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x86/bugs: Remove 'force' options for retbleed/ITS

RFC PATCH In review David Kaplan 4 participants 5 messages Jun 26, 2025 – Jun 27, 2025

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#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/1 x86/bugs: Remove 'force' options for retbleed/ITS

Command line options which force-enable a mitigation on an unaffected processor provide arguably no security value but do create the potential for problems due to the increased set of mitigation interactions.

For example, setting "indirect_target_selection=force" on an AMD Retbleed-affected CPU (e.g., Zen2) results in a configuration where the kernel reports that both ITS and Retbleed are mitigated, but Retbleed is not in fact mitigated. In this configuration, untraining of the retbleed return thunk is enabled but the its_return_thunk is active, rendering the untraining ineffective.

It is wrong for the kernel to report that a bug is mitigated when it is not. While this specific interaction could be directly fixed, the ability to force-enable these bugs creates unneeded complexity, so remove it.

If removing these options entirely is unacceptable, perhaps for compatibility reasons, another option could be to only allow forcing on the affected vendor (i.e., only allow forcing ITS on Intel CPUs), which would at least limit the potential interactions that need to be analyzed. Tagging as RFC to prompt discussion on this point.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0 -5
index e2a8a21efb10..edc913d26381 100644
@@ -1210,8 +1210,6 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
 		} else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) {
 			retbleed_nosmt = true;
-		} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
-			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 		} else {
 			pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str);
 		}
@@ -1411,9 +1409,6 @@ static int __init its_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 		its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 	} else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) {
 		its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS;
-	} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
-		its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS;
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
 	} else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) {
 		its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
 	} else if (!strcmp(str, "stuff")) {

base-commit: e51a38e71974982abb3f2f16141763a1511f7a3f

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · David Kaplan

Command line options which force-enable a mitigation on an unaffected processor provide arguably no security value but do create the potential for problems due to the increased set of mitigation interactions.

For example, setting "indirect_target_selection=force" on an AMD Retbleed-affected CPU (e.g., Zen2) results in a configuration where the kernel reports that both ITS and Retbleed are mitigated, but Retbleed is not in fact mitigated. In this configuration, untraining of the retbleed return thunk is enabled but the its_return_thunk is active, rendering the untraining ineffective.

It is wrong for the kernel to report that a bug is mitigated when it is not. While this specific interaction could be directly fixed, the ability to force-enable these bugs creates unneeded complexity, so remove it.

Quoted 5 lines

If removing these options entirely is unacceptable, perhaps for compatibility reasons, another option could be to only allow forcing on the affected vendor (i.e., only allow forcing ITS on Intel CPUs), which would at least limit the potential interactions that need to be analyzed. Tagging as RFC to prompt discussion on this point.

Testing; I use these things for testing. Makes I don't have to run on affected hardware, I can just force the feature on and inspect the code and ensures it runs.

If you use force, you get to keep all pieces -- no warranties.

maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Peter Zijlstra

Testing; I use these things for testing. Makes I don't have to run on affected hardware, I can just force the feature on and inspect the code and ensures it runs.

If you use force, you get to keep all pieces -- no warranties.

Right, I don't have a good feeling when "force" makes a machine unmitigated all of a sudden.

And we're not screaming nearly as loud as possible when =force is supplied and for such a thing we probably should even taint the kernel.

I'd prefer if we don't expose =force options to the general public but make them depend on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL perhaps.

IOW, too dangerous.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#3 lore raw
In reply to Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 22 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 15 lines · David Kaplan

Command line options which force-enable a mitigation on an unaffected processor provide arguably no security value but do create the potential for problems due to the increased set of mitigation interactions.

For example, setting "indirect_target_selection=force" on an AMD Retbleed-affected CPU (e.g., Zen2) results in a configuration where the kernel reports that both ITS and Retbleed are mitigated, but Retbleed is not in fact mitigated. In this configuration, untraining of the retbleed return thunk is enabled but the its_return_thunk is active, rendering the untraining ineffective.

It is wrong for the kernel to report that a bug is mitigated when it is not. While this specific interaction could be directly fixed, the ability to force-enable these bugs creates unneeded complexity, so remove it.

Quoted 5 lines

If removing these options entirely is unacceptable, perhaps for compatibility reasons, another option could be to only allow forcing on the affected vendor (i.e., only allow forcing ITS on Intel CPUs), which would at least limit the potential interactions that need to be analyzed. Tagging as RFC to prompt discussion on this point.

Quoted 5 lines

Testing; I use these things for testing. Makes I don't have to run on affected hardware, I can just force the feature on and inspect the code and ensures it runs.

If you use force, you get to keep all pieces -- no warranties.

I concur, however using force won't always guarantee that the code runs though, because there can be other condition that must/must not be met i.e trying to run ITS on AMD hw (yeah, yeah I know :) ) also required commenting out some checks in patch_retpoline.

Quoted 1 line
maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Nikolay Borisov
Quoted 5 lines

Testing; I use these things for testing. Makes I don't have to run on affected hardware, I can just force the feature on and inspect the code and ensures it runs.

If you use force, you get to keep all pieces -- no warranties.

I concur, however using force won't always guarantee that the code runs though,

Which is why you should run gdb on /proc/kcore to check what you ended up with :-)

Quoted 3 lines

because there can be other condition that must/must not be met i.e trying to run ITS on AMD hw (yeah, yeah I know :) ) also required commenting out some checks in patch_retpoline.

Ah, I might not have hit that, due to not actually having any AMD machines for testing :/