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fs: generalize anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass

PATCH Applied Shivank Garg 6 participants 10 messages Jun 26, 2025 – Jul 8, 2025

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 fs: generalize anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass

Extend anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to take superblock parameter and make it available via fs.h. This allows other subsystems to create anonymous inodes with proper security context.

Use this function in secretmem to fix a security regression, where S_PRIVATE flag wasn't cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing LSM/SELinux checks to be skipped.

Using anon_inode_make_secure_inode() ensures proper security context initialization through security_inode_init_security_anon().

Fixes 2bfe15c52612 ("mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes")

---
The handling of the S_PRIVATE flag for these inodes was discussed extensively ([1], [2], [3]).

As per discussion [3] with Mike and Paul, KVM guest_memfd and secretmem result in user-visible file descriptors, so they should be subject to LSM/SELinux security policies rather than bypassing them with S_PRIVATE.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

V3:
- Drop EXPORT to be added later in separate patch for KVM guest_memfd and keep this patch focused on fix.

V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
- Use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() since KVM is the only user.

V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

 fs/anon_inodes.c   | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/fs.h |  2 ++
 mm/secretmem.c     |  9 +--------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/anon_inodes.c +17 -5
index e51e7d88980a..c530405edd15 100644
@@ -98,14 +98,25 @@ static struct file_system_type anon_inode_fs_type = {
 	.kill_sb	= kill_anon_super,
 };
 
-static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(
-	const char *name,
-	const struct inode *context_inode)
+/**
+ * anon_inode_make_secure_inode - allocate an anonymous inode with security context
+ * @sb:		[in]	Superblock to allocate from
+ * @name:	[in]	Name of the class of the new file (e.g., "secretmem")
+ * @context_inode:
+ *		[in]	Optional parent inode for security inheritance
+ *
+ * The function ensures proper security initialization through the LSM hook
+ * security_inode_init_security_anon().
+ *
+ * Return:	Pointer to new inode on success, ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(struct super_block *sb, const char *name,
+					   const struct inode *context_inode)
 {
 	struct inode *inode;
 	int error;
 
-	inode = alloc_anon_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	inode = alloc_anon_inode(sb);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		return inode;
 	inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE;
@@ -132,7 +143,8 @@ static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
 
 	if (make_inode) {
-		inode =	anon_inode_make_secure_inode(name, context_inode);
+		inode =	anon_inode_make_secure_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb,
+						     name, context_inode);
 		if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
 			file = ERR_CAST(inode);
 			goto err;
include/linux/fs.h +2 -0
index b085f161ed22..040c0036320f 100644
@@ -3608,6 +3608,8 @@ extern int simple_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
 extern const struct address_space_operations ram_aops;
 extern int always_delete_dentry(const struct dentry *);
 extern struct inode *alloc_anon_inode(struct super_block *);
+struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(struct super_block *sb, const char *name,
+					   const struct inode *context_inode);
 extern int simple_nosetlease(struct file *, int, struct file_lease **, void **);
 extern const struct dentry_operations simple_dentry_operations;
 
mm/secretmem.c +1 -8
index 589b26c2d553..9a11a38a6770 100644
@@ -195,18 +195,11 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
 	struct file *file;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
-	int err;
 
-	inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb, anon_name, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		return ERR_CAST(inode);
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &QSTR(anon_name), NULL);
-	if (err) {
-		file = ERR_PTR(err);
-		goto err_free_inode;
-	}
-
 	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
 				 O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Acked-by on v3 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines

Extend anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to take superblock parameter and make it available via fs.h. This allows other subsystems to create anonymous inodes with proper security context.

Use this function in secretmem to fix a security regression, where S_PRIVATE flag wasn't cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing LSM/SELinux checks to be skipped.

Using anon_inode_make_secure_inode() ensures proper security context initialization through security_inode_init_security_anon().

Quoted 6 lines
Fixes 2bfe15c52612 ("mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes")

Relying on 'anon_inode_make_secure_inode' for anon inodes LSM/SELinux checks seems okay to me.

Quoted 107 lines

---
The handling of the S_PRIVATE flag for these inodes was discussed extensively ([1], [2], [3]).

As per discussion [3] with Mike and Paul, KVM guest_memfd and secretmem result in user-visible file descriptors, so they should be subject to LSM/SELinux security policies rather than bypassing them with S_PRIVATE.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

V3:
- Drop EXPORT to be added later in separate patch for KVM guest_memfd and keep this patch focused on fix.

V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
- Use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() since KVM is the only user.

V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

  fs/anon_inodes.c   | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
  include/linux/fs.h |  2 ++
  mm/secretmem.c     |  9 +--------
  3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/anon_inodes.c +17 -5
index e51e7d88980a..c530405edd15 100644
@@ -98,14 +98,25 @@ static struct file_system_type anon_inode_fs_type = {
  	.kill_sb	= kill_anon_super,
  };
 
-static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(
-	const char *name,
-	const struct inode *context_inode)
+/**
+ * anon_inode_make_secure_inode - allocate an anonymous inode with security context
+ * @sb:		[in]	Superblock to allocate from
+ * @name:	[in]	Name of the class of the new file (e.g., "secretmem")
+ * @context_inode:
+ *		[in]	Optional parent inode for security inheritance
+ *
+ * The function ensures proper security initialization through the LSM hook
+ * security_inode_init_security_anon().
+ *
+ * Return:	Pointer to new inode on success, ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(struct super_block *sb, const char *name,
+					   const struct inode *context_inode)
  {
  	struct inode *inode;
  	int error;
 
-	inode = alloc_anon_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	inode = alloc_anon_inode(sb);
  	if (IS_ERR(inode))
  		return inode;
  	inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE;
@@ -132,7 +143,8 @@ static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
  		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
 
  	if (make_inode) {
-		inode =	anon_inode_make_secure_inode(name, context_inode);
+		inode =	anon_inode_make_secure_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb,
+						     name, context_inode);
  		if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
  			file = ERR_CAST(inode);
  			goto err;
include/linux/fs.h +2 -0
index b085f161ed22..040c0036320f 100644
@@ -3608,6 +3608,8 @@ extern int simple_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
  extern const struct address_space_operations ram_aops;
  extern int always_delete_dentry(const struct dentry *);
  extern struct inode *alloc_anon_inode(struct super_block *);
+struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(struct super_block *sb, const char *name,
+					   const struct inode *context_inode);
  extern int simple_nosetlease(struct file *, int, struct file_lease **, void **);
  extern const struct dentry_operations simple_dentry_operations;
 
mm/secretmem.c +1 -8
index 589b26c2d553..9a11a38a6770 100644
@@ -195,18 +195,11 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
  	struct file *file;
  	struct inode *inode;
  	const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
-	int err;
 
-	inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb, anon_name, NULL);
  	if (IS_ERR(inode))
  		return ERR_CAST(inode);
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &QSTR(anon_name), NULL);
-	if (err) {
-		file = ERR_PTR(err);
-		goto err_free_inode;
-	}
-
  	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
  				 O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
  	if (IS_ERR(file))
Reviewed-by on v3 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Shivank Garg
Quoted 8 lines · Shivank Garg

Extend anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to take superblock parameter and make it available via fs.h. This allows other subsystems to create anonymous inodes with proper security context.

Use this function in secretmem to fix a security regression, where S_PRIVATE flag wasn't cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing LSM/SELinux checks to be skipped.

Quoted 7 lines

Using anon_inode_make_secure_inode() ensures proper security context initialization through security_inode_init_security_anon().

Fixes 2bfe15c52612 ("mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes")

[snip]

maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw
In reply to Shivank Garg
Quoted 9 lines · Shivank Garg

Extend anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to take superblock parameter and make it available via fs.h. This allows other subsystems to create anonymous inodes with proper security context.

Use this function in secretmem to fix a security regression, where S_PRIVATE flag wasn't cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing LSM/SELinux checks to be skipped.

[...]

Applied to the vfs-6.17.misc branch of the vfs/vfs.git tree. Patches in the vfs-6.17.misc branch should appear in linux-next soon.

Please report any outstanding bugs that were missed during review in a new review to the original patch series allowing us to drop it.

It's encouraged to provide Acked-bys and Reviewed-bys even though the patch has now been applied. If possible patch trailers will be updated.

Note that commit hashes shown below are subject to change due to rebase, trailer updates or similar. If in doubt, please check the listed branch.

tree:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git
branch: vfs-6.17.misc

[1/1] fs: generalize anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass

      https://git.kernel.org/vfs/vfs/c/4dc65f072c2b
#4 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Christian Brauner
Quoted 9 lines · Shivank Garg

Extend anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to take superblock parameter and make it available via fs.h. This allows other subsystems to create anonymous inodes with proper security context.

Use this function in secretmem to fix a security regression, where S_PRIVATE flag wasn't cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing LSM/SELinux checks to be skipped.

[...]

Applied to the vfs-6.17.misc branch of the vfs/vfs.git tree. Patches in the vfs-6.17.misc branch should appear in linux-next soon.

Please report any outstanding bugs that were missed during review in a new review to the original patch series allowing us to drop it.

It's encouraged to provide Acked-bys and Reviewed-bys even though the patch has now been applied. If possible patch trailers will be updated.

Quoted 8 lines

Note that commit hashes shown below are subject to change due to rebase, trailer updates or similar. If in doubt, please check the listed branch.

tree:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git
branch: vfs-6.17.misc

[1/1] fs: generalize anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass

      https://git.kernel.org/vfs/vfs/c/4dc65f072c2b

Hi Christian,

I think there may have been a mix-up with the patch versions that got merged.

We had agreed to use V3 of the patch (without EXPORT), which appears to be correctly merged in the vfs tree:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git/commit/?h=vfs.all&id=4dc65f072c2b30ae3653b76208a926f767c402a0

However, it looks like V2 (with EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES) was merged into Linus's tree instead:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=cbe4134ea4bc493239786220bd69cb8a13493190

Thanks,
Shivank

maintainer
#5 lore raw
In reply to Shivank Garg
Quoted 39 lines · On Jun 26, 2025 Shivank Garg <[email protected]> wrote:

Extend anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to take superblock parameter and make it available via fs.h. This allows other subsystems to create anonymous inodes with proper security context.

Use this function in secretmem to fix a security regression, where S_PRIVATE flag wasn't cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing LSM/SELinux checks to be skipped.

Using anon_inode_make_secure_inode() ensures proper security context initialization through security_inode_init_security_anon().

---
The handling of the S_PRIVATE flag for these inodes was discussed extensively ([1], [2], [3]).

As per discussion [3] with Mike and Paul, KVM guest_memfd and secretmem result in user-visible file descriptors, so they should be subject to LSM/SELinux security policies rather than bypassing them with S_PRIVATE.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

V3:
- Drop EXPORT to be added later in separate patch for KVM guest_memfd and keep this patch focused on fix.

V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
- Use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() since KVM is the only user.

Quoted 6 lines

V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

 fs/anon_inodes.c   | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/fs.h |  2 ++
 mm/secretmem.c     |  9 +--------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

Thanks again for your continued work on this! I think the patch looks pretty reasonable, but it would be good to hear a bit about how you've tested this before ACK'ing the patch. For example, have you tested this against any of the LSMs which provide anonymous inode support?

At the very least, the selinux-testsuite has a basic secretmem test, it would be good to know if the test passes with this patch or if any additional work is needed to ensure compatibility.

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite

--
paul-moore.com

#6 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore

On Jun 26, 2025 Shivank Garg <[email protected]> wrote:

...

Quoted 10 lines

Thanks again for your continued work on this! I think the patch looks pretty reasonable, but it would be good to hear a bit about how you've tested this before ACK'ing the patch. For example, have you tested this against any of the LSMs which provide anonymous inode support?

At the very least, the selinux-testsuite has a basic secretmem test, it would be good to know if the test passes with this patch or if any additional work is needed to ensure compatibility.

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite

Hi Paul,

Thank you for pointing me to the selinux-testsuite. I wasn't sure how to properly test this patch, so your guidance was very helpful.

With the current test policy (test_secretmem.te), I initially encountered the following failures:

~/selinux-testsuite/tests/secretmem# ./test
memfd_secret() failed: Permission denied
1..6
memfd_secret() failed: Permission denied
ok 1

ftruncate failed:  Permission denied
unable to mmap secret memory:  Permission denied
not ok 2
#   Failed test at ./test line 23.
ftruncate failed:  Permission denied
unable to mmap secret memory:  Permission denied
ok 3
ftruncate failed:  Permission denied
unable to mmap secret memory:  Permission denied
ok 4
memfd_secret() failed:  Permission denied
ok 5
ftruncate failed:  Permission denied
unable to mmap secret memory:  Permission denied

not ok 6
# Failed test at ./test line 37.
# Looks like you failed 2 tests of 6.

Using ausearch -m avc, I found denials for create, write, map. For instance:
avc: denied { create } for pid=11956 comm="secretmem" anonclass=[secretmem]
...

To resolve this, I updated test_secretmem.te to add additional required permissions {create, read, write, map}
With this change, all tests now pass successfully:

policy/test_secretmem.te +3 -3
index 357f41d..4cce076 100644
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_nocreate_secretmem_t)
 # Domain allowed to create secret memory with the own domain type
 type test_create_secretmem_t;
 testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_secretmem_t)
-allow test_create_secretmem_t self:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_secretmem_t self:anon_inode { create read write map };
 
 # Domain allowed to create secret memory with the own domain type and allowed to map WX
 type test_create_wx_secretmem_t;
 testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_wx_secretmem_t)
-allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:anon_inode { create read write map };
 allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:process execmem;
 
 # Domain not allowed to create secret memory via a type transition to a private type
@@ -30,4 +30,4 @@ type_transition test_nocreate_transition_secretmem_t test_nocreate_transition_se
 type test_create_transition_secretmem_t;
 testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_transition_secretmem_t)
 type_transition test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_create_transition_secretmem_t:anon_inode test_secretmem_inode_t "[secretmem]";
-allow test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_secretmem_inode_t:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_secretmem_inode_t:anon_inode { create read write map };

Does this approach look correct to you? Please let me know if my understanding makes sense and what should be my next step for patch.

Thanks,
Shivank

maintainer
#7 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Shivank Garg
Quoted 1 line · Paul Moore

On Jun 26, 2025 Shivank Garg <[email protected]> wrote:

...

Quoted 10 lines

Thanks again for your continued work on this! I think the patch looks pretty reasonable, but it would be good to hear a bit about how you've tested this before ACK'ing the patch. For example, have you tested this against any of the LSMs which provide anonymous inode support?

At the very least, the selinux-testsuite has a basic secretmem test, it would be good to know if the test passes with this patch or if any additional work is needed to ensure compatibility.

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite

Hi Paul,

Thank you for pointing me to the selinux-testsuite. I wasn't sure how to properly test this patch, so your guidance was very helpful.

With the current test policy (test_secretmem.te), I initially encountered the following failures:

~/selinux-testsuite/tests/secretmem# ./test
memfd_secret() failed: Permission denied
1..6
memfd_secret() failed: Permission denied
ok 1

ftruncate failed:  Permission denied
unable to mmap secret memory:  Permission denied

not ok 2

...

Quoted 10 lines

To resolve this, I updated test_secretmem.te to add additional required permissions {create, read, write, map}
With this change, all tests now pass successfully:

policy/test_secretmem.te +0 -0
index 357f41d..4cce076 100644
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_nocreate_secretmem_t)
 # Domain allowed to create secret memory with the own domain type

policy/test_secretmem.te testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_nocreate_secretmem_t) · line 21

Quoted 10 lines
policy/test_secretmem.te +2 -2
 type test_create_secretmem_t;
 testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_secretmem_t)
-allow test_create_secretmem_t self:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_secretmem_t self:anon_inode { create read write map };
 
 # Domain allowed to create secret memory with the own domain type and allowed to map WX
 type test_create_wx_secretmem_t;
 testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_wx_secretmem_t)
-allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:anon_inode { create read write map };

I believe this domain also needs the anon_inode/execute permission.

Quoted 10 lines
policy/test_secretmem.te +1 -1
 allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:process execmem;
 
 # Domain not allowed to create secret memory via a type transition to a private type
@@ -30,4 +30,4 @@ type_transition test_nocreate_transition_secretmem_t test_nocreate_transition_se
 type test_create_transition_secretmem_t;
 testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_transition_secretmem_t)
 type_transition test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_create_transition_secretmem_t:anon_inode test_secretmem_inode_t "[secretmem]";
-allow test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_secretmem_inode_t:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_secretmem_inode_t:anon_inode { create read write map };
Quoted 2 lines

Does this approach look correct to you? Please let me know if my understanding makes sense and what should be my next step for patch.

[NOTE: added selinux@vger and selinux-refpolicy@vger to the To/CC line]

Hi Shivank,

My apologies for not responding earlier, Friday was a holiday and I was away over the weekend. Getting back at it this morning I ran into the same failures as you described, and had to make similar changes to the selinux-testsuite policy (see the anon_inode/execute comment above, I also added the capability/ipc_lock permission as needed).

Strictly speaking this is a regression in the kernel, even if the new behavior is correct. I'm CC'ing the SELinux and Reference Policy lists so that the policy devs can take a look and see what impacts there might be to the various public SELinux policies. If this looks like it may be a significant issue, we'll need to work around this with a SELinux "policy capability" or some other compatibility solution.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#8 lore raw
Quoted 81 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 31 lines · Shivank Garg
Quoted 1 line · Paul Moore

On Jun 26, 2025 Shivank Garg <[email protected]> wrote:

...

Quoted 10 lines

Thanks again for your continued work on this! I think the patch looks pretty reasonable, but it would be good to hear a bit about how you've tested this before ACK'ing the patch. For example, have you tested this against any of the LSMs which provide anonymous inode support?

At the very least, the selinux-testsuite has a basic secretmem test, it would be good to know if the test passes with this patch or if any additional work is needed to ensure compatibility.

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite

Hi Paul,

Thank you for pointing me to the selinux-testsuite. I wasn't sure how to properly test this patch, so your guidance was very helpful.

With the current test policy (test_secretmem.te), I initially encountered the following failures:

~/selinux-testsuite/tests/secretmem# ./test
memfd_secret() failed: Permission denied
1..6
memfd_secret() failed: Permission denied
ok 1

ftruncate failed:  Permission denied
unable to mmap secret memory:  Permission denied

not ok 2

...

Quoted 10 lines

To resolve this, I updated test_secretmem.te to add additional required permissions {create, read, write, map}
With this change, all tests now pass successfully:

policy/test_secretmem.te +0 -0
index 357f41d..4cce076 100644
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_nocreate_secretmem_t)
  # Domain allowed to create secret memory with the own domain type

policy/test_secretmem.te testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_nocreate_secretmem_t) · line 21

Quoted 10 lines
policy/test_secretmem.te +2 -2
  type test_create_secretmem_t;
  testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_secretmem_t)
-allow test_create_secretmem_t self:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_secretmem_t self:anon_inode { create read write map };
 
  # Domain allowed to create secret memory with the own domain type and allowed to map WX
  type test_create_wx_secretmem_t;
  testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_wx_secretmem_t)
-allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:anon_inode { create read write map };

I believe this domain also needs the anon_inode/execute permission.

Quoted 10 lines
policy/test_secretmem.te +1 -1
  allow test_create_wx_secretmem_t self:process execmem;
 
  # Domain not allowed to create secret memory via a type transition to a private type
@@ -30,4 +30,4 @@ type_transition test_nocreate_transition_secretmem_t test_nocreate_transition_se
  type test_create_transition_secretmem_t;
  testsuite_domain_type_minimal(test_create_transition_secretmem_t)
  type_transition test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_create_transition_secretmem_t:anon_inode test_secretmem_inode_t "[secretmem]";
-allow test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_secretmem_inode_t:anon_inode create;
+allow test_create_transition_secretmem_t test_secretmem_inode_t:anon_inode { create read write map };
Quoted 2 lines

Does this approach look correct to you? Please let me know if my understanding makes sense and what should be my next step for patch.

[NOTE: added selinux@vger and selinux-refpolicy@vger to the To/CC line]

Hi Shivank,

My apologies for not responding earlier, Friday was a holiday and I was away over the weekend. Getting back at it this morning I ran into the same failures as you described, and had to make similar changes to the selinux-testsuite policy (see the anon_inode/execute comment above, I also added the capability/ipc_lock permission as needed).

Quoted 7 lines

Strictly speaking this is a regression in the kernel, even if the new behavior is correct. I'm CC'ing the SELinux and Reference Policy lists so that the policy devs can take a look and see what impacts there might be to the various public SELinux policies. If this looks like it may be a significant issue, we'll need to work around this with a SELinux "policy capability" or some other compatibility solution.

In refpolicy, there are 34 rules for anon_inode and they all have { create read write map } -- none of them have the execute permission. Of these, only 4 are explict and could potentially be broken. The remaining get it due to being unconfined, thus can be immediately fixed, since it's unconfined.

IMO, this is very low impact.

Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
maintainer
#9 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 8 lines · Paul Moore

Strictly speaking this is a regression in the kernel, even if the new behavior is correct. I'm CC'ing the SELinux and Reference Policy lists so that the policy devs can take a look and see what impacts there might be to the various public SELinux policies. If this looks like it may be a significant issue, we'll need to work around this with a SELinux "policy capability" or some other compatibility solution.

Quoted 7 lines

In refpolicy, there are 34 rules for anon_inode and they all have { create read write map } -- none of them have the execute permission. Of these, only 4 are explict and could potentially be broken. The remaining get it due to being unconfined, thus can be immediately fixed, since it's unconfined.

IMO, this is very low impact.

Thanks Chris, I think it's worth leaving the kernel code as-is and just patching the selinux-testsuite. I'll send out a patch for that tomorrow.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com