dm-verity: remove support for asynchronous hashes
PATCH 1/1 dm-verity: remove support for asynchronous hashes
The support for asynchronous hashes in dm-verity has outlived its usefulness. It adds significant code complexity and opportunity for bugs. I don't know of anyone using it practice. (The original submitter of the code possibly was, but that was 8 years ago.) Data I recently collected for en/decryption shows that using off-CPU crypto "accelerators" is consistently much slower than the CPU
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/),
even on CPUs that lack dedicated cryptographic instructions. Similar results are likely to be seen for hashing.
I already removed support for asynchronous hashes from fsverity two years ago, and no one ever complained.
Moreover, neither dm-verity, fsverity, nor fscrypt has ever actually used the asynchronous crypto algorithms in a truly asynchronous manner. The lack of interest in such optimizations provides further evidence that it's only the CPU-based crypto that actually matters.
Historically, it's also been common for people to forget to enable the optimized SHA-256 code, which could contribute to an off-CPU crypto engine being perceived as more useful than it really is. In 6.16 I fixed that: the optimized SHA-256 code is now enabled by default.
Therefore, let's drop the support for asynchronous hashes in dm-verity.
Tested with verity-compat-test.
--- drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 175 +++++----------------------------- drivers/md/dm-verity.h | 20 ++-- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +24 -151
@@ -17,11 +17,10 @@#include "dm-verity-fec.h" #include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h" #include "dm-audit.h" #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/reboot.h> -#include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/security.h> #define DM_MSG_PREFIX "verity"
@@ -59,13 +58,10 @@ static unsigned int dm_verity_use_bh_bytes[4] = {module_param_array_named (use_bh_bytes, dm_verity_use_bh_bytes, uint,NULL ,0644 );static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (use_bh_wq_enabled); -/* Is at least one dm-verity instance using ahash_tfm instead of shash_tfm? */ -static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (ahash_enabled); -struct dm_verity_prefetch_work {struct work_struct work;struct dm_verity *v;unsigned short ioprio;sector_t block;
@@ -116,104 +112,25 @@ static sector_t verity_position_at_level(struct dm_verity *v, sector_t block, int level) {return block >> (level * v->hash_per_block_bits); } -static int verity_ahash_update (struct dm_verity *v,struct ahash_request *req, -const u8 *data,size_t len, -struct crypto_wait *wait) -{ -struct scatterlist sg; - -if (likely (!is_vmalloc_addr (data))) { -sg_init_one (&sg, data, len); -ahash_request_set_crypt (req, &sg,NULL , len); -return crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_update (req), wait); - } - -do { -int r; -size_t this_step =min_t (size_t, len,PAGE_SIZE -offset_in_page (data)); - -flush_kernel_vmap_range ((void *)data, this_step); -sg_init_table (&sg,1 ); -sg_set_page (&sg,vmalloc_to_page (data), this_step,offset_in_page (data)); -ahash_request_set_crypt (req, &sg,NULL , this_step); - r =crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_update (req), wait); -if (unlikely (r)) -return r; - data += this_step; - len -= this_step; - }while (len); - -return 0 ; -} - -/* -* Wrapper for crypto_ahash_init, which handles verity salting. -*/ -static int verity_ahash_init (struct dm_verity *v,struct ahash_request *req, -struct crypto_wait *wait,bool may_sleep) -{ -int r; - -ahash_request_set_tfm (req, v->ahash_tfm); -ahash_request_set_callback (req, - may_sleep ?CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG :0 , - crypto_req_done, (void *)wait); -crypto_init_wait (wait); - - r =crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_init (req), wait); - -if (unlikely (r <0 )) { -if (r != -ENOMEM ) -DMERR ("crypto_ahash_init failed: %d" , r); -return r; - } - -if (likely (v->salt_size && (v->version >=1 ))) - r =verity_ahash_update (v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait); - -return r; -} - -static int verity_ahash_final (struct dm_verity *v,struct ahash_request *req, -u8 *digest,struct crypto_wait *wait) -{ -int r; - -if (unlikely (v->salt_size && (!v->version))) { - r =verity_ahash_update (v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait); - -if (r <0 ) { -DMERR ("%s failed updating salt: %d" , __func__, r); - goto out; - } - } - -ahash_request_set_crypt (req,NULL , digest,0 ); - r =crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_final (req), wait); -out: -return r; -} -int verity_hash (struct dm_verity *v,struct dm_verity_io *io,const u8 *data,size_t len,u8 *digest,bool may_sleep) { +struct shash_desc *desc = &io->hash_desc;int r; -if (static_branch_unlikely (&ahash_enabled) && !v->shash_tfm) { -struct ahash_request *req =verity_io_hash_req (v, io); -struct crypto_wait wait; - - r =verity_ahash_init (v, req, &wait, may_sleep) ?: -verity_ahash_update (v, req, data, len, &wait) ?: -verity_ahash_final (v, req, digest, &wait); + desc->tfm = v->shash_tfm; +if (unlikely (v->initial_hashstate ==NULL )) { +/* version 0: salt at end */ + r =crypto_shash_init (desc) ?: +crypto_shash_update (desc, data, len) ?: +crypto_shash_update (desc, v->salt, v->salt_size) ?: +crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); }else { -struct shash_desc *desc =verity_io_hash_req (v, io); - - desc->tfm = v->shash_tfm; +/* version 1: salt at beginning */ r =crypto_shash_import (desc, v->initial_hashstate) ?:crypto_shash_finup (desc, data, len, digest); }if (unlikely (r))DMERR ("Error hashing block: %d" , r);
@@ -1090,16 +1007,11 @@ static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)kfree (v->initial_hashstate);kfree (v->root_digest);kfree (v->zero_digest);verity_free_sig (v); -if (v->ahash_tfm) { -static_branch_dec (&ahash_enabled); -crypto_free_ahash (v->ahash_tfm); - }else { -crypto_free_shash (v->shash_tfm); - } +crypto_free_shash (v->shash_tfm);kfree (v->alg_name);if (v->hash_dev)dm_put_device (ti, v->hash_dev);
@@ -1155,11 +1067,12 @@ static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v) v->zero_digest =kmalloc (v->digest_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!v->zero_digest)return r; - io =kmalloc (sizeof (*io) + v->hash_reqsize,GFP_KERNEL ); + io =kmalloc (sizeof (*io) +crypto_shash_descsize (v->shash_tfm), +GFP_KERNEL );if (!io)return r;/* verity_dtr will free zero_digest */ zero_data =kzalloc (1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -1322,74 +1235,37 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v, }static int verity_setup_hash_alg (struct dm_verity *v,const char *alg_name) {struct dm_target *ti = v->ti; -struct crypto_ahash *ahash; -struct crypto_shash *shash =NULL ; -const char *driver_name; +struct crypto_shash *shash; v->alg_name =kstrdup (alg_name,GFP_KERNEL );if (!v->alg_name) { ti->error ="Cannot allocate algorithm name" ;return -ENOMEM ; } -/* -* Allocate the hash transformation object that this dm-verity instance -* will use. The vast majority of dm-verity users use CPU-based -* hashing, so when possible use the shash API to minimize the crypto -* API overhead. If the ahash API resolves to a different driver -* (likely an off-CPU hardware offload), use ahash instead. Also use -* ahash if the obsolete dm-verity format with the appended salt is -* being used, so that quirk only needs to be handled in one place. -*/ - ahash =crypto_alloc_ahash (alg_name,0 , - v->use_bh_wq ?CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC :0 ); -if (IS_ERR (ahash)) { + shash =crypto_alloc_shash (alg_name,0 ,0 ); +if (IS_ERR (shash)) { ti->error ="Cannot initialize hash function" ; -return PTR_ERR (ahash); - } - driver_name =crypto_ahash_driver_name (ahash); -if (v->version >=1 /* salt prepended, not appended? */ ) { - shash =crypto_alloc_shash (alg_name,0 ,0 ); -if (!IS_ERR (shash) && -strcmp (crypto_shash_driver_name (shash), driver_name) !=0 ) { -/* -* ahash gave a different driver than shash, so probably -* this is a case of real hardware offload. Use ahash. -*/ -crypto_free_shash (shash); - shash =NULL ; - } - } -if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (shash)) { -crypto_free_ahash (ahash); - ahash =NULL ; - v->shash_tfm = shash; - v->digest_size =crypto_shash_digestsize (shash); - v->hash_reqsize =sizeof (struct shash_desc ) + -crypto_shash_descsize (shash); -DMINFO ("%s using shash \"%s\"" , alg_name, driver_name); - }else { - v->ahash_tfm = ahash; -static_branch_inc (&ahash_enabled); - v->digest_size =crypto_ahash_digestsize (ahash); - v->hash_reqsize =sizeof (struct ahash_request ) + -crypto_ahash_reqsize (ahash); -DMINFO ("%s using ahash \"%s\"" , alg_name, driver_name); +return PTR_ERR (shash); } + v->shash_tfm = shash; + v->digest_size =crypto_shash_digestsize (shash); +DMINFO ("%s using \"%s\"" , alg_name,crypto_shash_driver_name (shash));if ((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) < v->digest_size *2 ) { ti->error ="Digest size too big" ;return -EINVAL ; }return 0 ; }static int verity_setup_salt_and_hashstate (struct dm_verity *v,const char *arg) {struct dm_target *ti = v->ti; +SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (desc, v->shash_tfm);if (strcmp (arg,"-" ) !=0 ) { v->salt_size =strlen (arg) /2 ; v->salt =kmalloc (v->salt_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!v->salt) {
@@ -1400,12 +1276,11 @@ static int verity_setup_salt_and_hashstate(struct dm_verity *v, const char *arg) hex2bin(v->salt, arg, v->salt_size)) { ti->error ="Invalid salt" ;return -EINVAL ; } } -if (v->shash_tfm) { -SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (desc, v->shash_tfm); +if (v->version) {int r;/* * Compute the pre-salted hash state that can be passed to * crypto_shash_import() for each block later.
@@ -1679,11 +1554,12 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) ti->error ="Cannot allocate workqueue" ; r = -ENOMEM ; goto bad; } - ti->per_io_data_size =sizeof (struct dm_verity_io ) + v->hash_reqsize; + ti->per_io_data_size =sizeof (struct dm_verity_io ) + +crypto_shash_descsize (v->shash_tfm); r =verity_fec_ctr (v);if (r) goto bad;
@@ -1786,14 +1662,11 @@ static int verity_preresume(struct dm_target *ti) v = ti->private; bdev =dm_disk (dm_table_get_md (ti->table))->part0; root_digest.digest = v->root_digest; root_digest.digest_len = v->digest_size; -if (static_branch_unlikely (&ahash_enabled) && !v->shash_tfm) - root_digest.alg =crypto_ahash_alg_name (v->ahash_tfm); -else - root_digest.alg =crypto_shash_alg_name (v->shash_tfm); + root_digest.alg =crypto_shash_alg_name (v->shash_tfm); r =security_bdev_setintegrity (bdev,LSM_INT_DMVERITY_ROOTHASH , &root_digest,sizeof (root_digest));if (r)return r;
drivers/md/dm-verity.h +6 -14
@@ -37,15 +37,14 @@ struct dm_verity {struct dm_dev *data_dev;struct dm_dev *hash_dev;struct dm_target *ti;struct dm_bufio_client *bufio;char *alg_name; -struct crypto_ahash *ahash_tfm;/* either this or shash_tfm is set */ -struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm;/* either this or ahash_tfm is set */ +struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm;u8 *root_digest;/* digest of the root block */ u8 *salt;/* salt: its size is salt_size */ -u8 *initial_hashstate;/* salted initial state, if shash_tfm is set */ +u8 *initial_hashstate;/* salted initial state, if version >= 1 */ u8 *zero_digest;/* digest for a zero block */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY u8 *root_digest_sig;/* signature of the root digest */ unsigned int sig_size;/* root digest signature size */ #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -59,11 +58,10 @@ struct dm_verity {unsigned char levels;/* the number of tree levels */ unsigned char version; bool hash_failed:1; /* set if hash of any block failed */ bool use_bh_wq:1; /* try to verify in BH wq before normal work-queue */unsigned int digest_size;/* digest size for the current hash algorithm */ -unsigned int hash_reqsize;/* the size of temporary space for crypto */ enum verity_mode mode;/* mode for handling verification errors */ enum verity_mode error_mode;/* mode for handling I/O errors */ unsigned int corrupted_errs;/* Number of errors for corrupted blocks */ struct workqueue_struct *verify_wq;
@@ -98,23 +96,17 @@ struct dm_verity_io {u8 real_digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE ];u8 want_digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE ];/* -* This struct is followed by a variable-sized hash request of size -* v->hash_reqsize, either a struct ahash_request or a struct shash_desc -* (depending on whether ahash_tfm or shash_tfm is being used). To -* access it, use verity_io_hash_req(). +* Temporary space for hashing. This is variable-length and must be at +* the end of the struct. struct shash_desc is just the fixed part; +* it's followed by a context of size crypto_shash_descsize(shash_tfm). */ +struct shash_desc hash_desc; }; -static inline void *verity_io_hash_req (struct dm_verity *v, -struct dm_verity_io *io) -{ -return io +1 ; -} -static inline u8 *verity_io_real_digest (struct dm_verity *v,struct dm_verity_io *io) {return io->real_digest; }
base-commit: 846e9e999dd36ce5898d302d674e441e72c3a8cf
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Quoted 26 lines · Eric Biggers
The support for asynchronous hashes in dm-verity has outlived its usefulness. It adds significant code complexity and opportunity for bugs. I don't know of anyone using it practice. (The original submitter of the code possibly was, but that was 8 years ago.) Data I recently collected for en/decryption shows that using off-CPU crypto "accelerators" is consistently much slower than the CPU
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/),
even on CPUs that lack dedicated cryptographic instructions. Similar results are likely to be seen for hashing.I already removed support for asynchronous hashes from fsverity two years ago, and no one ever complained.
Moreover, neither dm-verity, fsverity, nor fscrypt has ever actually used the asynchronous crypto algorithms in a truly asynchronous manner. The lack of interest in such optimizations provides further evidence that it's only the CPU-based crypto that actually matters.
Historically, it's also been common for people to forget to enable the optimized SHA-256 code, which could contribute to an off-CPU crypto engine being perceived as more useful than it really is. In 6.16 I fixed that: the optimized SHA-256 code is now enabled by default.
Therefore, let's drop the support for asynchronous hashes in dm-verity.
Quoted 8 lines
Tested with verity-compat-test.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>--- drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 175 +++++----------------------------- drivers/md/dm-verity.h | 20 ++-- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)
The diffstat speaks for itself
Quoted 370 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +24
-151@@ -17,11 +17,10 @@#include "dm-verity-fec.h" #include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h" #include "dm-audit.h" #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/reboot.h> -#include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/security.h> #define DM_MSG_PREFIX "verity"@@ -59,13 +58,10 @@ static unsigned int dm_verity_use_bh_bytes[4] = {module_param_array_named (use_bh_bytes, dm_verity_use_bh_bytes, uint,NULL ,0644 );static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (use_bh_wq_enabled); -/* Is at least one dm-verity instance using ahash_tfm instead of shash_tfm? */ -static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (ahash_enabled); -struct dm_verity_prefetch_work {struct work_struct work;struct dm_verity *v;unsigned short ioprio;sector_t block;@@ -116,104 +112,25 @@ static sector_t verity_position_at_level(struct dm_verity *v, sector_t block, int level) {return block >> (level * v->hash_per_block_bits); } -static int verity_ahash_update (struct dm_verity *v,struct ahash_request *req, -const u8 *data,size_t len, -struct crypto_wait *wait) -{ -struct scatterlist sg; - -if (likely (!is_vmalloc_addr (data))) { -sg_init_one (&sg, data, len); -ahash_request_set_crypt (req, &sg,NULL , len); -return crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_update (req), wait); - } - -do { -int r; -size_t this_step =min_t (size_t, len,PAGE_SIZE -offset_in_page (data)); - -flush_kernel_vmap_range ((void *)data, this_step); -sg_init_table (&sg,1 ); -sg_set_page (&sg,vmalloc_to_page (data), this_step,offset_in_page (data)); -ahash_request_set_crypt (req, &sg,NULL , this_step); - r =crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_update (req), wait); -if (unlikely (r)) -return r; - data += this_step; - len -= this_step; - }while (len); - -return 0 ; -} - -/* -* Wrapper for crypto_ahash_init, which handles verity salting. -*/ -static int verity_ahash_init (struct dm_verity *v,struct ahash_request *req, -struct crypto_wait *wait,bool may_sleep) -{ -int r; - -ahash_request_set_tfm (req, v->ahash_tfm); -ahash_request_set_callback (req, - may_sleep ?CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG :0 , - crypto_req_done, (void *)wait); -crypto_init_wait (wait); - - r =crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_init (req), wait); - -if (unlikely (r <0 )) { -if (r != -ENOMEM ) -DMERR ("crypto_ahash_init failed: %d" , r); -return r; - } - -if (likely (v->salt_size && (v->version >=1 ))) - r =verity_ahash_update (v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait); - -return r; -} - -static int verity_ahash_final (struct dm_verity *v,struct ahash_request *req, -u8 *digest,struct crypto_wait *wait) -{ -int r; - -if (unlikely (v->salt_size && (!v->version))) { - r =verity_ahash_update (v, req, v->salt, v->salt_size, wait); - -if (r <0 ) { -DMERR ("%s failed updating salt: %d" , __func__, r); - goto out; - } - } - -ahash_request_set_crypt (req,NULL , digest,0 ); - r =crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_final (req), wait); -out: -return r; -} -int verity_hash (struct dm_verity *v,struct dm_verity_io *io,const u8 *data,size_t len,u8 *digest,bool may_sleep) { +struct shash_desc *desc = &io->hash_desc;int r; -if (static_branch_unlikely (&ahash_enabled) && !v->shash_tfm) { -struct ahash_request *req =verity_io_hash_req (v, io); -struct crypto_wait wait; - - r =verity_ahash_init (v, req, &wait, may_sleep) ?: -verity_ahash_update (v, req, data, len, &wait) ?: -verity_ahash_final (v, req, digest, &wait); + desc->tfm = v->shash_tfm; +if (unlikely (v->initial_hashstate ==NULL )) { +/* version 0: salt at end */ + r =crypto_shash_init (desc) ?: +crypto_shash_update (desc, data, len) ?: +crypto_shash_update (desc, v->salt, v->salt_size) ?: +crypto_shash_final (desc, digest); }else { -struct shash_desc *desc =verity_io_hash_req (v, io); - - desc->tfm = v->shash_tfm; +/* version 1: salt at beginning */ r =crypto_shash_import (desc, v->initial_hashstate) ?:crypto_shash_finup (desc, data, len, digest); }if (unlikely (r))DMERR ("Error hashing block: %d" , r);@@ -1090,16 +1007,11 @@ static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)kfree (v->initial_hashstate);kfree (v->root_digest);kfree (v->zero_digest);verity_free_sig (v); -if (v->ahash_tfm) { -static_branch_dec (&ahash_enabled); -crypto_free_ahash (v->ahash_tfm); - }else { -crypto_free_shash (v->shash_tfm); - } +crypto_free_shash (v->shash_tfm);kfree (v->alg_name);if (v->hash_dev)dm_put_device (ti, v->hash_dev);@@ -1155,11 +1067,12 @@ static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v) v->zero_digest =kmalloc (v->digest_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!v->zero_digest)return r; - io =kmalloc (sizeof (*io) + v->hash_reqsize,GFP_KERNEL ); + io =kmalloc (sizeof (*io) +crypto_shash_descsize (v->shash_tfm), +GFP_KERNEL );if (!io)return r;/* verity_dtr will free zero_digest */ zero_data =kzalloc (1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,GFP_KERNEL );@@ -1322,74 +1235,37 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v, }static int verity_setup_hash_alg (struct dm_verity *v,const char *alg_name) {struct dm_target *ti = v->ti; -struct crypto_ahash *ahash; -struct crypto_shash *shash =NULL ; -const char *driver_name; +struct crypto_shash *shash; v->alg_name =kstrdup (alg_name,GFP_KERNEL );if (!v->alg_name) { ti->error ="Cannot allocate algorithm name" ;return -ENOMEM ; } -/* -* Allocate the hash transformation object that this dm-verity instance -* will use. The vast majority of dm-verity users use CPU-based -* hashing, so when possible use the shash API to minimize the crypto -* API overhead. If the ahash API resolves to a different driver -* (likely an off-CPU hardware offload), use ahash instead. Also use -* ahash if the obsolete dm-verity format with the appended salt is -* being used, so that quirk only needs to be handled in one place. -*/ - ahash =crypto_alloc_ahash (alg_name,0 , - v->use_bh_wq ?CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC :0 ); -if (IS_ERR (ahash)) { + shash =crypto_alloc_shash (alg_name,0 ,0 ); +if (IS_ERR (shash)) { ti->error ="Cannot initialize hash function" ; -return PTR_ERR (ahash); - } - driver_name =crypto_ahash_driver_name (ahash); -if (v->version >=1 /* salt prepended, not appended? */ ) { - shash =crypto_alloc_shash (alg_name,0 ,0 ); -if (!IS_ERR (shash) && -strcmp (crypto_shash_driver_name (shash), driver_name) !=0 ) { -/* -* ahash gave a different driver than shash, so probably -* this is a case of real hardware offload. Use ahash. -*/ -crypto_free_shash (shash); - shash =NULL ; - } - } -if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (shash)) { -crypto_free_ahash (ahash); - ahash =NULL ; - v->shash_tfm = shash; - v->digest_size =crypto_shash_digestsize (shash); - v->hash_reqsize =sizeof (struct shash_desc ) + -crypto_shash_descsize (shash); -DMINFO ("%s using shash \"%s\"" , alg_name, driver_name); - }else { - v->ahash_tfm = ahash; -static_branch_inc (&ahash_enabled); - v->digest_size =crypto_ahash_digestsize (ahash); - v->hash_reqsize =sizeof (struct ahash_request ) + -crypto_ahash_reqsize (ahash); -DMINFO ("%s using ahash \"%s\"" , alg_name, driver_name); +return PTR_ERR (shash); } + v->shash_tfm = shash; + v->digest_size =crypto_shash_digestsize (shash); +DMINFO ("%s using \"%s\"" , alg_name,crypto_shash_driver_name (shash));if ((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) < v->digest_size *2 ) { ti->error ="Digest size too big" ;return -EINVAL ; }return 0 ; }static int verity_setup_salt_and_hashstate (struct dm_verity *v,const char *arg) {struct dm_target *ti = v->ti; +SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (desc, v->shash_tfm);if (strcmp (arg,"-" ) !=0 ) { v->salt_size =strlen (arg) /2 ; v->salt =kmalloc (v->salt_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!v->salt) {@@ -1400,12 +1276,11 @@ static int verity_setup_salt_and_hashstate(struct dm_verity *v, const char *arg) hex2bin(v->salt, arg, v->salt_size)) { ti->error ="Invalid salt" ;return -EINVAL ; } } -if (v->shash_tfm) { -SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (desc, v->shash_tfm); +if (v->version) {int r;/* * Compute the pre-salted hash state that can be passed to * crypto_shash_import() for each block later. @@ -1679,11 +1554,12 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) ti->error ="Cannot allocate workqueue" ; r = -ENOMEM ; goto bad; } - ti->per_io_data_size =sizeof (struct dm_verity_io ) + v->hash_reqsize; + ti->per_io_data_size =sizeof (struct dm_verity_io ) + +crypto_shash_descsize (v->shash_tfm); r =verity_fec_ctr (v);if (r) goto bad;@@ -1786,14 +1662,11 @@ static int verity_preresume(struct dm_target *ti) v = ti->private; bdev =dm_disk (dm_table_get_md (ti->table))->part0; root_digest.digest = v->root_digest; root_digest.digest_len = v->digest_size; -if (static_branch_unlikely (&ahash_enabled) && !v->shash_tfm) - root_digest.alg =crypto_ahash_alg_name (v->ahash_tfm); -else - root_digest.alg =crypto_shash_alg_name (v->shash_tfm); + root_digest.alg =crypto_shash_alg_name (v->shash_tfm); r =security_bdev_setintegrity (bdev,LSM_INT_DMVERITY_ROOTHASH , &root_digest,sizeof (root_digest));if (r)return r;drivers/md/dm-verity.h +6
-14@@ -37,15 +37,14 @@ struct dm_verity {struct dm_dev *data_dev;struct dm_dev *hash_dev;struct dm_target *ti;struct dm_bufio_client *bufio;char *alg_name; -struct crypto_ahash *ahash_tfm;/* either this or shash_tfm is set */ -struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm;/* either this or ahash_tfm is set */ +struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm;u8 *root_digest;/* digest of the root block */ u8 *salt;/* salt: its size is salt_size */ -u8 *initial_hashstate;/* salted initial state, if shash_tfm is set */ +u8 *initial_hashstate;/* salted initial state, if version >= 1 */ u8 *zero_digest;/* digest for a zero block */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY u8 *root_digest_sig;/* signature of the root digest */ unsigned int sig_size;/* root digest signature size */ #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ @@ -59,11 +58,10 @@ struct dm_verity {unsigned char levels;/* the number of tree levels */ unsigned char version; bool hash_failed:1; /* set if hash of any block failed */ bool use_bh_wq:1; /* try to verify in BH wq before normal work-queue */unsigned int digest_size;/* digest size for the current hash algorithm */ -unsigned int hash_reqsize;/* the size of temporary space for crypto */ enum verity_mode mode;/* mode for handling verification errors */ enum verity_mode error_mode;/* mode for handling I/O errors */ unsigned int corrupted_errs;/* Number of errors for corrupted blocks */ struct workqueue_struct *verify_wq;@@ -98,23 +96,17 @@ struct dm_verity_io {u8 real_digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE ];u8 want_digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE ];/* -* This struct is followed by a variable-sized hash request of size -* v->hash_reqsize, either a struct ahash_request or a struct shash_desc -* (depending on whether ahash_tfm or shash_tfm is being used). To -* access it, use verity_io_hash_req(). +* Temporary space for hashing. This is variable-length and must be at +* the end of the struct. struct shash_desc is just the fixed part; +* it's followed by a context of size crypto_shash_descsize(shash_tfm). */ +struct shash_desc hash_desc; }; -static inline void *verity_io_hash_req (struct dm_verity *v, -struct dm_verity_io *io) -{ -return io +1 ; -} -static inline u8 *verity_io_real_digest (struct dm_verity *v,struct dm_verity_io *io) {return io->real_digest; }base-commit:
846e9e999dd36ce5898d302d674e441e72c3a8cf--
2.50.1