x86/bugs: Select best SRSO mitigation
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 x86/bugs: Select best SRSO mitigation
The SRSO bug can theoretically be used to conduct user->user or guest->guest attacks and requires a mitigation (namely IBPB instead of SBPB on context switch) for these. So mark SRSO as being applicable to the user->user and guest->guest attack vectors.
Additionally, SRSO supports multiple mitigations which mitigate different potential attack vectors. Some CPUs are also immune to SRSO from certain attack vectors (like user->kernel).
Use the specific attack vectors requiring mitigation to select the best SRSO mitigation to avoid unnecessary performance hits.
--- .../admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst +1 -1
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ Spectre_v1 X Spectre_v2 X X Spectre_v2_user X X * (Note 1) SRBDS X X X X -SRSO X X +SRSO X X X X SSB (Note 4) TAA X X X X * (Note 2) TSA X X X X
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -2
@@ -386,7 +386,6 @@ static bool __init should_mitigate_vuln(unsigned int bug)case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 :case X86_BUG_RETBLEED : -case X86_BUG_SRSO :case X86_BUG_L1TF :case X86_BUG_ITS : return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL) ||
@@ -3184,8 +3183,18 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) }if (srso_mitigation ==SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO ) { -if (should_mitigate_vuln (X86_BUG_SRSO )) { +/* +* Use safe-RET if user->kernel or guest->host protection is +* required. Otherwise the 'microcode' mitigation is sufficient +* to protect the user->user and guest->guest vectors. +*/ +if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST ) || + (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO ))) { srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET ; + }else if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER ) || +cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST )) { + srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE ; }else { srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE ;return ;
base-commit: 34481698fd9c3c21425ab744e9e15dc2ce3b1b85
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 4fa7d880aeb8cdbdaa4fb72be3e53ac1d6bcc088 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/4fa7d880aeb8cdbdaa4fb72be3e53ac1d6bcc088 Author: David Kaplan <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Mon, 21 Jul 2025 11:03:10 -05:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Mon, 11 Aug 2025 17:32:36 +02:00
x86/bugs: Select best SRSO mitigation
The SRSO bug can theoretically be used to conduct user->user or guest->guest attacks and requires a mitigation (namely IBPB instead of SBPB on context switch) for these. So mark SRSO as being applicable to the user->user and guest->guest attack vectors.
Additionally, SRSO supports multiple mitigations which mitigate different potential attack vectors. Some CPUs are also immune to SRSO from certain attack vectors (like user->kernel).
Use the specific attack vectors requiring mitigation to select the best SRSO mitigation to avoid unnecessary performance hits.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst +1 -1
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ Spectre_v1 X Spectre_v2 X X Spectre_v2_user X X * (Note 1) SRBDS X X X X -SRSO X X +SRSO X X X X SSB (Note 4) TAA X X X X * (Note 2) TSA X X X X
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -2
@@ -386,7 +386,6 @@ static bool __init should_mitigate_vuln(unsigned int bug)case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 :case X86_BUG_RETBLEED : -case X86_BUG_SRSO :case X86_BUG_L1TF :case X86_BUG_ITS : return cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL) ||
@@ -3184,8 +3183,18 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) }if (srso_mitigation ==SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO ) { -if (should_mitigate_vuln (X86_BUG_SRSO )) { +/* +* Use safe-RET if user->kernel or guest->host protection is +* required. Otherwise the 'microcode' mitigation is sufficient +* to protect the user->user and guest->guest vectors. +*/ +if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST ) || + (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO ))) { srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET ; + }else if (cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER ) || +cpu_attack_vector_mitigated (CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST )) { + srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE ; }else { srso_mitigation =SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE ;return ;