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x86/boot: Don't return encryption mask from __startup_64()

PATCH Superseded Khalid Ali 2 participants 2 messages Jun 17, 2025 x86

v3 of 8 Superseded Latest is v8 →

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Khalid Ali

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 x86/boot: Don't return encryption mask from __startup_64()

Avoid returning the SME encryption mask from __startup_64(), and instead let the function handle encryption directly as needed. The encryption mask is already available to callers and can be accessed via sme_get_me_mask() in C code, or directly through the sme_me_mask symbol in assembly, if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled.

This change aligns with how secondary_startup_64_no_verify handles SME and keeps the behavior consistent. For Intel CPUs, SME is not relevant, so there is no need to retrieve the mask unless CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled.

---
 arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c | 11 +++--------
 arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S          | 10 ++++------
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c +3 -8
index 332dbe6688c4..6fdb340e9147 100644
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static inline bool check_la57_support(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
+static void __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
 						    pmdval_t *pmd,
 						    unsigned long p2v_offset)
 {
@@ -68,11 +68,6 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
 		}
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
-	 * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
-	 */
-	return sme_get_me_mask();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -84,7 +79,7 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
  * the 1:1 mapping of memory. Kernel virtual addresses can be determined by
  * subtracting p2v_offset from the RIP-relative address.
  */
-unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
+void __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
 				  struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	pmd_t (*early_pgts)[PTRS_PER_PMD] = rip_rel_ptr(early_dynamic_pgts);
@@ -213,5 +208,5 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
 	for (; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++)
 		pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
 
-	return sme_postprocess_startup(bp, pmd, p2v_offset);
+	 sme_postprocess_startup(bp, pmd, p2v_offset);
 }
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h +1 -1
index 692af46603a1..29ea24bb85ff 100644
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ extern unsigned long acpi_realmode_flags;
 
 extern void reserve_standard_io_resources(void);
 extern void i386_reserve_resources(void);
-extern unsigned long __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset, struct boot_params *bp);
+extern void __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset, struct boot_params *bp);
 extern void startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void);
 extern void startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler);
 extern void early_setup_idt(void);
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +4 -6
index 3e9b3a3bd039..4390a28f7dad 100644
@@ -106,18 +106,16 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 
 	/*
 	 * Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt
-	 * the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
-	 * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
-	 * programmed into CR3.
+	 * the kernel.
 	 */
 	movq	%r15, %rsi
 	call	__startup_64
 
 	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
-	leaq	early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
-	addq	%rcx, %rax
-
+	leaq	early_top_pgt(%rip), %rax
+	
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	addq	sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax
 	mov	%rax, %rdi
 
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Khalid Ali

Avoid returning the SME encryption mask from __startup_64(), and instead let the function handle encryption directly as needed. The encryption mask is already available to callers and can be accessed via sme_get_me_mask() in C code, or directly through the sme_me_mask symbol in assembly, if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled.

Quoted 8 lines

This change aligns with how secondary_startup_64_no_verify handles SME and keeps the behavior consistent. For Intel CPUs, SME is not relevant, so there is no need to retrieve the mask unless CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled.

Please drop these lines ^^^ (but no need to resend just for that)

As it says on the page:

"If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags"

Quoted 90 lines
---
 arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c | 11 +++--------
 arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S          | 10 ++++------
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c +3 -8
index 332dbe6688c4..6fdb340e9147 100644
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static inline bool check_la57_support(void)
        return true;
 }
 
-static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
+static void __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
                                                    pmdval_t *pmd,
                                                    unsigned long p2v_offset)
 {
@@ -68,11 +68,6 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
                }
        }
 
-       /*
-        * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
-        * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
-        */
-       return sme_get_me_mask();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -84,7 +79,7 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
  * the 1:1 mapping of memory. Kernel virtual addresses can be determined by
  * subtracting p2v_offset from the RIP-relative address.
  */
-unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
+void __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
                                  struct boot_params *bp)
 {
        pmd_t (*early_pgts)[PTRS_PER_PMD] = rip_rel_ptr(early_dynamic_pgts);
@@ -213,5 +208,5 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
        for (; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++)
                pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
 
-       return sme_postprocess_startup(bp, pmd, p2v_offset);
+        sme_postprocess_startup(bp, pmd, p2v_offset);
 }
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h +1 -1
index 692af46603a1..29ea24bb85ff 100644
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ extern unsigned long acpi_realmode_flags;
 
 extern void reserve_standard_io_resources(void);
 extern void i386_reserve_resources(void);
-extern unsigned long __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset, struct boot_params *bp);
+extern void __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset, struct boot_params *bp);
 extern void startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void);
 extern void startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler);
 extern void early_setup_idt(void);
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +4 -7
index 3e9b3a3bd039..4390a28f7dad 100644
@@ -106,18 +106,16 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 
        /*
         * Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt
-        * the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
-        * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
-        * programmed into CR3.
+        * the kernel.
         */
        movq    %r15, %rsi
        call    __startup_64
 
        /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
-       leaq    early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
-       addq    %rcx, %rax
-
+       leaq    early_top_pgt(%rip), %rax
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+       addq    sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax
        mov     %rax, %rdi
 
        /*
--

2.49.0