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migration: workaround GNUTLS live migration crashes

PATCH In review Daniel P. Berrangé 3 participants 17 messages Jul 18, 2025 – Jul 28, 2025

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#0 lore raw

cover migration: workaround GNUTLS live migration crashes

TL:DR: GNUTLS is liable to crash QEMU when live migration is run with TLS enabled and a return path channel is present, if approx 64 GB of data is transferred. This is easily triggered in a 16 GB VM with 4 CPUs, by running 'stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 80%' to prevent convergance until 64 GB of RAM has been copied. Then triggering post-copy switchover, or removing the stress workload to allow completion, will crash it.

The only live migration scenario that should avoid this danger is multifd, since the high volume data transfers are handled in dedicated TCP connections which are unidirectional. The main bi-directionl TCP connection is only for co-ordination purposes

This patch implements a workaround that will prevent future QEMU versions from triggering the crash.

The only way to avoid the crash with *existing* running QEMU processes is to change the TLS cipher priority string to avoid use of AES with TLS 1.3. This can be done with the 'priority' field in the 'tls-creds-x509' object.eg

-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,priority=NORMAL:-AES-256-GCM:-AES-128-GCM:-AES-128-CCM

which should force the use of CHACHA20-POLY1305 which does not require TLS re-keying after 16 million sent records (64 GB of migration data).

https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1937

On RHEL/Fedora distros you can also use the system wide crypto priorities to override this from the migration *target* host by creating /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/gnutls-qemu.config containing

QEMU=NONE:+ECDHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-X448:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+GROUP-FF

and running 'update-crypto-policies'. I recommend the QEMU level 'tls-creds-x509' workaround though, which new libvirt patches can soon do:

https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/LX5KMIUFZSP5DPUXKJDFYBZI5TIE3E5N/

Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems
io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround
migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround
crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

 crypto/tlssession.c           | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 crypto/trace-events           |  2 +
 include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 +++++
 include/io/channel.h          |  1 +
 io/channel-tls.c              |  5 ++
 meson.build                   |  9 ++++
 meson_options.txt             |  2 +
 migration/tls.c               |  9 ++++
 scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
 9 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/4 crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems

When TLS 1.3 is negotiated on a TLS session, GNUTLS will perform automatic rekeying of the session after 16 million records. This is done for all algorithms except CHACHA20_POLY1305 which does not require rekeying.

Unfortunately the rekeying breaks GNUTLS' promise that it is safe to use a gnutls_session_t object concurrently from multiple threads if they are exclusively calling gnutls_record_send/recv.

This patch implements a workaround for QEMU that adds a mutex lock around any gnutls_record_send/recv call to serialize execution within GNUTLS code. When GNUTLS calls into the push/pull functions we can release the lock so the OS level I/O calls can at least have some parallelism.

The big downside of this is that the actual encryption/decryption code is fully serialized, which will halve performance of that cipher operations if two threads are contending.

The workaround is not enabled by default, since most use of GNUTLS in QEMU does not tickle the problem, only non-multifd migration with a return path open is affected. Fortunately the migration code also won't trigger the halving of performance, since only the outbound channel diretion needs to sustain high data rates, the inbound direction is low volume.

---
 crypto/tlssession.c           | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 ++++++
 meson.build                   |  9 ++++
 meson_options.txt             |  2 +
 scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
 5 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
crypto/tlssession.c +86 -3
index 6d8f8df623..939f69bdb3 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qemu/thread.h"
 #include "crypto/tlssession.h"
 #include "crypto/tlscredsanon.h"
 #include "crypto/tlscredspsk.h"
@@ -51,6 +52,14 @@ struct QCryptoTLSSession {
      */
     Error *rerr;
     Error *werr;
+
+    /*
+     * Used to protect against broken GNUTLS thread safety
+     * https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1717
+     */
+    bool requireThreadSafety;
+    bool lockEnabled;
+    QemuMutex lock;
 };
 
 
@@ -69,6 +78,7 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_free(QCryptoTLSSession *session)
     g_free(session->peername);
     g_free(session->authzid);
     object_unref(OBJECT(session->creds));
+    qemu_mutex_destroy(&session->lock);
     g_free(session);
 }
 
@@ -84,10 +94,19 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_push(void *opaque, const void *buf, size_t len)
         return -1;
     };
 
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_unlock(&session->lock);
+    }
+
     error_free(session->werr);
     session->werr = NULL;
 
     ret = session->writeFunc(buf, len, session->opaque, &session->werr);
+
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_lock(&session->lock);
+    }
+
     if (ret == QCRYPTO_TLS_SESSION_ERR_BLOCK) {
         errno = EAGAIN;
         return -1;
@@ -114,7 +133,16 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_pull(void *opaque, void *buf, size_t len)
     error_free(session->rerr);
     session->rerr = NULL;
 
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_unlock(&session->lock);
+    }
+
     ret = session->readFunc(buf, len, session->opaque, &session->rerr);
+
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_lock(&session->lock);
+    }
+
     if (ret == QCRYPTO_TLS_SESSION_ERR_BLOCK) {
         errno = EAGAIN;
         return -1;
@@ -153,6 +181,8 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_new(QCryptoTLSCreds *creds,
     session->creds = creds;
     object_ref(OBJECT(creds));
 
+    qemu_mutex_init(&session->lock);
+
     if (creds->endpoint != endpoint) {
         error_setg(errp, "Credentials endpoint doesn't match session");
         goto error;
@@ -289,6 +319,11 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_new(QCryptoTLSCreds *creds,
     return NULL;
 }
 
+void qcrypto_tls_session_require_thread_safety(QCryptoTLSSession *sess)
+{
+    sess->requireThreadSafety = true;
+}
+
 static int
 qcrypto_tls_session_check_certificate(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
                                       Error **errp)
@@ -480,7 +515,17 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_write(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
                           size_t len,
                           Error **errp)
 {
-    ssize_t ret = gnutls_record_send(session->handle, buf, len);
+    ssize_t ret;
+
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_lock(&session->lock);
+    }
+
+    ret = gnutls_record_send(session->handle, buf, len);
+
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_unlock(&session->lock);
+    }
 
     if (ret < 0) {
         if (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
@@ -509,7 +554,17 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_read(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
                          bool gracefulTermination,
                          Error **errp)
 {
-    ssize_t ret = gnutls_record_recv(session->handle, buf, len);
+    ssize_t ret;
+
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_lock(&session->lock);
+    }
+
+    ret = gnutls_record_recv(session->handle, buf, len);
+
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_unlock(&session->lock);
+    }
 
     if (ret < 0) {
         if (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
@@ -545,8 +600,29 @@ int
 qcrypto_tls_session_handshake(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
                               Error **errp)
 {
-    int ret = gnutls_handshake(session->handle);
+    int ret;
+    ret = gnutls_handshake(session->handle);
+
     if (!ret) {
+        gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher =
+            gnutls_cipher_get(session->handle);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS_BUG1717_WORKAROUND
+        /*
+         * Any use of rekeying in TLS 1.3 is unsafe for
+         * a gnutls with bug 1717, however, we know that
+         * QEMU won't initiate manual rekeying. Thus we
+         * only have to protect against automatic rekeying
+         * which doesn't trigger with CHACHA20
+         */
+        if (session->requireThreadSafety &&
+            gnutls_protocol_get_version(session->handle) ==
+            GNUTLS_TLS1_3 &&
+            cipher != GNUTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
+            session->lockEnabled = true;
+        }
+#endif
+
         session->handshakeComplete = true;
         return QCRYPTO_TLS_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE;
     }
@@ -584,8 +660,15 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_bye(QCryptoTLSSession *session, Error **errp)
         return 0;
     }
 
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_lock(&session->lock);
+    }
     ret = gnutls_bye(session->handle, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
 
+    if (session->lockEnabled) {
+        qemu_mutex_unlock(&session->lock);
+    }
+
     if (!ret) {
         return QCRYPTO_TLS_BYE_COMPLETE;
     }
include/crypto/tlssession.h +14 -0
index d77ae0d423..2f62ce2d67 100644
@@ -165,6 +165,20 @@ void qcrypto_tls_session_free(QCryptoTLSSession *sess);
 
 G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(QCryptoTLSSession, qcrypto_tls_session_free)
 
+/**
+ * qcrypto_tls_session_require_thread_safety:
+ * @sess: the TLS session object
+ *
+ * Mark that this TLS session will require thread safety
+ * for concurrent I/O in both directions. This must be
+ * called before the handshake is performed.
+ *
+ * This will activate a workaround for GNUTLS thread
+ * safety issues, where appropriate for the negotiated
+ * TLS session parameters.
+ */
+void qcrypto_tls_session_require_thread_safety(QCryptoTLSSession *sess);
+
 /**
  * qcrypto_tls_session_check_credentials:
  * @sess: the TLS session object
meson.build +9 -0
index c2bc3eeedc..e53cd5b413 100644
@@ -1809,6 +1809,7 @@ endif
 
 gnutls = not_found
 gnutls_crypto = not_found
+gnutls_bug1717_workaround = false
 if get_option('gnutls').enabled() or (get_option('gnutls').auto() and have_system)
   # For general TLS support our min gnutls matches
   # that implied by our platform support matrix
@@ -1834,6 +1835,12 @@ if get_option('gnutls').enabled() or (get_option('gnutls').auto() and have_syste
                         method: 'pkg-config',
                         required: get_option('gnutls'))
   endif
+
+  if gnutls.found() and not get_option('gnutls-bug1717-workaround').disabled()
+    # XXX: when bug 1717 is resolved, add logic to probe for
+    # the GNUTLS fixed version number to handle the 'auto' case
+    gnutls_bug1717_workaround = true
+  endif
 endif
 
 # We prefer use of gnutls for crypto, unless the options
@@ -2585,6 +2592,7 @@ config_host_data.set('CONFIG_KEYUTILS', keyutils.found())
 config_host_data.set('CONFIG_GETTID', has_gettid)
 config_host_data.set('CONFIG_GNUTLS', gnutls.found())
 config_host_data.set('CONFIG_GNUTLS_CRYPTO', gnutls_crypto.found())
+config_host_data.set('CONFIG_GNUTLS_BUG1717_WORKAROUND', gnutls_bug1717_workaround)
 config_host_data.set('CONFIG_TASN1', tasn1.found())
 config_host_data.set('CONFIG_GCRYPT', gcrypt.found())
 config_host_data.set('CONFIG_NETTLE', nettle.found())
@@ -4869,6 +4877,7 @@ summary_info += {'TLS priority':      get_option('tls_priority')}
 summary_info += {'GNUTLS support':    gnutls}
 if gnutls.found()
   summary_info += {'  GNUTLS crypto':   gnutls_crypto.found()}
+  summary_info += {'  GNUTLS bug 1717 workaround': gnutls_bug1717_workaround }
 endif
 summary_info += {'libgcrypt':         gcrypt}
 summary_info += {'nettle':            nettle}
meson_options.txt +2 -0
index fff1521e58..dd33530750 100644
@@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ option('libcbor', type : 'feature', value : 'auto',
        description: 'libcbor support')
 option('gnutls', type : 'feature', value : 'auto',
        description: 'GNUTLS cryptography support')
+option('gnutls-bug1717-workaround', type: 'feature', value : 'auto',
+       description: 'GNUTLS workaround for https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1717')
 option('nettle', type : 'feature', value : 'auto',
        description: 'nettle cryptography support')
 option('gcrypt', type : 'feature', value : 'auto',
scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh +5 -0
index e8504689e8..3493952d18 100644
@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ meson_options_help() {
   printf "%s\n" '  gio             use libgio for D-Bus support'
   printf "%s\n" '  glusterfs       Glusterfs block device driver'
   printf "%s\n" '  gnutls          GNUTLS cryptography support'
+  printf "%s\n" '  gnutls-bug1717-workaround'
+  printf "%s\n" '                  GNUTLS workaround for'
+  printf "%s\n" '                  https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1717'
   printf "%s\n" '  gtk             GTK+ user interface'
   printf "%s\n" '  gtk-clipboard   clipboard support for the gtk UI (EXPERIMENTAL, MAY HANG)'
   printf "%s\n" '  guest-agent     Build QEMU Guest Agent'
@@ -331,6 +334,8 @@ _meson_option_parse() {
     --disable-glusterfs) printf "%s" -Dglusterfs=disabled ;;
     --enable-gnutls) printf "%s" -Dgnutls=enabled ;;
     --disable-gnutls) printf "%s" -Dgnutls=disabled ;;
+    --enable-gnutls-bug1717-workaround) printf "%s" -Dgnutls-bug1717-workaround=enabled ;;
+    --disable-gnutls-bug1717-workaround) printf "%s" -Dgnutls-bug1717-workaround=disabled ;;
     --enable-gtk) printf "%s" -Dgtk=enabled ;;
     --disable-gtk) printf "%s" -Dgtk=disabled ;;
     --enable-gtk-clipboard) printf "%s" -Dgtk_clipboard=enabled ;;
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Reviewed-by on v1 1/4
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/4] crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems

Quoted 19 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

When TLS 1.3 is negotiated on a TLS session, GNUTLS will perform automatic rekeying of the session after 16 million records. This is done for all algorithms except CHACHA20_POLY1305 which does not require rekeying.

Unfortunately the rekeying breaks GNUTLS' promise that it is safe to use a gnutls_session_t object concurrently from multiple threads if they are exclusively calling gnutls_record_send/recv.

This patch implements a workaround for QEMU that adds a mutex lock around any gnutls_record_send/recv call to serialize execution within GNUTLS code. When GNUTLS calls into the push/pull functions we can release the lock so the OS level I/O calls can at least have some parallelism.

The big downside of this is that the actual encryption/decryption code is fully serialized, which will halve performance of that cipher operations if two threads are contending.

Quoted 8 lines

The workaround is not enabled by default, since most use of GNUTLS in QEMU does not tickle the problem, only non-multifd migration with a return path open is affected. Fortunately the migration code also won't trigger the halving of performance, since only the outbound channel diretion needs to sustain high data rates, the inbound direction is low volume.

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/4] crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

When TLS 1.3 is negotiated on a TLS session, GNUTLS will perform automatic rekeying of the session after 16 million records. This is done for all algorithms except CHACHA20_POLY1305 which does not require rekeying.

Unfortunately the rekeying breaks GNUTLS' promise that it is safe to use a gnutls_session_t object concurrently from multiple threads if they are exclusively calling gnutls_record_send/recv.

This patch implements a workaround for QEMU that adds a mutex lock around any gnutls_record_send/recv call to serialize execution within GNUTLS code. When GNUTLS calls into the push/pull functions we can release the lock so the OS level I/O calls can at least have some parallelism.

The big downside of this is that the actual encryption/decryption code is fully serialized, which will halve performance of that cipher operations if two threads are contending.

Quoted 8 lines

The workaround is not enabled by default, since most use of GNUTLS in QEMU does not tickle the problem, only non-multifd migration with a return path open is affected. Fortunately the migration code also won't trigger the halving of performance, since only the outbound channel diretion needs to sustain high data rates, the inbound direction is low volume.

Hi, the CI caught a couple of issues. I'll fixup on the branch, no need to resend.

...

crypto/tlssession.c qcrypto_tls_session_new(QCryptoTLSCreds *creds, · line 325

Quoted 4 lines
crypto/tlssession.c +4 -0
+void qcrypto_tls_session_require_thread_safety(QCryptoTLSSession *sess)
+{
+    sess->requireThreadSafety = true;
+}

Needs a stub.

...

crypto/tlssession.c int · line 609

Quoted 12 lines
crypto/tlssession.c +6 -1
@@ -545,8 +600,29 @@ int
 qcrypto_tls_session_handshake(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
                               Error **errp)
 {
-    int ret = gnutls_handshake(session->handle);
+    int ret;
+    ret = gnutls_handshake(session->handle);
+
     if (!ret) {
+        gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher =
+            gnutls_cipher_get(session->handle);
+

Unused var when the config is not enabled.

Quoted 19 lines
crypto/tlssession.c +16 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS_BUG1717_WORKAROUND
+        /*
+         * Any use of rekeying in TLS 1.3 is unsafe for
+         * a gnutls with bug 1717, however, we know that
+         * QEMU won't initiate manual rekeying. Thus we
+         * only have to protect against automatic rekeying
+         * which doesn't trigger with CHACHA20
+         */
+        if (session->requireThreadSafety &&
+            gnutls_protocol_get_version(session->handle) ==
+            GNUTLS_TLS1_3 &&
+            cipher != GNUTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
+            session->lockEnabled = true;
+        }
+#endif
+
         session->handshakeComplete = true;
         return QCRYPTO_TLS_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE;
     }
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/4 io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

Add a QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_CONCURRENT_IO feature flag.

If this is set on a QIOChannelTLS session object, the TLS session will be marked as requiring thread safety, which will activate the workaround for GNUTLS bug 1717 if needed.

---
 include/io/channel.h | 1 +
 io/channel-tls.c     | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
include/io/channel.h +1 -0
index 62b657109c..234e5db70d 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ enum QIOChannelFeature {
     QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_WRITE_ZERO_COPY,
     QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_READ_MSG_PEEK,
     QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_SEEKABLE,
+    QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_CONCURRENT_IO,
 };
 
 
io/channel-tls.c +5 -0
index db2ac1deae..a8248a9216 100644
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ void qio_channel_tls_handshake(QIOChannelTLS *ioc,
 {
     QIOTask *task;
 
+    if (qio_channel_has_feature(QIO_CHANNEL(ioc),
+                                QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_CONCURRENT_IO)) {
+        qcrypto_tls_session_require_thread_safety(ioc->session);
+    }
+
     task = qio_task_new(OBJECT(ioc),
                         func, opaque, destroy);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Reviewed-by on v1 2/4
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/4] io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround

Quoted 7 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

Add a QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_CONCURRENT_IO feature flag.

If this is set on a QIOChannelTLS session object, the TLS session will be marked as requiring thread safety, which will activate the workaround for GNUTLS bug 1717 if needed.

#6 lore raw

PATCH 3/4 migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

When either the postcopy or return path capabilities are enabled, the migration code will use the primary channel for bidirectional I/O.

If either of those capabilities are enabled, the migration code needs to mark the channel as expecting concurrent I/O in order to activate the thread safety workarounds for GNUTLS bug 1717

---
 migration/tls.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
migration/tls.c +9 -0
index 5cbf952383..284a6194b2 100644
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ void migration_tls_channel_process_incoming(MigrationState *s,
 
     trace_migration_tls_incoming_handshake_start();
     qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(tioc), "migration-tls-incoming");
+    if (migrate_postcopy_ram() || migrate_return_path()) {
+        qio_channel_set_feature(QIO_CHANNEL(tioc),
+                                QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_CONCURRENT_IO);
+    }
     qio_channel_tls_handshake(tioc,
                               migration_tls_incoming_handshake,
                               NULL,
@@ -149,6 +153,11 @@ void migration_tls_channel_connect(MigrationState *s,
     s->hostname = g_strdup(hostname);
     trace_migration_tls_outgoing_handshake_start(hostname);
     qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(tioc), "migration-tls-outgoing");
+
+    if (migrate_postcopy_ram() || migrate_return_path()) {
+        qio_channel_set_feature(QIO_CHANNEL(tioc),
+                                QIO_CHANNEL_FEATURE_CONCURRENT_IO);
+    }
     qio_channel_tls_handshake(tioc,
                               migration_tls_outgoing_handshake,
                               s,
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Reviewed-by on v1 3/4
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/4] migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround

Quoted 11 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

When either the postcopy or return path capabilities are enabled, the migration code will use the primary channel for bidirectional I/O.

If either of those capabilities are enabled, the migration code needs to mark the channel as expecting concurrent I/O in order to activate the thread safety workarounds for GNUTLS bug 1717

#8 lore raw

PATCH 4/4 crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé

We want some visibility on stderr when the GNUTLS thread safety countermeasures are activated, to encourage people to get the real fix deployed (once it exists). Some trace points will also help if we see any further wierd crash scenario we've not anticipated.

---
 crypto/tlssession.c | 10 ++++++++++
 crypto/trace-events |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
crypto/tlssession.c +10 -0
index 939f69bdb3..246cd6f7c0 100644
@@ -615,10 +615,20 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_handshake(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
          * only have to protect against automatic rekeying
          * which doesn't trigger with CHACHA20
          */
+        trace_qcrypto_tls_session_parameters(
+            session,
+            session->requireThreadSafety,
+            gnutls_protocol_get_version(session->handle),
+            cipher);
+
         if (session->requireThreadSafety &&
             gnutls_protocol_get_version(session->handle) ==
             GNUTLS_TLS1_3 &&
             cipher != GNUTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
+            warn_report("WARNING: activating thread safety countermeasures "
+                        "for potentially broken GNUTLS with TLS1.3 cipher=%d",
+                        cipher);
+            trace_qcrypto_tls_session_bug1717_workaround(session);
             session->lockEnabled = true;
         }
 #endif
crypto/trace-events +2 -0
index bccd0bbf29..d0e33427fa 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ qcrypto_tls_creds_x509_load_cert_list(void *creds, const char *file) "TLS creds
 # tlssession.c
 qcrypto_tls_session_new(void *session, void *creds, const char *hostname, const char *authzid, int endpoint) "TLS session new session=%p creds=%p hostname=%s authzid=%s endpoint=%d"
 qcrypto_tls_session_check_creds(void *session, const char *status) "TLS session check creds session=%p status=%s"
+qcrypto_tls_session_parameters(void *session, int threadSafety, int protocol, int cipher) "TLS session parameters session=%p threadSafety=%d protocol=%d cipher=%d"
+qcrypto_tls_session_bug1717_workaround(void *session) "TLS session bug1717 workaround session=%p"
 
 # tls-cipher-suites.c
 qcrypto_tls_cipher_suite_priority(const char *name) "priority: %s"
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Reviewed-by on v1 4/4
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/4] crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

Quoted 8 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

We want some visibility on stderr when the GNUTLS thread safety countermeasures are activated, to encourage people to get the real fix deployed (once it exists). Some trace points will also help if we see any further wierd crash scenario we've not anticipated.

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4/4] crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 22 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

We want some visibility on stderr when the GNUTLS thread safety countermeasures are activated, to encourage people to get the real fix deployed (once it exists). Some trace points will also help if we see any further wierd crash scenario we've not anticipated.

---
 crypto/tlssession.c | 10 ++++++++++
 crypto/trace-events |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
crypto/tlssession.c +1 -0
index 939f69bdb3..246cd6f7c0 100644
@@ -615,10 +615,20 @@ qcrypto_tls_session_handshake(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
          * only have to protect against automatic rekeying
          * which doesn't trigger with CHACHA20
          */
+        trace_qcrypto_tls_session_parameters(

crypto/tlssession.c qcrypto_tls_session_handshake(QCryptoTLSSession *session, · line 628

Quoted 10 lines
crypto/tlssession.c +6 -0
+            session,
+            session->requireThreadSafety,
+            gnutls_protocol_get_version(session->handle),
+            cipher);
+
         if (session->requireThreadSafety &&
             gnutls_protocol_get_version(session->handle) ==
             GNUTLS_TLS1_3 &&
             cipher != GNUTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
+            warn_report("WARNING: activating thread safety countermeasures "

And this hit the missing error-report.h weirdness.

Quoted 19 lines
crypto/tlssession.c +3 -0
+                        "for potentially broken GNUTLS with TLS1.3 cipher=%d",
+                        cipher);
+            trace_qcrypto_tls_session_bug1717_workaround(session);
             session->lockEnabled = true;
         }
 #endif
crypto/trace-events +2 -0
index bccd0bbf29..d0e33427fa 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ qcrypto_tls_creds_x509_load_cert_list(void *creds, const char *file) "TLS creds
 # tlssession.c
 qcrypto_tls_session_new(void *session, void *creds, const char *hostname, const char *authzid, int endpoint) "TLS session new session=%p creds=%p hostname=%s authzid=%s endpoint=%d"
 qcrypto_tls_session_check_creds(void *session, const char *status) "TLS session check creds session=%p status=%s"
+qcrypto_tls_session_parameters(void *session, int threadSafety, int protocol, int cipher) "TLS session parameters session=%p threadSafety=%d protocol=%d cipher=%d"
+qcrypto_tls_session_bug1717_workaround(void *session) "TLS session bug1717 workaround session=%p"
 
 # tls-cipher-suites.c
 qcrypto_tls_cipher_suite_priority(const char *name) "priority: %s"
#11 lore raw
In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 48 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

TL:DR: GNUTLS is liable to crash QEMU when live migration is run with TLS enabled and a return path channel is present, if approx 64 GB of data is transferred. This is easily triggered in a 16 GB VM with 4 CPUs, by running 'stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 80%' to prevent convergance until 64 GB of RAM has been copied. Then triggering post-copy switchover, or removing the stress workload to allow completion, will crash it.

The only live migration scenario that should avoid this danger is multifd, since the high volume data transfers are handled in dedicated TCP connections which are unidirectional. The main bi-directionl TCP connection is only for co-ordination purposes

This patch implements a workaround that will prevent future QEMU versions from triggering the crash.

The only way to avoid the crash with *existing* running QEMU processes is to change the TLS cipher priority string to avoid use of AES with TLS 1.3. This can be done with the 'priority' field in the 'tls-creds-x509' object.eg

-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,priority=NORMAL:-AES-256-GCM:-AES-128-GCM:-AES-128-CCM

which should force the use of CHACHA20-POLY1305 which does not require TLS re-keying after 16 million sent records (64 GB of migration data).

https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1937

On RHEL/Fedora distros you can also use the system wide crypto priorities to override this from the migration *target* host by creating /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/gnutls-qemu.config containing

QEMU=NONE:+ECDHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-X448:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+GROUP-FF

and running 'update-crypto-policies'. I recommend the QEMU level 'tls-creds-x509' workaround though, which new libvirt patches can soon do:

https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/LX5KMIUFZSP5DPUXKJDFYBZI5TIE3E5N/

Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems
io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround
migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround
crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

Quoted 10 lines
 crypto/tlssession.c           | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 crypto/trace-events           |  2 +
 include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 +++++
 include/io/channel.h          |  1 +
 io/channel-tls.c              |  5 ++
 meson.build                   |  9 ++++
 meson_options.txt             |  2 +
 migration/tls.c               |  9 ++++
 scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
 9 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Hi, thank you for getting to the bottom of this.

Do you think it would be too cumbersome to add a test for this somewhere? So we don't regress the workaround but also so the test tells us whether GNUTLS is fixed.

#12 lore raw
Quoted 61 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 48 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

TL:DR: GNUTLS is liable to crash QEMU when live migration is run with TLS enabled and a return path channel is present, if approx 64 GB of data is transferred. This is easily triggered in a 16 GB VM with 4 CPUs, by running 'stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 80%' to prevent convergance until 64 GB of RAM has been copied. Then triggering post-copy switchover, or removing the stress workload to allow completion, will crash it.

The only live migration scenario that should avoid this danger is multifd, since the high volume data transfers are handled in dedicated TCP connections which are unidirectional. The main bi-directionl TCP connection is only for co-ordination purposes

This patch implements a workaround that will prevent future QEMU versions from triggering the crash.

The only way to avoid the crash with *existing* running QEMU processes is to change the TLS cipher priority string to avoid use of AES with TLS 1.3. This can be done with the 'priority' field in the 'tls-creds-x509' object.eg

-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,priority=NORMAL:-AES-256-GCM:-AES-128-GCM:-AES-128-CCM

which should force the use of CHACHA20-POLY1305 which does not require TLS re-keying after 16 million sent records (64 GB of migration data).

https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1937

On RHEL/Fedora distros you can also use the system wide crypto priorities to override this from the migration *target* host by creating /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/gnutls-qemu.config containing

QEMU=NONE:+ECDHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-X448:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+GROUP-FF

and running 'update-crypto-policies'. I recommend the QEMU level 'tls-creds-x509' workaround though, which new libvirt patches can soon do:

https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/LX5KMIUFZSP5DPUXKJDFYBZI5TIE3E5N/

Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems
io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround
migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround
crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

Quoted 10 lines
 crypto/tlssession.c           | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 crypto/trace-events           |  2 +
 include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 +++++
 include/io/channel.h          |  1 +
 io/channel-tls.c              |  5 ++
 meson.build                   |  9 ++++
 meson_options.txt             |  2 +
 migration/tls.c               |  9 ++++
 scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
 9 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 5 lines

Hi, thank you for getting to the bottom of this.

Do you think it would be too cumbersome to add a test for this somewhere? So we don't regress the workaround but also so the test tells us whether GNUTLS is fixed.

The reproducer scenario is very expensive. I'm doing it with a 16 GB RAM guest, with 4 CPUs, running 'stress-ng' guest workload. With that, it takes between 10-20 minutes before live migration gets GNUTLS into the potentially broken state, and the failure is not 100% guaranteed at that point.

With regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
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#13 lore raw
Quoted 68 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 61 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 48 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

TL:DR: GNUTLS is liable to crash QEMU when live migration is run with TLS enabled and a return path channel is present, if approx 64 GB of data is transferred. This is easily triggered in a 16 GB VM with 4 CPUs, by running 'stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 80%' to prevent convergance until 64 GB of RAM has been copied. Then triggering post-copy switchover, or removing the stress workload to allow completion, will crash it.

The only live migration scenario that should avoid this danger is multifd, since the high volume data transfers are handled in dedicated TCP connections which are unidirectional. The main bi-directionl TCP connection is only for co-ordination purposes

This patch implements a workaround that will prevent future QEMU versions from triggering the crash.

The only way to avoid the crash with *existing* running QEMU processes is to change the TLS cipher priority string to avoid use of AES with TLS 1.3. This can be done with the 'priority' field in the 'tls-creds-x509' object.eg

-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,priority=NORMAL:-AES-256-GCM:-AES-128-GCM:-AES-128-CCM

which should force the use of CHACHA20-POLY1305 which does not require TLS re-keying after 16 million sent records (64 GB of migration data).

https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1937

On RHEL/Fedora distros you can also use the system wide crypto priorities to override this from the migration *target* host by creating /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/gnutls-qemu.config containing

QEMU=NONE:+ECDHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-X448:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+GROUP-FF

and running 'update-crypto-policies'. I recommend the QEMU level 'tls-creds-x509' workaround though, which new libvirt patches can soon do:

https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/LX5KMIUFZSP5DPUXKJDFYBZI5TIE3E5N/

Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems
io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround
migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround
crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

Quoted 10 lines
 crypto/tlssession.c           | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 crypto/trace-events           |  2 +
 include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 +++++
 include/io/channel.h          |  1 +
 io/channel-tls.c              |  5 ++
 meson.build                   |  9 ++++
 meson_options.txt             |  2 +
 migration/tls.c               |  9 ++++
 scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
 9 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 5 lines

Hi, thank you for getting to the bottom of this.

Do you think it would be too cumbersome to add a test for this somewhere? So we don't regress the workaround but also so the test tells us whether GNUTLS is fixed.

Quoted 6 lines

The reproducer scenario is very expensive. I'm doing it with a 16 GB RAM guest, with 4 CPUs, running 'stress-ng' guest workload. With that, it takes between 10-20 minutes before live migration gets GNUTLS into the potentially broken state, and the failure is not 100% guaranteed at that point.

Makes sense. Thanks.

Will you take the series or should I?

Quoted 2 lines

With regards,
Daniel

#14 lore raw
Quoted 77 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 68 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 61 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 48 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

TL:DR: GNUTLS is liable to crash QEMU when live migration is run with TLS enabled and a return path channel is present, if approx 64 GB of data is transferred. This is easily triggered in a 16 GB VM with 4 CPUs, by running 'stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 80%' to prevent convergance until 64 GB of RAM has been copied. Then triggering post-copy switchover, or removing the stress workload to allow completion, will crash it.

The only live migration scenario that should avoid this danger is multifd, since the high volume data transfers are handled in dedicated TCP connections which are unidirectional. The main bi-directionl TCP connection is only for co-ordination purposes

This patch implements a workaround that will prevent future QEMU versions from triggering the crash.

The only way to avoid the crash with *existing* running QEMU processes is to change the TLS cipher priority string to avoid use of AES with TLS 1.3. This can be done with the 'priority' field in the 'tls-creds-x509' object.eg

-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,priority=NORMAL:-AES-256-GCM:-AES-128-GCM:-AES-128-CCM

which should force the use of CHACHA20-POLY1305 which does not require TLS re-keying after 16 million sent records (64 GB of migration data).

https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1937

On RHEL/Fedora distros you can also use the system wide crypto priorities to override this from the migration *target* host by creating /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/gnutls-qemu.config containing

QEMU=NONE:+ECDHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-X448:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+GROUP-FF

and running 'update-crypto-policies'. I recommend the QEMU level 'tls-creds-x509' workaround though, which new libvirt patches can soon do:

https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/LX5KMIUFZSP5DPUXKJDFYBZI5TIE3E5N/

Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems
io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround
migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround
crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

Quoted 10 lines
 crypto/tlssession.c           | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 crypto/trace-events           |  2 +
 include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 +++++
 include/io/channel.h          |  1 +
 io/channel-tls.c              |  5 ++
 meson.build                   |  9 ++++
 meson_options.txt             |  2 +
 migration/tls.c               |  9 ++++
 scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
 9 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 5 lines

Hi, thank you for getting to the bottom of this.

Do you think it would be too cumbersome to add a test for this somewhere? So we don't regress the workaround but also so the test tells us whether GNUTLS is fixed.

Quoted 6 lines

The reproducer scenario is very expensive. I'm doing it with a 16 GB RAM guest, with 4 CPUs, running 'stress-ng' guest workload. With that, it takes between 10-20 minutes before live migration gets GNUTLS into the potentially broken state, and the failure is not 100% guaranteed at that point.

Quoted 3 lines

Makes sense. Thanks.

Will you take the series or should I?

I presume you've already got another migration pull request planned, so feel free to add this

With regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
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|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
#15 lore raw
In reply to Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 48 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

TL:DR: GNUTLS is liable to crash QEMU when live migration is run with TLS enabled and a return path channel is present, if approx 64 GB of data is transferred. This is easily triggered in a 16 GB VM with 4 CPUs, by running 'stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 80%' to prevent convergance until 64 GB of RAM has been copied. Then triggering post-copy switchover, or removing the stress workload to allow completion, will crash it.

The only live migration scenario that should avoid this danger is multifd, since the high volume data transfers are handled in dedicated TCP connections which are unidirectional. The main bi-directionl TCP connection is only for co-ordination purposes

This patch implements a workaround that will prevent future QEMU versions from triggering the crash.

The only way to avoid the crash with *existing* running QEMU processes is to change the TLS cipher priority string to avoid use of AES with TLS 1.3. This can be done with the 'priority' field in the 'tls-creds-x509' object.eg

   -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,priority=NORMAL:-AES-256-GCM:-AES-128-GCM:-AES-128-CCM

which should force the use of CHACHA20-POLY1305 which does not require TLS re-keying after 16 million sent records (64 GB of migration data).

   https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1937

On RHEL/Fedora distros you can also use the system wide crypto priorities to override this from the migration *target* host by creating /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/gnutls-qemu.config containing

   QEMU=NONE:+ECDHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-X448:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+GROUP-FF

and running 'update-crypto-policies'. I recommend the QEMU level 'tls-creds-x509' workaround though, which new libvirt patches can soon do:

https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/LX5KMIUFZSP5DPUXKJDFYBZI5TIE3E5N/

Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems
io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround
migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround
crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

Quoted 10 lines
  crypto/tlssession.c           | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
  crypto/trace-events           |  2 +
  include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 +++++
  include/io/channel.h          |  1 +
  io/channel-tls.c              |  5 ++
  meson.build                   |  9 ++++
  meson_options.txt             |  2 +
  migration/tls.c               |  9 ++++
  scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
  9 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Being a large(ish) change, but it looks like this patch set is a good candidate for qemu-stable series, at least for 10.0.x. What do you think?

Thanks,

/mjt

#16 lore raw
Quoted 60 lines · Michael Tokarev
Quoted 48 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé

TL:DR: GNUTLS is liable to crash QEMU when live migration is run with TLS enabled and a return path channel is present, if approx 64 GB of data is transferred. This is easily triggered in a 16 GB VM with 4 CPUs, by running 'stress-ng --vm 4 --vm-bytes 80%' to prevent convergance until 64 GB of RAM has been copied. Then triggering post-copy switchover, or removing the stress workload to allow completion, will crash it.

The only live migration scenario that should avoid this danger is multifd, since the high volume data transfers are handled in dedicated TCP connections which are unidirectional. The main bi-directionl TCP connection is only for co-ordination purposes

This patch implements a workaround that will prevent future QEMU versions from triggering the crash.

The only way to avoid the crash with *existing* running QEMU processes is to change the TLS cipher priority string to avoid use of AES with TLS 1.3. This can be done with the 'priority' field in the 'tls-creds-x509' object.eg

   -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,priority=NORMAL:-AES-256-GCM:-AES-128-GCM:-AES-128-CCM

which should force the use of CHACHA20-POLY1305 which does not require TLS re-keying after 16 million sent records (64 GB of migration data).

   https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1937

On RHEL/Fedora distros you can also use the system wide crypto priorities to override this from the migration *target* host by creating /etc/crypto-policies/local.d/gnutls-qemu.config containing

   QEMU=NONE:+ECDHE-RSA:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-X448:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+GROUP-FF

and running 'update-crypto-policies'. I recommend the QEMU level 'tls-creds-x509' workaround though, which new libvirt patches can soon do:

https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/[email protected]/thread/LX5KMIUFZSP5DPUXKJDFYBZI5TIE3E5N/

Daniel P. Berrangé (4):
crypto: implement workaround for GNUTLS thread safety problems
io: add support for activating TLS thread safety workaround
migration: activate TLS thread safety workaround
crypto: add tracing & warning about GNUTLS countermeasures

Quoted 10 lines
  crypto/tlssession.c           | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
  crypto/trace-events           |  2 +
  include/crypto/tlssession.h   | 14 +++++
  include/io/channel.h          |  1 +
  io/channel-tls.c              |  5 ++
  meson.build                   |  9 ++++
  meson_options.txt             |  2 +
  migration/tls.c               |  9 ++++
  scripts/meson-buildoptions.sh |  5 ++
  9 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 3 lines

Being a large(ish) change, but it looks like this patch set is a good candidate for qemu-stable series, at least for 10.0.x. What do you think?

Yeah, given broken gnutls is everywhere, I'd take it to any stable tree where it is reasonably easy to do a clean backport.

With regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
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