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evaluate: make sure chain jump name comes with a null byte

PATCH In review Florian Westphal 2 participants 2 messages Jun 24, 2025 – Jun 25, 2025 netfilter

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Florian Westphal

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 evaluate: make sure chain jump name comes with a null byte

There is a stack oob read access in netlink_gen_chain():

	mpz_export_data(chain, expr->chain->value,
			BYTEORDER_HOST_ENDIAN, len);
	snprintf(data->chain, NFT_CHAIN_MAXNAMELEN, "%s", chain);

There is no guarantee that chain[] is null terminated, so snprintf can read past chain[] array. ASAN report is:

AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffff5f00520 at .. READ of size 257 at 0x7ffff5f00520 thread T0

    #0 0x00000032ffb6 in printf_common(void*, char const*, __va_list_tag*) (src/nft+0x32ffb6)
    #1 0x00000033055d in vsnprintf (src/nft+0x33055d)
    #2 0x000000332071 in snprintf (src/nft+0x332071)
    #3 0x0000004eef03 in netlink_gen_chain src/netlink.c:454:2
    #4 0x0000004eef03 in netlink_gen_verdict src/netlink.c:467:4

Reject chain jumps that exceed 255 characters, which matches the netlink policy on the kernel side.

The included reproducer fails without asan too because the kernel will reject the too-long chain name. But that happens after the asan detected bogus read.

---
 src/evaluate.c                                | 26 +++++++++++++++----
 .../asan_out_of_bounds_read_with_long_chain   |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/shell/testcases/bogons/nft-f/asan_out_of_bounds_read_with_long_chain
src/evaluate.c +21 -5
index 3c091748f786..699891106cb9 100644
@@ -3040,16 +3040,32 @@ static int expr_evaluate_xfrm(struct eval_ctx *ctx, struct expr **exprp)
 	return expr_evaluate_primary(ctx, exprp);
 }
 
-static int verdict_validate_chainlen(struct eval_ctx *ctx,
+static int verdict_validate_chain(struct eval_ctx *ctx,
 				     struct expr *chain)
 {
-	if (chain->len > NFT_CHAIN_MAXNAMELEN * BITS_PER_BYTE)
+	char buf[NFT_CHAIN_MAXNAMELEN];
+	unsigned int len;
+
+	len = chain->len / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	if (len > NFT_CHAIN_MAXNAMELEN)
 		return expr_error(ctx->msgs, chain,
 				  "chain name too long (%u, max %u)",
 				  chain->len / BITS_PER_BYTE,
 				  NFT_CHAIN_MAXNAMELEN);
 
-	return 0;
+	if (!len)
+		return expr_error(ctx->msgs, chain,
+				  "chain name length 0 not allowed");
+
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	mpz_export_data(buf, chain->value, BYTEORDER_HOST_ENDIAN, len);
+
+	if (strnlen(buf, sizeof(buf)) < sizeof(buf))
+		return 0;
+
+	return expr_error(ctx->msgs, chain,
+			  "chain name must be smaller than %u",
+			  NFT_CHAIN_MAXNAMELEN);
 }
 
 static int expr_evaluate_verdict(struct eval_ctx *ctx, struct expr **exprp)
@@ -3060,7 +3076,7 @@ static int expr_evaluate_verdict(struct eval_ctx *ctx, struct expr **exprp)
 	case NFT_GOTO:
 	case NFT_JUMP:
 		if (expr->chain->etype == EXPR_VALUE &&
-		    verdict_validate_chainlen(ctx, expr->chain))
+		    verdict_validate_chain(ctx, expr->chain))
 			return -1;
 
 		break;
@@ -3296,7 +3312,7 @@ static int stmt_evaluate_verdict(struct eval_ctx *ctx, struct stmt *stmt)
 						  "not a value expression");
 			}
 
-			if (verdict_validate_chainlen(ctx, stmt->expr->chain))
+			if (verdict_validate_chain(ctx, stmt->expr->chain))
 				return -1;
 		}
 		break;
tests/shell/testcases/bogons/nft-f/asan_out_of_bounds_read_with_long_chain new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e166a0304f75
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+add table t
+add chain t eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
+add rule  t eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee jump   eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Westphal

There is a stack oob read access in netlink_gen_chain():

	mpz_export_data(chain, expr->chain->value,
			BYTEORDER_HOST_ENDIAN, len);
	snprintf(data->chain, NFT_CHAIN_MAXNAMELEN, "%s", chain);

There is no guarantee that chain[] is null terminated, so snprintf can read past chain[] array. ASAN report is:

AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffff5f00520 at .. READ of size 257 at 0x7ffff5f00520 thread T0

    #0 0x00000032ffb6 in printf_common(void*, char const*, __va_list_tag*) (src/nft+0x32ffb6)
    #1 0x00000033055d in vsnprintf (src/nft+0x33055d)
    #2 0x000000332071 in snprintf (src/nft+0x332071)
    #3 0x0000004eef03 in netlink_gen_chain src/netlink.c:454:2
    #4 0x0000004eef03 in netlink_gen_verdict src/netlink.c:467:4
Quoted 8 lines

Reject chain jumps that exceed 255 characters, which matches the netlink policy on the kernel side.

The included reproducer fails without asan too because the kernel will reject the too-long chain name. But that happens after the asan detected bogus read.