabled there. */ -case ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF :break ;case ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS :if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ))
@@ -1495,6 +1488,11 @@ static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void)setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK );set_return_thunk (its_return_thunk);break ; +case ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF : +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH ); +set_return_thunk (call_depth_return_thunk); +break ; } }
Pawan Gupta
reviewerPATCH v4 7/7 x86/its: Allow stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
In reply to Pawan GuptaAfter a recent restructuring of ITS mitigation, RSB stuffing can no longer be enabled in eIBRS+Retpoline mode. Before ITS, retbleed mitigation only allowed stuffing when eIBRS was not enabled. This was perfectly fine since eIBRS mitigates retbleed.
However, RSB stuffing mitigation for ITS is still needed with eIBRS. The restructuring solely relies on retbleed to deploy stuffing, and does not allow it when eIBRS is enabled. This behavior is different from what was before the restructuring. Fix it by allowing stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -2
@@ -1126,7 +1126,8 @@ static inline bool cdt_possible(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE))return false; -if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) +if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE )return true;return false;
@@ -1281,7 +1282,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF && !cdt_possible (spectre_v2_enabled)) { -pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); +pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on retpoline\n" ); retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; }
@@ -1454,6 +1455,7 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_OFF ;break ;case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE : +case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE :/* Retpoline+CDT mitigates ITS */ if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Allow ITS stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: e88b1627b86eb756406ca0738c3db86351a58e4f Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/e88b1627b86eb756406ca0738c3db86351a58e4f Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:30:33 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 12:29:49 +02:00
x86/bugs: Allow ITS stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
After a recent restructuring of the ITS mitigation, RSB stuffing can no longer be enabled in eIBRS+Retpoline mode. Before ITS, retbleed mitigation only allowed stuffing when eIBRS was not enabled. This was perfectly fine since eIBRS mitigates retbleed.
However, RSB stuffing mitigation for ITS is still needed with eIBRS. The restructuring solely relies on retbleed to deploy stuffing, and does not allow it when eIBRS is enabled. This behavior is different from what was before the restructuring. Fix it by allowing stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -2
@@ -1126,7 +1126,8 @@ static inline bool cdt_possible(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE))return false; -if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) +if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE )return true;return false;
@@ -1281,7 +1282,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF && !cdt_possible (spectre_v2_enabled)) { -pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); +pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on retpoline\n" ); retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; }
@@ -1454,6 +1455,7 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_OFF ;break ;case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE : +case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE :/* Retpoline+CDT mitigates ITS */ if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF ;
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Allow ITS stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
In reply to Pawan GuptaThe following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: ab9f2388e0b99cd164ddbd74a6133d3070e2788d Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ab9f2388e0b99cd164ddbd74a6133d3070e2788d Author: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:30:33 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 14:12:41 +02:00
x86/bugs: Allow ITS stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
After a recent restructuring of the ITS mitigation, RSB stuffing can no longer be enabled in eIBRS+Retpoline mode. Before ITS, retbleed mitigation only allowed stuffing when eIBRS was not enabled. This was perfectly fine since eIBRS mitigates retbleed.
However, RSB stuffing mitigation for ITS is still needed with eIBRS. The restructuring solely relies on retbleed to deploy stuffing, and does not allow it when eIBRS is enabled. This behavior is different from what was before the restructuring. Fix it by allowing stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -2
@@ -1126,7 +1126,8 @@ static inline bool cdt_possible(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE))return false; -if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE ) +if (mode ==SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE )return true;return false;
@@ -1281,7 +1282,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF && !cdt_possible (spectre_v2_enabled)) { -pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n" ); +pr_err ("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on retpoline\n" ); retbleed_mitigation =RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE ; }
@@ -1454,6 +1455,7 @@ static void __init its_update_mitigation(void) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_OFF ;break ;case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE : +case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE :/* Retpoline+CDT mitigates ITS */ if (retbleed_mitigation ==RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF ) its_mitigation =ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF ;
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Pawan Gupta
Pawan Gupta (7):
x86/retbleed: Avoid AUTO after the select step x86/retbleed: Simplify the =stuff checks x86/bugs: Avoid warning when overriding return thunk x86/its: Use switch/case to apply mitigation x86/retbleed: Introducecdt_possible()x86/its: Remove =stuff dependency on retbleed x86/its: Allow stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
Note that the subject prefixes are "x86/bugs:" not the mitigations themselves.
https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/maintainer-tip.html#patch-subject
I've fixed them up.
Otherwise looks ok to me, lemme put them through the test.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePawan Gupta
reviewerQuoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Pawan Gupta
Pawan Gupta (7):
x86/retbleed: Avoid AUTO after the select step x86/retbleed: Simplify the =stuff checks x86/bugs: Avoid warning when overriding return thunk x86/its: Use switch/case to apply mitigation x86/retbleed: Introducecdt_possible()x86/its: Remove =stuff dependency on retbleed x86/its: Allow stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also
Quoted 3 lines
Note that the subject prefixes are "x86/bugs:" not the mitigations themselves.
https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/maintainer-tip.html#patch-subject
Ok.
Do you think also appending the vulnerability name like "x86/bugs/retbleed" would be useful for someone filtering commits based on vulnerability?
Quoted 1 line
I've fixed them up.
Thanks.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Pawan Gupta
Do you think also appending the vulnerability name like "x86/bugs/retbleed" would be useful for someone filtering commits based on vulnerability?
I've moved the vuln into the commit title. bugs.c is not that special enough to have it be an exception.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette