Enable Secure TSC for SEV-SNP
v9 cover Enable Secure TSC for SEV-SNP
Patches are based on kvm-x86/next with [1] applied
Testing Secure TSC
-----------------
Secure TSC guest patches are available as part of v6.14.
QEMU changes:
https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/tree/snp-securetsc-latest
QEMU command line SEV-SNP with Secure TSC:
qemu-system-x86_64 -cpu EPYC-Milan-v2 -smp 4 \
-object memory-backend-memfd,id=ram1,size=1G,share=true,prealloc=false,reserve=false \
-object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,secure-tsc=on,stsc-freq=2000000000 \
-machine q35,confidential-guest-support=sev0,memory-backend=ram1 \
...Changelog:
----------
v9:
* Set guest_tsc_protected during guest vCPU creation (Kai Huang)
* Improve error handling (Kai Huang)
* Disable MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ write interception (Sean)
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
* Commit message improvements (Kai Huang)
* Remove 'desired_tsc_khz' from 'struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start' (Kai Huang)
Nikunj A Dadhania (2):
x86/cpufeatures: Add SNP Secure TSC
KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
base-commit: 87198fb0208a774d0cb8844744c67ee8680eafab
prerequisite-patch-id: 797bfc24c79c6b63fcc12cd93664fa04d99e2cd3
1. https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
--
2.43.0
PATCH v9 1/2 x86/cpufeatures: Add SNP Secure TSC
The Secure TSC feature for SEV-SNP allows guests to securely use the RDTSC and RDTSCP instructions, ensuring that the parameters used cannot be altered by the hypervisor once the guest is launched. For more details, refer to the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "Secure TSC".
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -443,6 +443,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH (19*32+ 2)/* VM Page Flush MSR is supported */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES (19*32+ 3)/* "sev_es" Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP (19*32+ 4)/* "sev_snp" Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Secure Nested Paging */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC (19*32+ 8)/* SEV-SNP Secure TSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9)/* Virtual TSC_AUX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10)/* hardware-enforced cache coherency */ #define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP (19*32+14)/* "debug_swap" SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 2/2 KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaAdd support for Secure TSC, allowing userspace to configure the Secure TSC feature for SNP guests. Use the SNP specification's desired TSC frequency parameter during the SNP_LAUNCH_START command to set the mean TSC frequency in KHz for Secure TSC enabled guests.
Always use kvm->arch.arch.default_tsc_khz as the TSC frequency that is passed to SNP guests in the SNP_LAUNCH_START command. The default value is the host TSC frequency. The userspace can optionally change the TSC frequency via the KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ ioctl before calling the SNP_LAUNCH_START ioctl.
Introduce the read-only MSR GUEST_TSC_FREQ (0xc0010134) that returns guest's effective frequency in MHZ when Secure TSC is enabled for SNP guests. Disable interception of this MSR when Secure TSC is enabled. Note that GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR is accessible only to the guest and not from the hypervisor context.
---
I have incorporated changes from Sean to prevent the setting of SecureTSC for non-SNP guests. I have added his 'Co-developed-by' acknowledgment, but I have not yet included his 'Signed-off-by'. I will leave that for him to add.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION BIT(3)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9)#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +27 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,14 @@ static bool sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(struct vcpu_svm *svm)return sev->vmsa_features &SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; } +bool snp_secure_tsc_enabled (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_sev_info *sev =to_kvm_sev_info (kvm); + +return (sev->vmsa_features &SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ) && + !WARN_ON_ONCE (!sev_snp_guest (kvm)); +} +/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */ static bool __sev_recycle_asids (unsigned int min_asid,unsigned int max_asid) {
@@ -416,6 +424,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,if (data->flags)return -EINVAL ; +if (!snp_active) + valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; +if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -2196,6 +2207,16 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) start.gctx_paddr =__psp_pa (sev->snp_context); start.policy = params.policy; + +if (snp_secure_tsc_enabled (kvm)) { +if (WARN_ON (!kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz)) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto e_free_context; + } + + start.desired_tsc_khz = kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz; + } +memcpy (start.gosvw, params.gosvw,sizeof (params.gosvw)); rc =__sev_issue_cmd (argp->sev_fd,SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START , &start, &argp->error);if (rc) {
@@ -3086,6 +3107,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) sev_supported_vmsa_features =0 ;if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; + +if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) + sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; }void sev_hardware_unsetup (void )
@@ -4456,6 +4480,9 @@ void sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) !guest_cpu_cap_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP ) && !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID)); +if (snp_secure_tsc_enabled (vcpu->kvm)) +svm_disable_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ ,MSR_TYPE_R ); +/* * For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if * the host/guest supports its use.
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2 -0
@@ -1317,6 +1317,8 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) svm->guest_state_loaded = false; + vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected =snp_secure_tsc_enabled (vcpu->kvm); +return 0 ; error_free_vmsa_page:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +2 -0
@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);int sev_private_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn);struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa); +bool snp_secure_tsc_enabled (struct kvm *kvm);#else static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node (int node,gfp_t gfp) {
@@ -905,6 +906,7 @@ static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return NULL; }static inline void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) {} +static inline bool snp_secure_tsc_enabled (struct kvm *kvm) {return false; }#endif /* vmenter.S */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0@@ -2196,6 +2207,16 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) start.gctx_paddr =__psp_pa (sev->snp_context); start.policy = params.policy;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) · line 2219
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10
-0+ +if (snp_secure_tsc_enabled (kvm)) { +if (WARN_ON (!kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz)) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto e_free_context; + } + + start.desired_tsc_khz = kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz; + } +
I thought you were going to remove the error handling but just only WARN_ON() and proceed. Anyway, no problem to me.