Skip to contentSkip to conversation

rust: miscdevice: Export vtable testing

PATCH In review Matthew Maurer 3 participants 5 messages Jun 27, 2025 – Jun 28, 2025

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 rust: miscdevice: Export vtable testing

A common pattern in the kernel is to test whether a file belongs to a particular driver by checking its f_op struct against an expected value. This provides a safe way to perform that test for MiscDevice implementations without needing to directly expose the vtable.

---
 rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs +8 -0
index 939278bc7b03489a647b697012e09223871c90cd..5f59eda57c38be5f0d54fa9692fe5b2819e31480 100644
@@ -177,6 +177,14 @@ fn show_fdinfo(
     }
 }
 
+/// Determines whether a given `File` is backed by the `T` `MiscDevice` based on vtable matching.
+pub fn is_miscdevice_file<T: MiscDevice>(file: &File) -> bool {
+    let vtable = core::ptr::from_ref(&MiscdeviceVTable::<T>::VTABLE);
+    // SAFETY: `f_op` is not mutated after file creation
+    let file_vtable = unsafe { (*file.as_ptr()).f_op };
+    vtable == file_vtable
+}
+
 /// A vtable for the file operations of a Rust miscdevice.
 struct MiscdeviceVTable<T: MiscDevice>(PhantomData<T>);
 

---
base-commit: 86731a2a651e58953fc949573895f2fa6d456841
change-id: 20250627-linux-miscident-7b67db234a5c

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Matthew Maurer <[email protected]>
#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Matthew Maurer

A common pattern in the kernel is to test whether a file belongs to a particular driver by checking its f_op struct against an expected value. This provides a safe way to perform that test for MiscDevice implementations without needing to directly expose the vtable.

Additionally, we have a sample user[1] of this in the Android ashmem wrapper. They're currently working around it by grabbing the vtable out of the registration and testing manually.

[1]: https://android-review.git.corp.google.com/c/kernel/common/+/3477511

Quoted 32 lines
---
 rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs +8 -1
index 939278bc7b03489a647b697012e09223871c90cd..5f59eda57c38be5f0d54fa9692fe5b2819e31480 100644
@@ -177,6 +177,14 @@ fn show_fdinfo(
     }
 }
 
+/// Determines whether a given `File` is backed by the `T` `MiscDevice` based on vtable matching.
+pub fn is_miscdevice_file<T: MiscDevice>(file: &File) -> bool {
+    let vtable = core::ptr::from_ref(&MiscdeviceVTable::<T>::VTABLE);
+    // SAFETY: `f_op` is not mutated after file creation
+    let file_vtable = unsafe { (*file.as_ptr()).f_op };
+    vtable == file_vtable
+}
+
 /// A vtable for the file operations of a Rust miscdevice.
 struct MiscdeviceVTable<T: MiscDevice>(PhantomData<T>);
 
 
---

base-commit: 86731a2a651e58953fc949573895f2fa6d456841
change-id: 20250627-linux-miscident-7b67db234a5c

Best regards,
--
Matthew Maurer <[email protected]>

maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Matthew Maurer
Quoted 6 lines · Matthew Maurer

A common pattern in the kernel is to test whether a file belongs to a particular driver by checking its f_op struct against an expected value. This provides a safe way to perform that test for MiscDevice implementations without needing to directly expose the vtable.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Additionally, we have a sample user[1] of this in the Android ashmem wrapper. They're currently working around it by grabbing the vtable out of the registration and testing manually.

[1]: https://android-review.git.corp.google.com/c/kernel/common/+/3477511

As ashmem isn't going to be upstream, it's hard for us to treat this as a real user :)

reviewer
#3 lore raw
In reply to Matthew Maurer
Quoted 15 lines · Matthew Maurer

A common pattern in the kernel is to test whether a file belongs to a particular driver by checking its f_op struct against an expected value. This provides a safe way to perform that test for MiscDevice implementations without needing to directly expose the vtable.

---
 rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs +0 -0
index 939278bc7b03489a647b697012e09223871c90cd..5f59eda57c38be5f0d54fa9692fe5b2819e31480 100644

rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs fn show_fdinfo( · line 182

Quoted 6 lines
rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs +3 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,14 @@ fn show_fdinfo(
     }
 }
 
+/// Determines whether a given `File` is backed by the `T` `MiscDevice` based on vtable matching.
+pub fn is_miscdevice_file<T: MiscDevice>(file: &File) -> bool {
+    let vtable = core::ptr::from_ref(&MiscdeviceVTable::<T>::VTABLE);

I don't think this always returns the same pointer. So this function might return false in a case where T actually backs file...

---
Cheers,
Benno

Quoted 14 lines
rust/kernel/miscdevice.rs +5 -1
+    // SAFETY: `f_op` is not mutated after file creation
+    let file_vtable = unsafe { (*file.as_ptr()).f_op };
+    vtable == file_vtable
+}
+
 /// A vtable for the file operations of a Rust miscdevice.
 struct MiscdeviceVTable<T: MiscDevice>(PhantomData<T>);
 
 
---

base-commit: 86731a2a651e58953fc949573895f2fa6d456841
change-id: 20250627-linux-miscident-7b67db234a5c

Best regards,

maintainer
#4 lore raw
In reply to Matthew Maurer
Quoted 4 lines · Matthew Maurer

A common pattern in the kernel is to test whether a file belongs to a particular driver by checking its f_op struct against an expected value. This provides a safe way to perform that test for MiscDevice implementations without needing to directly expose the vtable.

Ick, who does that? And why? Who cares within the kernel what driver owns a fd as why would any driver ever be passed a fd that is not owned by it?

I would like to see a real user first please, or point out some places in the kernel today that does this so we can go and fix them up :)

thanks,

greg k-h