securityfs cleanups and fixes
Subsystems (7)
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 1/1 securityfs cleanups and fixes
Resurrected and somewhat fixed series of securityfs
cleanups and fixes:
* one extra reference is enough to pin a dentry down; no need for two. Switch to regular scheme, similar to shmem, debugfs, etc. - that fixes securityfs_recursive_remove() dentry leak, among other things.
* we need to have the filesystem pinned to prevent the contents disappearing; what we do not need is pinning it for each file. Doing that only for files and directories in the root is enough.
* the previous two changes allow to get rid of the racy kludges in efi_secret_unlink(), where we can use simple_unlink() instead of securityfs_remove(). Which does not require unlocking and relocking the parent, with all deadlocks that invites.
* Make securityfs_remove() take the entire subtree out, turning securityfs_recursive_remove() into its alias. Makes a lot more sense for callers and fixes a mount leak, while we are at it.
* Making securityfs_remove() remove the entire subtree allows for much simpler life in most of the users - efi_secret, ima_fs, evm, ipe, tmp get cleaner. I hadn't touched apparmor use of securityfs, but I suspect that it would be useful there as well.
Branch (6.16-rc1-based) lives ingit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs.git #work.securityfs Individual patches in followups.
Help with testing and review would be very welcome.
Shortlog:
securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough...
securityfs: pin filesystem only for objects directly in root fix locking in efi_secret_unlink()
make securityfs_remove() remove the entire subtree
efi_secret: clean securityfs use up
ima_fs: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
ima_fs: get rid of lookup-by-dentry stuff
evm_secfs: clear securityfs interactions
ipe: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
tpm: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
Diffstat:
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c | 46 +++------- drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 47 ++-------- include/linux/security.h | 3 +- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 +- security/inode.c | 62 +++++--------- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 15 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 137 +++++++----------------------- security/ipe/fs.c | 32 +++---- security/ipe/policy_fs.c | 4 +- 9 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-)
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 1/10 securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough...
incidentally, securityfs_recursive_remove() is broken without that - it leaks dentries, since simple_recursive_removal() does not expect anything of that sort. It could be worked around by dput() in remove_one() callback, but it's easier to just drop that double-get stuff.
--- security/inode.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
security/inode.c +0 -2
@@ -159,7 +159,6 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode->i_fop = fops; }d_instantiate (dentry, inode); -dget (dentry);inode_unlock (dir);return dentry;
@@ -306,7 +305,6 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)simple_rmdir (dir, dentry); elsesimple_unlink (dir ,dentry ); -dput (dentry); }inode_unlock (dir);simple_release_fs (&mount, &mount_count);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 2/10 securityfs: pin filesystem only for objects directly in root
Nothing on securityfs ever changes parents, so we don't need to pin the internal mount if it's already pinned for parent.
--- security/inode.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
security/inode.c +13 -8
@@ -112,18 +112,20 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,struct dentry *dentry;struct inode *dir, *inode;int error; +bool pinned = false;if (!(mode &S_IFMT )) mode = (mode &S_IALLUGO ) |S_IFREG ;pr_debug ("securityfs: creating file '%s'\n" ,name); - error =simple_pin_fs (&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count); -if (error) -return ERR_PTR (error); - -if (!parent) +if (!parent) { + error =simple_pin_fs (&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count); +if (error) +return ERR_PTR (error); + pinned = true; parent = mount->mnt_root; + } dir =d_inode (parent);
@@ -167,7 +169,8 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode, dentry =ERR_PTR (error); out:inode_unlock (dir); -simple_release_fs (&mount, &mount_count); +if (pinned) +simple_release_fs (&mount, &mount_count);return dentry; }
@@ -307,13 +310,15 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)simple_unlink (dir, dentry); }inode_unlock (dir); -simple_release_fs (&mount, &mount_count); +if (dir == dir->i_sb->s_root->d_inode) +simple_release_fs (&mount, &mount_count); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (securityfs_remove);static void remove_one (struct dentry *victim) { -simple_release_fs (&mount, &mount_count); +if (victim->d_parent == victim->d_sb->s_root) +simple_release_fs (&mount, &mount_count); }/**
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 3/10 fix locking in efi_secret_unlink()
In reply to Al ViroWe used to need securityfs_remove() to undo simple_pin_fs() done when the file had been created and to drop the second extra reference taken at the same time. Now that neither is needed (or done by securityfs_remove()), we can simply call simple_unlink() and be done with that - the broken games with locking had been there only for the sake of securityfs_remove().
--- drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 10 +--------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c +1 -9
@@ -136,15 +136,7 @@ static int efi_secret_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)if (s->fs_files[i] == dentry) s->fs_files[i] =NULL ; -/* -* securityfs_remove tries to lock the directory's inode, but we reach -* the unlink callback when it's already locked -*/ -inode_unlock (dir); -securityfs_remove (dentry); -inode_lock (dir); - -return 0 ; +return simple_unlink (inode, dentry); }static const struct inode_operations efi_secret_dir_inode_operations = {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 4/10 make securityfs_remove() remove the entire subtree
In reply to Al Viro... and fix the mount leak when anything's mounted there. securityfs_recursive_remove becomes an alias for securityfs_remove - we'll probably need to remove it in a cycle or two.
--- include/linux/security.h | 3 ++- security/inode.c | 47 +++++++++------------------------------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +2 -1
@@ -2211,7 +2211,6 @@ struct dentry *securityfs_create_symlink(const char *name,const char *target, const struct inode_operations *iops);extern void securityfs_remove (struct dentry *dentry); -extern void securityfs_recursive_remove (struct dentry *dentry);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */
@@ -2243,6 +2242,8 @@ static inline void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)#endif +#define securityfs_recursive_remove securityfs_remove +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL union bpf_attr ;struct bpf_map ;
security/inode.c +10 -37
67 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 5/10 efi_secret: clean securityfs use up
In reply to Al Virosecurityfs_remove() does take care of entire subtree now; no need to mess with them individually.
NB: ->i_op replacement in there is still buggy. One shouldn't ever modify ->i_op of live accessible inode.
--- drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 37 +++++------------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c +8 -29
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@struct efi_secret {struct dentry *secrets_dir; -struct dentry *fs_dir; -struct dentry *fs_files[EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES ];void __iomem *secret_data;u64 secret_data_len; };
@@ -119,10 +117,8 @@ static void wipe_memory(void *addr, size_t size)static int efi_secret_unlink (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry) { -struct efi_secret *s =efi_secret_get ();struct inode *inode =d_inode (dentry);struct secret_entry *e = (struct secret_entry *)inode->i_private; -int i;if (e) {/* Zero out the secret data */
@@ -132,10 +128,6 @@ static int efi_secret_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) inode->i_private =NULL ; -for (i =0 ; i <EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES ; i++) -if (s->fs_files[i] == dentry) - s->fs_files[i] =NULL ; -return simple_unlink (inode, dentry); }
@@ -186,15 +178,6 @@ static int efi_secret_map_area(struct platform_device *dev)static void efi_secret_securityfs_teardown (struct platform_device *dev) {struct efi_secret *s =efi_secret_get (); -int i; - -for (i = (EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES -1 ); i >=0 ; i--) { -securityfs_remove (s->fs_files[i]); - s->fs_files[i] =NULL ; - } - -securityfs_remove (s->fs_dir); - s->fs_dir =NULL ;securityfs_remove (s->secrets_dir); s->secrets_dir =NULL ;
@@ -209,7 +192,7 @@ static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(struct platform_device *dev)unsigned char *ptr;struct secret_header *h;struct secret_entry *e; -struct dentry *dent; +struct dentry *dent, *dir;char guid_str[EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN +1 ]; ptr = (void __force *)s->secret_data;
@@ -232,8 +215,6 @@ static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(struct platform_device *dev) } s->secrets_dir =NULL ; - s->fs_dir =NULL ; -memset (s->fs_files,0 ,sizeof (s->fs_files)); dent =securityfs_create_dir ("secrets" ,NULL );if (IS_ERR (dent)) {
@@ -243,14 +224,13 @@ static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(struct platform_device *dev) } s->secrets_dir = dent; - dent =securityfs_create_dir ("coco" , s->secrets_dir); -if (IS_ERR (dent)) { + dir =securityfs_create_dir ("coco" , s->secrets_dir); +if (IS_ERR (dir)) {dev_err (&dev->dev,"Error creating coco securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n" , -PTR_ERR (dent)); -return PTR_ERR (dent); +PTR_ERR (dir)); +return PTR_ERR (dir); } -d_inode (dent)->i_op = &efi_secret_dir_inode_operations; - s->fs_dir = dent; +d_inode (dir)->i_op = &efi_secret_dir_inode_operations; bytes_left = h->len -sizeof (*h); ptr +=sizeof (*h);
@@ -266,15 +246,14 @@ static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(struct platform_device *dev)if (efi_guidcmp (e->guid,NULL_GUID )) {efi_guid_to_str (&e->guid, guid_str); - dent =securityfs_create_file (guid_str,0440 , s->fs_dir, (void *)e, + dent =securityfs_create_file (guid_str,0440 , dir, (void *)e, &efi_secret_bin_file_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) {dev_err (&dev->dev,"Error creating efi_secret securityfs entry\n" ); ret =PTR_ERR (dent); goto err_cleanup; } - - s->fs_files[i++] = dent; + i++; } ptr += e->len; bytes_left -= e->len;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 6/10 ima_fs: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
In reply to Al Viroremoval of parent takes all children out
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 57 +++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +18 -39
@@ -396,11 +396,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,static struct dentry *ima_dir;static struct dentry *ima_symlink; -static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; -static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; -static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; -static struct dentry *violations; -static struct dentry *ima_policy;enum ima_fs_flags {IMA_FS_BUSY ,
@@ -419,14 +414,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {static void __init remove_securityfs_measurement_lists (struct dentry **lists) { -int i; - -if (lists) { -for (i =0 ; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) -securityfs_remove (lists[i]); - -kfree (lists); - } +kfree (lists); }static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists (void )
@@ -533,8 +521,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)ima_update_policy ();#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY ) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY ) -securityfs_remove (ima_policy); - ima_policy =NULL ; +securityfs_remove (file->f_path.dentry);#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY )clear_bit (IMA_FS_BUSY , &ima_fs_flags);#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY )
@@ -553,6 +540,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {int __init ima_fs_init (void ) { +struct dentry *dentry;int ret; ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists =NULL ;
@@ -573,54 +561,45 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)if (ret !=0 ) goto out; - binary_runtime_measurements = -securityfs_create_symlink ("binary_runtime_measurements" , ima_dir, + dentry =securityfs_create_symlink ("binary_runtime_measurements" , ima_dir,"binary_runtime_measurements_sha1" ,NULL ); -if (IS_ERR (binary_runtime_measurements)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (binary_runtime_measurements); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto out; } - ascii_runtime_measurements = -securityfs_create_symlink ("ascii_runtime_measurements" , ima_dir, + dentry =securityfs_create_symlink ("ascii_runtime_measurements" , ima_dir,"ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1" ,NULL ); -if (IS_ERR (ascii_runtime_measurements)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (ascii_runtime_measurements); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto out; } - runtime_measurements_count = -securityfs_create_file ("runtime_measurements_count" , + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("runtime_measurements_count" ,S_IRUSR |S_IRGRP , ima_dir,NULL , &ima_measurements_count_ops); -if (IS_ERR (runtime_measurements_count)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (runtime_measurements_count); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto out; } - violations = -securityfs_create_file ("violations" ,S_IRUSR |S_IRGRP , + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("violations" ,S_IRUSR |S_IRGRP , ima_dir,NULL , &ima_htable_violations_ops); -if (IS_ERR (violations)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (violations); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto out; } - ima_policy =securityfs_create_file ("policy" ,POLICY_FILE_FLAGS , + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("policy" ,POLICY_FILE_FLAGS , ima_dir,NULL , &ima_measure_policy_ops); -if (IS_ERR (ima_policy)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (ima_policy); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto out; }return 0 ; out: -securityfs_remove (ima_policy); -securityfs_remove (violations); -securityfs_remove (runtime_measurements_count); -securityfs_remove (ascii_runtime_measurements); -securityfs_remove (binary_runtime_measurements);remove_securityfs_measurement_lists (ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists);remove_securityfs_measurement_lists (binary_securityfs_measurement_lists); securityfs_measurement_list_count =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Re: [PATCH 06/10] ima_fs: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
Quoted 3 lines · Al Viro
removal of parent takes all children out
Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 7/10 ima_fs: get rid of lookup-by-dentry stuff
In reply to Al Virolookup_template_data_hash_algo() machinery is used to locate the matching ima_algo_array[] element at read time; securityfs allows to stash that into inode->i_private at object creation time, so there's no need to bother
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 82 +++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +16 -66
@@ -116,28 +116,6 @@ void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)seq_putc (m, *(char *)data++); } -static struct dentry **ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists__ro_after_init ; -static struct dentry **binary_securityfs_measurement_lists__ro_after_init ; -static int securityfs_measurement_list_count__ro_after_init ; - -static void lookup_template_data_hash_algo (int *algo_idx,enum hash_algo *algo, -struct seq_file *m, -struct dentry **lists) -{ -struct dentry *dentry; -int i; - - dentry =file_dentry (m->file); - -for (i =0 ; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) { -if (dentry == lists[i]) { - *algo_idx = i; - *algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo; -break ; - } - } -} -/* print format: * 32bit-le=pcr# * char[n]=template digest
@@ -160,9 +138,10 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx; algo =HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ; -if (m->file !=NULL ) -lookup_template_data_hash_algo (&algo_idx, &algo, m, - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists); +if (m->file !=NULL ) { + algo_idx = (unsigned long )file_inode (m->file)->i_private; + algo = ima_algo_array[algo_idx].algo; + }/* get entry */ e = qe->entry;
@@ -256,9 +235,10 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx; algo =HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ; -if (m->file !=NULL ) -lookup_template_data_hash_algo (&algo_idx, &algo, m, - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists); +if (m->file !=NULL ) { + algo_idx = (unsigned long )file_inode (m->file)->i_private; + algo = ima_algo_array[algo_idx].algo; + }/* get entry */ e = qe->entry;
@@ -412,57 +392,33 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { };#endif -static void __init remove_securityfs_measurement_lists (struct dentry **lists) -{ -kfree (lists); -} -static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists (void ) { -char file_name[NAME_MAX +1 ]; -struct dentry *dentry; -u16 algo; -int i; - - securityfs_measurement_list_count =NR_BANKS (ima_tpm_chip); +int count =NR_BANKS (ima_tpm_chip);if (ima_sha1_idx >=NR_BANKS (ima_tpm_chip)) - securityfs_measurement_list_count++; + count++; - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists = -kcalloc (securityfs_measurement_list_count,sizeof (struct dentry *), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists) -return -ENOMEM ; - - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists = -kcalloc (securityfs_measurement_list_count,sizeof (struct dentry *), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!binary_securityfs_measurement_lists) -return -ENOMEM ; - -for (i =0 ; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) { - algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo; +for (int i =0 ; i < count; i++) { +u16 algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo; +char file_name[NAME_MAX +1 ]; +struct dentry *dentry;sprintf (file_name,"ascii_runtime_measurements_%s" , hash_algo_name[algo]); dentry =securityfs_create_file (file_name,S_IRUSR |S_IRGRP , - ima_dir,NULL , + ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t )i, &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);if (IS_ERR (dentry))return PTR_ERR (dentry); - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists[i] = dentry; -sprintf (file_name,"binary_runtime_measurements_%s" , hash_algo_name[algo]); dentry =securityfs_create_file (file_name,S_IRUSR |S_IRGRP , - ima_dir,NULL , + ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t )i, &ima_measurements_ops);if (IS_ERR (dentry))return PTR_ERR (dentry); - - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists[i] = dentry; }return 0 ;
@@ -543,9 +499,6 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)struct dentry *dentry;int ret; - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists =NULL ; - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists =NULL ; - ima_dir =securityfs_create_dir ("ima" , integrity_dir);if (IS_ERR (ima_dir))return PTR_ERR (ima_dir);
@@ -600,9 +553,6 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)return 0 ; out: -remove_securityfs_measurement_lists (ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists); -remove_securityfs_measurement_lists (binary_securityfs_measurement_lists); - securityfs_measurement_list_count =0 ;securityfs_remove (ima_symlink);securityfs_remove (ima_dir);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Re: [PATCH 07/10] ima_fs: get rid of lookup-by-dentry stuff
Quoted 6 lines · Al Viro
lookup_template_data_hash_algo()machinery is used to locate the matching ima_algo_array[] element at read time; securityfs allows to stash that intoinode->i_privateat object creation time, so there's no need to botherSigned-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>
Really nice clean up.
thanks,
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 8/10 evm_secfs: clear securityfs interactions
In reply to Al Viro1) creation never returns NULL; error is reported as ERR_PTR()
2) no need to remove file before removing its parent
--- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +7 -8
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@#include "evm.h" static struct dentry *evm_dir; -static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm;static struct dentry *evm_symlink;#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS
@@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ static int evm_init_xattrs(void) { evm_xattrs =securityfs_create_file ("evm_xattrs" ,0660 , evm_dir,NULL , &evm_xattr_ops); -if (!evm_xattrs ||IS_ERR (evm_xattrs)) +if (IS_ERR (evm_xattrs))return -EFAULT ;return 0 ;
@@ -301,21 +300,22 @@ static int evm_init_xattrs(void)int __init evm_init_secfs (void ) {int error =0 ; +struct dentry *dentry; evm_dir =securityfs_create_dir ("evm" , integrity_dir); -if (!evm_dir ||IS_ERR (evm_dir)) +if (IS_ERR (evm_dir))return -EFAULT ; - evm_init_tpm =securityfs_create_file ("evm" ,0660 , - evm_dir,NULL , &evm_key_ops); -if (!evm_init_tpm ||IS_ERR (evm_init_tpm)) { + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("evm" ,0660 , + evm_dir,NULL , &evm_key_ops); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { error = -EFAULT ; goto out; } evm_symlink =securityfs_create_symlink ("evm" ,NULL ,"integrity/evm/evm" ,NULL ); -if (!evm_symlink ||IS_ERR (evm_symlink)) { +if (IS_ERR (evm_symlink)) { error = -EFAULT ; goto out; }
@@ -328,7 +328,6 @@ int __init evm_init_secfs(void)return 0 ; out:securityfs_remove (evm_symlink); -securityfs_remove (evm_init_tpm);securityfs_remove (evm_dir);return error; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Re: [PATCH 08/10] evm_secfs: clear securityfs interactions
Quoted 4 lines · Al Viro
1) creation never returns NULL; error is reported as
ERR_PTR()
2) no need to remove file before removing its parentSigned-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>
Nice cleanup.
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 9/10 ipe: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
In reply to Al Viro... and use securityfs_remove() instead of securityfs_recursive_remove()
--- security/ipe/fs.c | 32 ++++++++++++-------------------- security/ipe/policy_fs.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
security/ipe/fs.c +12 -20
@@ -12,11 +12,8 @@#include "policy.h" #include "audit.h" -static struct dentry *np__ro_after_init ;static struct dentry *root__ro_after_init ;struct dentry *policy_root__ro_after_init ; -static struct dentry *audit_node__ro_after_init ; -static struct dentry *enforce_node__ro_after_init ;/** * setaudit() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit"
@@ -200,27 +197,26 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) {int rc =0 ;struct ipe_policy *ap; +struct dentry *dentry;if (!ipe_enabled)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; root =securityfs_create_dir ("ipe" ,NULL ); -if (IS_ERR (root)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (root); - goto err; - } +if (IS_ERR (root)) +return PTR_ERR (root); - audit_node =securityfs_create_file ("success_audit" ,0600 , root, + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("success_audit" ,0600 , root,NULL , &audit_fops); -if (IS_ERR (audit_node)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (audit_node); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto err; } - enforce_node =securityfs_create_file ("enforce" ,0600 , root,NULL , + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("enforce" ,0600 , root,NULL , &enforce_fops); -if (IS_ERR (enforce_node)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (enforce_node); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto err; }
@@ -237,18 +233,14 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } - np =securityfs_create_file ("new_policy" ,0200 , root,NULL , &np_fops); -if (IS_ERR (np)) { - rc =PTR_ERR (np); + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("new_policy" ,0200 , root,NULL , &np_fops); +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (dentry); goto err; }return 0 ; err: -securityfs_remove (np); -securityfs_remove (policy_root); -securityfs_remove (enforce_node); -securityfs_remove (audit_node);securityfs_remove (root);return rc; }
security/ipe/policy_fs.c +2 -2
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static const struct ipefs_file policy_subdir[] = {*/ void ipe_del_policyfs_node (struct ipe_policy *p) { -securityfs_recursive_remove (p->policyfs); +securityfs_remove (p->policyfs); p->policyfs =NULL ; }
@@ -485,6 +485,6 @@ int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p)return 0 ; err: -securityfs_recursive_remove (policyfs); +securityfs_remove (policyfs);return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Re: [PATCH 09/10] ipe: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
Quoted 9 lines · Al Viro
... and use
securityfs_remove()instead ofsecurityfs_recursive_remove()Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>--- security/ipe/fs.c | 32 ++++++++++++-------------------- security/ipe/policy_fs.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
These changes look good to me. I ran our ipe test suite and it works well.
However, I didn't try fault injection to trigger the dentry creation failure. I will try it later.
-Fan
Fan Wu
maintainerRe: [PATCH 09/10] ipe: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
Quoted 12 lines · Fan Wu
Quoted 9 lines · Al Viro
... and use
securityfs_remove()instead ofsecurityfs_recursive_remove()Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>--- security/ipe/fs.c | 32 ++++++++++++-------------------- security/ipe/policy_fs.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
Quoted 7 lines
Acked-by Fan Wu <[email protected]>These changes look good to me. I ran our ipe test suite and it works well.
However, I didn't try fault injection to trigger the dentry creation failure. I will try it later.
I tried tracing the reference count with and without this patch set. I found that without the patch, there were indeed dentry leaks in the ipe policy folder, and this patch set has successfully fixed them.
-Fan
Al Viro
maintainerPATCH 10/10 tpm: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing
In reply to Al ViroFWIW, there is a reliable indication of removal - ->i_nlink going to 0 ;-)
--- drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c | 46 ++++++++---------------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c +12 -34
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode,struct tpm_chip *chip;inode_lock (inode); -if (!inode->i_private) { +if (!inode->i_nlink) {inode_unlock (inode);return -ENODEV ; }
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int tpm_read_log(struct tpm_chip *chip)void tpm_bios_log_setup (struct tpm_chip *chip) {const char *name =dev_name (&chip->dev); -unsigned int cnt; +struct dentry *dentry;int log_version;int rc =0 ;
@@ -117,14 +117,12 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip)return ; log_version = rc; - cnt =0 ; - chip->bios_dir[cnt] =securityfs_create_dir (name,NULL ); + chip->bios_dir =securityfs_create_dir (name,NULL );/* NOTE: securityfs_create_dir can return ENODEV if securityfs is * compiled out. The caller should ignore the ENODEV return code. */ -if (IS_ERR (chip->bios_dir[cnt])) - goto err; - cnt++; +if (IS_ERR (chip->bios_dir)) +return ; chip->bin_log_seqops.chip = chip;if (log_version ==EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 )
@@ -135,14 +133,13 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip) &tpm1_binary_b_measurements_seqops; - chip->bios_dir[cnt] = + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("binary_bios_measurements" , -0440 , chip->bios_dir[0 ], +0440 , chip->bios_dir, (void *)&chip->bin_log_seqops, &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); -if (IS_ERR (chip->bios_dir[cnt])) +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) goto err; - cnt++;if (!(chip->flags &TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 )) {
@@ -150,42 +147,23 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip) chip->ascii_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm1_ascii_b_measurements_seqops; - chip->bios_dir[cnt] = + dentry =securityfs_create_file ("ascii_bios_measurements" , -0440 , chip->bios_dir[0 ], +0440 , chip->bios_dir, (void *)&chip->ascii_log_seqops, &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); -if (IS_ERR (chip->bios_dir[cnt])) +if (IS_ERR (dentry)) goto err; - cnt++; }return ; err: - chip->bios_dir[cnt] =NULL ;tpm_bios_log_teardown (chip);return ; }void tpm_bios_log_teardown (struct tpm_chip *chip) { -int i; -struct inode *inode; - -/* securityfs_remove currently doesn't take care of handling sync -* between removal and opening of pseudo files. To handle this, a -* workaround is added by making i_private = NULL here during removal -* and to check it during open(), both within inode_lock()/unlock(). -* This design ensures that open() either safely gets kref or fails. -*/ -for (i = (TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES -1 ); i >=0 ; i--) { -if (chip->bios_dir[i]) { - inode =d_inode (chip->bios_dir[i]); -inode_lock (inode); - inode->i_private =NULL ; -inode_unlock (inode); -securityfs_remove (chip->bios_dir[i]); - } - } +securityfs_remove (chip->bios_dir); }
include/linux/tpm.h +1 -1
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ struct tpm_chip {unsigned long duration[TPM_NUM_DURATIONS ];/* jiffies */ bool duration_adjusted; -struct dentry *bios_dir[TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES ]; +struct dentry *bios_dir;const struct attribute_group *groups[3 +TPM_MAX_HASHES ];unsigned int groups_cnt;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Al Viro
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Al Viro
Branch (6.16-rc1-based) lives in
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs.git#work.securityfs Individual patches in followups.Help with testing and review would be very welcome.
Seeing that no complaints have materialized, into -next it goes (with Acked-by/Tested-by attached)...
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 5 lines · Al Viro
Branch (6.16-rc1-based) lives in
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs.git#work.securityfs Individual patches in followups.Help with testing and review would be very welcome.
Seeing that no complaints have materialized, into -next it goes (with Acked-by/Tested-by attached)...
Thanks Al, I appreciate the help cleaning this up.
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com