Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices
Subsystems (2)
v4 cover Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices
cyrpto/x590-utils
- Updated patch descriptions to summarize what each patch introduces.
- Restricted accepted certificate format on the QEMU command line to PEM only.
- Added internal conversion routines to handle PEM-to-DER and
DER-to-PEM as needed.
- Renamed crypto functions using the qcrypto_x509_ prefix.
- Replaced QAPI enums with plain C enums.
- Improved GNUTLS error propagation throughout the crypto API.
- Standardized error returns to -1 (instead of using errno values) for consistency.
- Removed unused helpers: qcrypto_check_x509_cert_fmt() and qcrypto_get_x509_hash_len().
- Added bounds checking before converting GNUTLS enums to internal crypto enums.
- Modified qcrypto_get_x509_cert_key_id() to dynamically allocate the result.
- Fixed a typo in the crypto API documentation.
hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Removed max_size check when loading certificate.
- Removed check_path_type() and use the stat() & S_ISXXX checks inline where needed.
- Initialized all g_autofree variables.
- Refactored get_cert_paths()
- Used g_auto(GStrv) and g_autoptr(GPtrArray) for automatic cleanup.
- Renamed misleading variables and dropped unnecessary intermediates.
- Replaced check_path_type() with stat(), and treated failures as fatal.
- Treated empty path components as fatal configuration errors.
- Used GError with g_dir_open() and handled errors properly.
- Removed redundant casts and manual cleanup.
- Treated providing 65 or more certificates as a fatal error.
- Modified S390IPLCertificate
- Changed raw from char * to uint8_t * for API consistency.
- Added cert_der field to calculate certificate data buffer size for
DIAG 320 and format conversion.
s390x/diag
- Handled error propagation from crypto API correctly.
- Added g_autofree to variables to ensure proper memory cleanup.
- Initialized all g_autofree variables.
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Allocated certificate buffer based on calculated size instead of static MAX_CERT_SIZE.
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Refactored to improve readability.
- Handled SCLAB Single Component/No Unsigned Component flags.
docs: Add secure IPL documentation
- Updated documentation.
- Illustrated with gnutls ‘certtool’ instead of ‘openssl’ for consistency with other certificate creation docs.
- Updated cover letter with corresponding changes.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Description
This patch series is an external requirement by Linux distribution partners to verify secure IPL process. Additional secure IPL checks are also included in this series to address security holes in the original secure IPL design to prevent malicious actors to boot modified or unsigned code despite secure IPL being enforced.
Secure IPL is enabled when the QEMU options for secure IPL are specified in the command line.
During this process, additional security checks are performed to ensure system integrity.
As components are loaded from disk, DIAG 508 subcode 2 performs signature verification if a signature entry is identified. Upon successful verification, DIAG 320 subcode 2 will request the corresponding certificate from QEMU key store to the BIOS.
Secure IPL will continue until all the components are loaded if no error occurs during True secure IPL mode or in Audit mode (see explanation below).
After that, an IPL Information report block (IIRB) is initialized immediately following an IPL Parameter Information Block. The IIRB is populated with information about the components, verification results and certificate data.
Finally, the guest system proceeds to boot.
Only List-Directed-IPL contains the relevant zIPL data structures to perform secure IPL. This patch series only adds support for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices. Secure IPL for other device types will be considered as follow-up work at a later date.
** Note: "secure IPL" and "secure boot" are used interchangeably throughout the design. **
# True Secure IPL Mode and Audit Mode
## True Secure IPL Mode
When secure IPL is enabled and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will performed. The boot process will abort if any error occurs during the secure IPL checks.
## Audit Mode
When the secure IPL option is not selected and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will still be performed. However, the boot process will continue if any errors occur, with messages logged to the console during the secure IPL checks.
The audit mode is also considered as simulated secure IPL because it is less pervasive, and allows the guest to boot regardless of the secure checking results.
# How to Enable Secure IPL
## QEMU Build Notes
When building QEMU, enable the cryptographic libraries.
Run configure script in QEMU repository with either parameter:
./configure … --enable-gnutls
## Create Certificates via certtool
Generate and use an RSA private key for signing.
certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem
A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the cert.info template to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool.
cat > cert.info <<EOF cn = "My Name" expiration_days = 36500 cert_signing_key EOF certtool --generate-self-signed \ --load-privkey key.pem \ --template cert.info \ --hash=SHA256 \ --outfile cert.pem
It is recommended to store the certificate(s) in the /…/qemu/certs directory for easy identification.
## Sign Kernel and Prepare zipl
All actions must be performed on a KVM guest.
Copy the sign-file script (located in Linux source repository), generated private key(s), and certificate(s) to guest's file system.
Sign guest image(s) and stage3 binary:
./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-… ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin
Run zipl with secure boot enabled.
zipl --secure 1 -V
Guest image(s) are now signed, stored on disk, and can be verified.
## New QEMU Command Options for Secure IPL
New parameters have been added to the s390-ccw-virtio machine type to enable Secure IPL and provide certificates for signature verification.
This parameter enables or disables Secure IPL/boot. If not specified, it defaults to off.
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on|off
This parameter specifies one or more paths to boot certificates, used for signature verification. You can provide a single certificate file or a directory. Multiple paths can be separated by a colon (:).
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio, \
boot-certificates=/.../qemu/certs:/another/path/cert.pemExample:
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on, \
boot-certificates=/.../qemu/certs:/another/path/cert.pemSecure IPL command options overview:
If neither the -secure-boot nor the -boot-certificates options are specified, the guest will boot in normal mode, and no security checks will be conducted.
If the -secure-boot option is not specified or is set to off, and the -boot-certificates option is provided, the guest will boot in audit mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed; however, any errors encountered will not interrupt the boot process.
If the -secure-boot option is set to on and the -boot-certificates option is provided, the guest will boot in true secure IPL mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed, and any errors encountered will terminate the boot process.
- If the -boot-certificates option is not provided in true secure IPL mode, the boot process will fail for the corresponding device.
## Constraints
- z16 CPU model
- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format
- only sha256 encryption is supported
- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices
- The boot process will terminate if secure boot is enabled without
specifying a boot device.
- If enabling secure boot with multiple boot devices, any
unsupported devices or non-eligible devices will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error logged to the console.
- attempting to perform secure IPL outside of these constraints will result in a failure.
# DIAGNOSE 508 - KVM IPL Extensions
Signature verification is performed during IPL via DIAG 508. Component address, component length, signature address and signature length are obtained in the BIOS and pass to DIAG 508 subcode 2 to perform signature verification in QEMU. If verification succeeds, DIAG 508 subcode 2 (signature verification) will return the length and index of the certificate in the QemuCertificateStore that was used for verification.
## Data Structures
Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock (SVB) — stores addresses and lengths of the component and signature to be used for signature verification. Upon verification, an index and the length of the certificate used is stored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changelog v2->v3:
- Fixed typos in patches
- Edited and corrected patch description
- Enabled secure IPL feature in TCG
- Split crypto subsystem changes from s390x subsystem changes
- Added API documentation for each helper function
- Removed qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fmt()
- Reworked qcrypto_check_x509_cert_fmt() to return 0 on success and
negative error code on errors
- Rephrased error messages when GNUTLS is not enabled
- Changed dev cycle reference from 9.2 to 10.1
hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Passed *cert_buf to g_file_get_contents() directly in cert2buf()
- Returned NULL for early returns
- Added check to only allow maximum of 64 certificates in the certificate store
s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Renamed “diag320” to “cstore”
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from VCStorageSizeBlock
- Removed unnecessary error check from subcode 1 implementation
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from VCBlock and VCEngtry
- Reworked diag_320_is_cert_valid() to return 0 on success and negative error code on errors
- Set *key_id_data and *hash_data to NULL after g_free()
- Moved DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC case block implementation to a separate function
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Added a reserved field to Diag508CertificateStoreInfo
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from Diag508CertificateStoreInfo and Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock
- Applied g_autofree to svb, svb_comp and svb_sig varaibles
- Moved DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF case block implementation to a separate function
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
- Removed casting when calculating comp_len
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Used malloc() to allocate certificate buffer instead of statically allocating
- Reworked zipl_secure_print()
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
- Added check to make sure SIPL is enabled when SCLAF is enabled
docs: Add secure IPL documentation
- Split document into two parts:
- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst (developer reference)
- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst (user guide)
Changelog v1->v2:
- Fixed typos in patches
- Edited cover letter
- Added secure IPL documentation
QEMU Command-Line Interface:
- Moved boot-certificates under the machine-type option for s390x-virtio-ccw
- Moved secure-boot under the machine-type option for s390x-virtio-ccw
hw/s390x/ipl: Create Certificate Store
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Added check to only accept certificates using SHA-256 hashing
- Recalculated data_buf_size to ensure word alignment
- Cleaned up memory allocation
- Refactored functions for clarity
s390x: Guest Support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Updated patch description to clarify:
- Why Secure IPL is not available with Secure Execution
- Why this feature requires S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB
-Restricted features to z16 due to additional layers requiring z16
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 Subcode 1
- Renamed VerificationCertificate prefix to VC
- Byte-swap written values for endianness correctness
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 Subcode 2
- Edited commit message for clarity
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Renamed data structure variables
- Ensured length fields in VCE are word-aligned
- Handled the VC index 0 case
- General refactoring
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 Subcode 2 for Signature Verification
- Defined subcode from 2 to 1
- Removed unused error codes
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Byte-swap read values
hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB Flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Moved DIAG308 flags to a new header file
s390x: Guest Support for Secure-IPL Facility
- Renamed SCLP variable from cbl to fac_ipl
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add Signature Verification for Secure Boot (Audit Mode)
- Moved Secure IPL-related functions to pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ip.c|h
- Refactored code for clarity
Collin L. Walling (2):
s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
Zhuoying Cai (26):
Add boot-certificates to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS) s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit
mode
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility
(SCLAF)
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
docs: Add secure IPL documentation
crypto/meson.build | 5 +- crypto/x509-utils.c | 464 ++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 159 ++++++++ docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 156 ++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 223 +++++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 39 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 61 ++- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 27 +- hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 44 +++ hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 + include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 180 +++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h | 34 ++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 87 ++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 38 ++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 7 +- include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 2 + include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 3 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 284 +++++++++++-- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 96 ++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c | 6 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 111 +++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c | 8 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 18 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 52 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 7 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 590 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 228 +++++++++++ qemu-options.hx | 11 +- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 5 + target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 5 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 7 + target/s390x/diag.c | 468 +++++++++++++++++++++- target/s390x/gen-features.c | 7 + target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 36 ++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 4 + target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 14 + 40 files changed, 3424 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst create mode 100644 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 1/28 Add boot-certificates to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
Add boot-certificates as a parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option.
The boot-certificates=/path/dir:/path/file parameter is implemented to provide path to either a directory or a single certificate.
Multiple paths can be delineated using a colon.
--- hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 1 + qemu-options.hx | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c +22 -0
@@ -798,6 +798,22 @@ static void machine_set_loadparm(Object *obj, Visitor *v,g_free (val); } +static inline char *machine_get_boot_certificates (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + +return g_strdup (ms->boot_certificates); +} + +static void machine_set_boot_certificates (Object *obj,const char *str, +Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + +g_free (ms->boot_certificates); + ms->boot_certificates =g_strdup (str); +} +static void ccw_machine_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,const void *data) {MachineClass *mc =MACHINE_CLASS (oc);
@@ -851,6 +867,12 @@ static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)"Up to 8 chars in set of [A-Za-z0-9. ] (lower case chars converted" " to upper case) to pass to machine loader, boot manager," " and guest kernel"); + +object_class_property_add_str (oc,"boot-certificates" , + machine_get_boot_certificates, + machine_set_boot_certificates); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"boot-certificates" , +"provide path to a directory or a single certificate for secure boot" ); }static inline void s390_machine_initfn (Object *obj)
include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct S390CcwMachineState {uint8_t loadparm[8 ];uint64_t memory_limit;uint64_t max_pagesize; +char *boot_certificates;SCLPDevice *sclp; };
qemu-options.hx +6 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \ #endif " memory-backend='backend-id' specifies explicitly provided backend for main RAM (default=none)\n" " cxl-fmw.0.targets.0=firsttarget,cxl-fmw.0.targets.1=secondtarget,cxl-fmw.0.size=size[,cxl-fmw.0.interleave-granularity=granularity]\n" - " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n", + " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n" + " boot-certificates='/path/directory:/path/file' provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate\n", QEMU_ARCH_ALL) SRST ``-machine [type=]name[,prop=value[,...]]``
@@ -200,6 +201,10 @@ SRST :: -machine smp-cache.0.cache=l1d,smp-cache.0.topology=core,smp-cache.1.cache=l1i,smp-cache.1.topology=core + + ``boot-certificates='/path/directory:/path/file'`` + Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate on the host [s390x only]. + A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. ERST DEF("M", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_M,
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 01/28] Add boot-certificates to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
Quoted 71 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add boot-certificates as a parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option.
The
boot-certificates=/path/dir:/path/fileparameter is implemented to provide path to either a directory or a single certificate.Multiple paths can be delineated using a colon.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 1 + qemu-options.hx | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c +22
-0@@ -798,6 +798,22 @@ static void machine_set_loadparm(Object *obj, Visitor *v,g_free (val); } +static inline char *machine_get_boot_certificates (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + +return g_strdup (ms->boot_certificates); +} + +static void machine_set_boot_certificates (Object *obj,const char *str, +Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + +g_free (ms->boot_certificates); + ms->boot_certificates =g_strdup (str); +} +static void ccw_machine_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,const void *data) {MachineClass *mc =MACHINE_CLASS (oc);@@ -851,6 +867,12 @@ static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)"Up to 8 chars in set of [A-Za-z0-9. ] (lower case chars converted" " to upper case) to pass to machine loader, boot manager," " and guest kernel"); + +object_class_property_add_str (oc,"boot-certificates" , + machine_get_boot_certificates, + machine_set_boot_certificates); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"boot-certificates" , +"provide path to a directory or a single certificate for secure boot" ); }static inline void s390_machine_initfn (Object *obj)include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h +1
-0@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct S390CcwMachineState {uint8_t loadparm[8 ];uint64_t memory_limit;uint64_t max_pagesize; +char *boot_certificates;SCLPDevice *sclp; };qemu-options.hx +0
-0
qemu-options.hx DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \ · line 47
Quoted 6 lines
qemu-options.hx +2
-1@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \ #endif " memory-backend='backend-id' specifies explicitly provided backend for main RAM (default=none)\n" " cxl-fmw.0.targets.0=firsttarget,cxl-fmw.0.targets.1=secondtarget,cxl-fmw.0.size=size[,cxl-fmw.0.interleave-granularity=granularity]\n" - " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n", + " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n" + " boot-certificates='/path/directory:/path/file' provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate\n",
I forgot to respond to your previous question about how to do arrays for this. The command line exmaples here for cxl-fmw and smp-cache conveniently illustrate the syntax.
It would be something like this on the CLI:
boot-certs.0.path=/path/to/dir,boot-certs.1.path=/to/other/dir,boot-certs.2.path=/some/...
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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PATCH v4 2/28 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce new helper functions for x509 certificate, which will be used by the certificate store:
qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der() - converts a certificate from PEM to DER format qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len() - returns the length of the key ID qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm() - returns signature algorithm of the certificate
These functions provide support for certificate format conversion and metadata extraction.
--- crypto/meson.build | 5 +- crypto/x509-utils.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 71 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
crypto/meson.build +1 -4
@@ -22,12 +22,9 @@ crypto_ss.add(files( 'tlscredsx509.c', 'tlssession.c', 'rsakey.c', + 'x509-utils.c', )) -if gnutls.found() - crypto_ss.add(files('x509-utils.c')) -endif - if nettle.found() crypto_ss.add(nettle, files('hash-nettle.c', 'hmac-nettle.c', 'pbkdf-nettle.c')) if hogweed.found()
crypto/x509-utils.c +155 -0
170 lines not on this page · raw message
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +71 -0
81 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 02/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
Quoted 22 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce new helper functions for x509 certificate, which will be used by the certificate store:
qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der()- converts a certificate from PEM to DER formatqcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len()- returns the length of the key IDqcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm()- returns signature algorithm of the certificateThese functions provide support for certificate format conversion and metadata extraction.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- crypto/meson.build | 5 +- crypto/x509-utils.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 71 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)crypto/meson.build +0
-0
crypto/meson.build crypto_ss.add(files( · line 30
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/meson.build +1
-4@@ -22,12 +22,9 @@ crypto_ss.add(files( 'tlscredsx509.c', 'tlssession.c', 'rsakey.c', + 'x509-utils.c', )) -if gnutls.found() - crypto_ss.add(files('x509-utils.c')) -endif -
Lets make this change, plus....
crypto/x509-utils.c line 15
Quoted 13 lines
crypto/meson.build +0
-0if nettle.found() crypto_ss.add(nettle, files('hash-nettle.c', 'hmac-nettle.c', 'pbkdf-nettle.c')) if hogweed.found()crypto/x509-utils.c +2
-0@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@#include "qemu/osdep.h" #include "qapi/error.h" #include "crypto/x509-utils.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS
...this addition as a separate commit. They are refactoring the way we build the code, without adding any features, so best practice says they should be separated from feature additions.
Quoted 49 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +42
-0#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> #include <gnutls/crypto.h> #include <gnutls/x509.h> @@ -25,6 +27,87 @@ static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = { [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160, }; +static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[] = { + [QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA1 ] =GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA1 , + [QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA256 ] =GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA256 , + [QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA512 ] =GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA512 , + [QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_BEST_KNOWN ] =GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_BEST_KNOWN , +}; + +static const int gnutls_to_qcrypto_sig_alg_map[] = { + [GNUTLS_SIGN_UNKNOWN ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_UNKNOWN , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA1 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA1 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA1 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA1 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_DSA_SHA1 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD5 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_MD5 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_MD2 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_RMD160 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_RMD160 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA384 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA384 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA512 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA512 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA224 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA224 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA224 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_DSA_SHA224 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_DSA_SHA256 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_DSA_SHA256 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA1 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA224 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA224 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA256 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA384 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA384 , + [GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA512 ] =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA512 , +}; + +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + }
crypto/x509-utils.c static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = { · line 81
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+ + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + *result =g_malloc0 (*resultlen); + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_export (crt,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER , *result, resultlen); +if (rc !=0 ) {
We need to do "g_clear_pointer(result, g_free)" in this error path
Quoted 19 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +19
-0+error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert certificate to DER format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len (QCryptoKeyidFlags flag,Error **errp) +{ +if (flag >=G_N_ELEMENTS (qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map)) { +error_setg (errp,"Unknow key ID flag %d" , flag); +return -1 ; + } +
crypto/x509-utils.c static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = { · line 110
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+if ((flag & qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA512 ]) || + (flag & qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_BEST_KNOWN ])) { +return QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA512 ; + }else if (flag & qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA256 ]) { +return QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256 ; + }else { +return QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA1 ; + } +} +
If we eliminate the QCryptoKeyidFlags enum, then the need for this method also goes away.
Quoted 61 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +54
-0int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, QCryptoHashAlgo alg, uint8_t *result,@@ -74,3 +157,75 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt);return ret; } + +int qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + +/* +* This function never returns a negative error code. +* Error cases and unknown/unsupported signature algorithms +* are mapped to GNUTLS_SIGN_UNKNOWN. +*/ + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_signature_algorithm (crt); +if (rc >=G_N_ELEMENTS (gnutls_to_qcrypto_sig_alg_map)) { +error_setg (errp,"Unknown signature algorithm %d" , rc); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = gnutls_to_qcrypto_sig_alg_map[rc]; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ + +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to export X.509 certificate" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len (QCryptoKeyidFlags flag,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get key ID length" ); +return -1 ; +}
crypto/x509-utils.c int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, · line 223
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+ +int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +QCryptoHashAlgo hash, +uint8_t *result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get fingerprint" ); +return -1 ; +}
If you separate out the meson.build + #ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS change, then this specific stub should be done in that refactoring commit too.
Quoted 13 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +8
-0+ +int qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get signature algorithm" ); +return -1 ; +} + +#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ include/crypto/x509-utils.h +0
-0
include/crypto/x509-utils.h line 21
Quoted 9 lines
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +6
-0@@ -13,10 +13,81 @@#include "crypto/hash.h" +typedef enum { +QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA1 , +QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA256 , +QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA512 , +QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_BEST_KNOWN , +}QCryptoKeyidFlags ;
I don't think this enum serves any useful purpose.
The qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id method should just accept the QCryptoHashAlgo enum directly and avoid the redirextion.
Quoted 17 lines
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +17
-0+ +typedef enum { + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_UNKNOWN, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA1, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_DSA_SHA1, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_MD5, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_MD2, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_RMD160, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA384, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA512, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA224, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_DSA_SHA224, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_DSA_SHA256, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA1, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA224, + QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA256,
include/crypto/x509-utils.h line 48
Quoted 10 lines
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +4
-0+QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA384 , +QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA512 , +} QCryptoSigAlgo; +int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,QCryptoHashAlgo hash,uint8_t *result,size_t *resultlen,Error **errp);
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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PATCH v4 3/28 hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
In reply to Zhuoying CaiCreate a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.
Load certificates from the boot-certificate parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option into the cert store.
Currently, only X.509 certificates in PEM format are supported, as the QEMU command line accepts certificates in PEM format only. Additionally, only the SHA-256 hashing algorithm is supported, as it is required for secure boot on s390.
--- hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 223 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 39 +++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 9 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 3 + hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 2 + 6 files changed, 277 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +223 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/* +* S390 certificate store implementation +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "cert-store.h" +#include "qapi/error.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "qemu/option.h" +#include "qemu/config-file.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ebcdic.h" +#include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" +#include "qemu/cutils.h" +#include "crypto/x509-utils.h" + +static const char *s390_get_boot_certificates (void ) +{ +return S390_CCW_MACHINE (qdev_get_machine ())->boot_certificates; +} + +static size_t cert2buf (char *path,char **cert_buf) +{ +size_t size; + +if (!g_file_get_contents (path, cert_buf, &size,NULL ) || size ==0 ) { +return 0 ; + } + +return size; +} + +static S390IPLCertificate *init_cert_x509 (size_t size,uint8_t *raw) +{ +S390IPLCertificate *q_cert =NULL ; +int key_id_size; +int hash_size; +int hash_type; +Error *err =NULL ; + + g_autofree uint8_t *cert_der = NULL; +size_t der_len = size; +int rc; + + hash_type =qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm (raw, size, &err); +if (hash_type ==-1 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return NULL ; + } +if (hash_type !=QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return NULL ; + } + + key_id_size =qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len (QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA256 , &err); +if (key_id_size ==-1 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return NULL ; + } + + hash_size =QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256 ; + + rc =qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (raw, size, &cert_der, &der_len, &err); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return NULL ; + } + + q_cert =g_new0 (S390IPLCertificate,1 ); + q_cert->size = size; + q_cert->der_size = der_len; + q_cert->key_id_size = key_id_size; + q_cert->hash_size = hash_size; + q_cert->raw = raw; + q_cert->hash_type =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256 ; + +return q_cert; +} + +static S390IPLCertificate *init_cert (char *path) +{ +char *buf; +size_t size; +char vc_name[VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ]; + g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL; +S390IPLCertificate *qcert =NULL ; + + filename =g_path_get_basename (path); + + size =cert2buf (path, &buf); +if (size ==0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to load certificate: %s" , path); +g_free (buf); +return NULL ; + } + + qcert =init_cert_x509 (size, (uint8_t *)buf); +if (qcert ==NULL ) { +error_report ("Failed to initialize certificate: %s" , path); +g_free (buf); +return NULL ; + } + +/* +* Left justified certificate name with padding on the right with blanks. +* Convert certificate name to EBCDIC. +*/ +strpadcpy (vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES , filename,' ' ); +ebcdic_put (qcert->vc_name, vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ); + +return qcert; +} + +static void update_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store, +S390IPLCertificate *qcert) +{ +size_t data_buf_size; +size_t keyid_buf_size; +size_t hash_buf_size; +size_t cert_buf_size; + +/* length field is word aligned for later DIAG use */ + keyid_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert->key_id_size,4 ); + hash_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert->hash_size,4 ); + cert_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert->der_size,4 ); + data_buf_size = keyid_buf_size + hash_buf_size + cert_buf_size; + +if (cert_store->max_cert_size < data_buf_size) { + cert_store->max_cert_size = data_buf_size; + } + + cert_store->certs[cert_store->count] = *qcert; + cert_store->total_bytes += data_buf_size; + cert_store->count++; +} + +static GPtrArray *get_cert_paths (void ) +{ +const char *paths_list; +g_auto (GStrv) paths =NULL ; +gchar **paths_copy; +GDir *dir =NULL ; +const gchar *filename; +g_autoptr (GError) err =NULL ; +g_autoptr (GPtrArray) cert_path_builder =g_ptr_array_new_full (0 , g_free); + + paths_list =s390_get_boot_certificates (); +if (paths_list ==NULL ) { +return g_steal_pointer (&cert_path_builder); + } + + paths =g_strsplit (paths_list,":" ,-1 ); + + paths_copy = paths; +while (*paths_copy) { +if (!strcmp (*paths_copy,"" )) { +error_report ("Empty path in certificate path list is not allowed" ); +exit (1 ); + } + +struct stat st; +if (stat (*paths_copy, &st) !=0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to stat path '%s': %s" , *paths_copy,g_strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } + +if (S_ISREG (st.st_mode)) { +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder,g_strdup (*paths_copy)); + }else if (S_ISDIR (st.st_mode)) { + dir =g_dir_open (*paths_copy,0 , &err); +if (dir ==NULL ) { +error_report ("Failed to open directory '%s': %s" , + *paths_copy, err->message); +exit (1 ); + } + +while ((filename =g_dir_read_name (dir))) { +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder, +g_build_filename (*paths_copy, filename,NULL )); + } + +g_dir_close (dir); + }else { +error_report ("Path '%s' is neither a file nor a directory" , *paths_copy); + } + + paths_copy +=1 ; + } + +return g_steal_pointer (&cert_path_builder); +} + +void s390_ipl_create_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store) +{ +GPtrArray *cert_path_builder; + + cert_path_builder =get_cert_paths (); +if (cert_path_builder->len ==0 ) { +g_ptr_array_free (cert_path_builder, TRUE); +return ; + } + + cert_store->max_cert_size =0 ; + cert_store->total_bytes =0 ; + +for (int i =0 ; i < cert_path_builder->len; i++) { +if (i >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +error_report ("Maximum %d certificates are allowed" ,MAX_CERTIFICATES ); +exit (1 ); + } + +S390IPLCertificate *qcert =init_cert ((char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i]); +if (qcert) { +update_cert_store (cert_store, qcert); + } + } + +g_ptr_array_free (cert_path_builder, TRUE); +}
hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* +* S390 certificate store +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef HW_S390_CERT_STORE_H +#define HW_S390_CERT_STORE_H + +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h" +#include "crypto/x509-utils.h" + +#define VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES 64 + +struct S390IPLCertificate { +uint8_t vc_name[VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ]; +size_t size; +size_t der_size; +size_t key_id_size; +size_t hash_size; +uint8_t *raw; +QCryptoSigAlgo hash_type; +}; +typedef struct S390IPLCertificate S390IPLCertificate ; + +struct S390IPLCertificateStore { +uint16_t count; +size_t max_cert_size; +size_t total_bytes; +S390IPLCertificate certs[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct S390IPLCertificateStore S390IPLCertificateStore ; + +void s390_ipl_create_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store); + +#endif
hw/s390x/ipl.c +9 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include "qemu/option.h" #include "qemu/ctype.h" #include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_ids.h" +#include "cert-store.h" #define KERN_IMAGE_START 0x010000UL#define LINUX_MAGIC_ADDR 0x010008UL
@@ -422,6 +423,13 @@ void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm(char *ascii_lp, uint8_t *ebcdic_lp) } } +S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (void ) +{ +S390IPLState *ipl =get_ipl_device (); + +return &ipl->cert_store; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -717,6 +725,7 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)if (!ipl->kernel || ipl->iplb_valid) { cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->bios_start_addr; +s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store);if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl); }else {
hw/s390x/ipl.h +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#ifndef HW_S390_IPL_H #define HW_S390_IPL_H +#include "cert-store.h" #include "cpu.h" #include "exec/target_page.h" #include "system/address-spaces.h"
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ int s390_ipl_pv_unpack(struct S390PVResponse *pv_resp);void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu (S390CPU *cpu);IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb (void );IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb_pv (void ); +S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (void );enum s390_reset {/* default is a reset not triggered by a CPU e.g. issued by QMP */
@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ struct S390IPLState {IplParameterBlock iplb;IplParameterBlock iplb_pv;QemuIplParameters qipl; +S390IPLCertificateStore cert_store;uint64_t start_addr;uint64_t compat_start_addr;uint64_t bios_start_addr;
hw/s390x/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ s390x_ss.add(files( 'sclpcpu.c', 'sclpquiesce.c', 'tod.c', + 'cert-store.c', )) s390x_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_KVM', if_true: files( 'tod-kvm.c',
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +2 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@#define LOADPARM_LEN 8#define NO_LOADPARM "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" +#define MAX_CERTIFICATES 64 +/* * The QEMU IPL Parameters will be stored at absolute address * 204 (0xcc) which means it is 32-bit word aligned but not
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 03/28] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
Quoted 55 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Create a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.
Load certificates from the boot-certificate parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option into the cert store.
Currently, only X.509 certificates in PEM format are supported, as the QEMU command line accepts certificates in PEM format only. Additionally, only the SHA-256 hashing algorithm is supported, as it is required for secure boot on s390.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 223 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 39 +++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 9 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 3 + hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 2 + 6 files changed, 277 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.hhw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +27
-0@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/* +* S390 certificate store implementation +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "cert-store.h" +#include "qapi/error.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "qemu/option.h" +#include "qemu/config-file.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ebcdic.h" +#include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" +#include "qemu/cutils.h" +#include "crypto/x509-utils.h" + +static const char *s390_get_boot_certificates (void ) +{ +return S390_CCW_MACHINE (qdev_get_machine ())->boot_certificates; +} + +static size_t cert2buf (char *path,char **cert_buf) +{
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 37
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+size_t size; + +if (!g_file_get_contents (path, cert_buf, &size,NULL ) || size ==0 ) { +return 0 ; + } + +return size; +} + +static S390IPLCertificate *init_cert_x509 (size_t size,uint8_t *raw)
Add 'Error **errp' to this method, and don't use error_report
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 49
Quoted 12 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +12
-0+{ +S390IPLCertificate *q_cert =NULL ; +int key_id_size; +int hash_size; +int hash_type; +Error *err =NULL ; + + g_autofree uint8_t *cert_der = NULL; +size_t der_len = size; +int rc; + + hash_type =qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm (raw, size, &err);
Pass in errp
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 51
Quoted 3 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +2
-0+if (hash_type ==-1 ) { +error_report_err (err);
drop this
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 55
Quoted 4 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +4
-0+return NULL ; + } +if (hash_type !=QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256 ) { +error_report_err (err);
'err' is not set, in this branch, so you must use
error_setg(errp, "Only SHA256 hash type is suppoorted, not %s",
QCryptoHashAlgo_str(hash_type));
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 59
Quoted 4 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +4
-0+return NULL ; + } + + key_id_size =qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len (QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA256 , &err);
Pass in errp
hw/s390x/cert-store.c
Quoted 2 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +2
-0+if (key_id_size ==-1 ) { +error_report_err (err);
Drop this
hw/s390x/cert-store.c
Quoted 2 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +2
-0+return NULL ; + }
this can just be 'key_id_size = QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256'
Quoted 18 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +18
-0+ + hash_size =QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256 ; + + rc =qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (raw, size, &cert_der, &der_len, &err); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return NULL ; + } + + q_cert =g_new0 (S390IPLCertificate,1 ); + q_cert->size = size; + q_cert->der_size = der_len; + q_cert->key_id_size = key_id_size; + q_cert->hash_size = hash_size; + q_cert->raw = raw; + q_cert->hash_type =QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256 ; + +return q_cert;
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 90
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +9
-0+} + +static S390IPLCertificate *init_cert (char *path) +{ +char *buf; +size_t size; +char vc_name[VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ]; + g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL; +S390IPLCertificate *qcert =NULL ;
Error *local_err = NULL;
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 101
Quoted 11 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +11
-0+ + filename =g_path_get_basename (path); + + size =cert2buf (path, &buf); +if (size ==0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to load certificate: %s" , path); +g_free (buf); +return NULL ; + } + + qcert =init_cert_x509 (size, (uint8_t *)buf);
Pass in &local_err
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 103
Quoted 2 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +2
-0+if (qcert ==NULL ) { +error_report ("Failed to initialize certificate: %s" , path);
Use:
error_reportf_err(local_err, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", path);
Quoted 73 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +71
-0+g_free (buf); +return NULL ; + } + +/* +* Left justified certificate name with padding on the right with blanks. +* Convert certificate name to EBCDIC. +*/ +strpadcpy (vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES , filename,' ' ); +ebcdic_put (qcert->vc_name, vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ); + +return qcert; +} + +static void update_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store, +S390IPLCertificate *qcert) +{ +size_t data_buf_size; +size_t keyid_buf_size; +size_t hash_buf_size; +size_t cert_buf_size; + +/* length field is word aligned for later DIAG use */ + keyid_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert->key_id_size,4 ); + hash_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert->hash_size,4 ); + cert_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert->der_size,4 ); + data_buf_size = keyid_buf_size + hash_buf_size + cert_buf_size; + +if (cert_store->max_cert_size < data_buf_size) { + cert_store->max_cert_size = data_buf_size; + } + + cert_store->certs[cert_store->count] = *qcert; + cert_store->total_bytes += data_buf_size; + cert_store->count++; +} + +static GPtrArray *get_cert_paths (void ) +{ +const char *paths_list; +g_auto (GStrv) paths =NULL ; +gchar **paths_copy; +GDir *dir =NULL ; +const gchar *filename; +g_autoptr (GError) err =NULL ; +g_autoptr (GPtrArray) cert_path_builder =g_ptr_array_new_full (0 , g_free); + + paths_list =s390_get_boot_certificates (); +if (paths_list ==NULL ) { +return g_steal_pointer (&cert_path_builder); + } + + paths =g_strsplit (paths_list,":" ,-1 ); + + paths_copy = paths; +while (*paths_copy) { +if (!strcmp (*paths_copy,"" )) { +error_report ("Empty path in certificate path list is not allowed" ); +exit (1 ); + } + +struct stat st; +if (stat (*paths_copy, &st) !=0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to stat path '%s': %s" , *paths_copy,g_strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } + +if (S_ISREG (st.st_mode)) { +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder,g_strdup (*paths_copy)); + }else if (S_ISDIR (st.st_mode)) { + dir =g_dir_open (*paths_copy,0 , &err);
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 184
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+if (dir ==NULL ) { +error_report ("Failed to open directory '%s': %s" , + *paths_copy, err->message); +exit (1 ); + } + +while ((filename =g_dir_read_name (dir))) { +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder, +g_build_filename (*paths_copy, filename,NULL )); + }
IMHO it should only append files with an extension of ".pem" to avoid picking up any extraneous files in that location.
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 195
Quoted 11 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +11
-0+ +g_dir_close (dir); + }else { +error_report ("Path '%s' is neither a file nor a directory" , *paths_copy); + } + + paths_copy +=1 ; + } + +return g_steal_pointer (&cert_path_builder); +}
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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PATCH v4 4/28 s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 is supported when the certificate-store (CS) facility is installed.
Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 134's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.
Note: secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.
--- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 134 (bit numbers relative to byte-134) */ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") +DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)if (s390_is_pv ()) {switch (feat) {case S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 : +case S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 :case S390_FEAT_HPMA2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_F2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_SKEY :
@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_PTFF_STOUE, S390_FEAT_MULTIPLE_EPOCH }, { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +3 -0
@@ -720,6 +720,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_PAIE ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR , + S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -919,6 +920,8 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_KIMD_SHA_512 ,S390_FEAT_KLMD_SHA_512 ,S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG , +S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB , + S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +2 -0
@@ -2490,6 +2490,8 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 , model->features); } +set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 04/28] s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
Quoted 8 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 is supported when the certificate-store (CS) facility is installed.
Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 134's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.
Quoted 5 lines
Note: secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
For consistency with documentation, please change this from "S390_FEAT_DIAG_320" to "S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE".
Quoted 86 lines
--- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+)target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1
-0@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1
-0@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 134 (bit numbers relative to byte-134) */ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") +DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2
-0@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)if (s390_is_pv ()) {switch (feat) {case S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 : +case S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 :case S390_FEAT_HPMA2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_F2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_SKEY :@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_PTFF_STOUE, S390_FEAT_MULTIPLE_EPOCH }, { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },target/s390x/gen-features.c +3
-0@@ -720,6 +720,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_PAIE ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR , + S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {@@ -919,6 +920,8 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_KIMD_SHA_512 ,S390_FEAT_KLMD_SHA_512 ,S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG , +S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB , + S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +2
-0@@ -2490,6 +2490,8 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 , model->features); } +set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 04/28] s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
Quoted 9 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 8 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 is supported when the certificate-store (CS) facility is installed.
Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 134's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Note: secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>For consistency with documentation, please change this from "
S390_FEAT_DIAG_320" to "S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE".
I also believe this patch and the subsequent patch #5 should be merged. Functionally, this patch does nothing meaningful. This introduces the CPU feature and the next one makes use of it. They're both relatively small patches.
Make sure you merge the relevant information in the commit message.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 5/28 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support certificate store facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 7 ++++++ 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 320 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG320_H +#define S390X_DIAG320_H + +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 + +#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 + +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +41 -0
50 lines not on this page · raw message
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define DIAG_TIMEREVENT 0x288#define DIAG_IPL 0x308#define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES 0x318 +#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501
@@ -1560,6 +1561,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) } } +static void kvm_handle_diag_320 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1590,6 +1601,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT : r =handle_sw_breakpoint (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_CERT_STORE : +kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
@@ -400,6 +400,8 @@ int mmu_translate_real(CPUS390XState *env, target_ulong raddr, int rw,int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3);void handle_diag_308 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */
target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7 -0
@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)/* time bomb (watchdog) */ r =handle_diag_288 (env, r1, r3);break ; +case 0x320 : +/* cert store */ +bql_lock (); +handle_diag_320 (env, r1, r3,GETPC ()); +bql_unlock (); + r =0 ; +break ;default : r =-1 ;break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 05/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
Quoted 6 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support certificate store facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
Change to: "used to query the Installed Subcodes Mask (ISM)."
Based on my feedback below, make sure to include a statement that this subcode is only supported when the Certificate Store facility is enabled.
Quoted 47 lines
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 7 ++++++ 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.hinclude/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +17
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 320 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG320_H +#define S390X_DIAG320_H + +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 + +#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 + +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include "hw/watchdog/wdt_diag288.h" #include "system/cpus.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" #include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" #include "system/kvm.h" #include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h"
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 201
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0@@ -191,3 +192,43 @@ out:break ; } } + +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1]; +int rc;
Even though "rc" likely means "response code" in the context of DIAG, it screams "return code" in a void function, which looks a little odd. I'd remove this variable and simply set env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_320_RC_* instead, similar to how DIAG 308 handles this.
Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+ +if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!s390_has_feat (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )) {
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 218
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +if (r1 &1 ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +switch (subcode) {
In patch 4, you introduce the feature bit for DIAG 320. It is documented that subcodes 0-3 are only supported if this feature bit is on. Please add a check for this feature. Subcode 0 (and later 1 and 2) should not be handled if this feature bit is not present.
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 220
Quoted 2 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +2
-0+case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : +uint64_t ism =0 ;
Technically, this subcode is suppose to write to an 8-word installed subcodes block (ISB). Though I can't imagine that we'll grow beyond even the first word for quite some time. I guess it's up to the caller to provide a proper ISB anyway.
I'd suggest the following:
change from uint64_t to uint32_t ism_word0
Add a comment:
/*
* The Installed Subcode Block (ISB) can be up 8 words in size,
* but the current set of subcodes can fit within a single word
* for now.
*/
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 227
Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &ism,sizeof (ism))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } + + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_320_RC_OK;
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 231
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +4
-0+break ; +default : +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ;
As specified in the documentation, "response code 0x0102 indicates that the subcode is reserved or not supported on this model". There is no program specification when an incorrect subcode has been provided.
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 233
Quoted 2 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +2
-0+ } + env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc;
Remove this line.
Quoted 71 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0+}target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14
-0@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define DIAG_TIMEREVENT 0x288#define DIAG_IPL 0x308#define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES 0x318 +#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501@@ -1560,6 +1561,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) } } +static void kvm_handle_diag_320 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)@@ -1590,6 +1601,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT : r =handle_sw_breakpoint (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_CERT_STORE : +kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2
-0@@ -400,6 +400,8 @@ int mmu_translate_real(CPUS390XState *env, target_ulong raddr, int rw,int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3);void handle_diag_308 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7
-0@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)/* time bomb (watchdog) */ r =handle_diag_288 (env, r1, r3);break ; +case 0x320 : +/* cert store */ +bql_lock (); +handle_diag_320 (env, r1, r3,GETPC ()); +bql_unlock (); + r =0 ; +break ;default : r =-1 ;break ;
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 05/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
Quoted 1 line · Collin Walling
On 7/11/25 17:10, Zhuoying Cai wrote:
[...]
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +1
-0@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define DIAG_TIMEREVENT 0x288#define DIAG_IPL 0x308#define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES 0x318 +#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501@@ -1560,6 +1561,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) } }
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) · line 1572
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +9
-0+static void kvm_handle_diag_320 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +}
One more piece I forgot to add here:
This handler function should check if the required facilities are installed for DIAG 320. For now, the Certificate Store facility is used to indicate DIAG 320 is provided and possibly subcodes 0-3 are available. Please add a feature check here and throw a program specification interrupt if the facility is not available before handle_diag_320 is called.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +1
-0+#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 05/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
Quoted 33 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 1 line · Collin Walling
On 7/11/25 17:10, Zhuoying Cai wrote:
[...]
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +1
-0@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define DIAG_TIMEREVENT 0x288#define DIAG_IPL 0x308#define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES 0x318 +#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501@@ -1560,6 +1561,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) } }Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) · line 1572
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +9
-0+static void kvm_handle_diag_320 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +}One more piece I forgot to add here:
Quoted 7 lines
This handler function should check if the required facilities are installed for DIAG 320. For now, the Certificate Store facility is used to indicate DIAG 320 is provided and possibly subcodes 0-3 are available. Please add a feature check here and throw a program specification interrupt if the facility is not available before
handle_diag_320is called.
Ack, sorry. I think I was too far into the weeds w.r.t. to fencing this off that I more-or-less duplicated this feedback in another spot. I realize now that fencing this feature off in handle_diag_320() makes more sense, as TCG also invokes it and should handled for that case as well.
My other sentence in the previous reply "In patch 4, you introduce the feature bit for DIAG 320" should be disregarded, as I see it's already there in that function. My bad.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +1
-0+#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 05/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
In reply to Collin WallingQuoted 129 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 6 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support certificate store facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
Change to: "used to query the Installed Subcodes Mask (ISM)."
Based on my feedback below, make sure to include a statement that this subcode is only supported when the Certificate Store facility is enabled.
Quoted 47 lines
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 7 ++++++ 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.hinclude/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +17
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 320 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG320_H +#define S390X_DIAG320_H + +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 + +#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 + +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include "hw/watchdog/wdt_diag288.h" #include "system/cpus.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" #include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" #include "system/kvm.h" #include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h" target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 201
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0@@ -191,3 +192,43 @@ out:break ; } } + +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1]; +int rc;Even though "rc" likely means "response code" in the context of DIAG, it screams "return code" in a void function, which looks a little odd. I'd remove this variable and simply set
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_320_RC_*instead, similar to how DIAG 308 handles this.Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+ +if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!s390_has_feat (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )) {target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 218
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +if (r1 &1 ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +switch (subcode) {In patch 4, you introduce the feature bit for DIAG 320. It is documented that subcodes 0-3 are only supported if this feature bit is on. Please add a check for this feature. Subcode 0 (and later 1 and 2) should not be handled if this feature bit is not present.
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 220
Quoted 2 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +2
-0+case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : +uint64_t ism =0 ;Technically, this subcode is suppose to write to an 8-word installed subcodes block (ISB). Though I can't imagine that we'll grow beyond even the first word for quite some time. I guess it's up to the caller to provide a proper ISB anyway.
I'd suggest the following:
change from
uint64_ttouint32_t ism_word0Add a comment:
/*
* The Installed Subcode Block (ISB) can be up 8 words in size,
* but the current set of subcodes can fit within a single word
* for now.
*/target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 227
Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &ism,sizeof (ism))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } + + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;env->regs[r1 + 1] =
DIAG_320_RC_OK;
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 231
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +4
-0+break ; +default : +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ;As specified in the documentation, "response code
0x0102indicates that the subcode is reserved or not supported on this model". There is no program specification when an incorrect subcode has been provided.
Yes to this, but subcode is limited to one byte so we still need to do a spec exception if r3 is greater than 255 (you can do it before the switch, like is done to r1).
Quoted 78 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 233
Quoted 3 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +2
-0+ } + env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc;Remove this line.
Quoted 71 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0+}target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14
-0@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define DIAG_TIMEREVENT 0x288#define DIAG_IPL 0x308#define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES 0x318 +#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501@@ -1560,6 +1561,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) } } +static void kvm_handle_diag_320 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)@@ -1590,6 +1601,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT : r =handle_sw_breakpoint (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_CERT_STORE : +kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2
-0@@ -400,6 +400,8 @@ int mmu_translate_real(CPUS390XState *env, target_ulong raddr, int rw,int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3);void handle_diag_308 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7
-0@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)/* time bomb (watchdog) */ r =handle_diag_288 (env, r1, r3);break ; +case 0x320 : +/* cert store */ +bql_lock (); +handle_diag_320 (env, r1, r3,GETPC ()); +bql_unlock (); + r =0 ; +break ;default : r =-1 ;break ;
PATCH v4 6/28 s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check
In reply to Zhuoying CaiCreate a function to validate the address parameter of DIAGNOSE.
Refactor the function for reuse in the next patch, which allows address validation in read or write operation of DIAGNOSE.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 6 ++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.h +6 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,12 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200 +static inline bool diag_parm_addr_valid (uint64_t addr,size_t size,bool write) +{ +return address_space_access_valid (&address_space_memory, addr, + size, write,MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED ); +} +static inline bool iplb_valid_len (IplParameterBlock *iplb) {return be32_to_cpu (iplb->len) <=sizeof (IplParameterBlock);
target/s390x/diag.c +1 -3
@@ -65,9 +65,7 @@ static int diag308_parm_check(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t addr,s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra);return -1 ; } -if (!address_space_access_valid (&address_space_memory, addr, -sizeof (IplParameterBlock), write, -MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED )) { +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (IplParameterBlock), write)) {s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra);return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 7/28 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +23 -0
@@ -11,7 +11,30 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128 +#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 + +struct VCStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t total_vc_ct; +uint16_t max_vc_ct; +uint32_t reserved3[7 ]; +uint32_t max_vce_len; +uint32_t reserved4[3 ]; +uint32_t max_single_vcb_len; +uint32_t total_vcb_len; +uint32_t reserved5[10 ]; +}; +typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock ; +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +35 -1
@@ -191,9 +191,13 @@ out: } } +QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock) !=128 , +"size of VCStorageSizeBlock is wrong" ); +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store ();uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;
@@ -215,13 +219,43 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =0 ; +uint64_t ism =cpu_to_be64 (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI );if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &ism,sizeof (ism))) {s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra);return ; } + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI : +VCStorageSizeBlock vcssb; + +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock), + true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) { + vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (4 ); + }else { + vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (VCSSB_MAX_LEN ); + vcssb.version =0 ; + vcssb.total_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (qcs->count); + vcssb.max_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (MAX_CERTIFICATES ); + vcssb.max_vce_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCE_HEADER_LEN + qcs->max_cert_size); + vcssb.max_single_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN +VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->max_cert_size); + vcssb.total_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->count *VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->total_bytes); + } + +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &vcssb,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ;default :
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 07/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
Quoted 55 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +23
-0@@ -11,7 +11,30 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128 +#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 + +struct VCStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t total_vc_ct; +uint16_t max_vc_ct; +uint32_t reserved3[7 ]; +uint32_t max_vce_len; +uint32_t reserved4[3 ]; +uint32_t max_single_vcb_len; +uint32_t total_vcb_len; +uint32_t reserved5[10 ]; +}; +typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock ; +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +0
-0
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 196
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +3
-0@@ -191,9 +191,13 @@ out: } } +QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock) !=128 , +"size of VCStorageSizeBlock is wrong" ); +
The message doesn't provide any information that QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON wouldn't give us, so maybe just use that.
Also, maybe replace 128 with VCSSB_MAX_LEN?
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 222
Quoted 13 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +2
-1void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store ();uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;@@ -215,13 +219,43 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =0 ; +uint64_t ism =cpu_to_be64 (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI );
Oh... Doesn't this suggest that there should have been a bit here stating that Query ISM itself is supported? (I agree it's a catch-22, but...)
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 233
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &ism,sizeof (ism))) {s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra);return ; } + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI : +VCStorageSizeBlock vcssb; +
Verify that addr is doubleword aligned?
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 240
Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock), + true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) {
For my own curiosity, can qcs actually be NULL? Looks like s390_ipl_get_certificate_store() returns the address of the cert_store struct in the IPL device.
Quoted 21 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +18
-0+ vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (4 ); + }else { + vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (VCSSB_MAX_LEN ); + vcssb.version =0 ; + vcssb.total_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (qcs->count); + vcssb.max_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (MAX_CERTIFICATES ); + vcssb.max_vce_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCE_HEADER_LEN + qcs->max_cert_size); + vcssb.max_single_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN +VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->max_cert_size); + vcssb.total_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->count *VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->total_bytes); + } + +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &vcssb,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ;default :
Re: [PATCH v4 07/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
Quoted 1 line · Eric Farman
On Fri, 2025-07-11 at 17:10 -0400, Zhuoying Cai wrote:
...
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 240
Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock), + true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) {For my own curiosity, can qcs actually be NULL? Looks like
s390_ipl_get_certificate_store()returns the address of thecert_storestruct in the IPL device.
Thanks for pointing it out. qcs can't be NULL for the reason you mentioned. I'll remove the check since it's unnecessary.
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +18
-0+ vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (4 ); + }else { + vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (VCSSB_MAX_LEN ); + vcssb.version =0 ; + vcssb.total_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (qcs->count); + vcssb.max_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (MAX_CERTIFICATES ); + vcssb.max_vce_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCE_HEADER_LEN + qcs->max_cert_size); + vcssb.max_single_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN +VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->max_cert_size); + vcssb.total_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->count *VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->total_bytes); + } + +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &vcssb,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ;default :
Re: [PATCH v4 07/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 5 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
This is general DIAG knowledge. Remove this sentence.
Quoted 4 lines
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
Please add more detail describing where the data that the VCSSB gets filled with comes from (s390 cert store), how this subcode is useful (e.g. getting num of certs, knowing how much space may need to be allocated to store a cert).
There are some #defines for the VCE (cert entries) and VCB (subcode 2 data structure). Please elaborate on them in the commit message.
Quoted 11 lines
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +0
-0
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 18
Quoted 8 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +2
-0@@ -11,7 +11,30 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128
This is just the size of the struct, right? Why not just use sizeof instead of this define?
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 22
Quoted 4 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +4
-0+#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000
FYI: need a bit for subcode 0 (as Eric mentioned)
Quoted 23 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +17
-0+ +struct VCStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t total_vc_ct; +uint16_t max_vc_ct; +uint32_t reserved3[7 ]; +uint32_t max_vce_len; +uint32_t reserved4[3 ]; +uint32_t max_single_vcb_len; +uint32_t total_vcb_len; +uint32_t reserved5[10 ]; +}; +typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock ; +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +0
-0
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 196
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +3
-0@@ -191,9 +191,13 @@ out: } } +QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock) !=128 , +"size of VCStorageSizeBlock is wrong" ); +
I'm unsure of why this is needed? It's not necessarily up to the build to determine that the data structure sizing hasn't been tampered with. See below, which may help clarify where the 128 bytes need to be checked.
Quoted 19 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +2
-1void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store ();uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;@@ -215,13 +219,43 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =0 ; +uint64_t ism =cpu_to_be64 (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI );if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &ism,sizeof (ism))) {s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra);return ; }
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 238
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI : +VCStorageSizeBlock vcssb; + +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock), + true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + }
There is a piece missing of the "negotiation" between here and the userspace. Userspace must set the length to a "minimum of 128 [bytes] ...; otherwise, a response code of 0x0202 is returned ..."
So, you're going to need to read the VCSSB denoted by addr and check that the length field is >= 128. Otherwise set that response code.
Check out function get_vcssb in the kernel cert_store.c file for guidance.
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 241
Quoted 3 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +3
-0+ +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) { + vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (4 );
Please use a #define instead of a literal. 4 is denoted as the length set if no certs are found.
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 247
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +6
-0+ }else { + vcssb.length =cpu_to_be32 (VCSSB_MAX_LEN ); + vcssb.version =0 ; + vcssb.total_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (qcs->count); + vcssb.max_vc_ct =cpu_to_be16 (MAX_CERTIFICATES ); + vcssb.max_vce_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCE_HEADER_LEN + qcs->max_cert_size);
This field is suppose to represent a constraint imposed by the cert store that denotes the largest sized cert that it will allow to be stored, not necessarily the "size of the largest cert currently stored" (that is reserved for max_single_vcb_len below). I do not think you have such a limitation in place, so it may be safe to ignore it?
Kernel only prints this field for debugging. Your code later on doesn't utilize it.
Quoted 14 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +11
-0+ vcssb.max_single_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN +VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->max_cert_size); + vcssb.total_vcb_len =cpu_to_be32 (VCB_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->count *VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->total_bytes); + } + +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &vcssb,sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ;default :
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 07/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
Quoted 14 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 5 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
This is general DIAG knowledge. Remove this sentence.
Quoted 4 lines
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
Quoted 8 lines
Please add more detail describing where the data that the VCSSB gets filled with comes from (s390 cert store), how this subcode is useful (e.g. getting num of certs, knowing how much space may need to be allocated to store a cert).
There are some #defines for the VCE (cert entries) and VCB (subcode 2 data structure). Please elaborate on them in the commit message.
This may get satisfied when merging in the relevant documentation from patch 28, but it's still good practice to summarize things in the commit message.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 8/28 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata needed for DIAG 320 subcode 2:
qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version() - retrieves version of a certificate qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times() - validates the certificate's validity period against the current time qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm() - returns the public key algorithm used in the certificate qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() - extracts the key ID from the certificate
These functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.
--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 76 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
crypto/x509-utils.c +199 -0
@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ static const int gnutls_to_qcrypto_sig_alg_map[] = { [GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA512] = QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA512, }; +static const int gnutls_to_qcrypto_pk_alg_map[] = { + [GNUTLS_PK_UNKNOWN ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_UNKNOWN , + [GNUTLS_PK_RSA ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_RSA , + [GNUTLS_PK_DSA ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_DSA , + [GNUTLS_PK_DH ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_DH , + [GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_ECDSA , +}; +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen,Error **errp)
@@ -195,6 +203,169 @@ cleanup:return ret; } +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get certificate version: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = rc; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; +time_t now =time (0 ); +time_t exp_time; +time_t act_time; + +if (now == ((time_t)-1 )) { +error_setg_errno (errp, errno,"Cannot get current time" ); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + exp_time =gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (crt); +if (exp_time == ((time_t)-1 )) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get certificate expiration time" ); + goto cleanup; + } +if (exp_time < now) { +error_setg (errp,"The certificate has expired" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + act_time =gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (crt); +if (act_time == ((time_t)-1 )) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get certificate activation time" ); + goto cleanup; + } +if (act_time > now) { +error_setg (errp,"The certificate is not yet active" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +unsigned int bits; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (crt, &bits); +if (rc >=G_N_ELEMENTS (gnutls_to_qcrypto_pk_alg_map)) { +error_setg (errp,"Unknown public key algorithm %d" , rc); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = gnutls_to_qcrypto_pk_alg_map[rc]; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +QCryptoKeyidFlags flag, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + *resultlen =qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len (qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[flag], + errp); +if (*resultlen ==-1 ) { +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + *result =g_malloc0 (*resultlen); +if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id (crt, + qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[flag], + *result, resultlen) !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get key ID from certificate" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} +#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -228,4 +399,32 @@ int qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errreturn -1 ; } +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get certificate version" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get certificate times" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get public key algorithm" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id (uint8_t *cert,size_t size, +QCryptoKeyidFlags flag, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to get key ID" ); +return -1 ; +} +#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +73 -3
100 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 08/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
Quoted 61 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata needed for DIAG 320 subcode 2:
qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version()- retrieves version of a certificateqcrypto_x509_check_cert_times()- validates the certificate's validity period against the current timeqcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm()- returns the public key algorithm used in the certificateqcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id()- extracts the key ID from the certificateThese functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 76 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)crypto/x509-utils.c +29
-0@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ static const int gnutls_to_qcrypto_sig_alg_map[] = { [GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA512] = QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_ECDSA_SHA512, }; +static const int gnutls_to_qcrypto_pk_alg_map[] = { + [GNUTLS_PK_UNKNOWN ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_UNKNOWN , + [GNUTLS_PK_RSA ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_RSA , + [GNUTLS_PK_DSA ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_DSA , + [GNUTLS_PK_DH ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_DH , + [GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA ] =QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_ECDSA , +}; +int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen,Error **errp)@@ -195,6 +203,169 @@ cleanup:return ret; } +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (crt); +if (rc <0 ) {
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 236
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+error_setg (errp,"Failed to get certificate version: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = rc; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +}
I'm not convinced this method needs to exist. QEMU doesn't care about the cert version, and if something else consuming the data from guest OS/firmware cares, then it can validate the version.
Quoted 25 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +25
-0+int qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm (uint8_t *cert,size_t size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +unsigned int bits; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (crt, &bits); +if (rc >=G_N_ELEMENTS (gnutls_to_qcrypto_pk_alg_map)) { +error_setg (errp,"Unknown public key algorithm %d" , rc); + goto cleanup; + }
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+ + ret = gnutls_to_qcrypto_pk_alg_map[rc]; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, + QCryptoKeyidFlags flag,
IMHO this can just use "QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg"
Quoted 57 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +43
-2+uint8_t **result, + size_t *resultlen, + Error **errp) +{ + int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size}; + + *resultlen =qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len (qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[flag], + errp); +if (*resultlen ==-1 ) { +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + *result =g_malloc0 (*resultlen); +if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id (crt, + qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[flag], + *result, resultlen) !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to get key ID from certificate" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; +}@@ -53,10 +61,10 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, * @result: output location for the allocated buffer for the certificate in DER format (the function allocates memory which must be freed by the caller) * @resultlen: pointer to the size of the buffer - (will be replaced by the actual size of the DER-encoded certificate) + (will be updated with the actual size of the DER-encoded certificate) * @errp: error pointer * - * Convert given @cert from PEM to DER format. + * Convert the given @cert from PEM to DER format. * * Returns: 0 on success, * -1 on error.
crypto/x509-utils.c int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, · line 84
Quoted 8 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +1
-1@@ -70,7 +78,7 @@ int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,* qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len * @flag: the key ID flag * -* Determine the length of the key ID of the given @flag. +* Determine the length of the key ID corresponding to the given @flag. * * Returns: the length on success, * -1 on error.
Squash these changes into the arlier patch that introduced the mistakes,
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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PATCH v4 9/28 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.
Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 47 ++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 300 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +47 -0
@@ -12,14 +12,23 @@#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC 2#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN 0x0204 +#define DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE 0x0302#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 +#define DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC 0x2000000000000000 + +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID 0x80 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING 0 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FORMAT_X509_DER 1 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_HASHTYPE_SHA2_256 1struct VCStorageSizeBlock {uint32_t length;
@@ -37,4 +46,42 @@ struct VCStorageSizeBlock { };typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock ; +struct VCBlock { +uint32_t in_len; +uint32_t reserved0; +uint16_t first_vc_index; +uint16_t last_vc_index; +uint32_t reserved1[5 ]; +uint32_t out_len; +uint8_t reserved2[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint16_t stored_ct; +uint16_t remain_ct; +uint32_t reserved3[5 ]; +uint8_t vce_buf[]; +}; +typedef struct VCBlock VCBlock ; + +struct VCEntry { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t flags; +uint8_t key_type; +uint16_t cert_idx; +uint32_t name[16 ]; +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved0; +uint16_t keyid_len; +uint8_t reserved1; +uint8_t hash_type; +uint16_t hash_len; +uint32_t reserved2; +uint32_t cert_len; +uint32_t reserved3[2 ]; +uint16_t hash_offset; +uint16_t cert_offset; +uint32_t reserved4[7 ]; +uint8_t cert_buf[]; +}; +typedef struct VCEntry VCEntry ; +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +253 -1
286 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 09/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
Quoted 31 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.
Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 47 ++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 300 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)int
handle_diag_288(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3)target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0@@ -191,8 +193,252 @@ out: } } +static int diag_320_is_cert_valid (S390IPLCertificate qcert)
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 206
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+{ +int version; +int rc; +Error *err =NULL ; + + version =qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version (qcert.raw, qcert.size, &err); +if (version <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return -1 ; + }
IMHO this isn't doing anything worthwhile given qemu accepts any version at all here.
Quoted 17 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +17
-0+ + rc =qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times (qcert.raw, qcert.size, &err); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int diag_320_get_cert_info (VCEntry *vce,S390IPLCertificate qcert, +uint8_t **cert_der,unsigned char **key_id_data, +void **hash_data) +{ +int algo; +int rc; +Error *err =NULL ;
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 233
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ +/* key-type */ + algo =qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm (qcert.raw, qcert.size, &err); +if (algo <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return -1 ; + } +if (algo ==QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_RSA ) { + vce->key_type =DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING ; + }
Shouldn't this have an "else" clause to either fill in vce->key_type, or raise an error
Quoted 16 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +16
-0+ +/* certificate in DER format */ + rc =qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (qcert.raw, qcert.size, + cert_der, &qcert.der_size, &err); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); + goto out; + } + +/* VC format */ + vce->format =DIAG_320_VCE_FORMAT_X509_DER ; + +/* key id and key id len */ + rc =qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id (qcert.raw, qcert.size, +QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA256 , + key_id_data, &qcert.key_id_size, &err);
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 259
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+if (rc <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); + goto out; + } + vce->keyid_len =cpu_to_be16 (qcert.key_id_size); + +/* hash type */ +if (qcert.hash_type ==QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256 ) { + vce->hash_type =DIAG_320_VCE_HASHTYPE_SHA2_256 ; + }
Again, an "else" clause to either fill in vce->hash_type, or raise an error ?
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +11
-0+ +/* hash and hash len */ + *hash_data =g_malloc0 (qcert.hash_size); + rc =qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint (qcert.raw, qcert.size, +QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256 , + *hash_data, &qcert.hash_size, &err); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); + goto out; + } + vce->hash_len =cpu_to_be16 (qcert.hash_size);
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 280
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ +return 0 ; + +out: +g_clear_pointer (cert_der, g_free); +g_clear_pointer (key_id_data, g_free); +g_clear_pointer (hash_data, g_free); + +return -1 ; +}
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Re: [PATCH v4 09/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 116 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.
Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 47 ++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 300 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +47
-0@@ -12,14 +12,23 @@#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC 2#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN 0x0204 +#define DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE 0x0302#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 +#define DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC 0x2000000000000000 + +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID 0x80 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING 0 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FORMAT_X509_DER 1 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_HASHTYPE_SHA2_256 1struct VCStorageSizeBlock {uint32_t length;@@ -37,4 +46,42 @@ struct VCStorageSizeBlock { };typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock ; +struct VCBlock { +uint32_t in_len; +uint32_t reserved0; +uint16_t first_vc_index; +uint16_t last_vc_index; +uint32_t reserved1[5 ]; +uint32_t out_len; +uint8_t reserved2[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint16_t stored_ct; +uint16_t remain_ct; +uint32_t reserved3[5 ]; +uint8_t vce_buf[]; +}; +typedef struct VCBlock VCBlock ; + +struct VCEntry { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t flags; +uint8_t key_type; +uint16_t cert_idx; +uint32_t name[16 ]; +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved0; +uint16_t keyid_len; +uint8_t reserved1; +uint8_t hash_type; +uint16_t hash_len; +uint32_t reserved2; +uint32_t cert_len; +uint32_t reserved3[2 ]; +uint16_t hash_offset; +uint16_t cert_offset; +uint32_t reserved4[7 ]; +uint8_t cert_buf[]; +}; +typedef struct VCEntry VCEntry ; +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +2
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include "s390x-internal.h" #include "hw/watchdog/wdt_diag288.h" #include "system/cpus.h" +#include "hw/s390x/cert-store.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" #include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" @@ -24,6 +25,7 @@#include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h" #include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h" #include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "crypto/x509-utils.h" int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3)
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 196
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0@@ -191,8 +193,252 @@ out: } } +static int diag_320_is_cert_valid (S390IPLCertificate qcert)
This could be a boolean type and return true or false instead of 0 or -1.
Quoted 14 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +14
-0+{ +int version; +int rc; +Error *err =NULL ; + + version =qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version (qcert.raw, qcert.size, &err); +if (version <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return -1 ; + } + + rc =qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times (qcert.raw, qcert.size, &err); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_report_err (err);
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int diag_320_get_cert_info (VCEntry *vce,S390IPLCertificate qcert, +uint8_t **cert_der,unsigned char **key_id_data, +void **hash_data) +{
This function is doing a lot: extracting info from the cert, converting raw cert data into a X509 data, extracting key_id_data, and extracting hash_data. I'm afraid it's a bit tricky to follow along :(
I would suggest splitting this function into three: going in order of key, hash, cert. It'll help to consolidate the various fields and reduce some overhead, while producing some easy-to-follow patterns. Something like:
diag_320_convert_key(VCEntry *vce, S390IPLCertificate qcert) {
// set all key-related fields & error checking
// memcpy to vce
}
diag_320_convert_hash(VCEntry *vce, S390IPLCertificate qcert) {
// set all hash-related fields & error checking
// memcpy to vce
}
diag_320_convert_cert(VCEntry *vce, S390IPLCertificate qcert) {
// set all cert-related fields & error checking
// memcpy to vce
}
This will clean up the loop in handle_diag320_store_vc and the body of build_vce. Offsets should be set in the respective vce field.
build_vce and the loop could handle setting whichever remaining pieces of data that do not directly correlate to the above three -- whatever makes sense.
Quoted 71 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +71
-0+int algo; +int rc; +Error *err =NULL ; + +/* key-type */ + algo =qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm (qcert.raw, qcert.size, &err); +if (algo <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); +return -1 ; + } +if (algo ==QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO_RSA ) { + vce->key_type =DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING ; + } + +/* certificate in DER format */ + rc =qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der (qcert.raw, qcert.size, + cert_der, &qcert.der_size, &err); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); + goto out; + } + +/* VC format */ + vce->format =DIAG_320_VCE_FORMAT_X509_DER ; + +/* key id and key id len */ + rc =qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id (qcert.raw, qcert.size, +QCRYPTO_KEYID_FLAGS_SHA256 , + key_id_data, &qcert.key_id_size, &err); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); + goto out; + } + vce->keyid_len =cpu_to_be16 (qcert.key_id_size); + +/* hash type */ +if (qcert.hash_type ==QCRYPTO_SIG_ALGO_RSA_SHA256 ) { + vce->hash_type =DIAG_320_VCE_HASHTYPE_SHA2_256 ; + } + +/* hash and hash len */ + *hash_data =g_malloc0 (qcert.hash_size); + rc =qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint (qcert.raw, qcert.size, +QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256 , + *hash_data, &qcert.hash_size, &err); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report_err (err); + goto out; + } + vce->hash_len =cpu_to_be16 (qcert.hash_size); + +return 0 ; + +out: +g_clear_pointer (cert_der, g_free); +g_clear_pointer (key_id_data, g_free); +g_clear_pointer (hash_data, g_free); + +return -1 ; +} + +static VCEntry *build_vce (S390IPLCertificate qcert,uint32_t vce_len,int idx, +size_t keyid_buf_size,size_t hash_buf_size) +{ + g_autofree VCEntry *vce = NULL; + g_autofree uint8_t *cert_der = NULL; + g_autofree unsigned char *key_id_data = NULL; + g_autofree void *hash_data = NULL; +int is_valid =-1 ; +int rc; +
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 301
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+/* +* Construct VCE +* Unused area following the VCE field contains zeros. +*/ + vce =g_malloc0 (vce_len); + + rc =diag_320_get_cert_info (vce, qcert, &cert_der, &key_id_data, &hash_data); +if (rc) { +return NULL ; + }
Hrm, not sure if returning NULL is the right call here.
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 303
Quoted 2 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +2
-0+ + is_valid =diag_320_is_cert_valid (qcert);
With changing this function to boolean, you can do:
if (diag_320_is_cert_valid(qcert)) {
vce->flags |= DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID;
}Additionally, I think it makes more sense to handle any errors from diag_320_get_cert_info by setting the VCV flag bit to invalid (aka set to 0) and set the vce len to 72 (see below).
Judging by the fields encapsulated by those 72 bytes, you'll need to have key-type, cert index, and name filled out as well (if possible).
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 314
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +11
-0+ + vce->len =cpu_to_be32 (vce_len); + vce->cert_idx =cpu_to_be16 (idx +1 ); + vce->cert_len =cpu_to_be32 (qcert.der_size); + +strncpy ((char *)vce->name, (char *)qcert.vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ); + +/* VCE field offset is also word aligned */ + vce->hash_offset =cpu_to_be16 (VCE_HEADER_LEN + keyid_buf_size); + vce->cert_offset =cpu_to_be16 (VCE_HEADER_LEN + keyid_buf_size + hash_buf_size); +
You can use these calculated offsets...
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 320
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +6
-0+/* Write Key ID */ +memcpy (vce->cert_buf, key_id_data, qcert.key_id_size); +/* Write Hash key */ +memcpy (vce->cert_buf + keyid_buf_size, hash_data, qcert.hash_size); +/* Write VCE cert data */ +memcpy (vce->cert_buf + keyid_buf_size + hash_buf_size, cert_der, qcert.der_size);
...here instead, with vce + vce->*_offset
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 325
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0+ +/* The certificate is valid and VCE contains the certificate */ +if (is_valid ==0 ) { + vce->flags |=DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID ; + }
else, vce->len = 72
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 338
Quoted 13 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +13
-0+ +return g_steal_pointer (&vce); +} + +static int handle_diag320_store_vc (S390CPU *cpu,uint64_t addr,uint64_t r1,uintptr_t ra, +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs) +{ + g_autofree VCBlock *vcb = NULL; +size_t vce_offset; +size_t remaining_space; +size_t keyid_buf_size; +size_t hash_buf_size; +size_t cert_buf_size;
The above three fields can go into the respective helper functions that I mentioned earlier and reduce some of the bloat here.
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0+uint32_t vce_len; +uint16_t first_vc_index; +uint16_t last_vc_index; +uint32_t in_len; +
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 353
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ vcb =g_new0 (VCBlock,1 ); +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read (cpu, addr, r1, vcb,sizeof (*vcb))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return -1 ; + } + + in_len =be32_to_cpu (vcb->in_len); + first_vc_index =be16_to_cpu (vcb->first_vc_index); + last_vc_index =be16_to_cpu (vcb->last_vc_index); +
You need a check somewhere for no certs found in either the specified range or no certs exist in the store at all:
- VCB output len = 64
- stored and remaining count = 0
- response code 0x0001
Quoted 27 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +27
-0+if (in_len %TARGET_PAGE_SIZE !=0 ) { +return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN ; + } + +if (first_vc_index > last_vc_index) { +return DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE ; + } + +if (first_vc_index ==0 ) { +/* +* Zero is a valid index for the first and last VC index. +* Zero index results in the VCB header and zero certificates returned. +*/ +if (last_vc_index ==0 ) { + goto out; + } + +/* DIAG320 certificate store remains a one origin for cert entries */ + vcb->first_vc_index =1 ; + first_vc_index =1 ; + } + + vce_offset =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + vcb->out_len =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + remaining_space = in_len -VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + +for (int i = first_vc_index -1 ; i < last_vc_index && i < qcs->count; i++) {
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 390
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+VCEntry *vce; +S390IPLCertificate qcert = qcs->certs[i]; +/* +* Each VCE is word aligned. +* Each variable length field within the VCE is also word aligned. +*/ + keyid_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.key_id_size,4 ); + hash_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.hash_size,4 ); + cert_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.der_size,4 ); + vce_len =VCE_HEADER_LEN + cert_buf_size + keyid_buf_size + hash_buf_size;
You could define & set the above four lines inside build_vce (or as respective fields in the helper functions mentioned above).
The remaining space check could be done after the vce has been built.
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 400
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ +/* +* If there is no more space to store the cert, +* set the remaining verification cert count and +* break early. +*/ +if (remaining_space < vce_len) { + vcb->remain_ct =cpu_to_be16 (last_vc_index - i); +break ; + }
You also need to check somewhere if there is enough space to store *at least* the first cert in the range:
- VCB output len = 64
- stored count = 0
- remaining count = // however are remaining
- response code 0x0001
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 405
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0+ + vce =build_vce (qcert, vce_len, i, keyid_buf_size, hash_buf_size); +if (vce ==NULL ) { +continue ; + }
See above, there shouldn't be a NULL case.
Quoted 25 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +25
-0+ +/* Write VCE */ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr + vce_offset, r1, vce, vce_len)) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return -1 ; + }> + + vce_offset += vce_len; + vcb->out_len += vce_len; + remaining_space -= vce_len; + vcb->stored_ct++; + +g_free (vce); + } + + vcb->out_len =cpu_to_be32 (vcb->out_len); + vcb->stored_ct =cpu_to_be16 (vcb->stored_ct); + +out: +/* +* Write VCB header +* All VCEs have been populated with the latest information +* and write VCB header last. +*/ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, vcb,VCB_HEADER_LEN )) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra);
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 441
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8
-0+return -1 ; + } + +return DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +} +QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (sizeof (VCStorageSizeBlock) !=128 ,"size of VCStorageSizeBlock is wrong" ); +QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (sizeof (VCBlock) !=64 ,"size of VCBlock is wrong" ); +QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (sizeof (VCEntry) !=128 ,"size of VCEntry is wrong" );
I don't think these are necessary.
Quoted 25 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-1void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {@@ -219,7 +465,7 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =cpu_to_be64 (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ); +uint64_t ism =cpu_to_be64 (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI |DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC );if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, &ism,sizeof (ism))) {s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra);@@ -258,6 +504,12 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC : + rc =handle_diag320_store_vc (cpu, addr, r1, ra, qcs); +if (rc ==-1 ) { +return ; + } +break ;default :s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra);return ;
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 09/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
Thank you for the feedback!
Quoted 1 line · Collin Walling
On 7/11/25 17:10, Zhuoying Cai wrote:
...
Quoted 53 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 338
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +9
-0+static int handle_diag320_store_vc (S390CPU *cpu,uint64_t addr,uint64_t r1,uintptr_t ra, +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs) +{ + g_autofree VCBlock *vcb = NULL; +size_t vce_offset; +size_t remaining_space; +size_t keyid_buf_size; +size_t hash_buf_size; +size_t cert_buf_size;The above three fields can go into the respective helper functions that I mentioned earlier and reduce some of the bloat here.
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0+uint32_t vce_len; +uint16_t first_vc_index; +uint16_t last_vc_index; +uint32_t in_len; +target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 353
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ vcb =g_new0 (VCBlock,1 ); +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read (cpu, addr, r1, vcb,sizeof (*vcb))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return -1 ; + } + + in_len =be32_to_cpu (vcb->in_len); + first_vc_index =be16_to_cpu (vcb->first_vc_index); + last_vc_index =be16_to_cpu (vcb->last_vc_index); +You need a check somewhere for no certs found in either the specified range or no certs exist in the store at all:
- VCB output len = 64
- stored and remaining count = 0
- response code0x0001Quoted 18 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +18
-0+if (in_len %TARGET_PAGE_SIZE !=0 ) { +return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN ; + } + +if (first_vc_index > last_vc_index) { +return DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE ; + } + +if (first_vc_index ==0 ) { +/* +* Zero is a valid index for the first and last VC index. +* Zero index results in the VCB header and zero certificates returned. +*/ +if (last_vc_index ==0 ) { + goto out; + } + +/* DIAG320 certificate store remains a one origin for cert entries */
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 379
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8
-0+ vcb->first_vc_index =1 ; + first_vc_index =1 ; + } + + vce_offset =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + vcb->out_len =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + remaining_space = in_len -VCB_HEADER_LEN ; +
Re: check for no certs found in either the specified range or no certs exist.
This case is already handled.
vcb->out_len = VCB_HEADER_LEN is set outside the for loop. If the index is invalid, the loop won’t execute, and both the stored and remaining VC counts remain unchanged at 0.
Quoted 28 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 390
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +11
-0+for (int i = first_vc_index -1 ; i < last_vc_index && i < qcs->count; i++) { +VCEntry *vce; +S390IPLCertificate qcert = qcs->certs[i]; +/* +* Each VCE is word aligned. +* Each variable length field within the VCE is also word aligned. +*/ + keyid_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.key_id_size,4 ); + hash_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.hash_size,4 ); + cert_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.der_size,4 ); + vce_len =VCE_HEADER_LEN + cert_buf_size + keyid_buf_size + hash_buf_size;You could define & set the above four lines inside
build_vce(or as respective fields in the helper functions mentioned above).The remaining space check could be done after the vce has been built.
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 400
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ +/* +* If there is no more space to store the cert, +* set the remaining verification cert count and +* break early. +*/ +if (remaining_space < vce_len) { + vcb->remain_ct =cpu_to_be16 (last_vc_index - i); +break ; + }
Quoted 7 lines
You also need to check somewhere if there is enough space to store *at least* the first cert in the range:
- VCB output len = 64
- stored count = 0
- remaining count = // however are remaining
- response code0x0001
This case is also covered by the if statement above:
if (remaining_space < vce_len) {
vcb->remain_ct = cpu_to_be16(last_vc_index - i);
break;
}Response code 0x0001 is returned at the end of the function for both cases.
Quoted 38 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 405
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0+ + vce =build_vce (qcert, vce_len, i, keyid_buf_size, hash_buf_size); +if (vce ==NULL ) { +continue ; + }See above, there shouldn't be a NULL case.
Quoted 30 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +30
-0+ +/* Write VCE */ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr + vce_offset, r1, vce, vce_len)) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return -1 ; + }> + + vce_offset += vce_len; + vcb->out_len += vce_len; + remaining_space -= vce_len; + vcb->stored_ct++; + +g_free (vce); + } + + vcb->out_len =cpu_to_be32 (vcb->out_len); + vcb->stored_ct =cpu_to_be16 (vcb->stored_ct); + +out: +/* +* Write VCB header +* All VCEs have been populated with the latest information +* and write VCB header last. +*/ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, r1, vcb,VCB_HEADER_LEN )) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return -1 ; + } + +return DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +}
...
Re: [PATCH v4 09/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
Quoted 7 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Thank you for the feedback!
Quoted 1 line · Collin Walling
On 7/11/25 17:10, Zhuoying Cai wrote:
...
[...]
Quoted 79 lines
Quoted 25 lines
You need a check somewhere for no certs found in either the specified range or no certs exist in the store at all:
- VCB output len = 64
- stored and remaining count = 0
- response code0x0001Quoted 18 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +18
-0+if (in_len %TARGET_PAGE_SIZE !=0 ) { +return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN ; + } + +if (first_vc_index > last_vc_index) { +return DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE ; + } + +if (first_vc_index ==0 ) { +/* +* Zero is a valid index for the first and last VC index. +* Zero index results in the VCB header and zero certificates returned. +*/ +if (last_vc_index ==0 ) { + goto out; + } + +/* DIAG320 certificate store remains a one origin for cert entries */ Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 379
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8
-0+ vcb->first_vc_index =1 ; + first_vc_index =1 ; + } + + vce_offset =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + vcb->out_len =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + remaining_space = in_len -VCB_HEADER_LEN ; +Re: check for no certs found in either the specified range or no certs exist.
This case is already handled.
vcb->out_len=VCB_HEADER_LENis set outside the for loop. If the index is invalid, the loop won’t execute, and both the stored and remaining VC counts remain unchanged at 0.Quoted 28 lines
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 390
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +11
-0+for (int i = first_vc_index -1 ; i < last_vc_index && i < qcs->count; i++) { +VCEntry *vce; +S390IPLCertificate qcert = qcs->certs[i]; +/* +* Each VCE is word aligned. +* Each variable length field within the VCE is also word aligned. +*/ + keyid_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.key_id_size,4 ); + hash_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.hash_size,4 ); + cert_buf_size =ROUND_UP (qcert.der_size,4 ); + vce_len =VCE_HEADER_LEN + cert_buf_size + keyid_buf_size + hash_buf_size;You could define & set the above four lines inside
build_vce(or as respective fields in the helper functions mentioned above).The remaining space check could be done after the vce has been built.
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 400
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ +/* +* If there is no more space to store the cert, +* set the remaining verification cert count and +* break early. +*/ +if (remaining_space < vce_len) { + vcb->remain_ct =cpu_to_be16 (last_vc_index - i); +break ; + }Quoted 7 lines
You also need to check somewhere if there is enough space to store *at least* the first cert in the range:
- VCB output len = 64
- stored count = 0
- remaining count = // however are remaining
- response code0x0001
Quoted 9 lines
This case is also covered by the if statement above:
if (remaining_space < vce_len) { vcb->remain_ct = cpu_to_be16(last_vc_index - i); break; }Response code
0x0001is returned at the end of the function for both cases.
Sorry, I neglected to mentally trace some different loop variables to see that these cases are indeed handled. Thanks for clarifying!
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 10/28 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
In order to support secure IPL (aka secure boot) for the s390-ccw BIOS, a new s390 DIAGNOSE instruction is introduced to leverage QEMU for handling operations such as signature verification and certificate retrieval.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c | 7 +++++++ 5 files changed, 65 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h new file +15 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 508 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Collin Walling <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG508_H +#define S390X_DIAG508_H + +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 + +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +27 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include "hw/s390x/cert-store.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h" #include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" #include "system/kvm.h" #include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h"
@@ -516,3 +517,29 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) } env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; } + +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +int rc; + +if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } + +if ((subcode & ~0x0ffffULL ) || (r1 &1 )) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +switch (subcode) { +case DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC : + rc =0 ; +break ; +default : +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; +}
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501 +#define DIAG_SECURE_IPL 0x508#define ICPT_INSTRUCTION 0x04#define ICPT_PROGRAM 0x08
@@ -1571,6 +1572,16 @@ static void kvm_handle_diag_320(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run)handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); } +static void kvm_handle_diag_508 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_508 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1604,6 +1615,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_CERT_STORE :kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_SECURE_IPL : +kvm_handle_diag_508 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
@@ -402,6 +402,8 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra);void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */
target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7 -0
@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)bql_unlock (); r =0 ;break ; +case 0x508 : +/* secure ipl operations */ +bql_lock (); +handle_diag_508 (env, r1, r3,GETPC ()); +bql_unlock (); + r =0 ; +break ;default : r =-1 ;break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 11/28 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce helper functions to support signature verification required by DIAG 508 subcode 1:
qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem() – converts a signature from DER to PEM format qcrypto_x509_verify_sig() – verifies the provided data against the given signature
These functions enable basic signature verification support.
--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 39 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +110 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> #include <gnutls/crypto.h> #include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h> static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX ] = { [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5 ] =GNUTLS_DIG_MD5 ,
@@ -366,6 +367,98 @@ cleanup:return ret; } +int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem (uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_pkcs7_t signature; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_der = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size}; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_pem = {0 , }; + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_init (&signature); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initalize pkcs7 data: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_import (signature, &sig_datum_der,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_export2 (signature,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM , &sig_datum_pem); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert signature to PEM format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); +gnutls_free (sig_datum_pem.data); + goto cleanup; + } + + *result =g_steal_pointer (&sig_datum_pem.data); + *resultlen = sig_datum_pem.size; + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (signature); +return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig (uint8_t *cert,size_t cert_size, +uint8_t *comp,size_t comp_size, +uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +gnutls_pkcs7_t signature; +gnutls_datum_t cert_datum = {.data = cert, .size = cert_size}; +gnutls_datum_t data_datum = {.data = comp, .size = comp_size}; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &cert_datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_init (&signature); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initalize pkcs7 data: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_import (signature, &sig_datum ,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_verify_direct (signature, crt,0 , &data_datum,0 ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to verify signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (signature); +return ret; +} +#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */ int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -427,4 +520,21 @@ int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, return -1; } +int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem (uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required to export pkcs7 signature" ); +return -1 ; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig (uint8_t *cert,size_t cert_size, +uint8_t *comp,size_t comp_size, +uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size,Error **errp) +{ +error_setg (errp,"GNUTLS is required for signature-verification support" ); +return -1 ; +} +#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +39 -0
@@ -160,4 +160,43 @@ int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,size_t *resultlen, Error **errp); +/** +* qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem +* @sig: pointer to the PKCS#7 signature in DER format +* @sig_size: size of the signature +* @result: output location for the allocated buffer for the signature in PEM format +(the function allocates memory which must be freed by the caller) +* @resultlen: pointer to the size of the buffer +(will be updated with the actual size of the PEM-encoded signature) +* @errp: error pointer +* +* Convert given PKCS#7 @sig from DER to PEM format. +* +* Returns: 0 if PEM-encoded signature was successfully stored in @result, +* -1 on error. +*/ +int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem (uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size, +uint8_t **result, +size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp); + +/** +* qcrypto_x509_verify_sig +* @cert: pointer to the raw certificate data +* @cert_size: size of the certificate +* @comp: pointer to the component to be verified +* @comp_size: size of the component +* @sig: pointer to the signature +* @sig_size: size of the signature +* @errp: error pointer +* +* Verify the provided @comp against the @sig and @cert. +* +* Returns: 0 on success, +* -1 on error. +*/ +int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig (uint8_t *cert,size_t cert_size, +uint8_t *comp,size_t comp_size, +uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size,Error **errp); +#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 11/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
Quoted 67 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce helper functions to support signature verification required by DIAG 508 subcode 1:
qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem()– converts a signature from DER to PEM formatqcrypto_x509_verify_sig()– verifies the provided data against the given signatureThese functions enable basic signature verification support.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- crypto/x509-utils.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 39 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)crypto/x509-utils.c +38
-0@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> #include <gnutls/crypto.h> #include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h> static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX ] = { [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5 ] =GNUTLS_DIG_MD5 ,@@ -366,6 +367,98 @@ cleanup:return ret; } +int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem (uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size, +uint8_t **result,size_t *resultlen, +Error **errp) +{ +int ret =-1 ; +int rc; +gnutls_pkcs7_t signature; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_der = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size}; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_pem = {0 , }; + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_init (&signature); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initalize pkcs7 data: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_import (signature, &sig_datum_der,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_export2 (signature,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM , &sig_datum_pem); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert signature to PEM format: %s" , +gnutls_strerror (rc)); +gnutls_free (sig_datum_pem.data); + goto cleanup; + } + + *result =g_steal_pointer (&sig_datum_pem.data); + *resultlen = sig_datum_pem.size; + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (signature);
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 416
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+return ret; +} + +int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig (uint8_t *cert,size_t cert_size, +uint8_t *comp,size_t comp_size, +uint8_t *sig,size_t sig_size,Error **errp) +{ +int rc; +int ret =-1 ; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
= NULL;
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 417
Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +1
-0+gnutls_pkcs7_t signature;
= NULL;
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 425
Quoted 8 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +8
-0+gnutls_datum_t cert_datum = {.data = cert, .size = cert_size}; +gnutls_datum_t data_datum = {.data = comp, .size = comp_size}; +gnutls_datum_t sig_datum = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size}; + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initialize certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +return ret;
goto cleanup;
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 431
Quoted 6 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +6
-0+ } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &cert_datum,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import certificate: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt);
Drop this
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 432
Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +1
-0+return ret;
goto cleanup;
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 439
Quoted 7 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +7
-0+ } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_init (&signature); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to initalize pkcs7 data: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +return ret;
Likewise
Quoted 9 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +9
-0+ } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_import (signature, &sig_datum ,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM ); +if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to import signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rc =gnutls_pkcs7_verify_direct (signature, crt,0 , &data_datum,0 );
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 458
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10
-0+if (rc !=0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to verify signature: %s" ,gnutls_strerror (rc)); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret =0 ; + +cleanup: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt); +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (signature);
Both of these are safe to call with NULL, hence we can add the "goto cleanup" mentioned above.
crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 460
Quoted 2 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +2
-0+return ret; +}
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
PATCH v4 12/28 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
DIAG 508 subcode 1 performs signature-verification on signed components. A signed component may be a Linux kernel image, or any other signed binary. **Verification of initrd is not supported.**
The instruction call expects two item-pairs: an address of a device component, an address of the analogous signature file (in PKCS#7 DER format), and their respective lengths. All of this data should be encapsulated within a Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock, with the CertificateStoreInfo fields ignored. The DIAG handler will read from the provided addresses to retrieve the necessary data, parse the signature file, then perform the signature-verification. Because there is no way to correlate a specific certificate to a component, each certificate in the store is tried until either verification succeeds, or all certs have been exhausted.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-to-left-most bit of a 2-byte field.
A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the corresponding certificate will be set in the CertificateStoreInfo portion of the SigVerifBlock. The following values indicate failure:
0x0202: component data is invalid 0x0302: signature is not in PKCS#7 format 0x0402: signature-verification failed
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 23 +++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h +23 -0
@@ -11,5 +11,28 @@#define S390X_DIAG508_H #define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF 0x8000 + +#define DIAG_508_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS 0x0102 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA 0x0202 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG 0x0302 +#define DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF 0x0402 + +struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo { +uint8_t idx; +uint8_t reserved[7 ]; +uint64_t len; +}; +typedef struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo Diag508CertificateStoreInfo ; + +struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock { +Diag508CertificateStoreInfo csi; +uint64_t comp_len; +uint64_t comp_addr; +uint64_t sig_len; +uint64_t sig_addr; +}; +typedef struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock ;#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +111 -1
127 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 13/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe IPL information report block (IIRB) contains information used to locate IPL records and to report the results of signature verification of one or more secure components of the load device.
IIRB is stored immediately following the IPL Parameter Block. Results on component verification in any case (failure or success) are stored.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +62 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,68 @@ extern QemuIplParameters qipl; extern IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));extern bool have_iplb; +struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t iirb_flags; +uint8_t reserved1[2 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader IplInfoReportBlockHeader ; + +struct IplInfoBlockHeader { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t ibt; +uint8_t reserved1[3 ]; +uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplInfoBlockHeader IplInfoBlockHeader ; + +enum IplIbt { +IPL_IBT_CERTIFICATES =1 , +IPL_IBT_COMPONENTS =2 , +}; + +struct IplSignatureCertificateEntry { +uint64_t addr; +uint64_t len; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateEntry IplSignatureCertificateEntry ; + +struct IplSignatureCertificateList { +IplInfoBlockHeader ipl_info_header; +IplSignatureCertificateEntry cert_entries[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateList IplSignatureCertificateList ; + +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC 0x80 +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV 0x40 + +struct IplDeviceComponentEntry { +uint64_t addr; +uint64_t len; +uint8_t flags; +uint8_t reserved1[5 ]; +uint16_t cert_index; +uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplDeviceComponentEntry IplDeviceComponentEntry ; + +struct IplDeviceComponentList { +IplInfoBlockHeader ipl_info_header; +IplDeviceComponentEntry device_entries[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplDeviceComponentList IplDeviceComponentList ; + +#define COMP_LIST_MAX sizeof(IplDeviceComponentList) +#define CERT_LIST_MAX sizeof(IplSignatureCertificateList) + +struct IplInfoReportBlock { +IplInfoReportBlockHeader hdr; +uint8_t info_blks[COMP_LIST_MAX +CERT_LIST_MAX ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplInfoReportBlock IplInfoReportBlock ; +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 14/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDefine a memory space for both IPL Parameter Block (IPLB) and IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) since IIRB is stored immediately following IPLB.
Convert IPLB to pointer and it points to the start of the defined memory space. IIRB points to the end of IPLB.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 12 ++++++++++-- pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c | 6 +++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c | 8 ++++---- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +10 -2
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@#include <string.h> extern QemuIplParameters qipl; -extern IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +extern IplParameterBlock *iplb;extern bool have_iplb;struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader {
@@ -85,6 +85,14 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlock { } __attribute__ ((packed));typedef struct IplInfoReportBlock IplInfoReportBlock ; +struct IplBlocks { +IplParameterBlock iplb; +IplInfoReportBlock iirb; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplBlocks IplBlocks ; + +extern IplBlocks ipl_data __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff
@@ -127,7 +135,7 @@ static inline bool load_next_iplb(void) qipl.index++; next_iplb = (IplParameterBlock *) qipl.next_iplb; -memcpy (&iplb, next_iplb,sizeof (IplParameterBlock)); +memcpy (iplb, next_iplb,sizeof (IplParameterBlock)); qipl.chain_len--; qipl.next_iplb = qipl.next_iplb +sizeof (IplParameterBlock);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c +3 -3
@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ int jump_to_IPL_code(uint64_t address)* The IPLB for QEMU SCSI type devices must be rebuilt during re-ipl. The * iplb.devno is set to the boot position of the target SCSI device. */ -if (iplb.pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ) { - iplb.devno = qipl.index; +if (iplb->pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ) { + iplb->devno = qipl.index; } -if (have_iplb && !set_iplb (&iplb)) { +if (have_iplb && !set_iplb (iplb)) {panic ("Failed to set IPLB" ); }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +19 -15
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@static SubChannelId blk_schid = { .one =1 };static char loadparm_str[LOADPARM_LEN +1 ];QemuIplParameters qipl; -IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +/* Ensure that IPLB and IIRB are page aligned and sequential in memory */ +IplBlocks ipl_data; +IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */
@@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ void write_subsystem_identification(void)void write_iplb_location (void ) {if (cutype ==CU_TYPE_VIRTIO &&virtio_get_device_type () !=VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { - lowcore->ptr_iplb =ptr2u32 (&iplb); + lowcore->ptr_iplb =ptr2u32 (iplb); } }
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ static void menu_setup(void)return ; } -switch (iplb.pbt) { +switch (iplb->pbt) {case S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW :case S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI : menu_set_parms(qipl.qipl_flags & BOOT_MENU_FLAG_MASK,
@@ -191,8 +193,8 @@ static void boot_setup(void) {char lpmsg[] ="LOADPARM=[________]\n" ; -if (have_iplb &&memcmp (iplb.loadparm,NO_LOADPARM ,LOADPARM_LEN ) !=0 ) { -ebcdic_to_ascii ((char *) iplb.loadparm, loadparm_str,LOADPARM_LEN ); +if (have_iplb &&memcmp (iplb->loadparm,NO_LOADPARM ,LOADPARM_LEN ) !=0 ) { +ebcdic_to_ascii ((char *) iplb->loadparm, loadparm_str,LOADPARM_LEN ); }else {sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (loadparm_str); }
@@ -216,21 +218,21 @@ static bool find_boot_device(void)VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();bool found = false; -switch (iplb.pbt) { +switch (iplb->pbt) {case S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW : vdev->scsi_device_selected = false; -debug_print_int ("device no. " , iplb.ccw.devno); - blk_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid &0x3 ; +debug_print_int ("device no. " , iplb->ccw.devno); + blk_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid &0x3 ;debug_print_int ("ssid " , blk_schid.ssid); - found =find_subch (iplb.ccw.devno); + found =find_subch (iplb->ccw.devno);break ;case S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI : vdev->scsi_device_selected = true; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb.scsi.channel; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb.scsi.target; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb.scsi.lun; - blk_schid.ssid = iplb.scsi.ssid &0x3 ; - found =find_subch (iplb.scsi.devno); + vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb->scsi.channel; + vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb->scsi.target; + vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb->scsi.lun; + blk_schid.ssid = iplb->scsi.ssid &0x3 ; + found =find_subch (iplb->scsi.devno);break ;default :puts ("Unsupported IPLB" );
@@ -311,10 +313,12 @@ static void probe_boot_device(void)void main (void ) { + iplb = &ipl_data.iplb; +copy_qipl ();sclp_setup ();css_setup (); - have_iplb =store_iplb (&iplb); + have_iplb =store_iplb (iplb);if (!have_iplb) {boot_setup ();probe_boot_device ();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c +4 -4
@@ -488,11 +488,11 @@ static bool virtio_setup(void)*/ enable_mss_facility (); -if (have_iplb ||store_iplb (&iplb)) { -IPL_assert (iplb.pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ,"IPL_TYPE_CCW expected" ); - dev_no = iplb.ccw.devno; +if (have_iplb ||store_iplb (iplb)) { +IPL_assert (iplb->pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ,"IPL_TYPE_CCW expected" ); + dev_no = iplb->ccw.devno;debug_print_int ("device no. " , dev_no); - net_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid &0x3 ; + net_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid &0x3 ;debug_print_int ("ssid " , net_schid.ssid); found =find_net_dev (&schib, dev_no); }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 15/28 hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block to determine if IPL needs to perform securely and if IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) exists.
Move DIAG308 flags to a separated header file and add flags for secure IPL.
Secure boot in audit mode will perform if certificate(s) exist in the key store. IIRB will exist and results of verification will be stored in IIRB.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 17 ----------------- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h
hw/s390x/ipl.c +20 -0
@@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store(void)return &ipl->cert_store; } +static bool s390_has_certificate (void ) +{ +S390IPLState *ipl =get_ipl_device (); + +return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -487,6 +494,19 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* Secure boot in audit mode will perform +* if certificate(s) exist in the key store. +* +* IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) will exist +* for secure boot in audit mode. +* +* Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. +*/ +if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + } +return true; }
hw/s390x/ipl.h +0 -17
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#include "qom/object.h" #include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h" -#define DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID 0x80#define MAX_BOOT_DEVS 8/* Max number of devices that may have a bootindex */ void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm (char *ascii_lp,uint8_t *ebcdic_lp);
@@ -91,22 +90,6 @@ struct S390IPLState { };QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG (offsetof(S390IPLState , iplb) &3 ,"alignment of iplb wrong" ); -#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402 -#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0902 -#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0a02 - -#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0 -#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR 3 -#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4 -#define DIAG308_SET 5 -#define DIAG308_STORE 6 -#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8 -#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9 -#define DIAG308_PV_START 10 -#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02#define S390_IPL_TYPE_PV 0x05
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 308 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG308_H +#define S390X_DIAG308_H + +#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102 +#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402 +#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0902 +#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0a02 + +#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0 +#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1 +#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR 3 +#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4 +#define DIAG308_SET 5 +#define DIAG308_STORE 6 +#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8 +#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9 +#define DIAG308_PV_START 10 + +#define DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID 0x80 + +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL 0x40 +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR 0x20 + +#endif
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +4 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@#ifndef S390X_QIPL_H #define S390X_QIPL_H +#include "diag308.h" +/* Boot Menu flags */ #define QIPL_FLAG_BM_OPTS_CMD 0x80#define QIPL_FLAG_BM_OPTS_ZIPL 0x40
@@ -103,7 +105,8 @@ typedef struct IplBlockQemuScsi IplBlockQemuScsi;union IplParameterBlock {struct {uint32_t len; -uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t hdr_flags; +uint8_t reserved0[2 ];uint8_t version;uint32_t blk0_len;uint8_t pbt;
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 16/28 hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) immediately follows the IPL Parameter Block (IPLB).
The IPLB struct is allocated 4KB in memory, and iplb->len indicates the amount of memory currently used by the IPLB.
To ensure proper alignment of the IIRB and prevent overlap, set iplb->len to the maximum length of the IPLB, allowing alignment constraints to be determined based on its size.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 6 +++--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +3 -3
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)if (scsi_lp &&strlen (scsi_lp) >0 ) { lp = scsi_lp; } - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->blk0_len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN -S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ;
@@ -470,14 +470,14 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb) iplb->scsi.ssid = ccw_dev->sch->ssid &3 ;break ;case CCW_DEVTYPE_VFIO : - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ; iplb->ccw.devno =cpu_to_be16 (ccw_dev->sch->devno); iplb->ccw.ssid = ccw_dev->sch->ssid &3 ;break ;case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO_NET :case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO : - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->blk0_len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN -S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ;
hw/s390x/ipl.h +1 -0
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");#define S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN 200#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200 +#define S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN 4096static inline bool diag_parm_addr_valid (uint64_t addr,size_t size,bool write) {
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 17/28 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.
Use fac_ipl to represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.
Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 136's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.
When SIPL facility is installed, the IPL Parameter Block length must contains value that is multiple of 8 bytes.
--- hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 ++ include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +++- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 8 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/sclp.c +2 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ static void read_SCP_info(SCLPDevice *sclp, SCCB *sccb)if (s390_has_feat (S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB )) {s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , &read_info->fac134); +s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL , + read_info->fac_ipl); } read_info->facilities = cpu_to_be64(SCLP_HAS_CPU_INFO |
include/hw/s390x/sclp.h +3 -1
@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint32_t hmfai;uint8_t _reserved7[134 -128 ];/* 128-133 */ uint8_t fac134; -uint8_t _reserved8[144 -135 ];/* 135-143 */ +uint8_t _reserved8; +uint8_t fac_ipl[2 ];/* 136-137 */ +uint8_t _reserved9[144 -137 ];/* 138-143 */ struct CPUEntry entries[];/* * When the Extended-Length SCCB (ELS) feature is enabled the
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +3 -0
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data);clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ; +case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL : +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +break ;default :return ; }
target/s390x/cpu_features.h +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ typedef enum {S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , +S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CPU ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_MISC , S390_FEAT_TYPE_PLO,
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +3 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") +/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ +DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility") + /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)") DEF_FEAT(SIE_SKEY, "skey", SCLP_CPU, 5, "SIE: Storage-key facility")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_CMMA :case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS : +case S390_FEAT_SIPL :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;
@@ -507,6 +508,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +2 -0
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -922,6 +923,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG ,S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3 -0
@@ -2520,6 +2520,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Secure-IPL facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 17/28] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
Quoted 5 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.
Use
fac_iplto represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.
Quoted 7 lines
Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 136's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.
When SIPL facility is installed, the IPL Parameter Block length must contains value that is multiple of 8 bytes.
This has no relevance to the code below.
Add a comment that Secure IPL is not available for guests under protected virtualization.
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
I have a few nits below to about some code comments, but the code itself looks functionally sound.
@David, would you be able to review wrt adding this to the qemu_max model?
@Christian, @Hendrik, can either of you review wrt that it looks good to add this feature starting with the gen16a model?
Quoted 44 lines
--- hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 ++ include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +++- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 8 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)hw/s390x/sclp.c +2
-0@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ static void read_SCP_info(SCLPDevice *sclp, SCCB *sccb)if (s390_has_feat (S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB )) {s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , &read_info->fac134); +s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL , + read_info->fac_ipl); } read_info->facilities = cpu_to_be64(SCLP_HAS_CPU_INFO |include/hw/s390x/sclp.h +3
-1@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint32_t hmfai;uint8_t _reserved7[134 -128 ];/* 128-133 */ uint8_t fac134; -uint8_t _reserved8[144 -135 ];/* 135-143 */ +uint8_t _reserved8; +uint8_t fac_ipl[2 ];/* 136-137 */ +uint8_t _reserved9[144 -137 ];/* 138-143 */ struct CPUEntry entries[];/* * When the Extended-Length SCCB (ELS) feature is enabled the target/s390x/cpu_features.c +0
-0
target/s390x/cpu_features.c void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type, · line 154
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +3
-0@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data);clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ; +case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL : +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +break ;
There's a comment above this switch case that lists features which are not supported under PV. Please add a bullet for "Secure IPL facilities". This single mention should be sufficient to cover SCLAF as well.
Quoted 74 lines
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +0
-0default :return ; }target/s390x/cpu_features.h +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ typedef enum {S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , +S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CPU ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_MISC , S390_FEAT_TYPE_PLO,target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +3
-0@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") +/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ +DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility") + /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)") DEF_FEAT(SIE_SKEY, "skey", SCLP_CPU, 5, "SIE: Storage-key facility")target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2
-0@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_CMMA :case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS : +case S390_FEAT_SIPL :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;@@ -507,6 +508,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },target/s390x/gen-features.c +2
-0@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP ,S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {@@ -922,6 +923,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG ,S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +0
-0
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp) · line 2525
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3
-0@@ -2520,6 +2520,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Secure-IPL facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +
nit: change this comment to "Some Secure IPL facilities are emulated by QEMU"
When you introduce SCLAF, you could add that line-of-code directly below this one since it's in the secure IPL family.
Quoted 3 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +0
-0/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 18/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
In reply to Zhuoying CaiRefactor to enhance readability before enabling secure IPL in later patches.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +34 -24
@@ -674,6 +674,38 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)return 0 ; } +static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + +/* Secure boot is off, so we skip signature entries */ +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + entry++; +continue ; + } + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +return -1 ; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)&entry[1 ] > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); +return 0 ; +} +/* Run a zipl program */ static int zipl_run (ScsiBlockPtr *pte) {
@@ -700,34 +732,12 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || - entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - -/* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */ -if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - entry++; -continue ; - } - -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { -return -1 ; - } - entry++; - -if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { -puts ("Wrong entry value" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } - } - -if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { -puts ("No EXEC entry" ); -return -EINVAL ; +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; }/* should not return */ -write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw);jump_to_IPL_code (0 );return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 18/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
Quoted 13 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Refactor to enhance readability before enabling secure IPL in later patches.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +0
-0
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) · line 681
Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +5
-0@@ -674,6 +674,38 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)return 0 ; } +static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { +
Add space to align this line with the one above, as it was in the code you're refactoring:
while (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ||
entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE) {Quoted 57 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +27
-22+/* Secure boot is off, so we skip signature entries */ +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + entry++; +continue ; + } + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +return -1 ; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)&entry[1 ] > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); +return 0 ; +} +/* Run a zipl program */ static int zipl_run (ScsiBlockPtr *pte) {@@ -700,34 +732,12 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || - entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - -/* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */ -if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - entry++; -continue ; - } - -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { -return -1 ; - } - entry++; - -if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { -puts ("Wrong entry value" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } - } - -if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { -puts ("No EXEC entry" );
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) · line 743
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2
-2-return -EINVAL ; +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; }/* should not return */ -write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw);jump_to_IPL_code (0 );return -1 ; }
Both zipl_run_normal and zipl_run_secure will end with:
if (entry->component_type != ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC) {
puts("No EXEC entry");
return -EINVAL;
}
write_reset_psw(entry->compdat.load_psw);I'd suggest making the refactor pass &entry and leaving the checks mentioned above at the end of zipl_run. That way there is less duplicate code between _normal and _secure.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 19/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
In reply to Zhuoying CaiMake the address variable a parameter of zipl_load_segment and return segment length.
Modify this function for reuse in the next patch, which allows loading segment or signature data to the destination memory address.
Add a comp_len variable to store the length of a segment and return this variable in zipl_load_segment.
comp_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +7 -5
@@ -613,19 +613,18 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* IPL a SCSI disk */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry) +static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) {const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;const int bprs_size =sizeof (sec);block_number_t blockno; -uint64_t address;int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int comp_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno; - address = entry->compdat.load_addr;debug_print_int ("loading segment at block" , blockno);debug_print_int ("addr" , address);
@@ -662,6 +661,9 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)*/ break ; } + + comp_len += bprs->size * (bprs[i].blockct +1 ); + address =virtio_load_direct (cur_desc[0 ], cur_desc[1 ],0 , (void *)address);if (!address) {
@@ -671,7 +673,7 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) } }while (blockno); -return 0 ; +return comp_len; }static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec)
@@ -685,7 +687,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 19/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
Quoted 2 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Make the address variable a parameter of
zipl_load_segmentand return segment length.
There's mixed use of the term "comp_len" and "segment length". Since the context here is "zipl_load_segment", perhaps the variable should be "seg_len"?
Quoted 3 lines
Modify this function for reuse in the next patch, which allows loading segment or signature data to the destination memory address.
The function is still loading a segment from the disk regardless if it's a signature or something else. I'd suggest rewording the above for more precision about the change:
"Modify this function to allow the caller to specify a memory address where segment data should be loaded into."
Quoted 3 lines
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment and return this variable inzipl_load_segment.
This sentence is redundant since the change in the return behavior is mentioned in the first sentence.
Quoted 6 lines
comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
Bit of a nit: technically this isn't refactoring since the function's behavior has changed (new param and different return meaning). Change the commit header from "refactor" to "rework" or something akin to that.
Quoted 9 lines
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +0
-0
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int ipl_eckd(void) · line 616
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +1
-1@@ -613,19 +613,18 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* IPL a SCSI disk */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry) +static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address)
The return value meaning of this function has changed from being "< 0 means error, 0 is okay" to "< 0 means error, otherwise the total size of the component is returned". Please add a comment above this function to describe its return behavior so it's easy for future developers to understand it.
Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +1
-2{const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;const int bprs_size =sizeof (sec);block_number_t blockno; -uint64_t address;int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int comp_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno; - address = entry->compdat.load_addr;debug_print_int ("loading segment at block" , blockno);debug_print_int ("addr" , address);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) · line 666
Quoted 6 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +3
-0@@ -662,6 +661,9 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)*/ break ; } + + comp_len += bprs->size * (bprs[i].blockct +1 ); +
I'm confused by the arithmetic here. Why is size multiplied by the block count? Won't that artificially inflate the value representing the size of the component? What's the reason that comp_len += bprs->size isn't sufficient?
Quoted 21 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2
-2address =virtio_load_direct (cur_desc[0 ], cur_desc[1 ],0 , (void *)address);if (!address) {@@ -671,7 +673,7 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) } }while (blockno); -return 0 ; +return comp_len; }static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec)@@ -685,7 +687,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 19/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
Quoted 72 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 2 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Make the address variable a parameter of
zipl_load_segmentand return segment length.There's mixed use of the term "
comp_len" and "segment length". Since the context here is "zipl_load_segment", perhaps the variable should be "seg_len"?Quoted 3 lines
Modify this function for reuse in the next patch, which allows loading segment or signature data to the destination memory address.
The function is still loading a segment from the disk regardless if it's a signature or something else. I'd suggest rewording the above for more precision about the change:
"Modify this function to allow the caller to specify a memory address where segment data should be loaded into."
Quoted 3 lines
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment and return this variable inzipl_load_segment.This sentence is redundant since the change in the return behavior is mentioned in the first sentence.
Quoted 6 lines
comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>Bit of a nit: technically this isn't refactoring since the function's behavior has changed (new param and different return meaning). Change the commit header from "refactor" to "rework" or something akin to that.
Quoted 9 lines
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +0
-0pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int ipl_eckd(void) · line 616
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +1
-1@@ -613,19 +613,18 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* IPL a SCSI disk */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry) +static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address)The return value meaning of this function has changed from being "< 0 means error, 0 is okay" to "< 0 means error, otherwise the total size of the component is returned". Please add a comment above this function to describe its return behavior so it's easy for future developers to understand it.
Quoted 14 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +1
-2{const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;const int bprs_size =sizeof (sec);block_number_t blockno; -uint64_t address;int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int comp_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno; - address = entry->compdat.load_addr;
Quoted 15 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) · line 666
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +3
-0debug_print_int ("loading segment at block" , blockno);debug_print_int ("addr" , address);@@ -662,6 +661,9 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)*/ break ; } + + comp_len += bprs->size * (bprs[i].blockct +1 ); +I'm confused by the arithmetic here. Why is size multiplied by the block count? Won't that artificially inflate the value representing the size of the component? What's the reason that
comp_len+=bprs->sizeisn't sufficient?
A component table entry points to a segment table, which holds pointers to code segments loaded into contiguous memory.
Since segments can vary in length, the block count field may be nonzero.
Block size indicates the number of bytes in a single logical block, so the total component size is the block size multiplied by the block count.
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 21 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2
-2address =virtio_load_direct (cur_desc[0 ], cur_desc[1 ],0 , (void *)address);if (!address) {@@ -671,7 +673,7 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) } }while (blockno); -return 0 ; +return comp_len; }static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec)@@ -685,7 +687,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }
Re: [PATCH v4 19/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
[...]
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-0@@ -662,6 +661,9 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) */ break; }Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry) · line 666
Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +3
-0+ + comp_len += bprs->size * (bprs[i].blockct +1 ); +I'm confused by the arithmetic here. Why is size multiplied by the block count? Won't that artificially inflate the value representing the size of the component? What's the reason that
comp_len+=bprs->sizeisn't sufficient?
Quoted 8 lines
A component table entry points to a segment table, which holds pointers to code segments loaded into contiguous memory.
Since segments can vary in length, the block count field may be nonzero.
Block size indicates the number of bytes in a single logical block, so the total component size is the block size multiplied by the block count.
Okay. After referencing both your explanation and our disk layout docs, this makes more sense to me. Thanks!
More nitpicking: I think it reads better to put this line of code as the last line of the for loop. That will keep all disk-reading code together and make it a little more clear that this variable isn't used elsewhere in the inner loop.
Functionally, I think the patch is fine :)
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 20/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiEnable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a comp_len variable to store the length of a segment in zipl_load_segment. comp_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 3 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 193 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 9 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 9 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 14 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 44 ++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 98 +++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 563 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d .PHONY : all clean build-all distclean OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \ - virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o + virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \ + secure-ipl.o SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOF
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +191 -2
246 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +9 -0
@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +} __attribute__((packed))SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +9 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +ZiplBootMode boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "
@@ -272,9 +273,17 @@ static int virtio_setup(void)static void ipl_boot_device (void ) { +if (boot_mode ==0 ) { + boot_mode =zipl_mode (iplb->hdr_flags); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +14 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;#define MIN_NON_ZERO (a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \ ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif #define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))
@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */
@@ -76,6 +81,15 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE =1 , +ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE =2 , +}ZiplBootMode ; + +extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode; + +ZiplBootMode zipl_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +44 -0
50 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;
@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t fac_ipl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +190 -0
190 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +98 -0
98 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 20/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
Quoted 9 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.
Quoted 8 lines
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
I would suggest encapsulating all secure-boot related functions into the new secure-ipl.c|h files to help keep bootmap.c less bloated. I would suggest moving the following to the new file:
- zipl_handle_sig_entry
- handle_certificate
- zipl_run_secure (this should probably be the only non-static func, since it'll be used by bootmap.c, and you'll probably need to mess with the levels of indirection for the params)
Of course, make all functions used by zipl_run_secure as static since they'll only be used there.
I'll revist this patch later to verify the SCLP bits and triple-check the data structure layouts.
More comments below:
Quoted 49 lines
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 3 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 193 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 9 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 9 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 14 +++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 44 ++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 98 +++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 563 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.hpc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +2
-1@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d .PHONY : all clean build-all distclean OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \ - virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o + virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \ + secure-ipl.o SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOFpc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2
-0@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@* directory. */ +#include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include "s390-ccw.h" @@ -15,6 +16,7 @@#include "bootmap.h" #include "virtio.h" #include "bswap.h" +#include "secure-ipl.h" #ifdef DEBUG /* #define DEBUG_FALLBACK */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static uint8_t sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE*4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); · line 40
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2
-0@@ -34,6 +36,9 @@ static uint8_t sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE*4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));const uint8_t el_torito_magic[] ="EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" ; +/* sector for storing signatures */ +static uint8_t sig_sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));
Since only zipl_secure_run is making use of this scratch space, I'd suggest declaring some chunk of mem within that function and then passing it as a parameter to zipl_handle_sig_entry. It'll also make it a lot easier to understand what is going on in the ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE case.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 684
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2
-0+/* * Match two CCWs located after PSW and eight filler bytes. * From libmagic and arch/s390/kernel/head.S. @@ -676,6 +681,159 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)return comp_len; } +static uint32_t zipl_handle_sig_entry (ComponentEntry *entry)
I think "zipl_load_signature" reads better.
Quoted 63 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +63
-0+{ +uint32_t sig_len; + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, (uint64_t )sig_sec) <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format !=DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT ) { +puts ("Signature is not in DER format" ); +return -1 ; + } + sig_len = entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len; + +return sig_len; +} + +static int handle_certificate (int *cert_table,uint64_t **cert, +uint64_t cert_len,uint8_t cert_idx, +IplSignatureCertificateList *certs,int cert_index) +{ +bool unused; + + unused = cert_table[cert_idx] ==-1 ; +if (unused) { +if (zipl_secure_request_certificate (*cert, cert_idx)) { +zipl_secure_cert_list_add (certs, cert_index, *cert, cert_len); + cert_table[cert_idx] = cert_index; + *cert += cert_len; + }else { +puts ("Could not get certificate" ); +return -1 ; + } + +/* increment cert_index for the next cert entry */ +return ++cert_index; + } + +return cert_index; +} + +static int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +IplDeviceComponentList comps; +IplSignatureCertificateList certs; +uint64_t *cert =NULL ; +int cert_index =0 ; +int comp_index =0 ; +uint64_t comp_addr; +int comp_len; +bool have_sig; +uint32_t sig_len; +uint64_t cert_len =-1 ; +uint8_t cert_idx =-1 ; +bool verified; +uint32_t certs_len; +/* +* Store indices of cert entry that have already used for signature verification +* to prevent allocating the same certificate multiple times. +* cert_table index: index of certificate from qemu cert store used for verification +* cert_table value: index of cert entry in cert list that contains the certificate +*/ +int cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +int signed_count =0 ;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 757
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ +if (!zipl_secure_ipl_supported ()) { +return -1 ; + } + +zipl_secure_init_lists (&comps, &certs); + certs_len =zipl_secure_get_certs_length (); + cert =malloc (certs_len); + + have_sig = false;
You can get rid of this boolean and simply use sig_len as the indicator that there were nonzero bytes read when a signature entry was detected in the previous loop. Where you set have_sig to false below, you can set sig_len to 0 to reset it.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 760
Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +3
-0+while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { +
I'll be honest, I'm not a big fan of neither the design of this while loop nor the one in zipl_run_normal. I'd prefer something like:
while (entry->component_type != ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC) {
// sanity checking
switch (entry->component_type) {
case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE:
...
break;
case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD:
...
break;
default:
// Unrecognized entry type, return error
}
entry++;
}The above makes it clear that we're loading in segments until the exec entry is found, and the handling for each recognized component type is clearly labeled and organized.
I won't speak for making this change to the zipl_run_normal function yet, as it may introduce too many changes in this patch series.
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { +/* There should never be two signatures in a row */ +if (have_sig) { +return -1 ; + } + + sig_len =zipl_handle_sig_entry (entry); +if (sig_len <0 ) { +return -1 ; + }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 780
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ + have_sig = true; + }else { + comp_addr = entry->compdat.load_addr; + comp_len =zipl_load_segment (entry, comp_addr); +if (comp_len <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (have_sig) {
If you use my idea to re-write this loop, you'll be able to reduce one level of indentation of the code that follows by checking the inverse condition:
if (!have_sig) { // or if (!sig_len)
break;
Quoted 27 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +27
-0+ verified =verify_signature (comp_len, comp_addr, + sig_len, (uint64_t )sig_sec, + &cert_len, &cert_idx); + +if (verified) { + cert_index =handle_certificate (cert_table, &cert, + cert_len, cert_idx, + &certs, cert_index); +if (cert_index ==-1 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +puts ("Verified component" ); +zipl_secure_comp_list_add (&comps, comp_index, cert_table[cert_idx], + comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC | +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV ); + }else { +zipl_secure_comp_list_add (&comps, comp_index,-1 , + comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC ); +zipl_secure_print ("Could not verify component" ); + } + + comp_index++; + signed_count +=1 ; +/* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 817
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ have_sig = false; + } + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }
Can someone who is more informed than I am of the IPL process please explain to me what is the purpose of the above check? Why does it check if the next entry, the one which isn't going to be inspected/loaded, is within the bounds of tmp_sec? This has been here since this file's inception and I can't find any documentation or mention that supports it.
This code precludes any of the secure IPL changes.
Was this actually meant to be entry[0] to ensure the actual entry we want to work on is not outside the bounds of tmp_sec? Or perhaps it was meant to be done before the increment to entry?
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 827
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (signed_count ==0 ) { +zipl_secure_print ("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + }
Shouldn't this be handled within the loop? If it gets to a LOAD type without a signature, audit mode should report and move on. Secure mode should report and abort on the spot. Then you can get rid of signed_count.
I'll get back to reviewing patch 22 wrt to this variable's usage later on...
Quoted 156 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +42
-2+ +if (zipl_secure_update_iirb (&comps, &certs)) { +zipl_secure_print ("Failed to write IPL Information Report Block" ); + } +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); + +return 0 ; +} +static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) { while (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ||@@ -735,8 +893,17 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { -return -1 ; +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE : +if (zipl_run_secure (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; +case ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE : +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; }/* should not return */ @@ -1095,17 +1262,35 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */ +ZiplBootMode zipl_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags) +{ +bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ; +bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + +if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) { +return ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ; + } + +return ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); + }ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + }netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;@@ -1116,6 +1301,10 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +9
-0@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +} __attribute__((packed))SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +9
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +ZiplBootMode boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "@@ -272,9 +273,17 @@ static int virtio_setup(void)static void ipl_boot_device (void ) { +if (boot_mode ==0 ) { + boot_mode =zipl_mode (iplb->hdr_flags); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +5
-0@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;#define MIN_NON_ZERO (a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \ ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif #define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr); · line 87
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +4
-0@@ -76,6 +81,15 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE =1 , +ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE =2 , +}ZiplBootMode ;
These should be ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_*
Also, is there a reason why the list starts at 1 and not defaulting to the implicit 0?
Quoted 93 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +5
-0+ +extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode; + +ZiplBootMode zipl_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +44
-0@@ -113,6 +113,50 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) } } +static void sclp_get_fac134 (uint8_t *fac134) +{ + +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *fac134 = sccb->fac134; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ) +{ +uint8_t fac134 =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac134 (&fac134); +return fac134 &SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT ; +} + +/* +* Get fac_ipl (byte 136 and byte 137 of the SCLP Read Info block) +* for IPL device facilities. +*/ +static void sclp_get_fac_ipl (uint16_t *fac_ipl) +{ + +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *fac_ipl = sccb->fac_ipl; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6
-0@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t fac_ipl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +0
-0
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 8
Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +8
-0@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/* +* S/390 Secure IPL +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/
Let's take the opportunity to add some meaningful content to the file header. Something like:
/*
* S/390 Secure IPL
*
* Functions to support IPL in secure boot mode (DIAG 320, DIAG 508,
* signature verification, and certificate handling).
*
* For secure IPL overview: docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst
* For secure IPL technical: docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst *
* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp.
* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
No need to put in the .h
Quoted 207 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +182
-0+ +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include "s390-ccw.h" +#include "secure-ipl.h" + +uint8_t vcb_data[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE * 4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MAX_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); + +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void ) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +int rc; + + vcssb = (VCStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data; +/* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */ +if (vcssb->length ==VCSSB_MAX_LEN ) { +return vcssb; + } + + rc =diag320 (vcssb,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI ); +if (rc !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { +return NULL ; + } + +return vcssb; +} + +uint32_t zipl_secure_get_certs_length (void ) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +uint32_t len; + + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL ) { +return 0 ; + } + + len = vcssb->total_vcb_len -VCB_HEADER_LEN - vcssb->total_vc_ct *VCE_HEADER_LEN ; + +return len; +} + +uint32_t zipl_secure_request_certificate (uint64_t *cert,uint8_t index) +{ +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +VCBlock *vcb; +VCEntry *vce; +uint64_t rc =0 ; +uint32_t cert_len =0 ; + +/* Get Verification Certificate Storage Size block with DIAG320 subcode 1 */ + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL ) { +return 0 ; + } + +/* +* Request single entry +* Fill input fields of single-entry VCB +*/ + vcb = (VCBlock *)vcb_data; + vcb->in_len =ROUND_UP (vcssb->max_single_vcb_len,PAGE_SIZE ); + vcb->first_vc_index = index +1 ; + vcb->last_vc_index = index +1 ; + + rc =diag320 (vcb,DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC ); +if (rc ==DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + vce = (VCEntry *)vcb->vce_buf; + cert_len = vce->cert_len; +memcpy (cert, (uint8_t *)vce + vce->cert_offset, vce->cert_len); +/* clear out region for next cert(s) */ +memcpy (vcb_data,0 ,sizeof (vcb_data)); + } + +return cert_len; +} + +void zipl_secure_cert_list_add (IplSignatureCertificateList *certs,int cert_index, +uint64_t *cert,uint64_t cert_len) +{ +if (cert_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring cert entry [%d] because it's over %d entires\n" , + cert_index +1 ,MAX_CERTIFICATES ); +return ; + } + + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].addr = (uint64_t )cert; + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].len = cert_len; + certs->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (certs->cert_entries[cert_index]); +} + +void zipl_secure_comp_list_add (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +int cert_index,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t comp_len,uint8_t flags) +{ +if (comp_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring comp entry [%d] because it's over %d entires\n" , + comp_index +1 ,MAX_CERTIFICATES ); +return ; + } + + comps->device_entries[comp_index].addr = comp_addr; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].len = comp_len; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].flags = flags; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cert_index = cert_index; + comps->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (comps->device_entries[comp_index]); +} + +int zipl_secure_update_iirb (IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ +IplInfoReportBlock *iirb; +IplDeviceComponentList *iirb_comps; +IplSignatureCertificateList *iirb_certs; +uint32_t iirb_hdr_len; +uint32_t comps_len; +uint32_t certs_len; + +if (iplb->len %8 !=0 ) { +panic ("IPL parameter block length field value is not multiple of 8 bytes" ); + } + + iirb_hdr_len =sizeof (IplInfoReportBlockHeader); + comps_len = comps->ipl_info_header.len; + certs_len = certs->ipl_info_header.len; +if ((comps_len + certs_len + iirb_hdr_len) >sizeof (IplInfoReportBlock)) { +puts ("Not enough space to hold all components and certificates in IIRB" ); +return -1 ; + } + +/* IIRB immediately follows IPLB */ + iirb = &ipl_data.iirb; + iirb->hdr.len = iirb_hdr_len; + +/* Copy IPL device component list after IIRB Header */ + iirb_comps = (IplDeviceComponentList *) iirb->info_blks; +memcpy (iirb_comps, comps, comps_len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += comps_len; + +/* Copy IPL sig cert list after IPL device component list */ + iirb_certs = (IplSignatureCertificateList *) (iirb->info_blks + + iirb_comps->ipl_info_header.len); +memcpy (iirb_certs, certs, certs_len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += certs_len; + +return 0 ; +} + +bool zipl_secure_ipl_supported (void ) +{ +if (!sclp_is_sipl_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_secure_ipl_extension_supported ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL extensions are not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!(sclp_is_diag320_on () &&is_cert_store_facility_supported ())) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +return true; +} + +void zipl_secure_init_lists (IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ + comps->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_COMPONENTS ; + comps->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (comps->ipl_info_header); + + certs->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_CERTIFICATES ; + certs->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (certs->ipl_info_header); +}pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +19
-0@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* +* S/390 Secure IPL +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ +> +#ifndef _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H +#define _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H + +#include <diag320.h> +#include <diag508.h> + +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb (void ); +uint32_t zipl_secure_get_certs_length (void ); +uint32_t zipl_secure_request_certificate (uint64_t *cert,uint8_t index); +void zipl_secure_cert_list_add (IplSignatureCertificateList *certs,int cert_index, +uint64_t *cert,uint64_t cert_len);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h line 29
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +10
-0+void zipl_secure_comp_list_add (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +int cert_index,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t comp_len,uint8_t flags); +int zipl_secure_update_iirb (IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +IplSignatureCertificateList *certs); +bool zipl_secure_ipl_supported (void ); +void zipl_secure_init_lists (IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +IplSignatureCertificateList *certs); + +static inline void zipl_secure_print (const char *message)
This name is a bit misleading, since it will do something more sinister in a later patch when secure mode is introduced: it will assert and abort IPL... not something I'd expect a "print" function to do ;)
Perhaps something like zipl_secure_check... or something better... I just don't think "print" makes sense.
Quoted 68 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +68
-0+{ +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE : +IPL_check (false, message); +break ; +default : +break ; + } +} + +static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x320\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +} + +static inline bool is_cert_store_facility_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d320_ism; + +diag320 (&d320_ism,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM ); +return (d320_ism &DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ) && + (d320_ism &DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC ); +} + +static inline uint64_t _diag508 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x508\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +} + +static inline bool is_secure_ipl_extension_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d508_subcodes; + + d508_subcodes =_diag508 (NULL ,DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC ); +return d508_subcodes &DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ; +} + +static inline bool verify_signature (uint64_t comp_len,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t sig_len,uint64_t sig_addr, +uint64_t *cert_len,uint8_t *cert_idx) +{ +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock svb = {{}, comp_len, comp_addr, + sig_len, sig_addr }; + +if (_diag508 (&svb,DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ) ==DIAG_508_RC_OK ) { + *cert_len = svb.csi.len; + *cert_idx = svb.csi.idx; +return true; + } + +return false; +} + +#endif /* _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H */
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 20/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
[snip...]
Quoted 13 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 817
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +7
-0+ + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }Can someone who is more informed than I am of the IPL process please explain to me what is the purpose of the above check? Why does it check if the next entry, the one which isn't going to be inspected/loaded, is within the bounds of
tmp_sec? This has been here since this file's inception and I can't find any documentation or mention that supports it.
Quoted 6 lines
This code precludes any of the secure IPL changes.
Was this actually meant to be entry[0] to ensure the actual entry we want to work on is not outside the bounds of
tmp_sec? Or perhaps it was meant to be done before the increment to entry?
I noticed that as well and came to the same conclusions as you, which is to say, it has always been that way and it is not clear what the purpose is, but it does not appear to have any impact on the proposed secure IPL functionality. I agree that it seems somehow strange, but I believe any changes/fixes would be outside the scope of this item.
In my opinion, since this is already a large patch series, it is better to leave it alone for now unless we find a compelling reason to change it immediately.
Regards,
Jared Rossi
Re: [PATCH v4 20/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
Quoted 17 lines · Jared Rossi
[snip...]
Quoted 15 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 817
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +7
-0+ + entry++; + + if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1]) > tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) { + puts("Wrong entry value"); + return -EINVAL; + }Can someone who is more informed than I am of the IPL process please explain to me what is the purpose of the above check? Why does it check if the next entry, the one which isn't going to be inspected/loaded, is within the bounds of tmp_sec? This has been here since this file's inception and I can't find any documentation or mention that supports it.
This code precludes any of the secure IPL changes.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Was this actually meant to be entry[0] to ensure the actual entry we want to work on is not outside the bounds of tmp_sec? Or perhaps it was meant to be done before the increment to entry?
I noticed that as well and came to the same conclusions as you, which is to say, it has always been that way and it is not clear what the purpose is, but it does not appear to have any impact on the proposed secure IPL functionality.
I think it's meant as a check for the *end* of entry[0], so it's likely just a quirky way of saying:
if (((uint8_t *)entry) + sizeof(*entry) > tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE)
?
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v4 20/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
Quoted 23 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 22 lines · Jared Rossi
[snip...]
Quoted 19 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 817
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +7
-0+ + entry++; + + if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1]) > tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) { + puts("Wrong entry value"); + return -EINVAL; + }Can someone who is more informed than I am of the IPL process please explain to me what is the purpose of the above check? Why does it check if the next entry, the one which isn't going to be inspected/loaded, is within the bounds of tmp_sec? This has been here since this file's inception and I can't find any documentation or mention that supports it.
This code precludes any of the secure IPL changes.
Was this actually meant to be entry[0] to ensure the actual entry we want to work on is not outside the bounds of tmp_sec? Or perhaps it was meant to be done before the increment to entry?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I noticed that as well and came to the same conclusions as you, which is to say,
it has always been that way and it is not clear what the purpose is, but it does
not appear to have any impact on the proposed secure IPL functionality.
Fair enough. Let's keep the current code in and address it later. Thanks, Jared.
Quoted 10 lines
I think it's meant as a check for the *end* of entry[0], so it's likely just a quirky way of saying:
if (((uint8_t *)entry) + sizeof(*entry) > tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE)?
Thomas
This makes a lot more sense to me. Thanks, Thomas.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v4 20/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
In reply to Collin WallingQuoted 18 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 17 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
[snip...]
Quoted 164 lines
Quoted 23 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +23
-0+static int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +IplDeviceComponentList comps; +IplSignatureCertificateList certs; +uint64_t *cert =NULL ; +int cert_index =0 ; +int comp_index =0 ; +uint64_t comp_addr; +int comp_len; +bool have_sig; +uint32_t sig_len; +uint64_t cert_len =-1 ; +uint8_t cert_idx =-1 ; +bool verified; +uint32_t certs_len; +/* +* Store indices of cert entry that have already used for signature verification +* to prevent allocating the same certificate multiple times. +* cert_table index: index of certificate from qemu cert store used for verification +* cert_table value: index of cert entry in cert list that contains the certificate +*/ +int cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 }; +int signed_count =0 ;pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 757
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ +if (!zipl_secure_ipl_supported ()) { +return -1 ; + } + +zipl_secure_init_lists (&comps, &certs); + certs_len =zipl_secure_get_certs_length (); + cert =malloc (certs_len); + + have_sig = false;You can get rid of this boolean and simply use
sig_lenas the indicator that there were nonzero bytes read when a signature entry was detected in the previous loop. Where you sethave_sigto false below, you can setsig_lento 0 to reset it.pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 760
Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +3
-0+while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { +I'll be honest, I'm not a big fan of neither the design of this while loop nor the one in
zipl_run_normal. I'd prefer something like:while (
entry->component_type!=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC) {// sanity checking switch (entry->component_type) { case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE: ... break; case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD: ... break; default: // Unrecognized entry type, return error } entry++; }The above makes it clear that we're loading in segments until the exec entry is found, and the handling for each recognized component type is clearly labeled and organized.
I won't speak for making this change to the
zipl_run_normalfunction yet, as it may introduce too many changes in this patch series.Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { +/* There should never be two signatures in a row */ +if (have_sig) { +return -1 ; + } + + sig_len =zipl_handle_sig_entry (entry); +if (sig_len <0 ) { +return -1 ; + }pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 780
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ + have_sig = true; + }else { + comp_addr = entry->compdat.load_addr; + comp_len =zipl_load_segment (entry, comp_addr); +if (comp_len <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (have_sig) {If you use my idea to re-write this loop, you'll be able to reduce one level of indentation of the code that follows by checking the inverse condition:
if (!have_sig) { // or if (!sig_len)
break;Quoted 27 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +27
-0+ verified =verify_signature (comp_len, comp_addr, + sig_len, (uint64_t )sig_sec, + &cert_len, &cert_idx); + +if (verified) { + cert_index =handle_certificate (cert_table, &cert, + cert_len, cert_idx, + &certs, cert_index); +if (cert_index ==-1 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +puts ("Verified component" ); +zipl_secure_comp_list_add (&comps, comp_index, cert_table[cert_idx], + comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC | +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV ); + }else { +zipl_secure_comp_list_add (&comps, comp_index,-1 , + comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC ); +zipl_secure_print ("Could not verify component" ); + } + + comp_index++; + signed_count +=1 ; +/* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 817
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ have_sig = false; + } + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }Can someone who is more informed than I am of the IPL process please explain to me what is the purpose of the above check? Why does it check if the next entry, the one which isn't going to be inspected/loaded, is within the bounds of
tmp_sec? This has been here since this file's inception and I can't find any documentation or mention that supports it.This code precludes any of the secure IPL changes.
Was this actually meant to be entry[0] to ensure the actual entry we want to work on is not outside the bounds of
tmp_sec? Or perhaps it was meant to be done before the increment to entry?pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 827
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (signed_count ==0 ) { +zipl_secure_print ("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + }Shouldn't this be handled within the loop? If it gets to a LOAD type without a signature, audit mode should report and move on. Secure mode should report and abort on the spot. Then you can get rid of
signed_count.
Quoted 2 lines
I'll get back to reviewing patch 22 wrt to this variable's usage later on...
This is handled after the loop because the number of LOAD components can vary, and not all of them require signatures. We count the signed components once all have been processed to verify whether components, such as the stage3 bootloader and kernel, are signed for secure IPL.
The signed_count is also used in a later patch for the SCLAB check, which allows only one signed component when the Single Component flag is set.
Quoted 166 lines
Quoted 156 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +42
-2+ +if (zipl_secure_update_iirb (&comps, &certs)) { +zipl_secure_print ("Failed to write IPL Information Report Block" ); + } +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); + +return 0 ; +} +static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) { while (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ||@@ -735,8 +893,17 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { -return -1 ; +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE : +if (zipl_run_secure (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; +case ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE : +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; }/* should not return */ @@ -1095,17 +1262,35 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */ +ZiplBootMode zipl_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags) +{ +bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ; +bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + +if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) { +return ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ; + } + +return ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); + }ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + }netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;@@ -1116,6 +1301,10 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +9
-0@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +} __attribute__((packed))SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +9
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +ZiplBootMode boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "@@ -272,9 +273,17 @@ static int virtio_setup(void)static void ipl_boot_device (void ) { +if (boot_mode ==0 ) { + boot_mode =zipl_mode (iplb->hdr_flags); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +5
-0@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;#define MIN_NON_ZERO (a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \ ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif #define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr); · line 87
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +4
-0@@ -76,6 +81,15 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE =1 , +ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE =2 , +}ZiplBootMode ;These should be ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_*
Quoted 3 lines
Also, is there a reason why the list starts at 1 and not defaulting to the implicit 0?
boot_mode is a global variable defined in pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c, and it defaults to 0, which indicates that the boot mode hasn’t been determined yet.
We start the list at 1 to reserve 0 as the implicit “undefined” or “not yet set” value. The actual boot mode is only set later when boot_mode == 0:
if (boot_mode == 0) {
boot_mode = zipl_mode(iplb->hdr_flags);
}This allows us to distinguish between an unset state and valid boot modes.
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +5
-0+ +extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode; + +ZiplBootMode zipl_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +0
-0@@ -113,6 +113,50 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) } }
[snip...]
Re: [PATCH v4 20/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
Quoted 2 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 1 line · Collin Walling
On 7/11/25 5:10 PM, Zhuoying Cai wrote:
[...]
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 11 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr); · line 87
Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +4
-0+typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE =1 , +ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE =2 , +}ZiplBootMode ;These should be ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_*
Also, is there a reason why the list starts at 1 and not defaulting to the implicit 0?
boot_modeis a global variable defined inpc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c, and it defaults to 0, which indicates that the boot mode hasn’t been determined yet.
Quoted 7 lines
We start the list at 1 to reserve 0 as the implicit “undefined” or “not yet set” value. The actual boot mode is only set later when
boot_mode== 0:if (boot_mode == 0) { boot_mode = zipl_mode(iplb->hdr_flags); }This allows us to distinguish between an unset state and valid boot modes.
I would have thought to default the boot mode to NORMAL, but I haven't had my eyes on the BIOS patches in a bit. Unsure what makes sense.
For now, I'd suggest adding ZIPL_MODE_UNSPECIFIED (or something like that) to the list.
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 21/28 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during IPL.
Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.
--- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1 -0
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SCLAF )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store function /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility") +DEF_FEAT(SCLAF, "sclaf", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 3, "Secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +3 -0
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS :case S390_FEAT_SIPL : +case S390_FEAT_SCLAF :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;
@@ -509,6 +510,8 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_SIPL }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +2 -0
@@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 ,S390_FEAT_SIPL , + S390_FEAT_SCLAF, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -924,6 +925,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 ,S390_FEAT_SIPL , + S390_FEAT_SCLAF, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3 -0
@@ -2523,6 +2523,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)/* Secure-IPL facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +/* Secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SCLAF , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 21/28] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
Quoted 7 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during IPL.
Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
Aside from the comment I made in patch 17, LGTM.
Quoted 87 lines
--- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+)target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1
-0@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SCLAF )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1
-0@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store function /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility") +DEF_FEAT(SCLAF, "sclaf", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 3, "Secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")target/s390x/cpu_models.c +3
-0@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS :case S390_FEAT_SIPL : +case S390_FEAT_SCLAF :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;@@ -509,6 +510,8 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_SIPL }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },target/s390x/gen-features.c +2
-0@@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 ,S390_FEAT_SIPL , + S390_FEAT_SCLAF, }; static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {@@ -924,6 +925,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 ,S390_FEAT_SIPL , + S390_FEAT_SCLAF, };/****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3
-0@@ -2523,6 +2523,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)/* Secure-IPL facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +/* Secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SCLAF , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH v4 22/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.
Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to 0x2000.
When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).
The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.
When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.
Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).
When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 27 ++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 26 ++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 8 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 396 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 127 +++++++++++ 7 files changed, 579 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +22 -5
@@ -745,6 +745,10 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)*/ int cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ] = { [0 ...MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ] =-1 };int signed_count =0 ; +int unsigned_count =0 ; +SecureIplSclabInfo sclab_info; +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int addr_range_index =0 ;if (!zipl_secure_ipl_supported ()) {return -1 ;
@@ -777,7 +781,17 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)return -1 ; } -if (have_sig) { +zipl_secure_addr_overlap_check (comp_addr_range, &addr_range_index, + comp_addr, comp_addr + comp_len, have_sig); + +if (!have_sig) { +zipl_secure_check_unsigned_comp (comp_addr, &comps, comp_index, + cert_index, comp_len); + unsigned_count +=1 ; + }else { +zipl_secure_check_sclab (comp_addr, &comps, comp_len, comp_index, + &sclab_info); + verified =verify_signature (comp_len, comp_addr, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig_sec, &cert_len, &cert_idx);
@@ -802,11 +816,12 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)zipl_secure_print ("Could not verify component" ); } - comp_index++; signed_count +=1 ;/* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ have_sig = false; } + + comp_index++; } entry++;
@@ -822,9 +837,11 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)return -EINVAL ; } -if (signed_count ==0 ) { -zipl_secure_print ("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); - } +zipl_secure_check_signed_comp (signed_count, &comps); +zipl_secure_check_sclab_count (sclab_info.count, &comps); +zipl_secure_check_global_sclab (sclab_info, comp_addr_range, addr_range_index, + entry->compdat.load_psw, unsigned_count, signed_count, + &comps, comp_index);if (zipl_secure_update_iirb (&comps, &certs)) {zipl_secure_print ("Failed to write IPL Information Report Block" );
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +24 -2
@@ -32,11 +32,19 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader { } __attribute__ ((packed));typedef struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader IplInfoReportBlockHeader ; +#define S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_NO_SIGNED_COMP 0x8000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_NO_SCLAB 0x4000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x2000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x1000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_FOUND_UNSIGNED_COMP 0x800/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_MORE_SIGNED_COMP 0x400/* bit 5 */ +struct IplInfoBlockHeader {uint32_t len;uint8_t ibt;uint8_t reserved1[3 ]; -uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +uint16_t iiei; +uint8_t reserved2[6 ]; } __attribute__ ((packed));typedef struct IplInfoBlockHeader IplInfoBlockHeader ;
@@ -60,13 +68,27 @@ typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateList IplSignatureCertificateList;#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC 0x80#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV 0x40 +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB 0x80000000/* bit 0 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN 0x40000000/* bit 1 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT 0x20000000/* bit 2 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR 0x10000000/* bit 3 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW 0x8000000/* bit 4 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW 0x4000000/* bit 5 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_NUC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLA 0x2000000/* bit 6 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE 0x1000000/* bit 7 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB 0x800000/* bit 8 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO 0x400000/* bit 9 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO 0x200000/* bit 10 */ +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR 0x100000/* bit 11 */ +struct IplDeviceComponentEntry {uint64_t addr;uint64_t len;uint8_t flags;uint8_t reserved1[5 ];uint16_t cert_index; -uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +uint32_t cei; +uint8_t reserved2[4 ]; } __attribute__ ((packed));typedef struct IplDeviceComponentEntry IplDeviceComponentEntry ;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ void sclp_setup(void);void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm);bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void );bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +8 -0
@@ -157,6 +157,14 @@ bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void)return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT ; } +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t fac_ipl =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac_ipl (&fac_ipl); +return fac_ipl &SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +396 -0
411 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +127 -0
139 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 23/28 Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd secure-boot as a parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option.
The secure-boot=on|off parameter is implemented to enable secure IPL.
By default, secure-boot is set to false if not specified in the command line.
--- hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 1 + qemu-options.hx | 6 +++++- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c +22 -0
@@ -814,6 +814,21 @@ static void machine_set_boot_certificates(Object *obj, const char *str, ms->boot_certificates =g_strdup (str); } +static inline bool machine_get_secure_boot (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + +return ms->secure_boot; +} + +static inline void machine_set_secure_boot (Object *obj,bool value, +Error **errp) +{ +S390CcwMachineState *ms =S390_CCW_MACHINE (obj); + + ms->secure_boot = value; +} +static void ccw_machine_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,const void *data) {MachineClass *mc =MACHINE_CLASS (oc);
@@ -873,6 +888,13 @@ static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data) machine_set_boot_certificates);object_class_property_set_description (oc,"boot-certificates" ,"provide path to a directory or a single certificate for secure boot" ); + +object_class_property_add_bool (oc,"secure-boot" , + machine_get_secure_boot, + machine_set_secure_boot); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"secure-boot" , +"enable/disable secure boot" ); + }static inline void s390_machine_initfn (Object *obj)
include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct S390CcwMachineState {uint64_t memory_limit;uint64_t max_pagesize;char *boot_certificates; +bool secure_boot;SCLPDevice *sclp; };
qemu-options.hx +5 -1
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \ " memory-backend='backend-id' specifies explicitly provided backend for main RAM (default=none)\n" " cxl-fmw.0.targets.0=firsttarget,cxl-fmw.0.targets.1=secondtarget,cxl-fmw.0.size=size[,cxl-fmw.0.interleave-granularity=granularity]\n" " smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n" - " boot-certificates='/path/directory:/path/file' provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate\n", + " boot-certificates='/path/directory:/path/file' provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate\n" + " secure-boot=on|off enable/disable secure boot (default=off) \n", QEMU_ARCH_ALL) SRST ``-machine [type=]name[,prop=value[,...]]``
@@ -205,6 +206,9 @@ SRST ``boot-certificates='/path/directory:/path/file'`` Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate on the host [s390x only]. A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. + + ``secure-boot=on|off`` + Enables or disables secure boot on s390-ccw guest. The default is off. ERST DEF("M", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_M,
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 24/28 hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIf -secure-boot on is specified on the command line option, indicating true secure IPL enabled, set Secure-IPL bit and IPL-Information-Report bit on in IPIB Flags field, and trigger true secure IPL in the S390 BIOS.
Any error that occurs during true secure IPL will cause the IPL to terminate.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +17 -1
@@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ static bool s390_has_certificate(void)return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; } +static bool s390_secure_boot_enabled (void ) +{ +return S390_CCW_MACHINE (qdev_get_machine ())->secure_boot; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -494,6 +499,17 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags to trigger +* secure boot in the s390 BIOS. +* +* Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot. +* +* If SIPL is on, IPLIR must also be on. +*/ +if (s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |= (DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL |DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ); + }/* * Secure boot in audit mode will perform * if certificate(s) exist in the key store.
@@ -503,7 +519,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)* * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. */ -if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + else if (s390_has_certificate()) { iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 25/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiWhen secure boot is enabled (-secure-boot on) and certificate(s) are provided, the boot operates in True Secure IPL mode.
Any verification error during True Secure IPL mode will cause the entire boot process to terminate.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities. If secure boot is enabled but no certificate is provided, the boot process will also terminate, as this is not a valid secure boot configuration.
Note: True Secure IPL mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 +++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 2 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 4 ++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +13 -3
@@ -911,6 +911,9 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]);switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE : +return -1 ; +case ZIPL_SECURE_MODE :case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :if (zipl_run_secure (entry, tmp_sec)) {return -1 ;
@@ -1283,9 +1286,16 @@ ZiplBootMode zipl_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags) {bool sipl_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ;bool iplir_set = hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; +VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb;if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) {return ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ; + }else if (sipl_set && iplir_set) { + vcssb =zipl_secure_get_vcssb (); +if (vcssb ==NULL || vcssb->length ==4 ) { +return ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE ; + } +return ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ; }return ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ;
@@ -1296,7 +1306,7 @@ void zipl_load(void)VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); }ipl_iso_el_torito ();
@@ -1305,7 +1315,7 @@ void zipl_load(void) }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); }netmain ();
@@ -1318,7 +1328,7 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +5 -1
@@ -277,10 +277,14 @@ static void ipl_boot_device(void) boot_mode =zipl_mode (iplb->hdr_flags); } +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE ) { +panic ("Need at least one certificate for secure boot!" ); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +2 -0
@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);void zipl_load (void );typedef enum ZiplBootMode { +ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE =-1 ,ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE =1 ,ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE =2 , +ZIPL_SECURE_MODE =3 , }ZiplBootMode ;extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +4 -0
@@ -264,6 +264,10 @@ static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic, comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |=S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ;/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { +zipl_secure_print ("Magic is not matched. SCLAB does not exist" ); + } +return false; }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +3 -0
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ static inline void zipl_secure_print(const char *message)case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :IPL_check (false, message);break ; +case ZIPL_SECURE_MODE : +IPL_assert (false, message); +break ;default :break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 26/28 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe current approach to enabling secure boot relies on providing -secure-boot and -boot-certificates options, which apply to all boot devices.
With the possibility of multiple boot devices, secure boot expects all provided devices to be supported and eligible (e.g., virtio-blk/virtio-scsi using the SCSI scheme).
If multiple boot devices are provided and include an unsupported (e.g., ECKD, VFIO) or a non-eligible (e.g., Net) device, the boot process will terminate with an error logged to the console.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 28 +++++++++----- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +18 -10
@@ -1301,23 +1301,35 @@ ZiplBootMode zipl_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags)return ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; } +int zipl_check_scsi_mbr_magic (void ) +{ +ScsiMbr *mbr = (void *)sec; + +/* Grab the MBR */ +memset (sec,FREE_SPACE_FILLER ,sizeof (sec)); +if (virtio_read (0 , mbr)) { +puts ("Cannot read block 0" ); +return -EIO ; + } + +if (!magic_match (mbr->magic,ZIPL_MAGIC )) { +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { -panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); - }ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { -panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); - }netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;
@@ -1328,10 +1340,6 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { -panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); - } -switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +69 -5
96 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ typedef enum ZiplBootMode {extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode;ZiplBootMode zipl_mode (uint8_t hdr_flags); +int zipl_check_scsi_mbr_magic (void );/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 26/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
Quoted 3 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The current approach to enabling secure boot relies on providing -secure-boot and -boot-certificates options, which apply to all boot devices.
This reference of -secure-boot and -boot-certificates presumably is a left over from an older version of this series which didn't use machine properties ?
Quoted 10 lines
With the possibility of multiple boot devices, secure boot expects all provided devices to be supported and eligible (e.g., virtio-blk/virtio-scsi using the SCSI scheme).
If multiple boot devices are provided and include an unsupported (e.g., ECKD, VFIO) or a non-eligible (e.g., Net) device, the boot process will terminate with an error logged to the console.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
PATCH v4 27/28 hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIf secure boot in audit mode or True Secure IPL mode is enabled without specifying a boot device, the boot process will terminate with an error.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +10 -0
@@ -764,6 +764,16 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store);if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl); + +/* +* Secure IPL without specifying a boot device. +* IPLB is not generated if no boot device is defined. +*/ +if ((s390_has_certificate () ||s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) && + !ipl->iplb_valid) { +error_report ("No boot device defined for Secure IPL" ); +exit (1 ); + } }else { ipl->qipl.chain_len =0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH v4 28/28 docs: Add secure IPL documentation
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd documentation for secure IPL
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 159 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 315 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst create mode 100644 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +159 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +s390 Secure IPL +=============== + +Secure IPL (a.k.a. secure boot) enables s390-ccw virtual machines to +leverage qcrypto libraries and z/Architecture emulations to verify the +integrity of signed kernels. The qcrypto libraries are used to perform +certificate validation and signature-verification, whereas the +z/Architecture emulations are used to ensure secure IPL data has not +been tampered with, convey data between QEMU and userspace, and set up +the relevant secure IPL data structures with verification results. + +To find out more about using this feature, see ``docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst``. + +Note that "userspace" will refer to the s390-ccw BIOS unless stated +otherwise. + +Both QEMU and userspace work in tandem to perform secure IPL. The Secure +Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) is used to check the Secure Code +Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB) and ensure that secure IPL data has not +been tampered with. DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is invoked by userspace to query +the certificate store info and retrieve specific certificates from QEMU. +DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is used by userspace to leverage qcrypto libraries to +perform signature-verification in QEMU. Lastly, userspace generates and +appends an IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) at the end of the IPL +Parameter Block, which is used by the kernel to store signed and +verified entries. + +The logical steps are as follows: + +- Userspace reads data payload from disk (e.g. stage3 boot loader, kernel) +- Userspace checks the validity of the SCLAB +- Userspace invokes DIAG 508 subcode 1 and provides it the payload +- QEMU handles DIAG 508 request by reading the payload and retrieving the + certificate store +- QEMU DIAG 508 utilizes qcrypto libraries to perform signature-verification on + the payload, attempting with each cert in the store (until success or exhausted) +- QEMU DIAG 508 returns: + + - success: index of cert used to verify payload + - failure: error code + +- Userspace responds to this operation: + + - success: retrieves cert from store via DIAG 320 using returned index + - failure: reports with warning (audit mode), aborts with error (secure mode) + +- Userspace appends IIRB at the end of the IPLB +- Userspace kicks off IPL + +More information regarding the respective DIAGNOSE commands and IPL data +structures are outlined within this document. + +s390 Certificate Store and Functions +==================================== + +s390 Certificate Store +---------------------- + +A certificate store is implemented for s390-ccw guests to retain within +memory all certificates provided by the user via the command-line, which +are expected to be stored somewhere on the host's file system. The store +will keep track of the number of certificates, their respective size, +and a summation of the sizes. + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'320' - Certificate Store Facility +----------------------------------------------------------- + +DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is used to provide support for userspace to directly +query the s390 certificate store. Userspace may be the s390-ccw BIOS or +the guest kernel. + +Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes + Returns a 256-bit installed subcodes mask (ISM) stored in the installed + subcodes block (ISB). This mask indicates which sucodes are currently + installed and available for use. + +Subcode 1 - query verification certificate storage information + Provides the information required to determine the amount of memory needed to + store one or more verification-certificates (VCs) from the certificate store (CS). + + Upon successful completion, this subcode returns various storage size values for + verification-certificate blocks (VCBs). + + The output is returned in the verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB). + +Subcode 2 - store verification certificates + Provides VCs that are in the certificate store. + + The output is provided in a VCB, which includes a common header followed by zero + or more verification-certificate entries (VCEs). + + The first-VC index and last-VC index fields of VCB specify the range of VCs + to be stored by subcode 2. Stored count and remained count fields specify the + number of VCs stored and could not be stored in the VCB due to insufficient + storage specified in the VCB input length field. + + VCE contains various information of a VC from the CS. + + +Secure IPL Data Structures, Facilities, and Functions +===================================================== + +IPL Information Report Block +---------------------------- + +The IPL Parameter Block (IPLPB), utilized for IPL operation, is extended with an +IPL Information Report Block (IIRB), which contains the results from secure IPL +operations such as: + +* component data +* verification results +* certificate data + + +Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility +--------------------------------- + +The Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) enhances system security during the +IPL by enforcing additional verification rules. + +When SCLAF is available, its behavior depends on the IPL mode. It introduces verification +of both signed and unsigned components to help ensure that only authorized code is loaded +during the IPL process. Any errors detected by SCLAF are reported in the IIRB. + +Unsigned components are restricted to load addresses at or above absolute storage address +``0x2000``. + +Signed components must include a Secure Code Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB), which is +appended at the very end of the component. The SCLAB defines security attributes for +handling the signed code. Specifically, it may: + +* Provide direction on how to process the rest of the component. + +* Provide further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code + from the load device. + +* Specify where to start the execution of the loaded OS code. + + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'508' - KVM IPL extensions +--------------------------------------------------- + +DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is reserved for KVM guest use in order to facilitate +communication of additional IPL operations that cannot be handled by userspace, +such as signature verification for secure IPL. + +If the function code specifies 0x508, KVM IPL extension functions are performed. +These functions are meant to provide extended functionality for s390 guest boot +that requires assistance from QEMU. + +Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes + Returns a 64-bit mask indicating which subcodes are supported. + +Subcode 1 - perform signature verification + Perform signature-verification on a signed component, using certificates + from the certificate store and leveraging qcrypto libraries to perform + this operation.
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst new file +156 -0
156 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v4 28/28] docs: Add secure IPL documentation
Quoted 4 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Add documentation for secure IPL
Signed-off-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
We should consider segmenting these documents by introducing the wording with the same patch that introduces the relevant functionality. I'll try to do my best here to give some guidance on how it should be broken up, but I might miss a few things. Hopefully I've successfully conveyed what I meant in my first sentence.
I'll organize my feedback here using XML tags to help encapsulate the segments and provide a comment to which patch in this series they should be merged with. E.g.
<segment> Comment Diff </segment>
You do not need to provide my sign-off on the patches you merge the documentation with.
Quoted 13 lines
--- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 159 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 315 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst create mode 100644 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rstdocs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +0
-0
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 2
Quoted 2 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +
<segment>
This can be introduced in a standalone patch at the end of the series (basically this patch). You can keep my sign-off on that patch.
Quoted 41 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +41
-0+s390 Secure IPL +=============== + +Secure IPL (a.k.a. secure boot) enables s390-ccw virtual machines to +leverage qcrypto libraries and z/Architecture emulations to verify the +integrity of signed kernels. The qcrypto libraries are used to perform +certificate validation and signature-verification, whereas the +z/Architecture emulations are used to ensure secure IPL data has not +been tampered with, convey data between QEMU and userspace, and set up +the relevant secure IPL data structures with verification results. + +To find out more about using this feature, see ``docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst``. + +Note that "userspace" will refer to the s390-ccw BIOS unless stated +otherwise. + +Both QEMU and userspace work in tandem to perform secure IPL. The Secure +Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) is used to check the Secure Code +Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB) and ensure that secure IPL data has not +been tampered with. DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is invoked by userspace to query +the certificate store info and retrieve specific certificates from QEMU. +DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is used by userspace to leverage qcrypto libraries to +perform signature-verification in QEMU. Lastly, userspace generates and +appends an IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) at the end of the IPL +Parameter Block, which is used by the kernel to store signed and +verified entries. + +The logical steps are as follows: + +- Userspace reads data payload from disk (e.g. stage3 boot loader, kernel) +- Userspace checks the validity of the SCLAB +- Userspace invokes DIAG 508 subcode 1 and provides it the payload +- QEMU handles DIAG 508 request by reading the payload and retrieving the + certificate store +- QEMU DIAG 508 utilizes qcrypto libraries to perform signature-verification on + the payload, attempting with each cert in the store (until success or exhausted) +- QEMU DIAG 508 returns: + + - success: index of cert used to verify payload + - failure: error code +
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 53
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+- Userspace responds to this operation: + + - success: retrieves cert from store via DIAG 320 using returned index + - failure: reports with warning (audit mode), aborts with error (secure mode) + +- Userspace appends IIRB at the end of the IPLB +- Userspace kicks off IPL + +More information regarding the respective DIAGNOSE commands and IPL data +structures are outlined within this document.
</segment>
<segment>
This should be merged with [PATCH v4 05/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
Quoted 14 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +14
-0+ +s390 Certificate Store and Functions +==================================== + +s390 Certificate Store +---------------------- + +A certificate store is implemented for s390-ccw guests to retain within +memory all certificates provided by the user via the command-line, which +are expected to be stored somewhere on the host's file system. The store +will keep track of the number of certificates, their respective size, +and a summation of the sizes. + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'320' - Certificate Store Facility
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 77
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+----------------------------------------------------------- + +DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is used to provide support for userspace to directly +query the s390 certificate store. Userspace may be the s390-ccw BIOS or +the guest kernel. + +Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes + Returns a 256-bit installed subcodes mask (ISM) stored in the installed + subcodes block (ISB). This mask indicates which sucodes are currently + installed and available for use.
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 07/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 87
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+ +Subcode 1 - query verification certificate storage information + Provides the information required to determine the amount of memory needed to + store one or more verification-certificates (VCs) from the certificate store (CS). + + Upon successful completion, this subcode returns various storage size values for + verification-certificate blocks (VCBs). + + The output is returned in the verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB). +
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 09/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
Quoted 4 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +4
-0+Subcode 2 - store verification certificates + Provides VCs that are in the certificate store. + + The output is provided in a VCB, which includes a common header followed by zero
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 101
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+ or more verification-certificate entries (VCEs). + + The first-VC index and last-VC index fields of VCB specify the range of VCs + to be stored by subcode 2. Stored count and remained count fields specify the + number of VCs stored and could not be stored in the VCB due to insufficient + storage specified in the VCB input length field. + + VCE contains various information of a VC from the CS. + +
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 13/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
Quoted 5 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +5
-0+Secure IPL Data Structures, Facilities, and Functions +===================================================== + +IPL Information Report Block +----------------------------
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 116
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+ +The IPL Parameter Block (IPLPB), utilized for IPL operation, is extended with an +IPL Information Report Block (IIRB), which contains the results from secure IPL +operations such as: + +* component data +* verification results +* certificate data + +
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 21/28] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
Though we may need to revisit if this documentation is valuable. SCLAF has a lot of heavy technical information that may be better suited for the PoPs.
For now, let's keep it.
Quoted 15 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +15
-0+Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility +--------------------------------- + +The Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) enhances system security during the +IPL by enforcing additional verification rules. + +When SCLAF is available, its behavior depends on the IPL mode. It introduces verification +of both signed and unsigned components to help ensure that only authorized code is loaded +during the IPL process. Any errors detected by SCLAF are reported in the IIRB. + +Unsigned components are restricted to load addresses at or above absolute storage address +``0x2000``. + +Signed components must include a Secure Code Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB), which is +appended at the very end of the component. The SCLAB defines security attributes for
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 141
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+handling the signed code. Specifically, it may: + +* Provide direction on how to process the rest of the component. + +* Provide further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code + from the load device. + +* Specify where to start the execution of the loaded OS code. + +
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 10/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
Quoted 4 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +4
-0+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'508' - KVM IPL extensions +--------------------------------------------------- + +DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is reserved for KVM guest use in order to facilitate
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 155
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+communication of additional IPL operations that cannot be handled by userspace, +such as signature verification for secure IPL. + +If the function code specifies 0x508, KVM IPL extension functions are performed. +These functions are meant to provide extended functionality for s390 guest boot +that requires assistance from QEMU. + +Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes + Returns a 64-bit mask indicating which subcodes are supported. +
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 12/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 159
Quoted 4 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +4
-0+Subcode 1 - perform signature verification + Perform signature-verification on a signed component, using certificates + from the certificate store and leveraging qcrypto libraries to perform + this operation.
Add more detail here later to describe the data structures and input/output, similar to how the documentation for 320 is laid out.
</segment>
[...]
<segment>
Introduce this as another standalone patch (not with the same standalone as mentioned above)
Quoted 13 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +13
-0+s390 Secure IPL +=============== + +Secure IPL, also known as secure boot, enables s390-ccw virtual machines to +verify the integrity of guest kernels. + +For technical details of this feature, see ``docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst``. + +This document explains how to use secure IPL with s390x in QEMU. It covers +new command line options for providing certificates and enabling secure IPL, +the different IPL modes (Normal, Audit, and Secure), and system requirements. + +A quickstart guide is provided to demonstrate how to generate certificates,
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +10
-0+sign images, and start a guest in Secure Mode. + + +Secure IPL Command Line Options +=============================== + +New parameters have been introduced to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option +to support secure IPL. These parameters allow users to provide certificates +and enable secure IPL directly via the command line. +
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 01/28] Add boot-certificates to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
Quoted 11 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +11
-0+Providing Certificates +---------------------- + +The certificate store can be populated by supplying a comma-delimited list of +certificates on the command-line: + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio, \ + boot-certificates=/.../qemu/certs:/another/path/cert.pem +
</segment>
<segment>
Merge with [PATCH v4 23/28] Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
Quoted 5 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +5
-0+Enabling Secure IPL +------------------- + +Different IPL modes may be toggled with the following command line option: +
Change to: "Secure IPL is enabled by explicitly providing the secure-boot='on' option. The absence of this option is equivalent to setting this option to off.
(maybe reword it so "option" isn't used three times in one breath?)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
Quoted 7 lines
+.. code-block:: shell
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +6
-0+ + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on|off + +Additionally, the provision of certificates affect the mode. + +
Remove the line above. It'll be explained in the IPL Modes section.
</segment>
<segment>
Merge each mode below with the same patch that implements the respective enum.
Quoted 2 lines
+IPL Modes
+=========
Let's add a quick description of what "IPL Mode" means:
"The concept of IPL Modes are introduced to differentiate between the IPL configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on specific combinations of the ``secure-boot`` and ``boot-certificates`` options on the QEMU command line."
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
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-0+ +Normal Mode +----------- +
Configuration: ``qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ...``
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
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-0+The absence of both certificates and the ``secure-boot`` option will attempt to +IPL a guest without secure IPL operations. No checks are performed, and no +warnings/errors are reported. This is the default mode, and can be explicitly +enabled with ``secure-boot=off``. + + +Audit Mode +---------- +
Configuration: ``qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certificates=path/to/cert.pem ...``
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
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-0+With *only* the presence of certificates in the store, it is assumed that secure +boot operations should be performed with errors reported as warnings. As such, +the secure IPL operations will be performed, and any errors that stem from these +operations will report a warning via the SCLP console. + + +Secure Mode +----------- +
Configuration: ``qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certificates=path/to/cert.pem,secure-boot=on ...``
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
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-0+With *both* the presence of certificates in the store and the ``secure-boot=on`` +option, it is understood that secure boot should be performed with errors +reported and boot will abort. +
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Include this with the standalone patch for this doc.
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-0+ +Constraints +=========== + +The following constraints apply when attempting to secure IPL an s390 guest: + +- z16 CPU model +- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format +- only sha256 encryption is supported +- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices +- a boot device must be specified +- any unsupported devices (e.g., ECKD and VFIO) or non-eligible devices (e.g., + Net) will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error + logged to the console. + + +Secure IPL Quickstart +===================== + +Build QEMU with gnutls enabled +-------------------------------
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
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-0+ +.. code-block:: shell + + ./configure … --enable-gnutls + +Generate certificate (e.g. via certtool) +---------------------------------------- + +A private key is required before generating a certificate. This key must be keypt secure +and confidential.
s/keypt/kept
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-0+ +Use an RSA private key for signing. + +.. code-block:: shell + + certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem + +A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the ``cert.info`` template +to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool. + +.. code-block:: shell + + cat > cert.info <<EOF + cn = "My Name" + expiration_days = 36500 + cert_signing_key + EOF + + certtool --generate-self-signed \ + --load-privkey key.pem \ + --template cert.info \ + --hash=SHA256 \ + --outfile cert.pem + +Sign Images (e.g. via sign-file) +-------------------------------- + +- signing must be performed on a KVM guest filesystem +- sign-file script used in the example below is located within the kernel source + repo + +.. code-block:: shell + + ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-… + ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin + +Run zipl with secure boot enabled +--------------------------------- +
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
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-0+.. code-block:: shell + + zipl --secure 1 -V + +Start Guest with Cmd Options +---------------------------- + +.. code-block:: shell + + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certificates=cert.pem ...
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Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin